Strategic Studies Magzine

U.S.
Posture of Integrated Deterrence:

China’s Response and Implications for the Asian Security
Aiza Azam* and Adil Sultan**
Abstract
As the world is drawn increasingly into a web of shifting geopolitics, battle

lines are being drawn and alliances are re-orienting themselves. Working
from the premise that the competition between the United States (U.S.) and
the People’s Republic of China will define the dynamics of the international
system for the foreseeable future, this paper takes a look at the U.S.’s
evolving posture of Integrated Deterrence and the likely Chinese response,
which would have implications for Asian security. It reviews the contours of
‘Integrated Deterrence’ as it is laid out in the U.S. National Security
Strategy 2022 and how this may shape the policy decisions of the U.S. and
its partners, especially Taiwan, as well as how major U.S. regional allies,
including India are likely to play their role in support of the U.S. interests.
The paper also analyses China’s strategic thinking, national defence policy
and national security objectives that are likely to influence its choices in the
evolving great power competition. Taking Taiwan as the case study, the
paper finds that in addition to pursuing more traditional approaches, both
the U.S. and China will consider influencing domestic public opinion in
China and Taiwan as a key focus of their respective policy considerations;
it also finds convergences in the related responses of South Asia’s two
major players, India and Pakistan.
Keywords: Integrated Deterrence, Asia, Taiwan, U.S., China, India.
Introduction
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) released in October 2022 is a

clear and unambiguous declaration of intent regarding American policy for
the next decade. It highlights two primary challenges, the immediate one
*
The author is Faculty Member, Faculty of Aerospace and Strategic Studies, Air University
Islamabad. Email: aiza.azam84@gmail.com.
**
The author is Dean Faculty of Aerospace and Strategic Studies, Air University,
Islamabad. Email: adilsultan66@gmail.com.
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Strategic Studies
posed by Russia, and the long-term one, considered more dangerous, in the
form of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Russia is represented as an
immediate but lesser threat, in comparison to the PRC, which poses
formidable competition to the prevailing Western powers in an international
environment that has hitherto been shaped by and is favourable to America
and its allies; this is due to the fact that China is believed to have both the
will and the capacity to execute a re-ordering of the status quo.1
A key component of the NSS is the ‘Integrated Deterrence’, an

American framework for engaging allies to secure themselves against
challenges to their positions in the international arena. While the concept
is not at odds with American policy as it has stood for years, and the
terminology itself has been part of strategic discourse since at least late
2021, the NSS 2022 is the first to lay out what integrated deterrence
clearly means for the United States (U.S.) and its partners around the
world. Given that the primary thrust of the strategy is to restrain Chinese
ambitions and shape its policies, there will be clear implications of
integrated deterrence for relations between China and the U.S. and their
respective partner and allies. In order to understand what shape these
developments may take; the Taiwan issue serves as an example.
Agreement on an unconditional One China policy was fundamental to

the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the People’s
Republic of China. The common theme in the secretive, arduous and long-
drawn-out outreach and negotiation process, which eventually culminated in
the U.S. recognition of the Communist nation, was Mao Zedong’s and the
CPC leadership’s insistence on the matter of Taiwan; progress was
contingent on the Nixon administration’s unambiguous commitment to
upholding China’s conditions on the issue. In the years since their historical
rapprochement, however, Taiwan has been an area over which the U.S. and
China have butted heads regularly. While this has primarily been over the
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing has also lodged complaints over what it
asserted were Washington’s attempts to extend legitimacy to Taiwanese
leadership, tantamount to interference in China’s internal affairs.
1“National Security Strategy,” Government of the United States, October 2022,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-
Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
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US Posture of Integrated Deterrence
In recent years, under both the Trump and Biden administrations, the
Taiwan issue has taken on added energy, and Chinese protests have
grown equally vociferous. In August 2022, Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives, Nancy Pelosi conducted a much publicised visit to
Taiwan, in defiance of Beijing’s very clear and adamant objections to
what they believed was flagrant disregard for the Chinese position and
Chinese sentiments.2 While the aftermath of the visit included displays
of Beijing’s displeasure in the form of sanctions against Taiwanese
exports and conducting a comprehensive week-long military exercise
around the island, no armed conflict erupted.3Analysts have been divided
over whether this represented China’s impotence in the face of the U.S.
unilateralism or it was evidence of the Chinese leadership’s foresight to
avoid being dragged into a direct armed conflict with the U.S.; in either
case it marks a deliberate departure away from what was for years the
traditional Washington line and has created a marked schism in a
relationship that has come under increased strain in the last few years.
This paper attempts to determine how the strategy of Integrated

Deterrence, under America’s broader stated policy of Chinese containment,
will impact Chinese responses and how it could impact the balance of
power struggle in the broader Asian region.
The U.S. Policy towards China
The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy calls the People’s

Republic of China its “pacing challenge,” 4 and is based largely on the
premise that China is managing its power competition with the U.S. in an
irresponsible manner. It states that the “PRC harbours intentions to re-shape
the international order in its favour” and emphasises a greater need than
ever for a strong U.S. role.5
2 “Statement by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan,”

Xinhua News, August 2, 2022,
https://english.news.cn/20220802/df586fce79c04a9282c05cd26e997bb3/c.html
3 Martin Quin Pollard and Yimou Lee, “China Military ‘Completes Tasks’ Around Taiwan,
Plans Regular Patrols, Reuters, August 11, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-
pacific/china-extends-military-drills-around-taiwan-after-pelosi-visit-2022-08-10/
4 “National Security Strategy,” Government of the United States, October 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-
Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
5 “National Security Strategy.”
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The document highlights that the current U.S. administration’s decision

to resist what it calls the efforts of autocratic regimes to reshape the
international order is one that has bipartisan support domestically and
increasing support internationally. It is presented as a necessary measure in
order to protect the ability of the U.S. and its allies to enjoy democratic
values and uphold the principles they are guided by, particularly in light of
attempts by any “highly personalised and repressive type of autocracy”6 to
re-make the international order with a different vision. Therefore, it argues,
a coalition of like-minded partners is needed to counter it, as this serves the
collective interests of all and should not be viewed as a favour that is being
offered to the U.S. It also underscores the U.S. commitment to its allies,
reassuring them that they must” never doubt our will and capacity to stand
with them against aggression and intimidation.”7
The NSS 2022 specifically addresses the Taiwan issue by

simultaneously reiterating American support for the island at the same
time that it rejects any renunciation of the One China policy:
We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and
do not support Taiwan independence. We remain committed to our one
China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three
Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. And we will uphold our
commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-
defence and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or
coercion against Taiwan.8
In essence, this statement cautions both China and Taiwan against any
adventurism and refuses to offer the PRC an opportunity to suggest the U.S.
has reneged on the commitment their bilateral relations are based on.
Integrated Deterrence and Its Impact on Policies of the U.S. and

Allies
This section looks at the contours of Integrated Deterrence and how this will
shape the policies of the U.S. and its allies. The Taiwan issue is used as an
example to better understand how Integrated Deterrence will likely
determine state behaviour.

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Dimensions of Integrated Deterrence in the NSS 2022
The document describes Integrated Deterrence (ID) as a “seamless

combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs
of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits,”9 couching it regarding a
dissuasive policy. However, in light of the stated intentions of the NSS
2022, it can be argued that ID is, in fact, a strategy of denial about China,
strengthening the capacity of the U.S. and its allies to exercise a web of
collective capabilities that will constrict China’s ability to assert itself as a
regional power and as the status quo challenger on the global stage.
The integrated deterrence outlined in the strategy document identifies

five key dimensions:
i. Integration across domains, highlighting military and non-

military capabilities.
ii. Integration across regions, emphasizing the threat to the U.S.
interests at home and abroad in key regions.
iii. Integration across the spectrum of conflict, aimed at preventing
any changes to the status quo.
iv. Integration across the U.S. Government, specifying the use of all
platforms, channels and policies and.
v. Integration with allies and partners to adopt a coordinated
approach in pursuit of stated objectives.10
Strategic Options for the U.S. and its Allies
Essentially, exercising integrated deterrence in the case of Taiwan would

intensify current American strategy, but now with the engagement of
supporting actors to strengthen the U.S. position further and give teeth to the
effort of dissuading China from unilateral action. It is also important to note
rising perceptions that America’s traditional policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’
in the Taiwan matter is believed to have faded as it takes a more assertive
stance to counter China.

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Keeping in view the broader objectives stated in America’s National

Security Strategy 2022 regarding the containment of China, there are
following likely areas where efforts could be focused on in this regard:
Coordinating with Allies on the Diplomatic Front to Entrench

Opposition
This can be expected in the shape of policy declarations by the U.S.

allies to reiterate America’s position in the NSS 2022, aimed primarily at
deterring China from what would be considered an armed attack on
Taiwan and backed with the threat of necessary use of force.
To an extent, this has already begun to take place. Canada released its
Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) at the end of November 2022. The sections of
the IPS pertaining to China closely mirror the NSS 2022 in content and
tone. China is called “an increasingly disruptive power”, and it is stated that
in cases of deep disagreement between the two countries, Canada will
challenge China in response to any coercive activity as well as in case of
Chinese efforts to undermine Canada’s national security interests “and those
of partners in the region.” 11 On Taiwan, the document categorically refutes
any attempts to change the status quo by either Taiwan or the PRC. It states
that even as Canada upholds its One China policy, it remains committed to
supporting the island’s self-defence under the Taiwan Relations Act.12
Japan’s National Security Strategy (JNSS), released in December

2022, lists its intention to uphold a “free and open international order,
especially in the Indo-Pacific region”13 as one of its three broad national
interests. It asserts that China is working to capacitate itself in order to
challenge the existing international order and criticises the PRC for its
lack of cooperation with the international community on a wide range of
issues. It claims that Chinese policies and military activity present “the
greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan”14
11 “ Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Government of Canada, November 2022,

https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/assets/pdfs/indo-pacific-
indo-pacifique/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique-en.pdf, accessed 28th November 2022.
12 “ Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.”
13 “National Security Strategy of Japan,” Government of Japan, December 2022,
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/pdf/security_strategy_en.pdf
14 “National Security Strategy of Japan.”
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and of the international community as a whole. Laying out Japan’s

national security objectives, it states that it will work with like-minded
nations to achieve balance in the Indo-Pacific and will prevent any
circumstances from arising where the status quo can easily be altered by
any state. While reiterating its One China policy, in the same vein as the
American and Canadian strategies previously issued, the JNSS eschews
the more aggressive language of the former two and instead reiterates its
position for cross-strait issues to be resolved peacefully.15
Undermining the Domestic Standing of the Communist Party of

China
This can conceivably be achieved with three different and concurrent

approaches.
a. One would target the perceptions of China’s domestic population in an

effort to undermine Beijing’s position and resolve on Taiwan. Measures
could bear similarity to Pelosi’s much hyped visit to Taiwan in the
second half of 2022, creating the appearance of upgrading relations with
Taiwan with frequent and more high-profile interactions among officials
from Taiwan, the U.S. and American allies.
b. Another would be strengthening the denouncement of alleged human

rights abuses in China. The NSS 2022 asserts its intention to continue
to “hold Beijing accountable”16 for repression in Tibet, Xinjiang and
Hong Kong, while the Canadian IPS also promises to raise a voice
for the universal human rights of minorities such as Tibetans and
Uyghurs, while standing “shoulder to shoulder” 17 with the Hong
Kong population.
c. A third approach would involve exploiting any demonstration of anger

of the Chinese domestic public with the CPC, over any given issue, to
heighten the image of dissatisfaction with the regime; it can be done
both through statements by political leadership, via popular media
platforms and through online publications. An example of this was seen
in the protests that broke out in several Chinese cities in December
15 “National Security Strategy of Japan.”

17 “Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.” ’
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2022, with the people calling for an end to severely restrictive

government measures aimed at containing the spread of Covid-19.
Prominent Western media houses such as Bloomberg and the Iled the
Charge ─ beginning mere hours after protests broke out ─ with a slew
of articles and even Twitter spaces to discuss the development.
Bloomberg called the protests extraordinary for taking place in a country
where people “can face grave danger” 18 for speaking against the
authorities and termed them “one of the most significant challenges to
Communist Party rule” 19 since the Tiananmen protests of 1989.
Ambassador Nicholas Burns, the American envoy to China called for
China to resist interference and to let the demonstrations continue.20 The
BBC said the protests were shocking and “a huge challenge”21 for the
Chinese leadership, referencing protestors who were calling for
President Xi to step down.
Strengthening Taiwan’s Deterrent Capacity Against China
The U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have long been a bone of contention
between the former and the People’s Republic of China, given that the
intended purpose of the weapons is to serve as a deterrent against PRC.
In 2022 alone, the U.S. Department of Defence approved an arms sale to
Taiwan worth U.S.$108 million in July,22 gave approval in September to
move with another sale worth U.S.$1.1 billion, 23 and also issued
18 Rachel Chang, “China’s Covid Unrest is Raising Piercing Questions,” Bloomberg,

November 28, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-11-28/china-
s-covid-unrest-is-raising-piercing-questions
19 Colum Murphy and Rebecca Choong Wilkins, “Xi Has Few Good Options to End
Historic China Covid Protests,” Bloomberg, November 28, 2022,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-28/xi-has-few-good-options-to-
end-historic-china-covid-protests
20 “China Must Let ‘Extraordinary’ Protests Continue: US Envoy,” Bloomberg,
November 30, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2022-11-30/china-must-
let-extraordinary-protests-continue-us-envoy
21 Stephen McDonell, “China Covid: Shocking Protests Are Huge Challenge for
China’s Leaders,” BBC News, November 27, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-china-63772365
22 Erin Hale, “$108 Million Weapons Sale to Taiwan Moves Forward,” Voice of
America, July 19, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/million-weapons-sale-to-taiwan-
moves-forward-/6664796.html
23 “US Approves US$1.1 Billion Taiwan Arms Sale, Angering China,” BBC News,
September 3, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62775544
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approval in December 2022 for two additional sales with a combined

worth of U.S.$425 million.24
Also, in October 2022, it was reported that the U.S. government was
considering jointly producing weapons with Taiwan. 25 While Taiwan
would not be able to, eventually, overcome Chinese military might, the
weapons sold are intended to capacitate it to resist and make any attack
on it a costly venture.
In December 2022, days after the release of the Canadian Indo-Pacific

Strategy, the Canadian government announced that it would be sending
more warships into the Taiwan Strait to reiterate that the Strait constituted
international waters,26 a position not accepted by China. Under the current
Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, the UK government has not committed to
Taiwan’s defence; however, Sunak refused to take the options of arms sales
to Taiwan off the table.27
China’s Response Options
Chinese Strategic Thinking
Seeking peace and unity are central elements often highlighted in Chinese
strategic culture, and use of armed force is believed to be a final recourse,
always with restraint. Significantly, this links strategic culture to socialism
with Chinese characteristics, the heart of Chinese national policy. Ensuring
national development and upholding national security are the two core
elements of China’s overall national strategy, which aims at utilising all the
24 “U.S. Approves US$425 Million in Arms Sales to Taiwan”, AP News, December 7,

2022, https://apnews.com/article/biden-taiwan-business-china-xi-jinping-
ee81302800a9121614140683ff31e0ca
25 “U.S. Considering Joint Weapons Production with Taiwan,” Reuters, October 19,
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-government-considering-joint-
production-weapons-with-taiwan-nikkei-2022-10-19/
26 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Canada to Send More Warships Through Taiwan Strait in
Signal to China,” Financial Times, December 5, 2022,
https://www.ft.com/content/b19721e8-7bfc-44f2-9f72-971a63d2bfac
27 Kitty Donaldson, “UK’s Sunak Keeps Option of Sending Arms to Taiwan on the
Table,” Bloomberg, November 15, 2022,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-15/uk-s-sunak-keeps-option-of-
sending-arms-to-taiwan-on-the-table?leadSource=uverify%20wall
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strengths at its disposal ─ political, economic, cultural, military, scientific

and technological ─ to achieve its national objectives. China’s military
strategy has been described as “restrained and guided by national interest ”28
and is subservient to the latter. The essential purpose of China’s military
capability is to serve the pursuit of the nation’s strategic objectives,
therefore, decisions regarding the investment in building military forces and
their use in time and space must be made from a “political vantage point.”29
On challenges to China’s envisioned peaceful development, Chinese

strategic thought emphasises calmness and level headedness. In the case
of Taiwan, it is identified as one of the two fundamental challenges,
alongside American-led Western strategic containment of China; the
protracted Taiwan matter is described as a drain on China’s diplomatic,
political, economic and military resources, and is a “long-term hidden
danger”30 preventing the PRC from realising full rejuvenation.
China’s Defensive National Defence Policy in the New Era
China’s National Defence in the New Era is a defence strategy document

published in July 2019 by China’s State Council Information Office. It
lays out the drivers of China’s defence strategy and its implementation. A
key section is on ‘China’s Defensive National Policy in the New Era’ and
explains the key dimensions of China’s approach to national defence.
National defence aims include deterring and resisting aggression;
safeguarding national political security, the security of the Chinese people
as well as social stability; opposing and containing efforts aimed at
declaring Taiwan as independent; as well as preserving national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and security.31
A key highlighted feature is rejecting the pursuit of hegemony and

carving out spheres of influence. China, it is stated, based on its
experience of wars and aggression at the cost of national development,
28 Donaldson, “UK’s Sunak Keeps Option of Sending Arms to Taiwan on the Table.”
31 “ China’s National Defence in the New Era,” State Council Information Office of the
People’s Republic of China,
https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408
f502283d.html
54
has taken care to contribute towards ensuring world peace in order to

secure the progress of its own development, and seeks the same for other
nations. The document states that the purpose of China’s national
defence policy is to facilitate China’s role in creating a global
community of mutual progress and development, in service to the belief
that stability and peace within China translates to peace and development
opportunities for other countries; it is in pursuit of this commitment to
“win-win cooperation” 32 that the Chinese armed forces will carry out
their tasks and uphold their responsibilities.
In the context of this national defence strategy, it highlights Chinese

adherence to reunification that is peaceful and to developing positive cross-
Strait relations. It emphasises its resolve to not brook any interference aimed
at separating Taiwan from the PRC and declares its will to resort to use of
force should that eventuality be made necessary. At the same time, care is
taken to underscore that such measures will not be meant to target the
Taiwanese people, but rather external forces and “the very small number”33
of separatists in Taiwan.
Policy Options for China
China arguably has a range of options to consider to counter the Integrated

Deterrence squeeze from the U.S. and its allies. Using the example of
Taiwan, some possible Chinese responses are discussed in the section
below.
Make the Taiwanese Stakeholders in Peaceful Reunification
If Western surveys are to be considered reliable, only a very small

percentage of the Taiwanese public supports reunification with China. At
the same time, the majority would either wish for independence or for a
continuation of the status quo. A realistic assessment, considering
China’s stated position, its ongoing efforts toward the goal of
reunification, as well as Western agendas and interests, demonstrates that
maintaining the status quo indefinitely is not feasible. The only
32 “China’s National Defence in the New Era.”

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consideration would be whether the attempt at reunification is done by

means of armed conflict or is a political choice on the part of Taiwan.
For Beijing, an armed conflict would be a last resort; given the other
actors, this would drag in with it. The ideal solution would either be
Taiwanese leadership that supports reunification ─ such as the China
Unification Promotion Party ─ and has the support of the public majority or
a regime that can be coerced into acquiescing to Beijing’s objectives. In
adopting a military or economic coercive approach, Beijing is far less likely
to find reunification smooth. Public support can compel a regime that may
wish to choose otherwise.
The report delivered by President Xi Jinping on the occasion of the 20th

Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly addresses the people of
Taiwan, emphasising the PRC’s desire to work in unity with them towards
the goal of peaceful reunification. It refers to them as “one family bound by
blood,” 34 appealing to the notion of common roots; simultaneously, it
promises them policies that offer the Taiwanese an equal share in benefits
and prosperity.
In the preceding lines, these promises are juxtaposed against the clear
declaration that the PRC will pursue and achieve reunification at all costs.35
Undermine the Credibility of the U.S. and its Allies to the Cause
of Taiwan
This approach is supported in a great deal by several factors:
The world’s major economies — mostly the U.S. and China ─ are
deeply interdependent and cannot extricate themselves from each other
without great cost. Further, a conflict between these two, or between
either of them and another country, is a daunting prospect and would
appear to be an unlikely scenario.
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, which does not appear to be headed

to a negotiated settlement in the near future, has the U.S. stretched both
economically (as it continues to pledge financial assistance and humanitarian

56
aid) as well as in terms of arms sales (with increasing commitments being

made to the Ukrainian leadership). This is to be considered against the
backdrop of an American economy that was badly damaged by the pandemic.
American political clout has been adversely affected due to decades of

external interventions. The American people are tired of continuously being
in a state at war; public support for a fresh conflict will be a hard sell,
particularly after the withdrawal in defeat last year from Afghanistan at the
end of a two-decade war that cost America dearly in terms of blood, treasure
and lives. American allies will not take the lead unless backed by an
immovable guarantee of the U.S. military support.
The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated the limits of allied support.

This was seen especially when Europe plunged into freezing winters,
plagued by an energy shortage due to their dependence on Russia.
Reiterate Beijing’s Stance on Taiwan to the Chinese Public
President Xi’s report to the CPC at the 20th Party Congress underscores the
leadership’s determination to achieve reunification, calling it “a historic
mission and an unshakeable commitment”36 of the Communist Party. The
message was reiterated in August 2022, around the time of Nancy Pelosi’s
visit to Taiwan, in a White Paper issued by the Chinese government on the
matter. 37 This commitment is central to the CPC’s legitimacy and is
considered a fundamental objective for the PRC.
Reinforce Perception for the International Community of the

Chinese Peoples’ Support for the CPC
In President Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC in

October 2022, he refers to China as a “people’s democratic dictatorship
36 “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in
Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects,” President Xi Jinping’s
Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 16 th October
2022, https://english.news.cn/20221025/8eb6f5239f984f01a2bc45b5b5db0c51/c.html
37 “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” Government of
the People’s Republic of China, August 2022,
https://english.news.cn/20220810/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a/c.html
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under the leadership of the working class,”38 where the power of the state
belongs to the people of China. An entire section of the report is devoted to
this concept of what is termed as a Whole-Process People’s Democracy
which reiterates throughout that all citizens are stakeholders in helping
decide the development and the future of the country. These paragraphs are
aimed primarily at the Chinese domestic audience, engaging them as equals
in working for their collective destiny and deciding the direction they will
take as a nation; they are meant to evoke a sense of cohesion and national
unity which is ideally communicable to foreign publics. Additionally, they
serve as a signal for the international non-Chinese audience that the CPC
and the public are each committed to the other. While there may be
rumblings from time to time about systems and practices more common to
Western democracies, there is no gap wide enough to be exploited between
the Party and the people.
This approach would also be a rebuff to the U.S. NSS and the
Canadian IPS, both of which attempt to distinguish between the citizens
of China and the regime that runs the country under a one-party system.
Continue to Reiterate China’s Desire for a Peaceful Approach

to International Affairs
The fundamental concept that underscores all Chinese strategy shared for
international public consumption is based on the condition of peaceful
development. China follows a path of socialism with Chinese
characteristics, an approach which focuses all the capacities and strengths of
the country towards stability and security, both internal and external, and
towards ensuring long-lasting and peaceful politics.39
The Chinese leaders see this as a crucial aspect of their foreign policy. It
is intended to differentiate the path China intends to take from the traditional
route taken by other great powers as they rise to power. The message is to
discourage taking sides or getting involved in bloc politics.
38 “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.”

39 “Science of Military Strategy,” Academy of Military Science (Beijing: Military Science
Press, 2013), translated by the China Aerospace Studies Institute,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2021-02-
08%20Chinese%20Military%20Thoughts-
%20In%20their%20own%20words%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy%202013.pdf
58
It is also aimed at demonstrating China as a viable alternative to the

reigning superpower which, despite having lost much political clout in
recent years, continues to determine in great deal how the international
community moves forward. China acknowledges the U.S.’s capacity to
exert its influence over global affairs in alignment with its own interests.
However, China also recognises the significance of capitalising on the
international community’s adverse sentiments towards America, which
have been instigated by the U.S.’s contentious and domineering policies
over an extended period. China maintains its self-image as a developing
country and compares itself to other nations in the global south who
share similar disillusionment with the Western policies.
Implications for South Asia
As a key ally of the U.S., India has been playing an increasingly

prominent role in the U.S.-led machinations in the Asia Pacific, having
been projected as a counter to China in the Asian region, and has been
courted accordingly by the U.S. with political, economic and military
incentives. In the Integrated Deterrence posture, this would entail
diplomatic coordination by New Delhi on Washington’s foreign policy
positions and coordinating military approaches in case of last resort.
However, given India’s history of political machination, it is more likely
that there would be a selective implementation on its part.
The Taiwan issue again serves as an example in this area. Clues

regarding India’s potential role in the Taiwan situation can be found in a
review of the most recent Indian statement on the issue. In the aftermath
of the U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s much publicised visit to
Taiwan in August 2022, India maintained a somewhat vague stance. At a
briefing held by India’s Ministry of External Affairs on 12 August, 2022,
the spokesperson, on being asked about the visit and India’s position
regarding the One China policy, replied, “We urge the exercise of
restraint, avoidance of unilateral actions to change the status quo, de-
escalation of tensions and efforts to maintain peace and stability in the
region. India’s relevant policies are well known and consistent. They do
not require reiteration.”40
“Transcript of the Weekly Media Briefing by the Official Spokesperson,” Indian

40
Ministry of External Affairs, August 12, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-
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Strategic Studies
In addition to subtly declining to state India’s position on the One

China policy categorically, the spokesperson’s reference to avoiding an
alteration to the status quo and exercise of restraint is a language very
much in line with the position of the U.S. and its allies, reiterated as such
in the multitude of policy documents that have since been issued.
That being said, India is unlikely to take a position that would

undermine its own interests. China remains an important trading partner
for India. Figures released in early January 2023 show that India-China
bilateral trade for 2022 climbed to U.S.$135.98, 41 while India-Taiwan
trade lies at U.S.$7.7 billion for 2021.42 Talks between India and Taiwan
for a free trade agreement had begun but did not go anywhere
conclusive. Taiwanese diplomats have argued that though they are
willing to move forward with enthusiasm, New Delhi appears to be
dragging its feet; and though the latter is interested in pursuing a
healthier bilateral trade and investment relationship, it will not do so at
the cost of offering Taiwan overt political support, which Taiwan has
expressed expectation of.43
It is pertinent to keep in view that India is also unlikely to offer

greater political support to Taiwan beyond the generic expression of
support for the status quo to remain, for fear of provoking a Chinese
response. The Indo-China border clash at Galwan and its aftermath
constitute a current concern in Indian strategic thinking. Additionally,
adopting a stance that would seem supportive of external ─ non-Chinese
─ intervention on the Taiwan matter, whether politically or otherwise,
can have implications for India’s position on Kashmir, a matter on which
Beijing has taken a fairly neutral stance to date.
briefings.htm?dtl/35635/Transcript_of_Weekly_Media_Briefing_by_the_Official_
Spokesperson_August_12_2022
41 “Despite Frosty Relations, India’s Trade with China Reaches Record Levels,”
Wire, January 13, 2023, https://thewire.in/trade/india-china-trade-deficit-2022-
imports-exports
42 “How Can the 2023 Indian Budget Boost Opportunities for Taiwan Industries?,”
ANI, February 15, 2023, https://www.aninews.in/news/business/business/how-can-
the-2023-indian-budget-boost-opportunities-for-taiwan-industries20230215194301/
43 Harsh V. Pant and Shashank Mattoo, “India’s Taiwan Moment,” ORF, August 20,
2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-taiwan-moment/
60
Further, India has a strong history of hedging its bets. From the
relationships it nurtured with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the
Cold War to the upholding of its strong ties with both the U.S. and
Russia in the current Ukraine conflict, the Indian political leadership is
unlikely to jettison its tradition of prioritising the Indian polity above
alliance demands and expectations. This is visible even with the recent
talk from the BRICS platform ─ of which India is a founding member ─
to move towards an alternative currency for cross-border trade which
would reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar. 44 Even talk of such a
possibility is significant, given that BRICS is composed of five of the
world’s leading economies.
Against this context, Pakistan’s position is unlikely to change from

the current stance and its unconditional support for China has been
consistently reiterated. Following Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August
2022, the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated its commitment
to the One China policy, and stated that relations between states should
be guided by the principles of mutual respect and adhere to non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs. 45 Some months later, in
November, the two countries issued a joint statement in which Pakistan
reaffirmed its support on all matters pertaining to China’s core interests,
including Taiwan. 46 In this, convergences can be found on India and
Pakistan’s position; the former abstaining from adopting a stance
provocative to China and the latter adhering to its time-tested position,
are approaches that complement each other.
In the Integrated Deterrence context, should India be persuaded to

adopt a harder line on Taiwan against China, it opens up an avenue that
would encourage external intervention on the Kashmir issue, possibly by
China, which would in turn strengthen Pakistan’s position on the same.
44 Joseph W. Sullivan, “A BRICS Currency Could Shake the Dollar’s Dominance,”

