IPRI Magzine

Regionalism in the Arab World: Progress, Prospects, and Lessons
Regionalism in the Arab World: Progress,

Prospects, and Lessons
Ali Awadh Asseri* & Ishtiaq Ahmad**
Abstract
Regionalism in the Middle East and North Africa has evolved in two
phases. In the first phase, the Arab League took several steps after its
establishment in 1945, to boost trade and economic cooperation among its
members, but without achieving any major success. The second phase,
which began in the 1980s, witnessed the emergence of four key inter-
governmental organisations and trade initiatives, including the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the
Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) under the Arab League, and the
Agadir Agreement. In this study, we critically examine the progressive
evolution of these regional setups, their current challenges, and future
prospects as well as the lessons learned from Arab regionalism. The GCC
comes out clearly as a relatively successful organisation. Its future
prospects are also promising due to current economic growth and
diversification in the Gulf region. The GAFTA also has tremendous
potential to grow, especially if the AMU and Agadir nations align their
interests, accordingly. Finally, Arab regionalism provides valuable
lessons both in theory and practice, corresponding with the ‘new
regionalism’ trend in the developing world as compared to the integration
process in Europe.
Keywords: Regionalism, GAFTA, GCC, AMU, Agadir Agreement, Customs
Union, Common Market, Free Trade Area, Tariffs, Non-Tariff
Barriers
* Ali Awadh Asseri is the former Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Pakistan
and Lebanon.
** Ishtiaq Ahmad is a Member at the Planning Commission of Pakistan and former
Vice-Chancellor at Sargodha University, and Pakistan Chair at Oxford University.

__________________
@2023 by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

IPRI Journal ◼ XXIII (1): 1-22
https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.230101
IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023 1

Ali Awadh Asseri & Ishtiaq Ahmad
Introduction
conomic cooperation was the founding goal of the League of Arab
E States. It was established in Cairo in 1945, as an inter-governmental

organisation. The Council of the League of Arab States is the
highest decision-making body, which meets twice a year and also holds
emergency sessions, if needed. All of its decisions are made on the basis
of consensus, and unanimous voting. Its Charter obliged the member-
states to closely collaborate “in economic and financial matters, including
trade, customs, currency, agriculture and industry.”1 Therefore, until the
1970s, the Arab League concluded several agreements to promote trade
and economic cooperation, which included the 1950 Treaty of Joint
Defense and Economic Cooperation, the 1953 Convention for Facilitating
and Regulating Transit Trade, the 1957 Arab Economic Unity Agreement,
the 1964 Arab Common Market agreement, and the 1974 Investment and
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation agreement.2
However, these agreements were not implemented in the absence of the

political commitment of the member states and several structural barriers.
They included institutional weaknesses, disparities in national wealth,
protectionist trade policies, high connectivity costs, the lack of economic
diversification, and relatively small size of economies preventing product
diversification, and limiting the emergence of scale economies. The
colonial legacy, regional geopolitics, the US-Soviet Cold War, and the
Arab-Israeli wars over Palestine also played their part.3
While the first phase of regionalism under the Arab League was a failure,
its consequences were largely positive. In the 1980s, when ‘new
1 United Nation High Commission for Refugees, Charter of League of Arab States,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html
2 Alessandro Romangnoli and Luisa Mengoni, The Economic Development Process in the
Middle East and North Africa, (London: Routledge, 2013), 68-83.
3 Stewart M Patrick, “The Future of Middle East Regionalism: Can an Institutional Desert
Bloom?,” The Internationalist, November 12, 2012. Also see Samiha Fawzy, “The
Economics and Politics of Arab Economic Integration,” Between Hope and Reality: An
Overview of Economic Integration in the Arab World, ed. Galal and Hoekman
(Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 2003), 13-37.
2 IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023

regionalism’ gained momentum in the form of several regional trade

agreements and economic organisations across Asia, Africa, and South
America,4 the Arab nations became more pragmatic in pursuing trade and
economic integration. Two developments particularly determined the
future course of regionalism, including the establishment of sub-regional
groupings such as, the GCC in 1981, and the AMU in 1989, and the
conclusion of the Charter for National Economic Action in 1980, and the
Inter-Arab Trade Facilitation and Development Agreement in 1981.5
By 1990s, most Arab countries began to realise the importance of lifting

trade barriers and liberalising monetary policies for better access to the
global market. Several of them signed the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), besides concluding bilateral trade agreements with the
Western countries, with the support of international financial bodies such
as the World Bank and the UN Development Program. Moreover, in their
quest for a Free Trade Area, several Arab countries joined the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.6
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area

Consequently, in 1997, the Arab League decided to revive the Trade
Facilitation and Development Agreement. The GAFTA was established to
eliminate tariff and non-tariff restrictions on goods’ trade by January
2007. Agricultural products were given exceptions by granting individual
states the exception for 10 agricultural products from the agreement
during the harvesting season. Moreover, the rules of origin were fixed at
40% of the value added. The agreement was to be gradually implemented
and the least developed countries were offered special delays in the
process. By 2005, two years ahead of the deadline, tariff and customs
4 World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.traptop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.

5 World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.traptop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.
6 Alexander Brock, “Regional Cooperation in a New Middle East,” The Council for
Foreign Relations, November 2012.

duties on goods’ trade were fully re moved, and non-tariff barriers

partially removed.7
While 17 Arab League member-states have joined GAFTA, the remaining

five are seeking its membership.8 The GAFTA is overseen by the
Economic and Social Council of the Arab League. It has three distinctive
features. First, the grant of concessions to the least-developed states
represents a departure from the unanimity principle that hampered
previous integration efforts of the Arab League.9 Second, besides
overcoming tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, the GAFTA seeks
liberalising the agriculture trade along with specific rules of origin to
ensure tariff exemption for local products. Finally, it encourages the
member states to deepen economic integration by concluding bilateral and
sub-regional agreements in order to establish the Arab Customs Union and
Common Market,10 a goal that remains elusive even now.
GAFTA member-states trade mostly in hydrocarbons, manufactured

goods, food items, and chemical products. In terms of trade flow, intra-
regional trade has grown faster than the region’s trade with the outside
world. The GAFTA also has high trade surplus with the rest of the
world.11The Gulf countries constitute almost two-third of the trade
volume, which primarily consists of crude oil and natural gas exports.
7 Government of Egypt, Ministry of Trade and Industries, Trade Agreements Sector,

http://www.tas.gov.eg/NR/rdonlyres/164E81D4-27BB-4D63-9DA7-
33C8A315ACFF/1074/Gafta2.pdf.
8 Ahmed Galal and Bernard M. Hoekman, ed., Between Hope and Reality: An Overview of
Economic Integration in the Arab World, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,

2003), 1-12.
9 Julia Devlin and John Page, “Testing the Waters: Arab Integration Competitiveness and
the Euro-Med Agreements,” in Towards Arab and Euro-Med Regional Integration, ed.,
S. Dessus, et al, (Paris: OECD Development Center, 2001), 189-224.
10 Javad Abedini and Nicolas Peridy, “The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An
Estimation of the Trade Effects,” Journal of Economic Integration no. 1 (2008): 3.

11 “Full, Free Trade Agreement Can Enhance Inter-Arab Ties,” Gulf Times, May 12, 2013,
https://www.gulf-times.com/story/352290/full-free-trade-agreement-can-enhance-inter-
arab-ties.

Saudi Arabia is the leading exporter, followed by the UAE. Both countries
also lead the region’s trade partnerships.12
The GAFTA has, indeed, helped to increase the level of intra-regional

trade by 20% to 26%, 13 which is still far lower than the expected volume.
The share of intra-regional trade also remains under 10%of the global
trade volume (as compared to Europe’s 66%, East Asia’s 35% and
Southeast Asia’s 25%).14 Only South Asia and the Arab Maghreb lag
behind the GAFTA region with just a 5% intra-regional share in global
trade.15 Various factors account for this dismal situation.
First, tariffs have reduced only marginally and are still very high. For
example, while Asian tariffs range from 8% to 13%, they are estimated at
around 17% for Arab nations. The region only compares with South Asia
in terms of trade restrictions.16 Since non-tariff barriers are only partially
removed, they remain higher than in other developing regions17 and
include stringent regulations, import authorisation procedures, and
customs clearance processes.18
Second, the GAFTA has a poor trade facilitation track-record for lacking
harmonious and transparent cooperation. Its member-states are still
12 QNB Group, “A Free Trade Agreement Could Further Boost Intra-Arab Trade,”
http://www.qatarisbooming.com/article/qnb-group-free-trade-agreement-could-further-
boost-inter-arab-trade.
13 Timo Behr, Regional Integration in the Mediterranean Moving out of the Deadlock?”
(Paris: Notre Europe, April 2010), 25.

14 Nasser Saidi & Aathira Prasad, Trends in Trade and Investment Policies in the MENA
Region (Jordan: MENA-OECD Working Group on Investment and Trade, 2018).

15 Jean-Pierre Chauffour, From Political to Economic Awakening in the Arab World: The
Path of Economic Integration (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013), 44. Also see
Lisheng Dong and Günter Heiduk, ed. The EU's Experience in Integration: A Model for
ASEAN+3 (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2007), 204.
16
Matteo Legrenzi and Marina Calculli, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle
East: Options and Challenges, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2013), 1-6.
17 Ahmed Farouq Ghoneim, et al., “Shallow vs. Deep Integration in the Southern
Mediterranean: Scenarios for the Region up to 2030,” Mediterranean Prospects 13

(2012).
18 Steffen Hertog, “The GCC and Arab Economic Integration: A New Paradigm,” Middle
East Policy 14 (2007): 53.

unwilling to cede control over trade and tariff issues.19 Institutional and
practical constraints further compound the problem. The strict
interpretation of rules of origin often lead to disputes, for which there is
no proper resolution mechanism. Practical constraints include the high
trade connectivity costs due to poor transport and communication
infrastructure, and varying economies and currencies of GAFTA
members.20
Third, the GAFTA was meant to prevent its member-states from reaching
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements outside the MENA region.21
Yet, many of them have joined WTO and signed bilateral preferential
trade agreements.22 The Arab states have also failed to diversify their
exports, which are still confined mostly to hydrocarbon and agricultural
products. Instead of trading with each other, the Arab countries also prefer
to trade with Europe. Furthermore, while Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, and
Oman have signed free trade agreements with the US, Maghreb states
have joined trading arrangements with the Mediterranean European
nations and African organisations.
Fourth, the GAFTA covers only trade in goods, not in services, factor
mobility, or investment.23 This is despite the recent surge of the services
sector in the Gulf region. There is no provision for factor mobility across
the GAFTA region, which hampers economic productivity by restricting
the use of labour, capital, and land across state frontiers. Another barrier
19 Danielle Gendrano, League of the Arab States: Greater Free Trade Agreement (New
Jersey: Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, 2007), 13-17.
20 Bashar Malkawi and Mohammed El-Shafie, “The Design and Operation of Rules of
Origin in Greater Arab Free Area: Challenges of Implementation and Reform,” Journal
of World Trade 53, no. 2 (2019): 242-27.
21 Jamal Zarrouk and Franco Zallio, "Integrating Free Trade Agreements in the Middle
East and North Africa," Journal of World Investment 2 (2001): 403-426.

22 Jamal Zarrouk and Franco Zallio, "Integrating Free Trade Agreements in the Middle
East and North Africa.”

23 Nicolas M Depetris Chauvin, The Rise of the Gulf: Saudi Arabia as a Global Player
(Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, April 2010), 50-51.

to trade and business activity is the insufficiency of investment flows from

within and outside the region.24
Fifth, the private sector remains largely under-developed beyond the Gulf
region. The regionalisation process, marked by increased societal access
to sources of information and digital connectivity, has helped to generate
private business and commercial activities among the GCC members.
However, in the rest of MENA, state enterprises prevail over the corporate
sector. Without state patronage, private businesses are unable to gain due
access to capital and markets at home and abroad.25
Finally, the regional integration process as a whole remains paralysed due

to the same factors that failed the Arab League’s quest for regionalism in
the first phase: institutional deficiencies, political divisions, conflicts and
wars. The Arab League member-states have concluded many declarations
of intent and accords, whose implementation is hindered by their
unwillingness to forego national economic interests at the expense of
regional integration processes.26
The Agadir Agreement

Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia signed the Arab Mediterranean Free
Trade Area agreement in 2004. Commonly referred to as the Agadir
Agreement, it came into force in 2007. Lebanon and Palestine also signed
it in 2016. Other GAFTA/Arab League member countries that have free
trade agreements with the European Union (EU) are free to join the
Agadir process.
24 Matteo Legrenzi and Marina Calculli, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle
East: Options and Challenges, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2013), 1-6.
24 Ahmed Farouq Ghoneim, et al., “Shallow vs. Deep Integration in the Southern
Mediterranean: Scenarios for the Region up to 2030,” Mediterranean Prospects 13

(2012).
25 Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah, “The Economics of the Arab Spring,” World
Development 45 (2013): 296-313.

26 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Arab Development Outlook: Vision
2030 (Lebanon: ESCWA, 2015), 153.

The Agadir Agreement seeks to establish a free trade area for the member
states to promote economic cooperation and regional integration by
implementing GAFTA and establishing a Common Market. This goal is to
be achieved through policy coordination with respect to trade in goods
and services, regulatory reforms regarding taxation, customs, and
financial services, and removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers.27
The Agadir Agreement is sponsored by the European Commission under

the Barcelona Process, which was initiated by 15 EU states and 12
Mediterranean nations in 1995. The goal was to establish a Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), which is different from
GAFTA in three respects. First, it aims to fully liberalise trade in
industrial goods, while trade in agricultural goods is to be liberalised
under GAFTA terms. Second, it commits the member-states to remove all
non-tariff barriers and liberalise trade in services in accordance with WTO
rules and respective national laws. Finally, the Agadir member-states
subscribe to the Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin. Hence, they get easier
access to the EU market than other GAFTA countries.28
The intra-Agadir trade volume has, indeed, increased since 2007, but it
has grown less rapidly than the member states’ trade with GAFTA
members and the rest of the world. Several reasons account for the
extremely low level of trade and slow pace of integration among Agadir
countries.29 First, its geographical scope pales in comparison to GAFTA.
While the Agadir membership is open to all Arab League/GAFTA
member-states having free trade agreements with the EU, only Lebanon
and Palestine have joined it. Hence, the Agadir nations will continue to
27 The Agadir Agreement at: http://www.agadiragreement.org/Pages/viewpage.aspx?

pageID=243; “Lebanon, Palestine Join Agadir Free Trade Agreement,” Ahram, April 3,
2016.
28 European External Action Service, “Agreement Setting up a Free Trade Area Between
the Arab Mediterranean Countries,” http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/

documents/eu_egypt/trade/agreements/agadir.pdf.
29 “Intra-regional Trade Between Agadir Agreement Members Sees Steady Growth,”
Global Trade Matters, February 2, 2020, http://www.globaltradematters.org/intra-

regional-trade-between-agadir-agreement-members-sees-steady-growth/.

face tangible limitations in trade and market access, unless they are joined
by Algeria and other Arab League members.30
Second, tariff reductions under the Agadir Agreement are meaningless, as

they were already agreed upon in GAFTA. The efforts to overcome non-
tariff barriers and raise the level of investments and agricultural
productivity have also not produced desired results. Since Agadir nations
are also party to GAFTA, which grants duty-free access to the member-
states, the effects of the Agadir Agreement cannot be separated from those
of GAFTA.
Third, Agadir’s reliance on the EU rules of origin is problematic, as these

are in conflict with the US rules of origin. Hence, the member states have
to choose either of them, which leads to a violation of the Agadir terms.31
Fourth, lack of trade complementarity limits the export potential of Agadir

nations. Hence, unlike Egypt and Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia operate
tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade in goods.32 Moreover, since
Agadir countries export almost the same products to Europe, their
relatively easier access to the EU market under the Barcelona Process
does not contribute much to regional trade. In fact, over-reliance on trade
with the EU has led to a hub-and-spoke relationship, with the terms of
trade favouring the EU at the expense of Agadir nations.33
Finally, like other Arab regional setups, the Agadir Agreement lacks the
binding and comprehensive conditions that characterise trade agreements
in other regional blocs. As in the GAFTA case, the member states remain
unwilling to compromise national interests for the sake of regional
30 Luc De Wulf and Maryla Maliszewska, Economic Integration in the Euro-

Mediterranean Region, (Warsaw: Centre for Social and Economic Research, 2009), 26.
31 Luc De Wulf and Maryla Maliszewska, Economic Integration in the Euro
Mediterranean Region.
32 Anouar Boukhars, Maghreb: Dream of Unity, Reality of Division. (Doha: Aljazeera
Centre for Studies, 2018), 6.

33 Nicholas Peridy, “Towards a Pan-Arab Free Trade Area: Assessing Trade Potential
Effects of the Agadir Agreement,” The Developing Economics 43 (2005): 342.

connectivity. Practical constraints such as poor transport links, and strict

regulatory controls constitute additional structural barriers.
The Arab Maghreb Union

Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia signed the Treaty of
Marrakech in 1989 to establish this organisation, even though its idea was
conceived decades ago at the 1964 Conference of Economic Ministers of
Maghreb countries in Tunis.34 Saudi Arabia’s facilitation of reconciliation
between Tunisia and Libya in 1987, and restoration of diplomatic
relations between Algeria and Morocco in 1988, acted as a catalyst for the
purpose.
The AMU is governed by a Council of the Heads of State of the member

countries, where decisions are made through unanimous voting. The
Charter sets its key goal as fostering “the movement of goods and persons,
unifying customs systems, and gradually liberalising the movement of
goods, services and factors of production” among member countries. A
corresponding objective is to ensure “large scale economic cooperation;
develop agriculture, industry, trade, and food security; and implement
joint economic cooperation projects” while identifying the establishment
of an Economic Union in the Maghreb as an end goal.35 Despite sharing a
common history, culture, and language, the member countries have varied
economies, including oil-exporting Algeria and Libya, middle-income
Morocco and Tunisia, and lower-middle-income Mauritania. All AMU
states are also part of the Arab League, GAFTA and the African Union.
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia are WTO members. Morocco and
Tunisia are key Agadir nations as well.
AMU states trade primarily with Europe due to historical and economic
reasons. In order to enhance their exports to EU countries, they have
34 Tomer Broude, “Regional Economic Integration in the Middle East and North Africa: A
Primer,” in European Yearbook of International Economic Law, ed. C. Hermann and
J.P. Terhechte (New York: Springer, 2009), 269-296.
35 Treaty Establishing the Arab Maghreb Union, https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/
PDF/archive/MAGHREB.pdf.

joined important trading regimes. While Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia

are part of the EMFTA, Mauritania is a signatory of the Economic
Partnership Agreement between the EU and West African nations.
Morocco and Tunisia have joined the European Free Trade Association.
Morocco and Tunisia have a bilateral free trading arrangement with
Turkey. Morocco has a free trade treaty with the US. All AMU states are
included in the African Continental Free Trade Area. More recently,
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia have also joined China’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI).
In 2010, AMU member-states decided to establish a Maghreb Free Trade

Area, but the agreement has not been ratified due to unresolved political
and security issues. The organisation’s dismal performance is apparent
from the fact that its last Heads of State summit was held in
1995.36Consequently, King Mohammed VI of Morocco was compelled to
proclaim at the 2017 African Union summit that “AMU was dead.”37The
seventh AMU summit was planned for 2019,38 but it was also not held.
AMU members have individually made substantial progress in trade.

However, the share of intra-regional trade is less than 5% of the global
trade volume, which is one of the lowest in the GAFTA region and also as
compared to other regional organisations in the developing world. Their
bilateral trade volume is also extremely low.39 Several reasons explain
AMU’s failure in promoting intra-regional trade.
First, almost half of the Maghreb landmass is inhabited by Algeria, the

largest state, and Morocco, the second largest. Both of them remain
36 Yasmina Allouche, Regional Power Rivalry and the Failure of the Arab Maghreb Union
(Istanbul: TRT World Research Centre, January 2019).
37 “Full Speech of King Mohammed VI at 28th African Union Summit,” Morocco World News,
January 31, 2017, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/01/207060/full-speech-

king-mohammed-vi-28th-african-union-summit/.
38 Maya Barth, Regionalism in North Africa: the Arab Maghreb Union in 2019 (Brussels:
Business International Centre, June 2019).

39 Alexei Kireyev, et al., Economic Integration in the Maghreb: An Untapped Source of
Growth (Washington D.C: International Monetary Fund, 2018), 7.

hostage to their conflict over Western Sahara. The border between Algeria
and Morocco has remained shut for the past couple of decades.40 The civil
war in Libya after the Arab Spring additionally worsened the security
situation. Soon after the 2011 Arab uprisings, the AMU states did express
some interest in conflict resolution,41 but they are yet to make any
concrete effort in this regard.
Second, the restrictions on intra-regional trade remain high, including

both tariff and non-tariff barriers. AMU states have higher tariffs among
themselves than while trading with Europe. They range from 19% in
Algeria’s case and 12% on average for the rest of the countries. Non-tariff
barriers and other trade restrictions are aside.42
Third, there are serious logistic and transportation bottlenecks. Land and
air transportation networks between Maghreb countries are extremely
poor. The maritime connectivity is even worse, with shipping costs
exceeding by around 25% as compared to the developing countries.43
Long delays at border posts and stringent customs clearance procedures
constitute other trade barriers.
Fourth, intra-regional investment flows are significantly restricted as

compared to other regional organisations, representing less than 1% of the
total investment flows. Morocco’s investments in Africa alone exceed that
amount, which makes it the second largest investor and the third largest
exporter in Africa.44 Finally, rather than concentrating on developing trade
and economic cooperation within the Maghreb region, the AMU members
40 Carlotta Gall, “Fighting Is Long Over, But Western Sahara Still Lacks Peace,” New York
Times, February 22, 2015.
41 Lahcen Achy, “The Arab Spring Revives Maghreb Integration,” Al-Hayat, March 6,
2012.
42 Alexei Kireyev, et al., Economic Integration in the Maghreb: An Untapped Source of
Growth (Washington D.C: International Monetary Fund, 2018), 14.

43 Nasser Saidi, “Will the GCC Take Leadership of Arab Economic Integration?,” The
Huffington Post, December 19, 2013.

44 "Morocco in Line with AfDB's High 5s," All Africa, July 22, 2016, http://allafrica.com/
stories/201607221044.html

prefer to build bilateral and multilateral links with Europe, sub-Saharan

Africa and, more recently, China. Moreover, despite trading heavily with
Europe, the AMU states have failed to attract investment inflows from the
EU.45
The Gulf Cooperation Council

The GCC was established in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar and the UAE in response to the regional security threat from
Iran post-1979.46 But its relative success in subsequent decades has been
in the economic sphere. GCC’s founding goal was also to “achieve
coordination, integration and interconnection among member states’
economic, social, educational, research, cultural, legislative, and transport
fields, and to develop compatible systems so that unity can be achieved.”47
The Supreme Council is the GCC’s highest decision making body, which
meets annually and consists of the Heads of State. Its decisions are made
on the basis of unanimity. Based in Riyadh, it also has a Commission for
the Settlement of Disputes which seeks to resolve problems between the
member states. The GCC member-states own “almost 45% of the world’s
crude oil reserves and around 15% of natural gas reserves.” Their
combined GDP of about “$2 trillion a year in relation to around 56
million” population is among the largest in the world, constituting “more
than half of MENA’s GDP.”48 The Gulf region also connects three major
maritime trade routes – Africa and Europe via Suez Canal and Asia-
45 Nasser Saidi, “Will the GCC Take Leadership of Arab Economic Integration?,” The
Huffington Post, December 19, 2013.
46 Joseph Kechichian, “The Gulf Cooperation Council: The Search for Security,” Third
World Quarterly 7 (1985): 853-881. Also see Scott Cooper and Brock Taylor, “Power
and Regionalism: Explaining Regional Cooperation in the Persian Gulf,” in Comparative
Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives, ed. F. Laursen (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2003), 105-124.
47 See Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, May 25, 1981,
http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexfc7a.html.
48 Economist Intelligence Unit, “The GCC in 2020: The Gulf and Its People,” The
Economist, September, 2009, 2. Also see Mardo Soghom, “Migrant Crisis: Where Have
the Gulf States Been?,” The Atlantic, September 8, 2015; Institute of International
Finance, Arab Spring Countries Struggle: GCC Prospects Favorable (Washington D.C:
IIF, 2013), 3.

Pacific via the Indian Ocean – which pass through Bab El-Mandeb and the
Strait of Hormuz and connect major sea lines of communication.49
Over the years, the GCC has progressed quite smoothly. The Unified
Economic Agreement, which entered into force in 1982, sought to
establish a Free Trade Area and a Customs Union. The Free Trade Area
was launched in 1983, which exempted “GCC national products from
customs duties and other charges having similar effect under special
conditions.”50 In the security sphere, a Peninsula Shield Force was created
in 1984, as a standing coalition land force to defend the Gulf region from
external danger. In 1987, a collective security pact was signed. Economic
cooperation was put on hold due to Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991,
and its security implications in the next decade. In 2001, the GCC leaders
ratified the new Economic Agreement, which sought to deepen integration
by establishing a Customs Union, a Common Market and a Monetary
Union.”51
The Customs Union was established in 2003, with the goal “to abolish
customs duties and trade restrictions between the member states and
implement common customs duties and external trade regulations.” Its
key features included a common external tariff of 5% duty on most
imports, allowing locally produced goods to move freely across regional
frontiers; a common customs law, along with financial rules and
administrative procedures concerning trade among the member-states; a
single-entry point for the collection of customs duties; and free flow of
goods between the member-states with least tariff and non-tariff
exceptions.”52
49 Zakir Hussain, Saudi Arabia in a Multipolar World: Changing Dynamics, (New Delhi:
Routledge, 2016), 1.
50 “Unified Economic Agreement between the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council,” World Bank, November 11, 1981. http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF

/archive/GCC.pdf.
51 The Economic Agreement between the Gulf Cooperation Council States,
http://www.gcc-sg.org/DLibrary/download.php?B=168.
52 The Customs Union of the GCC Member States, https://nshr.org.sa/en/wp
content/uploads/2014/01/1274258579.pdf.

