Explaining The Logic of The US Taiwan Policy7

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JAS0010.1177/00219096211058887Journal of Asian and African StudiesYe
Original Article
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Journal of Asian and African Studies
From Strategic Ambiguity to

2022, Vol. 57(8) 1511–1543
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the Logic of the US Taiwan Policy journals.sagepub.com/home/jas
in the Post–Cold War Era
Xiaodi Ye
School of International Relations, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, China
Abstract
How do changes in US Taiwan policy play out? What is the logic behind these changes? To address these
questions, existing studies have formulated four schools of explanation, providing valuable theoretical
insights. However, these studies have obvious problems with unidirectional dichotomy and thus fail to
identify a causal mechanism explaining the long-term trajectory of US Taiwan policy. This article conducts a
re-typology of US Taiwan policy to break the traditional strategic ambiguity–clarity dichotomy by establishing
three key indicators and argues that the orientation of US China policy and Taiwan’s US policy are the two
major factors triggering changes. By conceptualizing and operationalizing the two independent variables
as engagement-oriented, coopetition-oriented, containment-oriented, and hedging/bandwagoning/binding,
this article develops a systemic theoretical framework to demonstrate how the US Taiwan policy transits
between strategic clarity, maximum pressure, partial strategic clarity, between partial strategic clarity and strategic
ambiguity, strategic ambiguity, and controlling the pro-independent forces. This article conducts empirical studies
by reviewing the transition of US Taiwan policy under different presidencies in post–Cold War era to
demonstrate how the theoretical framework works in realpolitik.
Keywords
Taiwan policy, maximum pressure, strategic ambiguity, strategic clarity, US–Taiwan relations
Introduction
The Taiwan question is widely considered one of the most important and sensitive political bases
in US–China relations. Since Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, which began the normaliza-
tion of relations between the United States and China, the two great powers have struggled with the
Taiwan question. With the Shanghai Communique, the Joint Communique on the Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations between United States and People’s Republic of China, and the 817
Communique in 1972, 1978, and 1982, respectively, the US government and the Chinese govern-
ment established a basic consensus on the One China principle. Three months after the
Corresponding author:
Xiaodi Ye, School of International Relations, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Xiaoguwei, Panyu District,
Guangzhou 510420, Guangdong, China.
Email: derekye8912@163.com
1512 Journal of Asian and African Studies 57(8)
establishment of diplomatic relations, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was approved by the House
and Senate and signed by President Jimmy Carter. Thus, the United States’ One China policy, con-
stituted by the Three Communiques and One Act, was officially formulated. This initiated the
strategic ambiguity of the US Taiwan policy. The United States insisted on strategic ambiguity,
attempting to produce deterrence in mainland China but to avoid involvement in military conflict
across the Taiwan Strait. However, since Barack Obama’s second term, the long-term strategic
ambiguity became strategic clarity before transforming into maximum pressure in Donald Trump’s
term (2017–2021). The transition of the US Taiwan policy poses several significant questions: first,
why has the US government changed its traditional Taiwan policy? Second, what is the logic
behind the transition from strategic ambiguity to maximum pressure? Third, how have such policy
changes played out?
Existing studies on US Taiwan policy have adopted different analytical perspectives and formu-
lated four schools of explanations. These studies provide valuable theoretical insights for under-
standing the change in US Taiwan policy, but most of them suffer from single attribution, which
constrains their explanatory power, particularly against the background of the great power competi-
tion between China and the United States. Based on this understanding, this article attempts to
construct a new analytical framework to demonstrate the logic of US Taiwan policy in the post–Cold
War era. This article selects US China policy as the first independent variable and operationalizes it
as engagement-oriented, coopetition-oriented, and containment-oriented. Then, Taiwan’s US policy
is considered the second independent variable and it is operationalized as hedging, bandwagoning,
and binding. Based on the operationalization of the two independent variables, this article argues
that different US policy orientations toward China and Taiwan’s changing US policy are the two
main factors leading the United States to change its Taiwan policy. These policy orientations include
strategic clarity, maximum pressure, partial strategic clarity, between partial strategic clarity and
strategic ambiguity, strategic ambiguity, and controlling the pro-independent forces.
To answer the research questions and verify the policy orientation described earlier, the remain-
der of this article is organized as follows. A critical literature review is presented in the second
section to identify the limitations of existing studies. Based on the literature review, the third sec-
tion constructs a new analytical framework to demonstrate the logic of the US’ changing Taiwan
policy in the post–Cold War era. To examine the causal mechanism of the analytical framework,
the fourth section uses process tracing to conduct empirical studies by reviewing the transition of
US Taiwan policy under different presidencies. This article concludes with a forward-looking view
of Biden’s Taiwan policy.
Existing studies concerning the United States’ changing Taiwan

policy
In discussing the changes in US Taiwan policy in recent years, existing studies have formulated
four schools of explanation: the United States’ strategic need to contain China’s rise, the promotion
of US pro-Taiwan congressional forces, US presidents’ preferences, and Taiwan’s strategic coop-
eration with the United States. A critical literature review is helpful to identify the boundaries of
the explanatory power in existing studies.
First, the United States’ strategic need to contain China’s rise

This school adopts the basic argument that a dynamic policy related to Taiwan is an indispensable
part of containing the rise of China. This school can be further divided into two perspectives. From
a geopolitical perspective, Robert Kaplan (2009, 2010) argues that Taiwan plays a crucial role in
Ye 1513
the containment strategy because China could break the First Islands Chain if reunification across
the Taiwan Strait occurred, which may substantially weaken America’s geopolitical predominance
in the Asia-Pacific region. Tucker and Glaser (2011) highlight Taiwan’s significance in the US alli-
ance system in the Asia-Pacific region. They contend that Asian countries, which look to the United
States to balance China’s rising power, may not want Washington to reduce its resources and
energy in Taiwan because doing so would harm the United States’ strategic credibility and then
convince American allies to rely less on Washington. From the perspective of US China policy,
Douglas Paal (2020) argues that the US government has strengthened its overall support to Taiwan
because the Trump administration abandoned the policy of engagement and adopted an anti-China
strategy. Specifically, Taiwan was played as a strategic card to show Washington’s assertive turn on
China (Lynch, 2018). Therefore, the US government increased arms sales to Taiwan to enhance
military deterrence in mainland China (Kastner, 2016; Zuo, 2021).
Second, the promotion from pro-Taiwan congressional forces

Beyond conducting analyses at the national strategic level, some studies focus on the driving forces
in the US Congress influencing the change in US Taiwan policy. Based on an empirical study of
596 Taiwan-related bills and resolutions from the 93rd to 116th US Congresses (1973–2020),
Wenxing Zhou and Gang Lin (2020) argue that the rapid deterioration of US–China relations and
cross-strait relations since 2016 has increased congressional incentives to expand Taiwan-related
legislation, creating a domestic impetus for the US government to change its traditional Taiwan
policy. Qiang Xin (2019) contends that the resurgent pro-Taiwan forces in the US Congress have
attempted to turn the United States’ One China policy into a hollow concept through normalizing
US arms sales to Taiwan, legally confirming the “Six Assurances” and promoting a quasi-alliance
with Taiwan. This indicates that US Taiwan policy-making originates from a lack of “red line con-
sciousness.” Similarly, Sutter (2019) proposes a context for assessing congressional-executive
relations throughout the Trump administration and suggests that both Congress and President
Trump held conventional Republican congressional views supporting greater pressure on China;
consequently, US Taiwan policy was strategic clarity.
Third, the US presidents’ preferences

This school attributes the changing US Taiwan policy in recent years to presidents’ personalities
and preferences. For example, Hu (2018) finds that Donald Trump’s strong interest-driven, eco-
nomic nationalist sentiment and transactional personality shaped his “deal-making” approach to
relations with China. Influenced by his personality and preferences, Trump intentionally increased
the use of Taiwan as a playing card because he considered the Taiwan question a bargaining chip,
particularly in addressing the unbalanced trade relations with China. Yihu Li’s (2019) research
confirms Hu’s argument and he also points out that Trumpism, which was mainly derived from
Trump’s unpredictable personality and transactional style, drove the president to view the One
China policy as a bargaining chip that could help reverse the imbalanced interests in US–China
relations. Another study, based on neoclassical realism, argues that Trump’s transactional and per-
sonalized approach to foreign policy drove Washington to overturn the use of strategic ambiguity
in its Taiwan policy, leading to greater volatility in cross-strait relations (Hoo and Sworn, 2020).
Fourth, Taiwan’s bandwagoning with the United States

This school emphasizes the important role of Tsai Ing-wen’s administration in pushing the US
government to change its traditional Taiwan policy. More specifically, one scholar argues that
Tsai’s administration saw the Trump administration as the largest external dependence.
Consequently, Tsai’s US policy shifted to bandwagoning, that is, attaching Taiwan politically, eco-
nomically, and militarily to Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy (Chu, 2020). To gain more substantial
support from the US government, Tsai’s administration coordinated with Trump’s anti-China effort
by weakening the 1992 Consensus, which is widely considered the most significant political basis
between mainland China and Taiwan (Chen, 2017). This action obviously aligned with Trump’s
effort to turn the One China policy into a hollow concept (deLisle, 2018). Taiwan’s bandwagoning
with the United States earns appreciation and support from strategists, who share the viewpoint
that strategic ambiguity with respect to Taiwan has outlived its usefulness and that the United
States must develop a long-term vision, focusing on Taiwan’s space in the international community
(Haas and Sacks, 2020).
To gain a better understanding of existing studies, this article summarizes these studies while
paying attention to several criteria, including the level of analysis, core variables, actors, and causal
mechanisms (see Table 1).
Although existing studies provide valuable insights into why and how the US government’s
Taiwan policy has changed, the studies contain some theoretical inadequacies, which can be con-
sidered from three perspectives. The first problem relates to single attribution. Specifically, studies
consider the United States’ strategic needs, pro-Taiwan congressional forces, presidents’ prefer-
ences, or Taiwan’s strategic bandwagoning to explain the reasons for America’s changing Taiwan
policy by exploring a certain variable. However, these efforts are seemingly divorced from realpo-
litik. With respect to the United States’ strategic needs, the American factor is undoubtedly the
most important variable, but Taiwan policy is a strategic consequence shaped by the United States,
mainland China, and Taiwan, constituting a strategic triangle (Wu, 2005). In other words, the sole
attribution to the America factor may ignore other important actors: mainland China and Taiwan.
Pro-Taiwan congressional forces and presidents’ preferences operate at the domestic and individ-
ual levels, but considering only these major factors may lead to the problem of reductionism pro-
posed by Waltz (1979). In addition, it is not helpful to provide a long-term study tracing the change
in US Taiwan policy in the post–Cold War period because it is difficult to deduce the general pat-
tern of US Taiwan policy from the frequent changes in congressional forces and presidents.
Likewise, the causality provided by Taiwan’s bandwagoning is questionable since it is hard to
imagine that a policy could achieve its strategic objectives without permission from the US gov-
ernment (Lin and Zhou, 2018).
The second problem is related to the first problem: the single attribution approach can explain
only the reasons for America’s changing Taiwan policy and not how this change operates or the
underlying logic for this change. Therefore, existing studies do not provide a firm theoretical basis
for answering the aforementioned questions and there is room for a new theoretical approach.
Third, the discussions of the existing studies mainly point to a single result, that is, strategic clarity,
but if we take a closer look at the recent Taiwan policy of Washington, it neither is the original
strategic ambiguity nor reaches the definition of strategic clarity. This realpolitik indicates that the
strategic ambiguity/clarity dichotomy may largely ignore some important immediate policy
options.
Theoretical framework of US Taiwan policy