Foreign Policy Magazine, April 24, 2023,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/brics-currency-end-dollar-dominance-united-
states-russia-china/
45 “Pakistan Reaffirms One China Policy,” Express Tribune, August 3, 2022,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2369205/pakistan-reaffirms-one-china-policy-1
46 “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan,” China Daily, November 3, 2022,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202211/03/WS6362b5fca310fd2b29e7ff1b.html
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Strategic Studies
Conclusion
Integrated Deterrence, for all intents and purposes, is a continuation of

American strategy as it has stood for decades. However, its representation in
the U.S. National Security Strategy and its reiteration in multiple forms of
official declaration since the NSS was issued are an unambiguous throwing
of the gauntlet to China.
The success of ‘Integrated Deterrence’ is contingent upon

America’s ability to persuade its allies that their interests are aligned
and this is not only a U.S. venture, as much as it is dependent on the
U.S. credibility of remaining by allies’ side should there be a conflict
of interests. Intended as a strategy of denial against a great economic
power in its own backyard, it is all but guaranteed to eventually
invoke a conflict, particularly when it steps into territory that China
considers an internal issue. In case of India, however, a key U.S. ally
in the region, it is difficult to see how the latter can incentivize the
former to adopt a stronger, more assertive stance against China on
Taiwan, given the potential for harm that it holds for Indian interests
and national security.
The success of ‘Integrated Deterrence’ will also be determined by

America’s ability to continue upholding an ‘us versus them’ image,
where countries like China are upheld as the autocratic antithesis of the
democratic and values-driven Western (largely) nations. It is largely
contingent upon America’s success in continuing to demonise a power
that has the capacity to challenge it and convince its allies that China
presents as much of a threat to their interests as it does to the U.S. In this
as well, India is more likely to adopt a carefully calibrated ‘non-position’
on Taiwan, given that any position that New Delhi perceives as
provocative for China has the potential to draw India into the line of fire,
a consideration which is especially pertinent under the current Indian
regime and its record of human rights abuses, and which would also have
repercussions for the Pakistan-India dispute over Kashmir.
America may well adopt a strategy of needling China towards a

confrontation over Taiwan at a stage in time when the PRC, its will
notwithstanding, cannot yet measure up to the American military might.
At the same time, there is weight to the consideration that venturing into
62
this territory at a time when American diplomatic and economic

resources are stretched as the war in Ukraine continues, and while
American allies are still finding their path towards converging fully to
serve a truly integrated deterrence posture, may well be a risk that pays
off for China.
63
Nuclear Signalling and Escalation Risk in the India-Pakistan
Context: A Critical Overview of the 2001-02 Standoff
Rizwan Zeb*
Abstract
A terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December, 2001 resulted

in a ten-month long military stand-off between India and Pakistan.
Throughout this period, both sides conducted aggressive and provocative
signalling by conducting missile tests, and through bellicose speeches,
statements and press briefings. These signals were conveyed at various
levels by the political, military, and bureaucratic leadership. This paper
provides a theoretical framework about signalling, deterrence stability and
the escalation risk grounded in the classical understanding on nuclear
deterrence and escalation. The paper analyses the nuclear signalling during
the stand-off in light of the theoretical framework. The paper tests the
hypothesis that a high percentage of indirect signalling would induce
instability into a nuclear crisis, and the large number of actors sending
signals from either side would increase the likelihood of miscommunication.
By sifting through media reports during the stand-off, an elimination
exercise was conducted and 72 signals were identified and analysed. The
paper is divided into five sections and points to the limitation of the Cold
War model to explain the South Asian strategic stability dynamics and the
need to work out a model specific to South Asian strategic dynamics.
Keywords: Nuclear Signalling, India, Pakistan, Strategic Stability,

Nuclear Deterrence, Escalation.
Introduction
In Thirteen Days, a movie about the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, US

Secretary of State Robert McNamara tells Chief of Naval Operations
*
The author is Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Air War
College Institute, Karachi. Email: srizwanzeb@gmail.com
Disclaimer: The view expressed in this paper are author’s own.
22
Nuclear Signalling and Escalation Risk in the India-Pakistan Context
Admiral George Anderson; “You don’t understand a thing, do you? This

is not a blockade. This is language. A new vocabulary, the likes of which
the world has never seen. This is President Kennedy communicating
with Secretary Khrushchev.” 1 Robert Jervis agrees: Signals are like a
language in that their meanings are established by agreement, implicit if
not explicit.2 Nowhere is this more applicable than in South Asia.
Following a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December,

2001, the Indian Government mobilised its military forces. A crisis erupted
between India and Pakistan resulting in a ten-month long military stand-off
and amassing of a million soldiers on the border. Throughout the crisis,
aggressive and provocative signalling took place by missile tests, speeches,
statements and press briefings. These signals were conveyed at multiple
levels by the political, military, and bureaucratic leadership.
New Delhi appeared keen to give two major signals to its domestic
public, to Islamabad, and to Washington. First, its threat to use
conventional force against Pakistan was credible, with limits to its restraint
and patience. Second, it would avoid any nuclear signalling to Islamabad
as well as deliberately ignore any nuclear signals emanating from
Islamabad.
What sets this research apart from existing works on ‘Signalling’ in

the Indo-Pak context3 is that while these are good at detail but lack a
theoretical discussion, whereas this paper provides a theoretical
framework about signalling, deterrence stability and the escalation risk.
This framework is grounded in the classical understanding on nuclear
deterrence and escalation. It also analyses how various types of
signalling impact deterrence stability.
1 The YouTube clip of this exact scene from 13 Days can be viewed at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BYRCTHj7k8Y
2 Robert Jervis, “Signalling and Perception,” in Monroe, ed., Political Psychology
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2002), 14.
3 For most comprehensive and up to date work see; Naeem Salik, “Nuclear
Signalling, Escalation and De-escalation in South Asia,” Nuclear Paper Series No.7,
Islamabad Papers, 2019, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad,
https://issi.org.pk/islamabad-paper-on-nuclear-signalling-escalation-and-de-
escalation-in-south-asia/
23
Strategic Studies
The hypothesis tested in this paper is that a high percentage of

indirect signalling would induce instability into a nuclear crisis. And that
a large number of actors emanating signals from the two sides would
increase the likelihood of miscommunication. Also analysed is the
assumption that nuclear signalling during crisis would have an impact on
ground preparations either positively (demobilisation) or negatively
(accelerated mobilisation).
For this, a simple but robust methodology was adopted. In order to

decipher relevant nuclear signals, all major Pakistani, Indian and
international press reports published throughout the stand-off were sifted.
An elimination exercise was conducted to arrive at the final list of signals.
For each of the selected signals, the channel of transmission and the actor
responsible for emanating the signal were identified. The author finally
analysed the information linking crisis stability to type of signals, number
of actors involved, and the context within which each signal was made.
The current paper begins with a theoretical discussion on nuclear

signalling deterrence stability and its linkage and impact on escalation
risk. After over viewing the standoff, the following section details the
signalling channels and the actors during the stand-off. After
contextualising the nuclear signals, the paper provides a detailed critical
analysis of nuclear signalling during the stand-off.
Nuclear Signalling and Deterrence Stability
As per the rationalist theory of deterrence, ensuring a first-strike capability

as well as the ability to absorb a first strike and conduct a second strike is a
key prerequisite for deterrence stability. In addition, for deterrence to
function, such a capability must also be perceived as real by the enemy.
However, while nuclear signalling is an essential condition for

deterrence stability, it can also act as an instability-inducing factor in a
nuclear relationship. Whether nuclear signals end up strengthening or
diluting deterrence, to a large extent depends on the channel through
which signals are transmitted, the number of actors involved in the
signalling exercise, and the context in which the signals are made.
Various channels through which nuclear signals can be transmitted have
varying degrees of risk associated with them. Nuclear signalling can be
24
conducted through three channels: i) direct signalling (communication

through official contact between governments/ representatives), ii) tacit
signalling (actual demonstration of a capability; nuclear tests, missile
tests or official policy pronouncements to that effect), and iii) indirect
signalling (press and media statements addressing multiple audiences).
The Actors
While there is little discussion in literature on who the most relevant

actors to convey nuclear signals could be, there is emphasis on the need
to designate official channels of communication, preferably through
high-ranking officials from all nuclear states involved in a crisis.
In order to determine the relative stability, or lack thereof, induced

by the number and relevance of the actors involved in nuclear signalling,
we take a set-up limited to one or two designated officials on each side
as the sole transmitters of nuclear signals as an optimal scenario where
crisis stability would be maximised. However, in real life crises some
signals would always be channelled indirectly for public and third-party
consumption. We contend that even in the case of indirect signalling, the
ideal scenario would be in which the same designated officials on all
sides are the only ones authorised to issue press statements especially
where official channels of communication are non-existent and states are
forced to rely solely on press and public statements for signalling.
25
Strategic Studies
Nuclear Signalling and Escalation Risk
The relative risk attached with the various signalling channels is depicted
graphically below:
Signalling and Risk
G
Risk
Direct Tacit Indirect No

Signalling Signalling Signalling Signalling
Types of Signalling
Source: Author’s own
To begin with, we abstract from any external variables impacting the

risk factor attached to a certain channel of signalling. The graph reflects
the risk factor, in relative terms. The risk (comparing an identical
message being transmitted from different channels) increases as one
moves from direct to tacit signalling. The risk factor increases further if
indirect signalling is employed as it is inherently provocative and geared
towards multiple audiences. A complete absence of signalling entails the
highest risk, given that nuclear signals are a principal mode of creating
credibility, the latter being a key pillar of deterrence stability. The
distance between points E-F, F-G, and G-H reflects the quantum increase
in the risk factor.
26
Points A-H complicates the scenario by weighing in on external

variables that could alter the risk attached with any signalling channel in
a real-life crisis. Each of these points highlights that the level of risk is
impacted by the context in which the signal is made. The external
variables which would alter the linearity of the graph could include state
of the conflict, relative strength of the conflicting parties, public opinion,
obtaining environment, who sends the signal, the body language while
making the signal (not applicable for tacit signalling), reaction of parties
that are not part of the conflict, venue where the signal is made,
frequency with which the signal is repeated, and intelligence information
available to conflicting as well as third parties. For example, when a
public statement (indirect signal) is made by a country’s leader implying
that preparation for a nuclear attack is underway. The risk factor
associated with this signal would vary depending on the situation of the
ongoing conflict. If the statement was made at a time when the adversary
already has unconfirmed intelligence that the opponent has moved its
nuclear arsenal out of the silos, the risk factor would be depicted by point
C (higher than the average risk). However, if the statement was made
when the adversary had current satellite imagery showing no movement
of the nuclear arsenal, and was based on human intelligence, the risk
factor would be represented by point G (lower than the average risk).
In our analysis, we abstract from the external variables, only

considering that under a given set of external variables (troop deployment,
force preparedness, etc.) the relative risk associated with various channels
for signal transmission hold according to our premise outlined above.
The other component of our framework is the actors through which

various signals are transmitted. In direct signalling, since official contact
is established between the two sides, any actor must be considered a
legitimate representative and his signal must be considered official. In
indirect signalling, the situation is quite complex as often a number of
actors send nuclear signals with little possibility for the recipient to
confirm actor’s relevancy, accuracy of the message, or whether
sanctioned officially. As detangling the authenticity of a signal from the
relevance of an actor to a situation is impossible, the smaller the number
of signal-transmitting actors during a crisis, the higher is the stability
factor in signalling. Moreover, the more relevant an actor is to the crisis
(actual decision makers), the lesser the probability of miscommunication.
27
Strategic Studies
2001-22 Military Stand-off between India and Pakistan
The attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December, 2001 resulted in

massive Indian military mobilisation and a yearlong military stand-off
between India and Pakistan.4 New Delhi blamed Islamabad and Pakistan
based militant groups. 5 A list of demands was given to Islamabad, 6
which was out rightly rejected by President Musharraf.7
New Delhi mobilised almost 800,000 troops, including three strike

corps, being deployed along the India-Pakistan border; furthermore, its
Air Force units and satellite airfields were activated, and the Eastern fleet
was shifted from the Bay of Bengal to the northern Arabian Sea to join
the Western fleet to blockade Pakistan. Islamabad counter-mobilised.
This increased the fear of war breaking out between the two caused by
accident, misperception, miscalculation or leadership irrationality, or
even by a deliberate design.
According to reports, India planned to undertake multiple thrusts

across the Line of Control (LoC) to seize territory in Azad Kashmir,
including militarily significant areas such as the Lipa Valley and the
Hajipir Pass.8 A major commando operation was also planned to hit and
destroy targets on the Pakistani side of the LoC in January 2002,
however it was cancelled.9
India from the very beginning created a situation in which it was

unable to gain most of its strategic objectives. Its posture of not
withdrawing troops unless cross-border terrorism ends and that it will
have no bilateral contact with Islamabad, at the same time refusing to
accept mediation by a third party created a stalemate. The only way of
getting out of it was to go to war which New Delhi was not willing to do
4 “Stern Warning to Pak,” Hindu, October 02, 2001.

5 “Police Claim ‘Clinching Evidence’,” Hindu, December 15, 2001.
6 Nazir Massodi, “India’s Most Wanted: Who is on the Hit List Sent to Pakistan,”
Indian Express, December 31, 2001,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/old/ie20011231/index.html
7 Muralidhar Reddy, “Ready to Act if Delhi Gives Proof: Musharraf,” Hindu,
December 16, 2001.
8 V. K Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New
Delhi: Sage, 2003), 73.
9 Jawed Naqvi, “India had Planned Offensive,” Dawn, December 24, 2002.
28
because its strategic thinkers were not clear how the Pakistanis will react
and also because of Washington’s pressure that was busy in fighting its
war against terror in Afghanistan. As the time passed even this option
seemed improbable.
Robert Powell in his study of deterrence has pointed out that

“Escalation generally becomes less and less likely the longer
confrontation lasts. As the crisis continues each state becomes
increasingly confident that it is facing a resolute adversary.” 10 In any
event, India undertook a “strategic relocation” of troops in end October
2002. India did not achieve its earlier stated objectives.11
Signalling Channels Used in the 2001-02 Stand-off
The 2001-02 stand-off represents acute instability in terms of the signalling

channels used to transmit messages to the adversary. Out of the three types
of signalling, indirect signalling was mostly employed. Below, the use of
the three channels of signalling in the stand-off are discussed.
Direct Signalling
During the stand-off, no signal was transmitted through direct contact.

The DGMOs hotline was not operational during the crisis. India recalled
its High Commissioner a day after the attack and later cut its diplomatic
strength in Islamabad by half. 12 When Islamabad did not reciprocate,
10 Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 180.
11 For details on this see Rizwan Zeb and Suba Chandran, Indo-Pak Conflicts: Ripe
to Resolve? (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005); Rizwan Zeb, “US Interests in South Asia:
Effects on Pakistan,” Margalla Papers 2004, National Defence College, Islamabad.
12 “India Recalls High Commissioner to Pakistan: Samjhauta Express, Lahore Bus
Service to be Terminated,” Tribune, December 21, 2001,
https://m.tribuneindia.com/2001/20011222/main1.htm; Pranay Sharma and Idrees
Bakhtiar, “Delhi Drops Diplomat Bomb,” Telegraph, December 22, 2001,
https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/delhi-drops-diplomatic-bomb/cid/910187;
Atul Aneja and Samdeep Dilkslut, “Pakistan Asked to Withdraw Staffer,” Hindu,
December 25, 2001, “Indian Threatens to Cut off Ties,” Nation, January 11, 2002 ;
“Pakistan Envoy Asked to Leave India,” Hindustan Times, February 8, 2003,
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/chauffeur-to-charge-d-affaires-list-of-
india-pak-staffers-expelled-in-the-past/story-VhtaJpDLH69V4RcBI2OOrN.html
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Strategic Studies
India ignored Pakistani High Commissioner during phase I of the crisis

and subsequently forced him to leave.
The Indo-Pakistan leaders attended two international forums but

could not establish a direct contact. During the SAARC summit in Nepal
in January 2002, Musharraf approached Vajpayee for the famous
handshake.13 At the international meeting on interaction and confidence
building measures in Kazakhstan on 3-4 June, 2002,14 Indian Minister of
State for External Affairs, Omar Abdullah declared: “There will be no
secret parlays, no official level talks, no dialogue at delegation level. I
am the only Minister (in Vajpayee’s delegation) and I can (say) I am not
having any talks.”15
The only direct signals during the crisis involved the U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell. On 1 June, 2002, he stated that he has made it
clear to both New Delhi and Islamabad that war will not serve their
interest. On 23 December, 2001, Powell assured Pakistan that India will
not attack it despite growing tensions between the two neighbours and
that it will not cross the line of control.16
Relevant direct signalling from the U.S. also involved sharing

intelligence information with both sides. On one instance, U.S. spy
satellite-based information was shared early on in phase I of the crisis,
which suggested aggressive troop movements by India along the
international border. The information led to the sacking of an Indian
Corps Commander for having exceeded orders from New Delhi.17
13 Josy Joseph, “SAARC: Musharraf Hands Vajpayee a Pleasant Surprise,” Rediff

News, January 5, 2002, www.rediff.com/news/2002/jan/05saarc2.htm; “No
Immediate Talks: Indian PM,” News, January 7, 2002.
14 “Musharraf Ready for Unconditional Talks,” News, June 4, 2002; Laurinda Keys,
“Pakistan Explains Nuclear Policy,” Associated Press (AP), June 4, 2002.
15 Ihtashamul Haque, “Musharraf Ready for Unconditional Talks with India: Almaty
Conference Begins Today,” Dawn, June 4,
2002,https://www.dawn.com/news/40171/musharraf-ready-for-unconditional-talks-
with-india-almaty-conference-begins-today
16 Moeed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments U.S. Crisis
Management in South Asia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 83-120.
17 V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished
(New Delhi: Sage, 2003), 80; Chari, Cheema and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace
Process (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2008), 154.
30
Tacit Signals
Since tacit signalling involves policy pronouncements or actual action on

ground, they are usually the least frequently used channels to transmit
nuclear signals. The 2001-02 stand-off confirms to the highly selective
use of tacit signals. In sum, one joint signal, and three signals each from
Pakistan and India were transmitted at different times during the crisis.
The first signal, amidst heightened tensions, came when Pakistan and
India agreed to adhere to the 31 December, 1988 agreement of
exchanging the list of coordinates of their nuclear facilities.18
India sent the next tacit signal on 25 January, 2002, by testing the
nuclear capable Agni I missile. 19 India also tested a supersonic cruise
missile, the Brahmos on April 28, 2002. Between May 24-26, 2002,
Pakistan tested three ballistic missiles.
The final tacit signal came after the active military stand-off was
over. In January 2003, India made its draft nuclear doctrine public in an
attempt to convince the world of its responsible nuclear policy. 20
Moreover, it also sought to clearly establish its deterrent capability by
underscoring its second-strike capability.
Indirect Signals
Lack of any direct communication between Pakistan and India during the
stand-off meant that virtually all signalling had to take place through
indirect channels. A total of 67 relevant indirect signals were transmitted
during the crisis. One inherent problem with indirect signalling is the
18 Rahul Roy Chaudhaury, “Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory, and Escalation Control,”

in Michael Krepon, Rodney Jones, and Ziad Haider, eds.,
Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington DC: Stimson
Center2004), 105.
19 Alex Wagner, “India Tests Short Range Agni Ballistic Missile,” Arms Control
Today, March 2002 ; also see Feroz Hasan Khan, “Nuclear Signalling, Missiles, and
Escalation Control in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon, Rodney Jones and Ziad
Haider, eds., Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington,
DC: Stimson Center, 2004), 88.
20 Press Release, “The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalisation
of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
January 4, 2003, http://www.meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm
31
Strategic Studies
absence of a specified recipient in most cases, forcing all parties

involved to assume it is directed to them. Added to this, due to non-
specified recipient, it is easier for the transmitters to retract or deny any
such signal.
Almost all indirect signals by India or Pakistan pointed to multiple

audiences or meant for domestic consumption. Moreover, signals that were
either passive or sounded general warnings about nuclear weapons use were
directed as much to the US as to the adversary or the South Asian masses.
Signals from Washington were clearer in their targeted audience than

messages emanating from Islamabad and New Delhi. Majority of the
relevant signals made by the then Secretary of State, Colin Powell
highlighted the dangers and futility of nuclear weapons use as well as to
dissuade any ambitions of initiating an attack on the other side.
The Actors
The total number of actors transmitting relevant positive or negative nuclear

signals from India, Pakistan, and third parties, were as high as 31. From
India, 14 actors transmitted signals while Pakistan sent out its messages
through 10 sources. Among third party sources, the U.S. was the major
external force involved. Signals from the US targeted towards either one or
both countries were transmitted through four sources.
An analysis of the make-up of the actors and their relevance across

the two phases reveals an interesting picture. Phase I turns out to be more
stable in terms of nuclear signalling, with India using six, and Pakistan
and the US four sources each. 21 Two of the U.S. signals were sent
directly. Major actors involved in signalling from the Indian side were
Omar Abdullah, the then Minister for State for external affairs, the then
BJP Party President, the then Indian Army Chief, General Padmanabhan
and the then Defence Minister, George Fernandez. From Pakistan, the
then President Pervez Musharraf and the then Foreign Minister Abdul
Sattar transmitted majority of the indirect signals. The most interesting
set of actors transmitting signals in the first phase came from the U.S.
21Two Indian signals were tacitly transmitted through missile tests during phase 1
and one tacit signal was conveyed by both sides by exchanging lists of the nuclear
facilities. These are not considered in the discussion on actors.
32
Apart from the then Secretary of State, Colin Powell, an official contact
between governments of Pakistan, India and the US brought threatening
troop movement to their notice.
In the first phase of the crisis, most of the relevant nuclear signalling
took place within the first month of the crisis. Within this short period, a
total of 12 actors transmitted indirect nuclear signals. This is much
higher than an optimal scenario and points to instability within the
nuclear regime. The second phase of the crisis, which followed the attack
on the Indian Army camp in Kaluchak witnessed a plethora of relevant
(indirect) nuclear signals from both sides as well as third parties. The
number of actors also grew significantly in phase II, pointing to the fact
that neither side saw the presence of a large number of signalling actors
as an instability-inducing factor.
Interestingly, while Pakistan and the U.S. seem to have chosen their
point men to conduct bulk of the signalling, in the Indian case no actor
was entrusted with the central role. For Pakistan, President Musharraf
made the most signals. From the U.S., Colin Powell was entrusted with the
job of ensuring détente in the crisis and made several relevant nuclear
observations in the process. While Indian Defence Minister, George
Fernandez made the most signals for India, other key actors remained
similarly active. Strangely, Prime Minister Vajpayee was largely dormant
until the threat of war had been averted and tensions subsided. His signals,
three in total, mostly fall towards the tail end of the active stand-off.
With regard to number-induced-instability, the second phase turns out to

be more unstable than the first phase. Apart from the greater number of
actors, phase II also witnessed a number of signals being made and
subsequently being contradicted or clarified by relevant actors. The Indian
side clarified comments made by Prime Minister Vajpayee and Defence
Secretary, Yogendra Narain. Vajpayee on June 18, 2002 stated: “if Pakistan
had not agreed to end infiltration, and America had not conveyed that
guarantee to India, then war would not have been averted.”22 The Indian
Ministry of External Affairs almost instantaneously issued a clarification
that Vajpayee’s comments did not in any way signal to India’s desire to start
a nuclear conflict. Yogendra Narain said: “India would retaliate with nuclear
22“India Claims ‘Victory without War’,” Nation, June 18, 2002; “Pak: Pledge on
Ultras Averted War,” Hindu, June 18, 2002.
33
Strategic Studies
weapons if Pakistan used its atomic arsenal… everything is finalised… we

don’t expect any delay in issuing orders.” 23 The clarification, as was
warranted, came from the Defence Minster himself who suggested: “…
India does not believe in the use of nuclear weapons.”24
On Pakistani side, after President Musharraf stated on 30 December,

2002: “that if the Indian army moved just a single step between the
international or the LoC… it would not be a conventional war.25 Islamabad
clarified it did not refer to nuclear war, as the media projected.26
While it is impossible to establish whether a signal was intentionally

transmitted and then clarified according to a pre-determined plan or was a
spontaneous statement that did not fall in line with the overall signalling
plan, the fact that two of these signals were made from the highest level
suggests that it was in fact a lack of planning that led to the transmission of
these signals. In the final outcome, this points to the fact that actors
transmitting signals, when not briefed about the situation (also a function of
the number of actors since the larger the number the tougher it is to
coordinate signals), could convey signals contrary to the country’s
established diplomatic line at a particular point in time.
Contextualising Nuclear Signals in the 2001-02 Stand-off
Phase I
Majority of the relevant nuclear signalling in the first phase was conducted
within the first month of the parliament attack. Apparently, little planning
went into signals from either side perhaps because of the sudden onset of
the crisis. However, an overall signalling pattern does emerge.
23 “Indian Official Says Attack Plan Ready: Defence Ministry Plays Down Report,
Dawn, June 4, 2002, https://www.dawn.com/news/40179/indian-official-says-
attack-plan-ready-defence-ministry-plays-down-report
24 “India Rules Out Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Times of India, June 3, 2002; “War,
If At All, Will be Sans Nukes: Army,” Pioneer, June 4, 2002.
25 “Warning Forced India to Pull Back Troops, says President,” Dawn, December
31, 2002.
26 “Warning Forced India to Pull Back Troops, says President,” Dawn, December
31, 2002.
34
Indian nuclear signals in the first month of the crisis were highly
provocative and looked to exert excessive pressure on Pakistan to comply
with its demands of roping in extremists and eliminating cross border
terrorism. The immediate reaction of the Indian Cabinet was to “liquidate
the terrorists and their sponsors wherever they are, whoever they are.”27 In
the first ten days of the crisis, at least two signals from India suggested
extreme complacency and a willingness to test Pakistan’s nuclear red
lines. 28 Omar Abdullah suggested on the day Operation Parakram was
launched that there is a feeling that surgical strikes will not lead to full-
fledged conflict. Indian Army expressed its preparedness for a strike and
pointed out that limited action in Azad Kashmir would not lead to a large-
scale conflagration since Pakistan’s political situation will not allow its
army to under-take full-fledged war.29 Two highly provocative statements
were made during this period. Indian Defence Minister, George Farnandez
stated: We can strike at Pakistan, and then survive a retaliatory attack and
again strike back to finish off Pakistan. 30 On 11 January, 2002, Indian
Army Chief General Padmanabhan claiming that India possessed the
capability of a retaliatory strike, warned that if any country was “mad
enough” to initiate a nuclear strike against India, then “the perpetrator of
that particular outrage shall be punished severely.”31 Perhaps in a bid to
27 Celia W. Dugger, “Terrorists Attack Parliament in India, Killing Seven People,”

New York Times, December 13, 2001.On this point also see Chari, Cheema, Cohen,
“Four Crises and a Peace Process American Engagement in South Asia,” (Noida:
HarperCollins, 2008) 151; Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory
Policy, and Escalation Control,” in Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad
Haider, eds., Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington
DC: Stimson Center, 2004),101-103: Moeed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear
Environments U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2018), 87-88.
28 J.P. Shukla, “No Weapon Will Be Spared for Self Defence: PM,” Hindu, January
3, 2002. Moeed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments U.S. Crisis
Management in South Asia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 87-90.
Also see T. Jyaraman, “Nuclear Crisis in South Asia,” Frontline, vol.19, no.12 (June
2002).
29 K. Subrahmanyam, “Indio-Pak Nuclear Conflict Unlikely,” Times of India,
January 2, 2002.
30 “Pakistan will be Wiped out in Nuclear Counterattack: Fernandes,” Agence
France-Presse, January 27, 2003. Also see T. Jyaraman, “Nuclear Crisis in South
Asia,” Frontline, vol.19, no.12 (June 2002).
31 Josy Joseph, “Army Chief Goes on the Offensive, Says Situation on Border is
‘War-Like,’” Rediff.com, January 11, 2002,
http://inhome.rediff.com/news/2002/jan/11army2.htm
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Strategic Studies
thwart any impression of India pressing the issue and forcing Pakistan to
take extreme measures, within hours of the Army Chief’s statement,
Fernandez issued a written statement repudiating the “uncalled for
concerns” caused by the Army Chief’s remarks and suggested that nuclear
issues ought not to be handled “in a cavalier manner.”32
Pakistani signals throughout the early stages of the crisis were

balanced and meant to signal its resolve to appear as responsible state,
not prone in making a hasty decision to use nuclear weapons. Two of
such signals came from Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar in his statements
on 30 and 31 December, 2001. “Nuclear weapons are awful weapons and
any use of these weapons should be inconceivable for any state.”33 He
maintained that nuclear weapons were meant for defence and deterrence,
and Pakistan did not want a local, general or nuclear war.34
The only major aggressive nuclear signal from Islamabad was

conveyed at a time when tensions in phase I were on a decline. In his
Pakistan Day speech on March 23, 2002, President Musharraf emphasised
on teaching an “unforgettable lesson” to any aggression from India. The
fact that no clarification was subsequently made suggests that the signal
was intentional and was aimed at convening the credibility of Pakistan’s
nuclear deterrent, something Pakistan had refrained from doing thus far in
the crisis in a bid to calm international concerns.35
Perhaps the most consequential signalling in phase I was undertaken

by Washington. Secretary of State, Colin Powell was in direct contact
with both sides and even publically asked India that it should desist from
military action.36 The US role was even acknowledged by Musharraf.
In a bid to avoid misunderstanding or action based on faulty or lack

of intelligence, the U.S., at least on three occasions shared information
32 “Uncalled for Concerns: Fernandes,” Hindu, January 12, 2002.

