INTER TRADE.

Critically examine the legal and institutional framework, functional mandate and

organizational challenges of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). What are

the prospects and problems of the organization?

INTRODUCTION.
The pursuit of continuous and all-encompassing socio economic growth has seen nations

participate in several forms of integration activities, ranging from economic, political, and, by

extension, social. Nonetheless, Wonnacott (1996) argued that such initiatives (in the form of

free trade agreements and market liberalization) have become synonymous within the

developed world where there are mechanisms, such as the political will and the resources to

ensure those initiatives are not only implemented but are also protected by constitutionalism

and the principles of good governance. According to Zeiler (1998), the end of the Cold War

provided countries with opportunities to spur development and one key initiative that was

seen as important in realizing this was free trade, in which barriers and regulations hindering

trade within regions should be removed and replaced by the free flow of goods and resources,

which was seen as critical for developing regions and the need to ensure inclusive growth.

The continent is heavily reliant on imports as well as on commodity-based natural resource

exports to meet its energy and food needs. Africa represented 2.8 percent of global trade

volume in 2019, with intraregional trade accounting for 14.4 percent of overall continental

trade volume in 2019. Countries in Africa have not yet established successful strategies for

promoting long-term development and raising living standards in their own countries. The

lack of intra-regional trade has prevented African countries from fully exploiting the

synergies and complementarities of their economies and reaping the benefits that greater

market integration would have provided.

Despite this admission of failure, nations in Africa still hold on to the hope that economic

regionalization will save them from failure and enable their economic integration and

development. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was recently established

by the African Union as a result.

Meaning of Free Trade Area.

In a free trade area (FTA), two or more countries agree to remove tariffs and other trade

restrictions between themselves, but each country still has the authority to impose its own

restrictions on trade with other countries. A group of nations in a certain region that have

signed a free trade agreement and have little or no price constraints, such as tariffs or quotas,

is another definition of an FTA. This enables the member nations to concentrate on their

comparative advantages and manufacture commodities that are comparatively more

efficiently made, increasing their own productivity and profitability. An example of an

established and largest FTA in the world is the Northern American Free Trade Agreement

NAFTA between North American countries which include the United States of America,

Mexico, and Canada; this agreement encourages and boosts trade between North American

Countries. In Africa, the most all-encompassing Free Trade Area, which has been a major

subject of contemporary discourse, was created in 2019, i.e., The Africa Continental Free

Trade Area (AfCFTA).

THE NEED FOR TRADE INTEGRATION/FREE TRADE IN AFRICA.

To understand the need and desire to consolidate trade integration in Africa, one needs to
understand the processes and policies that gave rise to this need.
 The Lagos Plan of Action
Africa represents a region that faces economic problems of the utmost severity. Informally

known as the Lagos plan, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) for the Economic Development of

Africa (1980–2000) was a plan backed by the Organization of African Unity born out of the
need to establish an African social and economic order primarily based on utilizing to the full

the region’s resources in building a self-reliant economy (United Nations, Economic and

Social Council, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 1991-03). A parallel

objective was the establishment of an African Economic Community by the beginning of the

twenty-first century. The LPA aimed to minimize Africa’s links with Western countries by

maximizing Africa’s own resources by increasing trade and consolidating relations between

African states. In adopting the LPA and the FAL (Final Act of Lagos), it was recognized that

national governments were to be responsible for implementing these strategies in their

respective development plans (Economic and Social Council, 1991). However, regional

bodies like the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Organization of African Unity

(OAU), and others would have the task of giving technical assistance to member states.

Ikome (2004) stated that if the objectives of the LPA had gotten support from all states, it

would likely have resulted in increased continental trade and growth in the inflow of foreign

direct investment, and, socioeconomically, would have lifted millions out of poverty.

However, even though the plan was noble in its development, many challenges were bound to

hinder its effective implementation and operation. For example, the main problems

confronting Africa in natural resource development included lack of information, lack of

adequate capital, and excessive foreign dependence. Moreover, this paper argues that the plan

did not take into consideration the different levels of economic development in Africa, and

how this was going to hamper the quest to ensure collective development.

In addition, it has been argued that the social climate in Africa has not changed; in fact, one

may argue that it has worsened, as scattered conflicts (ethno-religious), political and

governance instability, terrorism, a break- down in transparency and accountability, poverty,

inequality, and unemployment are issues that have made it difficult for the LPA to fulfil its

promises.
  The Abuja Treaty

The LPA was one of the instruments that were established to reinvigorate Africa’s

development. The Abuja Treaty, which gave rise to the establishment of the African

Economic Community was adopted on June 03, 1991, and came into force on May 12, 1994

(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2020). The treaty has been signed by all member states of

the OAU, except Eritrea. South Africa signed the treaty on 10 October 1997. Just like the

PLA, the Abuja Treaty put great emphasis on the need to foster the social, economic, and

cultural development of the African continent through the integration of the economies of the

various countries. The Abuja Treaty argued that, for continental development, RECs had to

be at the center of the process. The treaty argued for the liberalization of regional and intra-

regional trade, the harmonization of activities undertaken by RECs, the establishment of free

trade areas, and a customs union at REC level, finally aiming at achieving both a monetary

and economic union, leading to the establishment of an African Economic Community.