To avoid the problem of single attribution described earlier, this article attempts to reconstruct a
new theoretical framework based on the perspective of strategic interactions to demonstrate the
logic behind the changing US Taiwan policy. US China policy is selected as the first independent
variable and Taiwan’s US policy is considered the second variable.
Ye 1515
Table 1. Summary of Existing Studies.
Level of Core variable Actor Causal mechanism

analysis
United Systemic Relative United States, China’s growing capability → challenge
States’ need level Capability mainland America’s Hegemony → using Taiwan as
to contain China, and strategic card → contain China
China’s rise Taiwan
Pro-Taiwan Domestic Congressional Political The political elites’ consensus → congressional
Congressional level Force elites and consensus on Taiwan question → resurgence of
Force congressmen pro-Taiwan force in congress → change the
traditional strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity
US President’s Individual The US United States Trump’s interest-driven personality and
Preferences level President and China transactional preference → seeing the Taiwan
question as bargaining chip → enhance the
intensity of supporting Taiwan → challenge the
“One China Policy”
Taiwan’s Unit level Taiwan’s US United States Tsai Ing-wen’s bandwagoning with US →
Strategic Policy and Taiwan reinforcing the lobbying in United States →
Cooperation raising Washington’s willing and incentive to
enhance the support to Taiwan → strategic clarity
Source: The Author.
Conceptualizing and operationalizing US China policy

US–China relations have been widely considered the most important bilateral relations in contem-
porary international politics because the two countries are not only great powers but also are in a
hegemon-rising power relationship. Some structural realists propose that such a relationship is
destined for a hegemonic war (Gilpin, 1988). Thus, how the hegemon (the United States) responds
to the challenges posed by rising power (China) is a crucial variable shaping America’s grand strat-
egy. This argument is confirmed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who suggests that the priority of
America’s geostrategic imperatives in the post–Cold War period, to maintain its hegemonic posi-
tion in the existing international system, is to prevent the rise of potential challengers in Eurasia,
particularly Russia and China (Zbigniew, 1997). In this regard, the US China policy can be concep-
tualized as follows: the United States, the hegemon, adopts a series of varied degrees of strategic
choices to prevent or slow the rapid rise of China, the potential challenger, to maintain its hegem-
onic position in the international system. Meanwhile, US Taiwan policy is an indispensable part of
preventing China’s rapid rise, as it can continue to maintain a dynamic balance between deterrence
and cooperation in US–China relations if the Taiwanese authorities do not declare Taiwan’s inde-
pendence (Ross, 2002).
Given the significance of the hegemon’s strategic choices for the rising power, Randall Schweller
attempts to categorize the strategic responses of the hegemonic power. More specifically, based on
historical experiences, Schweller (1999) proposes a spectrum of strategic choices, including
preemptive war, balancing, bandwagoning, binding, engaging, buck-passing, and distancing. Fan
Wang (2012), vice president of China Foreign Affairs University, summarizes seven types of US
China policies: containment, engagement, hedging, selective engagement, offshore balance,
inducement, and integration. Likewise, Xiaodi (Ye, 2021), assistant professor at Guangdong
Figure 1. The major orientations of US China policy.

Source: The Author.
University of Foreign Studies, identifies America’s strategic choices as preemptive war, contain-
ment, competition, precaution congagement, engagement, accommodation, shared governance,
and demising. Although these studies help clarify US China policy and its impact on US–China
relations, these typologies are too specific to combine, particularly when we try to include other
important actors: Taiwan authorities with their diversified choices in relation to the US govern-
ment. Some of these typologies overlap, which means that we can simplify them by integrating
them. Kaisheng Li (2017), research fellow of the Institute of International Relations in the Shanghai
Academy of Social Science, makes a preliminary effort to do so. Based on the strategic interactions
between hegemons and rising powers, he proposes three major types of strategic choices: stran-
gling, accommodation, and abstention. Then, Li adds Schweller’s typologies to formulate a more
specific spectrum. However, several strategic choices, such as strangling, abstention, demising,
and preemptive war, are unlikely to be realized in contemporary international politics. This is
mainly because mutually assured destruction (MAD) from nuclear weapons largely prevents
hegemonic wars, and a hegemon’s eternal pursuit of power does not allow it to adopt abstention
(Onea, 2013). By deleting unlikely strategic choices and following Li’s theoretical logic, this arti-
cle integrates US China policy into three orientations: engagement-oriented, coopetition-oriented,
and containment-oriented (see Figure 1).
Furthermore, to clearly present the three major orientations of US China policy, we need to
define them precisely. First, the engagement-oriented policy is essentially based on the original
purpose of engagement. That is, the US government encourages Beijing to be a benign actor and
builds a mutually beneficial partnership of peace and prosperity by incorporating China into the
existing international order (Shambaugh, 1996). In line with this definition, the engagement-ori-
ented policy broadly includes several strategic choices, ranging from engagement and accommo-
dation to shared governance. Second, containment-oriented policy is rooted in the containment
strategy of using any means but war to limit a rival’s power expansion. George Kennan’s sugges-
tion to engage in military, economic, and ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union during
the Cold War is widely regarded as containment. Based on this definition, containment-oriented
strategy encompasses precaution, competition, and containment. Third, according to David
Shambaugh’s definition, the coexistence of cooperation and competition means that two great
powers cooperate in some fields but compete in others, which constitutes “coopetition”
(Shambaugh, 2012). Guided by the coopetition orientation, the US government adopts the con-
gagement as its China policy, which strengthens America’s overall economic and military power
and increases regional cooperation with China through political and cultural relations (Zalmay,
2017).
Ye 1517
Conceptualizing and operationalizing Taiwan’s US policy

As another key player in both US–China relations and cross-strait relations, Taiwan’s US policy
should be seriously considered in shaping US Taiwan policy. Both Chinese and Western scholars
agree that the Taiwan question is a strategic card played by the US government to contain China by
preventing the reunification of cross-strait relations (Bush, 2013; Tucker, 2009). However, what
existing studies overlook is that the intensity of US Taiwan policy is not merely determined by the
US government; it is also influenced by the policy choices made by Taiwan. In other words,
Taiwan’s US policy choices affect the efficacy and intensity of US Taiwan policy. Therefore, this
article conceptualizes Taiwan’s US policy as follows: the Taiwanese authorities have strategic
autonomy to make rational policy choices in relation to the United States to determine Taiwan’s
proper position under the two great powers, which largely depends on Taiwan’s calculation of the
development of US–China relations.
While there is considerable discussion on the US China and Taiwan policies, Taiwan’s US pol-
icy has received less attention. Fortunately, existing studies still provide some theoretical support
to operationalize Taiwan’s US policy. The recent international politics literature focuses not only
on the interactions between great powers but also on how weaker actors respond to stronger actors.
Traditionally, realists propose the “balancing-bandwagoning” dichotomy to describe the weaker
actor’s reaction to the stronger actor and they emphasize that balancing, formulating weaker actor
alliances to realize balance of power (BOP), is the mainstream choice in international politics
(Walt, 1985). This viewpoint simplifies the weaker actor’s choice as balancing. Other scholars
assert that bandwagoning is a rational choice only if the weaker actor can profit from the stronger
actor (Schweller, 1994). However, these works do not break the dichotomy, thus overlooking sev-
eral important strategic choices. Recently, hedging—an approach positioned between balancing
and bandwagoning—has received growing attention. According to Cheng-Chwe Kuik’s (2008,
2016) definition, hedging is a behavior in which an actor seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple
policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects under a situation of high
uncertainty and high stakes. Based on Kuik’s work, scholars have identified several strategic
choices beyond hedging, including soft balancing, complex engagement, enmeshment, binding,
appeasement, precaution, and distancing (Goh, 2007; Ye, 2020). Combined with balancing and
bandwagoning, these strategies provide weaker actors choices, especially when they confront com-
petition between two great powers.
Relating the above discussions to Taiwan’s US policy, these strategic choices are applicable for
Taiwan since it is a weaker actor than the United States and mainland China. Based on the realpo-
litik and historical experiences in the post–Cold War era, this article distinguishes three major types
of Taiwan’s US policy: hedging, bandwagoning, and binding. In this article, based on the previous
definition, hedging refers that Taiwan attempts to reduce the high uncertainty and seek for a proper
position between the two great powers through multiple policy options, which usually demon-
strates as “security dependence on United States and economic reliance on mainland China.”
Bandwagoning is the opposite of balancing and refers to weaker actors joining the stronger coali-
tion instead of allying with the weaker side (Waltz, 1979). Binding is a strategic choice where the
weaker actor can exert some measure of control and influence over the stronger side to shape the
policy of the stronger side in the weaker actor’s favor (Schweller, 1999). Taiwan adopts these three
strategic choices because of the following reasons. First, Taiwan has a strong strategic incentive to
bandwagon with the United States because of the TRA and the Six Assurances, which means that
the US government has a commitment to support Taiwan symbolically or substantially. Tsai Ing-
wen’s US policy in Trump’s term is a typical case of bandwagoning. Second, hedging is a rational
choice for Taiwan since it stands between the United States and mainland China and hedging
enables it to avoid the high risk brought by the growing competition between the two great powers.
Ma Ying-jeou’s US policy can be seen as hedging with the aim to maintain a dynamic balance
between the United States and mainland China (Wu, 2017). Third, when confronting strategic
inconsistency with the US government, binding is a potential choice for Taiwanese authorities to
influence the orientation of US Taiwan policy. Chen Shui-bian’s radical pro-independence policy
is the case for Taiwan’s binding policy.
Re-typology of US Taiwan policy: beyond the strategic ambiguity/clarity dichotomy