33 “Islamabad Adheres to Norms of Coexistence: Freedom to Struggle Confused
with Terrorism: Sattar,” Dawn, December 30, 2001.
34 “No Action to Be Taken in Haste, Says Sattar,” Dawn, December 31, 2001.
35 “Pakistan President: ‘Our Hopes are High,’ CNN, March 23, 2002,
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/03/23/pakistan.musharraf.speec
h/index.html
36 “India Must Exercise Restraint: Powell,” Hindu, December 17, 2001.
36
with both countries informing them of troop or missile movements on

the ground.
Moeed Yusuf in his magnum opus discussed the infamous interview

given by Director General Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as Pakistan’s
attempt “to signal its nuclear threshold for using nuclear weapons in
January.”37 According to Yusuf:
General Khalid Kidwai, the defacto head of Pakistan’s

nuclear establishment, enunciated Pakistan’s redlines
while talking to a group of Italian scientists who were
allowed to makes these public: Pakistan would employ
the nuclear option if India attacks Pakistan and takes
over a large part of its territory (space threshold); if it
destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or airforces
(military threshold)’ if it proceeds to strangle Pakistan
economically (economic threshold); or if it pushes
Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-
scale internal subversion in Pakistan — domestic
threshold).38
This as per Moeed Yusuf’s assessment was a signal that could be read
in more than one ways:
While many have seen this as a provocative signal

emphasising Pakistan’s commitment to using nuclear
weapons first, it was a clever message that conveyed
resolve but was equally meant to allay concerns that
Pakistan would choose to employ its nuclear capability
early on in a conflict.39
Phase II
During this phase, Pakistan adopted a two-pronged approach to nuclear

signalling. While emphasising through signals emanating from the highest
level, Pakistan’s responsible nature and its abhorrence to contemplation of
37 Yusuf, “Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments U.S. Crisis Management in

South Asia,” 93.
South Asia,” 93.
South Asia,” 93.
37
Strategic Studies
nuclear weapon use, it also sought to give strong signals that it was
intentionally keeping all options open and would not compromise on the
credibility of its deterrent. The most passive signals came from Musharraf
who at least on five occasions from the beginning of the second phase till
late July 2002 categorically ruled out even considering nuclear weapon
use. However, for the most part, actors around Musharraf sent signals
meant to convey the credibility of the country’s nuclear deterrent.
In late May and early June 2002, Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Dr.
Maleeha Lodhi and the Permanent Representative at the UN, Ambassador
Munir Akram both stated on different occasions that Pakistan did not
ascribe to the ‘no first use’ policy with regard to nuclear weapons. 40
Musharraf himself suggested that “one shouldn’t even be discussing these
things, because any sane individual cannot even think of going into this
unconventional war, whatever the pressures,” and that “let us hope that
good sense prevails (and) this does not lead to escalation. It has not
because we are restraining ourselves, and let Indians not test our patience
and restraint because it will be very dangerous.” Musharraf asserted:
“frustration and inability of India to attack Pakistan or conduct a so-called
limited war, bear ample testimony to the fact that strategic balance exists
in South Asia, and that Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capability
deter aggression.” Musharraf, in an interview to a German Magazine on
April 6, 2002 stated: “Using nuclear weapons would only be a last resort
for us. We are negotiating responsibly. And I am optimistic and confident
that we can defend ourselves using conventional weapons... only if there is
a threat of Pakistan being wiped off the map, then the pressure from my
countrymen to use this option would be too great.”41
40 Zamir Akram, The Security Imperative Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence and

Diplomacy, (Karachi: Paramount, 2023) 223; Masood Haider, “Islamabad Refuses
to Accept ‘No First Use Doctrine’,” Dawn, May 31, 2002; Dharam Shourie,
“Defiant Pakistan Threatens to Use Nukes,” Rediff.com, May 30, 2002,
http://in.rediff.com/news/2002/may/30war2.htm as quoted in Rahul Roy Ch,
“Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory, and Escalation Control,”109-110.
41 “Kashmir Konflikt: Pakistan’s Musharraf droht Indien der Atombombe,”
(Kashmir Conflict: Musharraf of Pakistan Threatens India with Nuclear Bomb), Der
Spiegel, April 6, 2003; “Pakistan Clarifies Threat to Use Nukes,” Rediff News, April
11, 2002.
38
To signal credibility, Pakistan sent three tacit signals by testing the

Ghauri, the Ghaznavi, and the Abdali missiles within a span of four days
in May 2002.42
India during this phase sent mixed and often confusing signals because
various actors involved in signalling were not operating under a set plan.
Post Kaluchak attack, New Delhi made every effort to convince its domestic
public of its resolve to take revenge. Amidst such high war rhetoric, New
Delhi was looking to convince the international community of Pakistan’s
culpability and to reinforce the perception that Pakistan was behaving
irresponsibly with nuclear weapons.
Responding to Musharraf’s televised address on 27 May, 2002 which

New Delhi considered ‘provocative and counterproductive’ Indian MEA
exhorted: “India is not talking about it now (nuclear conflict)…we are not
greatly impressed by these missile antics, particularly as they are based on
imported technology.”43 At the 57th sessions of the UN General Assembly
in September 2002, Vajpayee warned that nuclear blackmail had emerged
as a “new arrow in the quiver of State-sponsored terrorism and that to
succumb to such blatant “nuclear terrorism” would mean “forgetting the
bitter lessons of the September 11 tragedy.”44
The second leg of the Indian strategy, like Pakistan’s was to convey
restraint and signal resolve at the same time. Making a point in response
to Pakistan might use nukes if attacked, it was stated by Fernandez that
India can survive a nuclear attack, but Pakistan cannot.” However, this
was clarified by the Indian Ministry of Defence in an official statement
which stated: “India categorically rules out the use of nuclear weapons.
India is a responsible country and it feels that it would be imprudent to
use such weapons.”45
42 Chaudhaury, “Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory, and Escalation Control,” 110.

43 “Roundup: Pakistan Conducts Missile Tests Amid Rising Tensions with India,” as
quoted in Rahul Roy Chaudhaury, “Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory, and Escalation
Control,” 111; Also see “Pak. Missile Test a Provocation,” Hindu, October 5, 2002.
th
44 Address by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the 57 session of the
United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 13, 2002,
https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/68779lms53.pdf
45 “Indian Rules Out Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Times of India, June 3, 2002.
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Strategic Studies
Phase II: The Tail-end
The final twist in nuclear signalling from India and Pakistan came
towards the tail end of the crisis. The intention was to signal resolve and
credibility of the nuclear threat. Signalling at this stage was aimed at the
domestic audience and with future crises in mind. Moreover, the
international community was also being targeted to suggest the
importance of reigning in the adversary and warning them against any
future adventures.
On 30 December 2002, Musharraf stated: “if the Indian Army moved

just a single step beyond the international border or the LoC then
Inshallah the Pakistan Army and the supporters of Pakistan would
surround the Indian Army and that would not be a conventional war.”46
George Fernandez, in January 2003 suggested on two different
occasions: “we can take a bomb or two or more…but when we respond
there will be no Pakistan” and “…if Pakistan has decided that it wants to
get itself destroyed and erased from the world map, then it may take this
step of madness, but if (it) wants to survive then it would not do so.”47
None of these signals, however, were relevant to the 2001-02 stand-off
since the crisis was well on its way towards total de-escalation at the
time.
Analysis
Having discussed the existence of instability inducing factors in terms of

high proportion of indirect signals and large number of actors, as well as the
seeming intentions of all involved parties behind sending signals, it is time
to analyse the impact of these signals on military planning on both sides. In
this section we try to connect the theoretical argument of instability to on
ground developments to determine any visible impacts of nuclear signals on
either side’s war planning.
As per the conceptual framework based on the classical deterrence

literature provided in this paper, provocative signalling could lead to
46 “Warning Forced India to Pull Back Troops, Says President,” Dawn, December
31, 2002.
47 “Pakistan will be Wiped Out in Nuclear Counterattack: Fernandes,” Agence
France-Presse, January 27, 2003.
40
states interpreting messages conservatively and thus following up with

aggressive measures that may create further misunderstanding. It would
be interesting to see if provocative signals actually forced either side to
make any visible alterations to force positioning or movements on the
ground during the stand-off. Of course, on ground movements could be a
result of any number of factors. Therefore, admittedly, to determine
direct causality between on ground movements and any one factor that
might have influenced the movement is a difficult task. For example, it is
almost impossible to determine if a move has been made in line with a
pre-decided plan or any induced variable such as a specific nuclear
signal. However, one would still expect to see at least a weak correlation
between on ground movements and provocative signalling if the latter
has any bearing on the former.
An analysis of the 2001-02 stand-off suggests almost non-existent/

hardly/virtually no correlation between periods of highly provocative
signalling and aggressive ground movements. As can be expected, the
two major ground movements took place immediately after the 13
December, 2005 and 14 May, 2006 events. Operation Parakram was
launched five days after the parliament attack.48 Post-May 14, 2002 India
immediately ordered five warships to be moved from the Bay of Bengal
to the Indian Ocean; ordered the Army to adopt offensive operations
guidelines, moved Mirage 2000 fighters to forward airfields and
conducted a freshwar-game in Bikaner. After the Kaluchak attack, on 22
May, the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the area and while
addressing the troops announced that the time for a decisive battle has
come and that India will be victorious in it.49 Ironically, two days later,
he went for a five day vacation.50
U.S. Role in the 2001-02 Stand-off
The stand-off witnessed intense involvement from the international

community, particularly the U.S. The aim of the U.S. involvement was to
48 Chari, Cheema, Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process American Engagement
in South Asia, (Noida: Harper Collins, 2008), 153.
49 Luv Puri, “Be Ready for Decisive Battle, PM Tells Jawans,” Hindu, May 23,
2002.
50 Nayak and Krepon, U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,
(Washington: Stimson Center, 2006), 18.
41
Strategic Studies
ensure prevention of conflict at all costs. In the absence of direct

signalling channels between the two, both Pakistan and India relied
solely on the U.S. to transmit any messages that they ideally would have
conveyed directly to the other side. The stand-off thus witnessed the
existence of the ‘dependence-independence paradox.’ Moreover, an
active U.S. role also provided a certain level of comfort to both countries
that the U.S. would not allow things to spiral out of control. Such
complacency overlooks the limitations of U.S. influence and is highly
dangerous in a nuclear charged environment.
An evaluation of the U.S. signals in the stand-off also points to certain

risks associated with communication ‘rechanneling.’ Washington’s nuclear
signals as well as reporting missile and troop movements have the potential
of causing unnecessary misunderstanding. The U.S. information on missile
movements would automatically point to an aggressive intent of the
adversary. It overlooks the fact that missile movement during crises can
even be precautionary operational needs or defensive in nature and could
actually be stability-inducing.
Finally, while it remains in the supreme interest of the U.S. and the
entire world not to see a nuclear outbreak in the region, signalling from
third parties is bound to be influenced by their own interest and alliances
in the region. At the time of the 2001-02 stand-off, the U.S. was embroiled
in a military operation in Afghanistan and Pakistan was its frontline ally.
This was one reason many analysts contended that the U.S. did not support
India openly and in fact resented India’s move to tie its fight against
terrorism with the U.S. war on terror. Since the stand-off, the U.S. policy
in the region has seen a major shift towards India and the two are set to be
partners in a long-term strategic relationship.
Threat of Nuclear War: Western versus South Asian Perceptions
The 2001-02 stand-off also confirms the already known stark difference
between the perceptions of the international community versus those at
the helm of affairs in South Asia. The heightened alarm among the
international community about the realistic possibility of nuclear war in
South Asia during the stand-off does not match the sentiments within
42
South Asia. 51 Anecdotal evidence collected by the author during the

stand-off suggests a clear difference between the perceptions. In the
U.S., there were heightened fears, suggesting to some that the West did
not consider South Asian leaders capable of handling nuclear crises
carefully. Signals sent out during the crises reinforce this point. The
sense of complacency against an all-out war was clear from Omar
Abdullah’s statements at the very beginning of the crisis that there is a
feeling that surgical strikes will not lead to full-fledged conflict or that
several officers are confident that “surgical” strikes won’t lead to war.
Dispelling any concerns of immaturity among the South Asian
leadership, George Fernandez stated in June 2002: “I don’t agree with
the idea that India and Pakistan are so prudent and excitable that they’ll
forget what nuclear weapons can do “I think it should be accepted that in
South Asia there are responsible leaders. They may be belligerent and
not fulfill their promises. But on nuclear matters, the subcontinent is
alive to the implications. If the Western powers and China know how to
keep their nuclear capabilities under control, the same holds good for
India and Pakistan.”52
Conclusion
A close examination of the nuclear signalling during the Indo-Pakistan

stand-off brings to fore the limitations of the classical literature and
theoretical debates on signalling, deterrence stability and escalation risks
that evolved during the cold war when applied to the Indo-Pakistan case.
It could be argued that there is a need to develop a theoretical model
based on the ground realities of South Asian to make sense of issues
related to strategic stability in South Asia.
As regard nuclear signalling, following points are important for any

further analysis of the impact of signalling on the strategic stability in South
Asia: first, the make-up of the actors and their relevance is important.
51 Bharat Karnard, “South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Nuclear Deterrence

Theory,” India Review, vol. 4, no.2 (April 2005):203-04.
52 Note that Fernandez included Pakistani leadership in his statement as well, since
the signal was pointed to the international community with the aim of dispelling
fears about both Pakistan and India being irresponsible with nuclear weapons.
Blaming Pakistan in this case would have reinforced Western fear. For details see
Jawed Naqvi, “Delhi Sees No Chance of N-Weapons Use,” Dawn, June 4, 2002;
“Fernandes Dismisses Fears of Nuclear War,” Hindu, June 4, 2002.
43
Strategic Studies
Second, timing is very important to study a signal. Third, at times a signal

could be misinterpreted or misunderstood. This gets further complicated if
and when the receiver fails to get the intended message as it results in more
aggressive signals/measures. Fourth, taking a non-signal as a signal. For
instance, missile tests are planned well in advance. However, if the timing
of such test fall during an active crisis, it is taken as a signal. Fifth, to avoid
misperceptions and miscalculations, parties to a conflict should develop a
clear set of principles for signalling to each other.
As amply demonstrated in the paper, this research aimed at achieving

two research objectives: develop a theoretical model about nuclear
signalling and risk of escalation and then test it using the case study of
2002 Indo-Pakistan military stand-off. As the analysis was based on
single case study for an extensive and in-depth analysis and paucity of
space, it did not mention all signals or incorporate and analyse other
Indo-Pakistan crises such as the Mumbai crisis and Pulwama/ Balakot
crisis. It would be apposite to see how these crises evolved and how
nuclear signalling was conducted during these crises. Equally prudent
would be to see whether the conceptual framework/model presented in
this paper about nuclear signalling, deterrence stability and risk of
escalation is applicable to all nuclear relevant crises between India and
Pakistan.
44
Global Power Shift and Foreign
Policy Choices for Pakistan
Rizwana Abbasi*
Abstract
The shifting global order suggests arrival of the world away from the U.S.-
led liberal unipolar order. The rise of the rest, notably, the Chinese vision
reflected in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has defied the U.S. global
hegemony. For example, China’s growing wealth and power, Russia’s
resurge and belligerence, Europe’s pursuit for strategic autonomy, India’s
rise and its strategic balancing, turmoil in the Middle East and its
inclination to Asia suggest a world slipping away from the U.S.-led
hegemonic liberal order. The U.S., which once was a lead player, is unlikely
to play its global leadership role to manage global governance alone, and
even not China is yet close to replacing it. Thus, the argument is that the
U.S. global hegemony is waning while the world has entered a new era of
bumpier multipolarity with several interdependencies. Consequently, the
balancers, not the hedgers and/ or bandwagoners will capitalize on the new
world order. Pakistan’s security in this context, is inextricably linked to the
global and regional evolving order, which demands the contours of its
foreign policy centred on a balancing act.
Keywords: Global Power Shift, Hegemony, Liberal Order, Rules-

based Order, Multipolarity, BRI, Foreign Policy.
Introduction
The distribution of global power is constantly shifting marked by

transforming geo-political and geo-economic realities, innovation of new
technologies and proliferation of information and communication
technologies. The U.S. appeared as a global leader in the post-World War II
era by establishing the global liberal order. This means that the U.S. created
* The author is Associate Professor of Security Studies in the Department of

International Relations at National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad.
Email: rabbasi@numl.edu.pk.
1
Strategic Studies
and enforced ‘the rules of a liberal international order.’ 1 The ‘liberal

international order’ further means that the global system is not completely
anarchic but there is a rules-based mechanism of global institutions, which
govern inter-state relations.2 The rules-based international order3 reflects the
centrality of a world view based on Western-led liberal democratic values.
Global institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB),
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization and,
security alliances i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
other such mechanisms4 became the ground for the global rules-based order.
The demise of bipolarity was illustrated as a triumph of liberalism led by the
U.S. hegemonic designs. The U.S. projected its power globally by
encompassing economic interdependence (free trade), multilateral rules and
institutions, democratic political systems, and values and norms (especially
universal human rights). The U.S. liberal hegemony means that the U.S.
based on its liberal values and designs projected preponderant influence or
authority over others.
Nevertheless, the rise of the rest, notably, the Chinese vision reflected
in its BRI has defied the U.S. global hegemony. China’s growing wealth
and power, Russia’s resurge and belligerence, Europe’s pursuit for
strategic autonomy, India’s rise and its strategic balancing, turmoil in the
Middle East and its inclination to Asia suggest a world slipping away from
the ‘U.S.-led hegemonic liberal order.’ 5 The global power structure
entering a new era of multipolarity where almost all the regional states are
aligning and realigning to capitalise on the emerging world order. The
global power contestation has pushed the states into technological
competition and military asymmetries, lawfare, economic coercion
through IMF, Financial Action Task Force (FATF), technological denials,
economic slump and hybrid warfare. The geopolitical competition is
1 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 31-54.
2 Marc Trachtenberg, “The Problem of International Order and How to Think About
it,” The Monist, vol. 89, no. 2 (2006): 207, http://www.jstor.com/stable/27903976
3 Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Cevallos Astrid
Stuth, Understanding the Current International Order: Building a Sustainable
International Order Series (Santa, Monica Calif: Rand Corporation, 2016), 14-15.
4 John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of International Liberal
Order,” International Security, vol. 43, no. 4 (2019): 26.
5 John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International
Realities (Yale: Yale University Press, 2018).
2
Global Power Shift and Foreign Policy
compounding the challenges posed by the non-traditional security threats

thereby turning major powers’ attention away from climate change, 6
health, water, energy, food security, refugee crises and non-state actors.7
The war in Ukraine has been a classic example of this where the
disruptions caused by the conflict impacted the food and energy security
of several countries already struggling with low yields due to the impacts
of climate change.
Thus, the argument is that the U.S. global hegemony is wanning

while the world has entered a new era of bumpier multipolarity with
several interdependencies. Small states have three strategic options when
they are confronted by rising and declining powers i.e., balancing,
bandwagoning and hedging. Bandwagoning serves smaller states by
preserving their interests at the expense of great powers. In
bandwagoning, aligning with a powerful coalition assists the aligned
state to appease and gain some measure of security. 8 The key role of
small states which know they lack the resources and capacity to
influence the international system is likely to be one of bandwagoning
rather than balancing with powerful countries by the desire for gain. 9
Hedging is a set of strategies that ‘cultivate a middle position that
forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of
another’, and ‘refers to any behaviour that sits in between balancing and
bandwagoning’. 10 Contrary to the policy of bandwagoning, balancing
policy let states ally against prevailing threats. It also helps smaller states
to escape avoid joining the greater powers because aligning with the
strong side makes the small states vulnerable to the whims of its
6 Maximilian Terhalle and Joanna Depledge, “Great-power Politics, Order

Transition, and Climate Governance: Insights from International Relations
Theory,” Climate Policy, vol. 13, no. 5 (2013): 572-573.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2013.818849
7 Einsiedel Von Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Bruno StagnoUgarte, “The UN
Security Council in an Age of Great Power Rivalry,” Tokyo: United Nations
University Working Paper 4 (2015).
8 Sandya Nishanthi Gunasekara, “Bandwagoning, Balancing, and Small States: A
Case of Sri Lanka,” Asian Social Science; vol. 11, no. 28 (2015), 216.
9 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
10 Alexander Korolev, “Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia
Relations,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 9, issue no. 4 (Winter
2016).
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Strategic Studies
partners.11 Therefore, aligning with the weaker side rather than aligning
with coalitions of powerful states is the better policy for small states to
safeguard their interests. In a balancing world, states do not balance
merely against power, but they balance against threat. 12 Thus, balancers,
not the hedgers and/ or bandwagoners will capitalise on the new world
order. Smaller states like Pakistan have to make calculated foreign policy
choices based on a balancing act to capitalise on the emerging era of
multipolarity.
Great Power Competition — Who Dominates Whom
Global Power Shift to Asia
Butter not Guns determine destiny of Asia. China not the U.S. holds the
key in Asia. The Asia-Pacific region appears to be the most dynamic
region of the world, thereby, becoming the fulcrum for global power
projection. The U.S.’s pivot to Asia and its Indo-Pacific strategy13 has
been motivated by three driving factors, i.e., promoting economic
growth; maintaining the balance against China’s growing strength; and
sustaining its long-term presence there. Thus, the U.S. projects its power
by pursuing a policy of selective/deep engagement 14 through bilateral,
trilateral and multilateral alliance systems. Regional territorial disputes
between states,15 the security threats posed by nuclear North Korea, the
presence of undemocratic governments, ethnic issues and drug
trafficking legitimise the U.S. power projection in Asia. China’s
declaration of the South and East China Seas claims, unsettled key
disputes between China and its neighbouring countries, China’s building
of artificial islands around the South China Sea, and positioning of its
military batteries in the Paracel Island chain make the U.S. deeply
11 Sandya Nishanthi Gunasekara, “Bandwagoning, Balancing, and Small States: A

Case of Sri Lanka.”
12 T.Y. Wang and Alexander C. Tan, “Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging:
Taiwan’s Strategic Choices in the Era of a Rising China,” Political Science, 73:1
(2021): 66-84.
13 William Choong, “The Return of the Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Assessment,”
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 5 (2019): 415-430.
14 Charles L. Glaser, “A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order is
Misguided,” International Security, vol. 43, no. 4 (Spring 2019): 79.
15 Francesco Mancini, “Uncertain Borders: Territorial Disputes in Asia,” SSRN
(2017).
4
concerned. Chinese construction of ports, i.e., Gwadar, Hambantota,

Sittwe, and Chittagong, which are part of its transport corridor for trade
also create discomfort for the U.S. In parallel, the security of navigation
on trade lines/naval routes, and the rising geopolitical significance of
choke points i.e., the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca determine the U.S.
assertiveness in that region. The U.S. aims to limit China’s access to the
Arabian Sea, thereby obstructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), a fulcrum of China’s BRI to protect all sea lines of
communication (SLOCs discussed below) passing through the entire
Asia-Pacific to the broader Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Accordingly, the U.S. is fostering economic relations with the East

and the Southeast Asian countries. This is followed by establishing deep
bilateral security and military alliances with other states, 16 adapting
renewed military operational plans and stationing of military forces
across the Western Pacific. The U.S. has a joint strategic positioning of
the military platforms with South Korea and Japan to the North,
Australia and the Philippines to the South, and Guam as the forward
base. 17 Thus, the U.S. feels more militarily prepared to contain the
Chinese foothold in the disputed waters and its threat to Japan or
Taiwan.
The U.S. has further deepened its engagement in the region through
multilateral platforms i.e., the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the East-Asia-Summit (EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Forum (APEC),18 evolving Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(QUAD) 19 and a new trilateral alliance system among Australia, the
16 Feng Liu, “The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness: China’s Responses to the