Important principles which gave rise to the Abuja Treaty included the declarations and

resolutions adopted by the OAU Assembly in Algiers in September 1968, and in Addis

Ababa in August 1970 and May 1973 which argued that the economic integration of the

continent was a pre-requite for the realization of the objectives of the Organization of African

Unity, in 1997. Other considerations in the creation of the treaty were the decision taken in

Libreville by the Council of Ministers in 1976 concerning the establishment of an African

Economic Community, and the Lagos Plan of Action which reaffirmed Africa’s continued

efforts to integrate (United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic

Commission for Africa, 1991-03).

However, the question arose as to whether the goal of the Abuja Treaty could be realized,

considering existing legal and institutional frameworks as enshrined in both the Abuja Treaty

and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 88 (1) of the Abuja Treaty expressly
states that the Community shall be established mainly through the coordination,

harmonization, and progressive integration of the activities of RECs. The Treaty has at times

been met with feelings of skepticism. For example, the African Union (2014) argued that

while paragraph 3 of Article 88 of the Treaty stipulates those processes such as coordination,

harmonization, and the evaluation of existing and future RECs shall be entrusted to the

community, while welcomed, are essentially aspirational. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, the legal framework for economic integration can be examined at both regional and

continental levels. Regionally, African states belong to and are coordinated by RECs.

Eight of these RECs are recognised by the African Union as both legal and institutional

frameworks for attaining regional integration objectives. However, these legal and

institutional frameworks differ greatly in terms of their effectiveness between one REC and

another. As a result, there is a lack of synergy between the regional and continental legal and

institutional frameworks that ought to drive integration. Additionally, certain weaknesses in

the protocols adopted by RECs have been acknowledged. In some cases, protocols lack

complementarity across RECs, take too long to negotiate, and are often not signed, ratified,

and implemented by all member States (African Union, 2014). The high number of RECs

coupled with the issues of overlapping memberships gives rise to the fragmentation of

economic integration. Another inherent weakness is the inability of the Abuja Treaty to

prevent member states from belonging to more than one regional economic community. On

this issue, the African Union (2014) concludes that in the African integration context, the

privilege of sovereignty, and efforts to guard it by member states, seem to have led to the

construction of an institutional structure that is not cohesive and is lacking in the

supranational scope needed to effectively drive integration.

 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

The NEPAD was adopted by African states and the government of the OAU in 2001 and

aimed at addressing pressing issues hindering the development of the African continent.

NEPAD was ratified by the AU in 2002. The key principles of NEPAD are to empower

women, reduce the marginalization of Africa, reduce poverty, and put Africa on a sustainable

path toward collective development. The NEPAD has been central in the African Union’s

strategy to allow Africa to take full control of its development agenda, to work more closely

together, and cooperate more effectively with international partners. Key themes of the

NEPAD include Agriculture and Food Security, Climate Change and Natural Resource

Management, Regional Integration and Infrastructure, Human Development, Economic and

Corporate Governance, and Cross-cutting Issues including Gender, Capacity Development,

and ICT. However, while NEPAD is aimed at addressing pressing developmental issues in

Africa, it too, just like the PLA and the Abuja Treaty has faced considerable challenges

which to some extents have hindered its effectiveness. For example, NEPAD was challenged

in terms of forging new partnerships, unstable government systems, dismantling trade

barriers, the lack of investment in human capital, and the eradication of colonial mentality.

However, there are also collective gains that have been made by the NEPAD, as argued by

the UNCTAD (2012). One of the areas in which the NEPAD has made some progress is

agriculture. Through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program

(CAADP), NEPAD is slowly laying the foundation for higher agricultural productivity and

output in Africa. NEPAD also put Africa on the global agenda and has galvanized

international support for the region. As a result of the adoption of NEPAD, the Group of

Eight (G8) launched the Africa Action Plan in June 2002 and made commitments to support

the implementation of NEPAD. NEPAD has also made some progress in economic and

political governance. According to the 2011 African Economic Outlook, the economic

environment in several countries in the region has improved, particularly in areas such as tax
reform, access to credit, and enforcement of contracts. However, despite these achievements,

the NEPAD failed to achieve its goal, mainly because of capacity constraints, lack of

financial resources, coordination problems between the NEPAD secretariat and the RECs,

weak infrastructure, and the absence of quantifiable benchmarks for monitoring and

evaluation.

 THE AFRICA CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA (AfCFTA)

In line with the AU’s Agenda 2063 of economic integration on the African continent, the

African Continental Free Trade Area was conceptualised and subsequently endorsed as an

action plan to boost Intra-African Trade at the 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of

Heads of State and Government in 2012. Subsequently, the Agreement establishing the

agreement came into force on 30 May 2019. The AfCFTA is the first agreement of its kind to

bring together all 55 African countries under a single FTA.

This agreement creates a common market for goods, services and investment and allows for

free movement of persons in the continent. The AfCFTA is one of several AU frameworks

supporting the Abuja Treaty’s end goal, the establishment of an African Economic

Community (AEC). The vision for the AEC coincides with the continent’s uniformed

approach to fiscal, social, and sectorial policies, and is part of the AU’s broader development

frameworks designed to boost intra-African trade and establish continental customs union.

The AfCFTA follows the establishment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), a free

trade area between COMESA, SADC and the EAC. It aims to bridge regional divisions by

building on the TFTA’s regional industrial development policies and strengthening trade

among the various RECs, with the aim of incorporating all African economic blocs under

standardized rules and regulations. The AfCFTA considers RECs as building blocks of the

ultimate African Integration Agenda. While individual states that are part of the AfCFTA will

be able to continue implementing existing free-trade agreements, RECs that have advanced
significantly in their integration agenda will continue to apply the rules they had agreed upon.