For decades, the “strategic ambiguity” and its opposite concept “strategic clarity” have been two
key dimensions of US policy toward Taiwan, and the former one is widely considered by scholars
and policy-makers as the cornerstone to maintain the status quo of cross-strait relations after the
normalization of US–China relations. However, the cross-strait relations have recently become less
stable and more war-prone (Taylor, 2019), which drives increasingly many scholars to require a
clearer and enhanced US security commitment on Taiwan, which leads the US Taiwan policy to the
“strategic clarity.” Such transition causes the strategic debate and raises a crucial question related
to the key argument of this article: can the Taiwan policy of Washington be simply described by the
dichotomy of strategic ambiguity/clarity? To resolve this puzzle, we must briefly review the defini-
tion of strategic ambiguity/clarity.
Although the literature dates the origins of US strategic ambiguity to the Eisenhower adminis-
tration (Tucker, 1998), the contemporary debate of this concept is mainly based on Washington’s
“One China Policy” enshrined in the three US–China communiques and the 1979 TRA, in which
the United States formally acknowledges that there is only one China but maintaining unofficial
relations with Taiwan (Nathan, 2000). The TRA is designed to provide Washington and Taipei with
ambiguous space and practical methods to manage their unofficial relations during the post-nor-
malization period. Relying on these historical facts, Nancy Tucker (2005) conceptualizes the stra-
tegic ambiguity as follows: the United States does not state clearly whether it will help to defend
Taiwan in the event of an attack by mainland China, which has become a widely acceptable defini-
tion in exploring US Taiwan policy. Richard Bush connects this definition with the deterrence
theory to argue that the strategic ambiguity generates the “dual deterrence” effect on both sides
across the Taiwan Strait, which the Washington government simultaneously signals the deterrence
and reassurance to Beijing and Taipei not to take the unilateral action that would produce the unde-
sirable conflict (Bush, 2005). Following the similar logic, Dean Chen contends that the strategic
ambiguity would produce the inter-directional effects on cross-strait relations: on one hand, it
seeks to deter Beijing’s forceful threats to unify with Taiwan; on the other hand, the Washington
government warns that Taiwan would be left to its own fate if it takes unilateral actions to jeopard-
ize the status quo (Chen, 2019).
In sum, the US strategic ambiguity consists of three main elements: the pivotal position of the
United States to practice dual deterrence, a warning to Beijing against its forceful reunification,
and a signal to Taipei to deter it from declaring de jure independence (Chen, 2021; Glaser et al.,
2020).1 Based on the core components extracted from the previous “sacred texts,” the strategic
ambiguity can be defined as follows: to maintain its pivotal position in conducting dual deterrence
to mainland China and Taiwan, the Washington government would preserve the conditional secu-
rity commitment, unofficial political relation, and limited international recognition on/with Taiwan.
Accordingly, as its opposite concept, the strategic clarity refers that the Washington government
abandons its pivotal position to maintain the dual deterrence but chooses to implement the uncon-
ditional security commitment and allow Taiwan pursue the de jure independence by establishing
official political relations with the United States.
Ye 1519
Recently, some analysts now believe that the strategic ambiguity is no longer a game worth the
candle, which triggers the wide-range reconsideration for the benefit of strategic clarity. Richard
Hass, president of prestigious Council on Foreign Relations, and David Sacks suggest that the
traditional deterrence created by the strategic ambiguity may be quickly weakened due to the
growing military pressure of mainland China on the Taiwan Strait. Hass and Sacks (2020) require
the Washington government to explicitly answer how US would respond to mainland China’s
attack. Similarly, Joseph Bosco urges the Washington government to change the Taiwan policy to
strategic clarity by clarifying the security commitment and the condition of military intervening to
cross-strait relations (Bosco, 2020). Yeh et al. (2020) also contend that the United States has real-
ized the critical significance to assist Taiwan in standing up against mainland China, which paves
the way for the closer US–Taiwan relations to replace strategic ambiguity. Therefore, the propo-
nents of strategic clarity demonstrate a simple logic that the aggression of mainland China can be
deterred if US security commitment to Taiwan is more credible.
Based on the previous discussion, the definition and strategic ambiguity–clarity debate reflect
the logic of dichotomy in explaining the transition of US Taiwan policy. Indeed, the development
of dichotomies is a common practice in the literature of international relations. For example, struc-
tural realism uses the “balancing/bandwagoning” to explain the foreign behaviors of states.
Likewise, scholars usually define the states’ intention as “revisionist/status quo” (Schweller, 1994).
All of these efforts, including strategic ambiguity/clarity, attempt to provide an analytical frame-
work to simplify the growing complicate political phenomena.
However, the dichotomy is not without pitfalls, which can be illustrated in the following aspects:
from the methodological perspective, the opposite terms of any dichotomy are only the extremes
on a spectrum. Scholars usually place the strategic ambiguity–clarity dichotomy on one side of a
one-dimensional continuum to indicate whether the Washington government clarifies the condition
to implement its security commitment. This dichotomy proposes two extreme deductions: the
Washington government would totally follow the three communiques and TRA or it would com-
pletely break the One China Policy. These deductions shape the mindset among scholars and pol-
icy-makers to make an “either-or choice” between ambiguity and clarity. However, if we move
right or left from the two extreme points in the continuum, the intensity of policy undergoes incre-
mental changes. In this regard, a simple dichotomy may ignore several important strategic choices,
particularly when we attempt to examine the transitional logic of US Taiwan policy in a long-term
horizon (Liu, 2016). Related to the first problem, the dichotomy may also suffer some practical
pitfalls. In realpolitik, two contradictory strategies can be simultaneously used, and mixed strate-
gies are a common choice for decision-makers and strategic designers. Thus, policy-makers usu-
ally address the “both-and” instead of “either-or” question. Most dichotomies overlook the use of
mixed strategies. Some scholars have noted that US policy-makers have positioned themselves in
different positions along a continuum between strategic clarity and ambiguity in the history of US
foreign policy (Hsu, 2010; Wu, 2021). Moreover, the existing recommendations appear to be an
extension of the strategic ambiguity (Chang-Liao and Fang, 2021) because most of them do not
match the rigid definition of strategic clarity. Both methodological and practical pitfalls reflect that
a more specific spectrum to distinguish the types of US Taiwan policy is required.
To avoid the aforementioned problems, this article attempts to break the traditional strategic
ambiguity–clarity dichotomy by setting several key indicators to evaluate the intensity of a certain
US Taiwan policy. Existing studies have performed preliminary efforts in exploring the indicators.
For example, Alan Romberg summarized the key dimensions to manage the difference in
“Washington-Beijing-Taipei” triangular relations, which encompasses the security issues, political
relations, and international recognition. In Romberg’s view, the strategic ambiguity would not be
overturned if the three key dimensions are not rewritten (Romberg, 2003). Dennis Hickey also
Table 2. Re-Typology of the US Taiwan Policy.
Types of US Taiwan Security relations Political relations International recognitions

policy
Controlling the Pro- Weakened Weakened Weakened
Independent Force
Strategic Ambiguity Conditional Security Unofficial Political Limited International
Commitment Relations Recognition
Partial Strategic Clarity Slightly Strengthened Slightly Strengthened Slightly Strengthened
Between Strategic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic
Ambiguity and Partial
Strategic Clarity
Maximum Pressure Largely Strengthened Largely Strengthened Largely Strengthened
Strategic Clarity Unconditional Security Official Political Full International
Commitment Relations Recognition
Source: The Author.
proposed three sensitive issues in US Taiwan policy, including security commitment, political
future, and international status, and argued that these issues could reflect whether the Washington
government change or maintain its policy (Hickey, 2013). Likewise, Wang and deLisle (2021)
argued that the security, economic, and international participation were valid indicators in examin-
ing the continuity and change of US–Taiwan relations. The existing studies are useful to confirm
the validity and reliability of major indicators, but they do not specifically measure the degree and
intensity of different policy choices.
By accepting the security relations, political relations, and international recognition as the three
major indicators and by setting the strategic ambiguity/clarity as the benchmark, this article opera-
tionalizes these indicators as weakened, slightly strengthened, and largely strengthened. According
to the operationalization, the re-typology of US Taiwan policy includes controlling the pro-inde-
pendent force, strategic ambiguity, partial strategic clarity, between strategic ambiguity and par-
tial strategic clarity, maximum pressure, and strategic clarity, which goes beyond the strategic
ambiguity–clarity dichotomy (see Table 2). Other than the previously conceptualized strategic
ambiguity and clarity, more specific definitions on these concepts are required. In controlling the
pro-independent force, the Washington government would reaffirm the conditional security com-
mitment, reject the political appeals of the Taiwanese leader, and reduce the limited international
recognition, which causes the decline of three key indicators. In partial strategic clarity, the
Washington government would highlight the security role of Taiwan, slightly promote the political
relations, and finitely raise international recognition, which drives the US Taiwan policy to be
slightly strengthened. Between strategic ambiguity and partial strategic clarity is not a fixed con-
cept, but it reflects the transformative process that the US Taiwan policy is changed according to
adjustment of the US China policy, which leads to the dynamic status. Maximum pressure refers
that the Washington government would strengthen the security commitment and frequently dem-
onstrate the willingness to implement military support, elevate the political relations to quasi-
official relations, and greatly enhance the international recognition. It must be further clarified that
based on the previous conceptualization and operationalization, the maximum pressure does not
achieve the degree and intensity of strategic clarity and it should be considered a typical approach
that the Washington government attempts to maximize the strategic pressure produced by “Taiwan
Card” by symbolically or substantially raising the strategic value of Taiwan without entrapping
Ye 1521
Figure 2. Spectrum of US Taiwan policy.

Source: The Author.
Table 3. The Theoretical Framework of US Taiwan Policy.
Taiwan’s US The orientation of US China policy

policy
Engaging-oriented Coopetition-oriented Containing-oriented
Hedging Strategic Ambiguity Between Strategic Partial Strategic Clarity
Bandwagoning Ambiguity and Partial Maximum Pressure
Binding Controlling Taiwan’s Pro- Strategic Clarity
Independence Force
Source: The Author.
into direct conflict with mainland China. In other words, the maximum pressure is a brinkmanship
of strategic ambiguity.
Although the degree and intensity of the policy lack a certain standard to accurately quantify,
this article reorganizes the spectrum of US Taiwan policy, which may be helpful to provide an
overall observation (see Figure 2). In this spectrum, Taiwan’s independence and abandoning
Taiwan are two strategic consequences of the US Taiwan policy. Accordingly, the direction head-
ing to Taiwan’s independence, including partial strategic clarity, maximum pressure, and strategic
clarity, would increase the possibility of war between the United States and mainland China; the
contradictory direction would lead to the growing possibility of peaceful reunification of cross-
strait relations.
Theoretical framework and its causal mechanism

Relying on the previous conceptualization and operationalization of two crucial independent vari-
ables, this article combines the variables into a 3 × 3 matrix (see Table 3). According to the matrix,
this article proposes nine scenarios related to US Taiwan policy. One may contend that an explana-
tory model with nine scenarios is too complex to improve the understanding of the realpolitik
because, according to Waltz’s viewpoint, theory construction should simplify rather than compli-
cate a political phenomenon. Fortunately, Colin Elman develops a practical approach for simplify-
ing theoretical frameworks that involves indexing, rescaling, logical compression, empirical
compression, and pragmatic compression. In this article, logical compression and empirical com-
pression are selected to reorganize the explanatory model. Two cells can be compressed. Taiwan’s
hedging and bandwagoning, according to the previous conceptualization, are essentially coopera-
tive behaviors that follow the United States’ strategic design, which is consistent with America’s
Figure 3. The causal mechanism of the explanatory model.