Indo-Pacific Challenge,” International Affairs, vol. 96, no. 1 (2020): 12-13.
17 Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks:
China Conceptualises the Pacific Island Chains,” The China Quarterly, no. 225 (2016):
12-13.
18 Ralf Emmers, Joseph Chinyong Liow and See Seng Tan, “The East Asia Summit
and the Regional Security Architecture,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian
Studies, no. 3 (2010): 3.
19 Benjamin Clarke, “Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Current and
Future Perceptions,” IPRI Journal, vol. 19, no. 1 (2019): 30.
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Strategic Studies
United Kingdom and the U.S. (AUKUS).20 To counter China’s rise, the
group of G7 countries have introduced a new initiative, i.e., Build Back
Better World (B3W) offering a parallel vision to China’s BRI for
infrastructure building and socio-economic development to low-and-
middle-income countries. The U.S. seems to be using technological
coercion and de-coupling against China thereby keeping the latter out of
emerging technology markets including AI, 5G, semiconductor chip
manufacturing etc.
China in parallel has achieved the status of the world’s largest global
economy thereby reducing the power differential with the U.S. China has
introduced a range of global initiatives under its global dream of a
‘Community of Common Destiny Future for Mankind’21 that demonstrate a
broader infrastructure-building vision, i.e., BRI that reflects the shifting
global order based on inclusive socio-economic growth and a more
equitable multipolar system. Thus, China believes that the U.S. military
footprints in the region are directed to obstruct the former’s commercial,
and economic projects22 and challenging its SLOCs as China’s 90 per cent
of hydrocarbons are shipped via blue seas, 23 which makes the Straits of
Hormuz and Malacca pivotal for China. Further, the U.S. aims to obstruct
the Chinese ‘first island chain’ that runs through South Korea via Japan to
the Philippines and Malaysia to Indonesia. Thus, China has embraced a
range of air, land and sea based contingency countermeasures to offset the
U.S. aggressive regional military strategies.24
20 Soumyodeep Deb and Nathan Wilson, “The Coming of QUAD and the Balance of
Power in the Indo-Pacific,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, vol. 4, no. 9 (2021): 111-
114.
21 Denghua Zhang, “The Concept of ‘Community of Common Destiny’ in China’s
Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implications,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies,
vol. 5, no. 2, (April 16, 2018): 196-207.
22 Zhao Tong, “China’s Strategic Environment and Doctrine,” in Robert Einhorn and
W. P. S. Sidhu, ed., The Strategic: Linking Pakistan, India, China and the United
States (Washington D.C Brookings Institution, March 2017), 17.
23 Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: New
Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace (London: Routledge, 2019).
24 Abbasi and Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: New Technologies and
Challenges to Sustainable Peace.
6
Some scholars predict 25 that war over the status of Taiwan is a

possibility and a risk of a conflict over one of China’s maritime
territorial disputes is likely because of the U.S. intervention. Others
believe26 that China can target the U.S. maritime platforms and military
bases surrounding 500 miles of China’s territory and interrupt the
network-centric system that supports U.S. military might throughout East
Asia. For some, 27 China’s naval doctrine i.e., anti-access area denial
(A2/AD) seeks to deny the U.S. access to the East and South China
Seas.28 Michael Beckley doubts China’s military capabilities29 to a level
that can control the coast of the East Asia,30 initiate a surprise attack,
carry a naval blockade or engage targets inside Taiwan. Arguably, the
U.S. has bolstered Taiwan’s military might and maintained supremacy to
obstruct China’s air and naval power in the western and southern Pacific.
That said, China is a defensive and a continental power 31 and is

perceived as a non-war-waging country. For example, China has effectively
managed the border disputes with all the neighbouring countries including
India not by waging wars but through constructive dialogues. Given its
growing economic strength and deeper integration in the East and the
Southeast Asia, the likelihood of war between the U.S. and China over
Taiwan or confrontation in the South China Sea seems less likely. For
example, from 2010 to 2020, the ASEAN countries’ combined GDP of
25 Patrick Porter and Michael Mazarr, “Countering Chinas Adventurism over

Taiwan: A Third Way,” Lowy Institute Analysis (2021), 25.
26 Abbasi and Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: New Technologies and
Challenges to Sustainable Peace.
27 Syed Muhammad Irteza Imam and Sufian Ullah, “Anti-Access Area Denial
Capabilities: Implications for Strategic Stability,” Journal of Security & Strategic
Analyses, vol. 6, no. 1 (2020): 07-32.
28 Michael Beckley, “Balancing China: How the United States and its Partners can
Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” War on the Rocks, November 15, 2017,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/balancing-china-united-states-partners-can-
check-chinese-naval-expansion/
29 Beckley, “Balancing China: How the United States and its Partners can Check
Chinese Naval Expansion.”
30 Beckley, “Balancing China: How the United States and its Partners can Check
Chinese Naval Expansion.”
31 Carolijn Van Noort, “The Aesthetic Power of Ships in International Political
Communication: Why Ships Matter in China’s Communication of the Maritime Silk
Road Initiative,” Global Society, vol. 36, no. 4 (2022): 519,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2021.1942801
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Strategic Studies
US$3 trillion added well to the global economy. In 2000, trade between the
ASEAN countries and China was US$29 billion ─ one-third of the region’s
trade with the U.S. Nevertheless, trade between the ASEAN countries and
China has increased to US$669 billion by 2021 whereas ASEAN trade with
the U.S. has also grown up by US$364 billion.32 Compared to China, the
U.S. has little to offer to the ASEAN countries. Notably, the U.S. President,
Joe Biden has offered investment of US$150 million in ASEAN countries
whereas President, Xi Jinping pledged an investment of US$1.5 billion to
ASEAN to recover from the covid-19 and reform their economies over the
succeeding three years.33 ASEAN countries aim to foster a regional order
based on a cooperative framework, guided by a policy of accommodation,
not confrontation. They adopt a balancing act thereby effectively evading
geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. The Global South are
the most populous countries of the world and they aspire to socio-economic
growth and are deeply concerned about their climate vulnerabilities, lack of
access to advanced technologies, and their necessity for better infrastructure
building, health facilities and access to inclusive education. Since China’s
global trade has expanded to more than 140 countries 34 while creating
deeper footprints across the African region, Latin America, the Middle East
and Europe. The ASEAN countries do not lag and are inclined towards
China for their socio-economic development.
China, in parallel, has established non-Western institutions to implement

its global vision i.e. a better world. These institutions include Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), a forum of leading economies such as
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP ─ which embraces 30% of
global GDP and is the major trading block that includes the largest
economies in Asia), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB ─ 105
members body) are the initiatives that challenge U.S.’s hegemony in Asia.
32 Kishore Mahbubani, “Asia’s Third Way: How ASEAN Survives-and Thrives-

amid Great-Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, February 28, 2023.
33 “Biden Pledges US$150m to ASEAN with an Eye on China,” Aljazeera, May 13,
2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/5/13/biden-pledges-150m-to-
asean-with-eye-on-china
34 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on October 20, 2022,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202210/t20221020_1
0788936.html
8
There are dozens of additional multilateral forums that promote regional

cooperation between China and the rest.
Thus efforts are stirring for the establishment of alternative currency

trading mechanisms to rebalance the existing financial system. The
BRICS has already introduced a parallel monetary system for trade 35 and
aspire to launch their local trading currencies thereby circumventing the
U.S. dollar. This offers a renewed framework for decoupling global trade
and financial systems. Arguably, the rapid collapse of the dollar is not in
Chinese interest, thus, it will happen gradually meanwhile, China
diversifies its foreign reserves portfolio.
More so, the instant repercussions of great power rivalries in Asia are
alarming, as it carries the likelihood of an asymmetrical but robust
coalition between Russia and China as both share their vision to foster a
new era of multipolarity against the U.S. domination. This certainly
minimises strategic opportunities for the U.S. in Asia by enhancing the
broader options available to China.
India in the Emerging Order
India is balancing not hedging while legitimising the new era of

multipolarity. In the process of great power competition, India is being
considered a regional stabiliser and a ‘net security provider’ in the
framework of the U.S. Indo-Pacific vision. 36 India, therefore, has been
mainstreamed in the global political and financial system i.e., it currently
holds the presidency (which rotates through its members) of G-20 countries
and has joined BRICS, India-Israel-UAE-USA (I2U2) and SCO. Its position
is elevated in the global economic institutions i.e., the IMF and FATF.
Being not a member to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), it enjoys
the benefits of an NPT state while securing nuclear suppliers group (NSG)
waiver and access to the global technological market. India in turn is
building artificial intelligence (AI)-led technologies, hypersonic systems,
35 Cynthia Roberts, ‘The BRICS in the Era of Renewed Great Power Competition,’
Strategic Analysis, vol. 43, no. 6(2019): 469,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2019.1672930
36 Sufian Ullah and Zeeshan Hayat, “India as a Net Security Provider in Indo-Pacific and
Implications for the Region,” NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability, vol. 4,
no. 1 (2021): 30.
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Strategic Studies
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems, aircraft carriers and nuclear

submarines. The U.S. has signed a range of defence agreements with India
that include the General Security of Military Information Agreement; the
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement; the Communication
Compatibility and Security Agreement; and, the Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement.37 India is involved in joint military exercises and is
a party to the QUAD alliance system and endorses the AUKUS.
Interestingly, India on the one hand is playing a hedge against China in

the U.S.’s favour while on the other hand, it is pursuing a selective and deep
engagement with global and regional powers thereby fostering its
independent rise. India’s ‘Look East Policy’ leads India to integrate into the
East Asian region while adhering to a policy of accommodation towards
China. India’s diplomatic relations based on the Look West policy are
deepening with the Middle East. Indo-Israel relations are expanding in the
economic and military domains. India is not serious about Western calls for
Russia’s condemnation of the Ukraine crisis. India’s neutrality on Russian
incursions in Ukraine does not mean that it supports the invasion, but it
aspires to create a balancing act to pursue its broader national interests. India
would describe this as “pursuing its national interests.” Therefore, Indo-
Russian collaboration is flourishing amid a deepening Indo-U.S. strategic
alliance.
India aims to position itself as a pivot of the global south to legitimise

coming multipolarity. India is successfully navigating the competing
strategic trends and accommodating all the players such as China, Russia
and the West at a time thereby maintaining a balancing act. Today the U.S.
is India’s major exporter. The trade between the two states in goods and
services touched US$128 billion making the U.S. top trading partner in
FY23.38 The partnership between the U.S. and India in the technological
domain is poised to deepen. India has on the one hand joined the Quad
alliance system and on the other hand, it also becomes a member of the
Shangai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). India regularly participates in
37 Joshua T. White, “After the Foundational Agreements: An Agenda for U.S.-India

Defence and Security Cooperation,” Brookings Institution (2021): 6.
38 “U.S. Emerges as India’s Biggest Trading Partner in FY23 at US$128.55 Billion;
China at Second Position,” Hindu, April 16, 2023,
https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/us-emerges-as-indias-biggest-trading-
partner-in-fy23-at-12855-billion-china-at-second-position/article66743587.ece
10
trilateral meetings with China and Russia thereby keeping all

communication channels open with China while maintaining the status of
the largest trading partner with the latter. In 2022, trade between China and
India in goods touched US$136 billion. India in parallel is also deepening
business ties, investment and trade with Taiwan. Thus India is doing an
impressive job of balancing act. The Indian administration has signalled to
maintain an old-style non-aligned position thereby moving away from
strategic hedging to strategic balancing while legitimising the new era of
multipoalrity.
Russia’s Resurgence
Russia is a resurgent power that shares a vision of a new world order away
from the domination of a single power. Russia has actively instrumentalised
its political influence to counter the U.S. domination in the Middle East,
Europe and Asia. For example, Russia is constantly maximising its outreach
and is in an advantageous position to become an active extra-regional player
to curtail the U.S. footprint in the Middle Eastern region while stepping in
Asia. For instance, Russia along with Iran extended successful military
support to the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad vis-à-vis the U.S.-backed
regional Saudi bloc in the Syrian civil war.39 Though, Damascus undoubtedly
remained Russia’s priority in the Middle East, nevertheless, Russia is
constantly maximizing its outreach in the region. Russia is establishing an
industrial zone in the strategically important Said East Port and a logistical
support base for its naval forces at Port Sudan. Russia seemingly is involved
in the North African Wagner Group, a military contracting firm that is
operating in Libya.40 Thus, Russia is in an advantageous position to become
an active extra-regional player in the Middle Eastern region.
In parallel, by dragging the U.S. into the Ukraine war, Russia has
succeeded in engaging the U.S., thus challenging its global hegemony.
Therefore, there seems no serious effort towards a diplomatic settlement to
39 Muhammad Ahmed Qadri, Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman and Sajid Iqbal, “Syrian
Imbroglio: A Complex Interaction of Local, Regional, and Extra-Regional Actors,”
Research Journal of Social Sciences and Economics Review, vol. 2, no. 2 (2021): 76-86.
40 Anna Borshchevskaya, Raed Wajeeh, Daniel Rakov, and Li-Chen Sim, ‘Russia in
the Middle East: A Source of Stability or a Pot-stirrer?’ Atlantic Council, April 21,
2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/russia-in-the-middle-east-
a-source-of-stability-or-a-pot-stirrer/
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Strategic Studies
the war, which means the war is likely to prolong for years yielding serious
global consequences for the world and greater losses for Ukraine. The
Western-style democracies of the world, on the one hand, have displayed a
deeper commitment to preserving the rules-based liberal international order
while inflicting extraordinary costs on Russia by backing Ukraine.
Contrarily, the global powers of the south have abstained from taking sides
by adhering to the Western stance on Ukraine. For example, the emerging
economies of BRICS from the global south have mutually agreed to
establish a parallel infrastructure for the global economic system.41 In the
above process, Russia has become unpopular in the West and growing in
popularity in the East and South. Putin’s vision is based on sharing a new
world order away from the influence of a single power.42 The argument here
is that the Western responses to the Russian intrusion in Ukraine have
united the Western democracies on the one hand but the U.S.-led range of
economic sanctions may lead to negatively affect the Western financial
system. The non-Western influencers will emerge with their matching
alternative undermining the substance of U.S.-led coercive mechanisms.
This will lead to a global monetary decoupling thus undermining the U.S.
hegemony and sustaining the new era of multipolarity.
Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy
The European countries are in quest of their strategic autonomy and aim
to diversify their value chains. The outbreak of a high-intensity war on
European soil has suggested a sharp rise in the Europeans’ interest for
strategic autonomy in security and defence matters. Over the last three
decades, debates on security and defence in Europe have centred on
crisis management, peacekeeping operations abroad, stabilisation and the
fight against terrorism in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa and the
Balkans. Now the war in Ukraine has affected the Europeans’ ambition
to strengthen its autonomy in security and, defence and diversify
41 Bas Hooijmaaijers, “China, the BRICS, and the Limitations of Reshaping Global
Economic Governance,” The Pacific Review, vol. 34, no. 1 (2021): 47-48,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1649298.
42 Maria Papageorgiou, Mohammad Eslami, and Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, “A ‘Soft’
Balancing Ménage à Trois? China, Iran and Russia Strategic Triangle vis-à-vis US
Hegemony,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, vol.10, no. 1
(2023): 78.
12
cautiously 43 to gain economic stability. The European countries face

climate-led urgencies, the fallouts of the covid-19, the consequences of
the Ukraine war that has fuelled shockwaves on supply chains, and food
and energy emergencies. Thus, European countries are certainly re-
evaluating their economic avenues and want to diversify their value
chains. There is a consensus that Europe should now adopt an
autonomous approach, taking responsibility to strengthen its defence
capabilities and minimise dependencies by crafting a new model of
growth and investment by the end of this decade. 44 The European states
are now looking towards Asia and rising China. Both China and Europe
have solid economic trade ties as the trade volume between the two hit
nearly 850 billion Euros in 2022 while China was the major importer and
the third-largest buyer of European goods. 45 These indicators become
compelling amid the energy and economic crisis in the backdrop of
ongoing Russian blackmail. The European countries aspire to momentary
alignment with the U.S. on Ukraine while economic dependencies on
China while becoming self-reliant in the energy sector. There is also the
question of climate change, where many European leaders find a
dialogue with China pivotal toward any substantial progress in bringing
down CO2 emissions. Sound financial investments are required to
mitigate climate change-related risks in which China plays a key role.
U.S. Fading Footprint in the Middle East
Honey not guns will determine the destiny of the Middle Eastern region.
The U.S. receding influence in the Middle East is its self-inflicted damage.
The U.S. has pursued liberal hegemonic designs in the Middle East i.e., a
strategy of regime change to introduce Western-style democracies while
43 Luis Simon, “The Ukraine War and the Future of the European Union’s Security
and Defense Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 30,
2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraine-war-and-future-european-unions-
security-and-defense-policy
44 Raluca Csernatoni, “The EU’s Hegemonic Imaginaries: From European Strategic
Autonomy in Defence to Technological Sovereignty,” European security, vol. 31,
no. 3 (2022): 395-414.
45 Josep Borrel, “My View on China and EU-China Relations,” European Union External
Action, April 13, 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/my-view-china-and-eu-china-
relations_en#:~:text=As%20I%20said%2C%20China%20and,or%202.3%25%20of%20o
ur%20GDP
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Strategic Studies
becoming profoundly hostile. 46 The U.S. global ‘war on terror’ and its
regime change operations have introduced failure leading to illiberalism.
Libya and Syria are glaring examples of grave human rights violations,
refugees’ crisis and state destruction, not construction.
China’s diplomacy and broker role has created deeper trust between
China and the countries of the Middle East. Additionally, the Russia-China-
Iran triangle is deepening on regional political, economic, military and
security matters. Interestingly, these three states share their vision for
building a new era of multipolarity and also jointly demonstrate displeasure
with the U.S. liberal hegemonic designs there. The three states have
enhanced their understanding to maximise their geopolitical influence
stretching from Northeast Asia, and Central Asia to the Indo-Pacific Region.
They aim to promote soft balancing by minimising military interference and
pressure from an external power47 in the Middle East.48
China and Russia have sided with Iran and crafted several agreements
with the latter covering certain areas i.e., energy, infrastructure building,
mining and agriculture. The three partners have evaded the U.S.
dollarisation in their trade to minimise the effects of a range of Western
sanctions and diminish their reliance on the U.S. currency.49 The ‘Interim
Agreement for the Formation of a Free Trade Area’ between Iran and the
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is another case in point to revive the
Iranian crippling economy. Under the BRI vision, Iran’s integration into the
initiative reinforces regional connectivity and trade. The three countries also
consolidate President Putin’s dream of a ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ and
have also aligned in the technological realm, thereby strengthening
collaboration via China’s 5G network system. Both Russia and Iran have
expelled the U.S.-led component from their systems and have moved to
46 Doug Stokes, “Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal
International Order,” International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 1 (2018): 133.
47 Chaka Ferguson, “The Strategic Use of Soft Balancing: The Normative
Dimensions of the Chinese-Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’,” Journal of Strategic
Studies, vol. 35, no. 2 (2012): 200, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.583153
48 Nicole Grajewski, “An Illusory Entente: The Myth of a Russia-China-Iran
“Axis”,” Asian Affairs, vol. 53, no. 1 (2022): 169.
49 Daniel McDowell, “Financial Sanctions and Political Risk in the International Currency
System,” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 28, no. 3 (2021): 648-649.
14
China.50 Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria
and Argentina aspire to join the BRICS.51 If these states join BRICS, they
could circumvent the U.S. dollar while building reliance on BRICS
countries. To sum up, the U.S. unipolarity is challenged while other actors
are gaining a deeper footprint there creating new avenues for the regional
states. Thus, soft balancing not hard power will determine the destiny of the
Middle Eastern region.
Great Powers Contestation and Growing Hybrid Threats
The established power scrambles to retain power by coercing others

through hybrid threats. In the backdrop of global power contestation,
states are intensely prone to hybrid warfare, which targets economic,
societal, political, and psychological factors to threaten states through the
mix of complex tools including financial institutions, political dissent,
non-states actors/proxies, media and cyberspace. Major powers are
capable of harming each other and smaller rival actors by launching
cyber-attacks. The U.S. has used economic coercion in the form of
sanctions or embargoes to curtail the behaviour of other states. Hybrid
tools are designed such as fake news, strategic leaks, funded
organisations, organised protest movements, espionage, and proxies to
undermine states’ internal stability and regulate their behaviour thereby
turning one against the other. More so, information and communication
technologies are being used to disrupt other societies for desired goals.
Climate Governance and Western Budgetary Constraints
There are empty pockets, only talks and no walk to mitigate climate
threats. Climate change is affecting countries in a variety of ways
including desertification and draughts, flash floods, new disease vectors
and low yields of various crop types. These changes can threaten the
economy and lead to escalating poverty, internal migration and a host of
socio-economic problems. States will become extremely water stressed
50 Valentin Weber, “Making Sense of Technological Spheres of Influence,” Strategic

Update (April 2020): 11, https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-
IDEAS-Technological-Spheres-of-Influence.pdf
51 “BRICS Gets an Influx of Interest as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and More Knock on its
Door,” Pakistan Observer, May 2, 2023, https://pakobserver.net/brics-gets-influx-
of-interest-as-saudi-arabia-iran-and-more-knock-on-its-door/
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Strategic Studies
which will lead to affect crop yield thereby threatening human security.
International health indices, such as life expectancy, maternal and
newborn health, child stunting and malnutrition and covid-19 led
diseases are threatening states’ security. The West could not succeed
since the financial crisis of 2008 to prove that it is willing to be able to
push for an inclusive and sustainable liberal world order. More than 350
million people are in humanitarian need, and around 100 million people
are currently displaced for their survival from war-torn countries. 52
Nearly 54 countries are suffering from severe debt problems.53 The UN
climate adaptation fund aims to defend poor countries from the
consequences of the carbon emission from rich countries but failed to
meet its limits of raising US$100 Billion a year.54 The U.S.-led alliance
system is unable to meet budgetary demands to overcome global crises.
Thus the trust deficit between the West and the Rest’ is widening.
To sum up the above section, the emerging global multipolar order is

marked by a complex interplay of multiple players, interests, traditional
and non-traditional challenges and interdependencies. There are signs of
a new Cold War whereby the established power scrambles to retain its
dominance in the face of an emerging power and a resurgent power.
However, the dynamics of the new and a bumpier multipolarity are much
more complex due to interdependencies and several middle players
which wield much more influence than the hitherto developing South.
Foreign Policy Challenges and Options for Pakistan
Balancers, not the hedgers and/ or bandwagoners will capitalise on the

new and complex era of multipolarity and increased interdependencies.
Thus Pakistan’s security is inextricably linked to the regional and global
evolving orders explained in the preceding sections, which determines
the contours of its foreign policy. Pakistan has to navigate the evolving
52 “With 100 Million People Worldwide Fleeing War, Natural Disasters, Poverty in
2022, Peace Needed Now ‘More Than Ever’ Secretary-General Urges in New Year’s
Message,” United Nations Press Release of Secretary-General SG/SM/21645,
(December 28, 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sgsm21645.doc.htm
53 “UN Development Programme Calls for Debt Relief Now for 54 Countries,”
United Nations, October 11, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129427
54 Anna Belianska, et. al., “Climate Change and Select Financial Instruments an
Overview of Opportunities and Challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa,” International
Monetary Fund, November 2022, 3.
16
multipolarity, cautiously assessing emerging challenges on a short and

long-term basis while making tough decisions based on a balancing act
thereby seeking guidance from national interests.
U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy – Need for a Balancing Act
The Indo-Pacific strategy of the U.S. is bound to have negative implications

for Pakistan given Pakistan’s close alliance with China and cordial relations
with the U.S. There are certain challenges that Pakistan need to identify
clearly: one, the U.S. view of CPEC as a strategic partnership more than an
economic integration project certainly creates pressure for Pakistan. Indeed,
CPEC offers China the swift access to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Through CPEC, China will project its power in the Indian Ocean Region,
which makes the U.S. uncomfortable. Two, the designation of India as a
net-security provider has bestowed India with a sense of entitlement to build
military power beyond its genuine national security needs and for regional
domination.55 The U.S. is facilitating Indian access to advanced technologies
which would create regional asymmetry placing Pakistan at a strategic
disadvantage. Three, Pakistan is undergoing technological denial and it
cannot cooperate in the nuclear domain with any country except China
because of NSG restrictions and its defence deals also remain limited. Four,
Indo-U.S. alignment of interests in the global institutions will result in
increased the U.S. pressure on Pakistan concerning Pakistan’s nuclear
program, on issues such as human rights, IMF and FATF-led financial
coercion and pressures on counter-terrorism. Five, the Indian history of false
flag operations (staged terrorists’ attacks), to malign Pakistan and justify
Indian military aggression against Pakistan and the establishment of the so-
called new normal56 (Balakot style offensive military operations) cannot be
ruled out. India remains Pakistan’s primary adversary and the security
calculus vis-à-vis India is unlikely to change soon. To counter Indian
military threats, Pakistan must maintain credible minimum deterrence
coupled with effective conventional and, nuclear capabilities and Al-led
new technologies.
55 Rory Medcalf, “Unselfish Giants? Understanding China and India as Security

Providers,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 5 (2012): 557.
56 Rizwana Abbasi and Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman, Changing Patterns of Warfare
between India and Pakistan: Navigating the Impact of New and Disruptive
Technologies (Oxford: Routledge, 2023).
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Strategic Studies
Against the backdrop of the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy, Pakistan

needs to maintain strategic neutrality by joining countries of the global
south. Pakistan should formulate a ‘Look East Policy’ to integrate its
economy into the Southeast Asian and ASEAN countries. Pakistan needs
to sign bilateral and trilateral free-trade agreements with the Asian
economies. In the security domain, Pakistan should focus on expanding its
maritime engagement with the littoral countries of the IOR in general and
the Arabian Sea and Gulf states in particular. These could include
military-to-military contacts, goodwill calls by naval vessels, joint naval
exercises, training and supply of equipment. It is imperative to neutralise
Indian influence and deny them space in the maritime domain through
proactive maritime engagement. Pakistan’s vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by adversaries include the presence of non-state actors, security
of CPEC i.e. direct attack on infrastructure and Chinese workers,
disinformation campaigns and social unrest in sensitive areas like Gilgit-
Baltistan, Balochistan. The CPEC constitutes a major opportunity for
Pakistan to transform itself into an energy, trade and logistic hub and
deepen regional connectivity.57 Therefore, Pakistan needs to invite other
countries to invest in Special Economic Zones and CPEC thereby turning
it into a multilateral project, stretching it via Afghanistan and Iran to
Central Asia and Russia. More stakeholders in the project would help
evade external powers’ interference and ensure its safety and resilience.
Pakistan should consider joining the Russia-Iran-China emerging
economic alliance system and BRICS to minimise dependence on U.S.
dollarisation and IMF.
Turbulent Middle East — Bridging the Gap
The looming threat of a conflict between Iran and the U.S. constitutes a
challenge for Pakistan. Instability in Iran could not only spill refugee
influx in Pakistan but also result in proxy warfare with sectarian
undertones, impacting Pakistan’s internal stability. Pakistan needs to
strengthen its socio-economic linkages with Iran and maintain good
relations ensuring that Iran does not become part of any containment
policy directed against Pakistan. Any distribution of oil supplies through
57Zahid Khan, Guo Changgang and Muhammad Afzaal, “China-Pakistan Economic