In 2008, the GCC established the Common Market to promote the

movement of capital and labour across national frontiers.53 Grounded in
the principle of economic nationality, it has enabled the citizens of Gulf
States to reside, move and work across the GCC region. They also enjoy
social benefits like health and education, as well as the right to own
property and run private businesses.54
The GCC was supposed to establish a Monetary Union and float a

common currency (the Gulf Dinar) by 2010, under the Economic
Agreement of 2001. However, despite Saudi Arabia’s insistence, neither
of these goals have been realised due to intra-GCC differences over
common fiscal and monetary policies. For example, all the member states
had pegged their currencies to the US dollar in 2002. However, in the
wake of the 2007-08 global financial crisis, Kuwait rescinded and decided
to peg its currency to a currency basket that included the US dollar. For
the same reason, Oman pulled out of the currency project in 2007. The
UAE followed suit in 2009, while opposing Riyadh as the location of the
Gulf Central Bank.55
Despite its failure to establish a Monetary Union with a single currency,

the GCC has gradually evolved into an integrated economic bloc with
harmonised legal and economic systems. It has also successfully
coordinated external commercial policies and trade relations.56 The
Customs Union has generally contributed to the free movement of goods
53 Villalta Puig and Bader Al-Haddab, “The Constitutionalisation of Free Trade in the
Gulf,” Arab Law Quarterly 25 (2011): 317.
54 GCC Economic Nationality, https://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/index39e0.html? action=Sec-
Show&ID=429.
55 Matteo Legrenzi, “Did the GCC Make a Difference? Institutional Realities and
(Un)intended Consequences,” Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies Working

Paper (2005). Also see Shinji Takagi, Establishing Monetary Union in the Gulf
Cooperation Council: What Lessons for Regional Cooperation? (Tokyo: Asian
Development Bank Institute, 2012), 107-124.
56 International Monetary Fund, Trade and Foreign Investment: Keys to Diversification
and Growth in the GCC (Washington, DC: IMF, 2018).

and services.57 Intra-GCC trade has grown nearly forty since its
establishment.58
Internal security is an area where the GCC has achieved a high level of
cooperation, largely due to a common perception of regional threats as
well as a shared interest in state integrity and regime survival.59 In 2004,
the Gulf countries signed the intelligence-sharing pact to counter-
terrorism. An Internal Security Pact, first proposed in 1982 and revised in
1994, was concluded by all the GCC interior ministers in 2012, to
reinforce security cooperation and coordination between the member
states.60
However, in the economic sphere, the Customs Union is yet to achieve its
full potential due to some unresolved matters. The first issue pertains to
the tariff revenue collection and distribution system. The revenue of
imported items is collected by each member state at the first point of entry
and then transferred to a central account. Thereafter, the revenue is
redistributed among the member states with respect to their respective
proportion in GCC imports, GDP and population size.61 Accordingly,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE being bigger countries receive a greater share
in revenues, which the remaining GCC members oppose.62 Second,
despite agreeing to levy a Cohesive Common External Tariff of 5% for
most goods from outside the region, some member states levy higher
57 Fred Lawson, Transformation of Regional Economic Governance in Gulf Cooperation

Council (Doha: Centre for International and Regional Studies, 2012), 20-21.
58 Karen Young, “Have Taxes Killed GCC Economic Integration?,” Al-Monitor, May 15,
2020.
59 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy,
Security and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London:Tauris, 2011),

59.
60 Sean L. Yom, “Regimes, Identities, and Regional Order: Kuwait, Qatar, and the Gulf
Cooperation Council,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 14 (2018).

61 Jayanta Roy and Jamel Zarrouk, Completing the GCC Customs Union (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, 2002).

62 World Bank, Economic Integration in the GCC (Washington, DC: The World Bank,
2010).

tariffs to generate revenue or protect local industries.63 Third, non-tariff

trade barriers have not been fully removed.64
The Common Market also lags behind in implementation due to lack of

harmonisation in GCC regulatory mechanisms and policies. For example,
in terms of labour mobility, although millions of Gulf nationals travel
across GCC frontiers each year, the number of workers in the public and
private sectors remain very low.65 This is because the public sector
employment in GCC nations is already saturated,66 and their private and
public sectors tend to discriminate by preferring their own nationals over
other GCC citizens in employment.67 Likewise, some restrictions on
property and business ownership, and investments by other GCC citizens
and foreigners in a member state remain in place.68
Several factors inhibit further economic integration of the GCC. First, the
economic structure and resource base of the GCC states are almost
similar. Therefore, complementarities in exports and trade are low. This
leads to a low level of intra-regional trade. There is no doubt that almost
all the Gulf nations are currently trying to diversify their economies away
from oil, and towards other productive sectors such as technology, energy,
tourism, and financial services. But crude oil and natural gas still
constitute their key revenue streams, ranging between 24% of the GDP in
63 Bernard Hoekman and Khalid Sekkat, Arab Economic Integration: The Missing Links”
(Brussels: The European Centre for International Political Economy, 2010).
64 Khalid Shams Abdulqader, “GCC's Economic Cooperation and Integration:
Achievements and Hurdles,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, March 31, 2015): 311-324.
65 Mahmood Abdulghaffar, et al, “The Malfunctioning of the Gulf Cooperation Council
Single Market: Features, Causes and Remedies,” Middle Eastern Finance and
Economics 19 (September 2013): 55-68.
66 Salem Nechi, “Assessing Economic and Financial Cooperation and Integration among
the GCC Countries,” Journal of Business and Policy Research 5 (2010): 158-178.
67 Mahmood Abdulghaffar, et al, “The Malfunctioning of the Gulf Cooperation Council
Single Market: Features, Causes and Remedies,” Middle Eastern Finance and
Economics 19 (September 2013): 55-68.
68 James R. England, “Real Estate Investing in the Middle East: Foreign Ownership
Restrictions in the GCC,” The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, January 20, 2012.

the UAE to 57% in Kuwait.69That is why the GCC economies remain

vulnerable to volatility in the global energy markets.
Second, the GCC economies rely heavily on foreign imports and

workforce. Each Gulf economy, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, is
relatively small and unable to provide scale economies in production.70
There are also considerable disparities among the member states, ranging
from a GDP per capita of around $15,000 in Oman to almost $61,000 in
Qatar.71 Third, the private sector’s contribution to the GDP has not grown,
although private investment from within the region has recently increased.
As for the labour market, while the GCC citizens are concentrated in the
public sector, foreign workers dominate the private sector.72
Fourth, the GCC is yet to establish a viable infrastructure for the

transportation of goods and natural gas. Two projects for this purpose
include “a unified natural gas pipeline distribution network and an
integrated regional railway system.”73 Both are far from implementation.
Finally, the GCC integration process has also been hampered by internal
divisions such as the crisis with Qatar, and regional security threats from
Iran, Yemen and Iraq.
Future Prospects
The MENA region has, indeed, been able to put in place important free
trade arrangements and sub-regional cooperation formations. But most of
them have not achieved their founding objectives due to the prevailing
barriers that restrict the free flow of goods, people, and capital in the
69 “Oil and the Gulf States: After the Party,” The Economist, March 26, 2016.
70 Bernard M. Hoekman and Patrick Messerlin, Initial Conditions and Incentives for
Arab Economic Integration (DC: The World Bank, 2002), 13.
71 “World Bank Open Data,” The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/.
72 Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah, “The Economics of the Arab Spring,” World
Development 45 (2013): 296-313.

73 Mirium Malek, “Saudi Arabia-GCC Gas Pipeline Studies to Commence within Weeks:
Falih,” S & P Global, April 8, 2019, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-

insights/latest-news/natural-gas/040819-saudi-arabia-gcc-gas-pipeline-studies-to-
commence-within-weeks-falih.

region, as well as other economic, political, and security reasons.

However, current trends toward reconciliation, conflict resolution, and
economic diversification augur well for the future of Arab regionalism.
Two developments are particularly noteworthy.
First, after decades of wars and conflicts rooted in the regional and global
geopolitics, which worsened in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the
MENA region is undergoing a major shift towards geo-economics-centric
reconciliation and conflict resolution, including the resolution of the Qatar
crisis, the relative peace in Libya and Iraq, the return of Syria into the
Arab League fold, the ceasefire in Yemen conducive to political
settlement and, above all, the normalisation of relations between Saudi
Arabia and Iran. Moreover, China has emerged as a major economic
player in the Gulf region, in particular, and the rest of MENA, in general.
Most of the Arab League members are part of the BRI and have a
common stake in lucrative Chinese investments in vital projects of
infrastructure, energy and technology.
Second, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries are implementing major
national vision programs to diversify their economies away from
overbearing dependence on crude oil and natural gas. Their economic
revival and growth after the global pandemic are spurring the
implementation of these vision programs.74 Saudi Arabia, being the largest
Gulf state and the richest Arab nation, particularly seeks to enhance its
regional and international profile under Vision 2030. Its potential to act as
a catalyst for economic integration of the Arab world is already
manifested in the Green Middle East Initiative and Saudi investments
across the MENA region, particularly in Egypt, Iraq, and expectedly,
Syria and Yemen. Aligned with the ongoing regional reconciliation and
conflict resolution trends, the diversification of Gulf economies and their
74 “Saudi Arabia tops India as world's fastest growing major economy,”Middle East Eye.
January 31, 2023.

transregional connectivity with China and rest of Asia is likely to boost

trade and investment links across the Arab world.75
It is clear from the preceding discussion that despite structural woes and
inter-state differences, the GCC has outperformed other Arab initiatives
by creating sound conditions for more active coordination among the
majority of its member states. However, its intra-regional profile still
pales in comparison with its international trajectory. Therefore, its
members must continue to diversify their economies, expand the private
sector and empower the youth with quality education and relevant skills
needed for absorption in the market economy. Simultaneously, they have
to extend the benefits of their collective success through GCC integration
to the rest of the Arab world by creating favourable conditions for the
promotion of the private sector and free trade in the region.
Other Arab regional initiatives also need to be revitalised. The presence of

three parallel regional groupings within the Arab world, including
GAFTA, AMU and Agadir Agreement, is problematic due to their
overlapping jurisdiction and field of action.76 The Agadir Agreement is
open for membership for GAFTA/Arab League members that have signed
free trade agreements with the EU. However, both the AMU and Agadir
Agreement have not made any headway in increasing intra-regional trade.
Therefore, while political commitment and structural reforms are required
to make these initiatives more productive, the Arab states need to focus on
GAFTA. Since the AMU and Agadir member-states face almost the same
barriers as other GAFTA members do, their future lies in a more vibrant
GAFTA process. Besides overcoming these barriers, all Arab League
members should, in fact, be part of the GAFTA.
75 “Saudi Arabia commits $2.5 bln to Middle East green initiative - Crown Prince,”
Reuters, November 7, 2022. Also see Ali Awadh Asseri, “Saudi Arabia is the Gulf’s
Status Quo Power,” Manara Magazine, October 5, 2022.
76 Talha Jebril,“ Morocco-ECOWAS: Good Intentions Are Not Enough,” Moroccan
Institute for Policy Analysis, February 13, 2020.

GAFTA’s success in liberalising trade is limited by the persistence of

non-tariff barriers, as well as infrastructure and regulatory constraints.
Rather than merely trading in goods, its member states need to develop
the services industries, including trade facilitation and transportation,
banking and finance, and information and communication technology. As
for the AMU and Agadir nations, they will accrue more economic gains
by trading collectively with Europe as a bloc. Improving regional
infrastructure, creating a regional bank, and resolving inter-state conflicts,
such as between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara, are other
initiatives worth taking for the AMU. Finally, the member countries of the
Agadir agreement need to overcome the problem of trade
complementarity among them and in relation to their trade with Europe.
Lessons Learned
Arab regionalism provides a number of valuable lessons both in theory
and practice, which are similar to the cases of “new regionalism” across
the developing world. But they are different from the economic
integration process in Europe.
First, all the Arab regional organisations and trade initiatives are based on
inter-governmental cooperation, which is pursued as long as it serves the
economic interests of the member-states. Sovereignty is a sacred principle
for the Arab states. Hence, they are unwilling to create a supranational
institution like the EU. Instead of sovereignty pooling, the Arab
organisations serve as a means for sovereignty enhancement of the
member-states. The focus remains on cooperation rather than integration.
Therefore, Arab regionalism is better explained by inter-governmentalism
theory, although its liberal facet is visible in the GCC, marked by EU-like
regionalisation trends, denoting increased interaction among social and
market forces.
Second, Arab regionalism challenges the Eurosceptic view that

democracy is a precondition to economic integration. All the Gulf nations
have authoritarian systems of government, and yet they have moved

steadily on the integration path, from the establishment of a free trade area
to the partial realisation of the Customs Union and Common Market in the
GCC. Their current quest for economic diversification is also happening
under similar political conditions. Other cases like the AMU and Agadir
Agreement constitute an abject failure of regionalism, not because of the
nature of politics but due to economic barriers and security issues.
Third, GCC history makes it clear that Saudi Arabia is the driving force
behind its progressive evolution. This is not surprising. The most powerful
economies in any regional setting have a pragmatic interest in deeper
economic integration, such as Germany in the EU. That is why Saudi
Arabia seeks GCC’s monetary union and the common currency, a
proposition that is resisted by smaller Gulf nations like the UAE and
Oman. The Kingdom has to assuage its political and economic concerns if
it wants tangible progress in the Gulf integration process beyond the
Common Market.
Finally, Arab regionalism confirms the causal link between security issues
and economic integration. Regional organisations emerge as a collective
response to perceived or real dangers from outside. GCC’s creation due to
the Iranian threat is a pertinent example. Moreover, the persistence of
security conflicts may hamper the process of regionalism. The border
conflict between Algeria and Morocco, for instance, is the key factor
behind AMU’s dismal performance in the past three decades.
Reconciliation and conflict resolution trends in a region – such as in the
Gulf and the Middle East at present – could also create the enabling
conditions for regionalism to flourish.◼

Indian Quest for Hypersonic Missiles in South Asia and…
Indian Quest for Hypersonic Missiles in

South Asia and Disruption of Strategic
Stability in the Indo-Pak Dyad
Ayesha Abbasi *
Abstract
The novelty associated with hypersonic weapons - which covers their
extraordinary attributes like speed, maneuverability, dual-use capability,
and absence of an effective defense - has convinced all the major powers
to acquire them. While acquisition of hypersonic weapons by the United
States, Russia and China may be justified, keeping in view their
intertwined power dynamics and desire for defence, India’s pursuit of
hypersonic missiles is merely for prestige as it certainly does not face any
offense from Pakistan. To counter China’s fear, which is often projected
as a key threat to their security, the current specifications of Indian
hypersonic missiles do not make them compatible in any way.
Nevertheless, Indian hypersonic weapons come at a great cost for the
stability of crisis resolution, deterrence, and arms race stability in the
region. All this is done just to enhance India’s stature and put it in the
same league as the major global powers. Concurrently, the Hindutva-
driven fascist ideology of India, being superior to the rest is feeding this
quest for exceptional technologies with a complete disregard for
international norms and regional stability. On the contrary, Pakistan
continues to adhere to the tenets of Full Spectrum Deterrence under the
overhang of the concept of Credible Minimum Deterrence and continues
to invest only in defensive technologies which fulfill the requirements to
ensure credible deterrence. This paper discusses the trends of hypersonic
weapons acquisition by the US, Russia, China, and Iran -- as these
*Ayesha Abbasi is an independent analyst. She can be reached at

ayeshaabbasi1990@gmail.com.
__________________


Ayesha Abbasi
countries are seen to form the crux of the nuclear domino effect. The
paper presents a special focus on the Indian pursuit of these weapons,
their strategic implications for the strategic stability in the region, and the
response options available to Pakistan.
Keywords: Hypersonic Weapons (HSW), HSTDV, BrahMos II, Deterrence

Instability, Arms Race Instability, Crisis Instability

Introduction
C
arl Von Clausewitz proposed the idea of achieving the maximum
military gains despite limited resources – both military and
political.1 Similarly, Sun Tzu proposed the idea of ‘winning
without fighting’2 – an end that may be achieved either through political
tactics alone or by possessing such weapons which prevent an adversary
from initiating any aggression. One of the new entrants in the inventory of
nuclear weapon possessor states is hypersonic weapons (HSWs). They
tend to fulfill both these purposes for the possessor state as philosophised
by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.3 These weapons do so by allowing a state the
option to credibly deter an adversary from using its nuclear weapons.
Similarly, the HSWs can also help in coercing an adversarial state into
making concessions beneficial for the possessor state. Hence, if employed
tactfully, these weapons, due to their distinct capabilities, which will be
discussed in detail in the following paragraphs, can allow the possessor
state to essentially win any conflict without actually fighting it. In the
proceeding paragraphs, this paper attempts to deconstruct the dynamics
surrounding hypersonic weapons, their attributes, the associated novelty,
and the evident ongoing race among major powers to perfect the HSW
technology to enhance their respective arsenals. This will be followed by
an assessment of the impact of HSWs on strategic stability with a special
focus on the acquisition of these weapons by India and the consequences
for regional stability.
For a layperson, using the definition given by Merriam-Webster,

hypersonic relates to a “speed five or more times that of sound in the air,”4
1 Patrick J. Garrity, “The Parameters of Victory,” Claremont Review of Books, August 15, 2
012, accessed October 10, 2022, https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/digital/the-param
eters-of-victory/.
2 John F. Sullivan, “Sun Tzu’s Fighting Words,” The Strategy Bridge, June 15, 2020, acces
sed June 18, 2023, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/6/15/sun-tzus-fighting-w
ords.
3 Alan Cummings, “Hypersonic Weapons: Tactical Uses and Strategic Goals,” War on the
Rocks, November 12, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/hypersonic-weapons-tacti
cal-uses-and-strategic-goals/.
4 Merriam-Webster Online, “Hypersonic Definition,” accessed October 12, 2022, https://w
ww.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hypersonic.

Ayesha Abbasi
and is represented as Mach 5. In aerodynamics – the ach number is used

to identify an object’s speed in relation to the speed of sound. Hypersonic
missiles may not be categorised as a new technology per se, as most
ballistic missiles can travel at hypersonic speeds. Concurrently, cruise
missiles can fly at both subsonic (< Mach 1) and supersonic (Mach 1-5)
speeds.5 The United States’ nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) Minuteman III can reach the levels of Mach 23 at
burnout, and has the capability to take just 30 minutes to reach the
Russian mainland after taking off from its silo housed in the western US.6
What makes “hypersonic weapons” novel is their practical ability to fly at

a trajectory which falls lower than that of an ICBM and higher than the
path followed by traditional cruise missiles (See Figure 1). Moreover, due
to this distinction, they are primarily intended to be used in a regional
theatre instead of intercontinental use.7
5 Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif, “Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the
Allure and the Risks,” Arms Control Association (2021): 4. https://www.armscontrol.org/s
ites/default/files/files/Reports/ACA_Report_HypersonicWeapons_2021.pdf, accessed on
February 5, 2023.
Allure and the Risks.

Figure 1. Notional flight paths of the hypersonic boost-glide missiles, ballistic missiles,
and cruise missile8
Types of Hypersonic Missiles

Presently, hypersonic missiles can be divided into two categories:
hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles
(HCMs). HGVs can cover a distance of 1 mile per second and travel at the
speed of at least Mach 5. They fly at lower altitudes compared to ballistic
missiles and glide towards the target after being launched through a
rocket. A main feature of the HGVs is their maneuverability. This
characteristic differentiates the HGVs from ballistic reentry vehicles i.e.,
those that travel on a ballistic trajectory throughout their flight.
Furthermore, it is also assumed that in contrast to a standard ballistic
missile trajectory, the HGV boosters may be launched along a depressed
trajectory and consequently release their glider at a lower altitude, thereby
defeating the enemy’s air defences (See Figure 2). This, however, is not
necessary in all cases.9
8 Zohuri, Bahman & Mcdaniel, Patrick & Lee, Jim & Rodgers, Casey, “New Weapon of To
morrow's Battlefield Driven by Hypersonic Velocity,” Journal of Energy and Power Engi
neering 13 (2019): 177-196.
9 K. M Sayler, Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons (D.C: Congressional Res
earch Service, 2020).

Ayesha Abbasi
Figure 2. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles10
Concurrently, the HCMs possess a capability to fly at a higher altitude

than traditional cruise missiles and can reach greater speeds than their
traditional counterparts too. Furthermore, they are powered by high-speed
engines, called scramjets11 – which are a supersonic combustion ramjet
engine. As compared to hypersonic gliders, scramjets are technically
difficult to develop resulting in the former to be completed first.12
Both types of hypersonic missiles are designed to carry both conventional

and nuclear payloads. The energy that the conventional variants derive
from their high speed may be used to effectively destroy these missiles’
intended targets on impact. It is a combination of speed, maneuverability,
10 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019,
accessed December 12, 2022, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/0
4/06/gliding-missiles-that-flyfaster-than-mach-5-are-coming.
11 Kelley M. Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress (D.C: Con
gressional Research Service, 2021).

12 “Hypersonic Cruise Missile,” Global Security, October 20, 2022, accessed November 12,
2022, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/hcm.htm.

and accuracy.13 This explains the growing attention towards these missiles
and their development in recent years. This was also recognised by former
US Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly, who argued that “the
nature of the battle space” has been changed by HSWs, and they “can
destabilise the global security environment and pose an existential threat”
to the US.14
Trends of Acquisition
Boost-glide technology has been researched since 1930s; however, the
programme gained momentum in the early 2000s. Currently, US, Russia
and China pursue an active HGV acquisition program with several
successful flight tests under their belts. There are a few other states,
including India, which are also actively pursuing this technology.15 The
paragraphs below give a primer on the existing capabilities possessed by
the US, Russia and China. Subsequently, India’s ambitions and
acquisitions are also discussed followed by the grave threats posed to
regional security and beyond.
United States
The need for investment in hypersonic technology by the US arose from
its desire to be able to hit targets inside enemy territory without having to
rely on forward bases. This is due to an ongoing active effort to reduce the
force numbers overseas. This restructuring also stems from the growing
realisation within the US that due to the evolving nature of warfare in the
21st Century, it may not be able to ascertain whether the existing bases
13 Ron Harper, “Army Hypersonic Weapons Demonstrating Super Accuracy,” National Def
ense Magazine, October 13, 2020, accessed December 5, 2022, https://www.nationaldefen
semagazine.org/articles/2020/10/13/ausanews-army-hypersonic-weapons-demonstrating-s
uper-accuracy.
14 K. M Sayler, Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons (D.C: Congressional Re
search Service, 2020).

15 “Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control, United
Nations,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affair, February 2019, accessed on Dec
ember 6, 2022, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/hypersonic-
weapons-study.pdf.

Ayesha Abbasi
would be close enough to the epi-centre of any future conflict.16 This has
resulted in the emergence of numerous proposals to enhance the US long-
strike capability.17 The benefits of such technologies are numerous, as
identified. Firstly, these weapons would reduce the utility of forward
bases, thereby cutting down the resources being expended to maintain
these bases. Secondly, the US will no longer be handicapped in reaching
targets deep inside enemy territory. Thirdly, long-range strike capability
utilising ballistic missile technology provides an effective edge in
circumventing and degrading the adversary’s air defences if launched
early on in a conflict.18 The fourth benefit entails these weapons prospects
to be used as strategic non-nuclear weapons whereby US can employ
them against adversaries like China without breaking the nuclear
threshold. The notion of strategic non-nuclear weapons, coupled with
hypersonic speeds entail a “compressed battle space,” which may allow
the US to launch disarming conventional attacks against China without
any prior warning.19
The 2001 US Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) highlighted the need

for long-range strike weapons by noting that US defence strategy “rests on
the assumption that the US forces have the ability to project power
worldwide.”20 In addition to their utility in helping US project its power
globally, the 2006 QDR pointed out another purpose which these weapons
may serve by stating that the prompt global strike capabilities can be used
to “attack fixed, hard and deeply buried, mobile and relocatable targets
16 “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and
Issues,” Congressional Research Service, July 16, 2021, accessed August 11, 2022https://
sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf.
17 Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and I
ssues, 3.
18 Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and I
ssues, 3.
19 Fabian Hoffmann, “Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability - Promoting T
rust Through Technical Understanding,” Foundation Pour La Recherché Strategique, No

vember 2021, accessed on February 26, 2023, https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/file
s/documents/programmes/Programme%20TNP%20-%20P5/2021/202103.pdf.
20 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (D.C: U.S. Department of Defense,
September 29,2001), 2, http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf.

with improved accuracy anywhere in the world promptly.”21 In the 2018

US National Defense Strategy, hypersonic weapons were identified as one
of the primary technologies with the ability to ensure that the US “will be
able to fight and win the wars of the future.” 22
With these propositions as a baseline, the US focused its efforts on the

development of HGVs and HCMs. Modifications are also being made to
introduce shorter and intermediate range versions which may be deployed
in regional conflicts. The development of hypersonic weapons was
accelerated under the John S. McCain National Defense Authorisation Act
for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115- 232), after USD (R&E)
identified the program as a top priority research and development area.23
Presently, hypersonic weapons are being developed under the US Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike program, and several Air Force, Army and
DARPA programs by the Department of Defense (DOD).24
Russia
Russia’s HSWs are being developed to evade US missile defence
systems.25 President Vladimir Putin has noted that these systems are
aimed at “neutralis(ing) the threats posed by the deployment of the US
global missile defense system.” He further remarked in 2020 that, “the US
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 forced Russia
to start designing hypersonic weapons.”26
21 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (D.C: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 200
6), 49-50, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.pdf.
22 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (D.C: D
epartment of Defense, 2018), 3, at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/201

8-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
23 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, (D.C: Congressional Researc
h Service February 13, 2023), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf.

24 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, 4.
25 Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif, Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the
Allure and the Risks (D.C: An Arms Control Association Report, September 2021), 12,
https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/Reports/ACA_Report_HypersonicWe
apons_2021.pdf.
26 Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif, Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the

Ayesha Abbasi
Russia, however, has pursued an effective HGV capability since the 1980s
with Yu-70 HGV being the first system of its kind developed by the
country – thereby making Russia the frontrunner in the race of HSW
acquisition. Russian Avangard consists of an HGV, sometimes referred to
as Yu-71, deployed on an ICBM. The Yu-71 is reportedly a successor of
the Yu-70 HGV. Avangard – with an estimated range of 10,000km.27 It
has been tested through the period from 2011 till 2019 with a mixture of
successes and failures.28 However, President Putin highlighted successful
tests of the Avangard and further confirmed that these systems – capable
of lateral and vertical maneuverability at speeds in excess of Mach 20 –
will be inducted in all the Russian Strategic Missile Forces “in the near
future.”29 Russia has also followed the US suit and is now developing
hypersonic weapons to be used in regional theatre. This class of missiles
includes the Kinzhal (“Dagger”) – a hypersonic air-launched ballistic
missile (ALBM) – which has been fielded; and Tsirkon (or Zircon) – a
hypersonic sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) – which is under
development. 30
Figure 3. Flight time of Avangard and Kinzhal missiles.31
27 Rahul Udoshi and Akshara Parkala, “Prompt strike: ground-launched hypersonics move a
gainst missile defences,” Jane’s International Defence Review, June 21, 2018.
28 Pavel Podvig, “Avangard System Is Tested, Said to Be Fully Ready for Deployment,” Ru
ssian Strategic Nuclear Forces (blog), December 26, 2018, http://russianforces.org/blog/

2018/12/avangard_system_is_ tested_said.shtml.
29 President of Russia, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, http:
//en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.
30 Shannon Bugos and Kingston, Understanding Hypersonic Weapons… 13.
31 Sander Ruben Aarten, “The impact of hypersonic missiles on strategic stability: Russia, C
hina and the U.S.,” Militaire Spectator 189 no. 4, (2020): 187, https://www.militairespect
ator.nl/thema/strategie/artikel/impact-hypersonic-missiles-strategic-stability.