Source: The Author.
interests. Thus, US Taiwan policy reflects full strategic ambiguity if the US government adopts an
engagement-oriented China policy and Taiwan selects hedging and bandwagoning as its US policy.
Similarly, US Taiwan policy will range between strategic ambiguity and partial strategic clarity if
the US government adopts a coopetition-oriented China policy and Taiwan selects hedging, band-
wagoning and binding as its US policy.
By compressing the cells, the nine scenarios are reduced to five to improve the theoretical
construction and empirical observation. Scenario 1: If the US government adopts an engage-
ment-oriented China policy and Taiwan chooses hedging and bandwagoning, US Taiwan policy
will be strategic ambiguity. Scenario 2: If the US government adopts engagement-oriented China
policy but Taiwan chooses binding, US Taiwan policy will be to control Taiwan’s pro-independ-
ence forces. Scenario 3: If the US government adopts a coopetition-oriented China policy and
Taiwan chooses hedging, bandwagoning or binding, US Taiwan policy will be between strategic
ambiguity and partial clarity. Scenario 4: If the US government adopts containment-oriented
China policy and Taiwan chooses hedging, US Taiwan policy will be partial strategic clarity.
Scenario 5: If the US government adopts a containment-oriented China policy and Taiwan
chooses bandwagoning or binding, the US Taiwan policy will be maximum pressure. Notably,
while this article provides five strategic scenarios, these are ideal types because they do not
reflect all details or aspects of such political phenomena. Some suggest that an ideal type can
never accurately and exclusively illustrate the concrete manifestation of a specific phenomenon
but provide a benchmark for analytical comparison of a real phenomenon (Jackson and Nexon,
2009).
In addition, this article demonstrates the causal mechanism in the explanatory model. As shown
in Figure 3, the orientation of US China policy and the orientation of Taiwan’s US policy are the
two independent variables. Engagement-oriented, coopetition-oriented, and containment-oriented
China policies lead to different strategic needs in Taiwan, producing policy compatibility between
the two actors. Moreover, given the importance of mainland China’s response to the interactions
between the United States and Taiwan, this article considers it the intervening variable, which may
strengthen or weaken the policy compatibility between the United States and Taiwan. The two
independent variables and the intervening variable produce covariation in the United States’ incen-
tive to adjust its Taiwan policy, thus leading to policies of strategic clarity, maximum pressure,
partial strategic clarity, between strategic ambiguity and partial strategic clarity, strategic ambigu-
ity, and controlling Taiwan’s pro-independent force.2
Ye 1523
Figure 4. The credit of Sino–US relations.

Source: The Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University, http://www.imir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iis/7522/201
2/20120415183809561499053/20120415183809561499053_.html.
Empirical studies: the transition of US Taiwan policy in the post–

Cold War era
Relying on the previous theorization, this article aims to verify the explanatory model and its
causal mechanism using empirical studies that focus on the changing US Taiwan policies during
the post–Cold War period. The full coverage of case studies is helpful to avoid selection bias in the
verification. Moreover, to clearly present the orientation of US China policy, this article cites the
credit of Sino–US relations calculated by the Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua
University (see Figure 4).
Clinton’s terms: from partial strategic clarity to strategic ambiguity

The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War but also made the United States the
sole superpower in the international system, leading the world into a unipolar era. The impassable
gap in relative capabilities between the United States and China did not give Washington a positive
perception of China. Rather, the containment-oriented policy was formulated during William J.
Clinton’s election campaign, in which he preliminarily delivered the three major principles in deal-
ing with US–China relations, including taking an assertive position (The New York Times, 1992).3
When he officially came to power, Clinton sent Winston Lord to visit Beijing and suggested that
China should make great progress in the fields of human rights, nonproliferation, and trade, as
outlined in 14 items, if China were to maintain its most favored nation (MFN) treatment. This sug-
gestion was rejected by the Chinese government. Thereafter, Clinton signed an executive order to
conditionally extend China’s MFN treatment, which not only linked the MFN treatment with
human rights issues but also reversed the unconditional treatment offered by the Bush administra-
tion (Kamath, 1998). In addition, citing the need for the nonproliferation of chemical weapons, the
Clinton administration accused the Yinhe cargo ship (银河号) of transporting dangerous chemicals
to Iran and required the Chinese government to stop the ship and allow American inspectors to
check it. These actions were driven by Clinton’s negative perception of China, which led to the
adoption of the containment-oriented China policy. Although the linkage of human rights and
MFN ended a year after America reviewed this approach and the Clinton administration presented
a comprehensive engagement strategy, the containment-oriented China strategy did not completely
transform into an engagement strategy until 1997. Therefore, the credit of US–China relations in
the early stage of the post–Cold War period started at −1.04 in 1993 and then dropped again to −0.8
in 1996 (see Figure 4).
However, the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis made the Clinton administration realize that the
US government needed a coherent and consistent China policy (Hickey, 1998). After the Taiwan
Strait crisis, William Perry, Secretary of Defense, delivered a speech at Harvard University, which
suggested that the United States and China had wide-ranging common interests in the world, so
engagement with China was the better choice (Perry, 1996). Following this notion, Warren
Christopher, Secretary of State, further elaborated Clinton’s view by proposing three principles
that established the basic orientation of US China policy (Friedman, 1996).4 In July 1996, Anthony
Lake, National Security Advisor, visited Beijing to engage in extensive conversation with Chinese
leaders and to reach a consensus on coordinating strategic interests between the United States and
China. Lake’s visit was considered marking Clinton’s turning point from a containment-oriented to
an engagement-oriented China policy. These efforts laid the important political foundation for the
forthcoming meeting between Clinton and Chinese president Jiang Zemin. After that meeting, the
Clinton administration further elaborated the engagement-oriented China policy by listing six
areas in which the United States could expand its cooperation with China: promoting world peace
and prosperity; peace and stability in Asia; nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; fight-
ing international crime; trade liberalization; and environmental protection (US Department of
State, 1997). In October 1997, President Jiang Zemin made his historic visit to the United States
and signed a joint statement to build US–China relations as a “constructive strategic partnership
facing the 21st century,” which officially confirmed the engagement-oriented China policy.
Consequently, the credit of US–China relations witnessed rapid growth from −0.8 in 1996 to 0.76
in 1997 and 2.8 in 1998, which represented its peak in the post–Cold War period.
During this process, Taiwan’s US policy can be generally categorized as hedging because it
displayed the flexibility to seek a proper position between the United States and mainland China.
On the one hand, Taiwan tried to gain stronger and more sustainable supports from the Washington
government; on the other hand, Lee Teng-hui did not wholly abandon the efforts to maintain the
stability of cross-strait. In dealing with US–Taiwan relations, Taipei proposed two major political
appeals in 1992: (1) canceling the prohibition on high-level officials visiting Taiwan and (2) renam-
ing the Coordinating Committee on North American Affairs and the American Institute in Taiwan.
While the Clinton administration did not accept Taipei’s appeals, the appeals did garner wide-
spread attention in the US Congress, laying an important foundation for the subsequent implemen-
tation of the binding policy. In 1994, to substantiate the support from the US government, Lee
Teng-hui (李登辉) initiated “holiday diplomacy” and requested to spend a night in Hawaii, which
was fiercely rejected by mainland China. Under pressure from China, the Clinton administration
only allowed Lee to stay in the departure hall when the aircraft refueled. Lee’s unfair treatment
again elicited sympathy and concern from the US Congress, reinforcing the impetus for
Washington’s intervention (Mann and Edwards, 1999). In addition, Lee Teng-hui founded the
Taiwan Research Institute in 1994 and then signed a 3-year contract (US$4.5 million) with Cassidy
& Associates, one of Washington’s most powerful and effective government relations and public
affairs firms, to strengthen the lobby in the US Congress. In 1995, when Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the
United States was unwelcomed by the Clinton administration, Cassidy carried out powerful lobby-
ing activities and successfully made the US Congress raise a resolution to suggest that Clinton
approve Lee’s visa. Furthermore, by taking advantage of the turbulence between the United States
and China caused by the bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Lee Teng-hui
proposed that mainland China and Taiwan should be characterized as having a so-called “special
state-to-state relationship” when he was interviewed by the Deutsche Welle.
Ye 1525
In addition to earning the stronger substantial commitment from the Washington government,
Taiwan did not stop developing its relations with mainland China through social-economic integra-
tion. In the economic realm, according to the statistics, Taiwan’s share of export to mainland China
increased from 6.54% in 1990 to 16.46% in 2000 and Taiwan’s share of import increased from
1.40% in 1990 to 4.43% for the same year, which indicated steadily growing economic interactions
in cross-strait relations (Clark, 2003). In the social realm, the cross-strait visits skyrocketed. The
number of Taiwanese visitors to mainland China was 1,526,969 in 1993 and this figure increased
to 3,108,643 in 2000, realizing the double growth within 7 years. By 2000, a total of 20,368,240
Taiwanese people had visited mainland China (Li, 2014). After the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis,
Lee Teng-hui also attempted to limitedly promote the political relations with mainland China. For
example, Taiwan’s New Brothers visited mainland China in November 1997. This trip was met
with reception by Wang Daohan, the president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait (ARATS), who advocated that both sides should end the hostility and resume the “three
links” under the One China principle. In October 1998, Koo Chen-fu, the president of the Strait
Exchange Foundation (SEF), met with Wang Daohan in Shanghai. The second Wang-Koo Talk
helped mainland China and Taiwan reach four consensuses: resuming the institutionalized consul-
tation between ARATS and SEF, promoting all levels of communication, actively resolving prop-
erty and security issues, and inviting Wang Daohan to visit Taiwan.
Clinton’s assertive posture toward China in his early term and Taiwan’s political appeals for
stronger support produced high policy compatibility to enable the United States and Taiwan to
meet the strategic needs of each other. This drove Clinton’s Taiwan policy beyond strategic ambi-
guity toward partial strategic clarity. In political relations, the Clinton administration concluded a
year-long interagency review of US Taiwan policy. The proposed changes included the following:
(1) cabinet-level officials of the United States and Taiwan would be permitted to visit each other;
(2) Taiwanese officials would be permitted to meet with their American counterparts in US govern-
ment buildings; and (3) the Coordination Council for North American Affairs would be renamed
the Taipei Representative Office (Lasater, 1995). This review of Taiwan policy, the first since 1979,
promoted US–Taiwan political relations to a new level. In international recognition, on 22 May
1995, the Clinton administration confirmed Lee’s personal visit to the United States and empha-
sized Lee’s personal activity. However, according to a review of Taiwan policy in 1994, Lee Teng-
hui was forbidden from visiting the United States and this action was interpreted as another great
promotion of US–Taiwan relations within 6 months. This action made mainland China believe that
both Washington and Taipei try to internationalize Taiwan’s independence in world affairs, which
might convey the wrong message to other members in the international community (Benson and
Niou, 2000). In security relations, the assertive response of mainland China became a test of
Washington’s determination in defending Taiwan. For example, when responding to Lee Teng-
hui’s military exercises, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) decided to conduct missile
exercises in July and August 1995. This action drove the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier to traverse the
Taiwan Strait for the first time since the normalization of US–China relations. Similarly, when the
PLA announced another round of missile exercises from 8–13 March 1996, the Clinton administra-
tion sent two aircraft carriers—the USS Nimitz and the USS Independence—to the Taiwan Strait
to provide the necessary military support. This was the largest military build-up of the US army in
East Asia since the Vietnam War (McIntyre, 1996). Although the Clinton administration did not
overturn the strategic ambiguity, the slight reinforcement of three key indicators—security rela-
tions, political relations, and international recognition—suggests that the Washington did not
remind its Taiwan policy unchanged and moved to the partial strategic clarity.
Nevertheless, Clinton’s partial strategic clarity did not last long, since he chose to retake the
engagement-oriented China policy, which caused the return of strategic ambiguity. First, the
Clinton administration reemphasized the United States’ One China policy. Christopher (1996), for
example, stressed in his speech presented on 17 May 1996, that as Taiwan sought an international
role, it should pursue that objective in a way that was consistent with the One China policy. Some
US officials privately warned Taiwanese officials that Washington would not defend Taiwan at any
cost (Tucker, 2001). While confronting Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory,” Clinton postponed a
visiting mission of the Department of Defense, which had planned to conduct an assessment of
Taiwan’s air defense. All of these attitudes were to warn Taiwan and reaffirm that the Washington’s
security commitment was conditional. Second, the Clinton administration showed increasingly
prudent policy in addressing the Taiwanese leader’s visa. In January 1997, when Lien Chan
requested a transit visa, the Clinton administration did not allow him to attend any public events
and shortened his time in the United States. In addition, the US government did not allow Lee to
meet any US officials, which aimed at downplaying the political relations with Taiwan. Third, to
suppress the side-effect on the internationalization of Taiwan’s pro-independence, Clinton admin-
istration revised his wait-to-see policy to encourage Taiwan to resume the political dialogue with
mainland China, which attempted to limit the Taiwan question under the framework of cross-strait
relations. Some scholars proposed the concept of “interim agreement” and suggested that the US
government could be the warrantor for the agreement between mainland China and Taiwan to
promise that the former would not attack Taiwan and that the latter would not be de facto independ-
ent within 50 years (Harding, 2000). In this regard, the intensity of the three key indicators exhib-
ited an obvious decline, which suggests that Clinton’s Taiwan policy return from partial strategic
clarity to strategic ambiguity.
In addition, while confronting Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory,” mainland China avoided
another round of crisis across the Taiwan Strait by taking relatively gentle action. Instead, Beijing
strongly expressed its concern to the Clinton administration and condemned Lee’s pro-independ-
ence movement. Clinton chose to have a phone call with President Jiang Zemin to guarantee the
United States’ One China policy and sent Richard Bush to elaborate on the United States’ strategic
ambiguity strategy toward Taiwan to Lee Teng-hui. The above discussion verifies that the two
independent variables, plus the intervening variable, led to the transition of Clinton’s Taiwan pol-
icy from partial strategic clarity to strategic ambiguity.
Bush’s terms: from short maximum pressure to controlling Taiwan’s pro-