Corridor at the Cross Intersection of China, Central Asia and South Asia:
Opportunities for Regional Economic Growth,” The Chinese Economy, vol. 53, no.
2 (2020): 200-215.
18
the Straits of Hormuz could have severe economic and strategic

implications for Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan will have to walk a tightrope to
keep its Middle Eastern allies and Iran in good relations.
After China’s broker role between Iran and Saudi Arabia,58 the Iran-
Pakistan gas pipeline can be materialised and trade with Iran and the Middle
Eastern countries can be further strengthened. The relationship with the
Middle East should be based on the strength of religious, historical and
cultural ties and Pakistan’s diaspora living there can contribute significantly
to improving ties between Pakistan and the countries of the Middle Eastern
region. The challenge for Pakistan is to continue a balanced policy and create
space for itself as a peace broker for dialogue between various adversaries.
Pakistan must join the emerging Russia-Iran-China economic alliance system
to diversify its economic growth. By joining this emerging alliance, Pakistan
can safeguard its geopolitical interests and legitimise its mobility stretching
from the Northeast Asia to Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region.
Stabilise the Afghanistan — Holding China’s Hand tightly
The ongoing turmoil in Afghanistan has not only obstructed Pakistan

pivoting to the energy and trade corridor but has also extremely affected
stability in the border region.59 The dangers of expected uncertainty and the
likelihood of instability in the post-U.S. withdrawal is continuously on the
rise. An unstable Afghanistan could lead to it becoming a fertile ground for
foreign players such as India — to exacerbate the security challenge to
Pakistan from Afghan soil. If the world does not legitimise the Taliban
government, Pakistan needs China’s support to stabilise its own backyard
and minimise future security risks erupting from Afghanistan.
58 Mohammad Alyahya, “China Brokers Diplomacy Between Iran and Saudi Arabia:
Implications for the US Role in the Middle East,” Belfer Center for Science and
Technology March 23, 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/china-
brokers-diplomacy-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia-implications-us-role-middle-east
59 Fatima Raza, “Prospects for Pakistan-China-Iran Trilateral Cooperation,” Strategic
Studies, vol. 39, no. 3 (2019): 42-43.
19
Strategic Studies
Dealing with Non-Traditional and Hybrid Threats
According to the Global Climate Index Pakistan is among the top ten
countries likely to be most affected by the impact of climate change.60
Unless arrested, these vulnerabilities shall accentuate existing threats to
Pakistan’s political, economic and social security besides enhancing the
incidents of poverty, internal migrations and other socio-economic
problems. Thus, strengthening existing institutional policy frameworks,
and integrating them with new innovative tools and technologies in
urban mobility, decarbonisation and eco-system restoration shall remain
paramount options. Pakistan’s alignment of its national development
agenda with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) towards
tackling the cross-cutting challenges of poverty, disease, hunger, climate
change, water, food security and energy will be critical.
Pakistan remains vulnerable to economic coercion through international

mechanisms such as IMF and FATF. Pakistan needs to craft a look east
policy and diversify options by building linkages with the BRICS, ASEAN
and Chinese-led forums in parallel to the existing dependence on IMF.
ASEAN is a key model that offers Pakistan a lesson on adopting a balancing
act between the U.S. and China by not siding one against the other.
Conclusion
The distribution of global power is constantly shifting. The U.S. global

liberal hegemony is in crisis, since ‘Rest’ and China’s BRI vision have
defied the exploitative global liberal order. Although the West still holds
global dominance, controls the global financial system, technological
industry and information. Nevertheless, the ‘Rise of the Rest’ and
China’s growing footprints across Africa, Europe, the Middle East and
Asia, its establishment of alternative political institutions and financial
systems, BRICS countries’ debut of their local currencies against
dollarisation, and the Middle Eastern countries’ aspirations to join
60Jumaina Siddiqui, “Pakistan’s Climate Challenges Pose a National Security

Emergency,” United States Institute of Peace (July 7, 2022),
https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/pakistans-climate-challenges-pose-
national-security-
emergency#:~:text=For%20the%20past%2020%20years,from%20173%20extreme
%20weather%20events
20
BRICS will lead to weaken the Western-led political and financial

influence. This will lead to a monetary decoupling and defying the U.S.
hegemony while sustaining the delicate new era of liberal multipolarity.
Russia and China share a vision of a new multipolar world order

while India aims to position itself as a pivot of the global south to
legitimise coming multipolarity thereby maintaining a balancing act. The
Ukraine crisis has suggested a sharp rise in the European interests in
strategic autonomy. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has offered
space to Russia and China for a deeper geopolitical footprint.
Thus, Pakistan should formulate a prudent policy based on a balancing

act considering the emerging realities of a new multipolar era. The U.S.
Indo-Pacific strategy demands neutrality. Pakistan needs to craft a ‘Look
East Policy’ and diversify options by building linkages with the BRICS,
ASEAN and Chinese-led forums in parallel to the existing dependence
on IMF. ASEAN is a key model that offers Pakistan a lesson on adopting
a balancing act between the U.S. and China by not siding one against the
other. Pakistan needs to strengthen its socioeconomic linkages with all
the Middle Eastern countries and join the emerging Russia-Iran-China
economic alliance system to minimise dependence on the U.S.
dollarisation and open up avenues to diversify its economic growth. In
addition, Pakistan’s alignment of its national development agenda with
the UN SDGs towards tackling the cross-cutting climate-driven non-
traditional challenges will be critical. Thus a holistic approach to dealing
with the external environment necessitates Pakistan’s efforts at all fronts
based on a balancing act.
21
Strategic Stability in South Asia: The Evolving Challenges and
Potential Opportunities for India and Pakistan
Sitara Noor*
Abstract
The strategic stability debate in South Asia is largely influenced by the

complex and volatile relationship between nuclear rivals India and
Pakistan. Growing competition between the United States (U.S.) and
China and border dispute between China and India are influencing the
security dynamics of the region, but it is the aggravating hostility between
New Delhi and Islamabad over ongoing issues such as Kashmir and
terrorism charges against one another that have increased risk of war in
the region. The fragile balance of terror is influenced by various
challenges such as evolving nuclear postures, regional power competition,
conventional and nuclear arms race, and emerging technologies. In that
regard, it is imperative that both states engage to resolve outstanding
issues, develop confidence and evolve a strategic restraint regime to
strengthen strategic stability in the region.
Keywords: Strategic Stability, India, Pakistan, Nuclear, CBMs, South

Asia.
Introduction
South Asian security dynamics offer one of the most complex and
volatile situations in the world with three nuclear armed states ─ China,
India and Pakistan ─ sharing a complicated relationship. Within this
equation, India and Pakistan have been in a confrontational relationship
since their independence from the British rule. 1 The incessant Indo-
Pakistani rivalry is fuelled by ongoing territorial issues arising from the
contested partitioning of the two countries; resource competition and
*
The author is Fellow with the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Centre for Science
and International Affairs, Harvard University. Email: sitaranoor@hks.harvard.edu.
1Asad Hashim, “Timeline: India-Pakistan Relations,” Aljazeera, March 1, 2019,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/1/timeline-india-pakistan-relations
64
Strategic Stability in South Asia
competing regional interests.
In discussing strategic stability in South Asia, it is imperative to

assess the issue in its regional order, identify the primary parties to the
conflict and address fundamental questions, such as: are we viewing
India, Pakistan and China as a part of one problem? Is it essentially a
triangular competition between Pakistan, India and China or rather a
dyadic rivalry between Pakistan and India on the one hand and between
India and China on the other, where the U.S.-China competition has also
begun to influence the region? What is the level of hostility in the two
dyads and how do they impact each other?
India and Pakistan share a long history of rivalry and have experienced
several military crises and wars.2 The same is not true for the relationship
between India and China, who have not resorted to a major war since
1962. India-China competition has recently been exacerbated due to the
greater United States (U.S.) involvement in the Asia-Pacific region where
India was being projected as the net security provider and received
massive military assistance for that purported role. 3 However, the U.S.
reliance on India for standing up against China has already been called out
as a “bad bet.”4 The China-India relationship have become strained as a
result of border issues since 2020. Nonetheless, these border issues
remained limited to small skirmishes and scuffles and by no means
indicated a crisis potentially leading to a nuclear war. Therefore, in terms
of risk of direct confrontation, the India-China dyad cannot be paralleled
with the nuclear flash point of the India-Pakistan dyad.
This is not to understate the significance of the India-China dyad,

which has certainly become more volatile after recent border issues.
However, by comparison, it is more of a competition than the
confrontation. China does not view India as a primary security threat and
have historically maintained a no-war bottom-line intention threshold
2 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947

(Columbia University Press, 2002).
3 India has Emerged as a regional power and net security provider in the Indo-
Pacific: Defence Minister, Hindu, November 29, 2022,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-has-emerged-as-a-regional-power-
and-net-security-provider-in-the-indo-pacific-defence-minister/article66201456.ece
4 Ashley J. Tellis, “America’s Bad Bet on India,” Foreign Policy, May 1, 2023,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/americas-bad-bet-india-modi
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Strategic Studies
vis-à-vis India. 5 Between India and China, it is not only nuclear

deterrence but economic deterrence that has significantly reduced the
risk of war and has contained bilateral issues to diplomatic scuffles and
border skirmishes. India-China bilateral trade has witnessed a
phenomenal increase in the past two decades. Since 2015, India-China
bilateral trade has grown exponentially; with over 90 per cent growth,
the current trade between Beijing and New Delhi stands at U.S.$136.26
billion. 6 Therefore, India-China relationship can be explained more in
terms of complex interdependence, where one-time rivalry has moved
towards economic interdependence, thereby reducing the chance of a
major direct conflict even more in the future. Therefore, when it comes
to the primary conflict in South Asia, it is India and Pakistan’s volatile
relationship that runs the risk of triggering a nuclear war, whether
intentionally or inadvertently. Unlike the India-China dyad, the India-
Pakistan rivalry has failed to create interdependency and the bilateral
trade remained as low as U.S.$1.3 billion during the year 2022.7
With this backdrop, this study aims to analyse the traditional concept
of strategic stability and its evolving nature in the context of India and
Pakistan. The paper will provide a detailed assessment of contemporary
challenges to strategic stability in South Asia and how these challenges
are evolving with the potential to destabilise the fragile balance. The
paper will also explore potentially useful albeit limited opportunities for
stabilising bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Understanding Strategic Stability in the Context of India-Pakistan
Strategic stability emerged as a concept after the advent of nuclear

weapons and it continued to develop and evolve during the Cold War.
India and Pakistan have borrowed the Cold War nuclear lexicon for their
analysis and their nuclear learning process is also heavily influenced by
the U.S.-USSR examples. Therefore, the theoretical understanding of
5 Xiaoping Yang, “China’s Perception of India as a Nuclear Weapon State, Regional

Insight, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016.
6 Trade and Economic Relations, Embassy of India in Beijing, China,
https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibejing_pages/MjQ,
7 “India-Pakistan Trade Stood At US$1.35 Billion During April-December 2022,”
Outlook India, February8, 2023, https://www.outlookindia.com/business/india-
pakistan-trade-stood-at-1-35-billion-during-april-december-2022-news-260565
66
strategic stability in South Asia is shaped by western scholars and

literature. Going back to the Cold War literature, one finds that there is
no formal definition of the term strategic stability, nonetheless, many
cold war theorists have analysed the concept and shared their
explanations. Thomas Schelling, for example, explained strategic
stability in the following manner: “If both sides have weapons that need
not go first to avoid their own destruction, so that neither side can gain
great advantage in jumping the gun and each is aware that the other
cannot, it will be a good deal harder to get a war started. Both sides can
afford the rule: When in doubt, wait.”8
In simple terms, strategic stability refers to a country’s ability to

effectively strike back after absorbing the first nuclear strike by the
adversary. Thus, the basic premise of strategic stability is that the sense
of mutual vulnerability will dissuade a country to engage in a disarming
first strike against the rival state.
One of the core elements of strategic stability is first strike stability.

Glenn Kent and David Thaler are credited to have explained the contours
of first strike stability as follows: “After considering the vulnerability of
strategic forces on both sides, neither leader perceives the other as
pressured by the posture of forces to strike first in a crisis either leader
sees an advantage in striking first to avoid the potentially worse outcome
of incurring a first strike if he waits.”9 In other words, first strike stability
refers to a balance of terror where neither side finds value or advantage
in attacking the adversary. The Cold War adversaries, in order to achieve
the first strike stability focused on the survivability of their assets.
The other two associated concepts are crisis stability and arms race
stability. Crisis stability is closer to the first strike stability concept as it
refers to the “absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first.” Arms
8Thomas C Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 2020), 246.
9G. A. Kent, and D. E. Thaler, “First-Strike Stability: A Methodology for
Evaluating Strategic Forces,” Interim report. no. AD-A-215606/5/XAB; RAND/R-
3765-AF. Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA (USA), 1989,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12086.5.pdf
67
Strategic Studies
race stability, on the other hand refers to “the absence of incentives to

build up a nuclear force.”10
Strategic stability can also be assessed in both narrow and wider

scope. The narrow scope essentially focuses on achieving crisis stability
and arms race stability. This narrow objective can be slightly expanded
to include avoidance of an armed conflict between nuclear armed states.
In a broader scope, strategic stability refers to a stable global
environment and absence of conflict; a situation where countries are
enjoying peaceful relationship.11 The focus of this study shall remain on
analysing challenges to strategic stability between India and Pakistan in
its narrower scope.
Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia
Nuclear learning in South Asia has been slow and challenging. Strategic
stability in South Asia has evolved at its own pace with some features
that are sharply distinct from the Cold War model. Like other nuclear-
armed states, India and Pakistan entered the nuclear club without having
any prior experience or conceptual maturity in dealing with the role of
nuclear weapons in their respective security strategies.12
Over the years, the trial-and-error learning process has enabled both
states to strengthen their nuclear institutions and exercise certain restraint
in their policies.13 However, this learning process was not identical in the
two countries and transpired at different levels and with varying degrees.
Nuclear learning in South Asia has not reached a point where the states
can display a stable relationship. While India and Pakistan have not
resorted to a full-fledged war since overt nuclearisation, there have been
serious crises, such as the Kargil war (1999), military standoff (2001-2),
Mumbai attack (2008) Uri and Pathankot attack (2016) and
10 James M Acton, “Reclaiming Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations,”

Strategic Studies Institute (2013): 117-146,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/05/reclaiming-strategic-stability-pub-51032
11 Acton, “Reclaiming Strategic Stability.”
12 Feroz Hasan Khan and Ryan Jacobs, “The Challenges of Nuclear Learning in South
Asia,” in Feroz Hasan Khan, Ryan Jacobs and Emily Burke eds., “Nuclear Learning in
South Asia: The Next Decade (Naval Post Graduate School, June, 2014), 5.
13 Imran Hassa, “Strategic Stability & Restraint in South Asia,” South Asian
Voices, July 22, 2021.
68
Pulwama/Balakot crisis (2019) which have threatened the security of the

region. The challenges to strategic stability in South Asia, currently one
of the most war-prone regions in the world, are very much visible at the
conceptual and operational levels. Some of these specific challenges are
described below:
Transitory Nature of Strategic Stability
One major challenge in South Asia is the evolving/transitory nature of

strategic stability itself. In the third nuclear age, the classical idea of
Cold War bipolar strategic stability is shifting to multipolar strategic
stability. This major shift has transformed the Cold War security
dilemma into what Gregory Koblentz calls a new “security trilemma”
where more than two parties are involved in a strategic competition.14
The actions of one state to increase its security against an adversary
creates an impact on the third state, which in turn, takes extra security
measures against a threat which is not primarily aimed against it. This
process undermines overall security and makes it difficult to identify the
nature of threat which remains multidirectional. In addition, the theatre
of war in South Asia is no longer confined to state actors. It also involves
the non-state actors, who do not conform to the basic rules of strategic
stability and have the potential to initiate an inadvertent crisis.
While it is recognised that there is a need to reformulate the concept

of strategic stability, there is dearth of scholarly work and a lack of
policy priority in that regard.15 In the absence of a clear understanding of
this evolving situation, insisting on an outdated model of strategic
stability to deal with the fast changing dynamics of South Asia creates
the risk of increasing instability.
Doctrinal Challenges
One important element of stable deterrence is a well-defined nuclear

doctrine. Soon after their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan focused on
their nuclear policies and postures. While both states have exercised
relative restraint and responsibility following the nuclear tests, their
14 Gregory D. Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, Council Special
Report no. 71 (Washington: Counsel on Foreign Relations, November 2014).
15 Kane and Nielsen, “Rethinking Strategic Stability,” 2.
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Strategic Studies
nuclear postures are not free from ambiguities which are discussed below
in detail.
India’s Doctrinal Incongruity
On August 17, 1999, India’s National Security Advisory Board announced

a draft nuclear doctrine that included a No First Use (NFU) policy. 16
India’s 2003 official statement, however, included a caveat to its erstwhile
absolute NFU pledge stating, “in the event of a major attack against India,
or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will
retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.”17
The incumbent government under Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in

India alluded to the revision of India’s nuclear doctrine during the
election campaign in 2014, and announced in the election manifesto its
intention “to revise and update [the nuclear doctrine], to make it relevant
to challenges of current time.”18 The announcement came in view of the
aforementioned contradictions in the existing nuclear doctrine that not
only left space for ambiguity but also called its credibility into question.
The BJP announcement rekindled the debate about forswearing India’s
NFU policy and changing the massive retaliation posture. A similar
approach was visible in the 2016 statement by India’s Defence Minister,
Manohar Parrikar in which he questioned India’s NFU policy. 19
Notwithstanding later clarification that this was his personal view, it
reignited the enduring debate in India on NFU policy. The debate got
further accentuated as a potential change in India’s nuclear strategy from
counter-value to counter-force was noted, suggesting that India might
16 “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,”

Ministry of External Affairs, August 17, 1999, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-
article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+India
n+Nuclear+Doctrine
17 “Cabinet Committee On Security Reviews Progress In Operationalising India’s
Nuclear Doctrine,” Office of the Prime Minister, New Delhi, January 4, 2003,
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html
18 Bharatiya Janata Party, “Ek Bharat Shrestha Bharat: SabkaSaath, Sabka Vikas
(One India, Great India: With All, Development for All); Election Manifesto 2014,”
March 26, 2014, 39,
http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf
19 Sushant Singh, “Manohar Parrikar Questions India’s no-first-use Nuclear Policy,
adds ‘My Thinking,” Indian Express, November 11, 2016.
70
initiate a decapitating first strike against threat of an imminent use of

nuclear weapons by Pakistan. 20 India’s 2017 Joint Armed Forces
Doctrine once again emphasised on the sanctity of the NFU policy but
that assurance was short-lived as Indian Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh
once again nullified India’s NFU in 2019.21 Regardless of this back and
forth, India’s NFU policy is viewed with great scepticism and concern
inside Pakistani strategic circles.
In the 2003 official statement, India also departed from previously

held idea of “sufficient damage” and moved to a posture of “massive
retaliation.” thus leaving fewer options for response. This change was
criticised by some analysts as being unrealistic since it called into
question the credibility of India’s threat to carry out a massive retaliation
in response to the use of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan. 22 It also
left no space for escalation control due to some “missing rungs on
escalation ladder.”23 As has also been observed that even the U.S. had
had to shift from the 1950s policy of massive retaliation to a flexible
response option.24
20 Remarks by Professor Vipin Narang, Department of Political Science,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Carnegie International Nuclear Policy
Conference Washington, DC, March 20, 2017. For further debate on Professor
Narang’s comment see: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Counterforce
Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine and Capabilities,” International
Security, vol. 43, no. 3 (Winter 2018/19):7–52,
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00340. Max Fisher; “India, Long at Odds With
Pakistan, May Be Rethinking Nuclear First Strikes,” New York Times, March 31,
2017; Shashank Joshi, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine Should no longer be Taken for
Granted,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, March 22, 2017;
Ankit Panda, “Nuclear South Asia and Coming to Terms with ‘No First-Use’ With
Indian Characteristics,” The Diplomat, March 28, 2017, Sameer Lalwani and
Hannah Haegeland, “The Debate Over Indian Nuclear Strategy is Heating Up,” War
on the Rocks, April 5, 2017.
21 Toby Dalton,” Much Ado about India’s No-First-Use Nuke Policy,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, September 26, 2019.
22 Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Reviewing NFU and Massive
Retaliation,” IPCS, January, 2015.
23 Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, “India’s Unresolvable Nuclear Debate,”
Dawn, June 2, 2016, http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153416/indias-unresolvable-
nuclear-debate
24 Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security
(Princeton University Press, 1989), 11-57.
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Strategic Studies
A similar debate has continued over India’s “credible minimum

deterrence.” Over the years, India has referred to a variety of threats,
which it perceives from both Pakistan and China, as justification of a
policy of “credible minimum deterrence.” This policy had enabled India
to keep its options open in defending what is meant by “minimum.” As
Vipin Narang noted, “anything credible against China will not be
‘minimum’ against Pakistan; and what constitutes ‘minimum’ against
Pakistan cannot be ‘credible’ against China.”25 India’s 2017 Joint Armed
Forces Doctrine also omitted the phrase “minimum” from the “credible
minimum deterrence” posture.26 India was already adding more nuclear
weapons and nuclear material into its arsenal and perfecting new
capabilities, this categorical announcement of doing away with
“minimum” along with plausible signs of India moving towards
counterforce strategy is bound to increase arms race and affect strategic
balance in the India-Pakistan dyad particularly.
Pakistan’s Doctrinal Paradox
Unlike India, Pakistan has not declared its nuclear doctrine. There are
only a few official statements that outline some features of the nuclear
policy of Pakistan. The official statements, while carefully calibrated so
as not to reveal any details of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, do not indicate
an NFU posture. Pakistan has announced a policy of credible minimum
deterrence and identifies deterrence against India’s conventional military
superiority as the driving factor of its nuclear policy. Pakistan has also
postulated a “full spectrum deterrence” (FSD) posture after testing the
short-range tactical nuclear missile, the Nasr, for the purpose of plugging
the perceived gaps in Pakistan’s deterrence posture in response to India’s
Cold Start doctrine ─ a limited-war strategy reportedly conceived in
2004 by the Indian army, that aimed to seize Pakistani territories in
25 Vipin Narang, “Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Programme,” The Washington
Quarterly, vol. 36, issue no. 3 (2013),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.825555
26 Joint Armed Forces Doctrine, Ministry of Defence, April 2017,
http://bharatshakti.in/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf> also see:
Ankit Panda, “India’s 2017 Joint Armed Forces Doctrine: First Takeaways,” April
28, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/indias-2017-joint-armed-forces-doctrine-
first-takeaways/
72
blitzkrieg attacks, without risking a nuclear response.27
Notwithstanding, Pakistan maintains a first use option, it has not

clearly defined the so-called “redlines” that might initiate a nuclear
response.28 This opacity is aimed at deterring an attack from India at any
level, but it also increases the risk of a miscalculated escalation in case of
a conflict because unspecified redlines are more likely to fail when they
are not fully acknowledged and consequences of their violation are not
clear to the adversary.29
In the aftermath of the Indian claims of a surgical strike in Azad

Jammu and Kashmir in 2016 and attack on mainland Pakistan in 2019,
there is a growing perception in India that it is possible to fight a limited
war under nuclear overhang without affecting Pakistan’s nuclear
redlines. 30 Such assertions are dangerous and hold a greater risk of
escalation in future crises.
Lack of Escalation Control Mechanism
At the dawn of nuclear era, Bernard Brodie famously asserted that, “thus
far the chief purpose of our military establishments has been to win wars,
now onwards their chief purpose should be to avert them.” 31 This
realisation was based on perceived mutual vulnerability as a result of
massive nuclear development on each side of the Cold War rivals. It led
the Cold War strategic thinkers to establish ways and means to control
crises from escalating into full-fledged wars.
27 Naveed Ahmad, “India’s Elusive ‘Cold Start’ doctrine and Pakistan’s Military
Preparedness,” Express Tribune, January 20, 2017,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1300686/indias-elusive-cold-start-doctrine-pakistans-
military-preparedness/
28 Sadia Tasleem, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 30, 2016; Sitakanta Mishra, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Threshold:
Not as Low as Perceived.” IndraStra Global 6 (2017):
4.https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/52086/ssoar-indrastraglobal-
2017-6-mishra-Pakistans_Nuclear_Threshold_Not_as.pdf?sequence=1
29 Bruno Tertrais, Drawing Red Lines Right, The Washington Quarterly, (Fall 2014 ), 7-24,
<https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Tertrais_Fall2014.pdf>
30 Shekhar Gupta, “How Indian Armed Forces can Defeat Pakistan in Less than a
Week, The Print, February 1, 2020.
31 Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: The Atomic Power and World Order
(New Haven, Connecticut: YaleInstitute of International Studies, 1946).
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Strategic Studies
Nuclear weapons have not eliminated the risk of war, instead they
have given way to a constantly looming risk of a crisis escalating to a
nuclear exchange. Adversaries deliberately escalating a conflict to
achieve certain objectives (e.g. controlling the behaviour of the other
state through escalation dominance) would create the risk of an
inadvertent escalation, which could spiral out of control if escalation
control mechanisms are not in place.
In South Asia, India and Pakistan are competing to strengthen

nuclear deterrence, but lack escalation control mechanisms, thus
exposing themselves to the uncontrolled dynamics of a crisis situation.
Unlike the Cold War deterrence equation, which according to Bhumitra
Chakma, was “an autonomous strategic phenomenon,” South Asian
deterrence is more complex and “subject to the penetration of systemic
forces,” involving external powers. 32 In the absence of bilateral
escalation control mechanisms, India and Pakistan have largely relied on
these extra regional systemic forces such as the U.S. intervention for
escalation control during crisis situations.
The idea of outsourcing crisis management to a third party is

inherently destabilising as it is based on potentially misplaced trust that the
third party will intervene before the crisis becomes out of control. This can
lead the competing states to feel more incentivised to engage in a policy of
brinkmanship.33 In addition, a third party’s motivation to intervene during
a crisis may be different at any given point, hence increasing the chance of
miscalculation by the competing states that in turn would challenge the
strategic stability in the region. Likewise, to be effective, the third party
must have an impartial character and should have leverage on parties
involved in a conflict. This situation seems to be changing in South Asia,
particularly after the U.S. tilt towards India in the wake of rebalancing in
the Indo Pacific region.34 During Pulwama/Balakot crisis in 2019, the U.S.
32 Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia’s Nuclear Security (New York: Routledge, 2015), 8.
33 Rabia Akhtar, “Outsourcing Escalation Control,” South Asian Voices, September
23, 2013, http://southasianvoices.org/outsourcing-escalation-control/
34 Jayita Sarkar, “Three Concrete Steps Toward South Asian Nuclear Stability,” The
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September 13, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/how-reduce-
south-asias-nuclear-dangers
74
role as a neutral third party was debated as it was perceived to be missing

at the beginning and tilting more in favour of India. 35
Growing Conventional Asymmetry
Conventional force balance plays an essential role in maintaining regional

peace. There is, however, an increasing gap between Pakistan and India’s
conventional force structures. Pakistan is wary of India’s acquisition of
sophisticated weapon systems and views them as a source of conventional
imbalance. Unable to match India’s conventional superiority due to its weak
economy, Pakistan has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons vis-à-vis
India, thereby lowering the nuclear threshold.
India is emerging as the higher spender on its conventional military

with the proposed allocation of U.S.$72.6 billion for defence in the fiscal
year 2023-24 which is a 13 per cent increase from previous year.36 In
comparison, Pakistan’s 2022-23 defence budget stands at U.S.$10.3
billion.37 India has also been the world’s top arms importer since 2010.
It’s major imports includes high-tech systems such as warplanes, and
missile defence system from Russia, combat aircraft and submarines
from France, Israeli missiles and American transport aircraft etc.38
This conventional asymmetry is bound to increase in future as India

is expected to further increase its defence spending. This, in turn, will
increase Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons since, as Robert
Crockett notes, “without nuclear weapons, Pakistan loses military
35 Sameer Lalwani, “America Can’t Ignore the Next Indo-Pakistan Crisis,” War on
the Rocks, February 26, 2021, Https://Warontherocks.Com/2021/02/America-Cant-
Ignore-The-Next-Indo-Pakistani-Crisis/
36 Manoj Kumar, “India Raises Defence Budget to $72.6 bln Amid Tensions with
China,” February 1, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-raises-
defence-budget-726-bln-amid-tensions-with-china-2023-02-
01/#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%2C%20Feb%201%20(Reuters,its%20tense%20bord
er%20with%20China
37 Military Expenditure Database, SIPRI yearbook 2022, SIPRI,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
38 Surge in Arms Imports to Europe, while US Dominance of the Global Arms
Trade Increases, SIPRI, March 13,2023, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-
release/2023/surge-arms-imports-europe-while-us-dominance-global-arms-trade-
increases#:~:text=India%20remains%20the%20world’s%20top,replace%20imports
%20with%20local%20designs
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Strategic Studies
parity.” 39 Furthermore, nuclear deterrence is deemed to be more cost

effective for Pakistan as the cost of its conventional forces is at least six
times higher than that of the nuclear force. 40
Strategic Defence Upgrades
South Asia is witnessing an upsurge in the acquisition of advanced

weapon systems, capabilities and new technologies. There is rapid
modernisation of conventional and non-conventional weapon systems.
While all military upgrades lead to a securitised environment, the
following developments are specifically challenging the regional
stability between India and Pakistan.
Missile Developments
Since 1998, India and Pakistan have come a long way in developing and
improving their missile delivery systems. The past decade has witnessed
rapid missile proliferation and both India and Pakistan now possess a
variety of missiles with different ranges and pay loads.
India possesses a mature and wide ranging missile programme,

consisting of both ballistic and cruise missiles. It includes short, medium
and long range systems. India’s operational land-based missiles include
Prithvi-I, Agni-I and Agni-II. The Prithvi series has three road-mobile,
surface-to-surface systems (Prithvi-I, II, III), and one sea-to-surface
(Dhanush). In the Agni series, there are four operational missile systems:
Agni-I, II, and III and the recently tested inter-continental ballistic
missile (ICBM) Agni-V. Successful testing of the Agni-V, with a range
of 5000-8000 km, is significant as it puts India in the exclusive club of
39 Robert Crockett, “National Security Implications of Eliminating Nuclear