In a nutshell, the agreement provides an African-based framework as an alternative to the

traditional World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. Countries that trade with each other

under WTO rules are to start trading instead under AfCFTA rules, now that it is in effect.

The agreement further entails deep and comprehensive trade agreements, including

investments, intellectual property rights, and competition laws (African Union, 2018). The

AfCFTA portends dramatic opportunities for the continent, it will reduce tariffs among

member countries and cover policy areas such as trade facilitation and services, as well as

regulatory measures such as sanitary standards and technical barriers to trade. The full

implementation of AfCFTA shall reshape markets and economies across the region and boost

output in the services, manufacturing, and natural resources sectors.

The first day of trade in commodities between various African nations under the aegis of

AfCFTA was January 1, 2021. Pending the delay by other state parties on the adoption of

fundamental annexes to the trade agreement protocol, the latter is presently limited to states

that have ratified the AfCFTA. Amid high expectations envisaged on the AfCFTA, one of

many questions of interest is the extent to which it will enhance trade within Africa. The

World Bank (2020) communicated that AfCFTA “connects 1.3 billion people across 55

countries, with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) valued at US$3.4 trillion”.

Historical Background.

In 1963, the Organization of African Unity was founded by the independent states of Africa.

The OAU aimed to promote cooperation between African states. The 1980 Lagos Plan of

Action was adopted by the organization. The plan suggested Africa should minimize their

reliance upon the West by promoting intra-African trade. This began as the creation of a

number of regional cooperation organizations in the different regions of Africa, such as the
Southern African Development Coordination Conference. Eventually this led to the Abuja

Treaty in 1991, which created the African Economic Community, an organization that

promoted the development of free trade areas, customs unions, an African Central Bank, and

an African common currency union.

In 2002, the OAU was succeeded by the African Union (AU), which had as one of its goals to

accelerate the "economic integration of the continent". A second goal was to "coordinate and

harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for

the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union.

At the 2012 African Union summit in Addis Ababa, leaders agreed to create a new

Continental Free Trade Area by 2017. At the 2015 AU summit in Johannesburg, the summit

agreed to commence negotiations. This began a series of ten negotiating sessions which took

place over the next three years.

The first negotiation forum was held in February 2016 and held eight meetings until the

Summit in March 2018 in Kigali. From February 2017 on the technical working groups held

four meetings, where technical issues were discussed and implemented in the draft. On

March 8–9, 2018 the African Union Ministers of Trade approved the draft.

2018 Kigali Summit

In March 2018, at the 10th Extraordinary Session of the African Union on AfCFTA, three

separate agreements were signed: the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the Kigali

Declaration; and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. The Protocol on Free Movement

of Persons seeks to establish a visa-free zone within the AfCFTA countries, and support the

creation of the African Union Passport. At the summit in Kigali on 21 March 2018, 44

countries signed the AfCFTA, 47 signed the Kigali Declaration, and 30 signed the Protocol
on Free Movement of People. While a success, there were two notable holdouts: Nigeria and

South Africa, the two largest economies in Africa.

One complicating factor in the negotiations was that Africa had already been divided into

eight separate free trade areas and/or customs unions, each with different regulations. These

regional bodies will continue to exist; the African Continental Free Trade Agreement initially

seeks to reduce trade barriers between the different pillars of the African Economic

Community, and eventually use these regional organizations as building blocks for the

ultimate goal of an Africa-wide customs union.

Membership.

Among the 55 AU member states, 44 signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement

(consolidated text), 47 signed the Kigali Declaration and 30 signed the Protocol on Free

Movement of People at the end of the 2018 Kigali Summit. Benin, Botswana, Eritrea,

Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, and Zambia were among the 11 countries that did not initially sign

the agreement. After the 2018 Kigali summit, more signatures were added to the AfCFTA. At

the 31st African Union Summit in Nouakchott on 1 July 2018, South Africa (the second

largest economy of Africa), Sierra Leone, Namibia, Lesotho and Burundi joined the

agreement. In February 2019, Guinea-Bissau, Zambia and Botswana also joined. Kenya and

Ghana were the first nations to ratify the agreement, depositing their ratification on 10 May

2018.

Of the signatories, 22 needed to deposit the instrument of ratification of the agreement for it

to come into effect, and this occurred on 29 April 2019 when both Sierra Leone and the

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic deposited the agreement. As a result, the agreement came
into force 30 days later on 30 May 2019. At this point, only Nigeria (the continent's largest

economy), Eritrea and Benin had not signed.

Former President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari was particularly reluctant to join the

AfCFTA, fearing it would hurt Nigerian entrepreneurship and local industries, and his

decision not to was praised by some local groups including the Manufacturers Association of

Nigeria and the Nigeria Labour Congress. The Nigerian government intended to consult

further with local businesses in order to ensure private sector buy-in to the agreement,

because a key concern was whether the agreement adequately prevented anti-competitive

practices such as dumping. In July 2019, just months after being re-elected to a new term,

Buhari agreed to adhere the Africa free trade at the 12th extraordinary session of the

assembly of the union on AfCFTA.

At the same meeting, Benin also committed to signing the agreement, leaving Eritrea as the

only of the 55 African Union Member States not to sign up to the deal. Formally, Eritrea was

not part of the initial agreement due to an ongoing state of war, but the 2018 peace agreement

between Ethiopia and Eritrea ended the conflict and ended the barrier to Eritrean participation

in the free trade agreement.