China
In congruence with the secrecy surrounding China’s nuclear forces,
information regarding the country’s development of hypersonic missiles is
also not publicly disclosed. However, of the little information that is in
fact available, it can be ascertained that similar to Russia, China’s pursuit
of these weapons is also driven by its desire to be able to counteract US
missile defences, and to overpower the latter’s offensive capabilities in
case of a conflict in Asia.32 From 2014-2017, nine flight tests of China’s
DF-ZF HGV have been conducted with six termed ‘broadly successful’ by
outside observers. The HGV reportedly attained speeds up to Mach 10 and
covered distances between 1250 and 2100 km. Analysts have opined that
the DF-ZF HGV will be eventually used with Chinese DF-31 ICBM.
However, the question regarding which warhead the DF-ZF will carry
remains unanswered.33 Another nuclear-capable hypersonic missile
prototype Xing Kong-2 or “Starry Sky-2” is under-development.34 This
missile has the ability to derive lift from the shockwaves generated as a
result of its own hypersonic flight – hence being called “Wave-rider.”
Reportedly successful flight testing of the Xing Kong-2 was conducted in
2018.35
32 Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif, Understanding Hypersonic Weapons:

Managing the Allure and the Risks (D.C: Arms Control Association, 20121), 13.
33 Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control (New
York: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs,, 2019), https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-

content/uploads/2019/02/hypersonic-weapons-study.pdf.
34 Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress (DC: Congressional Research
Service, 2023), 19, accessed on March 7, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pd

f/R/R45811.
35
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.

Ayesha Abbasi
Figure 4. The DF-21D easily covers the first island chain and large parts of the second
island chain, enhancing its A2/AD capability in that region36
Iran
In the broader Asian regional context, Iran also tested its hypersonic
missile Fattah in June this year. This missile was tested a few months
after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed the existence of an
Iranian hypersonic missile. Reportedly, this missile has a range of
1,400km (870 miles) and can move at a speed of up to Mach 15 (5.1 km
36 Sander Ruben Aarten, “The impact of hypersonic missiles on strategic stability: Russia, C
hina and the U.S.,” Militaire Spectator no. 4 (2020): 187, https://www.militairespectator.n
l/thema/strategie/artikel/impact-hypersonic-missiles-strategic-stability.

or 3.2 miles per second) before hitting its target. Iranian officials have
further indicated that a longer-range variant of this missile is expected to
be unveiled in near future.37
Advent of HSW in South Asia

The Twilight of the 20th Century saw India pushing the South Asian
Subcontinent towards the nuclear weapons black hole – a metaphorical
point of no return – when it conducted the so-called ‘peaceful’ nuclear
explosion in 1974. Living up to these tendencies of jeopardising peace in
favour of upholding its prestige, the 21st Century saw India delving in the
pursuit of novel technologies. In this regard, India claimed to have
indigenously developed a Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle
(HSTDV) – an unmanned scramjet demonstration aircraft capable of
hypersonic speed flight. This vehicle is built to be used as a carrier for
hypersonic and long-range cruise missiles. Supposedly slated for flight
tests in 2016, the tests of HSTDV did not happen until June 2019. The
next testing took place on September 7, 2020 – a delay which may be
attributed to the complexity of this technology.38 This indigenous
development has been termed as a “landmark achievement” by Indian
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh when he confirmed that the hypersonic
weapon testing was successful.39
In addition to indigenously developing hypersonic weapons, India has

been engaged in procuring the technology from Russia and collaborated
on the BrahMos missiles. BrahMos missile is a supersonic, ramjet-
powered cruise missile and can be launched from air or sea. Several tests
37 Maziar Motamedi, “Iran has a hypersonic missile. What does that mean?,” Al-Jazeera,
June 7, 2023, accessed June 19, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/6/7/iran-h
as-a-hypersonic-missile-what-does-that-mean.
38 Samran Ali, “Assessing the Implications of India’s Hypersonic Technology Test for
Pakistan,” Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research, September 11, 2020, accesse
d June 6 2023, https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/assessing-the- imp
lications-of-indias-hypersonic-technology-test-for-pakistan/.
39 Press Trust India, “ "Great Achievement": Made-In-India Hypersonic Vehicle Su
ccessfully Tested,” NDTV, September 7, 2020, accessed January 15, 2023, https://www.n
dtv.com/india-news/rajnath-singh-on-successful-test-of-long-range-missile-tech-landmark
- achievement-2291608.

Ayesha Abbasi
of the missile have been conducted since late 2004, from numerous
platforms. The land-based test from the Pokhran testing range reached a
speed of Mach 2.8. Collaboration between Russia and India is underway
for the development of BrahMos II which is being designed to reach
speeds up to Mach 7 using a scramjet engine.40 It is estimated that
BrahMos II may become operational by 2025, at the earliest. BrahMos II,
once fully developed, will be the world’s fastest cruise missile.41
Concurrently, India continues to actively test the BrahMos cruise missile
from its aerial and naval platforms.42 Integration of the air-launched
variant into India’s Sukhoi fighter jets has also been planned since 2016,
in an attempt to complement the Indian Air Force’s capability to strike
targets – both at sea or land – while being placed at large stand-off ranges.
A successful test of an advanced variant of BrahMos was conducted in the
Indian Ocean from a stealth destroyer on March 5, 2022.43
Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) tested a

Shaurya missile on October 3, 2020, which can reach speeds of 7.5 Mach,
and has a range of 750 kilometres - which was raised from 290 kilometres
range possessed by its earlier variant. The missile is dual-capable and can
be stored in a composite canister.44 In order to ascertain the implications
of these weapons in the South Asian construct, one must study the drivers
behind Indian acquisition of HSWs.
40 Richard H. Speier, et al., “Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of

a New Class of Weapons,” RAND National Defense Research Institute (2017): 24, rhttps:
//www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.
41 Uswa Khan, “India’s Joining of Hypersonic Club and its Repercussions on Pakistan,”
Strafasia, December 1, 2020, accessed June 6, 2023, https://strafasia.com/indias-joining-

of-hypersonic-club-and-its-repercussions-on-pakistan/.
42 “Defence tech: Indian Air Force successfully test fires Brahmos missile from Sukhoi
SU-30 MKI,” Economic Times Government, December 30, 2022, accessed June 5, 2023,
https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/technology/defence-tech-indian-
air-force-successfully-test-fires-brahmos-missile-from-sukhoi-su-30-mki/96619182.
43 “IAF Successfully test-fires BrahMos Missile from Su30-MKI,” Times of India, April 19,
2022, accessed June 5, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/iaf-successfully-

test-fires-brahmos-missile-from-su30-mki-fighter-jet/articleshow/90942148.cms.
44 “India Successfully Tests Nuclear-Capable Shaurya Missile,” Hindustan Times, October
3, 2020, accessed June 5, 2023, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-succes

sfully-tests-nuclear-capable-shaurya-missile/story-fkYlozVJ5oq1MWO26GOwNN.html.

The Drivers of Indian HSW Program

Instead of any particular military objectives, developments in the
technological domain are an important driver behind the pursuit of
hypersonic weapons program45 – especially by India. While the US,
Russia and China may justify their developments by stating security
concerns emanating from each other, the same criterion does not apply to
India. This hypothesis may be proven by highlighting the primary utility
of hypersonic weapons which is to dodge an adversary’s BMD system
through high speed and maneuverability. India proclaims that it faces an
acute security threat from China, however, the hypersonic missiles
currently being developed by it do not possess the range to effectively
circumvent Chinese BMD. Similarly, Pakistan - with which India has
fought three major wars, numerous mid-level crises and frequent border
clashes - does not even possess a BMD system to warrant a counter-
capability like HSW. Hence the argument that India will use these
missiles to counter China can be safely discarded at this point in time. On
the other hand, development of these missiles having shorter and
intermediate ranges feed India’s “counterforce temptations” and may be
termed a harbinger of revision of the Indian ‘No First Use’ posture.46
Shourya HSW with its 750km range can easily target all of Pakistan’s
strategic locations - thus augmenting a counter-force mission against
Pakistan. Similarly, BrahMos is also ‘uniquely tailored’ for a counter-
force role47 - a posture that is designed solely as a means to target
Pakistan. All this while India continues to divert the attention of global
powers from its continued vertical proliferation by proclaiming China as a
primary threat.
Concurrently, the domestic Hindutva-driven fascist narrative of the Hindu

nation being superior to the rest is also a contributing factor in the
45 James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, April 2, 2018, accessed August 11, 2022, https://carnegieendowment
.org/2018/04/02/hypersonicweapons-explainer-pub-75957.
46 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic
Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,” International Security 43, no. 3 (2019): 7–52.
47
Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India's Counterforce Temptations: ….”

Ayesha Abbasi
growing domestic fervour in favour of exceptional technologies like the

hypersonic missile program. Therefore, akin to India’s prestige-driven
nuclear weapons program, its pursuit of HSW capability may also be
attributed to the inherent Indian desire to enhance its prestige and stature
to allow it to rub shoulders with great powers like the P-5, which may in
turn help it attain the much-desired seat in the United Nations Security
Council. This prestige-driven approach greatly shapes Indian attitude as a
regional actor trying to project its image globally, while considerably
disregarding the strategic implications of its developments for the region,
as discussed in detail below.
Strategic Effects of HSWs – Indo-Pak Theatre

The duality of HSWs does not just cover their ability to carry both types
of warheads. It also covers their civilian and military applications as well
as their utility as both defensive and offensive weapons. And while the set
of these applications on one side of the spectrum could prove to enhance
strategic stability – once possessed by a belligerent state like India whose
adversary is conventionally much smaller and does not possess similar
novel technologies and defenses – HSWs pose a massive threat to
strategic stability.
India, with the successful production of scram-jet powered HSTDV has

managed to send disruptive ripples through the rubric of strategic stability
of the South Asian region. This is especially concerning as the currently
prevailing Hindutva ideology in India is driving the ruling elite to create a
fascist Hindu legacy fortified with military supremacy, both regionally
and internationally. These developments have created a complex security
environment for Pakistan which has endured the brunt of Indian
belligerence for the past seven decades. The following paragraphs touch
upon the implications of Indian HSWs on Pakistan’s security and strategic
stability.

Deterrence Instability
The deterrence equilibrium between two nuclear weapon states gets
disturbed by the possession of a novel technology by one state only. It
provides the possessor state with a considerable advantage in a conflict
situation. Moreover, in peacetime, such an edge may entice the possessor
state to indulge in coercive tactics to further suppress its adversary. A
novel technology – in this case, the HSW possessed by India – could
contribute to first-strike tendencies giving it a false sense of confidence to
conduct a first-strike through HSWs, and then being able to employ its
missile defenses to absorb a retaliatory strike by Pakistan.48 The
deterrence equation between India and Pakistan would be further
hampered by their close geographical proximity and further reduction in
flight times that hypersonic missiles entail due to their super speeds. With
Pakistan lacking any counter-measure for HSWs, and the reduced flight
time – from 5-10 minutes otherwise to a couple of minutes in case of a
hypersonic flight – the deterrence equilibrium will be considerably
jeopardised. Such technological edge and seemingly favourable conditions
will further embolden India to pursue its belligerent and coercive tactics
against Pakistan.49 Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the
compression of time brackets required for an HSW to reach its target.
48 Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, “Implications of Emerging Hypersonic Missile Race,” Hilal Magaz
ine, December 3, 2020, accessed on, June 1, 2023, https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/de
tail/NDcwOQ==.html,
49
Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, “Implications of Emerging Hypersonic Missile Race...”

Ayesha Abbasi
Figure 5. Time Required by Hypersonic Cruise Missiles and Ballistic Missiles to Reach a
Target 50
A target country’s inability to detect, track, and defend against a

hypersonic attack stems primarily from the HSW/HGVs evolving
trajectory and in-flight maneuverability.51 The booster’s launch may be
detected as in the case of a ballistic missile, but an HGV’s maneuverable
flight path complicates the situation. The issues in the detection of flight
paths and predicting the target would make it tougher to redirect missile
defense interceptors toward the incoming HGV.52 An HGV can hit its
target much faster than any other sub-sonic delivery means – which can
also be seen as an added bonus for these missiles as they can eliminate the
target with mere impact generated as a consequence of these high speeds.
50 Kolja Brockmann and Dr Markus Schiller, “A matter of speed? Understanding

hypersonic missile systems,” SIPRI, February 4, 2022, accessed January 10, 2023, https://
www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2022/matter-speed-understanding-hyper
sonic-missile-systems.
51 Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons, Congressional Research Service
(DC: U.S. Congress, 2022), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11459.pdf.

52
Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons, Congressional Research Service.

Added to this, the absence of any effective defensive mechanisms to

counter the HSWs makes the possessor states immune to deterrence by
denial. These factors act as drivers to put the dilemma of conventional-
nuclear entanglement in motion.
The term “conventional-nuclear entanglement” encompasses a scenario

involving any dual-capable technology which, once deployed, cannot be
distinguished into carrying either nuclear or conventional payload –
therefore making it difficult for the target country to choose an adequate
response option. HSWs may further be deemed a key example of
technology which can cause conventional-nuclear entanglement due to its
perceived capabilities and expected missions.53 The situation is further
complicated because of the speed and maneuverability, and consequently
the inability of the target to detect incoming missile which may or may
not be carrying nuclear warhead.
In South Asia, this entanglement could come into play if India decides to
use a non-nuclear hypersonic missile as a counterforce tool, or to deter an
adversary’s nuclear capability. Similarly, New Delhi may decide to
initiate a border clash with Beijing under the overhang of nuclear-tipped
hypersonic missiles which may act as a deterrent against a conventionally
superior China. It may be argued that while these scenarios could have
destabilising effects, since they can contribute to mutual vulnerability
between two adversaries, a more stable deterrence relationship may be
ensured. However, even though this is a good prospect working in favour
of the hypersonic technology, without confidence-building measures
entailing mutual verification, misinterpretation, and misperception will
pose serious risks to the overall strategic stability.54 Keeping in view
India’s track record of rejecting CBM proposals by Pakistan, it is unlikely
53 James Acton, “Escalation through entanglement: How the vulnerability of command-and-

control systems raises the risk of inadvertent nuclear war,” International Security 43, no.
1 (2018): 97–98.
54 Kolja Brockman and Dmitry Stefanovich, Hypersonic Boost-Glide Systems and Hyperson
ic Cruise Missiles: Challenges for the Missile Technology Control Regime (Stockholm: SI
PRI, 2022), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/2204_hgvs_and_hcm_ challe
nges_for_the_mtcr.pdf.

Ayesha Abbasi
that India will engage in a similarly intrusive CBM covering HSWs. It

may further be argued that the duality is not solely associated with HSWs
and a number of short-range ballistic and cruise missiles also possess the
capability to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons, hence HSW
do not warrant such an extensive debate. However, the features such as
speed, maneuverability, accuracy, and numerous operational applications
of hypersonic weapons may make the associated ambiguity to be more
difficult to deal with.55 This is especially true when a weapon such as this,
has the ability to significantly increase the possessor’s war-fighting
potential.
It seems to be a common fallacy to overestimate the capabilities of

adversaries and underestimate one’s own. A particularly problematic
scenario that could arise from misperception, misinterpretation, or a
combination thereof is a ‘use it or lose it’ situation where one party fears
that the perceived capability of its adversary could disarm it and that if it
does not strike first, it would lose its ability to launch its strategic weapons
or retaliate. The party may even choose to strike with nuclear weapons
because of its doubts about the capabilities of its non-nuclear options.56
Arms Race Instability

The vulnerability of the infrastructure required for maintaining a
hypersonic program requires protection. In this regard, missile defences
may be installed to serve this purpose.57 Henceforth, the existing and new
missile defence systems are acting as the drivers behind pursuit of HGVs
and HCMs by numerous states. Similarly, some states are justifying their
55 Maya Brehm and Anna de Courcy Wheele, “Hypersonic Weapons: Discussion on Discus
sion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),” Article 36, UK
, February 2019.
PRI, 2022), 12, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/2204_hgvs_and_hcm_ ch
allenges_for_the_mtcr.pdf.
, February 2019.

acquisition of HGVs and HCMs as a counter to others’ relentless pursuit

of missile defence systems.58 This, in the near future, will result in a never
ending cycle with new missile defence systems leading to the
development of missiles capable of defeating these defences. This in turn
will result in the development of more sophisticated defences which can
counteract such missiles. In the South Asian theatre, while India did not
face any of these threats and merely sought prestige, its developments are
on the verge of triggering an arms race in the region. This would result in
the unraveling of secured strike capability and will lead to overall regional
strategic instability.59 The secrecy surrounding India’s hypersonic
program is fueling Pakistan’s threat perceptions, which may in turn lead to
the changed dynamics of an arms race.
The dual nature of HSWs makes it rather cumbersome to assess the

prospective implications of these weapons on the existing arms control
and disarmament arrangements. However, one important aspect of this
new technology warrants immediate attention towards the possibility of
the resumption of weapons testing. This would be necessary to attest to
the design and efficacy of the nuclear warheads for HGVs. Hence the
possibility of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ever
entering into force will become much less. Similarly, the arms race
between states for the acquisition of HSWs has already begun. These
developments indicate an imminent threat to the arms control and
disarmament regime, consequently posing a significant risk to the global
security and strategic stability.60 India has very deftly avoided engaging
with the prospects of a CTBT by proclaiming a unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing and projecting on international forums that “if the CTBT
59 Kolja Brockman and Dmitry Stefanovich, Hypersonic Boost-Glide Systems and Hyperso
nic Cruise Missiles, 13.

, February 2019.

Ayesha Abbasi
did not contain a time-bound commitment to nuclear disarmament, then it

(India) would oppose the treaty.” In 1996, Indian Ambassador Arundhati
Ghose stated that the Conference on Disarmament should start
negotiations on a time-bound program for the elimination of nuclear
weapons and that India was committed to a CTBT that would “promote
the universally enunciated goal of total nuclear disarmament.”61 This
position has been maintained knowing full well that the P5 states will
never work towards the attainment of complete disarmament.
Indian scholars have time and again proposed the possibility of the
resumption of nuclear testing by the country in order to “obtain better
yield-to-weight ratios or (to develop) weapons of the megaton variety.”62
A new narrative in the making builds on the idea that a “supreme
emergency”63 may force India to resume nuclear testing and instead of
getting penalised for it, the US should look for ways to facilitate the
Indian quest to strengthen itself militarily to be able to balance China
which is “fundamentally in American interest.”64 Therefore, Indian
nuclear testing is no longer a remote possibility now and may just require
a slight nod from the West, thereby putting India in direct violation of the
spirit of CTBT which it follows through the proclaimed unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing.
On June 27, 2016, India became a member of the Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR) which also covers the issue of dual-capable
delivery systems i.e., those possessing capability to deliver either nuclear
or a conventional payload at any given time. This is evident in the
categorical mention of missiles and UAVs “capable of” delivering
chemical, biological or nuclear warheads in the MTCR guidelines and
61 Dinshaw Mistry, “India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” (PhD Diss.,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998), 17.
62 Manpreet Sethi, “Nuclear Arms Control and India: A Relationship Explored,” Arms
Control Association, September 2010, accessed May 23, 2023, https://www.armscontrol.

org/act/2010-09/nuclear-armscontrol-india-relationship-explored.
63 Ashley Tellis, “Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2022.

64
Ashley Tellis, “Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia, 255.

annex.65 Additionally, the MTCR annex also covers technologies and

equipment which are deemed “relevant to” delivery vehicles that fall
under the MTCR’s payload and range parameters.66 As per the non-
proliferation export control mechanisms, a delivery system technology
like the hypersonic missiles – with their ability to drastically disrupt the
strategic balance between states, due in part to their dual-use nature – do
in fact fall under the ambit of the MTCR irrespective of the nuclear or
conventional end-use which they may be destined for.67 Similarly, key
technologies required in the production of HGVs and HCMs are already
covered under the MTCR control lists.68 This makes India, being a
member of the MTCR, a violator of the regime’s guidelines because of its
development of HSWs. These rampant violations and disregard of
international export control infrastructure by India and the silence of the
western community to the same signify the double standards being
followed to accommodate India’s rise as a regional hegemon. However,
this western blind eye is contributing to India’s massive investments in
military and nuclear technologies – even those which do not fall under the
ambit of capabilities that are necessary to ensure credible minimum
deterrence – causing considerable damage to strategic stability.
Crisis Instability
States pursue conflict resolution only when they are faced with a certain
level of vulnerability vis-à-vis their adversary. Technologies like the
HSWs – which provide a considerable edge due to their precision and
efficacy – once acquired by prestige and hegemony-driven states like
India, reduce the inclination for any conflict resolution. Furthermore, the
65 “MTCR, Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers”, Nuke Fas, accessed Febru
ary 11, 2023, https://nuke.fas.org/control/mtcr/text/mtcr_handbook_guide-annex.pdf.
66 “MTCR, Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers”, Nuke Fas.
67 Joshua Pollack, “Boost-glide weapons and US-China strategic stability,”
Nonproliferation Review 22, no. 2 (2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2930

14314_Boost-glide_Weapons_and_US-China_Strategic_Stability.

Ayesha Abbasi
strategic ambiguity which HSWs entail, as well as the uncertainty

surrounding India’s nuclear use posture, will significantly contribute to
crisis instability in the event of any conflict situation in South Asia.
Moreover, possessing a novel capability like hypersonic technology –
whose defense does not yet exist in the region – India will be tempted to
coerce and pressurise Pakistan in both conventional and nuclear domains
while continuing to conduct a Hybrid War against the latter.
Shaurya – an intermediate range hypersonic weapon — is being seen as a

tool to facilitate India’s move away from the proclaimed nuclear no first
use (NFU) to a first use policy. The hypersonic weapons program is
further being seen to indicate New Delhi’s shift towards a counterforce
strategy, and these two revisions go in line with the recent movement in
the Indian political circles to review the long-standing nuclear use policy.
With the HSWs in its arsenal, India may try to overwhelm Pakistan with
counterforce strikes as well as by using these weapons in a conventional
role to decapitate Pakistan conventionally. 69
As for the detection dilemmas, whether intermediate or long-range, the

delivery vehicles (missiles) for HGVs can be detected in the launch phase
by early-warning satellites and early-warning radars installed closer to the
launch pads of these missiles. This is the only phase during the whole
flight of an HGV or HCM wherein this weapon can be detected and
destroyed, as their maneuverability and speed make them difficult to be
detected in the glide and terminal/re-entry phases – even by satellites or
terrestrial radars. These factors make it harder to ascertain the actual target
of the missile.70 Keeping in view that HGVs and HCMs can carry either
nuclear or conventional payload at a given time, this ambiguity once
coupled with the ambiguity of its target – both the target state and the
69 Gabriel Honrada, “India’s hypersonics hint at nuclear strike policy shift,” Asia Times, De
cember 24, 2021, accessed October 5, 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2021/12/indias-hyperso
nics-hint-at-nuclear-strike-policy-shift/.
70 Paul Labbé, Ahmed Ghanmi and Mohamed Abdelazez, “Current and future hypersonic th
reats, scenarios and defence technologies for the security of Canada,” Defence Research a
nd Development Canada, (2020), https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc413/p814591_
A1b.pdf.

exact target location within that state – complicates deterrence, especially

in case of States wherein nuclear and conventional forces are co-located.
Moreover, this scenario may culminate into escalation if the target country
– or its neighbouring countries – are unable to timely ascertain the intent
of the incoming missile, and launching State.
To avoid such a scenario, the country initiating a hypersonic strike may

decide to communicate its intent to non-target States, or it may even
choose to communicate whether the missile is carrying a nuclear or
conventional payload. However, the possibility of miscommunication,
misinterpretation, and miscalculation will remain high. Since sea-
launched ballistic missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles have never been used in active combat before, their deployment
would further contribute to the aforementioned misunderstanding. This is
because there is no awareness yet of how the early-warning and command
and control systems would react to their use.71 Additionally, while India
has indeed developed the HGVs, it has not become adept at managing
these weapons. This was made evident in the recent BrahMos misfiring
incident that could have resulted in inadvertent escalation, had Pakistan
taken it as a preemptive strike. Furthermore, the targeting ambiguity –
which does not get clear until the final moment when the hypersonic
weapon strikes its target – leads to the possibility of miscalculation and
nuclear escalation even if the missile itself is detected in time.
Options for Pakistan

A detailed study of the South Asian dyad, which comprises two nuclear-
armed adversaries – India and Pakistan – clearly indicates an action-
reaction model since the inception of both states and consequently their
nuclear programs. In the face of India’s growing military program and
Pakistan’s own economic constraints, the latter’s defence industry
continues to evolve to effectively develop counter-options. Pakistan is
71 Pavel Podvig, “Risks of Nuclear Command and Control Accidents,” in Understanding Nu

clear Weapon Risks, ed. John Borrie, Tim Caughley and Wilfred Wan (Geneva: UNIDIR,
2017), 57, accessed on, January 15, 2023, https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/
pdfs//understanding-nuclear-weapon-risks-en-676.pdf.

Ayesha Abbasi
now capable enough to produce missiles and tactical weapons which can
easily neutralise India’s defence lines, if provoked.
However, these developments by Pakistan have not come at the expense

of its responsibility as a nuclear weapon state which entails non-pursuance
of offensive weapons and technologies. This is in stark contrast to India
which has continued to put the South Asian deterrence stability under
duress – merely to enhance its stature and prestige – by adding advanced
weaponry and technologies in its inventory. Pakistan’s reactive approach
to some of these developments has been necessary and has helped
maintain a credible balance vis-à-vis India while ensuring a robust
deterrence equation in the region. Pakistan has and will continue to
strengthen and make its defences invincible while pursuing the policy of
Full Spectrum Deterrence under the overarching concept of Credible
Minimum Deterrence. To quote former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee General Zubair Hayat, India continues to introduce weapons
of instability in the region with the help of third parties, yet “we have and
we will continue to provide necessary response to ensure that strategic
balance is maintained and Pakistan’s deterrence remains credible.”72
Similar sentiments were expressed when former DG SPD Lieutenant
General (retd) Khalid Kidwai noted that Pakistan has “adequate response
options which will disallow any disturbance of the strategic balance or
strategic stability. That fundamental policy will prevail.”73 The paragraphs
below discuss some of the response options that Pakistan may pursue in
the face of the Indian expansion of its missile inventory with the induction
of HGVs.
Developing Pakistan’s own HSW

India’s test of an HSTDV has managed to raise concerns in Pakistan, as
these platforms could potentially give India a strategic advantage over
72 Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, "The S-400 Deal and Pakistan’s Quest for Strategic Stability,” Pakis
tan Politico, November 14, 2018, accessed May 26, 2023, https://pakistanpolitico.com/the
-s-400-deal-and-pakistans-quest-for-strategic-stability/
73 “Pakistan to maintain strategic balance with India, says NCA Adviser,” Dawn, November
7, 2018, accessed May 26, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1444087.