independence forces
George W. Bush quickly overturned the constructive relationship by transforming the engagement-
oriented China policy to a containment-oriented policy. In an interview with CNN in August 1999,
Bush criticized Clinton’s constructive strategic partnership with China as a major strategic calcula-
tion. Three months later, Bush further pointed out that China should be defined as a strategic com-
petitor rather than a partner (Janine, 1999). Guided by this negative perception of China, Bush
adopted a containment-oriented China policy before the 9/11 attacks. For example, Bush initiated
a phone call with more than 20 leaders, emphasized the significance of allies in the Asia-Pacific
region, and declined a phone call with Chinese leaders. He positioned China behind Japan, South
Korea, Russia, and India. This demonstrated Bush’s assertive posture and containment orientation
toward China. Even after a military plane collision occurred in April 2001, the Bush administration
still rejected direct communication with President Jang Zemin; instead, Bush chose to express his
assertiveness through the media. Moreover, the Bush administration considered China a potential
target of a nuclear attack. These actions illustrated Bush’s precaution toward China, which reflected
a containment-oriented China policy. Thus, the credit of Sino–US relations started at −0.5 in 2001.
Ye 1527
The extraordinary impact of the 9/11 attacks transformed Bush’s foreign strategy from focusing
on great power competition to fighting against global terrorism, which caused the resurgence of the
engagement-oriented China policy. Bush realized that the United States could not singlehandedly
eliminate terrorism without help from its allies and partners. Consequently, China became one of
the United States’ most important anti-terrorist partners. Only one day after the attack, Bush initi-
ated a phone call with President Jiang Zemin to discuss the anti-terrorism issue. On 19 October
2001, Bush suggested that China was an important partner in fighting against global terrorism and
that Washington sought candid, constructive, and cooperative relations with Beijing (Bush and
Zemin, 2001). In his first National Security Strategy Report in 2002, Bush further contended that
a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China was an important part of America’s strategy to promote a
stable Asia-Pacific region (The White House, 2002). In September 2005, Robert Zoellick, the
Deputy Secretary of State, gave a speech and argued that the US government urged China to
become a responsible stakeholder in the international system because China had a responsibility to
strengthen the international system that had enabled its success (Zoellick, 2005). This concept was
written in Bush’s second National Security Strategy Report in 2006, reflecting a new perception of
China. Guided by this perception, Bush’s engagement-oriented China policy began. For example,
in high-level communication, the leaders of the two countries preserved a close connection in
addressing bilateral, regional, and global affairs by holding several meetings in international con-
ferences. In 2005, Beijing and Washington initiated a strategic dialogue mechanism and this type
of dialogue was held 5 times during Bush’s terms. The two great powers proposed another mecha-
nism, strategic economic dialogue, in 2006, and this type of dialogue was held 6 times. In 2009, the
two mechanisms were integrated as the China–US Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED).
Regarding economic issues, the Bush administration also advocated free trade to promote eco-
nomic connections with China, leading the United States and China to be each other’s second larg-
est trade partners. The credit of Sino–US relations grew from −0.11 in 2002 to 1.56 in 2007 (see
Figure 4).
Meanwhile, Taiwan realized its first transition of the ruling party when Chen Shui-bian (陈水扁)
and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2000. At the beginning of his term,
Chen Shui-bian chose bandwagoning as his US policy, mainly because he knew that the pro-inde-
pendence path could not survive without Washington’s support. In Chen Shui-bian’s inaugural
speech delivered on 20 May 2000, he proposed “four nos and one without” as his cross-strait policy,
which met the strategic requirement of Washington to maintain the dynamic balance.5
However, when the Bush administration decided to adopt the engagement-oriented China policy,
Chen Shui-bian turned to the contradictory direction to carry out the binding policy by connecting
America’s security commitment with the radical pro-independence approach, as demonstrated in the
following issues. First, on 3 August 2002, Chen Shui-bian proposed “one country on each side,”
arguing that separate situations existed on either side of the Taiwan Strait. He asked 23 million
Taiwanese people to consider legislation on holding a referendum to decide the island’s future,
which was seen as the updated version of Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state theory” (Glaser, 2002).
Second, in May 2003, Chen Shui-bian advocated the defensive referendum because he contended
that Taiwan Island was under military pressure from mainland missiles. This was the preliminary
action for Chen’s referendum of Taiwan’s de facto independence and helped Chen win his second
term. Third, during a speech at the Spring Festival in 2006, Chen Shui-bian raised his three political
appeals: abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification, confirming the New Constitution, and
joining the United Nations (UN) under the name Taiwan. On 27 February 2006, Chen claimed that
the Guidelines for National Unification were terminated (rather than abolished). However, during
the 318 parades, Chen Shui-bian asserted that there was no difference in using abolishing or termi-
nating. Chen’s actions largely violated his promise of “four nos and one without,” accelerating the
materialization of his pro-independence approach. Fourth, Chen Shui-bian did not stop his pursuit
of Taiwan’s independence. In a New Year’s speech in 2007, Chen Shui-bian again launched the
referendum of Taiwan’s participation in the UN. In March 2007, Chen proposed the “four wants and
one without,” which overturned his promise of “four nos and one without.”6 Consequently, Chen
Shui-bian tried to combine the referendum of Taiwan’s participation in the UN with the election in
2008 to realize his political appeal of the referendum of Taiwan’s independence. The political calcu-
lation behind Chen’s radical pro-independence movement was to push mainland China to make a
fierce response, triggering a new round of the Taiwan Strait crisis and compelling the Bush admin-
istration to intervene in cross-strait relations by enhancing security support for Taiwan.
Accordingly, driven by the variation of the two independent variables discussed above, the US
Taiwan policy transitioned from a short maximum pressure to controlling the pro-independent
force. Before the 9/11 attacks, the combination of US containing-oriented China policy and
Taiwan’s bandwagoning led to a short appearance of maximum pressure, since some of the key
indicators showed significant changes. In security relations, after the military plane collision, Bush
initiated his first arms sale to Taiwan, which was worth US$4 billion and included eight diesel
submarines, which broke the tradition that the United States provided only defensive weapons. To
demonstrate his strong willingness, Bush also highlighted the security commitment by claiming
that the United States would do “whatever it takes to defend Taiwan” if mainland China conducted
martial reunification (Kelly, 2001). In political relations, Tang Yao-ming (汤曜明), the leader of
Taiwan’s Department of Defense, was invited to participate in the US–Taiwan Defense Summit,
which was considered an elevation of US–Taiwan political relations. Although the appearance of
maximum pressure was only an episode of Bush’s Taiwan policy due to the 9/11 attacks, it still
verified the validity of the two independent variables.
After the 9/11 attacks, Chen Shui-bian’s radical pro-independence movement was largely
incompatible with Bush’s global anti-terrorist strategy because this strategy shifted America’s stra-
tegic emphasis to the middle-east region, rather than the Asia-Pacific, which required Taiwan to act
as a stabilizer and not a troublemaker. Thus, the combination of Bush’s engagement-oriented China
policy and Chen’s radical binding drove Washington’s Taiwan policy to controlling pro-independ-
ence forces, which can be examined by the following indicators.
For political relations, the Bush administration strongly rejected several political appeals of
Chen Shui-bian. For example, in responding to Chen’s “one country on each side” argument, the
Bush administration publicly reaffirmed its stance that the US government insisted on the One
China policy and would not support Taiwan’s de facto independence. To stop Chen’s increasingly
radical movement, Bush secretly sent James Moriarty, senior director at the National Security
Council, to Taiwan to warn that Chen Shui-bian should not use sovereignty-related statements or
referendums to trigger intense cross-strait relations (Sanger, 2003). In December 2003, Bush reiter-
ated his objection on Chen’s pro-independence statement when he held a meeting with Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao. Furthermore, in answering Chen’s abolishment of the Guidelines for National
Unification, the Bush administration reinforced the intensity of controlling Taiwan. For example,
Bush arranged the high-level treatment for then Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou but only allowed Chen
to have a whistle stop in Honolulu or Anchorage, leading to Chen’s “drifting trip.” In this regard,
Bush intentionally downplayed the political relations with Taiwan.
In security relations, although the Bush administration continued to conduct several arms sales
to Taiwan, the Washington government held its position that the security commitment and military
support were conditional and Taiwan would implement self-defense if a war broke out due to the
persistence of Taiwanese leaders on carrying out the radical pro-independent activities (Corson,
2014). With regard to the international recognition, the Bush administration assertively denied
Chen’s referendum of Taiwan’s participation in the UN. Thomas Christensen, deputy assistant
Ye 1529
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that this referendum largely violated
Chen’s early political promise, giving the Taiwanese people a chance to select unification or inde-
pendence. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice contended that Taiwan’s referendum to apply to the
UN was a provocative policy, and it unnecessarily raised tensions in the Taiwan Strait (US
Department of State, 2007). Furthermore, Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the American Institute
in Taiwan, adopted the views from the highest level in Washington to suppress Chen’s pro-inde-
pendent movement, which reflected Bush’s strong dissatisfaction on Taiwan’s effort to internation-
alize radical independent activities (AIT, 2007).
Mainland China’s response acted as the intervening variable to strengthen Bush’s controlling
policy in relation to Chen Shui-bian. Mainland China changed its policy from reunification to
fighting against Taiwan’s pro-independence forces, mainly referring to the pro-green camp led by
DPP. This change was vividly illustrated in China’s anti-secession law in 2005, which produced
high strategic compatibility with Bush’s global anti-terrorist strategy. In addition, mainland China
demonstrated its strategic restraint in dealing with Chen Shui-bian’s radical movement rather than
causing a new round of crisis in the Taiwan Strait. This gentle response enhanced the mutual trust
between the United States and mainland China. More importantly, Beijing expressed its view on
jointly managing Taiwan’s pro-independence forces for regional peace and stability, creating a
common interest with the Bush administration.7 Based on the previous discussion, it is reasonable
to confirm that the US Taiwan policy experienced a transition from the short maximum pressure to
controlling the pro-independent force during the Bush’s terms.
Obama’s terms: from strategic ambiguity to partial strategic clarity