As of May 2022, there are 54 signatories, of which 43 (80%) have deposited their instruments

of ratification. Additionally, one country (Somalia) completed its domestic ratification, but

had not yet deposited their ratification with the depository by May 2020. Eritrea is the only

AU member state which had not signed the agreement by 2019.

Review of Trade in Africa Prior to the AfCFTA.

Africans had been engaged with inter-Africa and intra-Africa trade before the establishment

of AfCFTA in 2019. Prior to the explorations of Africa by European merchants in the 15th
century African traders and rulers had established trading relationships with the Indian ocean

region, western Asia, and the Mediterranean world. Internally, there were local exchanges

between African communities themselves. It has been established that in pre-colonial Africa,

local manufacturers already made items of comparable quality to goods from pre-industrial

Europe. Taking a cue from the existing trade model in Africa, European explorers

hoodwinked and hijacked the trade to expand on the gains they made from the industrial

revolution. In the trail of this, explain that African economies and trade became structured

with the aim of serving as suppliers of cheap labor and non-value-added raw materials to the

colonial economies and as markets for their manufactured and value-added products.

As such, trade benefited the metropolitan nations while marginalizing and impoverishing

African nations. Moreover, African economies were fully integrated into the colonial ones,

resulting in a one-sided dependency that has largely remained so to date. The crux of the

matter,in anticipation of AfCFTA, is to at least alter the pattern of trade flow to boost intra-

African trade; defend the African domestic markets from further harmful liberalization;

defend our producers – especially our farmers – from demise resulting from “dumping” of

subsidized imports; seeking market access without reciprocal market opening obligation

(considering the coercive and unfair trade balance over the years); and promoting regional

integration. Current African trade patterns reinforce the continent’s reliance on the economies

of developed markets, primarily the ex-colonial powers. Africa’s trade particularly with the

economies of previous colonial masters (European economies) has largely remained in the

form of servicing these economies by way of providing raw materials for the industries of

these colonial economies and serving as markets for their industrial goods. This pattern of

trade has made African exports have little or no value added as these exports come back to

Africa as imports with high value added and with higher prices. Consequently, Africa’s share

of total world trade has remained very low. Despite the efforts made by African countries to
improve the region’s share of global trade, statistics from Africa Trade Report shows that

Africa’s share of global trade has remained at less than 3 per cent for the last few decades.

Goals and Functional Mandate of the AfCFTA

A significant milestone for economic integration in Africa was reached on March 21, 2018,

when the AfCFTA was signed. As of July 2019, 54 of the 55 AU Member States have ratified

the deal. After 22 State Parties deposited their ratification instruments, the agreement entered

into force on May 30, 2019, enabling the AfCFTA to begin its operational phase.

Currently in effect are the protocols on trade in goods and services, dispute resolution

processes, and their annex protocols on customs cooperation, trade facilitation, sanitary and

phytosanitary measures, and rules of origin. The negotiations, carried out by the Heads of

State of the AU Member States, have been separated into two phases: Phase I deals with the

aforementioned protocols, while Phase II deals with the protocols on investment, competition

policy, and intellectual property. It should be emphasized that various concerns from Phase I,

such as schedules of tariff concessions, schedules of services obligations, and rules of origin,

still need to be worked out. The AfCFTA promises to eliminate tariffs (up to 97% of tariff

lines) and NTBs and liberalise trade in services – particularly in the financial, transport,

tourism, business and communication sectors, among others. However, to date, it remains

unclear which products will be subject to tariff cuts, which services will be liberalised and

what system of rules of origin that will be applied. The AU has indicated that trading under

the AfCFTA will commence by 1 July 2020.

While acknowledging the pursuit of the Pan-African vision for economic independence, the

launch of the AfCFTA must also be seen in the context of growing uncertainty over the future

of the direction of the global multilateral trading system, and ever-changing trade landscape.

African states are not a party of any of the emerging mega-regional trade agreements, such as
the Trans-Atlantic and Investment Partnership, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The United Nations Economic Commission

for Africa (UNECA) research estimates that due to preference erosion and greater

competition faced by African countries in the mega-regional markets, total exports from

Africa could be reduced by USD 2.7 Billion. These negative impacts could be offset with the

effective establishment of the AfCFTA.

As previously noted, the general objectives of the AfCFTA are to create a continental market

for trade in goods and services, with free movement of persons and investments, thus paving

the way for accelerating the establishment of a continental customs union. Article 4 of the

AfCFTA highlights the specific objectives necessary to realise these general objectives.

Particular importance to this analysis are the objectives requiring State parties to “establish a

mechanism for the settlement of disputes concerning their rights and obligations” and to

“establish and maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and administration

of the AfCFTA”

The AfCFTA is a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), established in terms of Article XXIV:8(b) of

the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1994), aimed at jumpstarting

intra-African Trade and boosting investment in the continent. Article 3 of the AfCFTA

provides for the general objectives of the agreement; with the primary objective being “to

create a single market for goods, services, facilitated by movement of persons in order to

deepen the economic integration of the African continent and in accordance with the Pan

African Vision of “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa enshrined in Agenda

2063”. The AfCFTA will also serve to “lay the foundation for the establishment of a

Continental Customs Union at a “later stage” in terms of the GATT Article XXIV:8(a).