Pakistan, keeping in view their speed and maneuverability. No counter-

measures presently exist to neutralise an HSW due to its high speed and
maneuverability. Yet, if Pakistan decides to pursue HSW technology,
thinking that this will deter India from any belligerence, it will be seen as
a tit-for-tat approach and lead to an arms race between India and Pakistan.
Moreover, whether possession of an HSW by Pakistan will prevent India
from launching a preemptive counter-force strike against it or not, cannot
be ascertained. However, the existence of a high-speed weapon like HSW,
coupled with a ballistic missile defence (though lacking hundred per cent
efficacy) may induce a false sense of security in India to pursue a counter-
force targeting against Pakistan as a preemptive measure. To neutralise
the latter’s defences which will have considerable implications for
Pakistan’s deterrence posture will, however, have a remote probability of
counter offense. 74
Pakistan will need to explore several options to counter India's

development of hypersonic missiles. Ideally, Pakistan could pursue
hypersonic missile technology to counter Indian developments. The
country can allocate more funds towards research and development of
hypersonic missiles and establish partnerships with other countries to gain
expertise and knowledge. By developing its own hypersonic missiles,
Pakistan can level the playing field and deter India's military capabilities.
However, the prevalent economic situation in Pakistan may not allow it to
delve into the development of these missiles which come with a hefty
price tag. Moreover, given the technological limitations, Pakistan may opt
for a ‘deterrence by punishment’ posture, instead of ‘deterrence by
denial.’ Concurrently, being a responsible nuclear weapon state, Pakistan
does not endorse the idea of weapon to weapon match with its adversary.
Rather it seeks to plug the gaps in the deterrence equation which are
created as a result of the Indian development of destabilising technologies.
74 Dr Adil Sultan and Itfa Khursheed, "Hypersonic Weapons in South Asia: Implications for
Strategic Stability,” IPRI Journal 11, no 1 (2021): 61-81, https://journal.ipripak.org/wp-co
ntent/uploads/2021/07/Article-3-IPRI-Journal-XXI-1.pdf.

Ayesha Abbasi
Cruise Missiles and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)

If Pakistan decides not to employ nuclear weapons in the face of any
Indian aggression by conducting a conventional hypersonic strike, cruise
missiles can serve to be an important tool to respond. Pakistan’s cruise
missiles have a greater targeting accuracy and penetration capability
which could easily neutralise the Indian missile defences. Pakistan Navy
is currently developing a supersonic cruise missile that can even target
moving targets75 and hence can be used to neutralise India’s second-strike
options. Pakistan can therefore opt to enhance the features of its existing
cruise missiles while increasing the numbers too. The “shoot and scoot”
capability inherent in Pakistan’s SRBMs increase their chances of evading
an incoming strike from the adversary. This mobility of SRBMs can be
further enhanced in addition to a quantitative increase in the number of
these missiles. 76 Said attributes will work to enhance the survivability of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons which can in turn evade the chances of
escalation by India.
Developing Second Strike Capability

Another way to increase the survivability of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is
through the acquisition of second-strike capability. As Albert Wohlstetter
notes, “the ability to survive adversary’s pre-emptive attack is a
precondition to maintain deterrence,” hence, providing a justification for
Pakistan to develop nuclear submarines capable of housing nuclear
weapons.77 This capability will considerably reduce the possibility of the
launch of a preemptive strike using nuclear or conventionally-tipped HSW
by India. Pakistan already possesses submarine launched cruise missile
75 Samran Ali, “Assessing the Implications of India’s Hypersonic Technology Test for Pakis
tan,” Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research, September 11, 2020, accessed Jun
e 6 2023, https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/assessing-the-implications-of-in
dias-hypersonic-technology-test-for-pakistan/.
76 Sultan et al, HSWs in South Asia, 18.
77 Sufian Ullah, “Strategic Calculations Behind Pakistan’s Pursuit of Sea-Based Nuclear Det
errence,” South Asian Voices, June 11, 2020, accessed June 3, 2023, https://southasianvoi
ces.org/strategic-calculations-behind-pakistans-pursuit-of-sea-based-nuclear-deterrence/#:
~:text=Although%20Pakistan%20does%20not%20possess,to%20land%2Dbased%20nucl
ear%20forces.

Babur III with a range of 450 km. However, this range is insufficient
cover for an attack on the Indian mainland. Therefore, increasing the
ranges of SLCMs and developing SLBMs is imperative for Pakistan to be
able to target major Indian cities and deter India from opting for a
preemptive strike.78 The second-strike capabilities can be further
supplemented with failed deadly mechanisms. In that case even if
deterrence fails and the weapon systems are compromised, they will
induce some damage to the opponent nonetheless predetermined by the
possessor state.
Diplomatic Engagement and Confidence Building

Despite India’s rejection of numerous confidence building proposals in
the past, Pakistan should continue to push for diplomatic engagement to
prevent any inadvertent escalation and miscalculation in the future. The
incident of misfiring of a BrahMos missile from India should be taken as a
baseline by Pakistan to build its case in favour of such an engagement.
Pakistan can also propose a flight test ban on all weapons which fly at
hypersonic speeds. The existence of a hotline between India and Pakistan
is a positive step towards achieving broader benefits to ensure crisis
stability, especially keeping in view the ambiguities related to HSWs.
While India failed to use this hotline during the BrahMos incident, the
consequences of a potential miscalculation by Pakistan in the aftermath of
that incident may be kept in mind by India in the future.
Conclusion
HSW by virtue of their capabilities fulfill both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu’s
respective philosophies entailing the achievement of eventual victory i.e.,
maximum gains with limited resources and winning without losing i.e.
preventing any aggression. This novelty does not fit as perfectly on any
other weapon system, thereby enticing all the major powers to invest in
the development of HSWs despite the associated hefty price tag. Yet,
there is India which has zero utility for these weapons as it is faced with
an adversary in Pakistan. Pakistan does not possess a BMD system nor
78
Sultan et al, HSWs in South Asia, 19.

Ayesha Abbasi
does it aspire to acquire one in future; the same holds true for China,
projected as the primary adversary of China. The fascist Indian ruling elite
is increasingly opting for war-fighting capabilities and technologies that
only enhance its prestige without enhancing strategic stability; rather
conversely, these weapons only disrupt peace and stability at various
levels. Despite India’s continued efforts to damage deterrence and
strategic stability in the region, the Western world continues to turn a
blind eye toward its activities. Possession of such weapons by India -
without the presence of any counter-measures with Pakistan - will
increasingly entice India to conduct provocative actions along the Line of
Control. Similarly, due to their hypersonic speeds, the HSWs greatly
compress the response times which will further make it difficult for
Pakistan to retaliate effectively on time. In this scenario, Pakistan can opt
to strengthen its deterrence by investing in the enhancement of the
capabilities of its existing weapons systems such as its cruise missiles and
SRBMs. It can further speed up the process of acquisition of its second-
strike capability.
Sun Tzu, the ancient military strategist said, “invincibility lies in the
defence.”79 This entails strengthening defense instead of opting for
offensive maneuvering in order to subdue an enemy. Pakistan’s military
posture is an embodiment of this approach whereby the country has
always been and will continue to be inclined towards strengthening its
defenses in the face of an ever-belligerent adversary.◼
79 Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu on The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (Leicester, England: Allandale O
nline Publishing, 2000), 12. https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.p
df, accessed June 19, 2023.

Book Review
War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-

Century Great Power Competition and Conflict
Mick Ryan, ‘War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First
Century Great Power Competition and Conflict,’ Naval Institute
Press; (Annapolis, Maryland 2022): 333
Nimra Fatima 1
Mick Ryan's War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century

Great Power Competition and Conflict is a well-crafted and insightful
analysis of the nature of modern warfare and its implications for
global stability in the 21st century. Ryan, a retired Australian Army
major general and former commander of the Australian Defence
College, brings a wealth of experience and expertise to the subject
matter, and his book is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate
about the changing face of conflict.
Ryan's central argument is that the nature of war has undergone a

fundamental transformation in recent years, as a result of
technological innovation, geopolitical shifts, and changing global
trends. He contends that the traditional distinctions between
conventional and irregular warfare are becoming increasingly blurred ,
and that the lines between war and peace are becoming increasingly
fuzzy. Ryan sees this as a major challenge for policymakers and
military strategists, who need to adapt to this new reality if they are to
meet the demands of a rapidly changing security environment.
One of the key strengths of Ryan's book is his ability to synthesize

complex ideas and distill them into clear and concise language. He
draws on a wide range of sources, from academic research to his own
personal experiences, to make his case. He is particularly effective in
1
Reviewer is a Research Intern at Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan. .


Nimra Fatima
his analysis of the impact of new technologies, such as cyberwarfare

and artificial intelligence, on the nature of conflict. He is also adept at
identifying the key trends and patterns that are shaping the global
security landscape, and he provides a nuanced and insightful analysis
of the implications of these developments.
Ryan's book is also notable for its comprehensive coverage of the

subject matter. He covers a wide range of topics, from the role of
military power in international politics to the impact of climate
change on global security. He also provides detailed case studies of
recent conflicts, such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and draws
valuable lessons from these experiences. Ryan's in-depth knowledge
and his ability to connect the dots between seemingly disparate issues
make his book a valuable resource for anyone interested in
understanding the complexities of modern conflict.
However, it lacks a clear and coherent framework for understanding

the changing nature of war. While Ryan provides profound details
about various trends and factors that are shaping the security
landscape, he does not provide a clear conceptual framework for
understanding how these different factors interact and influence each
other. Consequently, making it incoherent and difficult to follow.
Moreover, it tends to focus primarily on the challenges and threats
posed by great power competition, at the expense of other important
security issues. While Ryan does touch on a range of other topics,
such as terrorism and non-state actors, these are often dealt with in a
relatively cursory manner. This narrow focus may limit the book's
appeal to readers who are interested in a broader and more
comprehensive analysis of the security landscape.
One of the notable lines in the book are:

Book Review
"In the 21st century, warfare will be less about territorial acquisition
and more about influence, control, and manipulation."
This statement encapsulates the central argument of the book,

emphasising the shifting focus from traditional military strategies to
information warfare and non-kinetic forms of conflict. The author
effectively illustrates how the rise of cyber warfare, disinformation
campaigns, and economic coercion are reshaping the dynamics of
international power struggles.
The book occasionally falls victim to speculative conjecture. For

instance, when the author claims,
"Autonomous weapons will dominate future battlefields, rendering
human soldiers obsolete,"
It fails to provide a comprehensive analysis of the ethical, legal, and

practical challenges associated with such a shift. While advancements
in autonomous technologies are undoubtedly reshaping warfare, the
complete replacement of human soldiers raises significant moral
dilemmas and strategic considerations that demand further
exploration.
Furthermore, the book tends to overlook the complex socio-political

factors that shape great power competition. While technology
undoubtedly plays a significant role, it is crucial not to underestimate
the influence of historical, cultural, and ideological elements that
drive conflicts. A more nuanced examination of these factors would
have enhanced the book's overall analysis.
Another line from the book states,

"The future of warfare will be defined by asymmetric strategies and
non-state actors."
This observation acknowledges the rise of non-state actors and the

asymmetric nature of modern conflicts. The author convincingly

Nimra Fatima
argues that traditional state-centric approaches to warfare are

increasingly insufficient in addressing the challenges posed by
transnational terrorist organizations, insurgencies, and other non-state
actors.
The book could have benefited from a deeper exploration of the

complexities inherent in dealing with non-state actors. It often
simplifies the motivations, objectives, and strategies of these actors,
failing to fully consider the local dynamics, ideological factors, and
socio-economic grievances that contribute to their emergence and
persistence.
Despite these limitations, War Transformed is a valuable and thought-

provoking contribution to the ongoing debate about the nature of
modern warfare. A rich bibliography adds another pearl to the strings.
Ryan's insights and analysis are well worth considering, and his book
should be of interest to anyone who is concerned about the future of
global security in the 21st century.◼

IWRM and the Indus River Basin: Principles, Frameworks…
IWRM and the Indus River Basin:

Principles, Frameworks, and Strategies for
Effective Implementation
Dr Bushra Bibi*, Dr Ke Jian** & Abid Hussain ***
Abstract
The Indus River Basin is a critical water resource management region,
particularly in view of growing demand and climate change impacts on
one of the most vulnerable parts of the world. The Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM) offers a promising approach to
effectively managing the basin’s water resources. This paper explores the
journey of IWRM; defines its principles and underpinnings, and assesses
their applicability to the Indus River Basin. Additionally, in this paper an
Integrated River Resources Framework is proposed as a way forward to
implement IWRM effectively. This research also examines the policy and
legal framework required for successful implementation while outlining
the necessary institutional and management strategies. In conclusion, this
study suggests that the successful implementation of IWRM can offer a
sustainable strategy to manage water resources within the Indus River
Basin Treaty, enabling stakeholders to achieve durable sustainability.
Keywords: Indus River Basin, IWRM, Frameworks, Strategies, Policy, Legal

Framework, Institutional Framework
* Dr Bushra Bibi is associated with Research Institute of Environmental Law (RIEL), School
of Law, Wuhan University, China. She can be reached at bushrafarooq53@gmail.com.
** Dr Ke Jian is Professor at Research Institute of Environmental Law (RIEL), School of
Law, Wuhan University, China. He can be reached at fxykj@whu.edu.cn.

***Abid Hussain is associated with Research Institute of Environmental Law (RIEL), School
of Law, Wuhan University, China. He can be reached at abid@whu.edu.cn.

__________________


Dr Bushra Bibi, Dr Ke Jian & Abid Hussain
Introduction
he Indus Basin, originating from the Tibetan Mountains and
T spanning Pakistan, India, China, and Afghanistan, is the lifeline for

over 300 million people. However, the basin faces a range of
environmental and legal challenges as the region’s water resources are
strained due to population growth, industrialisation, and climate change.
The Indus Waters Treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1960,
through the office of the World Bank aimed at facilitating equitable water
resource sharing, but political differences, especially between India and
Pakistan, have partially impeded its effective implementation.
Source: Map by Author
Map of Indus Basin

Water scarcity, climate change, and pollution have reduced the region’s
water quality and quantity, straining water management systems. The
IWT also ignored climate change and other environmental issues,
requiring urgent changes. Climate change is a serious threat in the
Himalayas region.2 Glacial retreat, diminishing ice mass, early snowmelt,
and increasing winter stream flow indicate that climate change has already
influenced the Himalayan cryosphere. The Indus basin is sensitive to
climate change because snowmelt and glacier melt from the Western
Himalayas contribute a large percentage of its water.3 The world’s most
strained basin is the Indus since the water quality is deteriorating in the
Indus Basin due to pollution. The Indus is also among the top 10 rivers for
plastic contamination.4
Another contentious issue is the construction of dams. Water scarcity and

increasing demand causes interstate conflict in the Indus region. Pakistan
and India sorely need water to grow their economies due to their agro-
based economies. Moreover, due to massive population growth, water
demand for irrigation and energy has also increased manifold. Their
hydroelectricity production ambitions to power their large businesses and
meet the demands of ever increasing population growth has complicated
the water issue. This has caused a record drop in per capita water
accessibility.
The best way to manage transboundary water resources is through an

integrated approach where cooperation among riparian states is vital for
sustainable progress, and managing collective water resources.
2 Shrestha, Uttam Babu, Shiva Gautam, and Kamaljit S. Bawa, "Widespread climate chang
e in the Himalayas and associated changes in local ecosystems," PloS One 7, no. 5 (2012):
36741.
3 Lone, Suhail A., Ghulam Jeelani, Virendra Padhya, and R. D. Deshpande, "Identifying an
d estimating the sources of river flow in the cold arid desert environment of Upper Indus
River Basin (UIRB), western Himalayas," Science of The Total Environment 832 (2022):
154964.
4 Hojjati-Najafabadi, Akbar, Mojtaba Mansoorianfar, Tongxiang Liang, Khashayar Shahin,
and Hassan Karimi-Maleh, "A review on magnetic sensors for monitoring of hazardous p
ollutants in water resources," Science of The Total Environment 824 (2022): 153844.

IWRM is a sophisticated and ecologically sound approach for managing

water resources sustainability.5 It harmonises economic, social, and
environmental considerations and engages stakeholders in decision-
making through regional cooperation. IWRM is iterative, continuously
improving, and tailored to the unique characteristics of each river basin. It
coordinates water resource management across all sectors and scales, from
local to global, emphasising stakeholder participation and good
governance. Tools such as environmental and social assessments, policy
interventions, and monitoring systems support the process.
The traditional sectoral management approach has generally failed to

address global water concerns and resolve conflicts between diverse water
use sectors and societies. The IWRM offers an alternative by promoting
coordinated management across borders. It addresses conflicts between
upstream and downstream regions, urban and rural water consumers,
hydropower demand, and irrigated agriculture. Achieving sustainable
water management through IWRM requires consensus and political
commitment, making it a politically sensitive but no less vital challenge.
This research will examine IWRM’s development as a promising water

resource management strategy. We aim to understand the principles,
frameworks, and strategies for an effective IWRM implementation in the
Indus River Basin. The institutional and policy frameworks needed to
implement IWRM in the Indus River Basin will also be examined.
Finally, we will discuss engagement by the stakeholders, capacity
building, and monitoring and evaluation for basin-wide IWRM
implementation. This research seeks to improve understanding of IWRM
and its potential to solve water scarcity and distribution issues in South
Asia. We recommend equitable and sustainable outcomes for
policymakers and practitioners to improve the region’s future.
5 Overton, I. C., D. M. Smith, and J. M. Kirby, "Implementing environmental flows in integ

rated water resources management and the ecosystem approach," Hydrological Sciences J
ournal 59, no. 3-4 (2014): 860-877.

The Journey of IWRM

Historically, we may trace the origins of the current IWRM paradigm
back to centuries, if not millennia. Over millennia, water management has
been organised comprehensively and is integrative in the governance of
many nations. The history of IWRM’s modern formulation dates back to
the early 20th century. In Spanish Valencia, for instance, multi-party,
participatory water tribunals have existed since at least the tenth century.
Spain was likely the first nation to organise a water management plan
delineated from political constraints and based on river basins. It approved
the system in 1926.6 Significant efforts have been made to deploy IWRM
in several global regions over the past decades. In the 1940s, the
Tennessee Valley Authority initiated the development of the region’s
water resources. Since then, major efforts have been made to adopt
IWRM in numerous other global locations.7 For instance, in 1960,
Integrated Water Resources Management Planning was developed in
Hessen, Germany, using the same multidisciplinary methodology.8
Over the past twenty to thirty years, IWRM has dramatically been
transformative, becoming recognised worldwide as a crucial strategy for
accomplishing water-related sustainable development goals. The Mar del
Plata Action Plan, itself the result of an international water conference
held in 1977, can be seen as the genesis of the current demand for
integration throughout the water sector.9 IWRM was incorporated into the
Dublin Principles in 1992, a foundation for IWRM’s inclusion in Agenda
6 O. Varis, M. M. Rahaman, and V. Stucki, "The Rocky Road from Integrated Plans to
Implementation: Lessons Learned from the Mekong and Senegal River Basins,"
International Journal of Water Resources Development 24, no. 1 (2008): 103-121.
7 A.K Biswas, “Integrated water resources management: A reassessment - A Water Forum
Contribution,” Water International 29 no. 2, (2004): 248–256.
8 M. M. Rahaman, "Integrated Water Resources Management: Constraints and
Opportunities with a Focus on the Ganges and the Brahmaputra River Basins," (PhD
diss., Helsinki University of Technology, 2009),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=e03f5ea25147fa1714
1e538327710772cf7a0526.
9 Martinez-Santos, Pedro, Maite M. Aldaya, and M. Ramón Llamas, ed., Integrated water
resources management in the 21st century: revisiting the paradigm (London: CRC Press,
2014).

21 of the “United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

(UNCED).”10 The goal is to better manage water resources by integrating
the various existing water-related services through effective management
and appropriate infrastructure.11 To foster stability through the
sustainable development, management, and utilisation of water resources,
the Global Water Partnership (GWP) was founded in 1996. It aimed to
encourage IWRM and provide an international platform for dialogue
among businesses, government agencies, water users, and environmental
organisations. In 2002, “the World Summit on Sustainable Development”
in Johannesburg reiterated the call for the development of IWRM, with all
participating countries agreeing to create IWRM and water efficiency
plans.12
A series of events, including “The International Conference on Water and

Environment (1992), the Second World Water Forum (2000), the
International Conference on Fresh Water (2001), World Summit on
Sustainable Development (2002), and Third World Water Forum (2003),”
contributed to significant advancements that propelled IWRM to the
forefront of political agendas.
Definition of IWRM
The international water sector gathered in the Hague in 2000, for the
second World Water Forum. In preparation for this event, the Global
Water Vision was established. The 2000 Global Water Vision exercise
consisted of “not just to speed up the implementation of the Dublin
principles, but also to propose a comprehensive set of practical principles
for implementation.”13 Notwithstanding the effort to be practical, the
Vision document’s glossary defines IWRM as
10 Cherlet, Jan. "Tracing the emergence and deployment of the Integrated Water Resources
Management' paradigm," Paper presented at the 12th EASA Biennial Conference, Ghent
University, Department of Third World Studies, France, July 2012,
https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/2964994.
11 Agenda 21, chapter 18.3.
12 Agenda 21...
13 W. J. Cosgrove and F. R. Rijsberman, World Water Vision: Making Water Everybody's
Business (England: Earthscan, 2000).

“A philosophy that holds that water must be viewed from a

holistic perspective, both in its natural state and in balancing
competing demands on its agricultural, industrial and
environmental. Water resources and services management must
reflect the interaction between these different demands and so
must be coordinated within and across sectors. If the many
crosscutting requirements are met, and if there can be horizontal
and vertical integration within the management framework for
water resources and services, a more equitable, efficient, and
sustainable regime will emerge.”14
After having observed that “an unambiguous definition of IWRM does not
currently exist,” the GWP presented in 2000 a definition of IWRM in two
parts: 1. “What is IWRM? And 2. How to implement IWRM”?
Furthermore, the GWP (2000) has established a definition according to

which IWRM is “a process that promotes the coordinated development
and management of water, land, and related resources, in order to
maximise the resultant economic and social welfare equitably without
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.”15
A few key elements are derived from these definitions:

• IWRM emphasises coordination among all stakeholders.
• It prioritises economic, social, and environmental well-being.
• It bases judgments on scientific data/tools.
• For its precise implementation, democratic governance is
emphasised.
Thus, it is important to note that IWRM is a process used for evaluation

and program evaluation, not a sheer product. Ideally, IWRM’s principles,
14 Olli Varis, Konrad Enckell, and Marko Keskinen, "Integrated water resources manageme
nt: horizontal and vertical explorations and the ‘water in all policies’ approach," Internati
onal Journal of Water Resources Development 30, no. 3 (2014): 433-444.
15 Peter Rogers and Alan W. Hall, Effective water governance (Sweden: Global Water Partn
ership, 2003).

strategies, and regulations must be tailored to each country, territory, or

river basin.
Principles of IWRM and their applicability to the Indus River

Basin
In future, problems and issues about water and the environment are
anticipated to deepen and expand, and water resources will need to be
managed more comprehensively to avoid regional and international
conflicts. IWRM promotes a comprehensive approach to water
management that incorporates the administration of all sectors that use or
are affected by water. The Dublin principles are the first significant
international endeavor to clarify concisely the central issues and
objectives of water management.16 The principles are based on four major
themes: the environment, economics, social requirements, and the role of
women, with sustainability as the overarching objective.17 These
principles are discussed below in the context of the transboundary Indus
basin.
1) Ecological: Fresh water is a limited and perilous resource

indispensable for sustaining life, development, and the
environment.18
IWRM, which aims to manage water resources sustainably, is based on

the “Dublin Principle 1.” Recognising environmental and social values
while balancing sustainable growth is necessary. New organisations and
regulations are needed to coordinate water use across sectors, with basin-
level organisations empowered to manage water resources within a
16 Solanes, Miguel, and Fernando Gonzalez-Villarreal, "The Dublin Principles: Institutional

and legal arrangements for integrated water resource management," Water and Developm
ent no.1 (2009): 34-52.
17 Georg Meran , Markus Siehlow , Christian von Hirschhausen, The Economics of Water:
Rules and Institutions (Switzerland: Springer, 2021).

18 Smith, Mark, and T. Jønch Clausen, "Integrated water resource management: A new way
forward," World Water Council 152, no. 1–3 (2015): 333-338.

hydrological boundary.19 Integration at multiple levels is required to

ensure that efforts to improve water quality are coordinated locally,
nationally, and internationally. Data collection and distribution must be
rigorous to coordinate water resource management across physical and
socio-economic measures.
IWRM would apply a holistic and integrated approach to managing the

Indus River basin’s water resources. This would require balancing the
water needs of agriculture, industry, and households with those of the
environment and ecosystem. It would also involve promoting efficient and
sustainable use of water resources, reducing water waste and losses, and
improving water storage and distribution systems to increase water
availability and resilience. The Indus River basin stakeholders would also
need to collaborate to create and implement water policies, laws, and
regulations that promote equitable and sustainable water use for future
generations.
2) Decentralisation: Participation from people who plan for, make use

of, and make decisions regarding water resources is required at every
stage of the process of developing and managing water resources.20
This participatory approach aims to educate policymakers and the public

about water issues. IWRM requires decentralisation because effective
organisations and institutions must be near resource management.
Stakeholder and public participation are essential to decentralising water
management reforms.21 The second IWRM strategy involves assigning the
19 Jusi Sari, "Integrated water resources management-a paradigm to sustainable

development in Lao PDR," Progress in Industrial Ecology, an International Journal 7,
no. 4 (2012): 307-321.
20 Smith, Mark, and T. Jønch Clausen, "Integrated water resource management: A new way
forward," World Water Council 152, no. 1–3 (2015): 333-338.

21 Pahl-Wostl, Claudia, "The role of governance modes and meta-governance in the transfor
mation towards sustainable water governance," Environmental Science & Policy 91

(2019): 6-16.

management of water resources to the lowest effective administrative

level, fulfilling the second Dublin principle’s subsidiarity goal.22
This principle is specifically crucial for the Indus River Basin. Taking the
examples from the world, one realises that several nations share the basin,
each with their own priorities. Governments, civil society organisations,
and local communities must work together for basin management to
succeed. Participatory water management in the Indus River Basin can
take several forms. For instance, local communities can be involved in
water management decisions. Similarly, examples may include
consultation, information sharing, and active involvement in water project
planning and implementation. Another option involves agriculture,
industry, and domestic users in water resource management. Water
allocation plans that considers the needs of all sectors and water user
associations to enable stakeholder participation in water resource
management can be created to accomplish this. Participatory management
can also foster cooperation among Indus River Basin nations. This may
include the examples of joint projects, data, and information sharing, and
institutional frameworks for cooperation and coordination.
In conclusion, participatory management is a key component of IWRM

and essential for sustainable water resource management and development
in the Indus River Basin. Water management must include all
stakeholders at all levels due to the basin’s complexity and competing
demands.
3) Participation: Women play an essential part in the provisioning,

management, and protection of water resources.23
22 Global Water Partnership (GWP), Integrated Water Resources Management (Sweden:

Global Water Partnership Secretariat Technical Advisory Committee, 2000).
23 Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, and Margreet Zwarteveen, "Gendered Participation in Water
Management: Issues and Illustrations from Water Users' Associations in South Asia,"
Agriculture and Human Values 15, no. 4 (1998): 337-345.