Weapons,” in Project on Nuclear Issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2013
Conference Series, ed., Sarah Minot (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, 2014).
40 Asim Bashir Khan, The Price of Nonconventional Security, Regional Insight,
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. June 30, 2016),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/29/price-of-nonconventional-security-pub-
63914
76
states possessing ICBMs.41India’s K series of missiles, including the K-

15 (Sagarika) and the K-4, are submarine launched missiles. Successful
testing of the K-4 along with commissioning of the INS Arihant
submarine provided India a seaborne nuclear deterrent.42 India’s K-5 is
rumoured to have a range of 5000 to 6000 kilometres (km). India’s
cruise missiles include a 300-500 km BrahMos supersonic missile (a
joint Indian-Russian project), the Astra (indigenously produced air-to-air
missile) and the Nirbhay (indigenously developed long-range cruise
missile).43
Pakistan has three operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles: the

short-range Ghaznavi (Hatf-III) and Shaheen-1 (Hatf-IV), and the medium-
range Ghauri (Hatf-VI). It has four other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles:
the medium-range Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6); the short-range Abdali (Haft-2); the
Nasr (Haft-9); and the Shaheen III with a range of 2750 km.44 Pakistan has
also developed two cruise missiles, Babur (Hatf-7) and Ra’ad (Hatf-8).45
Pakistan also tested Babur III, a submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM)
with a range of 450 km. With the induction of the Babur III into its arsenal,
Pakistan has acquired a sea-based second strike capability.46 Pakistan has
also conducted the first flight test of a new medium range ballistic missile,
Ababeel, with a range of 2200 km. The Ababeel is capable of launching
multiple warheads using multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRV)
technology.47 Notwithstanding doubts about the accuracy and efficiency of
MIRV technology on a medium or short range missile, Pakistan has become
the fifth country after the U.S., China, France and Russia to acquire this
41 O’Donnell, Frank and Harsh V. Pant, “Evolution of India’s Agni-V Missile:

Bureaucratic Politics and Nuclear Ambiguity,” Asian Survey 54, no. 3 (2014): 584-
610.
42 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Indian Nuclear Weapons, 2022,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 78, no. 4 (2022): 224-236.
43 The success and accuracy of Nirbhay is questionable as three out of four flight
tests of the missile has been a failure.
44 Zafar Khan, “Conceptualising Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Policy after Two
Decades of Nuclearisation,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 8, no. 1 (2023):
228-243.
45 ISPR, ISPR Press Release no. PR104/2011-ISPR, April 29, 2011,
http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1732
46 Iftikhar Ali and Jatswan S. Sidhu, “Strategic Dynamics of the Arms Race in South
Asia,” Journal of Asian and African Studies (2023).
47 ISPR Press release no PR-34/2017-ISPR, Dated: January 24, 2017,
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=3705
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Strategic Studies
capability.48
Although the pattern of missile testing suggests that India and

Pakistan are not in a mutual competition, it certainly adds to the strategic
stability challenges. The induction of short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) such as Pakistan’s Nasr, a surface-to-surface, multi-tube
ballistic missile with 60 km range, and India’s Prahar,49a solid-fuelled,
road-mobile with a range of 150 km, invite even greater challenges to
regional stability.
Both India and Pakistan claim that they maintain assertive control on
all missiles, including the SRBMs, thereby reducing the risk of
unauthorised detonation or accidental use. The shorter range missiles,
however, may cause a nuclear ambiguity problem.50 India’s Prahar is not
a declared nuclear capable system, but it is largely viewed as one in
Pakistan’s security circles.51 India’s decision to replace the older Prithvi-
I system, which is designed primarily for a nuclear attack, with the
Prahar reinforces this view in Pakistan and increases the risk of
ambiguity.52
Pakistan has introduced into its arsenal the long range Shaheen III
(2750 km), which can cover India’s whole landmass. According to
Pakistani officials, it will “strengthen Pakistan’s deterrence capability
vis-à-vis India” by targeting Indian bases in the Andaman and Nicobar
48 Sitakanta Mishra, “The Myth of Pakistani MIRVs,” South Asian Voices, The
Stimson Centre, January 27, 2017, https://southasianvoices.org/hot-takes-pakistans-
mirv-capable-ababeel-missile/>
49 The Prahar is not declared by India as a nuclear missile, but it is capable of
carrying both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons and largely viewed as a
nuclear weapon by Pakistan. See; Vishal Thapar, “India Test Fires a Shoot-and-
Scoot Nuclear Missile, Prahar,” SP’s MAI, August 01-15, 2011; Toby Dalton,
George Perkovich, “India’s Unresolvable Nuclear Debate,”Herald, October 01,
2016, http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153416
50 Dinshaw Mistry, “Missile Proliferation and Deterrence Stability in South Asia,”
in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation
Control in South Asia, (Washington DC: The Stimson Centr, 2008).
51 Z. Kazmi, (n.d.). SRBMs, Deterrence and Regional Stability in South Asia: A
Case Study of Nasr and Prahaar,” www.irs.org.pk/strategic/spso12.doc
52 Design Characteristics of India’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, Nuclear Threat
Initiative, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/delivery-systems/
78
islands in the Bay of Bengal. 53 India views the introduction of the

Shaheen III as a destabilising move because it can destroy India’s
second-strike capability, one of the requirements of strategic stability.54
India has also announced its intention to equip its medium and long-
range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with MIRV technology. While
Pakistan’s test of its MIRV missile Ababeel is proclaimed to render
Indian radars ineffective, India’s Defence Research & Development
Organisation (DRDO) is pitching its MIRVs a counter-measure to
China’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. Development of MIRV
missiles would challenge both India’s and Pakistan’s claims of nuclear
minimalism and particularly call into question India’s commitment to
NFU.55
Acquisition of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System
India is heavily investing in its BMD system against threats emanating

from Pakistan’s strategic missile system. India began its efforts to acquire
a BMD system soon after its overt nuclearisation, and accelerated its
efforts after acquiring key technologies such as tracking, fire control and
interceptor guidance from countries like Israel, France and Russia. 56 In
2012, India’s DRDO announced the successful development of a missile
defence shield that could be deployed to cover two major Indian cities in
53 Khalid Ahmad Kidwai, Advisor, National Command Authority and former DG

Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan, Interview with the author, Karachi, August 31,
2016.
54 Arka Biswas, “Pakistan’s New Missile Disrupts Nuclear Stability in South Asia,”
The National Interest, March 27, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/pakistan%E2%80%99s-new-missile-disrupts-nuclear-stability-south-asia-
12495
55 Joshua T. White and Kyle Deming, “Dependent Trajectories: India’s MIRV
Program and Deterrence Stability in South Asia” in Michael Krepon eds.,
Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, (Washington DC: The
Stimson Centre 2015), 178.
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190631/Deterrence_Instability_WEB.pdf
56 Manoj Joshi, “Government Baffled Over DRDO Chief’s Claim on Missile
Shield,” India Today, July 18, 2012, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/government-
baffled-over-drdo-chief-claim-on-missile-shield/1/208850.html
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Strategic Studies
its first phase.57 India’s BMD is a double-tiered system comprised of two

interceptor missiles that provide high-low cover against incoming missiles.
The Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile tested in November 2006 is
capable of interception at exo-atmospheric altitudes of 50km to 80km. The
Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile tested in December 2007 is
designed for interception at the endo-atmospheric altitudes up to 30km.58
In 2017, India tested another indigenously built ballistic missile

system. The new exo-atmospheric interceptor missile named the Prithvi
Defence Vehicle (PDV) is slated to replace the old PAD system. With its
Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker capability, it will be able to distinguish
between incoming warheads and decoys. 59
India has also completed two flight tests of its very short-range air-
defence system (VSHORADS) missiles which is a man-portable air
defence system (MANPADS).60 Possessing miniaturised reaction control
system (RCS) and integrated avionics, VSHORADS has a range of 6 km
and it is capable of carrying a pre-fragmentation warhead of upto 2 kg.
In 2018, India also signed a deal with Russia for five regiments of
Russian-made S-400 Triumf advanced Air Defense Systems. 61 Despite
U.S. opposition, India has received third squadron in February 2023 and
57 “India’s Missile Defence Shield Ready, Says DRDO Chief,” India Today, May 6,
2012, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-missile-defence-shield-ready-drdo-
chief/1/187601.html
58 Design Characteristics of India’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, Nuclear Threat
Initiative, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/delivery-systems/ , also see Pooja
Tyagi, “A Look at the Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Programme,” India
TV, March 23, 2013 and “India Successfully Tests Interceptor Missile,” Dawn, May
16, 2016.
59 Franz-Stefan Gady,”India Successfully Tests Prithvi Defense Vehicle, A New
Missile Killer System,” The Diplomat, February 15,
2017,https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/india-successfully-tests-prithvi-defense-
vehicle-a-new-missile-killer-system/
60 “Agnipath — Major Transformative Reform,” India’s Ministry of Defence 2022
Year End Review (Some Extracts), chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.vayuaerospace.in/Issue/
202302121749556419.pdf
61 Richa Tokas “Procuring S-400: Changing Dynamics of Foreign
Relations,” Strategic Analysis 46, no. 2 (2022): 220-226.
80
have installed the system on its western border alongside Pakistan in

Punjab sector.62
India rationalises BMD development on the grounds that it has

displayed restraint in adopting an NFU policy, oppossed to Pakistan’s
first use posture, and that a BMD system is a necessary defensive
measure to ensure survivability and to counter any threat emanating from
Pakistan.63At the same time, there is a debate within and outside India
about the usefulness of a BMD system in South Asia. There are also
questions about the effectiveness of the BMD system other than under
controlled circumstances.64
Apart from its uncertain effectiveness, BMD systems are considered

a destabilising development that could initiate an arms race in the region.
In the view of critics, it upsets mutual vulnerability, an essential
prerequisite for strategic stability, and would create a false sense of
security in the minds of Indian decision makers which may lead to an
unwarranted escalation of crises in the region. BMD deployment also
complements India’s offensive military doctrines such as the proactive
military strategy and the counter force strategy which is deemed risky. 65
It is assessed that Pakistan, in response to India’s BMD, would

potentially take certain measures to restore mutual vulnerability in its
favour. Pakistan’s test of the MIRV missile Ababeel is a step in that
direction. Pakistan may further opt for larger arsenals, penetration devices
and other countermeasures against BMD system. 66 These developments
on both sides would disturb the existing precarious balance.
62 Akash Sharma, “India Receives 3rd Squadron of S-400 Missile System from
Russia, Likely to be Deployed Along Pak Border,” News 18, February 28, 2023,
https://www.news18.com/news/india/india-receives-3rd-squadron-of-s-400-air-
defence-missile-system-from-russia-likely-to-be-deployed-along-pakistan-border-
7187119.html
63 Balraj Nagal, India and Ballistic Missile Defence: Furthering a Defensive Deterrence,
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June. 2016).
64 Joshi, “Government Baffled over DRDO Chief’s Claim on Missile Shield.”
65 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia:
Implications on Strategic Stability,” in Feroz Hasan Khan, Ryan Jacobs, and Emily
Burkeeds., Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade, (Monterrey, CA:
Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, June 2014).
66 Nagal. India and Ballistic Missile Defence: Furthering a Defensive Deterrence,
2016.
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Strategic Studies
Adoption of Disruptive Technologies
There is a worldwide technological revolution in emerging disruptive

technologies and South Asia is not immune to it. Disruptive technologies
refer to “new technologies that unexpectedly displace the position of
established technologies,” such as cyber weapons, 3D printing,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) remote sensing technologies and lethal
autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). 67 In the defence sector, these
new technologies are replacing the old ones, making warfare more
dangerous and unpredictable. The introduction of disruptive technologies
by states changes the rules of the game without prior notice and might
destabilise the existing balance. In South Asia, cyber space has emerged
as a new and as yet unspecified battleground. Although India and
Pakistan have not officially embraced the idea of the offensive use of
cyber space against one another, India is reported to have developed
some cyber-intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities against
Pakistan. 68 The growing reliance on cyber links and technologies in
warfare has increased mutual vulnerabilities, adding an additional front
to an already problematic situation. Cyber space may also be exploited
by non-state actors to create a false alarm during a crisis situation,
similar to a hoax call to the Pakistani President from someone claiming
to be the Indian Minister of External Affairs following the Mumbai
attack in 2008. 69
67 J. Bower and C. Christensen, “Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave,” in

Robinson, N. and Valeri, L., 2008, in IFIP International Federation for Information
Processing, vol. 253, Critical Infrastructure Protection, eds., E. Goetz and S. Shenoi;
(Boston: Springer), 3-14.
68 Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment, International Institute
for Strategic Studies, June 28, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-
library---content--migration/files/research-papers/cyber-power-report/cyber-
capabilities-and-national-power---a-net-assessment___.pdf
69 According to Wiki Leaks cables, few days following terrorist attack on the Indian
city Mumbai in 2008, a man pretending to be India’s then External Affairs Minister,
Pranab Mukherjee created an alarm in Islamabad, when he called Asif Zardari,
Pakistan’s President and warned about India’s military response. See for details:
Dean Nelson, “Wiki Leaks: hoax phone call brought India and Pakistan to brink of
war,” Telegraph, March 23 2011,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8401391/WikiLeaks-hoax-
phone-call-brought-India-and-Pakistan-to-brink-of-war.html.
82
Another dimension of disruptive technologies is unfolding in the

form of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In September 2015, Pakistan
became the fourth country in the world ─ following the U.S., the United
Kingdom and Israel ─ to use an armed drone, in this instance for a
targeted assault on terrorists in the tribal areas of Pakistan. 70 Initially,
India largely relied on Israeli and the U.S. drones, but in a latest move
India is trying to acquire MQ-9B Predator armed drones from the U.S.
However, New Delhi is heavily investing in its indigenous capability as
well e.g. development of its own stealth combat drones such as medium-
altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (MALE UAVs).71 The
excessive reliance on UAVs is bound to change the nature of warfare in
South Asia. With the prospect of less or no human loss, it is not
unreasonable to assume that states in conflict are more likely to engage
in more aggressive military postures.
Potential employment of lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) or the

so-called killer robots is likely to create additional risk of instability.
Technological advancements have challenged the traditional foundations
of stable deterrence and have exposed it to new vulnerabilities. The
survivability of nuclear assets is facing new challenges in view of
enhanced accuracy and availability of remote sensing that can even
target submarines and mobile missiles.72
Impact of Regional Rebalancing
The external rebalancing in the Indo-Pacific region has direct impact on

the security situation in the South Asian region. The U.S. pivot to Asia
paved the way for new strategic and economic cooperation in the region,
including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and
India. While the policy was primarily aimed at containing China’s
70 Michael Boyle, “Why Pakistan’s First Drone Strike Should Worry Obama,”
Express Tribune, October 1, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/965600/why-
pakistans-first-drone-strike-should-worry-obama/
71 Manish Kumar Jha, “India’s Quest for High-Calibre Military UAVs is Still in its
Infancy,” Financial Express, December 30, 2022,
https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-indias-quest-for-high-calibre-
military-uavs-is-still-in-its-infancy-2931909/
72 Keir A. Lieber, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Era of Counterforce” in Policy
Roundtable 1-4 on U.S. Nuclear Policy, ISSF, December 22 2016,
https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-4-nuclear
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growing influence, it destabilised the existing power structure in the

region. As a counter-weight to this policy, China began to assert its
control in the region through economic cooperation, trade and military
relationships and diplomatic initiatives. 73 The growing U.S.-China
competition is fast changing into an adversarial relationship and posing
great challenges to regional security.
As a result of this external rebalancing, the security dynamics in South

Asia have changed dramatically. India’s status was elevated in this new
arrangement due to its perceived position as a counter weight to China.
While Indian position elevated, Pakistan’s importance, as a frontline ally in
the war on terror lessened after the U.S. final withdrawal from Afghanistan
in 2021.74 Since the introduction of “Af-Pak” policy of the U.S.,75 Pakistan
was viewed more as a part of the Afghanistan problem. As a result, India
managed to become de-hyphenated from the decades old India-Pakistan
equation and entered into a strategic partnership with the U.S. which opened
up new ways for nuclear and defence cooperation for India.
In the last 15 years alone, India has acquired equipment worth

around U.S.$ 20 billion from the U.S.76 Additionally, India has signed
a number of defence cooperation agreements with the U.S. including the
Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geospatial
cooperation in 2020. This is the third foundational agreement that has
been signed between India and the U.S. after the Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement and the Communications Compatibility
73 International conference on “Emerging Security Order in Asia Pacific and its

Impact on South Asia,” organized by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
November 17-18, 2015, http://www.ipripak.org/emerging-security-order-in-asia-
pacific-and-its-impact-on-south-asia/
74 Madiha Afzal, “An Uneasy Limbo for US-Pakistan Relations Amidst the
Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” The Brookings Institute, August 6, 2021.
75The Obama Administration announced its new “Af-Pak” strategy to deal with
situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27, 2009. Under this policy, as
explained by National Security Advisor General James Jones, the United States
“will treat Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries, but as – with one challenge in
one region.” The US administration discontinued the use of term in 2010, in view of
growing criticism.
76 Manjeet Negi, “India, US to Sign BECA Deal this Month-end for Closer Defence
Ties,” India Today, October 19, 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-
us-beca-china-defence-ties-1733082-2020-10-19
84
and Security Agreement in 2016 and 2018 respectively. 77
In response to the U.S. rebalancing, China initiated a charm offensive

in the region. China’s engagement with Pakistan, its massive U.S.$46
billion investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and
the development of Gwadar port as part of the CPEC raised serious
concerns regarding China’s ambitions. India has made no attempt to hide
its anxiety over the CPEC, especially given the prospect of a Chinese
presence in the Arabian Sea through the Gwadar port.78
The external rebalancing of major powers has had a direct influence on

South Asian strategic stability following the newly defined roles of the two
nuclear rivals. India, after its elevated regional status, has become more
assertive and as a result, is less inclined towards negotiations on core issues
on equal terms. Recent events, especially the India-Pakistan face off
following the Pulwama/Balakot crisis have demonstrated a more risk
acceptance approach.
Challenging the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Norms
The emerging trends and positions on nuclear non-proliferation in South

Asia not only have the tendency to make the nuclear norms more
vulnerable, but also undermine the security of the region as a whole. The
emerging trends include preferential treatment of India in civil nuclear
agreements and its potential membership in the NSG, growing nuclear
material stockpiles and the consistent opposition by both Pakistan and
India to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Following the announcement of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement in

2005, India was granted a waiver by the NSG, which exempted it from
the requirement of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear
trade. India, with its booming economy, attracted numerous civil nuclear
77 US Security Cooperation with India, Factsheet, Bureau of Political-Military

Affairs, US department of State, January 20, 2021.
78 Anurag Kotoky and A. Ananthalakshmi, “India “Concerned” by China Role in
Pakistan’s Gwadar Port,” Reuters, February 2, 2013,
http://in.reuters.com/article/india-airshow-china-pakistan-antony-
idINDEE91506I20130206
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deals with a number of countries, including France, Russia, Kazakhstan,

Namibia, Canada, Australia and Japan among others. The uranium
supply from these countries is being used for the civilian nuclear energy
programme, freeing up India’s indigenous uranium reserves for nuclear
weapons development.
In addition, a number of concerns have been expressed with respect to

India’s separation plan. India has not made a clear distinction between its
civilian and military nuclear facilities, and has not placed its all civilian
nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards. 79 As a result, India’s
separation plan did not create two categories of civilian and military
facilities as envisaged. It has rather resulted in three categories: civilian
safeguarded, civilian unsafeguarded, and military facilities. 80 The
distinction between its civilian and military programme is quite blurred,
making it a unique case where three streams of a nuclear programme run
in parallel. Interestingly India’s nuclear deal with the U.S., which suffered
a deadlock for six years since its signing in 2008, was finalised only after
the U.S. agreed to give up two primary demands: one, related to tracking
as the U.S. origin all nuclear material supplied by the U.S. and the other
concerning U.S. suppliers’ liability in case of an accident.81
Besides that, both India and Pakistan are expanding their fissile
material stocks exponentially. According to the 2022 report of
International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), India is estimated to
possess 4.9±2 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 8.1±4.3
tonnes of reactor-grade plutonium separated from unsafeguarded heavy-
water power reactors as of the beginning of 2021. Pakistan’s fissile
material stocks are estimated to include 4±1.2 tons of HEU and0.5
tonnes of plutonium of plutonium.82 In 2015, it was reported that India
79 Kalman A. Robertson and John Carlson, “The Three Overlapping Streams of

India’s Nuclear Program,” Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/thethreesoverlappingtreamsofindiasnuclearp
owerprograms.pdf
80 Robertson and Carlson, The Three Overlapping Streams of India’s Nuclear
Program.
81 “US-India Reach ‘Breakthrough Understanding’ on Stalled Civil Nuke Deal,” RT,
January 25, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/226099-us-india-nuclear-agreement/
82 Global Fissile Material Report 2022, The International Panel on Fissile Materials,
https://fissilematerials.org/publications/2022/07/global_fissile_material_r.html
86
was building a large secret uranium enrichment centrifuge complex, the

Special Material Enrichment Facility (SMEF), in Karnataka, which
would further increase the fissile material stocks. 83 In view of the
existing disparity in fissile material reserves vis-à-vis India, Pakistan has
stalled negotiations on an FMCT, intended to prohibit only future
production. Pakistan is pressing, as a condition for initiating FMCT
negotiations, the taking into account of existing stockpiles.
India and Pakistan are two of the three Annex 2 states according to
the CTBT that have neither ratified nor signed the treaty. Pakistan has
conditioned its ratification on India’s ratification and has also proposed
signing a bilateral test ban treaty with India as a confidence building
measure.84 India, however, has vehemently opposed signing the CTBT
on the grounds of nuclear sovereignty and has not indicated any interest
in formalising its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. This
resistance was even more visible during discussions between India and
Japan regarding the civil nuclear agreement, where Japan insisted on
understanding regarding cancellation of the agreement if India conducted
a nuclear test.85
According to experts, India’s massive uranium enrichment

developments are an indication of its efforts to develop thermonuclear
weapons.86 India’s ambition to develop ICBMs up to the range of 10,000
83Adrian Levy,” India Is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce

Thermonuclear Weapons, Experts Say,” Foreign Policy, December 16, 2015. Also
see: David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “India’s New Uranium
Enrichment Plant in Karnataka,” ISIS, July 1, 2014, http://isis-online.org/isis-
reports/detail/indias-new-uranium-enrichment-plant-in-karnataka1/
84 “Pakistan Offers India Bilateral Arrangement on Non-Testing of Nuclear
Weapons” Express Tribune, August 16, 2016,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1163773/pakistan-offers-india-bilateral-arrangement-
non-testing-nuclear-weapons/
85 Suhasini Haidar, “Deal or no Deal? India, Japan Wrangle over N-Pact Note,”
Hindu, November 14, 2016, http://m.thehindu.com/news/national/deal-or-no-deal-
india-japan-wrangle-over-npact-note/article9341159.ece
86 Levy, “India Is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear
Weapons, Experts Say.” Also see: David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini,
“India’s New Uranium Enrichment Plant in Karnataka,” ISIS, July 1, 2014,
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/indias-new-uranium-enrichment-plant-in-
karnataka1/
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km would also require progression in the thermonuclear capability. 87

Considering India’s reportedly failed thermonuclear test in 1998, it is
likely that India may conduct another series of test before closing the
door on nuclear tests.88 Any such development would be a serious blow
to the global non-proliferation norms and highly destabilising for
regional security as it would prompt Pakistan to reconfigure its future
nuclear options as well.
Role of Strategic Culture
Understanding strategic culture is an important tool for analysing and

predicting a state’s policy choices. As Iain Johnston contends, “different
states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the
early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some
degree, by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics
of the state and its elites.”89 In South Asia as well, India and Pakistan have
had distinct strategic preferences stemming from their past experiences and
ideational outlook which have played a significant role in the development
of their respective nuclear programmes and policies. Factors such as
prestige and domestic politics played an important role in India’s policy
outlook and acquisition of nuclear weapons.90 India’s nuclear programme,
as we see it today, is a product of “multicausality”91 in which the idea of
Indian exceptionalism has dominated its nuclear development and continues
87 Ankit Panda, “India Is Capable of Developing a 10,000-Kilometer Range ICBM,”

The Diplomat, April 06, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/india-is-developing-
a-10000-kilometer-range-icbm/
88 Sachin Parashar, “Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist,” Times of India,
August 27, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pokhran-II-not-fully-
successful-Scientist/articleshow/4938610.cms
89 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security,
19:4, 33-64, http://www.fb03.uni-frankfurt.de/45431264/Johnston-1995-Thinking-
about-Strategic-Culture.pdf
90 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation
(California: University of California Press, 1999).
91 Michael Brown, et al., eds., “Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and
International Security in the 21st Century” as quoted by Adil Sultan, “Pakistan’s
Emerging Nuclear Posture: Impact of Drivers and Technology on Nuclear
Doctrine,” Strategic Studies, 2011, 149, chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://issi.org.pk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/1340000409_86108059.pdf
88
to effect its posture. 92 Despite India’s strong advocacy of global nuclear

disarmament, India’s premier scientist Dr. Homi Bhabha announced India’s
ability to develop a nuclear bomb in 1958.93 Security as a driving factor for
nuclear weapons development arose only after India’s war with China in
1962. Over the years, India’s scientific community has assumed a stronger
role in nuclear policymaking through their assertive role in determining the
types of weapons and capabilities.94
Pakistan, on the other hand, has perceived an existential threat from

India right from its independence in 1947 that triggered a security
anxiety in the Pakistani leadership.
Tensions over Kashmir have created a perpetual state of volatile

relations that have culminated in a nuclear competition. In Pakistan, the
nuclear programme started under civilian leadership after dismemberment
of Pakistan in 1971. Over the years, especially after the enactment of the
Pressler Amendment by the U.S. Congress, which constrained the sale of
conventional weapons, Pakistan increased its reliance on nuclear
weapons.95 With growing reliance on the nuclear weapons as part of its
national security policy, the military assumed primary responsibility in
various aspects of nuclear policy as well. The civilian government was
largely left with a ceremonial role in the nuclear policy making.
The current nuclear postures of both India and Pakistan are a result of
their respective strategic cultures which have evolved out of their
92 Malik, India’s Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb.