Article 4 of the AfCFTA stipulates that State parties have committed “cooperate on all trade

related areas, while Article 5 illustrates the governing principles of the agreement. Of
particular importance are that the AfCFTA “will be driven by Member States of the AU” and

that RECs shall be the “building blocs” for the establishment of the FTA. It is clear that the

signatory states envision a very high and intricate level of economic integration, that will be

achieved largely through the progressive removal of tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) to

trade, and characterised by reciprocity in participation and equal opportunity for benefits

gained from effective implementation. The UNECA estimates that under the AfCFTA, intra-

African trade could increase by 52.3% by 2022, and once the final 10% of tariffs are

removed, this trade could be doubled again.

Overall, improvement in intra-African trade and enhanced levels of economic integration

stand to advance the lives of regular African people. In line with the United Nations (UN)

Sustainable Development Goals, the AU 2063 Agenda and other development-oriented

programmes, poverty alleviation considered a top priority in African States. Arguably, the

most vulnerable sectors of the population across the continent- the youth and women- stand

to benefit the most from improved trade facilitation, access to markets and free movement of

labour. A present, it suggested that Africa’s most urgent challenge is the fact that its massive

youth population is devoid of economic and social prospects. With 60% of the continent’s

population being under 25 years old, youth unemployment is considered one of the most

pressing challenges that governments need to address. Under the AfCFTA, expanded markets

and unobstructed factor movements of labour, goods, services, capital and persons should

promote economic diversification, structural transformation, and technological development

and facilitate job creation. A single African market will provide a conducive environment for

professional mobility and skills portability.

The AfCFTA, through supporting improved trade facilitation efforts on the continent will

also make strides in formalising informal the cross-border trade practices which make

significant contributions to the economies of most African States. A majority of informal

cross-border trade in Africa is carried out by women, and is considered the most important

source of employment among women in Sub-Saharan Africa, providing 60% of non-

agricultural self-employment. Many of the major challenges faced by these traders are caused

by the deficient implementation of regional trading agreements and protocols.

This causes conflicts between nation and regional trading policies, thus stifling the smooth

movement of goods and persons across border. Traders are subject to heavy duties and

inconsistent licensing and clearance procedures. Likewise, because of the lack of coherent

trade facilitation regulation, women also face other non-economic risks and challenges at

borders- these include theft of their goods, corrupt propositions from customs officials and

sexual abuse from border authorities. The protection of women and other vulnerable is of

groups in Africa is of paramount importance; foremost, because they are persons who deserve

safe and fair opportunities to partake in economic activities to improve their lives and those

of their households. Also because their protection through improved trade facilitation and

regulation stands to increase the significance to the economic growth and development of

African States.

The general objectives of the AfCFTA (as provided in part II, Article 3 and 4 of the

Agreement establishing the AfCFTA), are to:

(a) create a single market for goods, services, facilitated by movement of persons in order to

deepen the economic integration of the African continent and in accordance with the Pan

African Vision of “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa” enshrined in Agenda

2063;

(b) create a liberalised market for goods and services through successive rounds of

negotiations;
(c) contribute to the movement of capital and natural persons and facilitate investments

building on the initiatives and developments in the State Parties and RECs;

(d) lay the foundation for the establishment of a Continental Customs Union at a later stage;

(e) promote and attain sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, gender

equality and structural transformation of the State Parties;

(f) enhance the competitiveness of the economies of State Parties within the continent and the

global market;

(g) promote industrial development through diversification and regional value chain

development, agricultural development and food security; and

(h) resolve the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite the regional

and continental integration processes.

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE AfCFTA

The African Continental Free Trade Agreement's (AfCFTA) institutional frameworks are

essential to the agreement's success and efficient implementation. These frameworks offer the

procedures, institutions, and mechanisms required to support the AfCFTA's operation and

respond to the many demands and difficulties faced by member nations. The following

elements make up the AfCFTA's institutional framework:

1. African Union (AU):

The AU is the overarching institution that provides the political and administrative

framework for the AfCFTA. It serves as the continental body responsible for coordinating

and supervising the implementation of the agreement. The AU provides strategic direction,

policy guidance, and ensures harmonization of the AfCFTA with other AU initiatives.
 2. Assembly of Heads of State and Government:

The Assembly is the highest decision-making body of the AU. It consists of all the heads of

state and government of AU member states. The Assembly provides political oversight, sets

the overall goals and objectives of the AfCFTA, and makes key decisions regarding its

implementation.

3. African Union Commission (AUC):

The AUC is the secretariat of the AU and plays a central role in implementing the AfCFTA.

It is responsible for coordinating the negotiations, monitoring the implementation, and

providing technical and administrative support to the AfCFTA process. The AUC works

closely with other AU organs, member states, and stakeholders to ensure the effective

functioning of the agreement.

4. AfCFTA Secretariat:

The AfCFTA Secretariat is a specialized institution established to oversee the day-to-day

implementation and management of the AfCFTA. It is located in Accra, Ghana, and serves as

the operational arm of the agreement. The Secretariat is responsible for facilitating trade

negotiations, coordinating trade-related activities, resolving disputes, promoting capacity

building, and providing information to stakeholders.

The AfCFTA Secretariat will be responsible for coordinating the implementation of the

agreement and shall be an autonomous body within the AU system. Though it will have

independent legal personality, it shall work closely with the AU Commission and receive its

budget from the AU. The Secretariat is responsible for convening meetings, monitoring and

evaluating the implementation process of the AfCFTA and other duties assigned to it by the

AU Assembly of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, and the Committee of Senior
Trade Officials. The Secretariat houses experts, notably in legal affairs, economic

policymaking, research, and communications, to assist the Member States, among other

things, in ensuring easy progress of negotiations and that the rules set out in the Agreement

are correctly applied and enforced.