IWRM also emphasises the significance of incorporating community-

based groups, water user associations, and other stakeholders in the
management process. Sustainable water resource management is IWRM’s
long-term goal. This requires building the capacity of these organisations
and stakeholders and promoting gender consciousness and inclusiveness
to ensure the participation of women and vulnerable groups. Regardless of
the degree of centralisation in water resources management, the
participation of water users and interest groups is essential for fostering an
enabling environment and securing the commitment and success of
IWRM. 24 This principle acknowledges women’s role in water
management as primary caregivers and providers of domestic water,
sanitation, and hygiene. Women can improve water resource management
and sustainability by using their water management knowledge and skills.
Women’s central role in water supply, management, and protection is

relevant in the Indus River Basin also. The Indus River provides water,
means of transportation, food for millions of people in the region, and all
the stakeholders, including women, must participate in its management
and governance. Women collect water from distant sources, manage
household water use, and ensure agriculture and livestock have water in
more or less all Indus River Basin rural areas.
However, women’s participation in water management decision-making is

often limited and undervalued. To address this, efforts are underway to
increase women’s participation in water management and decision-
making in the Indus River Basin. For instance, the International Water
Management Institute (IWMI), Sri Lanka, has partnered with local
organisations to train women in water management, improve their access
to water resources, and increase their participation in community-level
water management committees.
24 Jan Hassing, Niels Ipsen, Torkil Jønch Clausen, et al, Integrated Water Resources
Management in Action (Paris: UNESCO, 2009).

The World Bank-supported Indus Basin Initiative also works to increase

women’s participation in water governance and management, recognising
their importance to sustainable water management in the region.25
4) Sustainability: Water should be acknowledged as both an economic

and a social benefit because it possesses monetary worth across all of
its potential applications.26Rising water supply costs and inefficiencies
in water service delivery have shown the economic value of water in
many countries. Water must be priced at full cost to ensure long-term
sustainability, including withdrawal, delivery, opportunity cost, and
economic and environmental externalities.27 Water should be used by
sectors that value it most, so laws and policies should establish clear
water use rights and create markets for trading them (while protecting
social and environmental concerns). Long-term water management in
the Indus Basin requires recognising water’s economic and social
worth. Recognising water’s economic value in agriculture, industry,
and domestic use is necessary to sustainably and equitably manage
water supplies. In the Indus Basin, water is scarce and used for
numerous reasons. Given water’s importance in various industries,
recognisng it as an economic and social good and encouraging
sustainable water management practices is critical.
Recognising water’s economic value can help solve some of these

problems by encouraging more efficient and sustainable water use.
Farmers may be encouraged to use more efficient irrigation methods that
reduce water waste and boost crop yields by pricing water according to its
economic value. Water-efficient technologies that reduce water use and
save money may also be encouraged for industries.
25 Menezes,Debbie; Hensha,Taylor; Fruman,Cecile, South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) :

Annual Report for July 2019 - June 2020 (English) (Washington, D.C.: World Bank
Group, 2020).
26 Semdoe Mary, "Effects of Human Settlement and Activities on Water Resources in
Morogoro Region: A Case of Mlali Ward in Mvomero District," (PhD diss., Mzumbe
University, 2015).
27 James Winpenny, Managing Water as an Economic Resource (London: Routledge,
2005).

This principle must be balanced with social and environmental

considerations. For example, high water prices may disproportionately
affect low-income households and not be socially equitable.
Environmental factors like river ecosystem health and biodiversity must
also be considered when allocating water resources.
Integrated River Resources Framework in the Indus River

Basin: A Way Forward
Entrenched mindsets, complex issues, political barriers, mistrust, and
negative perceptions can hinder progress in the division of the Indus River
Basin water. Its management must be integrated and sustainable to
address these issues. Indus water management can learn from the
Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) framework, which has been
successful worldwide.28 Successful practices applied by Australia, the
US, and South Africa drawn from the IWRM framework, can be
replicated to the Indus River basin also.29 Land, water, plants, knowledge,
and people must be managed sustainably in a similar manner. Mutual
confidence and trust amongst all the Stakeholders must be built by sharing
a vision of water challenges faced by all the affected countries.
The Indus Basin Treaty fairly recognises the risks and uncertainties of
ensuring a sustained water supply from upstream sources to meet the
needs of the downstream. This includes environmental factors affecting
annual and seasonal water supply. Thus, the future management strategy
must balance land, water, vegetation, and socio-economic factors to
ensure sustainable development. The IWRM framework can help achieve
this balance by addressing climate change adaptation and disaster
reduction, which are increasingly important in the Indus Basin due to
climate and socio-economic changes.
28 Gupta, Ashim Das. "Challenges and opportunities for integrated water resources
management in Mekong river basin," Role of Water Sciences in Transboundary River
Basin Management (2005): 221-230.
29 Bruce Hooper, Integrated River Basin Governance, Learning from International Experien
ce (London: IWA Publishing, 2005).

To manage water in the Indus Basin, a comprehensive, coordinated,

sustainable, and ecologically friendly plan is required. This strategy
should take into account upstream, downstream, and future generations.
IWRM can assist sub-basin and basin managers in achieving these
objectives.30 The Indus River Basin has many sub-basins and
transboundary catchments, so a basin-wide framework for IWRM is
necessary. This framework can be used across national boundaries to
manage water resources efficiently and fairly. Basin-wide data collection
is needed to adopt an IWRM framework. This data can create basin-wide
and sub-basin water resources management and sustainable development
plans. These measures will help the Indus Basin manage water efficiently,
fairly, and with sustenance.
The Global Water Partnership’s IWRM toolbox helps implement the

management of the integrated water resources. IWRM requires
adjustments across many sectors and levels while realising a one-size-fits-
all blueprint is impossible. Thus, the GWP’s toolbox offers a variety of
means and methods for IWRM practitioners to choose and use based on
their needs. The tools fall into three main categories:31 “(a) Legislative
framework, (b) Institutional Roles, and (c) Management Instruments.”
The Policy and Legal Framework for Implementing IWRM in

The Indus Basin
The Legislative framework is the legal infrastructure for managing and
regulating water resources, including the constitution, legislation, laws,
treaties, policies, and regulations for sustainable resources management
30 Karki, Manoj B., Arun B. Shrestha, and Matthias Winiger. "Enhancing Knowledge
Management and Adaptation Capacity for Integrated Management of Water Resources
in the Indus River Basin," Mountain Research and Development 31, no. 3 (2011): 242-
251.
31 Meran, Georg, Michael Siehlow, and Claudia vonHirschhausen, "Integrated Water
Resource Management: Principles and Applications," The Economics of Water (2021):

23-121.

and development.32 Incorporating the IWRM principles of “integration,

decentralisation, participation, and sustainability,” policies should adopt a
comprehensive approach towards water management, recognising its
intrinsic value and accounting for the needs of all potential users, land
uses, and water quality. This involves safeguarding the rights and interests
of all stakeholders while protecting public assets.
A policy and legal framework for implementing IWRM in the Indus River
Basin is required. A comprehensive water law that establishes a legal
framework for water allocation, management, and conservation could be
developed. The law should include dispute resolution and law
enforcement mechanisms. The following are some of the framework’s key
elements:
National Water Policy

Revising a national water policy is the first step in implementing IWRM
in the Indus River Basin. Policies at the national level are critical because
they lay the groundwork for things like lawmaking, long-term strategy,
and day-to-day management. The states that share the Indus basin must
ensure the making and revision of national water policies based on IWRM
principles as a top priority. The development of this policy should involve
input from a wide range of sectors, including agriculture, industry, and
civil society. Given the dynamic nature of a country’s political, economic,
social, environmental, and technological landscapes, the policy must be
flexible and adaptable over the medium term. It requires constant attention
and revision. The policy’s top priorities should be ensuring that water is
used effectively, protecting water quality, and equitably distributing water
among various users.
32 Qadir, Shireen Ali. "Integrated Water Resources Management: Case Study of Iraq,"
(PhD diss., Faculty of Political Science, Public Administration and Diplomacy, Notre
Dame University, Louaize, 2010).

Regional Water Laws

The existing water laws in the Indus River Basin Treaty need to be
updated to align with the principles of IWRM. The laws should address
water allocation, quality, and conservation issues. In order to encourage
the participation of stakeholders in the administration of water resources,
the laws should also allow the formation of water user associations.
Changes in environmental and demographic conditions on both sides of
the border necessitate revising the Indus Water Treaty’s dispute resolution
mechanism to align it with modern international law governing
watercourses. Surface and subsurface water resources are included in the
scope of international watercourse law, which regulates their use and
protection wherever they flow across international borders. Water issues
should be decoupled from other unresolved matters between the two
countries, and prioritising the resolution of water disputes should be a key
component of future confidence-building measures.
Water Allocation and Management

Water allocation and management are critical components of IWRM, and
a policy and legal framework should define the principles and rules for
water allocation and management based on equity, efficiency, and
sustainability. This could involve the development of a water allocation
plan that considers the needs of different users, such as agriculture,
industry, and households, and ensures that water is used in an
environmentally sustainable way. The plan should also establish
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing water allocation rules.
Environmental Protection
Environmental protection is a key component of IWRM, and a policy and
legal framework should include provisions for protecting and conserving
the environment and biodiversity in the Indus River Basin. This could
involve establishing protected areas, such as wetlands, forests, and
riverine ecosystems, and developing strategies to manage water-related
environmental risks, such as floods and droughts. The policy should also

establish mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing environmental

protection rules.
Water Infrastructure
Water infrastructure, such as dams, canals, and irrigation systems, is
critical for the efficient use and management of water resources, and a
policy and legal framework should support the development of water
infrastructure that is efficient, safe, and sustainable. This could involve
establishing standards and guidelines for the design, construction,
operation, and maintenance of water infrastructure, as well as measures to
ensure that the benefits of water infrastructure are equitably distributed
among stakeholders.
Monitoring and Evaluation

A policy and legal framework should monitor and evaluate IWRM
implementation in the Indus River Basin. A monitoring and evaluation
system could track IWRM goals and targets and evaluate policies, laws,
and programs. The upper basin needs long-term monitoring and database
development and sharing. This program would give water managers and
policymakers the possible trends and scenarios of the basin and sub-basin.
This initiative would strengthen national and regional research capacities,
creating an integrated river basin-wide database and information system
(IRBIS). This database addresses key Indus Basin issues. Data also helps
water resource planners and managers plan and design water
infrastructure and implement development programs and projects to meet
future supply demands. Laws should regulate water quality and pollution.
Pollutant limits and water quality should be regulated. The law should
also monitor water quality and enforce regulations.
Institutional Framework
Institutional roles encompass a variety of elements, such as official
policies and procedures, traditional customs and habits, knowledge and
information, and networks of stakeholders and communities. These factors
together form the institutional framework or context within which

decision-makers make their choices. An institutional framework is

essential to coordinate stakeholders’ efforts and facilitate collaboration
and cooperation. This could involve establishing a River Basin
Organisation (RBO) that brings together representatives of different
stakeholders to coordinate the planning and management of water
resources in the basin. The RBO should have the authority to make water
allocation and management decisions and should be supported by
technical and administrative staff.
River Basin Organisation

A RBO can be established to manage the Indus River Basin’s water
resources. It can be a platform for cooperation among the riparian
countries and can facilitate dialogue, negotiation, and coordination to
manage the basin’s water resources. Various insights can be gleaned from
the experiences of the Mekong and Orange-Senqu River Basins that apply
to the Indus River Basin. Cooperation among “Cambodia, Laos, Thailand,
Vietnam, China, and Myanmar,” the six countries sharing the Mekong
River, is crucial in successfully implementing IWRM in the region.33 The
Mekong River Commission (MRC), established by these nations, is
responsible for coordinating the management and development of water
resources in the Mekong River Basin. Similarly, the 2000-founded
ORASECOM manages the Orange-Senqu River Basin’s water resources
in “Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa.”34 ORASECOM
promotes sustainable basin water management and equitable water
resource usage. Stakeholder participation, a basin-wide water
management vision, and integrated water resources management have
been achieved by ORASECOM.
Global experience in river basin management has demonstrated the

importance of establishing a long-term vision for the entire river basin,
33 Ha Mai-Lan, "The role of regional institutions in sustainable development: a review of

the Mekong River Commission's first 15 years," Consilience 5 (2011): 125-140.
34 Mirumachi Naho and E. Van Wyk, "Cooperation at different scales: challenges for local a
nd international water resource governance in South Africa," Geographical Journal 176,

no. 1 (2010): 25-38.

supported by major stakeholders and accompanied by an appropriate

water management strategy at the river basin level.35
The Indus consultation should also strive to unite all stakeholders in

developing a shared vision and strategy. Both India and Pakistan should
use the platform of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) to address water management and agricultural growth issues.
By focusing on increased interaction and collaboration among member
countries, they can explore solutions for water management through joint
hydropower projects and energy exchanges between the two nations.36
Stakeholder Participation
The involvement of diverse stakeholders, including scientists, researchers,
managers, and policymakers, is crucial for conducting action research on
long-term impacts and vulnerability analysis in the Indus Basin region.
These stakeholders are needed to design and implement effective
adaptation strategies by producing and sharing data and information on
various aspects of climate and environmental changes, particularly in river
runoff, hydrology, and the water cycle.37 The strategy ought to be nested,
with research conducted at various scales and with a focus on various
themes.
Data and Information Management

Researchers, scientists, and water managers in the Indus River Basin need
updated spatial and non-spatial data. Regional studies and scenario
projections must be more detailed for effective Indus water resource
35 Tim Jones, "Elements of good practice in integrated river basin management. A

Practical Resource for implementing the EU Water Framework Directive," Paper
presented at Water Seminar Series, World Wide Fund for Nature, Brussels, Belgium,
2001.
36 Bruce Hooper, "Covenant action to facilitate integrated river basin management," Water
SA 34, no. 1 (2008): 456-460.

37 Madhav Bahadur Karki, Arun Bhakta Shrestha, Matthias Winiger, "Enhancing
knowledge management and adaptation capacity for integrated management of water

resources in the Indus River Basin." Mountain Research and Development 31, no. 3
(2011): 242-251.

management. Water resource research must be interdisciplinary. Resource

managers must manage “too much” and “not enough” water scenarios
using integrated and transboundary approaches.38 There also needs to be a
continuous focus on fostering long-term communication between
management and academics.39 Understanding how natural, social, and
economic factors affect the Indus Basin’s ecosystems and water supplies
requires a solid scientific foundation. The local community and water
managers must cooperate in implementing the program.
A formalised system for sharing the hydrology of ongoing and future river
projects is needed to ensure fair water distribution. A satellite-based data
collection system is recommended to eliminate data transfer scepticism
and for implementing a satellite-based data collection system. The cost of
such a system should be borne by both countries.
Financing Mechanisms
Water is an essential resource and an economic asset in every country.
Financial principles can improve water resource distribution and water
facility growth. Regardless of income, everyone should access a minimum
amount of safe water. Economic instruments should be designed to
promote water distribution efficiency and equity using value and price
principles. This approach can improve water resource management’s
allocative and technical efficiency, supporting the Indus Basin’s social
and economic development.40 An agriculture tax that addresses
constitutional and legal flaws preventing large farmers from being taxed
could be a solution. This tax can improve government irrigation
infrastructure and services, benefiting the region.
38 Daniel P Loucks and Eelco Van Beek, Water resource systems planning and
management: An introduction to methods, models, and applications (New York:
Springer, 2017).
39 Daniel Viviroli, David R. Archer, Wouter Buytaert, et al, "Climate change and mountain
water resources: overview and recommendations for research, management and

policy," Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 15, no. 2 (2011): 471-504.
40 Government of Pakistan, " Chapter 20, Water, " Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-2011,
228-49, Retrieved from https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/plans/Ch20-Water1.pdf.

Political Will
Both/all sides must show the political will to jointly manage the Indus
Basin without politicising the issue. A joint group must harmonise tools,
models, and scenarios, exchange information, involve stakeholders, and
work with international organisations to conduct a basin-wide
vulnerability assessment.41 Historic grievances and other issues such as
Kashmir should not be discussed during the Indus Waters Treaty
talks/parleys. Instead of fighting over water, both sides should use it to
develop cooperation. Pakistan and Afghanistan should cooperate in
developing Kabul River water resources and protecting Pakistan’s historic
water rights, emphasising the need for dialogue.
The upper riparian holds regional hegemony and all the cards. The
Institute of Defense Studies in India calls India the “epicenter of riparian
politics,” emphasising the need for change in India. Thus, brave and open-
minded Indians must explain to the public why this is a crucial issue for
Pakistan.
Management Strategies
Water management policies are implemented through various tools and
techniques, such as water structures, technologies, and other instruments.
These instruments are designed to tackle specific management issues and
provide decision-makers with options. Essentially, management
instruments make informed and logical decisions by offering alternative
courses of action.42
Water Allocation
The management framework should establish a transparent and
participatory process for water allocation based on principles of equity,
41 Sarfraz Hamid, "Revisiting the 1960 Indus waters treaty," Water International 38, no. 2
(2013): 204-216.
42 Masud Alam and Philippe Quevauviller. "An evaluation of Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM) activities in Bangladesh," Asia Pacific Journal of Energy and

Environment 1, no. 1 (2014): 22-38.

efficiency, and sustainability. This includes defining water rights and

entitlements and developing water allocation plans that consider the needs
of different sectors and the impacts of climate change and other
environmental factors.
Water Use Efficiency

Enhancing the efficiency of water usage constitutes an essential aspect of
IWRM within the Indus River Basin. This includes promoting efficient
irrigation practices, such as drip and sprinkler systems, and reducing water
losses due to leakage and evaporation. It also involves encouraging water-
saving technologies and practices in other sectors, such as industry and
domestic water use.
Water Quality Management

The management framework should address water quality issues in the
Indus River Basin, including controlling water pollution from point and
non-point sources. This includes developing water quality standards and
monitoring programs and implementing appropriate treatment and
disposal measures for wastewater and industrial effluents.
Environmental Sustainability
The management framework should protect and improve the Indus River
Basin ecology and help to promote biodiversity and ecosystem
conservation while ensuring environmentally sustainable water resource
development projects.
First, IWRM optimises basin water resource allocation. The Indus River
Basin’s ecological balance depends on agriculture, and efficient water
management can help maintain the river’s environmental flow. IWRM
principles can sustainably allocate water to different sectors while
considering environmental and human needs.

Second, IWRM can promote basin renewable energy use. IWRM can help
small hydropower projects in the Indus River Basin. These projects can
reduce fossil fuel use and promote regional sustainability.
Thirdly, IWRM helps manage basin wastewater. Untreated wastewater is

a major environmental issue in the Indus River Basin. IWRM principles
can treat and reuse wastewater for agriculture or other purposes, reducing
river and groundwater stress.
Finally, IWRM can conserve and restore basin ecosystems. IWRM can
protect biodiversity in the Indus River Basin by ensuring water flow and
quality. It can also help restore degraded ecosystems, which is essential
for basin ecology.
Climate-informed Water Management

IWRM can help the Indus River Basin deal with climate change by
encouraging a more holistic and integrated water resource management
approach. This approach considers the interactions of agriculture,
industry, and households with the environment. IWRM can balance water
demands by bringing stakeholders together and encouraging cooperation
and collaboration.
IWRM can help water resources adapt to climate change. Improved

irrigation practices, better water storage and management, and early flood
and drought warning systems can achieve this. IWRM can help mitigate
climate change’s effects on ecosystems and biodiversity by protecting and
restoring wetlands and other vital habitats.
Finally, IWRM can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate
change by adopting sustainable and low-carbon water management
practices. Promoting renewable energy in water pumping and treatment
and reducing water losses through leak detection and repair can reduce the
Indus River Basin’s water management carbon footprint.

Conclusion
Adopting Integrated Water Resources Management presents a feasible
approach to achieving sustainable water management in the Indus River
Basin. IWRM is pivotal to attaining Sustainable Development Goals and
ensuring the ecological, decentralised, participatory, and sustainable
management of water resources in the Indus River Basin. Implementing
IWRM in the Indus River Basin will bring numerous benefits, such as
improved water availability, enhanced water quality, and increased social
and economic development. However, several challenges, including
limited financial resources, conflicting interests of stakeholders, and
inadequate legal frameworks, may deter the successful application of
IWRM in the region.
To overcome these challenges, an integrated river resources framework in

the Indus River Basin, coupled with a robust policy and legal framework
and institutional capacity building, will be essential. Furthermore,
cooperation and collaboration among all stakeholders, including China
and Afghanistan, will be crucial for implementing IWRM in the Indus
River Basin. Despite all these issues and challenges, one may surmise the
IWRM as a decisive tool for sustainable water management in the Indus
River Basin, and its successful implementation will require collaborative
efforts and a comprehensive approach from all the stakeholders.◼

Comparative Analysis of Food Security in Pakistan and Iran…
Comparative Analysis of Food Security in

Pakistan and Iran: Prospects for Improving
Bilateral Trade and Cooperation
Dr Asia Mukhtar * & Dua Hamid **
Abstract
As one of the central concerns of human beings for ensuring their survival,
food security is a multi-faceted concept that includes regular and safe
access to enough and nutritious food for an active and healthy lifestyle.
Adopting a qualitative methodology, this study has focused on tracing the
conditions and causes of food insecurity in Pakistan and Iran. In the case
of Iran, the major constraints arise from its arid and semi-arid climate
which curbs agricultural production, while the situation is aggravated due
to the sanctions which not only put an end to the available subsidies but
also reduce the purchasing power of the population. In Pakistan, the
constraints mostly arise due to mismanagement and flawed policy-making
in the agricultural sector. The lack of land reforms, ineffective water
consumption methods, governmental neglect in the provision of subsidised
agricultural input, and negligence in dealing with smuggling has
exacerbated the food insecurity in the state. While addressing these issues
can dramatically increase the food production of Pakistan, the same can
be used to boost trade with Iran. As the economic sanctions on Iran have
been the major impediment in the smooth trade relations between Iran and
Pakistan, the alternative option is to use barter trade in goods and to
engage private sector organisations. The last section of the paper provides
policy recommendations for improving trade and cooperation between
Iran and Pakistan that can not only enhance the food security in Iran but
also the energy security in Pakistan. The recommendations include
* Dr Asia Mukhtar is Assistant Professor, Kinnaird College for Women University

Lahore.
** Dua Hamid is Lecturer, Lahore College for Women University, Lahore.
__________________

Dr Asia Mukhtar & Dua Hamid
coordinating efforts in the research and development sector, improving

border controls for preventing smuggling, and regularizing and
channelizing trade, while also improving Pakistan’s capacity for
increasing agricultural production.
Keywords: Food Security, Bilateral Relations, Trade, Pakistan-Iran Relations

Introduction
nsuring the availability of food has been the most central concern
E of human beings since the day human life existed on the face of the
earth. Without food security, the survival and existence of the
human race is unimaginable. As a concept, food security has evolved to
reach its present multi-faceted form which includes the availability of
sufficient food supplies on one hand while the adequate nutritious value
on the other hand. Documented by the World Food Summit (1996), ‘Food
security refers to a situation in which all common masses possess
economic and social access at all times to safe, sufficient, and nutritious
food which not only meets food preferences but also the dietary needs for
a healthy and active lifestyle.’1 In contrast, as defined by the Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the UNO, ‘food insecurity is a
situation in which people lack regular access to enough safe and nutritious
food for normal growth and development and an active and healthy
lifestyle.’1 The neighboring states of Iran and Pakistan, both have been
facing food insecurity. While Pakistan’s Global Hunger Index (GHI) score
is 24.7, it is categorized as ‘serious levels of hunger.’2 Iran, with an index
of 7.7 has a comparatively low level of food insecurity, however, its
condition has been worsened with the recent droughts in 2021.3 In both
states, natural environmental conditions, political issues, policy failures,
and economic constraints including high levels of inflation and low levels
of technological innovation have been responsible for food insecurity.
Historically, the bilateral trade and cooperation between both states has
remained unsteady due to the economic sanctions repeatedly imposed on
Iran. Other political issues such as Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan
jihad, as well as the cross-border smuggling, there have been some issues
that have been the cause of frost in the relations. However, by increasing
1 “Policy Brief- Food Security,” Food and Agriculture Organization, accessed November 1
5,2021,.https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faoitaly/documents/pdf/pdf_Food_Secu
rity_Cocept_Note.pdf.
2 “Global Hunger Index,‘Pakistan,” GHI, Accessed July 20, 2022,
https://www.globalhunger index .org/pakistan.html.

3 Global Hunger Index. ‘Iran,’ GHI, accessed July 20, 2022, https://www.globalhungerind
ex.org/iran.html.

bilateral trade and cooperation, both states can not only improve their food
security, but can also enhance their coordination for better bilateral and
regional relations. The first two sections of the article highlight the
situation and factors responsible for food insecurity in Iran and Pakistan.
The second section sheds light upon the prospects of improving trade
relations and cooperation in the agricultural sector which can improve the
food security of both states. The last section provides policy
recommendations for both Iran and Pakistan to enhance cooperation in the
food and agriculture sector.
Occupying a prominent position in the global food market by being an

important exporter of agricultural products, Pakistan still struggles with
food insecurity. Despite possessing one of the world’s largest irrigation
systems,4 being amongst the top ten producers of cotton,5 wheat,6 mango,7
sugarcane, oranges and dates; and occupying the top 10th position of rice
producers in the world,8 Pakistan still faces food insecurity. The food
insecurity that Pakistan inherited at the time of its inception persists at
exacerbated levels as the International Food Security Assessment (2021-
2031) by the US Department of Agriculture reported that 38 per cent of
population in Pakistan is food insecure, making it 90.7 million people
facing the crisis.9 According to the World Food Program Report of
Pakistan, in 2020-2021, 20.5 per cent of the population in Pakistan was
undernourished and 44 per cent of the children under the age of 5
4 Muhammad Basharat, "Water Management in the Indus Basin in Pakistan: Challenges

and Opportunities," In Indus River Basin: Water Security and Sustainability, ed. Thomas
Adams and Sadiq Khan (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2019), 375-388.
5 Elke Hortmeyer, "Top 10 Cotton Producing Countries in the World," Discover Natural Fi
bres Initiative, accessed July 01, 2022, https://dnfi.org/cotton/top-10-cotton-producin g-

countries-in-the-world_4785/.
6 "Wheat Production by Country 2021," World Population Review, January 10, 2022,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/wheat-production-by-country.
7 "Top 15 Biggest Mango Producers." Ranking Royals, accessed January 10, 2022,
https:// rankingroyals.com/top-15-biggest-mango-producers/.
8 “Pakistan Ranking in the World,” Ayub Agriculture Research Institute, accessed
December 15, 2021, https://aari.punjab.gov.pk/pak_ranking.