When Barack Obama came to power, the United States was trapped in a dilemma caused by the
financial crisis. Because the United States had a strategic need for China to help reboot the world
economy, the Obama administration adopted an engagement-oriented China policy in the early
stage of his first term, regardless of the rapidly narrowing relative capabilities between the two
great powers. During his election campaign, Obama presented his view in Foreign Affairs that the
United States would compete with China in some areas but cooperate in other areas (Obama,
2007). This set the preliminary concept of coopetition. Following this logic, Obama reaffirmed his
coopetition policy in a phone conversation with Chinese President Hu Jintao, stressing that the
United States intended to develop constructive relations with China because of their wide-ranging
common interests in economic and security issues. Based on this perception, the United States and
China issued a joint statement about growing a partnership between them to meet common chal-
lenges in contributing to world peace, stability, and prosperity (The White House, 2009a). By 2011,
US–China relations were further upgraded to a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect
and mutual benefits to address the 21st century’s opportunities and challenges in another joint
statement (The White House, 2011). Driven by the strategic partnership and the need to eliminate
the negative impact of the financial crisis, the Obama administration adopted accommodation, a
sub-strategy of the engagement-oriented policy. More specifically, in his first National Security
Strategy Report, Obama argued that the United States should welcome the rise of China because
the Chinese government played a responsible role and cooperated with the United States in address-
ing economic, climate change, and security issues. Following this logic, the US government also
increased the significance of China’s role in the reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank. For example, China’s share in the IMF increased from 3.72% to 6.07% and
its voting weight grew from 3.67% to 6%, surpassing Great Britain, France, and Germany to wield
the third-highest decision-making power. Consequently, the credit of Sino–US relations increased
from 0.97 in 2009 to 1.95 in 2012 (see Figure 4).
However, Obama’s engagement-oriented China policy changed to a coopetition-oriented policy

in 2012, as illustrated in the following ways. First, at the domestic level, a wide-ranging debate on
the efficacy of US China policy in the past 40 years occurred in 2015, representing the greatest
reflection on this issue in the post–Cold War period. Generally, American strategists and scholars
agreed that the traditional policy of engaging China had failed and that the policy orientation take
an assertive turn (Friedberg, 2012; Harding, 2015). This debate shaped the domestic political
atmosphere for Obama’s China policy. Second, at the governmental level, Obama’s response to
domestic needs was reflected in his second National Security Strategy Report. The Obama admin-
istration reminded its allies that the Chinese government might resolve territorial disputes through
its growing military power and then claimed that the US government would manage the great
power relationship via powerful strength, compelling China’s foreign behaviors to accord with
international rules and norms. Influenced by this perception, the Obama administration also
rejected the concept of a new type of great power relationship proposed by President Xi Jinping,
although President Xi reiterated this concept on several important international occasions (Zeng
and Breslin, 2016; Zhao, 2015). Third, at the strategic level, the Obama administration first accel-
erated the rebalancing strategy by enhancing Japan’s strategic autonomy to transform the tradi-
tional hub-and-spoke system into a multilateral networked alliance system, which could place
greater strategic pressure on China’s peripheral security. Then, Obama proposed the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP) to rebuild international trade order from a global model to a club
model with the aim to compete against the dominant economic power of China in the Asia-Pacific
region. In this regard, although Obama still accepted cooperation with China in some fields, the
level of competitiveness grew in his second term. This was directly reflected in the Sino–US credit,
which dropped from 2.06 in 2013 to 0.325 in 2016 (see Figure 4).
At the same time, Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang (KMT) successfully retook their ruling
power from the DPP. Chen Shui-bian’s failure made Ma Ying-jeou realize that Taiwan should take
a more practical approach to achieve a balance of relations with mainland China and the United
States. Based on this understanding, hedging became Ma Ying-jeou’s US policy, as reflected in his
articulations of Taiwan’s policies of external relations and cross-strait relations. In terms of exter-
nal relations, Ma Ying-jeou revised Chen’s radical foreign behaviors, fenghuo waijiao (烽火外交),
to a more practical approach, huolu waijiao (活路外交), which demonstrated that Taiwan attempted
to communicate with mainland China to find a balance for Taipei’s participation in the interna-
tional organization (Yan, 2009). More importantly, Ma Ying-jeou tried to reconstruct the mutual
trust between Washington and Taipei. In his inaugural speech, Ma reaffirmed that US–Taiwan rela-
tions played the most significant role in external relations because the United States was the last
guarantee for Taiwan’s security. While confronting Obama’s rebalancing strategy, Ma Ying-jeou
warmly welcomed Obama’s rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, during a
meeting with James Jones, former US National Security Advisor, Ma stressed that Taiwan would
seek to form stronger security and economic relations with the United States by participating in the
TPP and the rebalancing strategy (Taiwan Today, 2012). In November 2012, Ma further suggested
that Taiwan would play an important role in Obama’s pivoting Asia strategy. During an interview
with Forbes, Ma again argued that Taiwan would generally support Obama’s rebalancing strategy
because this strategy could bring peace and stability to the Asia-Pacific region (Flannery, 2014).
Namely, Ma still sought a security commitment from the US government.
In terms of cross-strait relations, Ma Ying-jeou also revised Chen’s “one country on each side”
argument and accepted the 1992 consensus, seeing the One China principle as the political basis of
the interactions between mainland China and Taiwan. To demonstrate his strong willingness to
achieve rapprochement with mainland China, Ma Ying-jeou further reversed Chen’s “four wants
one without” as the “three nos”: no unification, no independence, and no use of force. Furthermore,
Ye 1531
Ma suggested that the interactions between mainland China and Taiwan should be “easy first then
hard, economy first then politics.” In his second inaugural speech, Ma Ying-jeou reemphasized that
he would maintain the stability and status quo through the “three nos” and promote peaceful devel-
opment based on the 1992 Consensus. In addition, Ma contended that Taiwan should not be part of
the security alliance, which aimed to contain mainland China. In this vein, security dependence on
the United States but economic dependence on mainland China constituted Ma’s US policy, which
was consistent with the definition of hedging.
Driven by the engagement-oriented China policy and Taiwan’s hedging, Obama’s Taiwan pol-
icy continued on the track of strategic ambiguity in his earlier term. First, in the political relations,
the Obama administration largely followed the tradition of the One China policy. For example,
during his visit to Beijing in 2009, Obama reaffirmed that the US government would abide by the
principles of the three US–China joint communiques, welcome the peaceful development of cross-
strait relations, and look forward to dialogues in economic, political, and other fields (The White
House, 2009b). Therefore, the Obama administration avoided the learning circle of its Taiwan
policy, which might have directly caused turbulence in US–China relations. Second, in the security
realm, the Obama administration intentionally hid the Taiwan’s role in US regional strategy, not
allowing it to touch mainland China’s strategic bottom line. In Hillary Clinton’s famous speech
America’s Pacific Century—which was widely seen as the preliminary explanation of Obama’s
regional strategy—she did not officially mention Taiwan’s role. However, she unofficially defined
Taiwan as a US security and economic partner in this speech given in Hawaii (Clinton, 2011). In
addition, Obama launched several military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region and he excluded
Taiwan to avoid a fierce response from mainland China. Third, regarding to the international rec-
ognition, the Obama administration rejected the congress’ proposal of promoting Taiwan to be the
formal member of World Health Organization (WHO) and International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), and support Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in some international organization. After
the consultation with mainland China, Taiwan participated in the World Health Assembly in the
name of “observer,” rather than a formal member. All of these indicators illustrated Obama’s stra-
tegic ambiguity in relation to Taiwan.
Nevertheless, the increased competitiveness in Obama’s China policy increased the need to use
the Taiwan question as a strategic card. Consequently, Obama’s Taiwan policy shifted from strate-
gic ambiguity to partial strategic clarity, as demonstrated in the changes of the following
indicators.
In political relations, the reassessment of the United States’ traditional China policy in the past
40 years created an important space for pro-Taiwanese congressional forces to strengthen their sup-
port for Taiwan. For example, the pro-Taiwanese forces in the House proposed a resolution to
require that the cornerstone of US Taiwan policy be constituted by the “Six Assurances” and the
TRA rather than merely the One China policy. On 16 May 2016, the House approved H. Con. Res.
88, which was the first time the “Six Assurances” were included in congressional legislation. For
security relations, the Obama administration was devoted to enhancing Taiwan’s strategic role in
the rebalancing strategy. On 14 March 2014, Kin Moy, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
asserted that the enduring relationship under the TRA represented a unique asset for the United
States and was an important multiplier of the influence in a special committee meeting to mark the
35th anniversary of the TRA (Moy, 2014). On 3 April, Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of State,
reaffirmed the significance of the political, economic, cultural, and security relations between the
United States and Taiwan under the framework of the TRA. Third, domestic pressure compelled
Obama’s turn to partial strategic clarity. The reassessment of the United States’ traditional China
policy in the past 40 years created an important space for pro-Taiwanese congressional forces to
strengthen their support for Taiwan. For example, the pro-Taiwanese forces in the House proposed
a resolution to require that the cornerstone of US Taiwan policy be constituted by the “Six
Assurances” and the TRA rather than merely the One China policy. On 16 May 2016, the House
approved H. Con. Res. 88, which was the first time the “Six Assurances” were included in congres-
sional legislation. With respect to the international recognition, the Obama administration decided
to accept Taiwan into the Visa Waiver Program, which allows Taiwanese citizens to travel to the
United States for up to 90 days without a visa (US Department of Homeland Security, 2012). This
case generated a spillover effect in the international society that there were 129 countries and
regions following the United States’ step to give Taiwanese visa-free or arrival visa service, which
made Ma Ying-jeou believed that Taiwan could stand internationally even if it was without official
diplomatic relations with most countries. In addition, the impetus from the US congress to enlarge
Taiwan’s international space grew. On 18 and 19 June 2013, the House and Senate approved the
resolution that required the Secretary of States to help Taiwan obtain the qualification to participate
in the ICAO. On 12 July, Obama made it the legislation and argue that it was a rightful action to
properly promote Taiwan’s international space (The American Presidency Project, 2013). Although
the Obama administration did not overwrite the One China Policy, it is not difficult to find that the
three key indicators were relatively reinforced to move beyond the original definition of strategic
ambiguity to the partial strategic clarity.
During this period, mainland China maintained the rapprochement approach. Politically, there
were 11 high-level meeting hold in this period, which largely enhanced the mutual political trust of
both sides across the Taiwan Strait. Most importantly, cross-strait relations led to the first leader
meeting since the end of the civil war, resulting in a historical breakthrough of political relations
between mainland China and Taiwan. Economically, the total trade volume between mainland
China and Taiwan reached US$179.6 billion in 2016, realizing over 60% growth within 8 years.
Socially, the mainland tourists to visit Taiwan achieved 3.51 million in 2016 and there were more
than 30,000 students studying in Taiwan. To some extent, the rapprochement approach of mainland
China strengthened the stance of Ma and willingness to maintain the hedging policy, which accord-
ingly limited the transition of Obama’s Taiwan policy.
Trump’s term: from partial strategic clarity to maximum pressure