The whole existence of the AfCFTA is to create a single continental market for the free

movement of goods, services and investments. The AfCFTA Agreement covers goods and

services, intellectual property rights, investments, digital trade and Women and Youth in

Tade among other areas. The Secretariat, therefore, works with State Parties to negotiate

trade rules and frameworks for eliminating trade barriers while putting in place a Dispute

Settlement Mechanism, thereby levelling the ground for increased intra-Africa trade.

Another function of the Secretariat is to ensure that trade policies of the various State Parties

are in conformity with the provisions in the AfCFTA Agreement. Where there are identifiable

gaps, the Secretariat then facilitates the process of bridging the gaps. It also undertakes

periodic reviews of State Parties reports and monitors the overall implementation of the

Agreement while providing appropriate interventions.

5. AfCFTA Council of Ministers:

The Council of Ministers is composed of trade ministers or equivalent representatives from

each AU member state. It is responsible for providing overall policy guidance, making

decisions on trade-related matters, and ensuring the effective implementation of the AfCFTA.

The Council meets regularly to discuss trade issues, review progress, and address challenges.

The Council of Ministers shall report to the Assembly through the Executive Council.

(Article 11, Agreement Establishing the Africa Continental Free Trade Area)
The Council of Ministers shall within its mandate:

(a) take decisions in accordance with this Agreement;

(b) ensure effective implementation and enforcement of the Agreement;

(c) take measures necessary for the promotion of the objectives of this Agreement and other

instruments relevant to the AfCFTA

(d) work in collaboration with the relevant organs and institutions of the African Union;

(e) promote the harmonisation of appropriate policies, strategies and measures for the

effective implementation of this Agreement;

(f) establish and delegate responsibilities to ad hoc or standing committees, working groups

or expert groups;

(g) prepare its rules of procedure and those of its subsidiary bodies created for the

implementation of the AfCFTA and submit them to the Executive Council for approval;

(h) supervise the work of all committees and working groups it may establish pursuant to this

Agreement;

(i) consider reports and activities of the Secretariat and take appropriate actions;

(j) make regulations, issue directives and make recommendations in accordance with the

provisions of this Agreement;

(k) consider and propose for adoption by the Assembly, the staff and financial regulations of

the Secretariat;
(l) consider the organisational structure of the Secretariat and submit for adoption by the

Assembly through the Executive Council;

(m) approve the work programs of the AfCFTA and its institutions;

(n) consider the budgets of the AfCFTA and its institutions and submit them to the Assembly

through the Executive Council;

(o) make recommendations to the Assembly for the adoption of authoritative interpretation of

this Agreement; and

(p) perform any other function consistent with this Agreement or as may be requested by the

Assembly.

6. AfCFTA Technical Working Groups:

These working groups are established to address specific technical issues related to the

implementation of the AfCFTA. They cover areas such as trade in goods, trade in services,

investment, intellectual property rights, rules of origin, customs cooperation, and dispute

settlement. The working groups provide technical expertise, conduct research, and make

recommendations to the Council of Ministers.

7. National AfCFTA Coordination Mechanisms:

Each AU member state establishes a national coordination mechanism to facilitate the

implementation of the AfCFTA at the national level. These mechanisms may include inter-

ministerial committees, task forces, or dedicated units within relevant government

departments. They are responsible for coordinating policy formulation, stakeholder

engagement, domestic implementation, and reporting on progress.

PROSPECTS OF THE AfCFTA

The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) is an innovative project that has

the potential to change Africa's economic landscape. The AfCFTA presents enormous

potential for fostering economic growth, regional integration, and sustainable development by

uniting the continent's markets. In-depth analysis of the AfCFTA's possible outcomes and

opportunities for African countries is provided in this report. The AfCFTA is a transformative

force for the future of Africa, promoting economic diversification, job creation, intra-African

investment, and greater continental integration. For the African continent, the African

Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) offers a wealth of options and possible

advantages. The following are some significant AfCFTA prospects:

1. According to a document compiled by the African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) of the

Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in association with the African Union Commission,

the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will cover a market of 1.2 billion people

and a gross domestic product (GDP) of $2.5 trillion, across all 55 member States of the

African Union.

2. Data has shown that over 75 per cent of Africa’s exports outside the continent were

extractives from 2012 to 2014, while less than 40 per cent of intra-African trade were

extractives in the same period. The volatility of the extractive market makes the development

disturbing. Africa’s industrial exports are therefore expected to benefit most from AfCFTA,

with projections that it will help diversify Africa’s trade and encourage a move away from

extractive commodities, such as oil and minerals, which have traditionally accounted for most

of Africa’s exports. This will, in turn, result in a more balanced and sustainable export base

for countries on the continent.

3. In terms of numbers of participating countries, AfCFTA will be the world’s largest free

trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organization. Of course, it is also a highly
dynamic market. The population of Africa is projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050, at which

point it will comprise 26 per cent of what is projected to be the world’s working age

population, with an economy that is estimated to grow twice as rapidly as that of the

developed world.

4. With about 80 per cent of the region’s businesses tied to Small and Medium Scale

Enterprises, they are key to growth across Africa. Studies have shown that these businesses

usually struggle to penetrate more advanced overseas markets, but are well positioned to tap

into regional export destinations and can use regional markets as stepping stones for

expanding into overseas markets at a later point, via AfCFTA.