9 Farrukh Saleem,"Food Insecurity," The News International, August 15, 2021,
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/878304-food-insecurity.

continued surviving with stunted growth.10 Additionally, in the statistics

of Food Security Index, the position of Pakistan is yet again not laudable.
In 2020, Pakistan was ranked on 80th position out of 113 countries in the
Global Food Security Index.11
The official statistics of the Pakistani government regarding agricultural

production and food availability in Pakistan portray a partially promising
picture. The table below depicts the food availability in Pakistan from the
year 2019-2022.
Source: Ministry-of-Finance. 2022. ‘Health and Nutrition’, Pakistan Economic Survey

2021-2022. Islamabad: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
Presenting these statistics, the government of Pakistan has claimed that

Pakistan produces enough food for domestic consumption. While an
average person requires between 1800 to 2500 calories per day, the data
reveals that the calories available per person per day were sufficient in
2019 and have been in surplus since 2020.
10
"Country Brief- Pakistan," World Food Program, accessed October 2022, https://docs.
wfp.org/api/documents/WFP0000133985/download/?ga=2.203646997.402553185.1638
789858-123792941.1638008043.
11 "Food-insecure nation," Dawn, accessed July 31, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/
1633265/food-insecure-nation.

Similarly, the agricultural statistics are presented with the claim that the
agricultural growth of 4.40 per cent against the target of 3.5 per cent has
been highly encouraging.12 As the graph below depicts, keeping aside a
slight decline in the productivity of categories, ‘fishing’ and ‘other crops,’
almost all sectors of agricultural production have shown commendable
growth.
Source: Ministry of Finance. 2022. ‘Agriculture’, Pakistan Economic Survey2021-2022.

Islamabad: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
Despite the governmental claims of Pakistan being self-sufficient in food

production and having promising agricultural growth, Pakistan scored
24.7 on the Global Hunger Index in 2021, and acquired 92nd position out
of 116 countries.13 The Hunger Index score for Pakistan is categorised as
‘serious.’ This situation brings forth the question of the causes of food
insecurity in Pakistan -- a state that has the capacity of exporting
agricultural products.
According to the World Food Program (WFP), unaffordability is the

greatest barrier to a healthy and nutritious sufficient diet. In Pakistan, the
economic instability, flawed agricultural policies, sky-rocketing poverty,
unemployment, and inflation all contribute in aggravating the food crisis
12 Shahzad Paracha, “Agriculture sector surpasses growth targets in FY 2022,” Pakistan

Today, June 9, 2022, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2022/06/09/agriculture-sector-
surpasses-growth-targets-in-fy2022 sector%20has,surpassed%20the%20 target%20 of%
203.5%25.
13 “Global Hunger Index 2021: Iran,” GHI, accessed January 5, 2022, https://www.global
hungerindex. org/ pdf/ en/ 2021s/Iran.pdf.

in the country. While unemployment remains a global developmental

issue; in Pakistan it has continuously been following an upwards trend for
the past few years. According to the statistics published by Pakistan
Bureau of Statistics (PBS), the unemployment rate jumped from 5.8% in
FY 2017-2018 to 6.9% in FY 2018-2019.14 The Covid-19 pandemic
worsened the situation and according to the statistics of Pakistan Institute
of Developmental Economics (PIDE), the actual rate of unemployment
currently in Pakistan is around 16 per cent.15 Such massive two-digit rates
of unemployment have an immediate impact on undermining the food
security of families with unemployed people.
Owing to the economic crisis, out of which Pakistan hardly ever moved
out, the amount of loans is always mounting with the servicing and
structural adjustments tightening continuously. Around 30% of Pakistan’s
federal budget is spent on servicing the debt. While efforts have been
made to negotiate the IMF Conditionality, the negotiations with the loans
taken in 2021 failed to bring about any relaxation in the austerity
measures and budget cuts in governmental spending. The IMF
Conditionality combined with the impacts of Covid-19 had accelerated the
inflation rate of Pakistan up to 24.9 per cent by the mid of 2022.16
Resultantly, the agriculture and the food sector has remained amongst the
worst hit ones with food inflation being recorded at a high of 19.5 per cent
in 2022.17 The top five commonly used food commodities showing a
sharp incline in prices include: eggs (32.88 per cent), mustard oil (32.34
per cent), vegetable ghee (23.75 per cent), condiments and spices (23.27
per cent), cooking oil (21.93 per cent), sugar (21.54 per cent), tomatoes
14 Nasir Jamal, "Joblessness jumped in 2018-19: labour survey", Dawn, September 17,
2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1646761.
15 Nadir Gurmani, "24pc educated people are jobless countrywide, Senate body told,"
DAWN, September 27, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1648765.

16 Shahbaz Rana, “Inflation rate highest since Great Recession,” The Express Tribune,
August 2, 2022, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2369084/inflation-rate-highest-since-great-

recession.
17 Mohiuddin Azam, “Furious Food Inflation,” DAWN, February 14, 2022,
https://www.daw n.com/news/1674954.

(19.67 per cent), wheat (18.99 per cent), meat (16.66 per cent) and milk
(14.19 per cent).18
Amongst natural conditions that affect the food security of Pakistan

include the state’s vulnerability to natural disasters such as drought,
famine, floods and earthquakes. According to German Watch, in global
ranking, Pakistan is listed in the top ten countries threatened by climate
change.19 As the number of floods in two decades, from 1993-2013
increased up to 54, the country has also faced worst droughts in Sindh
since 2014, thus negatively affecting the food security of the state.20 More
recently, the floods of 2022 have wreaked a havoc on the state of
Pakistan, with over 1100 people losing their lives, half a million being
displaced from their homes and the agricultural production, including
many crops such as rice, cotton, onions and tomatoes being completely
wiped out. This has dramatically threatened the food security of the state
by making the food unavailable in the first place, and also by drastically
increasing the food inflation to over 25 per cent by July 2022.21
In addition to droughts and floods, one of the most serious environmental

threats to the agricultural production and food security of Pakistan is
water scarcity. Pakistan faces acute water scarcity, despite the fact that it
is located in Indus Water Basin and possesses numerous glaciers. The
water scarcity in Pakistan not only jeopardizes the present food and
agricultural production but is also a threat for future generations as
multiple reports have assessed that Pakistan could ‘run dry’ by 2025, and
18 Munawar Hasan, "Despite claims, Pakistan poised to be most food-insecure in region,"

The News, August 1, 2021, accessed December 01, 2021 https://www.thenews.com.
pk/print/871469- despite-claims-pakistan-poised-to-be-most-food-insecure-in-region.
19 “Pakistan Economic Survey 2020-2021,” Ministry-of-Finance, accessed January 27,
2022, https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_21/Overview.pdf.
20 Phoebe Sleet, “Food Security in Pakistan: Surplus Food is not Enough to Create a Food
Secure Country,” Nedlands: Future Directions International (2019).

21 Faseeh Mangi and Ismail Dilawar, “Pakistan's Food Security Threatened by Massive
Floo ding”, TIME, August 31, 2022, https://time.com/6209889/pakistan-food-floods/.

become the ‘most-water-stressed’ country in the world by 2040.22 23 In

Pakistan, a major cause of water scarcity has the poor water management
policy which includes lack of reservoirs and dams. With over 5000
glaciers in the northern areas of the country, glacial runoff and snowmelt
add up to 35per cent to 40 per cent respectively in Pakistan’s hydrological
cycle. However, as Pakistan’s water storage spaces have a storage
capacity limited to 30 days only, the country faces drastic droughts and
devastating floods in the dry and wet seasons respectively. With the two
largest dams in Pakistan, Tarbela, and Mangla, hitting their dead levels
each year since 2018, the surface water availability for agricultural
production has been seriously constrained. As the figure below elucidates,
the water availability for the Rabi and Khairf crops remains insufficient
over the years. Thus, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture has claimed
that water scarcity is one of the major challenges to agricultural
production.
Source: Ministry-of-Finance. 2021. Pakistan Economic Survey 2020-2021. Islamabad:

Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.
The table above has provided an analysis of the required water for the
Kharif and Rabi crops, compared with the actual availability of surface
water. The record of the past decade elucidates that water has never been
22 Usmaan Farooqui, "The Cost of Pakistan’s Dam Obsession," The Diplomat, March 4,
2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-cost-of-pakistans-dam-obsession/.
23 Phoebe Sleet, “Food Security in Pakistan: Surplus Food is not Enough to Create a Food
Secure Country,” Nedlands: Future Directions International (2019).

sufficiently available for the crops. The minimum water deficit of -1.1 per
cent was recorded in 2014-2015, while the maximum had been recorded
in 2018-19 with a deficit of -18.5 per cent. As an agricultural country,
with a majority of the population relying on agriculture for the provision
of livelihood and food, water scarcity has drastic consequences for the
food security of Pakistan.
In case of Pakistan, the construction of dams has remained a controversial

issue. While the hype surrounding Kalabagh dam subsided over the years
after becoming a victim of political controversy, the construction of
Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand Dams have been in limelight since the
former Chief Justice Saqib Nisar and Prime Minster of Pakistan Imran
Khan began the campaign of crowd funding for the dam. The extent to
which the dams can resolve the issue of water scarcity remains debatable.
While there is no doubt that the construction of these dams will increase
the water storage capacity of Pakistan from 30 days to 48 days, Professor
Danish Mustafa from Kings College London asserts that surface storage is
highly inefficient as they only increase seasonal storage.24 Additionally,
the cost of building these dams is another controversial issue with years of
crowd funding bringing about no laudable results due to the high cost of
building a dam. While the cost of building the dam is a major obstacle, the
fact that it can improve at least the seasonal storage of water is critically
important for Pakistan to improve the availability of water and have
improved flood mitigation.
Pakistan’s current rate of water consumption is ranked 4th highest in the

world, with 93 per cent of the water being consumed by the extremely
water-intensive agricultural sector that still relies on outdated irrigation
systems. Furthermore, the over-reliance on groundwater resources after
the depletion of surface water resources has resulted in the dramatic
decline in the groundwater tables in the Indus River Basin. While the
24 Ibrahim Usmani, "What value does Diamer Bhasha Dam provide to Pakistan?," The
News International, September 28, 2020, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/721481-
what-value-does-diamer-bhasha-dam-provide-to-pakistan.

Indus River Basin has become one of the most stressed underground
aquifers, the number of tube wells being drilled in Pakistan is ever-
increasing with over 1.3 million wells recorded in 2017. This groundwater
reserve is accounting for up to 80 per cent of crop production in
Pakistan.25 Thus, agriculture in Pakistan is not only the victim of water
scarcity, rather it has also been the cause of water scarcity in the country
which has created a vicious cycle of water scarcity and food insecurity.
Agriculture is one of the most important sectors in the economy of

Pakistan, contributing about 19.5 per cent to the GDP, providing
employment to over 38.5 per cent population, and having over 70% of the
population depending on it for its livelihood.26 Yet, agriculture has been
largely neglected in improved policy-making that has adversely affected
not only production levels but also food availability in the country.
The flawed policy making has affected the food security and the
agricultural sector in multiple dimensions. The former government of
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) (2018- 2022) started with the Ehsaas
Program. Under the program, the government’s focus was to transfer cash
(an amount of Rs12000 per family) to the targeted families in order to
improve the food security conditions. This approach attracted much
criticism for being unsustainable in nature. Former Finance Minister,
Hafeez Pasha took a swipe on the government’s agricultural neglect and
asserted that the reason of food inflation and insecurity was the high cost
of agriculture in the past few years. With the electricity and gas prices
hiking, the devaluation of rupee and the costs of fertilisers and seeds
25
Usman Farooqui, "The Cost of Pakistan’s Dam Obsession," The Diplomat, March 4,
2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-cost-of-pakistans-dam-obsession/.
26
“Pakistan Economic Survey 2020-2021,” Ministry-of-Finance, accessed January 27,
2022. https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_21/Overview.pdf.

increasing dramatically, the food security and self-sufficiency becomes a

challenging goal.27
The PTI government also came up with schemes to provide subsidised

agricultural products, but these too have challenges associated. Of late, the
PTI government in Punjab issued the Punjab Kissan Card scheme to help
small farm holders’ gain easy and direct access to government subsidies
for fertilisers, seeds, and pesticides, and small loans on easy conditions in
the long run. Similar ambitious schemes for agricultural financing have
been rolled out by predecessor governments. As accounted by the State
Bank of Pakistan, between 90-94 per cent of the loans are utilized in
agricultural production, such as buying seeds and fertilizers; while only a
miniscule amount of 6-10 percent is invested in the agricultural research
and development sector. Resultantly, while machinery is bought and
tunnel farms are constructed, there persists a lack of research focus on
strategies and methods that can improve the crop yield while minimising
the waste.28 Almost none of the governments has paid due attention to
tackling long-term issues such as loss of soil fertility, low levels of
technological advancement, poor quality seeds, and waste of water
resources.29
Another way in which policy neglect affects food security in Pakistan is in

the form of smuggling. According to Nizamanni, the policymakers of
Pakistan have no idea about the time when food prices are higher in the
international market as compared to the local support price. Due to this
major neglect, the food finds its way to the food-scarce neighboring states
of Pakistan such as Afghanistan and Iran, thus benefitting a few
agricultural investors at the expense of the wider population of the
27Qamar-uz-Zaman, "Low earnings and agricultural neglect push Pakistan into food
insecurity," The Third Pole, December 11,2020, https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/
food/low-earnings-and-agricultural-neglect-push- pakistan-into-food-insecurity/.
28 Mohiuddin Aazim, "Need to overhaul agricultural finance regime," Dawn, March 8,
2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1611249.
29 "Neglect of farm sector," DAWN, August 17, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/
1641140/neglect-of-farm-sector.

country. As a result of smuggling, food scarcity is created in Pakistan. To

meet the demands of the domestic market, Pakistan has to import wheat
on higher prices- a commodity which has the tendency to be produced in
surplus. Most recently, the government has allowed the private sector to
import wheat since 2020, by relaxing the import tariffs in order to meet
the local food demand.30 As a result of such flawed policies, Pakistan has
become a net importer of food which has caused a loss of billions of
rupees to Pakistani farmers. A recent example of this has been the
imported wheat price of Rs2500 per 40 kg against the federal
government’s support price of Rs1800 per 40 kg- causing a loss of over
Rs400 billion to Pakistani farmers.31
Summing up the food security condition of Pakistan, it can be easily

concluded that despite massive potential, the country is facing a ‘serious’
level of food insecurity. Being an agricultural state with fertile soil and
ample water resources, the food and agriculture crisis mainly owes to
flawed policymaking. The economic downturn and uncontrolled inflation
on the one hand makes food inaccessible for the poor and unemployed;
and on the other hand, increase the prices of seeds and fertilizers to the
point that the agricultural input becomes unaffordable. In natural
conditions, while Pakistan is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate
change, water scarcity is one of the most serious threats to agricultural
production and food security. Here again, policy neglect appears to be the
main culprit for the crisis. With multiple glaciers and the Indus River
System flowing, water scarcity should not have been an issue. However,
the inefficient agricultural methods that lead to over-consumption and
abstraction as well as the alarmingly low storage capacity of only 30 days
in dams are the policy failures that have resulted in water scarcity being a
threat to food security. Lastly, agricultural neglect yet again comes forth
as responsible for food insecurity in Pakistan. The lack of coordination
with international market prices and the unsatisfactory condition of law
30 Mehtab Haider, "Wheat Fiasco," The News International, October 2021, https://www.
thenews.com.pk/magazine/money-matters/724557-wheat-fiasco.
31 Aijaz Nizamanni, "Wheat import and food security," Dawn, October 22, 2021, https://
www.dawn.com/news/1653353.

and order has encouraged cross-border smuggling which has created a

scarcity of basic food items such as wheat and sugar. Additionally, while
subsequent governments have brought forth ambitious programs to
reinvigorate the agricultural sector, the overall focus has been on short-
term goals such as providing subsidised seeds and fertilisers, and loans on
easy conditions. There has been negligence in technological advancement,
mechanisation, and research and development in the agricultural sector
which has hampered the food security in the state.
Food Security in Iran

Historically, owing to its arid and semi-arid natural climate, achieving and
maintaining food security in Iran has been a challenge. Droughts and
famines had threatened the food insecurity of Iran during the Anglo-
Soviet years and had exacerbated to unprecedented levels in the Shah’s
regime. With the 1979 revolution, ensuring self-sufficiency in food
became one of the imperative objectives of the regime as it got enlisted in
the constitution. Expecting the repercussions of economic sanctions that
were imposed on Iran almost immediately after the Revolution, the new
regime adopted a number of policies focusing on the agenda of food self-
sufficiency such as subsidies to the farmers and increased tariffs on the
imported food products.32 The policies adopted by the revolutionary
regimes brought about positive improvement in the food security
indicators in Iran. For instance, the Global Hunger Index (GHI) indicated
that the number of people suffering from hunger in Iran declined from 8.5
in 1990s to below 5 in 2014. Furthermore, there has been a decrease in the
number of underweight children from 16 per cent in 1988 to less than 4.1
per cent in 2012. By 2012, quite impressively, Iran became the 12th
largest wheat producer in the world, which dramatically reduced the
amount of its wheat imports. The efforts to move towards self-sufficiency
also brought about some positive results as in 1979, Iran was importing 65
per cent of the food it consumed annually, whereas in 2014, it started to
32 David Michel, "Iran’s troubled quest for food self-sufficiency," Atlantic Council, July 9,
2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-s-troubled-quest-for-food-
self-sufficiency/.

produce 66 per cent of its local food consumption demand.33 However,

while Iran combatted its natural environmental conditions to an extent to
improve its food security conditions, the economic sanctions reversed
some achievements in food security. In the year 2019, over 42.5 per cent
of the Iranian population was facing moderate to severe food insecurity.34
As of 2021, Iran has been ranked in 35th position in the Global Hunger
Index out of 116 countries. Iran’s GHI, which had dropped to less than 5
has inclined to 7.7 in the year 2021, and the percentage of the
undernourished population has inclined from less than 4.1 per cent to over
5.5 per cent in 2021.35
Iran’s natural environmental conditions and constraints continue to

threaten agrarian production and associated food security in Iran. With
Iran being an arid and semi-arid climatic state, droughts remain a
permanent climatic constraint to its food production. Due to the aridity,
agriculture remains the most water-intensive sector, making up to 90 per
cent of the water consumption in Iran. The figure below depicts the water
consumption in the agricultural sector in comparison with industry and
portable usage. The government’s policies to regulate water consumption
and limit over-consumption by prohibiting the drilling of unlicensed wells
in water-scarce areas have largely failed as reported in the study
conducted by Nabavi (2018). Furthermore, the pro-agricultural policies
adopted since the revolution of 1979, including the water and energy
subsidies have only led towards over-consumption and over-abstraction of
groundwater resources. According to the study of Soltani et al., Iranian
33 Soazic Heslot, "Iran’s Food Security," Future Directions International, August 8, 2014,
https://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/iran-s-food-security/.
34 "Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population (%) - Iran, Islamic
Rep," World Bank-Data, accessed January 21, 2022.https://data.worldbank.org/indicator

/SN.ITK.MSFI.ZS?end=2019&locations=IR&start= 2015.
35 "Global Hunger Index 2021: Iran," Global Hunger Index, https://www.globalhungerind
ex.org/pdf/en/2021/Iran.pdf. Accessed January 21, 2022.

food self-sufficiency would drop to levels below 39 per cent if the current
rate of water consumption for agriculture continued till 2030.36
Source: Ehsan Nabavi, "Failed Policies, Falling Aquifers: Unpacking Groundwater

Overabstraction in Iran." Water Alternatives 11 no. 3 (2018): 699-724.
The graph above depicts the share of water consumption by different

sectors of the Iranian economy. As evident from the graph, agriculture is
the most water-intensive sector of Iran- thus worsening the issue of water
scarcity.
The soil erosion and salinity make food production a challenge and the
attainment of complete food self-sufficiency an unattainable goal. The
diagram below indicates the soil suitability for cultivation in Iran.
36 Abdullah Kaviani Rad, Redmond R. Shamshiri, Hassan Azarm, Siva Balasundram, and
Muhammad Sultan, "Effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Food Security and
Agriculture in Iran: A Survey." Sustainability 13 (2021): 1-19.

Source: Abdullah Kaviani Rad, Redmond R. Shamshiri, Hassan Azarm, Siva

Balasundram, and Muhammad Sultan, "Effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Food
Security and Agriculture in Iran: A Survey." Sustainability 13 (September, 2021) 1-19
With water scarcity and high levels of soil salinity, food production does
not meet the food demand in Iran, thus impeding Iran from reaching the
goal of food self-sufficiency. The table below depicts the disparity in food
production and demand in Iran, along with the percentage of self-
sufficiency in the relevant food items.

Source: A. Soltania, S.M. Alimagham, A. Nehbandani, B. Torabi, E. Zeinali, E. Zand, V.

Vadez, M.P. van Loon, and M.K. van Ittersum, "Future food self- sufficiency in Iran: A
model-based analysis," Global Food Security 24 (March 2020): 1-9,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2020.100351
Furthermore, the irregular and sudden rainfall patterns cause recurrent

floods and droughts which threaten the food security in Iran.

Source: AgFlow, "Here is Why Turkey and Iran Grain Imports Surged in August 2021,"
AgFlow. September 21, 2021. https://www.agflow.com/agricultural- markets/here-is-why-
turkey-and-iran-grain-imports-surged-in-august-2021/.
Most recently, in the Fiscal Year 2020-2021, the below average levels of
rainfall have caused a massive drought that caused an insufficient local
production, thus dramatically increasing the food imports. By August
2021, the wheat imports had increased up to 6 Million Tons, which further
inclined up to 8 Million Tons by March 2022. The barley imports also
increased from 3.2 Million Tons to 5.2 Million Tons.37 According to
Kaveh Zargaran from the Iran’s Grain Union, the total Iranian imports of
grains including meal and oilseeds would increase up to 25 million tonnes
in the year 2022-23.38 The figure below depicts the increase in imports of
5 basic food commodity products. The sharp incline in the import of
staple food took place due to the drought which had made the local food
production insufficient for the domestic demand.
37 "Iran wheat imports soar due to drought," Grain Central, October 12, 2021, https://
www.graincentral.com/markets/iran-wheat-import-soars-due-to-drought/.
38 “Iran faces second year of big wheat imports after drought, says grain union,” Reuters,
May 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/iran-faces-second-year-big-w heat-

imports-after-drought-says-grain-union-2022-05-10/.

Apart from the natural conditions and policy issues, the major factor in
heightening the food insecurity in the current scenario is the re-imposition
of US sanctions as well as the Covid-19 pandemic. As the sanctions
barred the Iranian trade, restricted its oil and gas exports while also
limiting the food imports from many of the states, Iranian economy faced
massive shocks.
Source: Jalal Hejazi and Sara Emamgholipour, "The Effects of the Re-imposition of US
Sanctions on Food Security in Iran." International Journal of Health Policy and
Management 11, no. 5 (2022): 651-657.
While the economic conditions of Iran had improved after the uplifting of
sanctions in the aftermath of JCPOA, the Trump administration revoked
the sanctions while withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. This resulted
in negative growth in the Iranian GDP since 2018, as depicted in the graph
below.

Similarly, with declining economic conditions, the unemployment rate

and inflation increased to unprecedented levels, worsening Iran’s food
insecurity. As shown in the graph above, Hejazi and Emamgholipour
(2022) have studied the impacts of imposition of US sanctions on the food
security in Iran. According to their analysis, the prices of most of the food
products increased by 50 per cent between 2017 and 2019, as the USA re-
imposed the sanctions in defiance of the JCPOA. The high-nutrition foods
such as fruits, vegetables, and meat had the highest inflation whereas low
nutrition food such as, bread and oil had low levels of inflation. As a
result of the sanctions, and subsequent IMF efforts to bring about
macroeconomic stability, the Iranian currency depreciated 10 times
between 2017 and 202239 and its exchange rate value declined by 590 per
cent. Resultantly, while prior to the imposition of sanctions around 10 per
cent of the Iranian population was facing food insecurity, it heightened up
to 50 per cent for the urban population and 24 per cent for the rural
population.40
39
Syed Zafar Mehdi, “Iran's currency hits all-time low amid nuclear deal standoff,”
Anadol u Agency, June 12, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/irans-currency-
hits-all-ti me-low-amid-nuclear-deal-standoff/2611949#.
40
Jalal Hejazi and Sara Emamgholipour, "The Effects of the Re-imposition of US
Sanctions on Food Security in Iran," International Journal of Health Policy and
Management 11, no. 5 (2022): 651-657

Source: "AGRICULTURAL AND AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY IN IRAN," EU Sanctions

Help Desk, Accessed January 18, 2022, https://sanctions-helpdesk.eu/sites/default/files/
2021-07/2021.07%20Agriculture%20and%20Agri Food%20Industry%20in%20Iran%
20Web-
The table above depicts the sharp increase in food prices from 2017 till
2021. The price hike in 2019 was mainly the result of re-imposed
sanctions whereas the 2021 increased prices are the consequence of
economic decline following the Covid-19 pandemic. More recently, as a
combined result of numerous factors including drought, sanctions and
devaluation of the Iranian currency, the rate of inflation in Iran went up to
40 per cent in April 2022,41 which further steeply inclined up to 52.2 per
cent in June 2022. This has dramatically proliferated the food insecurity in
Iran. Violent protests have broken in the country as there has been 80 per
cent increase in the price of dairy products and the fruits and vegetables
consumption of people has declined by 25 to 30 per cent.42
The food insecurity in Iran primarily owes to its arid climate with high
levels of water scarcity and soil salinity. Despite rigorous efforts, the
Iranian government had not been able to achieve its goal of food self-
41 “Iran’s Protests Over Food Prices,” The Iran Premier, June 1, 2022, accessed July 15,
2022, https://iran primer.usip.org/blog/2022/jun/01/explainer-iran%E2%80%99s-
protests-over-food-prices.
42 “Consumption Falls as Skyrocketing Prices Hit Iranian Food Security,” Radio-Free-Euro
pe, June 23, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-food-security-price-

increases/31912264.ht ml.

sufficiency. While appreciable improvement in food security indicators

was experienced, the success did not sustain long due to the re-imposition
of sanctions on Iran. Combined with the sanctions, the economic impacts
of the Covid pandemic have reversed some of the achievements in the
food sector of Iran. Lastly, the most recent drought and locusts attacks
have threatened the food self-sufficiency of Iran as it has increased its
imports of staple food since 2020.
Prospects for Improving Bilateral Trade and Cooperation

Despite a warm initiation of relations between both states at the time of
the inception of Pakistan, the bilateral trade, just like the bilateral relations
of Iran and Pakistan has been subjected to the changing regional as well as
global geopolitical shifts. As Pakistan came into being during the Cold
War era, both Iran and Pakistan allied with the American-led bloc and
thus enjoyed cordial bilateral relations. Being part of the CENTO, Iran,
and Pakistan, in association with Turkey, led to the formation of the
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). However, with the
Iranian Revolution and American sanctions on Iran, as well as with the
Pakistani involvement in the Afghan war, the trade volume dwindled as
the relations hit a rocky patch. In the mid of the decade of 1980s, the
Economic Cooperation Organisation was developed to replace the RCD
and to encourage regional cooperation in trade, investment, agriculture,
industry, tourism, research, and development. Despite these regional
efforts, the bilateral trade relations between Iran and Pakistan have been
marred with rocky patches ever since the imposition of sanctions on Iran.
The bilateral trade peaked in the year 2010 when the amount crossed over
$1 billion,43 which has now declined to less than $393 million in 2022.44
43 Iram Khalid and Faheem Ahmad Khan, "Iran Pakistan Relations: Convergences and
Dive rgences in Present Political and Economic Developments," Journal of the Punjab
Univers ity Historical Society 33, no. 2 (2020): 119-135.
44 “Pakistan-Iran Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Government of Pakistan, accesse
d on June 19, 2022, https://mofa.gov.pk/news-items/#:~:text=Currently%2C%

20the%20v olume%20of%20trade,imports%20US%24%20369.23%20million).