93 Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective, 15.
94 Joshua T. White and Kyle Deming, “Dependent Trajectories: India’s MIRV
Program and Deterrence Stability in South Asia” in Michael Krepon, Joshua T.
White, Julia Thompson, Shane Mason eds. Deterrence Instability and Nuclear
Weapons in South Asia (Washington DC: Stimson Centre 2015), 177.
95 The 1985 Pressler amendment to the US law was introduced in view of Pakistan’s
covert nuclear activities during 1980s. It required that a presidential determination
be given to the US Congress annually that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device,
failing which, military and economic assistance to Pakistan would stop. In 1990,
President Bush withheld this determination and halted the sale of F-16 planes and
other military equipment to Pakistan. This increased the conventional disparity in
South Asia and contributed to greater reliance on nuclear weapons by Pakistan. See
for example; Khan, “Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb,” 326.
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historical experiences and distinct national aspirations.96 On the political

front, the conflicting objectives of India and Pakistan have increased
countervailing tendencies in the masses, making it difficult for the
leaders to change or take flexible positions on sticky issues. 97 In India,
for instance, the current BJP leadership has adopted a tough policy on
Pakistan and have used anti Pakistan narrative even during the election
campaigns. As a result, the Modi government in 2019 risked the stability
of the region by launching an air strikes inside Pakistan for election
gains. Likewise in Pakistan, right wing groups, despite having less
political strength, make it difficult for the government to show any
flexibility on the traditional Kashmir policy.98This behaviour was visible
during Pakistani Foreign Minister’s visit to India to attend the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in New Delhi recently, where
no breakthrough could be possible as both sides remained stuck to their
traditional positions. 99
Opportunities for Positive Engagement
While there are multiple views on how to ensure that deterrence does not
fail and lead to war, there is relatively less attention being paid to the fact
that deterrence is not an end in itself.100 The very purpose of maintaining
deterrence is to buy time for formulating strategies to deal with issues
which are challenging regional security. In South Asia as well, it is
necessary to realise that, while deterrence is working, efforts should be
made to find ways and means to resolve issues, create interdependence
and move towards peace and stability.
96 Eric Arnet, ed., Military Capacity and Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and
Iran,” SIPRI (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
97 Sitara Noor, Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures and Peace-Making in South
Asia, Strategic Studies, Fall (2012): 142.
98 Pak Trashes Musharraf’s 4-Point Kashmir Formula,” Times of India, June 30,
2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pak-trashes-Musharrafs-4-
point-Kashmir-formula/articleshow/6109996.cms
99 Hafsa Adil, “At SCO Summit, India, Pakistan Squabble over Kashmir,
Terrorism,” Aljazeera, May 8, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/8/at-
sco-summit-india-pakistan-squabble-over-kashmir-terrorism
100 Van Jackson, “Stop Confusing Deterrence with Strategy,” The Diplomat, July 06,
2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/stop-confusing-deterrence-with-strategy/
90
India and Pakistan have witnessed short-lived moments of peace.

These moments have not yielded any lasting results and have fallen
victim to chronic trust deficit between the two states. As a result of the
Lahore Memorandum of Understanding in 1999 101 and the Composite
Dialogue process of 2004, both India and Pakistan became engaged in a
series of confidence building measures (CBM). 102 While some CBMs,
such as people to people contact and bilateral trade, succumbed to the
rising tensions, many other, such as the agreement on non-attack on
nuclear facilities, have withstood the pressure of crises. For over a
decade now, however, even the CBM process has been stalled and India
has declined to engage in any new CBMs with Pakistan. In response to
India’s reactions, Pakistan also displayed “CBM fatigue.”The situation
worsened after India’s abrogation of article 370 and 35-A that revoked
special status of Indian held Kashmir and bifurcated the region into two
union territories in 5 August 2019. Despite this new low in bilateral
relations, a silver lining, however, was Pakistan’s opening of Kartarpur
Corridor in 2019 as per schedule and bilateral reaffirmation of a 2003
ceasefire agreement on the line of control in 2021.
These agreements amidst heightened tension between the two

countries suggest that despite gloomy situation arising from the hardened
positions on both sides, there are some areas of potential engagement. A
starting point could be giving space to legal diplomacy to address
imminent issue of terrorism. It is worth recalling that Pakistan and India
were not only engaging on the 2008 Mumbai case and the Pathankot
base attack but they were also jointly investigating the Samjhota carnage
involving the killing of 42 passengers, mostly Pakistani citizens, by
Hindu extremist groups inside India as well as former Indian navy
officer Kulbhushan Yadev’s case, who was arrested inside Pakistani
territory and admitted facilitating numerous terrorist activities in
Balochistan and Karachi on the direction of India’s Research & Analysis
Wing (RAW). While commenting on these pending cases, analysts have
highlighted that “the common legal feature is that all of them are
transnational crimes, in which the crime of terrorism has been conspired
in one jurisdiction and executed in the other… all the cases are pending
101 Lahore Declaration February, 1999, February 02, 1999, Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India.
102 Noor, “Nuclear Confidence Building Measures and Peace Making in South
Asia,”137-143.
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investigation before the courts and courts demand admissible evidence to

convict the accused which has never been provided by either country in
their respective cases.”103 To date, these cases and trials have been used
for political point scoring against the adversaries, leaving aside the legal
trail, which has resulted in a continuous blame game and allegations of
not doing enough to the satisfaction of the other state.104
It is, therefore, important that both India and Pakistan share

actionable evidence, if available as claimed by both sides, for a proper
legal investigation. This step will mutually benefit both states, each of
which blames the other for terror activities inside their jurisdiction, while
they also face home-grown terrorists. In view of the risk of emergence of
IS affiliates in India and Pakistan, it is even more important to
distinguish the existing terror networks from that of the Islamic State,
which could manipulate the simmering tensions between the two states.
India and Pakistan may also consider expanding the existing CBMs
which are successfully being implemented. For instance, since the
signing of the 1988 India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement on Nuclear
Installations, at the beginning of each year, the two countries exchange
lists of their nuclear installations. This is lauded as the most successful
CBM between the two nuclear rivals, and one that has withstood the
pressures of various crises. Article 1 of Non-Attack Agreement prohibits
an attack or damage to the other’s nuclear facilities. However, it does not
specifically address cyber attacks. It is therefore suggested that acyber-
security aspect may be incorporated in the existing agreement for greater
clarity and broader application. It may also be expanded to secure other
critical infrastructures, such as aviation and the nuclear command and
control systems.
Another mutually beneficial area of cooperation is nuclear safety and

security. While it is naive to think of close cooperation and information
sharing under the current circumstance, it is certainly beneficial for both
states to establish close communication links and share best practices.
103 Mariana Baabar, “Timely Message from Pakistan Sobers Modi India,” News,
September 21, 2016, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/151450-Timely-message-
from-Pakistan-sobers-Modi-govt
104 Sitara Noor, “Uri Attack: Managing Conflict through Legal Diplomacy,” South
Asian Voices, The Stimson Centre, September 30, 2016,
https://southasianvoices.org/hot-takes-uri-in-context/
92
India and Pakistan have signed an agreement on “Reducing the Risk

from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons” under which both states
agreed to notify each other immediately in the event of any accident
relating to nuclear weapons. The agreement was signed in 2007, initially
for five years, and has been extended twice since then. 105 India and
Pakistan should consider expanding this agreement to include all nuclear
related emergencies, as already proposed by Pakistan, to establish a
bilateral mechanism for early notification of nuclear emergencies. Given
geographical proximity, this is important to providing quick information
and work together in any such eventuality.
An associated area of cooperation could be in combating illicit

trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, minimizing the risk of
nuclear or radioactive material being used for an improvised nuclear
device or a radiological dispersal device. In a worst case scenario, if
nuclear or radioactive material stolen in one country is used in the other
as a dirty bomb, it may create a serious crisis, particularly if that source
is identified as originating from the rival state. In a worst case scenario,
it may be viewed as a nuclear first use.106
Lastly, with growing realisation about the necessity of regional

stability for a better future, Pakistan’s long standing proposal to establish
a strategic restraint regime (SRR) needs to be revisited and repackaged
in more nuanced manner. The proposed SRR to control a prospective
arms race in the region envisions three interlocking features: (1) a
mutually agreed framework for nuclear and missile restraint; (2)
conventional restraint; (3) establishing an agreed mechanism to resolve
all outstanding issues especially the Kashmir dispute for stable
relations. 107 The SRR broadly covers political, military and nuclear
dynamics that have destabilised the region. 108 Hence, it offers a risk
reduction mechanism as well.
105 Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating To Nuclear Weapons,
The Stimson Center, February 21, 2007.
106 Noor, “Nuclear Confidence Building Measures and Peace Making in South
Asia,”146-147.
107 Khan, Eating Grass: the Making of Pakistani Bomb, 296.
108 Shahzad Chaudhry, “Strategic Restraint,” News International, March 11, 2016,
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/104353-Strategicrestraint
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Conclusion
Strategic stability in South Asia has been sustained through various

crises over the past two decades. However, recent developments have
created destabilising factors that pose new challenges. Incidents
involving non-state actors, whose interests lie in perpetual India-Pakistan
conflict, call into question the role of nuclear deterrence and its
applicability in the 21stcentury.
The existing tense situation is further exacerbated with the development

and implementation of inflammatory military strategies, actions and
statements. Arms control stability is also on shaky grounds due to the
growing arms build-up in the region. These developments put a severe
burden on crisis stability and have increased the probability of a crisis
originating from some unintended incident that might lead to a nuclear alert.
It is therefore important that both states develop more confidence and
evolve a strategic restraint regime that would work at crosscutting levels to
strengthen strategic stability. A stable relationship based on a genuine desire
to resolve decade old issues would be the only guarantee of a stable future
of South Asia.
94
Authoritative Populism and the Media:
Perception Control and Narrative Building in India
Sumeera Imran* and Humayun Javed**
Abstract
The article analyses the interrelationship between authoritarian populism and

the media in India. It explores the core question of political authoritarianism
under the rule of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and whether it has exercised
control on media. The article explores two main questions: First, what are the
dynamics of media control in India, if any? Second, whether media control
has played any role in the polarisation of the Indian society. The article
employs the theoretical framework of authoritarian populism, using content
analysis, to explore whether media has any role to play in the recent upsurge
of right-wing Hindu nationalism. The article’s empirical evidence suggest
media’s complacent and partisan role, favouring populist political agenda in
India. The article highlights that the bulk of Indian media works under the
state control, with major newsgroups towing the ruling BJP’s line on
exclusivists right-wing ideology. Furthermore, the groups which do not
comply have faced governmental repression and clampdown for independent
reporting and objective journalism. The article’s original contribution rests in
the analyses of authoritarian populism and right-wing nationalist control of
the media and the health of democracy in India.
Keywords: Indian Media, Concentration of Ownership, Bollywood,

Muslims, Right-wing Nationalism.
Introduction
Media ─ print, digital and electronic ─ is one of the most significant

sources of information in shaping public opinion in today’s world. An
*
The author is Assistant Professor IR, Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS),
National Defence University. Email: drsameeraimran@ndu.edu.pk.
**
The author is a Fulbright Grantee pursuing MA in International Relations at the New
York University. Email: humayunjaved347@gmail.com.
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Strategic Studies
impartial and free media is the fourth pillar of the state in a secular
democracy. 1 As medium of communication, its various types include
news media, social media and web media, while earned media, shared
media and owned media are some other names used for the media. 2
Media acts as a watchdog of democracy. It performs the role of a
vigilant, holding democratic institutions accountable before the law. In a
technologically advanced world, media monitors the functioning of
government, acting as an essential source of information for public
debate and representation. 3 Media has an important role to play as a
watchdog in representing the public interest while holding those in
power accountable. It allows people to make informed choices from
within the different options discussed and represented.4 However, behind
this apparently over-simplistic role, media is a powerful mechanism of
perception control and narrative building in the modern world. A free
and impartial media is the parametre of an inclusivist, liberal democracy.
Contrarily, lack of media independence, subtle or direct forms of the
state control, right-wing ownership or ideological inclination, unequal
and partial representation of societal preferences illustrates illiberal
disposition of the media in a free democracy.
The article analyses authoritarian populism’s rightwing control

on media and the health of democracy in India. The article refers to
authoritarian populism as the theoretical framework, employing content
analysis to explore: first, the dynamics of media control in India; and,
second, whether media control has played any role in polarisation of the
Indian society. It explores the core question of the interlink age, if any,
between right wing authoritarianism and control on the media. The
research examines whether right-wing Hindu nationalism’s ownership
and control of Indian media has contributed to the recent upsurge of
1 Julianne Schultz, Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and the
Media (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 23-47.
2 Bernard Cecil Cohen, Press and Foreign Policy (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2015), 5-14.
3 Edward Anderson and Christophe Jaffrelot, “Hindu Nationalism and the
‘Saffronisation of the Public Sphere’: An Interview with Christophe
Jaffrelot,” Contemporary South Asia 26, no. 4 (2018): 468-
482, https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2018.1545009
4 Duncan McDonnell and Luis Cabrera, “The Right-Wing Populism of India’s
BharatiyaJanata Party and why comparativists should care,” Democratization 26,
no. 3 (2019): 484-501.https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1551885
96
Authoritative Populism and the Media
right-wing Hindu nationalism in India. Moreover, it seeks to examine

how state control has undermined pluralist representation of Indian
minorities in India. The indicators for the present research include such
aspects as the impact of right-wing populism on the structure of Indian
media (ownership concentration and political affiliations), lack of
plurality and diversity; biased and partial reporting; marginalized
representation of Indian minorities, politicised or negative portrayal in
Bollywood cinema.
Many experts on Indian politics such as Julianne Schultz,

Bernard Cecil Cohen, Kalyani Chadha have observed that Indian
democracy is facing an assault from right-wing authoritarianism marked
by the centralisation of power and curbing of freedoms.5 Media’s role
becomes all the more prominent as a watchdog of democracy in India,
given the state’s tilt towards Hindu majoritarianism or extreme Hindu
nationalism. Empirical indicators of such a tilt include instances of
official abrogation of Article 370 and 35A, formulation of divisive and
discriminatory laws such as Citizenship Amendment Act (2019),
National Register of Citizens in Assam and “Love Jihad” Law
(Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance) in 2020.
This paper offers lens for academia and scholarship in addressing a

research gap about how state’s policies have profound implications for
media freedom and democracy in India. Furthermore, the study offers
students of media and politics new avenues for research related to Indian
media ownership, screen representation of minorities, and
corporatisation/market trends of the media. More importantly, the
research article throws light on how Indian media shares a complex
relationship with the political elite in facing reprisals for working with
objectivity and impartiality.
The article is divided into five sections: the first examines the
ideational approach of authoritative populism; the second reviews India’s
authoritarian turn and challenges for plurality and accountability of the
media; third analyses concentration of media ownership; fourth
5Anderson and Jaffrelot, “Hindu Nationalism and the Saffronisation of the Public
Sphere.” Contemporary South Asia 26, no. 4 (2018): 468-482,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2018.1545009
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establishes a connection between Hindi cinema and Hindu nationalism;

and the last section addresses how authoritarian nationalism and media
control has impacted independent and critical reporting today.
Authoritative Populism: An Ideational Approach
This section examines authoritative populism as a political discourse to

explore how it works to exert control on working of the Indian media.
Populism as a political discourse portrays advancement of a struggle
between the ‘the pure people’ on the one hand and ‘the corrupt elite’ on
the other.6 Dean and Maiguashca see populism as a set of ideas that is
merged with other thick ideologies (communism and nationalism) that are
more intellectually refined and consistent.7 Populism has a more limited
ambition and scope. Dutch scholar, Cas Mudde refers to populism as a
“thin-centered ideology.” 8 Populism tends to exhibit both anti-elitist and
anti-pluralistic features. Pluralism entails the diversity of various ideas and
interests in society, and elitism celebrates the virtues of elites and the
fallibility of the masses. Populism has marked a struggle against both.
Populists claim exclusive representation of the ‘real’ people defined by

narrow conceptions of national identity, cultural practices and religious
norms. Populism tends to favour authoritarian policies to combat threats
from the dangerous ‘others’ showing hostility towards immigrants and
suspicions towards minorities on identity lines.9 Populist leaders assert that
“they, and they alone, represent the people.”10 However, for their anti-elitist
bid to establish direct contact with the ‘real’ people, populist leaders create
6 Kirk A Hawkins and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “The Ideational Approach to

Populism,” Latin American Research Review 52, no. 4 (2017): 513-
528.http://doi.org/10.25222/larr.85.
7 Jonathan Dean and Bice Maiguashca, “Did Somebody Say Populism? Towards a
Renewal and Reorientation of Populism Studies,” Journal of Political Ideologies 25,
no. 1 (2020): 11–27.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2020.1699712.
8 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy,” West
European Politics 33, no. 6 (2010): 1167-
1186.https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2010.508901.
9 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007) 66.
10 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism? (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 3.
98
an unmediated relationship with the people by criticizing intermediary

institutions, discrediting unelected experts as part of the nefarious elite, and
confronting media and institutions that maintain a check and balance on
executive authority and populist policies.11 Therefore, populism in power
sees the consistent dissemination of ‘common-sense solutions’ to complex
problems with a disregard for experts, portrayed as the enemy of the
common people. Common-sense simplification of complex issues helps
populists to seek greater political connection with ordinary masses pitted
against elite institutions and experts.12
Populism, with an anti-establishment platform, frames the elite as

corrupt, self-serving, and ignorant of the problems of ordinary people.It
develops an unmediated relationship of the populist leader (often
charismatic) with the ‘real’ and ‘true’ people defined as homogenous and
virtuous, whose primacy must be ensured against the parasitic elite.It
oversimplifies reality and proposes common-sense solutions to identify with
the common people. Populists with right-wing leanings manifest anti-
pluralism in defining the ‘real people’ as they exclude some groups as
‘others’ based on a narrow conception of identity ─ race, religion, ethnicity,
immigration, gender ─ and claim that they alone represent the people.
Authoritarian populists disregard institutions and experts as part of the
nefarious elite and show authoritarian impulses towards institutions that
limit or check executive power ─ opposing political parties, legislative
assemblies, judiciary, media and civil society.
India’s Authoritarian Turn
This section examines India’s authoritarian turn and challenges for media
accountability and plurality. From 2014 onwards, after winning the
elections in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the leadership of
Narendra Modi (followed by a re-election with a thumping majority in
2019) has been making institutional efforts to reconfigure democracy by
redefining the ‘people’ in ethno-religious terms. At the government level
these efforts have fuelled authoritarian populism under the banner of the
11 “Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 11.
12 Hans-Georg. Betz, “Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical
Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies,” in Democracies and
the Populist Challenge, ed. Y. Mény and Y. Surel, (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
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Strategic Studies
Hindutva project (an exclusionary right-wing religious movement based

on exclusive Hindu nationalism) to redefine India as primarily a Hindu
nation (of ‘the true people’) while casting religious minorities,
independent institutions, and political opposition as ‘others’ or ‘anti-
national.’13 As French Indologist, Christophe Jaffrelot that anti-pluralistic
policies carried out with majoritarian goals is of the opinion have
demonstrated the deteriorating health of Indian democracy. Right-wing
populism specifically targets Indian Muslims, terming the largest minority
as the ‘other,’ leading to erosion of the secular makeup of India’s body
politic.’14
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as manifestation of

authoritative populism, identifies himself with the ordinary man. Modi
portrays his life mission aimed at serving Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS), an extremist Hindu nationalist organisation which he joined at the
age of six. Modi has portrayed himself as a “common man” fighting a
corrupt elitist system. He is often framed as a railway tea-seller in his
youth who became a self-made leader without a privileged political
background. This is reflected in his first Independence Day speech after
taking office in 2014: “I come from a poor family”, and “I am an outsider
for Delhi … I have been quite isolated from the elite class of this place.”15
Modi’s discriminatory populist practices have marginalised not only

state institutions but other segments of the Indian population. The impact
is most evident in case of India’s Muslim population, targeted
systematically and disregarded as equal citizens of the state. In 2019, for
instance, updating of National Register of Citizens (NRC) status left 1.9
million Muslim residents in the state of Assam without legal status, since
they belonged originally from Bangladesh. In the same year, while
implementing Article 370 and Article 35-A, the BJP government
13 Duncan Mc Donnell and Luis Cabrera, “The Right-Wing Populism of India’s

Bharatiya Janata Party and why comparativists should care,” Democratization 26,
no. 3 (2019): 484-501.https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1551885.
14 Anderson and Jaffrelot, “Hindu Nationalism and the ‘Saffronisation of the Public
Sphere” 468-482. https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2018.1545009
15 Narendra Modi’s First Independence Day speech: Full text,” India Today, updated
September 17, 2016, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/narendra-modi-
independence-day-speech-full-text-red-fort-204216-2014-08-15
100
abrogated the special status of Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, the only
Muslim-majority state in Indian polity.16
In late 2019, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was passed

to provide citizenship to refugees from neighbouring countries ─ with
the sole exception of Muslims, who are systematically disenfranchised.17
Under Modi’s rule, India has seen a rapid rise in religious intolerance
with cow vigilantism and campaigns against the so-called ‘love Jihad’ (a
conspiracy theory that Muslim men marry Hindu women to convert them
to Islam). 18 Such an exclusive conception of the people based on a
religious divide is reflected in the BJP’s Chief Minister of Haryana,
Manohar Lal Khattar’s statement in 2015: “Muslims can live here, but in
this country, they will have to stop eating beef.”19
Populist tendencies are also evident in Modi’s tension with other

institutions, which maintain a check on executive powers, particularly the
media. Writing about India’s illiberal shift, political scientist, Rahul
Mukherji, mentions that a distrustful relationship with the media is obvious
as “Modi has held virtually no formal press conferences open to the public
view.” 20 The Indian populist leader instead chooses social media to
communicate directly with his followers in an unmediated manner. Modi
and his senior party members have targeted the press for its ‘elitist’ makeup,
manipulated and corrupt “paid news.”21 Demonstrating lean towards right-
wing Hindu nationalism, the concentration and ownership of major media
16 “Article 370: What Happened with Kashmir and Why It Matters,” BBC News,
August 5, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708.
17 “Citizenship Amendment Act: India’s New ‘Anti-Muslim Law’ Explained,” BBC
News, September 11, 2019,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-50670393
18 Ashutosh Varshney et al., “Populism and Hindu Nationalism in India,” Studies in
Comparative International Development 56, no. 2 (2021): 197-
222.https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-021-09335-8
19 Varinder Bhatia and Nirupama Subramanian, “Muslims can Live in this Country,
but will have to Give up Eating Beef, says Haryana CM Manohar Lal Khattar,”
Indian Express, October 16, 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
news-india/muslims-can-live-in-this-country-but-they-will-have-to-give-up-eating-
beef-says-haryana-cm-manohar-lal-khattar/.
20 Rahul Mukherji, “Covid vs. Democracy: India’s Illiberal Remedy,” Journal of
Democracy 31, no. 4 (2020): 91-105. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0058.
21 Paula Chakravartty and Srirupa Roy, “Mr. Modi Goes to Delhi: Mediated
Populism and the 2014 Indian Elections,” Television & New Media 16, no. 4 (2015):
311–322, https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476415573957
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outlets/houses has jeopardised independent journalism, impartial

representation and news coverage in India. In the World Press Freedom
Index of 2023, issued by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), India finds
itself on the rank of 161 among 180 countries. 22 Modi’s contempt for
unelected institutions, usage of social media and his widespread
discrimination of the minorities show how authoritarian populism defines
Modi’s exclusionary politics in India.
Core Features of Populism: Narendra Modi’s Practices in India
Anti-Establishment and Anti-Pluralism and Contempt for Institutions

Association with the Narrow Conception of and Checks and Balances
‘People’ the ‘Real People’
Modi Portrayed himself as Exclusive Hindu nationalism The Modi government showed
a common man; an deems Muslims as others; disregard for judges who
outsider to New Delhi with the government introduced protested against executive
a modest background; and NRC and CAA; and conduct; displayed distrust for
a pious leader associating revoked article 370 in media seen as ‘elitist’; and
himself with the Hindu Kashmir placed curbs on media freedom
majority
Source: Authors’ own research findings based on data analysis.
Populist Control on the Indian Media:

Concentration and Political Ties
This section examines the interrelationship between populism control on

the media in India. It argues that the fundamental tenet of a vibrant and
free democracy is an informed and well-aware public regulated through a
free media. A democratic polity demands various and impartial
information sources, which help the people decide for themselves.23 To
22 “2021 World Press Freedom Index,” Reporters Without Borders, accessed May 3,
2023, https://rsf.org/en/2023-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-threatened-
fake-content-industry. .
23 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is... And Is
Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 75-88,

https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1991.0033
102
evaluate how political control on media impacts the state of democracy

in any country, we need to configure: first, who owns the media and
what is the nature of media ownership/viewership? Second, what is the
kind of relationship, which media owners share with the public and
elite/power structures?
Diversity of the sources of information can help establish diverse

opinions based on multiple perspectives. Concentration of media
ownership jeopardises the likelihood of different perspectives and
multiplicity of representation.24 Moreover, the study of media ownership
and viewership allows us to examine how regulated or market-inclined
media outlets are and what is the spirit that guides them: public
awareness or corporate interests. Media ownership serves as a clear
indicator of the relationship media houses share with those in power.
Media groups’ political connections/ideological affiliations reduce the
chances of credibility/ accountability which is a fundamental aspect in
case of a free democracy. Hence, understanding the structure of media
ownership is critical to comprehend if media actually depicts freedom of
the press; if ownership is concentrated in a few hands having political
ties; the role of independence of journalism and accountability and the
health of democracy.25
In India, there are nearly 900 satellite channels, out of which half are
news channels. 26 Television is the most accessible form of media
consumption for 210 million households in India.27 Of the more than 550
radio stations, there is only one licensed news radio station in India.
Akashvani (formerly known as All India Radio) is the only station with the
24 C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6-16.
25 Steven Barnett, “What’s Wrong with Media Monopolies? A Lesson from History and
a New Approach to Media Ownership Policy,” MEDIA@ LSE Electronic Working

Papers, no. 18 (2010),
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/mediaWorkingPapers/ewpNumber18.aspx.
26 “India Media Guide,” BBC News, March 21, 2023,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12557390.
27 “TV-Owning Households in India Grew 6.9% to 210 Mln in Two Years: BARC,”
Business Standard India, April 15, 2021, https://www.business-
standard.com/article/current-affairs/tv-owning-households-in-india-grew-6-9-to-
210-mln-in-two-years-barc-121041500923_1.html
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license to broadcast news and current affairs program. 28 In print media,

118,239 registered publications exist in India, which demonstrates that the
country is one of the biggest media markets in the world.29 However, the
immense size and a huge number of media outlets do not illustrate the
diversity of ownership and plurality of viewership. Such concentration is
sharp at the national level and becomes even greater at the regional level.
The regulatory frameworks to ensure media pluralism are weak in India. For
instance, to explore the nature of media ownership and audience
concentration in India, Reporters Without Borders in collaboration with
Data LEADS (a New Delhi-based digital media company) analysed 58
biggest media outlets in the latest study on Media Ownership Monitor in
India.30
The project illustrated that the trends of media concentration have put
media pluralism at risk. The top eight media outlets have more than 70
per cent of media audience. 31 Research showed that the readership
concentration is very high in the print media market, with four Hindi
language outlets at the national level ─ Dainik Jagran, Hindustan, Amar
Ujala and Dainik Bhaskar─ capturing 76.45 per cent of the readership.32
It depicts that readership becomes more concentrated at the regional
level. According to this study, half of the readership shares are
concentrated among the top two newspapers. In the radio segment,
readership and ownership cannot be less concentrated, as there is a
complete state monopoly of control over radio news. There is only one
radio news channel ─ Akashvani, previously All India Radio, owned by
28 Mochish KS, “Democratise Radio News in India,” Economic and Political