5. Africa’s growing youth population and absence of opportunities are key concerns troubling

development experts on the continent. AfCFTA is projected to produce jobs for this bulging

youth population. This is possible because extractive exports, on which Africa’s trade is

currently based, are less labour-intensive than manufactured products and agricultural goods

that will benefit most from AfCFTA. With the promotion of more labour-intensive trade,

AfCFTA will generate more employment and create opportunities.

6. The supply chain across the continent is one area AfCFTA is expected to impact, by

making it easier for SMEs to connect to larger regional companies, who then export within

and outside the continent. This will help grow the SMEs and create a bigger market for larger

companies.

7. For women across the continent, estimated to account for around 70 per cent of informal

crossborder trade in Africa, the agreement will facilitate movement and trade. With reduced

tariffs, AfCFTA will make it more affordable for informal traders to operate through formal

channels, which offer more protection from harassment, robbery and confiscation of goods as
seen today. It is also projceted to provide simplified clearing procedure alongside reduced

import duties for women traders.

8. Businesses around the continent currently face higher tariffs

when they export within Africa than when they export outside it. The average is put at 6.1 per

cent. Of course, AfCFTA is expected to progressively eliminate tariffs on intra-African trade,

making it easier for African businesses to trade within the continent and tap from the huge

potential of a larger African market.

9. While signing the agreement on Sunday, President Muhammadu Buhari spoke of “fair

trade” in relation to free trade. ‘‘Nigeria wishes to emphasise that free trade must also be fair

trade,” he said. This resonates well with countries nursing the fear of “unfair” trading

practices that could hurt their economies. While African countries that are relatively more

industrialized are well placed to take advantage of the opportunities for manufactured goods,

less-industrialized countries can benefit from linking into regional value chains. These value

chains involve larger industries sourcing their supplies from smaller industries across borders,

made easier by reduced trade costs and bigger investment.

10. Development is a big challenge across the African continent. AfCFTA, a flagship project

of Agenda 2063 of the African Union, is expected to help accelerate Africa’s own

development vision. It was approved by the African Union Summit as an urgent initiative

whose immediate implementation would provide quick wins, impact on socioeconomic

development and enhance confidence and the commitment of Africans as the owners and

drivers of Agenda 2063. The effect, as projected, will contribute to the achievement of the

United Nations 2030 Agenda, especially the Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES OF THE AfCFTA.

The extensive agenda of the AfCFTA integration process among African countries affects

several dimensions of economic and socio-ecological development. A wide range of

institutional and structural factors will determine the progress and the outcomes of the

integration project. These include the regional economic communities, implementation and

adjustment costs, structural transformation and industrial policies, as well as the role of the

European Union and other non-African actors, amongst others.

The eight regional economic communities are the building blocks of the AfCFTA agreement,

as every African country participates in one or more of these RECs. However, the diversity of

integration levels and overlapping RECs add complexity to the liberalization process. The

AfCFTA agreement is a free trade agreement for every country in addition to the RECs.

Initially, the AfCFTA liberalizes trade in goods between countries and RECs with common

external tariffs that do not yet apply preferential tariff rates amongst each other, such as EAC

and ECOWAS (Schmieg 2020). All countries are affected, once the liberalization efforts of

the AfCFTA go beyond the level of liberalization within the RECs and when the AfCFTA

covers new policy areas not yet included in the RECs. In case of inconsistencies, the

AfCFTA regulations prevail, thereby pushing all countries towards a common regulatory

framework, except for REC with an even higher level of liberalization. This implies that there

will be different speeds of liberalization processes in the different African regions in the

coming years, which depend in turn on the current level of liberalization. In particular,

Western and Central African countries will experience stronger pressure to implement

regulatory adjustments. This can also influence further negotiations among the AU member

states, in case that these states become reluctant to support further opening.

Further implementation challenges emerge with the actual removal of tariffs in the single

countries. Even though impact studies assume few burdens from tariff reductions on public
revenues in most countries, many low-income countries are typically slow to phase-out tariffs

due to concerns over revenue loss and import competition. For instance, Malawi has only

liberalized 70 % of its trade with SADC partners, despite the commitment to remove them

fully. Besides border measures, also national regulations have to be adjusted, for instance,

SPS and TBT regulations, which should be developed and harmonized based on international

standards (AfCFTA Annex 7) (African Union 2019). The agreement defines commitments to

monitor and report the implementation of the different protocols on trade in goods and

establishes various committees to manage the process, but further mechanisms to foster and

support implementation might be necessary. In particular, countries with weaker

administrative and financial capacities might face burdens from the implementation of more

enhanced regulatory frameworks, but also with respect to the use of the special and

differential treatment clauses of the AfCFTA.