Source: "Pakistan Imports from Iran." Trading Economics, Accessed July 10, 2022,
https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports/iran.

Source: "Pakistan Imports from Iran." Trading Economics, Accessed July 10, 2022,
https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports/iran.
Source: "Iran Imports from Pakistan." Trading Economics, Accessed July 10, 2022,
https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/imports/pakistan.

As evident from the above-mentioned data, the quantitative statistics of

trade between Iran and Pakistan have not been encouraging. However,
both states realise their trade potential and have repeatedly engaged in
trade deals and agreements. In 2004, for instance, Iran and Pakistan
concluded the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), according to which
both states enjoy concessions on about 18 per cent of items. Iran has given
concession to Pakistan on 309 items, which Pakistan has reciprocated by
giving a concession to Iran on 338 items.45
As shown in the tables above, Pakistan’s major exports to Iran include

food and agricultural products including staples and cereals such as wheat,
rice, and sugar. On the other hand, Pakistan’s major imports from Iran
include minerals such as oil and natural gas, as well as iron and steel.
Given the fact that the economic sanctions on Iran have recurrently curbed
the state’s trade relations, Pakistan and Iran have sought the channel of
‘barter trade’ to bypass the US sanctions. In 2012, Iran concluded the
‘Wheat Barter deal’ with Pakistan. According to the deal, Iran was to
import a million tonnes of wheat as well as 200,000 tonnes of rice from
Pakistan as it faced a food shortage due to the US and European Union
imposed sanctions. In exchange for wheat and rice, Pakistan was to import
iron ore and fertilisers from Iran. The nature of the deal was kept barter as
Iran had been facing payment issues due to the renewed sanctions.46 More
recently, with Iran under the strain of renewed sanctions from USA, a
barter trade deal between Iran and Pakistan has been concluded under
which Pakistan will import Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in exchange
of rice. As US sanctions have also prohibited barter trade with Iran, the
officials at both the sides of borders have asserted that the deal is taking
45 "Trade and economic relations between Pakistan and Iran," Business Recorder, accessed
November 15, 2021, https://www.brecorder.com/news/544423.
46 Qasim Nauman, and Rebecca Conway, "Iran, Pakistan "in talks on wheat barter deal,"
Reuters, February 24, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-pakistan-wheat-

idUKTRE81N0HA20120224.

place in the private sector between the Chamber of Quetta and Chamber
of Zahedan.47
From the above-mentioned aspects, it can be concluded that despite the

fact there have been obstacles to the improvement of bilateral trade
between Iran and Pakistan, there is still massive potential. While Iran’s
natural environmental conditions have made food self-sufficiency a far-
fetched goal, Pakistan’s agricultural and food surplus can facilitate in
bolstering trade with Iran. As evident from the two barter deals, Iran has
been interested in importing staple cereals such as wheat and rice from
Pakistan. Historically, Pakistan has been included in the list of top
producers and exporters of wheat and rice. Recently, the Iranian
Ambassador to Pakistan, Syed Muhammad Ali Hussaini claimed that with
8 million tonnes of rice ready to be exported, Pakistan can meet the entire
demand of rice of Iran. He also claimed that Pakistan can find a lucrative
market of meat, fisheries, livestock, citrus fruits and mangoes in Iran.48 By
increasing food trade with Pakistan, Iran can efficiently mitigate its food
insecurity. On the other hand, while Pakistan can find an important market
for its agrarian products in Iran, Pakistan can also benefit by importing oil
and natural gas from Iran. Given the constraints of sanctions that prohibit
trading in currency-being forced to deal in barter goods, Pakistan can
import minerals that can help improve the energy security of Pakistan.
According to an assessment of the Pakistani-based research think-tank
IPRI, the Iranian imported gas could add up to 4000 MW of electricity in
the national gridlines of Pakistan. Additionally, it could facilitate Pakistan
in an annual saving of USD 2.3 billion which it spends on importing the
high-cost furnace oil for the production of electricity.49 Pakistan imports a
47
Khurshid Ahmed, "Pakistan to trade rice for LPG under barter arrangement with Iran –
PM’s commerce adviser," Arab News, November 18, 2021,
https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1970286/pakistan.
48
"Pak-Iran to remove taxes on food exports to fight inflation," Global Village Space,
accessed January 5, 2022, https://www.globalvillagespace.com/pak-iran-to-remove-
taxes-on-food-exports-to-fight-inflation/.
49 Muhammad Munir, Muhammad Ahsan, and Saman Zulfiqar, "Iran-Pakistan Gas
Pipeline: Cost-Benefit Analysis," Islamabad Policy Research Institute, April 4, 2014,

https://ipripak.org/iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-cost-benefit-analysis/.

massive amount of its required oil, with over 75 per cent of the imports
being from Saudi Arabia and UAE.50 Oil trade between Iran and Pakistan
has been halted since 2009, with the pretext of American sanctions.
However, between Iran and Pakistan, a serious issue of oil smuggling
looms overhead that is negatively affecting the economies of both the
concerned states. While the government of Pakistan has started a
crackdown on the oil smugglers in 2021, willingness has also been
expressed by government officials to initiate legal oil trade with Iran.51 In
conclusion, the bilateral barter trade between Iran and Pakistan, with
Pakistan exporting agricultural products and Iran providing oil and natural
gas to Pakistan can improve the food and energy security of the respective
countries.
One challenge persists however. While increasing food trade with

Pakistan and importing the basic essential staples of wheat and rice from
Pakistan can assist Iran in curbing the food insecurity; the problem of food
insecurity persists in case of Pakistan. Where food insecurity in Pakistan
requires serious efforts in the improvement of policy making at domestic
level, Pakistan can also coordinate with Iran in three main sectors to
effectively deal with the challenge. Pakistan and Iran can establish
bilateral cooperation mechanism for dealing with water scarcity; security
arrangement for mitigating cross-border smuggling and a regional level
effort with the assistance of China for promoting agricultural research in
order to increase the quantity and improve the quality of food available.
For dealing with the issue of over-abstraction of groundwater resources,

Pakistan can coordinate with Iran to replicate the SMART WADI model
of Iran. While the program itself is in the feasibility phase in Iran, the
project appears to be promising. It focuses on quantifying water
consumption by using satellite technology, and on providing policy
recommendations for effective and efficient usage of water for irrigation
50 Aamir Shafaat Khan, "Import of Iranian oil still elusive," DAWN, July 18, 2015,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1195157.
51 Mubarak Zeb Khan, "PM orders action against fuel smuggling across Iran border,"
Dawn January 3, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1599346.

and agricultural processes. The project has been initiated in 2014-2015

under the title SMART WADI (Water Decisions for Iran). The project
aims at the provision of up-to-date information and policy
recommendation regarding water productivity, irrigation, and farm
management. The operational framework of the project is to quantify
water consumption and productivity by using the latest satellite
technology while monitoring the crop growth with high-resolution drone
images. The desired goal of the SMART WADI project is to achieve a
high crop yield with high water productivity and to eventually enable the
farmers to utilise the policy advice for effective irrigation planning.52
The Iranian government has also begun making investments in new

irrigation technologies such as drip irrigation, which has the potential of
saving water by delivering it to the roots of the plants while minimizing
the evaporation rate. The replacement of traditional irrigation systems
with drip irrigation has the maximum potential of conserving water. In
case of Iran, the effectiveness has been debated as the policy makers point
towards the fact that the scheme was successful in saving up to 7.5 Bm3.
The researchers, however, assert that it created a rebound effect due to the
absence of water allocation system that increased the water
consumption.53 54 The debate surrounding the efficiency of drip irrigation
scheme indicates the fact that it is one of the most effective ones, if
combined with proper allocation system. Additionally, while Pakistan has
also initiated its projects on drip irrigation, the progress is very slow and
with multiple obstacles. While the Punjab government subsidized the
installation of High Efficiency Irrigation Systems (HEIS), the clogging of
emitters, the salinity of soil, there is a requirement of the great
52 Gjis Simons,"SMART-WADI: SMART WAter Decisions for Iran," Future Water,

accessed December 18, 2021, https://www.futurewater.eu/projects/smart-wadi-iran/.
53 Ehsan Nabavi, "Failed Policies, Falling Aquifers: Unpacking Groundwater
Overabstraction in Iran," Water Alternatives 11, no. 3 (2018): 699-724.

54 Fatemeh Karandish, "Socioeconomic benefits of conserving Iran’s water resources
through modifying agricultural practices and water management strategies," Springer,

(2021):1824-1840.

management skills for operations.55 Thus, Pakistan and Iran can

collaborate with one another to share research and information regarding
the feasibility, opportunities, successes and threats of efforts for dealing
with water scarcity that affects agricultural production and food security.
As discussed earlier, the illicit trade and smuggling between Iran and
Pakistan is not only a cause of food insecurity it has also been a cause of
strain in bilateral relations between Iran and Pakistan. The illicit trade at
the Iran-Pakistan border, between the Pakistani Balochistan and the Sistan
Balochistan of Iran is a multi-faceted challenge for both the states. Wheat,
rice, and sugar are smuggled out of Pakistan to the food-scarce neighbours
such as Iran and Afghanistan, causing a loss of billions of Rupees to the
local producers and consumers of food. While the smuggled food plays a
key role in improving the food security in Iran’s border areas, oil is
smuggled into Pakistan from Iran. With Balochistan on both sides of the
border being highly underdeveloped and sheer poverty-stricken, the locals
find no option other than engaging in smuggling food and fuel across the
border. With the dearth of development and employment opportunities
from the state, a massive number of Baloch depend on illicit oil trade
across the border with Iran as their livelihood. The government of
Pakistan has recently begun a crackdown on the oil smugglers along the
900km of Pakistan-Iran border. While smuggling might negatively affect
the economy of a state, this crackdown is almost an equal or even more
intense death blow to the families and communities residing near the
border on both sides. According to the statistics from one district of
Balochistan, as quoted by The Diplomat, the crackdown on oil smuggling
would adversely affect over 9000 fishing boats, 54 fishing farms, 125
local trucks, and over 25 inter-provincial buses- thus leading to the sudden
unemployment of over thousands of people in the province.56 While the
illicit trade is a major setback for the economies of the respective states, it
also worsens the political conditions and security of Pakistan as well as
55 Syed Haris Ali, "Why Drip Irrigation not popular in Pakistan despite subsidies?" 24
NEWS, April 27, 2021, https://www.24newshd.tv/27-Apr-2021/why-drip-irrigation-not-
popular-in-pakistan-despite-subsidies.
56 Mariyam Suleman, "What’s Going on at the Iran-Pakistan Border?" The Diplomat, April
23, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/whats-going-on-at-the-iran-pakistan-border/.

Iran. In Pakistan, the situation aggravates to the point of separatist

demands. Pakistan and Iran need to address the problem jointly. Not only
should there be strict border controls with a rigorous crackdown on
smuggling, but there is also a dire need to regularise and channelise
economic activity and trade across Iran and Pakistan, so that the ones
engaged in illegal activities can have legitimate alternatives for economic
activity and earning a livelihood.
Lastly, the use of outdated agricultural methods, lack of technological

innovation and mechanisation and negligible research efforts in the
agricultural sector have been the common issue of agricultural
productivity and food security in Iran and Pakistan. Recently, the
Agricultural Transformation Plan has been initiated by ex-Prime Minister
Imran Khan. It focuses on mechanising the agricultural sector, improving
quality seed and ensuring efficient water management.57 On the other side
of border, Iran has declared self-sufficiency in producing farm machinery.
The agricultural machinery sector of Iran has experienced a boom since
the Comprehensive Agricultural Mechanisation Plan was started a decade
ago. Iran has been investing millions of dollars in development, research
and education for improvement in the agricultural sector.58 As both Iran
and Pakistan have started paying attention towards research and
development in the agricultural sector, the efforts can be coordinated to
share technical information that can help both countries in improving their
agricultural sector and food security.
Analysis and Assessment

Food security including the availability, accessibility, affordability and
nutritious quality of food is a unanimous concern of the humankind. In
Iran, despite numerous policies adopted since the revolution for the
improvement of food self-sufficiency, the situation remains unsatisfactory
57 Syed Irfan Raza, "Agriculture sector being transformed on priority: PM Imran," Dawn,
December 28, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1666249.
58 "Iran almost self-reliant in manufacturing agricultural machinery," Tehran Times,
Octobe r 30, 2021, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/466487/Iran-almost-self-reliant-

in-manufa cturing-agricultural-machinery.

with Iran being unable to meet the local food demand with its domestic
production. For Iran, major threats to food security come from its arid and
semi-arid climate which lowers the potential of agricultural production.
The situation is further exacerbated by the crushing sanctions placed on
Iran that have crippled its economy while slashing all the subsidies on the
food and agricultural sector. Across the border, Pakistan is one of the
major agricultural producers in the world with high ranks in the export of
wheat, cotton, and rice, the rate of food insecurity is rising dramatically.
With Pakistan having a climate highly conducive to agrarian production,
the neglect in policy-making to address water scarcity, to provide
agricultural input at subsidised rates and the inability to control smuggling
has worsened the food security situation in the state. As both states have
been facing rampant food insecurity, increasing bilateral trade and
cooperation can help in improving the conditions in both states. As
discussed previously, despite the fact that numerous times, efforts have
been made and agreements have been concluded to increase trade; the US
imposed sanctions nullified the efforts. However, by using barter deals
and engaging private organisations, this hurdle can be surpassed.
Furthermore, while Pakistan can provide wheat, rice and fruits to Iran, it
can import minerals such as oil and natural gas. While this can reduce the
food insecurity of Iran, it can also improve the energy security of
Pakistan. For improving its own food security, cooperation with Iran in
the agricultural research, improving border security, and knowledge and
experience sharing for dealing with water scarcity, can be the suitable
options for Pakistan.
Policy Recommendations for Improving the Prospects of

Cooperation between Iran and Pakistan
• In case of common threats faced by Pakistan and Iran, joint
collaborative efforts should be initiated for the mutual benefit of the
participating states. As water scarcity is a common issue, Pakistan and
Iran can collaborate in the research and development sector regarding
policy programs such as drip irrigation and smart metering system.

Sharing of knowledge regarding the challenges and prospects of these

programs can improve efficiency.
• As wheat and rice are the major staples in Iran, Pakistan produces a
surplus of these crops-not only for domestic demand but also for
foreign markets (if the crop does not fail due to mismanagement or is
not smuggled out), regularisation of trade in this sector can benefit
both the states. While it can improve the food security in Iran, it can
earn foreign exchange for Pakistan while improving the relations with
its neighbouring state.
• Economic sanctions remain one of the main hurdles in regularising and

channelising trade with Iran. In this regard, Pakistan and Iran can
resort to barter trade deals. As Iran requires food commodities from
Pakistan, Pakistan can gain fuel (oil and gas) from Iran at concessional
rates. While the food security of Iran will improve, simultaneously
Pakistan will also experience improved indicators for its energy
security.
• In case the barter deals are also sanctioned with Iran, the states can
continue trading through the involvement of the private sector.
• As previously discussed, illicit trade and cross-border smuggling pose

multi-dimensional threats to both states. Efforts should be coordinated
to enhance border security. Furthermore, the illicit trade should not
only be curbed; rather it should alternatively be channelised and
regularised under the states’ auspices. This will not only help in
improving food security but would also improve the general security
and stability in the Balochistan province, which has remained unstable
for long.

Recommendations for Pakistan

• One of the first things required in Pakistan in this regard is the need of
realisation of the significance of agricultural sector for the economy.
With 19.5 per cent of GDP and a non-negligible large part of the
population linked directly and indirectly with the agricultural sector for
its livelihood, it is definitely a sector in which neglect is unaffordable.
• In addition to the smart metering and drip irrigation programs for

efficient water consumption, there is a dire need to increase the water
conservation capacity of the country. The 30-day water storage
capability of Pakistan is alarmingly low, as recurrently the major dams
of Tarbela and Mangla have hit their dead storage levels. Reservoirs
and dams need to be built.
• With Pakistan’s 60 per cent of the rural population being composed of

small-scale farmers, targeted subsidies should be provided by the
government to increase and improve the quantity as well as quality of
the input for agricultural production.
• While agricultural loans are available in Pakistan, efforts should be

made to improve their accessibility for the remote and small-scale
farmers. Furthermore, from the budget allocated for the agricultural
sector, a certain portion must be allocated for the research and
development sector. Continuing with the same years old outdated
policies is one of the major constraints on the agricultural growth and
food production in Pakistan.◼

Pakistan's Road to Central Asia: A Perspective through the Prism..
Pakistan's Road to Central Asia:

A Perspective through the Prism of
Transit Trade Treaties
Umar Khan *
Abstract
Central Asian Republics (CARs) are landlocked countries looking
for access to nearest sea ports. On the other hand, Pakistan is
looking to diversify its economy by accessing CARs. Afghanistan has
traditionally been the land bridge from the subcontinent to CARs, but
the transit trade through Afghanistan has not been without
challenges. Because of Afghanistan's political unrest and instability,
APTTA 2010, has not been entirely successful in easing Pakistan's
transit trade to CARs. This paper employs qualitative analysis to
examine Pakistan's physical access to CARs through the prism of
transit trade treaties. It investigates alternative solutions that
circumnavigate Afghanistan via Iran and China, with a focus on the
aspirations and sensitivities of these transit countries. Iran and
China are apparently attractive alternatives in the context of an
insecure Afghanistan, but these alternative routes to CARs are not
without their own set of challenges and drawbacks, which warrant a
renewed push to establish a working relationship for beneficial
transit trade with Afghanistan.
Keywords: Pakistan, APTTA, Chabahar Agreement, QTTA, CARs, CAREC
*Umar Khan is a graduate of the National Defence University in War Studies. He can be
reached at umar179@hotmail.com.
__________________


Umar Khan
Introduction
C
entral Asian Republics (CARs) are imprisoned by landlocked-ness
of their geography, with no immediate access to world ocean trade.
In this prison analogy, Russia and China (and to a lesser extent
Iran) are their guards due to geographical encirclement. They geo-
economically dominate CARs by virtue of their large size, economic
footprint and good neighbourly linkages/ contiguous borders. Consequently
it causes cost escalation of any commodity coming in and out of CARs.
Innate high costs discourage businesses. Connectivity with the rest of the
world also gets affected. Easing of these high costs are dependent on hard
and soft connectivity of CARs with their neighbours. Hard connectivity is
the physical connection via road, rails links etc, whereas soft connectivity
is the customs and other bureaucratic/ regulatory issues, which delays
smooth transit of freight through multiple border crossing points (BCPs) of
intermediate countries. In order to address these hard and soft connectivity
issues, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC)
program and the TIR convention are playing active roles in breaking CARs
out of their geographical prison. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
is also an important regional cooperation initiative, but it helps to tie CARs
more tightly to the big two, China and Russia, who cast a long shadow. It
is unlikely that CARs would be able to leave this shadow under the banner
of SCO.
Furthermore, there are two major UN conventions that also aim to ensure
free transit trade to landlocked countries. The first is the Convention on
Transit Trade of Landlocked States (1965) and the second is the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982). Pakistan is
not a signatory to the first, but it has ratified UNCLOS with a declaration
that the content of the freedom of transit to the land-locked states has to be
agreed upon by the transit State and the land-locked State concerned. It will
be regulated only by the national laws of Pakistan;1 thereby necessitating
1
“UN Treaty Collection,” United Nations, accessed February 19, 2023,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII .aspx? src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-
6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en# EndDec.

bilateral/ multilateral transit treaties with the land-locked countries of

Central Asia.
Literature Review
Asif2 has highlighted that Pakistan shares no common border with any of
the CARs, which is one of the main obstacles to accessing the region. Khan
and Elahi3 regard the poor political and security situation in Afghanistan as
an obstacle preventing CARs from taking advantage of the shortest route to
the Indian Ocean via Pakistani ports. With the construction of Chabahar
port, CARs have an alternative and Pakistan must do all it can for peace in
Afghanistan for future links with CARs. Akbari4 has concluded that though
Chabahar Agreement offers Afghanistan an alternative to Pakistan,
however, it cannot completely supplant Pakistan as a transit country and
trade partner.
Fair5 describes historical Pakistani relations with CARs, noting that

Pakistan’s aspirations with CARs were economic in nature after the
dissolution of the USSR. Initially, Pakistan’s push for linkages was
welcomed by CARs with their inclusion in the Economic Cooperation
Organisation (ECO) in 1992. However, Pakistan's support for the Taliban
in Afghanistan and the growth of Islamic extremism in the area in the mid-
1990s prompted fear and anxiety in these new countries. As a result, instead
of focusing on connection with Pakistan, CARs began to turn to Russia for
economic security. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was
created in 2001, to deal with the concerns of security and terrorism in the
2
F. Asif, “Pakistan’s ties with central Asian States irritants and challenges,” PIPS Research
Journal of Conflict and Peace Studies (2011): 4.
3
Hashmat Ullah Khan and Muhammad Manzoor Elahi, "Pakistan’s Economic Interests in
Central Asia: Prospects and Challenges in Regional Perspective," Central Asia Journal
(2017).
4
Suhailah Akbari, "APTTA versus Chabahar: Which Transit Trade Agreement Offers
Afghanistan Broader Legal Benefits," Research Review International Journal of
Multidisciplinary 5, no. 07 (2020): 32-41.
5
Christine Fair, "Pakistan's relations with Central Asia: Is past prologue?," Journal of
Strategic Studies 31, no. 2 (2008): 201-227.

Umar Khan
region with Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan as

members. After Pakistan joined the United States’ War on Terror (WoT)
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s perception was salvaged and
started re-engaging with CARs for economic connectivity.
Linn6 examined CARs regional economic integration in his paper on

Central Asian regional integration and cooperation. He mentions how, after
the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the five states experienced a
severe economic downturn. However, they regained economic stability
after the year 2000 and worked to improve internal and external integration.
Despite the region's abundance of electricity, oil, and other mineral
resources, neighbouring countries such as Pakistan have been unable to
underwrite this opportunity.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB)7 emphasises that CARs capabilities

in utilising their abundant energy resources are improving. However, the
major challenge that these countries face is finding a channel for exporting
their resources. ADB through its Central Asia Regional Economic
Cooperation (CAREC) program has compared8 progress made by regional
countries in removing bottlenecks in the shape of benchmarks. This report
has highlighted high dwell times and large costs of freights crossing through
Pakistan, as compared to other regional countries. It indicates poor
performance of Pakistani customs and communication infrastructure.
Moreover, it has also shown Pakistan’s over-reliance on road-based
transport for high freight costs and deemed such practice unsustainable.
Emphasis on rail-based freight and reducing custom clearance times are
recommended.
6
J. F Linn, “Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?,” in
Eurasian Development Bank, ed. Evgeny Vinokurov (Almaty: EDB Eurasian Integration
Yearbook, 2012).
7
Central Asia Atlas of Natural Resources. (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2010).
8
CAREC Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring Annual Report 2019
(Philippines: CAREC Program. June 1, 2020), accessed February 07, 2021,
https://www.carecprogram.org/?publication =carec-corridor-performance-measurement-
monitoring-2019.

Javaid et al.9 argue that Russia intends to maintain its hold on CARs through
dependency and does not wish CARs to explore southern trade links that
would free them from this dependency. Al-Nouimat et al.10 and Zhekenov
et al.11 contend that China primarily uses the SCO's influence to ensure the
stability of its eastern Muslim Xinjiang province by combating the three
evils, i.e., religious extremism, terrorism, and separatism, as well as to
further its economic interests. Russia, on the other hand, uses the SCO to
counter Western encroachment in its sphere of influence (CARs). They also
emphasise that Iran has made significant diplomatic inroads into CARs by
portraying itself as a benign neighbour with no intention of spreading its
brand of Islamic revolution (a major concern for CARs) and has positioned
itself well to be a viable ocean outlet for the CARs.
While admitting the geographical shortcomings of both Pakistan and CARs,

this paper recommends a few proposals in view of the historical background
approved by Fair, Asif, Linn, Javaid et al, Al-Nouimat et al.,12 and
Zhekenov et al.13
9
Faisal Javaid, Asghar Dashti, and Muhammad Arif Khan, "Russian Foreign Relations
with Central Asian Republics After 9/11," Pakistan Journal of International Affairs 5,
no. 1 (2022).
10
Al-Nouimat, Abdalla Moh’d Dyab, Saltanat Jakubayeva, Duman Zhekenov, and Alibek
Azimov. "Geopolitical interest of Iran in Central Asia," Вестник КазНУ. Серия
международные отношения и международное право 87, no. 3 (2019): 40-46.
11
Zhekenov, D, S. Jakubayeva, M. Sarybayev, R. Utkelbay, and К. Zhetpisbayeva.
"Cooperation between China and Central Asian countries in the field of religious security"
Вестник КазНУ. Серия Востоковедения 99, no. 4 (2021): 46-55.
12
Al-Nouimat, Abdalla Moh’d Dyab, Saltanat Jakubayeva, Duman Zhekenov, and Alibek
Azimov. "Geopolitical interest of Iran in Central Asia." Вестник КазНУ. Серия
международные отношения и международное право 87, no. 3 (2019): 40-46.
13
Zhekenov, D, S. Jakubayeva, M. Sarybayev, R. Utkelbay, and К. Zhetpisbayeva.
"Cooperation between China and Central Asian countries in the field of religious
security." Вестник КазНУ. Серия Востоковедения 99, no. 4 (2021): 46-55.