Weekly, July 22, 2022, https://www.epw.in/engage/article/democratise-radio-news-
india.
29 Nalin Mehta, “India and its Television: Ownership, Democracy, and the Media
Business,” Emerging Economy Studies 1, no. 1 (2015): 50-63,

https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2394901514562304
30 Chhetria Patrakar, “Who Owns India’s Media?,” Himal Southasian, December 30,
2019, https://www.himalmag.com/who-owns-indias-media-rsf-dataleads-2019/.
31“Media Ownership Matters,” Media Ownership Monitor, India, accessed Feb 24,
2020, https://india.mom-rsf.org/en/.
32“Is Regional The New National?,” Media Ownership Monitor,
India, https://india.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/nationalandregionalmedia/
104
the state ─ with private radio channels restricted from producing news.33
According to the research, audience concentration in television channels
is also very high with the top four owners have an audience share of
more than 50 per cent. Moreover, another underlying aspect that
demonstrates a concentrated image of media ownership is cross-media
ownership. This phenomenon of cross-media ownership is when a single
media producer owns different channels of communication with political
ties. This results in concentration of media ownership and media content.
The Media Ownership Monitor report illustrated that the top eight media
owners possess more than 70 per cent of the market share along with
several political ties. 34 For example, four out of five major television
media groups are owned by individuals affiliated with the ruling political
party: Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).35 Co-owner of Zee News, Dr.Subash
Chandra, got elected as an independent member of Rajya Sabha with the
help of the BJP.36 Rajeev Chandrashekar, who initiated Republic TV, is a
member of the BJP in the Rajya Sabha and the Minister of State for the
BJP government. BJP’s national vice president and official spokesman
Baijayant Jay Panda is the co-owner of Odhisa TV. 37 Owner of News
Live Rinki Bhuyan Sarma is the wife of a BJP Chief Minister of Assam,
Himanta Biswa Sarma.38
This is not a surprise when we see the weaker state of regulatory

frameworks against cross-media ownership and ownership transparency.39
Regulatory laws are not implemented to ensure the diversity and plurality of
Indian media. Instead of establishing a balance between regulation and
freedom in ownership, one can see intense state intervention with political
33 “Radio News Monopoly,” Media Ownership Monitor, India, https://india.mom-

rsf.org/en/findings/radionewsmonopoly/.
34 “A Delicate Handshake,” Media Ownership Monitor, India, https://india.mom-
rsf.org/en/findings/politicalaffiliations/.
35 Media Ownership Monitor: Who Owns the Media in India?” Reporters Without
Borders, India, https://rsf.org/en/news/media-ownership-monitor-who-owns-media-
india
36 “Media Ownership Monitor.”
37 “Media Ownership Monitor.”
38 “The Sarma Family,” Media Ownership Monitor, http://pakistan.mom-
gmr.org/en/owners/individual-owners/detail/owner/owner/show/the-sarma-family/
39 Media Ownership Monitor: Who Owns the Media in India?” Reporters Without
Borders, India, https://rsf.org/en/news/media-ownership-monitor-who-owns-media-

india
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Strategic Studies
leverage on the one hand and sheer concentration and cross-media

ownership on the other: the presence of a single radio news channel owned
by the state with no regulation of media markets exhibiting monopolies in
television and print media, prove the point. Hence, such trends affecting
plurality of ownership and diversity of opinion challenge democratic
accountability, freedom of the press, and a multitude of information sources.
Ultimately, this leads to control of content and public opinion ─ a grave
danger to democratic Indian polity, where a mix of diverse cultures, ideas,
and faiths require pluralist sources of representation.
Factor of Bollywood Cinema
The Indian film industry ─ Bollywood is the largest film industry in the
world in movies production per year and the number of audiences.40 Also
known as Hindi cinema, Bollywood has an audience that spans six
continents and produces more than 1000 films per year. 41 Bollywood
film industry is one of the largest media industries which play a crucial
role in shaping public opinion and perception building. It has large
viewership, with intense communication and interaction with enormous
content in Indian Hindi cinema.
Consequently, the Indian film industry also shapes the attitudes of large
masses about minorities ─ especially Muslims, who are the largest minority
in India. Muslims are regularly portrayed in negative leading roles in many
films. In a democratic society as diverse as India, the impartial
representation of minorities as equal citizens is crucial to uphold the spirit of
democracy, equality and justice. Discrimination against Muslims in
portrayal of stereotyped roles in the largest media industry has serious
consequences for the diversity of the Indian polity. Muslim portrayal in the
world’s largest film industry exhibits a bias in favour of nationalist
40 Hariqbal Basi, “Indianising Hollywood: The Debate over Copyright Infringement

by Bollywood,” UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 18 (2010): 33,
https://doi.org/10.5070/LR8180027138
41 Tejaswini Ganti, Bollywood: A Guidebook to Popular Hindi Cinema, 2nd ed.
(London: Routledge, 2013), 2-4.
106
discourse, showing signs of intense polarisation.42 This misrepresentation is

characterised by the portrayal of Muslim characters as terrorists and anti-
national; imagining Muslim roles in a stereotypically negative way; and
constructing vilified images of Muslims as ‘others’ and those linked with
‘arch-enemy Pakistan.’ This trend has seen greater intensification after the
rise of right-wing Hindu nationalism under the Prime Minister Narendra
Modi.
Although there have been limited attempts by some filmmakers to

uphold secular principles and champion the message of communal
harmony, Hindi cinema has frequently portrayed Muslims either as non-
modern feudal characters or as anti-national, terrorist, villain, or anti-
social characters.43 The urge to propagate the idea of narrow nationalism
with communal overtones using cinema has further made Bollywood a
controversial site. Indian Hindi cinema, in its objective to promote Indian
nationalism, has equated Indian nationalism with Hindu nationalism on
exclusive terms. It has deliberately excluded Muslims and represented
them as distrustful people and antagonists; the Indian film industry
overwhelmingly links Islam and Muslims with terrorism.44 In most of the
films where Bollywood has tried to promote Indian nationalism, it has
done so on majoritarian terms while constructing the image of Muslims
as ‘others’; a similar kind of motive is evident in the hate campaign
against what is referred to as ‘love jihad in the intent to mobilise,
polarise and communalise citizens.45 Marks of anti-Muslim trends have
been present in the Bollywood cinema even before, prior to Modi and his
BJP government. However, Modi’s populism is guilty of exacerbating
the dangerous polarisation directed against the Muslim minority of India.
42 Sanjeev Kumar, “Constructing the Nation’s Enemy: Hindutva, Popular Culture and
the Muslim ‘Other’ in Bollywood Cinema,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2013):
458-469, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2013.785340
43 Maidul Islam, “Imagining Indian Muslims: Looking through the Lens of
Bollywood Cinema,” Indian Journal of Human Development 1, no. 2 (2007): 403-

422, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0973703020070208
44 Salma Umber, Muhammad Junaid Ghauri and Hassan Nawaz, “Exploring the
Image of Muslims in India,” South Asian Studies 33, no. 2 (2018): 475-490,
http://journals.pu.edu.pk/journals/index.php/IJSAS/article/viewFile/3178/1355.
45 Nadira Khatun, “Love-Jihad and Bollywood: Constructing Muslims as
Other,” Journal of Religion & Film 22, no. 3 (2018): 8,

https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol22/iss3/8/
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Strategic Studies
For instance, research published in the Pakistan Journal of Islamic

Research examined the portrayal of Muslims in Indian cinema from 2002 to
2008. The study analysed the content of 50 Indian movies to judge whether
the content presented Muslims as favourable, unfavourable, or neutral.
Results illustrated just 4.4 per cent images of Muslims as favourable, 65.2
percent as unfavourable, and 30.4 per cent neutral. The study concluded that
Muslim images were highly distorted ─ the Indian film industry greatly
emphasised Muslims asterrorists. 46 Moreover, the representation of
Kashmiri Muslims in Hindi cinema has not been much different. Muslims
are characterised by stereotyped representation as synonymous with
terrorism. For example, a study of how Bollywood represented Kashmiri
Muslims with special reference to three films ─ Roja (1992), Mission
Kashmir (2000), and Haider (2014) ─ concluded a pre-Modi trend, which
continued in the BJP government, portraying Muslims in a binary of good
nation vs. the bad Muslim terrorists, thereby dehumanising Muslims.47
Furthermore, the rise of right-wing Hindu nationalism, substituting

Indian nationalism with Hindu nationalism under Modi’s rightwing
populism further aggravated the trend of dismal portrayal of the Muslim
community in India. The Bollywood industry ─ after the rise of BJP as
India’s biggest political party in 2014, in its apparent attempt to promote
Indian nationalism ─ has, in reality, championed Hindu nationalism even
more in a progression to distort the image of Muslims in India. A study
involving the content analysis of four top-rated Hindi movies in recent
years involving nationalistic content ─ Bajirao Mastani (2015),
Padmaavat (2018), Uri: The Surgical Strike (2019) and Tanhaji (2020) ─
showed that these movies were characterised by a high level of
46 Muhammad Ashraf Khan and Syeda Zuria Bokhari, “Portrayal of Muslims in

Indian Cinema: A Content Analysis of Movies during (2002-8),” Pakistan Journal
of Islamic Research 8 (2011): 1-15,
https://www.academia.edu/download/29241362/eng1ashrafkhan_zuria.pdf
47 Mohammad Ameen Parray, “Bollywood and Kashmir: A Study of Stereotyped
Representation of Kashmiri Muslims with Special Reference to Roja, Mission

Kashmir and Haider,” International Journal of English: Literature, Language &
Skills 7, no. 1 (2018): 20-38, https://www.ijells.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/August-2018-.pdf#page=20
108
encouragement for Hindutva along with a negative portrayal of Islam and

Muslims.48
Under the influence of rightwing populism, Bollywood is increasingly

becoming a source of damaging the pluralist orientation of Indian society.
It’s taking part in the exclusive construction of Indian Muslims as ‘others’
linking them with terrorism, extremism, conservatism, and anti-
nationalism. Bollywood is producing more films aligned BJP’s Hindu
supremacism. For instance, The Kashmir Files — a movie, which
according to Time, villainises Muslims, liberal intellectuals and past
secular governments — made major box office success.49 In addition, a
considerable proliferation of Islamophobia has been observed in
Bollywood films featuring noble Hindus resisting devilish Muslim rulers.
Such portrayal of past Muslim rulers in black and white with no shades of
grey highlight Bollywood’s increasing inclination toward BJP’s narrative
of Muslims portrayed in bad light.50
Different newspaper reports have cited BJP’s pressure on Bollywood

owners’ and mutual connivance in building Hindu nationalism favouring
Modi’s electoral agenda. 51 Impartial representation of minorities ─
especially Muslims, who feel more vulnerable in today’s India is
essential, and no other media industry can play as vital a role in ensuring
this as Indian Hindi cinema. Such impartial and inclusive
characterisation of Muslim characters and roles, however, is not on the
horizon. Rather, the Indian film industry prompts further polarisation by
displaying a distorted image of Islam and Muslims. In shaping the views
and attitudes of the people towards minorities, Bollywood cinema’s large
48 Noman Ahmed Ansari and Osama Shafiq, “Hindutva in Bollywood Exploration

of Hindu Nationalism and Image of Muslims in Hindi Cinema,” Al Tafseer-
Biannual Journal 36 (2020): 87-107, https://al-
tafseer.org/index.php/at/article/view/193
49 Debasish Roy Chowdhury, “How Bollywood Rolled over to Hindu
Supremacists,” Time, January 26, 2023, https://time.com/6250414/bollywood-
hindu-supremacists/.
50 Meghnad Bose, “Here’s Why Tanhaji Is Bollywood’s Latest Islamophobic Period
Film ,” The Quint, January 10, 2020, https://www.thequint.com/opinion/tanhaji-the-
unsung-warrior-bollywood-islamophobia-ajay-devgn-saif-ali-khan#read-more.
51 Sabyasachi Karmaker, “Why is the BJP so Angry with Bollywood,” Business
Standard, November 9, 2021, https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/why-bjp-
so-angry-bollywood-327145
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viewership and great potency can play a crucial positive role for the state
of democracy in India.
Media’s Link-up with State Narrative: State Control and Repression
The political environment in India under the flag of the Hindutva project,
right-wing Hindu nationalism, has turned increasingly towards right-
wing Hindu majoritarianism in India. This development has also been
observed in mainstream news media, which has either been sliding
towards the promotion of a state-sponsored version of Hindu nationalism
or has been the victim of state reprisals and restrictions when acting as a
critical watchdog. The media’s representation of Gujarat’s the then chief
minister, alleged of compliance in the Gujarat riots (2002), to a
completely different portrayal of a rebranded Narendra Modi in 2014,
and showed how the media’s objectivity has experienced a change. As
the Chief Minister Modi has been found guilty of compliance in the
Gujarat riots. Moreover, with the passage of time, media dynamics
reflected a change of stance, as BJP affiliated politicians started to own
large media houses, exhibiting jingoist sentiments with hyper-
nationalism against Pakistan. Furthermore, Hindutva ideology inspired
the people in using social media to contribute to BJP’s electoral efforts in
both the 2014 and 2019 elections. Purchase of Indian media by BJP
affiliates helped in bringing Modi’s image transformation in the
ideological contest.
Firstly, Indian media was highly critical of Modi during his tenure as
the Chief Minister of Gujarat for being a proponent of extreme right-
wing Hindu nationalism. This description slowly began to change as
nationalism and populism found more space in the Indian political
environment along with a massive increase in Modi’s popularity.
Referred to as the ‘Butcher of Gujarat’ on mainstream media and often
held guilty by civil society, media, and opposition for being complicit,
media owner’s ideological orientation and party affiliation played a great
role in Gujarat’s former chief minister’s image re-evaluation in Indian
media. Henrik Berglund of the Stockholm University has argued that
Modi’s capabilities as an administrator and political leader were
increasingly emphasised while his guilt in the anti-Muslim violence was
110
downplayed. 52 According to Berglund, Modi was able to enjoy full

support from RSS and Indian business community simultaneously for the
first time. Along with his solid background within the RSS, Modi
“strengthened his relations with Indian business community, both within
India and with Indian expatriates,” writes Berglund. The donations to his
campaigns in 2014 were estimated to be more than U.S.$500 million.53
Secondly, social media platforms played an equally significant part

in reshaping BJP’s prime ministerial candidate’s image before the 2014
elections: BJP ─ with a new group of Hindutva sympathisers ─ utilised
social media more than any other party in 2014, and this approach of
Hindutva supporters seeking new spaces for influence got a new name,
neo-Hindutva.54 As Sahana Udupa, a research scholar, on the Hindutva
group’s use of social media has established that BJP became the first
party to use social media strategies for electoral gains. 55 Marked by
intense mobilisation, these strategies transformed Modi’s image from a
tainted leader accused of complicity in Gujarat riots into a messiah of
‘New India.’
Thirdly, India’s media ownership structure also demonstrates how

the owners of major news media outlets share political ties with BJP or
are members and leaders in the party. 56 As shown above, media
ownership is highly concentrated, state-owned, and politically affiliated
52 Henrik Berglund, “Media and Nationalism in India: Reflections on the Narendra

Modi Government,” Asian Politics & Policy 7, no. 3 (2015): 502-505,
https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12194
53 Amy Kazmin, “Narendra Modi Rode Wave of Money to Indian Victory,”
Financial Times, May 19, 2014,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ce68abf0-df3f-11e3-
86a4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UZlcBRdl
54 Edward Anderson, and Arkotong Longkumer, “‘Neo-Hindutva’: Evolving Forms,
Spaces and Expressions of Hindu Nationalism,” Contemporary South Asia 26, no. 4
(2018): 371-377, https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2018.1548576.
55 Sahana Udupa, “Enterprise Hindutva and Social Media in Urban
India,” Contemporary South Asia 26, no. 4 (2018): 453-467,

https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2018.1545007.
56 Subir Sinha, “Fragile hegemony: Modi, Social Media and Competitive Electoral
Populism in India,” International Journal of Communication 11, no. 2017 (2018):

4158-4180, http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24533/6/sinha-fragile-hegemony-published-
version-IJC.pdf
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Strategic Studies
with the ruling party. Our study has shown that business conglomerates
are taking over media outlets and have close ties with the ruling
government. Owners of pro-government media outlets are concentrating
media ownership. For example, NDTV’s acquisition by Gautam Adani, a
controversial conglomerate seen as being close to Narendra Modi, has
seen founders and critical voices like Ravish Kumar leave the media
house.57
Fourthly, Indian news media’s coverage in recent years has been

characterised by enormous rousing of narrow nationalist feelings in the
audience by anti-Pakistan rhetoric, propaganda, and false reporting.
Shruti Pandalai argues that the Indian media, in its blind conformism
with national discourse, has blurred the lines between national interest
and jingoism while exacerbating hyper-nationalism against Pakistan. 58
Its crucial role in mobilising public opinion, according to Shruti, has
made it an agenda-setter with a greater inclination towards
warmongering. This tendency was explicitly evident after the 2019
terrorist attack in Pulwama and the subsequent Balakot incursion by the
Indian air force, where the Indian media provoked jingoistic sentiments,
stirred warmongering, and helped Modi get electoral benefits by
demanding and appreciating a muscular response from New
Delhi.59 (Arnab Goswami, one of the leading news anchors and director
of Republic TV ─ who knew about the Indian incursion into Balakot a
couple of days before the actual incident, as shown by police probe in
57 Shalu Yadav, “With Raids, Arrests and Hostile Takeovers, India Press Freedom
Continues to Decline,” NPR, April 3, 2023,
https://www.npr.org/2023/04/03/1167041720/india-press-freedom-journalists-modi-
bbc-documentary.
58 Shruti Pandalai,” Truth vs Hype: Media, Hyper-Nationalism and Impact on
Perceptions in India-South Asia Relations,” in The Role of Media in Promoting

Regional Understanding In South Asia, ed. Priyanka Singh (New Delhi: Pentagon
Press, 2016) 154-177.
59 Rida Ansari, and Sadia Riaz, “Construction of ‘Anti-National’: Framing and
Othering Discourse in Indian Media,” Global Media Journal 18, no. 36 (2020): 1A-
8A, https://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/construction-of-antinational-
framing-and-othering-discourse-in-indian-media.pdf
112
TRP Scam60─ was watched demanding on national television: “We want

revenge… not condemnation… It’s time for blood.”)61
Lastly, in BJP ruled India, critical voices in the media are

consistently suppressed while objective reporting is referred to as anti-
national, even treasonable. Journalists and media persons are more
vulnerable in today’s India as a clampdown on free media continues.
Vindictive actions, lawsuits, threats, and complaints against
unsympathetic voices to the government are increasing considerably.
According to Reporters Without Borders, journalists risk the possibility
of life imprisonment due to vague sedition charges. Journalists or media
outlets that question the national-populist ideology of the incumbent
prime minister are branded as targeted with lawsuits, defamation and
online trolling. 62 Research published in Policy Perspectives maintained
that journalists and reporters are facing severe reprisals, which have also
been a concern for Amnesty International and other transnational
agencies.63
The media outlets that do not fall in line are seeing their independent
spaces to operate being receded by the BJP government. The latest
casualty in this regard has been the BBC for making a documentary
showing an inquiry report by the British government that called Modi
“directly responsible for a climate of immunity” that led to massive
violence during the Gujrat riots (2002).64 Firstly, the government took
down the online links of the documentary titled, India: The Modi
Question. Later, the Indian tax authorities raided BBC’s offices in
60 “Goswami knew about Balakot 3 Days before it Happened, Police Probe in Ratings
Scam Suggest,” Dawn, January 16, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1601852
61 Deepanshu Mohan, “Brexit to Balakot, What is Fuelling the Anger in You and
Who is Responsible,” Print, March 7, 2019, https://theprint.in/opinion/brexit-to-

balakot-what-is-fuelling-the-anger-in-you-and-who-is-responsible/202208/.
62 “Narendra MODI | RSF,” Reporters Without Borders, July 5, 2021,
https://rsf.org/en/protagonist-narendra-modi
63 SheikhTajammul-ul-Islam, “Is Indian Media Free from State Control? An
Appraisal,” Policy Perspectives 16, no. 2 (2019): 27-40,

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.13169/polipers.16.2.0027.pdf.
64 Tarushi Aswani, “In India, the State Challenges Independent Media,” The
Diplomat, March 28, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/in-india-the-state-
challenges-independent-media/
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Strategic Studies
Mumbai and Delhi for questioning the staff and scanning documents.
BBC is not the only media outlet targeted and being made to survive
such pressure.
In July 2017, another media house critical of the Modi government,

New Delhi Television, NDTV, faced government’s wrath with offices
being raided for a “bank fraud.” The BJP government is frequently seen
of attempting to muzzle the network while calling NDTV’s advertisers
and sponsors to back off.65 Similarly, Bobby Ghosh, Editor-in-Chief of
Hindustan Times resigned from his position in 2017 for the persistent
political pressure after launching a database of hate crimes in India ─
Hate Tracker. 66 As critical voices are suppressed, journalists peddling
the government narrative have consistently got away with broadcasting
and publishing material targeting minorities.67 As much of mainstream
media is seen as uncritical, Freedom House reminds that “India is also
sending signals that holding the government accountable is not part of
press’s responsibility.” 68 Although online spaces are more difficult to
censor, government control is more evident in mainstream television
news where media personnel are pressured, scrutiny is tightened and
advertisers and sponsors are asked to back off.
Indian media has established a harmonious association with state

narrative evident from its framing of Narendra Modi’s right-wing Hindu
nationalism, and ownership linkage with BJP affiliated politicians.
Moreover, the mainstream media in India has demonstrated a greater
urge for inspiring jingoistic and extreme nationalist feelings in audiences
during moments of crisis with Pakistan. However, critical voices in the
Indian media, which have been working with objectivity and
impartiality, have faced repression and accusations of being ‘anti-
national.’ One part of mainstream media, therefore, instead of holding
65 Vindu Goel, Jeffrey Gettleman and Saumya Khandelwal, “Under Modi, India’s
Press Is Not so Free Anymore,” New York Times, April 2, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/asia/modi-india-press-media.html.
66 “After Editor’s Exit, Hindustan Times Pulls down Controversial ‘Hate Tracker,’”
The Wire, October 25, 2017, https://thewire.in/media/hindustan-times-hate-tracker.
67Soutik Biswas, “Why Journalists in India Are under Attack,” BBC News, February
4, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-55906345.
68 Sarah Repucci, “Media Freedom: A Downward Spiral,” Freedom House, 2019,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-
downward-spiral
114
the powerful accountable, is in line with state narrative, while the other
part of Indian media is facing a clampdown and restrictions.
Conclusion
Media houses in India exhibit a great concentration of ownership, with

media outlets confined to a few corporate hands. This ownership is
marked by media outlets owned by people having close affiliations with
the ruling party and state ideology. The concentration is also seen in
viewership, thereby greatly undermining the prospects of diverse and
democratic Indian media. In the media’s portrayal of the largest
minority, i.e., Muslims, misrepresentation, stereotyped depiction, and
discrimination is observed consistently. Bollywood’s depiction of
Muslims is identified with many linkages of Islam shown with terrorism
and extremism with the vilification of Muslim roles in acts of violence
and barbarism. With the large extent of Bollywood’s viewership, such
divisive characterisation of Muslim characters and roles influences
public opinion and leads to greater polarisation and divisions occurring
on religious lines. The role of Indian media before and after the rise of
Narendra Modi as the Prime Minister of India’s largest political party ─
Bharatiya Janata Party ─ has become increasingly controversial, taking
in a nationalist turn to demonstrate a convergence between media
reporting and state narrative. However, there remains a group of critical
and impartial voices in Indian media which faces severe crackdowns and
accusations. All of this, consequently, has led to the suppression of free,
democratic, political and journalistic space. Although a large segment of
journalists and media persons are still committed to objective and
impartial reporting in India, the centralisation of power, concentration of
media ownership, and increasing right-wing nationalist tendencies of
Indian media are threatening the pluralistic attributes of Indian society.
115

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U.S.

Posture of Integrated Deterrence:

Aiza Azam* and Adil Sultan**

As the world is drawn increasingly into a web of shifting geopolitics, battle

Keywords: Integrated Deterrence, Asia, Taiwan, U.S., China, India.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) released in October 2022 is a

A key component of the NSS is the ‘Integrated Deterrence’, an

Agreement on an unconditional One China policy was fundamental to

1“National Security Strategy,” Government of the United States, October 2022,

This paper attempts to determine how the strategy of Integrated

The U.S. Policy towards China

The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy calls the People’s

2 “Statement by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan,”

The document highlights that the current U.S. administration’s decision

The NSS 2022 specifically addresses the Taiwan issue by

Integrated Deterrence and Its Impact on Policies of the U.S. and

6 “National Security Strategy.”

Dimensions of Integrated Deterrence in the NSS 2022

The document describes Integrated Deterrence (ID) as a “seamless

The integrated deterrence outlined in the strategy document identifies

i. Integration across domains, highlighting military and non-

Strategic Options for the U.S. and its Allies

Essentially, exercising integrated deterrence in the case of Taiwan would

9 “National Security Strategy.”

Keeping in view the broader objectives stated in America’s National

Coordinating with Allies on the Diplomatic Front to Entrench

This can be expected in the shape of policy declarations by the U.S.

Japan’s National Security Strategy (JNSS), released in December

11 “ Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Government of Canada, November 2022,

and of the international community as a whole. Laying out Japan’s

Undermining the Domestic Standing of the Communist Party of

This can conceivably be achieved with three different and concurrent

a. One would target the perceptions of China’s domestic population in an

b. Another would be strengthening the denouncement of alleged human

c. A third approach would involve exploiting any demonstration of anger

15 “National Security Strategy of Japan.”

2022, with the people calling for an end to severely restrictive

Strengthening Taiwan’s Deterrent Capacity Against China

18 Rachel Chang, “China’s Covid Unrest is Raising Piercing Questions,” Bloomberg,

approval in December 2022 for two additional sales with a combined

In December 2022, days after the release of the Canadian Indo-Pacific

China’s Response Options

Chinese Strategic Thinking

24 “U.S. Approves US$425 Million in Arms Sales to Taiwan”, AP News, December 7,

strengths at its disposal ─ political, economic, cultural, military, scientific

On challenges to China’s envisioned peaceful development, Chinese

China’s Defensive National Defence Policy in the New Era

China’s National Defence in the New Era is a defence strategy document

A key highlighted feature is rejecting the pursuit of hegemony and

has taken care to contribute towards ensuring world peace in order to

In the context of this national defence strategy, it highlights Chinese

Policy Options for China

China arguably has a range of options to consider to counter the Integrated

Make the Taiwanese Stakeholders in Peaceful Reunification

If Western surveys are to be considered reliable, only a very small

32 “China’s National Defence in the New Era.”

consideration would be whether the attempt at reunification is done by

The report delivered by President Xi Jinping on the occasion of the 20th

This approach is supported in a great deal by several factors:

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, which does not appear to be headed

34 “China’s National Defence in the New Era.”

aid) as well as in terms of arms sales (with increasing commitments being

American political clout has been adversely affected due to decades of

The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated the limits of allied support.