Entering Trump’s term, US China policy was wholly transformed from coopetition-oriented to
containment-oriented. Trump had expressed his negative perception of China’s rise since his elec-
tion campaign. In an interview with the New York Times, Trump comprehensively condemned
China’s foreign behaviors in terms of its regional influence, international trade, and the South
China Sea, suggesting that China was acting as a revisionist state to challenge the international
order and was increasing its national interest at the cost of America’s strategic interest (The New
York Times, 2016). When he officially came to power, Trump’s negative perception of China was
demonstrated in his National Security Strategy Report issued in December 2017. In this report, the
Trump administration considered the Chinese government a strategic rivalry and a revisionist state
that might be the greatest challenger to American power, influence, and interest because China
attempted to erode America’s security and prosperity (The White House, 2017). Moreover, the
Trump administration released more specific instructions titled United States Strategic Approach
to the People’s Republic of China in 2020. This document clearly contended that China not only
undermined the sovereignty and integrity of countries worldwide through its expanding economic,
political, and military power but also exploited the free and open rules–based order and attempted
to reshape the international system in its favor.
Guided by the abovementioned strategic reports and instructions, the Trump administration
implemented a containment-oriented China policy in various realms. In the security realm, Trump
Ye 1533
upgraded the geopolitical scale of containment from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific by defin-
ing India as a strategic pillar. In June 2019, Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report pointed out that
the United States would contain China’s growing influence through preparedness, a posture with
combat-credible forces; partnership, a network of allies and partners as a force multiplier for peace
and interoperability; and promoting a networked region, a networked security architecture. In the
economic realm, the decoupling trend in US–China trade relations became increasingly apparent
in Trump’s term. Starting with the “Section 301 investigation,” the Trump administration imposed
a 10%–25% retaliatory tariff on China’s goods worth between US$60 and US$200 billion. In the
realm of humanities and technology, the Trump administration first investigated the Confucius
Institutes and accused Chinese American Scholars with “Changjiang” or “Thousand Talents” titles
of being funded by the Chinese government. Then, Trump imposed visa restrictions on visiting
Chinese students, particularly those who studied cutting-edge technology in the United States.
Furthermore, Trump acted against ZTE and Huawei by preventing the transfer of core technology
to ensure that the United States maintained its dominance. This technology war was extended to
TikTok and WeChat. Thus, the credit of Sino–US relations dropped from −1.45 in 2017 to –5.36 in
2019, reaching its lowest point in the post–Cold War era.
Tsai Ing-wen and DPP reclaimed ruling power in 2016. Tsai’s pro-independence approach and
bandwagoning policy had high policy compatibility with Trump’s containment-oriented China
policy, becoming an important multiplier. More specifically, Tsai Ing-wen’s bandwagoning policy
was demonstrated in the following aspects. In the political aspect, Tsai Ing-wen fully accepted the
1992 Consensus in her two inaugural speeches, intentionally distancing the connections with main-
land China and creating growing hostility due to the absence of the most important political basis
in cross-strait relations. Accordingly, Tsai sought political support from the US government by
actively constructing Taiwan’s democracy-based alliance and partnership with the United States
under the framework of Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy. For example, during a meeting with a del-
egation from the Atlantic Council, Tsai stressed that Taiwan looked forward to advancing bilateral
cooperation and partnership under the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy and to jointly
maintaining a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific (Teng, 2018). In the security aspect, to coor-
dinate with Trump’s “peace through strength,” Tsai increased Taiwan’s military expenditure, which
grew from 322.7 to 366.8 billion TWD from 2018 to 2021. This expenditure was invested in the
development of military industries and R&D for military technology. In the economic aspect, Tsai
Ing-wen actively promoted the negotiation of Trade & Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs)
to deepen the economic connection between the United States and Taiwan, which was a counter-
measure for economic integration with mainland China (Chung, 2019). Moreover, Tsai decided to
terminate the 14-year restrictions on the import of US beef and pork, paving the path for a US–
Taiwan trade deal (Reuters Staff, 2020).
Driven by the containment-oriented China policy and Tsai’s bandwagoning policy, the Trump
administration quickly transformed its Taiwan policy to maximum pressure. This transformation
can be examined in the following indicators.
First, the Trump administration attempted to upgrade US–Taiwan political relations from unof-
ficial to quasi-official political relations by adding more interpreting space in the One China Policy.
By using the gray zone in his president-elect period, Trump initiated a phone call with Tsai Ing-
wen. This call was the first direct communication between leaders of the countries since the estab-
lishment of the US–China diplomatic relationship in 1979 and it broke the sensitive political basis
between the two great powers. When officially coming to power, the Trump administration pro-
posed the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA), which not only encouraged visits between officials from the
United States and Taiwan at all levels (H.R.-Taiwan Travel Act, n.d.) but also became America’s
second Taiwan-related domestic law since the signature of TRA. Importantly, the TTA changed
Table 4. Taiwan-Related Laws/Legislations/Resolutions in Trump’s Term.
Legislations/resolutions Time Taiwan-related content Status

National Defense 2017–2019 1. Closer communication of high-level military Approved
Authorization Act for Fiscal commanders between the United States and
Year (2017–2019) Taiwan
2. Reassessing the possibility of American and
Taiwanese warship dock at each other
3. Normalizing the transfer of defensive service
to Taiwan
Taiwan Travel Act 2018 This act encouraged visits between officials from Approved
the United States and Taiwan at all levels, which
made the America’s “three communiques and
one law” to “three communiques two laws.”
Asia Reassurance Initiative 2018 Substantializing the normalization of arms sale Approved
Act (ARIA) to Taiwan and reinforcing US–Taiwan defensive
relations.
Taiwan Allies International 2019 Protecting Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, enlarging Approved
Protection and Enhancement Taiwan’s international space, and enhancing its
Initiative Act of 2019 international role.
Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 Providing US$3 million for the US–Taiwan Approved
2020 Global Cooperation Training Framework and
strengthening Taiwan’s capability of self-defense
Source: The Author.
America’s “Three Communiques and One Law” to “Three Communiques and Two Laws,” which
enlarged the interpreting space for the Washington government to substantially promote relations
with Taiwan. On 9 August 2020, Alex Azar, US Health Secretary, visited Taiwan citing cooperation
to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. Azar’s trip not only put the Taiwan Travel Act into practice; Azar
was also the highest level official to visit Taiwan, making a breakthrough in US–Taiwan political
relations. Before a few days of leaving the office, Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, further declared
that the Trump administration had decided to lift restrictions on contacts between US officials and
their Taiwanese counterparts (Ali and Brunnstrom, 2021). In this way, the Trump administration
attempts to move its Taiwan policy toward a quasi-official US–Taiwan relationship.
Second, the Trump administration strengthened its security commitment and intentionally high-
lighted Taiwan’s security role in America’s regional strategic design. In addition to 11 times of
arms sale of the Trump administration to Taiwan (US$18.3 billion), the US military increased the
frequency and publicity of its warship transits through the Taiwan Strait’s international water,
which demonstrated America’s security commitment on Taiwan. The military support was also
seen in a series of Taiwan-related laws/legislations/resolutions, including the Fiscal Year of
National Defense Authorization Act, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA), and the
Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (TAA 2020) (see Table 4). In the recent Fiscal Year of National
Defense Authorization Act, the United States continuously urged to reinforce the security relation
by enhancing the personnel communication and reassessing the possibility of American and
Taiwanese warship dock at each other. Other initiatives and legislations, such as ARIA and TAA
2020, suggested to normalize the arms sales to Taiwan and strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense.
Moreover, in the Indo-Pacific Report issued on 1 June 2019, the Trump administration deliberately
emphasized Taiwan’s security role in the Indo-Pacific strategic and listed Taiwan as the important
partnership to deter China’s growing aggression and constrain its expanding regional influence.
Ye 1535
Third, the Trump administration attempted to raise Taiwan’s international recognition by consoli-
dating its diplomatic allies, enlarging the international space, and increasing the international role.
This effort was systematically reflected in the Taiwan International Allies Protection and
Enhancement Initiative Act (hereafter, TAIPEI Act). The TAIPEI Act propose several approaches
to enlarge Taiwan’s international space, including seeing Taiwan as a “nation-state,” upgrading US
trade relations with Taiwan, supporting Taiwan to participate in international organizations, encour-
aging other countries within and beyond the Indo-Pacific region to establish the official relations
with Taiwan, and so forth.
Meanwhile, mainland China’s responses might have strengthened Washington’s maximum
pressure. On the one hand, the Chinese government conducted peer sanctions on enterprises,
organizations, and individuals that were involved in arms sales to Taiwan. On the other hand,
mainland China reinforced military and legal deterrence by initiating military exercises around
the Taiwan Strait and creating a blacklist of pro-independence forces. These strategic responses
generated policy compatibility for Washington and Taipei, accelerating the process by which
Trump’s Taiwan policy transformed into maximum pressure. Some may question that most of
Trump’s pro-Taiwan initiatives and legislations were symbolic and without much of legal binding
power (Bush, 2021; Hu, 2018), but at least for the mainland China, the Trump administration had
undeniably carried out an unprecedented transformation of the Taiwan policy by hollowing out
the traditional One China Policy, overall upgrading US–Taiwan relations, and signaling the stra-
tegic message to Taiwan’s leader to reinforce the anti-China policy of the island, which objec-
tively generated the strategic significance of maximum pressure on mainland China. In other
words, the Washington’s symbolic support to Taiwan produced the substantial strategic pressure
on containing China.
Conclusion
The sensitiveness of the Taiwanese question has increased dramatically with the growing strategic
competition between the United States and China. In this regard, clarifying the changing logic of
US Taiwan policy in the post–Cold War period has both theoretical and practical significance.
However, existing studies have not formulated a systemic explanation of the long-term transition
of US Taiwan policy due to the single attribution problem and limitation of strategic ambiguity–
clarity dichotomy. Therefore, this article considers two crucial independent variables—US China
policy and Taiwan’s US policy—to construct a new theoretical framework. Using this framework,
we summarize the logic of US Taiwan policy as follows. On the one hand, the change in US Taiwan
policy is positively correlated with the United States’ engagement, coopetition, and containment
orientations in its China policy. On the other hand, Taiwan’s US policy, that is, hedging, bandwag-
oning, and binding, should be seriously considered as it shapes the strategy and efficacy of US
Taiwan policy. The policy compatibility or incompatibility between the United States and Taiwan
constitutes a major impetus underlying the transition of US Taiwan policy in the post–Cold War
period, which leads to six different policy choices, from high intensity to low: strategic clarity,
maximum pressure, partial strategic clarity, between partial strategic clarity and strategic ambi-
guity, strategic ambiguity, and controlling the pro-independent forces.
To verify the logic of the new theoretical framework, this article reviews the transitions of US
Taiwan policy throughout the post–Cold War period from Clinton’s terms to Trump’s term. This
full coverage of case studies is useful to avoid the problem of selection bias and enhance the reli-
ability and validity of the theoretical framework (see Table 5). In Clinton’s case, before the 1995–
1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States’ containment-oriented China policy and Lee Teng-hui’s
hedging to the United States led to full strategic clarity, which verified Scenario 4. After the crisis,
1536
Table 5. The Summary of Comparative Case Studies..
Variables Periods & scenarios US Taiwan policy
US China policy Taiwan’s US Strategic Maximum Partial Between Strategic Controlling