Umar Khan
CAREC
CAREC programme is an initiative sponsored by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) in 1997, to develop economic cooperation among countries
by linking landlocked CARs with the world. There are eleven members of
this program including all five CARs, Pakistan, China, Azerbaijan,
Afghanistan, Georgia, and Mongolia. This program sponsors hard and soft
infrastructure development projects like roads and railway links to ensure
connectivity with CARs. This program14 financed by ADB for hard
infrastructure projects to build connectivity. It more importantly proffers
solutions to the problems of soft barriers to trade, like delays at ports,
borders, inefficient customs procedures, and cumbersome and unnecessary
clearance procedures that need to be overcome to increase trade
connectivity with CARs and the rest of the world.15 CAREC has earmarked
six routes, called transport corridors to connect CARs with the rest of the
world and two of these routes (routes 5 and 6) originate/terminate at
Pakistani ports, linking CARs with the Indian Ocean.
Figure 1: CAREC Transport Corridors. Corridors 5 and 6 connect with the Indian Ocean
through Pakistan. Source: carecprogram.org
14
Cordula Rastogi and Arvis Jean-Francois, “The Eurasian connection: supply-chain
efficiency along the modern silk route through Central Asia,” The World Bank, 2014.
15
Ferrantino, Michael J, "11 Policies to improve the supply chain: what needs to be done?,"
Global value chains in a changing world (2013): 263.

TIR Convention
TIR stands for Transports Internationaux Routiers or International Road
Transports. It is an important international road transit convention that was
concluded in 1975 to harmonise issues of international transport of goods.
This convention not only covers customs transit by road but also by rail or
a combination of rail and road. It is the only16 universal customs transit
system in existence, from which cargo can be moved in sealed
containers/vehicles from the customs office of departure of one country to
another country without requiring customs checks through intermediate
borders by ensuring the security of cargo and guarantees to customs’
authorities. This convention also sets out international standards for
transporters like regular checks and standards for vehicles, insurance, etc.,
to ensure confidence in the transporters to ply reliably through intermediate
countries.
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, and other CARs are signatories17 of this
convention, enabling CARs to trade in an international customs transit
framework without facing mandatory customs stoppages/checks through
transit countries.
Routes to CARs
As Pakistan does not have contiguous borders with CARs, it can only access
CARs via Afghanistan, Iran, and China through the following trade routes:
a. Afghan Route
(1) First route traverses through Pakistan – Afghanistan –
Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan touching Peshawar, Torkham, Kabul,
Termiz and Shymkent to Almaty.
16
"TIR Introduction," UNECE, accessed February 11, 2021,https://unece.org/transporttir/
introduction..
17
"UN, United Nations, UN Treaties, Treaties," United Nations, accessed February 11, 202,
https://treaties.un.org /Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-A-
16&chapter=11&clang=_en.

Umar Khan
(2) Second route transverses through Pakistan – Afghanistan –

Tajikistan – Kyrgyzstan – Kazakhstan touching Torkham, Kabul,
Bander Sherkhan, Dushanbe and Bishkek to Almaty.
(3) Third route transverses through Pakistan – Afghanistan –

Turkmenistan – Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan touching Chaman,
Towrgondi, Bukhara, and Shymkent to Almaty.
(4) This route traverses from Pakistan to Afghanistan's cities

Kandahar, Herat to the Turkmenistan border at Towrgondi.
b. Chinese Route
This corridor is the shortest route to Kazakhstan, passing through
Karakoram highway to China and reaching Kazakhstan through
Kyrgyzstan traversing via Sost - Khunjerab pass -Kashgar- Bishkek
to reach Almaty (Kazakhstan).
c. Iran Route
This is the southernmost corridor traversing through Iran's port of
Bandar Abbas to Turkmenistan. Using Turkmenistan's rail/road
infrastructure onwards to Uzbekistan, finally reaching Kazakhstan.
IIOJ&K
Figure 2: Red lines depicting trade corridors through China and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan
Traditionally, Afghanistan has been the main transit route to CARs for
Pakistan. Using other countries to traverse to CARs requires additional
layers of bureaucracy and treaties to make that happen.
Afghan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement 201018 is the main instrument

through which Pakistan accesses CARs. This agreement was signed
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which expired19 on February 11, 2021.
It is in the process of renegotiation. Earlier, the Afghanistan Transit Trade
Agreement (ATTA, 1965) was signed in 1965, which granted Afghanistan
access to Pakistan's ports but did not address Pakistan's access to Central
Asia through Afghanistan. Due to ATTA, Pakistan faced the founding of
black markets, in which duty-free goods for Afghanistan were rerouted to
Pakistani markets. This resulted in revenue losses for Pakistan. Moreover,
Afghanistan was not given access to the Indian markets under the ATTA of
1965. There was no mention of the transit trade to CARs for Pakistan also.
As a result, in 2010, a new Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement
(APTTA, 2010) was signed, granting Afghanistan trade access to all
countries of the world through Pakistani ports, barring imports from India,
and in return Pakistan’s trade with CARs was allowed.
Despite APTTA 2010, Pakistani traders faced hurdles to export and import
goods from CARs. Earlier, this was widely presumed to be due to anti-
Pakistan sentiment toward the USA-sponsored Afghan regime. On the
contrary, even after the change of regime in Kabul in August 2021, there
has not been much change in Afghan dealings with the Pakistani traders.
18
"Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement," Digital image, Ministry of Commerce
Pakistan, accessed January 25, 2021, https://www.commerce.gov.pk/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/APTTA.pdf.
19
Zafar Bhutta, "Lack of Trust Hinders Trade with Kabul," The Express Tribune, October
12, 2020, accessed February 06, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2268121/1.

Umar Khan
All cargo from Pakistan is offloaded20 from Pakistani trucks and then
loaded on Afghani trucks for further transport to CARs. Moreover, customs
clearance and check stops in Afghanistan further delay any consignments
passing through Afghanistan. This is generally justified as a reaction to
Pakistan’s decision of not letting trouble free transit trade from India to
Afghanistan. The Afghan transporters face many delays due to prolonged
customs clearance, burdening mandatory requirements of working with
expensive bonded transporters (due to large bank guarantees/insurance
associated with bonded transporters).21 These complaints of slow and
expensive processing of freight are not without merit. ADB research22 has
found Pakistan's BCPs at the Pakistan-Afghan border (Torkham and
Chaman) to be among the slowest and most costly in the region. Moreover,
Pakistani ports have the longest dwell periods in the region, escalating
demurrage and freight costs.23,24,25 Persistence of such soft barriers to trade
20
“PAJCCI, Pakistan-Afghanistan Bilateral and Transit Trade Issues & Proposed
Resolutions,” Ministry of Commerce, April 2018, accessed January 25, 2021,
http://www.pajcci.com/Downloads/Pakistan- Afghanistan Bilateral and Transit Trade
Issues & Proposed Resolutions - April 2018.pdf.
21
Shoaib Ahmad Rahim, "Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan: Trade, transit and the
cost of being landlocked," Kardan Journal of Economics and Management Sciences 1,
no. 4 (2018): 1-21.
22
CAREC Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring Annual Report 2019
(Philippines: CAREC Program. June 1, 2020), accessed February 07, 2021,
https://www.carecprogram.org/?publication=carec-corridor-performance-measurement-
monitoring-2019.
23
Arif Rafiq, "Regional Transit Trade Isn't Enough to Drive Pakistan's Gwadar Port,"
Middle East Institute. October 14, 2020, accessed February 08, 2021,
https://www.mei.edu/publications/regional-transit-trade-isnt-enough-drive-pakistans-
gwadar-port.
24
“Sector Assessment,” Publication no. PAK 46378, accessed January 1, 2021.,
https://www.adb. org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/46378-002-ssa.pdf.
25
Muhammad Nawaz Khan, “Afghan Transit Trade: A Dividend or Drag on Pakistan's
Economy.” Eurasia Review, October 11, 2022,
https://www.eurasiareview.com/11102022-afghan-transit-trade-a-dividend-or-drag-on-
pakistans-economy-oped/.

over the years has led to diminishing trade with Pakistan. This will likely
result in a complete loss of business traffic to neighbouring Iran.
Figure 3: Snapshot of APTTA 2010, explicitly baring imports from India.
On giving Afghanistan access to India, APTTA clearly states that

Afghanistan can export goods directly to Wagah border, but no imports are
allowed from India. Pakistan will use Afghanistan for transit to CARs,
which was the basic purpose of APTTA 2010. In 2016, Afghanistan refused
to honour APTTA and when Pakistan announced plans for bypassing
Afghanistan using Quadrilateral Transit Trade Agreement (QTTA),
Afghanistan agreed to re-honour APTTA. Afghanistan has now found an
alternate route to India via Iran's Chabahar port by signing a Chabahar
agreement in 2016, with India and Iran.26 It allows the shipping of Indian
goods to Afghanistan via Iran's Chabahar port. However, it was later found
that APTTA is a more comprehensive and generous agreement in
Afghanistan's favour. Some of the salient differences are: 27
26
Sumitha Kutty, "India Cements Role in Iran with Chabahar Deal," Lobe Log. June 02,
2016, accessed February 10, 2021, https://lobelog.com/india-cements-role-in-iran-with-
chabahar-deal/.
27
Suhailah Akbari, "APTTA versus Chabahar: Which Transit Trade Agreement Offers
Afghanistan Broader Legal Benefits," Research Review International Journal of
Multidisciplinary 05, no. 07 (2020): 32-41.

Umar Khan
a. Chabahar agreement covers transit of goods and persons through

Chabahar port, while APTTA gives Afghanistan access to all seaports
of Pakistan in addition to Wagah border.
b. The Chabahar agreement does not state freedom of transit, whereas
APTTA gives this right to Afghanistan.
c. Most important of all, APTTA abolishes all custom duties/charges for
transiting cargo, except for services rendered; whereas the Chabahar
agreement does not allow such concessions. It only mentions the
provision of best endeavours for the reduction of such charges in its
language.
d. APTTA provides an explicit definition and type of visa (6 months, with
each stay no longer than 15 days) to transporters. On the other hand,
Chabahar agreement does not entertain any such provision and vaguely
mentions facilitation of visas for contracting parties.
In addition to APTTA being a comprehensive agreement, Pakistan is

Afghanistan’s major trading partner and top export destination, accounting
for 43% of Afghanistan's exports. Ninety per cent of Afghanistan's fresh
fruits and vegetables end up in Pakistani markets.28 These factors make
Pakistan an indispensable trade partner to Afghanistan and gives Pakistan
leverage in re-negotiating APTTA, which has become a protracted issue.29
Iran
There are several advantages of the Iran-Afghanistan route to CARs. Iran
has a direct border with Turkmenistan boasting connectivity with CARs.
Unlike Pakistan, Iran has good rail connectivity with both Afghanistan and
Turkmenistan, giving Iran a significant advantage in freight transportation
costs. Due to the low cost of fuel in Iran, freight costs within Iran are
reduced even further. Secondly, Iran has an FTA with the Eurasian
28
Dr. Hussain Yasa, "The Political Aspects of APTTA." Daily Outlook Afghanistan,
February 03, 2021, accessed February 10, 2021, http://outlookafghanistan.net/
topics.php?post_id= 28555.
29
Muhammad Ali, Mushtaq Ghumman, "Cabinet to Approve APTTA Extension,"
Brecorder, May 21, 2021, accessed June 15, 2021, https://www.brecorder.com/news/
40094109/cabinet-to-approve-aptta-extension.

Economic Union (EAEU), which increases its trade advantage over

Pakistan. Due to these reasons, Iran is a major trading partner of CARs and
provides them an outlet to the Indian Ocean through her ports. Iran, with
assistance from India, covets to channel and monopolise trade with CARs
via Chabahar port.30 Iran is the linchpin of the International North–South
Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Ashgabat Agreement, which aims to
connect Iran with India, Russia, and CARs. Considerable progress has been
made to remove barriers to trade with CARs and increase connectivity,
especially via rail. It is a direct competitor for Pakistan's ambitions to
provide Indian Ocean access to CARs.
Figure 4: Iran's Vision. Adapted from Source: CSIS: Reconnecting Asia
The only obstruction for Iran to monopolise its trade with CARs is
economic sanctions. Pakistan can access CARs via Iran due to its stronger
rail infrastructure and contiguous borders with Turkmenistan, but this
would only let Iran compete more effectively with Pakistani commodities,
30
Sayareh Jafar, and Meysam Fooladi Mehtarkalateh, "Chabahar port vs. Gwadar port: A
Logistics Performance Comparison," In Proceedings of the International Association of
Maritime Economists (IAME) 2016 Conference, Hamburg, Germany, 2016.

Umar Khan
resulting in a decreasing market space for Pakistani exports. This is not

mere conjecture. Iran has a precedence of having a trade rivalry.31
Earlier Iran had provided a land bridge to Turkey with CARs. Iran had
repeatedly raised costs for Turkish cargos transiting Iran to CARs by
increasing transit trade fees32 and refusing to refuel CARs bound Turkish
trucks.33 It has rendered Turkish exports more costly in competition with
Iranian exports in the CARs market.
Not to scale
Figure 5: Chabahar Agreement Route. Source: https://ifpnews.com/
31
Omid Rahimi and Ali Heydari, "How Iran and Turkey Compete in Central Asian Trade,"
The Diplomat, February 26, 2020, accessed August 08, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/
2020/02/how-Iran-and-turkey-complete-in-Central-Asian-trade/.
32
“Turkey and Iran Agree on Transit Truck Fee," World Bulletin / News from Turkey and
Islamic World., November 17, 2014, Accessed August 09, 2021,
https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni. net/turkey/turkey-and-iran-agree-on-transit-truck-fee-
h148602.html.
33
"Turkey Hopes to Normalize Truck Transit Fees with Iran," World Bulletin / News from
Turkey and Islamic World, November 11, 2014, accessed February 07, 2021,
https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/turkey/turkey-hopes-to-normalize-truck-transit-
fees-with-iran-h148185.html.

China
As lack of stability and political will in Afghanistan made transportation of
goods a liability, Pakistan along with China, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan,
decided to form a Quadrilateral Transit Trade Agreement (QTTA) to bypass
Afghanistan by transporting goods using the Karakorum Highway via
China to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.34 QTTA was signed on March 9,
1995, by Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to enable Pakistan
to circumnavigate Afghanistan to Central Asia. It was enforced in May
2004 and followed the route Karachi-Rawalpindi-Hassanabdal-Gilgit-
Khunjerab (Pak/China Border)-Kashgar-Torugart (China/Kyrgyzstan
Border) -Bishkek- Akjol-Kordai (Kyrgyzstan/ Kazakhstan Border) -
Almaty (Kazakhstan). QTTA uses the Karakoram Highway to connect to
Xinjiang province in China which in turn is linked with CARs. This route
remained in operation till a landslide on the Karakoram Highway in January
2010. After considerable repairs and rehabilitation, this route was reopened
on September 2, 2015, for traffic. However, this agreement has not been
effective in enhancing trade. Freight moving through this route faces
numerous delays at BCPs due to oversight and lack of concentrated effort
by the member countries to remove customs/bureaucratic hurdles. These
delays make it unattractive for traders to utilise QTTA for shipments.
34
Muhammad Shoaib, "Presentation on Quadrilateral Agreement," CAREC Program
(2015), accessed February 07, 2021, https://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/2015-QTTA-
06-PAK-Presentation-QATT-Workshop.pdf.

Umar Khan
Figure 6: QTTA route. Source: www.issi.org.pk
China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

CPEC is a Chinese flagship programme of the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) to link western China to Pakistani ports in the Indian Ocean.
Since QTTA uses the Karakorum highway, CPEC projects will help
Pakistan to connect with Kazakhstan using the CPEC infrastructure. Not
only will hard infrastructure be improved but delays in BCPs and custom
co-ordinations will be streamlined automatically when China’s own goods
will be subjected to similar transit exercises from Pakistan to China and
vice versa.
In light of Afghanistan being a willing barrier between Pakistan and CARs,

QTTA is a viable alternative. As already stated, QTTA's importance was
highlighted when Afghanistan insisted on the inclusion of India in APTTA

and stopped Pakistani shipments to CARs in 2016.35 This was not

acceptable to Pakistan due to prevalent tensions with India. Afghanistan
dropped its demand for reciprocal access to India after Pakistan announced
its intention to revitalise QTTA. It ostensibly challenged Afghanistan’s
desire to monopolise Pakistan’s route to CARs.36
On the other hand, due to persistent instability in Afghanistan, the rest of

the CARs have also requested to join QTTA like Tajikistan37 and
Uzbekistan.38 They also wish to enhance their connectivity to the rest of the
world through Pakistan's warm water ports. However, certain issues have
persisted which have resulted in a lacklustre utilisation of the QTTA
agreement which includes:
a. Delay in the issuance of visas to the drivers/personnel.

b. Lack of information about the agreement and associated protocols by
customs officials of member countries. Authorities unnecessarily stop
vehicles in a variety of locations when they pass through their
jurisdictions. China's customs and immigration authorities cause
unnecessary delays in the inspection and clearance of vehicles in transit.
c. The QTTA transit route is not an all-weather road link. Due to unsuitable
weather, it remains closed for a minimum of four months every year
(December to end March).
35
"Regional Connectivity through QTTA and CPEC," Daily Times, October 04, 2020,
accessed February 11, 2021, https://dailytimes.com.pk/674284/regional-connectivity-
through-qtta-and-cpec/.
36
A Framework for Renegotiating Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement
(Islamabad: Pakistan Business Council, 2020), 6, accessed February 12, 2021,
https://www.pbc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/Framework-for-Renegotiating-the-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-Transit-Trade-Agreement.pdf.
37
Zafar Bhutta, "Tajikistan to Join Pakistan Road Link Bypassing Afghanistan," The
Express Tribune, February 23, 2017, accessed February 10, 2021,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1337274/tajikistan-join-pakistan-road-link-bypassing-
afghanistan.
38
Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Uzbekistan Looks to Pakistani Ports." Dawn, May 8, 2020,
accessed February 10, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1555445/uzbekistan-looks-to-
pakistani-ports.

Umar Khan
d. Most borders work on a 5 or 6-days weekly basis and have different

working hours.
e. Numerous inspections by different agencies at the borders and during
transit, especially in China.
There is sensitivity39 in China with respect to Islamic separatism (East

Turkistan Islamic Movement) and China has a strict posture towards any
activity which might be perceived to aid such unrest in her
Xinjiang province. Cross-border movement of cargo from one Muslim state
Pakistan, to another (Kyrgyzstan/ Kazakhstan) is a cause for suspicion and
increased checking of cargoes at BCPs. To streamline the transit of goods
via QTTA, the following are considered essential:
a. Adherence to TIR convention by member countries. After customs

Inspection at the point of origin, the truck/container should be
sealed, and the same seal should be opened at the final destination.
b. E-Visa facilitation for transport operators may be ensured by

QTTA member countries. Multiple entry unified visa sticker
mechanism is also a viable option that may be introduced to ease
transporter's multiple visa woes.
c. Facilitation of approved transport operators should be ensured via

embassies of QTTA member countries by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
d. Operators should be granted at least 6 months or one-year multiple

entry visas as per QTTA agreement.
e. China may be sensitised about Pakistan's trade interests with CARs,

and Pakistan must reinforce soft infrastructure linkages of CPEC
39
Raj Verma, "Domestic Political Drivers and Chinese Diplomacy: Xinjiang and Counter-
Terrorism in South Asia," Asian Perspective 44, no. 4 (2020): 561-586.

with QTTA in the shape of MOUs and written understandings from

China in order to streamline transit trade.
Pak-CAR Trade Prospects

Against popular belief, Pakistan has a good light industrial and agricultural
capacity which has export potential to CARs.40 Both China and Iran also
have good industrial capacity and compete with Pakistani light industrial
goods/produce in CARs market. Relying on Iranian or Chinese transit has
the potential to introduce unintended sharing of trade intelligence. This may
subsequently lead to the loss of market share from CARs in the long run.
Whereas, Afghanistan with no industrial capacity offers no competition and
is a viable transit country for Pakistan. Besides, Afghanistan is also rife with
political instability. It is expected that transit trade to CARs via Afghanistan
will always be problematic even after the conclusion of renewed APTTA.
Safeguards to these concerns must be introduced in the newly-negotiated
APTTA deal to have a financial punitive effect on Afghanistan, thereby
deterring it from obstructing Pakistani trade.
Further, a multilateral approach in dealing with Afghanistan is also a

feasible option, if CARs can be persuaded to discourage Afghanistan from
blocking trade. This can be achieved by expanding APTTA to include other
CARs under one transit trade agreement for duty-free transit to CARs and
beyond. If Pakistan is successful in forging an umbrella multilateral transit
trade deal that includes all CARs and Afghanistan, it will save Pakistan
from becoming a hostage to Afghani unilateral actions; as the trade interests
of other CARs/ stakeholders would also be impacted. At the same time,
Afghanistan's own commerce with CARs would be leveraged as collateral.
Presently, APTTA is the best agreement for Afghanistan, and it would not
be possible for it to get any better deal from any other country. The case of
Chabahar agreement is relevant in this regard. It may be argued that while
Pakistan gives Afghanistan access to the whole world (through its ports)
40
Umar Khan, “Pakistan’s Trade Opportunities and Challenges with CARs: Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan in Perspective,” Central Asia 91 (2023):1-28.

Umar Khan
sans Indian imports, Afghanistan gives Pakistan access to three CARs. This
huge quantitative imbalance in terms of access to countries needs to be
properly understood. At present negotiations for renewing APTTA are
stalled with Afghanistan due to the following reasons:
● Afghanistan wanted import access from India

● Insistence on the reduction of customs delays, and charges on
services/facilities, etc.
Reduction of custom delays and service charges may be addressed to make

Pakistani ports competitive. However, the Government of Pakistan (GoP)
may continue to stay firm in negotiations vis-a-vis Indian imports. Pakistan
needs to protect its trading interests. Pakistan is Afghanistan's main trading
partner. Otherwise, the government of Pakistan has the option of offering
the same terms and conditions as offered in the Chabahar agreement already
signed by Afghanistan with India and Iran. The new APTTA agreement is
already very generous by regional standards.
Nonetheless, Pakistan should only chase the project of the road to CARs if
it can reap tangible economic benefits from it. Renting out port and rail/
road infrastructure to decrease landlocked-ness of CARs will not contribute
to changing Pakistan's economic landscape. Real tangible economic
benefits can be realised only if there are Pakistani trading companies
operating from CARs territory; marketing and importing products of
Pakistani-origin into CARs. Encouraging the establishment41 of Pakistani
trading houses/companies inside CARs territory can be considered a major
policy discourse. It can be dovetailed with all initiatives (transit trade
agreements, preferential trade agreements, etc.,) aimed at promoting
enhanced connectivity with CARs.
41
Umar Khan, “Pakistan’s Trade Opportunities and Challenges with CARs: Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan in Perspective,” Central Asia 91 (2023):1-28.

Conclusion
Pakistan accesses CARs through Afghanistan, Iran, and China. Despite the
obvious hard connectivity concerns with CARs: soft infrastructure
connectivity challenges play a dominant role in influencing the trend, speed
and cost of trade between these countries. Important international
instruments like CAREC and TIR are available to address hard and soft
connectivity issues with CARs. Iran is taking advantage of these
instruments and augmenting them with its own regional partnership
programs like INSTC and Ashgabat Agreement to increase its hard and soft
connectivity and become a go to warm water port for CARs. Despite having
a firmer international standing and access to better transit agreements than
Iran, Pakistan has lagged behind in utilising and enforcing cooperation
programs (QTTA, APTTA, CAREC, CPEC etc.,) to its advantage for
connecting with CARs. Bureaucratic/regulatory bottlenecks (soft
infrastructure issues) have plagued transit trade through Afghanistan and
China. This must change and Pakistan must exercise adroit diplomacy to
renegotiate and enforce transit agreements, if Pakistan wishes to capitalise
on the untapped economic potential of CARs. Furthermore, the idea of
using Iran to connect with CARs must be spurned; otherwise, it will see
itself bypassed and circumvented, negating the value of its prized
geostrategic location.◼

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Regionalism in the Arab World: Progress, Prospects, and Lessons

Regionalism in the Arab World: Progress,

Vice-Chancellor at Sargodha University, and Pakistan Chair at Oxford University.

@2023 by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023 1

E States. It was established in Cairo in 1945, as an inter-governmental

However, these agreements were not implemented in the absence of the

2 IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023

regionalism’ gained momentum in the form of several regional trade

By 1990s, most Arab countries began to realise the importance of lifting

The Greater Arab Free Trade Area

4 World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.traptop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.

Foreign Relations, November 2012.

IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023 3

duties on goods’ trade were fully re moved, and non-tariff barriers

While 17 Arab League member-states have joined GAFTA, the remaining

GAFTA member-states trade mostly in hydrocarbons, manufactured

7 Government of Egypt, Ministry of Trade and Industries, Trade Agreements Sector,

Economic Integration in the Arab World, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,

Estimation of the Trade Effects,” Journal of Economic Integration no. 1 (2008): 3.

4 IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023

The GAFTA has, indeed, helped to increase the level of intra-regional

(Paris: Notre Europe, April 2010), 25.

Region (Jordan: MENA-OECD Working Group on Investment and Trade, 2018).

Mediterranean: Scenarios for the Region up to 2030,” Mediterranean Prospects 13

East Policy 14 (2007): 53.

IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023 5

East and North Africa," Journal of World Investment 2 (2001): 403-426.

East and North Africa.”

(Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, April 2010), 50-51.

6 IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023

to trade and business activity is the insufficiency of investment flows from

Finally, the regional integration process as a whole remains paralysed due

The Agadir Agreement

Mediterranean: Scenarios for the Region up to 2030,” Mediterranean Prospects 13

Development 45 (2013): 296-313.

2030 (Lebanon: ESCWA, 2015), 153.

IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023 7

The Agadir Agreement is sponsored by the European Commission under

27 The Agadir Agreement at: http://www.agadiragreement.org/Pages/viewpage.aspx?

the Arab Mediterranean Countries,” http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/

Global Trade Matters, February 2, 2020, http://www.globaltradematters.org/intra-

8 IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023

Second, tariff reductions under the Agadir Agreement are meaningless, as

Third, Agadir’s reliance on the EU rules of origin is problematic, as these

Fourth, lack of trade complementarity limits the export potential of Agadir

30 Luc De Wulf and Maryla Maliszewska, Economic Integration in the Euro-

Centre for Studies, 2018), 6.

Effects of the Agadir Agreement,” The Developing Economics 43 (2005): 342.

IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023 9

connectivity. Practical constraints such as poor transport links, and strict

The Arab Maghreb Union

The AMU is governed by a Council of the Heads of State of the member

10 IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023

joined important trading regimes. While Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia

In 2010, AMU member-states decided to establish a Maghreb Free Trade

AMU members have individually made substantial progress in trade.

First, almost half of the Maghreb landmass is inhabited by Algeria, the

January 31, 2017, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/01/207060/full-speech-

Business International Centre, June 2019).

Growth (Washington D.C: International Monetary Fund, 2018), 7.

IPRI JOURNAL ◼ 2023 11

Second, the restrictions on intra-regional trade remain high, including

Fourth, intra-regional investment flows are significantly restricted as