policy clarity pressure strategic strategic ambiguity Taiwan’s pro-
clarity ambiguity and independent
strategic clarity force
From Containing- From Binding Clinton’s term: before and Partial Strategic Clarity → Strategic Ambiguity
oriented to Engaging- Policy to after 1995–1996 Taiwan
oriented Hedging Policy Strait Crisis (Scenario 4 and
Scenario 1)
From Containing- Binding Policy Bush’s term: before and Short Maximum Pressure → Controlling Taiwan’s pro-Independent Forces
oriented to Engaging- after 9/11 attack (Scenario
oriented 5 and Scenario 2)
From Engaging- Hedging Policy Obama’s first term Strategic Ambiguity → Partial Strategic Clarity → Between Strategic Ambiguity and
oriented to (Scenario 1) Strategic Clarity
Competition-Oriented Obama’s second term
(Scenario 4)
Obama’s two terms
(Scenarios 3)
Containing-oriented Bandwagoning Trump’s Term (Scenario 5) Heading to Maximum Pressure
China policy Policy

Prediction
Competition-oriented Bandwagoning Biden’s Term Range from Partial Strategic Clarity to Maximum Pressure (Strategic Clarity when
or Containing-oriented Policy Comprehensive Confrontation with China, if Necessary)
China Policy
Source: The Author.

Journal of Asian and African Studies 57(8)
Ye 1537
Clinton adopted an engagement-oriented China policy, and Lee’s continuously hedging between
the United States and mainland China, making the US Taiwan policy strategic ambiguity, verify-
ing Scenario 1. In Bush’s case, before the 9/11 attacks, Bush’s containment-oriented China policy
and Chen Shui-bian’s bandwagoning policy drove the formulation of an episode of maximum
pressure, which verified Scenario 5. In the post-9/11 period, the Bush administration changed to
an engagement-oriented China policy, but Chen Shui-bian insisted on his radical pro-independ-
ence approach of binding with the United States. This made Bush’s Taiwan policy transform to
controlling Taiwan’s pro-independence forces, which verified Scenario 2. In Obama’s case, the
US government chose an engagement-oriented China policy to resolve the setback effect pro-
duced by the financial crisis and Ma Ying-jeou hedged between the United States and mainland
China, which led US Taiwan policy to strategic ambiguity in Obama’s first term and verified
Scenario 1. In his second term, Obama adopted a competition-oriented China policy, but Ma
Ying-jeou still maintained his hedging, which made the US Taiwan policy partial strategic clarity
(Scenario 4). More importantly, the changes that occurred in Obama’s term provided empirical
evidence for Scenario 3. In Trump’s case, the US government’s containment-oriented China pol-
icy and Tsai Ing-wen’s bandwagoning with the United States led to maximum pressure, which
verified the logic of Scenario 5.
Given the inevitable structural confrontation between the United States and China, US Taiwan
policy will change again in the future. Theoretically, the new analytical framework allows for a
more focused and coherent discussion of the inherent logic of the US Taiwan policy. The consist-
ency and divergence between US China policy and Taiwan’s US policy enable us to understand the
transition of US Taiwan policy from the long-term perspective. As such, the re-typology of US
Taiwan policy breaks the limitation of strategic ambiguity/clarity dichotomy, which may contrib-
ute to resolve the dilemma in the recent fierce debate on strategic ambiguity or strategic clarity. By
providing more specific policy alternatives, the debate would not merely focus on choosing ambi-
guity/clarity but take a broader scope to reconsider the degree and intensity of the US Taiwan
policy.
Practically, this analytical framework offers implications for observing US–Taiwan relations
during Biden’s term. Compared with Trump’s strong containment orientation, Biden’s China pol-
icy appears more dynamic and flexible. For example, although the Biden administration identified
China as the most serious challenger to US security and prosperity in his Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance, Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, still proposed a trinitarian US–China
framework comprising competition, cooperation, and confrontation (Lewis and Pamuk, 2021).
This indicates that the coopetition-oriented China policy will be the principal axis in Biden’s term,
even if extreme competition plays a much larger role. Meanwhile, Tsai Ing-wen won her second
term and bandwagoning could be her first choice for Taiwanese US policy. In accordance with the
theoretical framework, this article reasonably infers that Biden’s Taiwan policy will mainly be
between partial strategic clarity and maximum pressure and the strategic clarity will occur only
when Biden decides to implement comprehensive confrontation with China. In this regard, partial
strategic clarity, maximum pressure, and strategic clarity accordingly match the trinitarian frame-
work of Biden of China policy, including cooperation, competition, and confrontation.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to express gratitude to Prof. Qiang Xin for organizing the 6th Cross-Strait Youth Forum
at Fudan University in June 2021, where the early draft of this research was presented. The author also thanks
Prof. Dalei Jie of Peking University and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions and
feedback on the article. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article: This project is sponsored by the National Social Science Fund of China (No. 20AGJ005).
ORCID iD
Xiaodi Ye https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4466-0831
Notes
1. Even under the background of the US–China confrontation in recent years, the strategic ambiguity still
earns its support because they believe that “uncertainty breeds restraint.”
2. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments that the mainland
China’s response is a variable worth factoring more, particularly in Xi’s terms. Given mainland China’s
peaceful reunification, Beijing usually takes the reactive responses—hard or soft approaches—to the
changing status of cross-strait relations. This can be distinguished in Ma’s and Tsai’s terms. Meanwhile,
Washington raises its intensity of Taiwan policy due to the justification on Beijing’s action in changing
the status quo. These facts rightly reflect the rationality and validity to set mainland China’s response
as the intervening variable. Since the study focuses on the US Taiwan policy, not the mainland China’s
Taiwan policy, the issue would be left for further research.
3. The three principles were as follows: (1) US–China relations were important, and China should not have
been isolated by international society; (2) the US government needed to take an assertive stance toward
China by linking the human rights issue with most favored nation treatment; and (3) the government
would protect the economic and democratic interests in China.
4. The three principles are as follows: (1) a stable, open, and successful China meeting America’s interests;
(2) US supporting China to engage in international society; and (3) solving divergences through com-
municating. See Friedman (1996).
5. The “four noes and one without” means that Taiwan would not declare Taiwanese independence, change
the national title, include the doctrine of special state-to-state relations, or promote a referendum on
unification or independence.
6. The “four wants and one without” include Taiwan wants independence, wants the rectification of its
name, wants new constitution, wants development, and Taiwanese politics was without question of left
or right, but only the question of unification or independence.
7. During the Informal APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Economic Leader’s Meeting in 2004,
President Hu Jintao suggested that the United States and mainland China should jointly manage the pro-
independence forces because it would destroy the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
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Author biography
Xiaodi Ye is an Assistant Professor (Yunshan Scholar) in the School of International Relations, Guangdong
University of Foreign Studies, China. He received his PhD degree in Political Science (International Politics)
from National Taiwan University in 2019. His research interests include international relations (IR) theory,
Chinese foreign policy, and cross-strait relations. His previous article appeared in The China Review, Journal
of Chinese Political Science, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, and Mainland China Studies.

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1058887

From Strategic Ambiguity to

in the Post–Cold War Era

Existing studies concerning the United States’ changing Taiwan

First, the United States’ strategic need to contain China’s rise

Second, the promotion from pro-Taiwan congressional forces

Third, the US presidents’ preferences

Fourth, Taiwan’s bandwagoning with the United States

Theoretical framework of US Taiwan policy

Table 1. Summary of Existing Studies.

Level of Core variable Actor Causal mechanism

Source: The Author.

Conceptualizing and operationalizing US China policy

Figure 1. The major orientations of US China policy.

Conceptualizing and operationalizing Taiwan’s US policy

Re-typology of US Taiwan policy: beyond the strategic ambiguity/clarity dichotomy

Table 2. Re-Typology of the US Taiwan Policy.

Types of US Taiwan Security relations Political relations International recognitions

Source: The Author.

Figure 2. Spectrum of US Taiwan policy.

Table 3. The Theoretical Framework of US Taiwan Policy.

Taiwan’s US The orientation of US China policy

Source: The Author.

Theoretical framework and its causal mechanism

Figure 3. The causal mechanism of the explanatory model.

Figure 4. The credit of Sino–US relations.

Empirical studies: the transition of US Taiwan policy in the post–

Clinton’s terms: from partial strategic clarity to strategic ambiguity

Bush’s terms: from short maximum pressure to controlling Taiwan’s pro-

Obama’s terms: from strategic ambiguity to partial strategic clarity

However, Obama’s engagement-oriented China policy changed to a coopetition-oriented policy

Trump’s term: from partial strategic clarity to maximum pressure

Table 4. Taiwan-Related Laws/Legislations/Resolutions in Trump’s Term.

Legislations/resolutions Time Taiwan-related content Status

Source: The Author.

Table 5. The Summary of Comparative Case Studies..

Variables Periods & scenarios US Taiwan policy

US China policy Taiwan’s US Strategic Maximum Partial Between Strategic Controlling

Source: The Author.

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