That being said, some key fundamental challenges identified plaguing the implementation of

the AfCFTA includes the following:

1. Neocolonial Interventions and Weak Indigenous Industrial Base

One major obstacle to the successful take-off of the AfCFTA is a series of neocolonial

economic interventions and the associated weak indigenous industrial base in most African

countries. These problems can be attributed not just to centuries of resource plunder by

Western capital and states (principally through both the trans-Atlantic slave trade and

colonialism), but also to the nature of the post-colonial (neo-colonial) political economy. For

instance, studies demonstrate how former colonial powers nurtured a rent-seeking class of

comprador African leaders who, since independence, have helped Western capital continue

the plunder of African resources. Sometimes, this class of comprador leaders was created

through external threats of violence, national economic ruination, or a sponsored coup d'état.
The French government is known to have used these forms of threat and suppression to create

and sustain a class of compliant leaders in its former African colonies. African comprador

leaders have primarily become the conduit through which foreign capital and governments

control the economic and trade policies of most African states and through which these

foreign interests ensure their dominance of both African markets and economies. The former

AU's Permanent Representative to the US, Arikana ChihomboriQua, highlighted this neo

colonial control of African economies when she called out France for the continuing

economic strangulation of its former African colonies through a set of garroting policies

(ironically called "cooperation agreements''), which is extorted from its former colonies as a

condition for independence. Some of these so-called cooperation agreements included the

demand by the French government that its former African colonies deposit their entire

foreign reserves with the French central bank upon attainment of independence. These

emerging states were threatened with economic devastation if they chose an independent

economic future. Scared of the potential impacts of such devastations upon independence,

fourteen emerging states accepted this condition upon the attainment of independence. These

states included Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast (now Cote D'Ivoire), Mali, Niger, Senegal,

Togo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Congo-

Brazzaville, and Gabon. Thus, at independence, France confiscated the national reserves of

these countries. To date, the bulk of the national foreign reserves of these countries are held

by the French central bank and the French Treasury determines how much and the conditions

under which any of these reserves would be withdrawn. In other words, none of these

countries has an independent monetary policy and, in some cases, they do not even know

how much of their foreign reserves are held by France. Conservative estimate puts the total

amount of the foreign reserves France takes out of its former African colonies every year at

about $500 billion. African countries can only access 15 percent of this money each year and
will have to borrow any extra amount at commercial interest rates imposed by the French

Treasury, albeit the money belongs to them. France can and sometimes does veto requests

from its former African colonies to access any part of these foreign reserves. One condition

under which this veto often applies is the failure to submit to France an annual report of how

they spent the reserves they were previously permitted to access. This is a central requirement

for these African countries to continue to access part of their foreign reserve with the French

central bank. Before the accession to independence, France also demanded from its former

African colonies preferential treatment over the purchase and exploitation of their natural

resources, as well as over public procurement. In line with the pre-independence policy

extortion, French companies and interests must be considered in contract biddings before

other competing foreign interests. As a result of this requirement, French companies control

major investments and economic assets in its former colonies, including such utilities as

electricity, water, telephone, public transport, ports, and construction, as well as the

agricultural and banking sectors. As Yates documents, French parastatals represented national

interests. Privately-owned companies receiving development contracts and privileged

licenses also amassed immense family fortunes. From these businesses came today's small

class of super-rich French profiteers whose strong ties to the former empire have made them

brand names of Francafrique. Another means through which France places a stranglehold

over its former African colonies is the imposition of its currency as part of the cooperation

agreements. France determines the exchange rates of this currency and guarantees its

convertibility. To ensure complete control of the monetary policies of its former African

colonies, the French central bank is usually represented on the sub-regional central banks of

these countries. Even after joining the Euro currency zone, France has continued to dictate

most of the monetary policies of its former colonies. Compliance with these arrangements has

been achieved through force and economic sabotage. For instance, when the founding
president of Guinea, Sekou Toure, refused to accept France's terms for independence, the

French government did everything possible to devastate its post-independence economy. The

French government immediately withdrew all its personnel which was vital for a stable

transition to both a new government and an independent country. It also reportedly

dismantled the national telephone system and the gadgets were shipped to France. The French

secret services also sabotaged the economy of the newly independent state by flooding its

economy with counterfeit currency. These sabotage activities were activated to deter other

emerging Francophone African states from following in Guinea's footsteps. Other

independent-minded African leaders who defied France at different stages of their countries'

development suffered even harsher penalties, including assassinations and sponsored

putsches. These included Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, Modibo Keita of Mali, David Dacko of

the Central African Republic, Maurice Yaméogo of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), and

Hubert Maga of Benin. It has been suggested that France had a hand in the military coups that

removed and/or killed these courageous leaders. France has also directly intervened in some

of these countries in support of compliant leaders. It is estimated that "between 1960 and

2005 France launched some 46 military operations in its former African colonies" to protect

its interests. The political and economic influence of France over its former African colonies

is as overwhelming today as it was during the colonial era. This influence manifested once

again in full force in 2019, when under the influence of the current President of France,

Emmanuel Macron, Francophone West African states re-named their common CA franc

currency as the "Eco" as a way of deflecting the increasing criticism of its economic

subservience to France. And in unilaterally renaming its currency, they disrupted both the

timeline and economic outline commonly agreed to by members of the regional economic

group, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for the adoption of a

common currency by the same name. Similarly, in the same year, Ariana Chihombori-Quao,
the former African Union's Permanent Representative to the US, was promptly relieved of

her position after her blistering criticism of the French continuing economic imperialism in

Africa. It was believed that the leadership of Francophone African countries demanded her

immediate removal. The letter which terminated her appointment was issued by Moussa Faki

Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission and a native of Chad, a

Francophone African state. Beyond the demonstrable ability of France to undermine the

commitment of its comprador African leaders to regional free-trade areas, the speed with

which Arikana Chihombori-Quao was terminated by the leadership of the African Union

shows how beholden African leaders are to Western interests. This lack of economic and

policy independence will, no doubt, hamstring the development of the AfCFTA as outlined.

In similar ways, but without formally imposing such overt conditions for independence, other

former colonial powers in Africa, particularly Britain, have had an enormous influence on the

policies and political economy of their former colonies. For instance, Britain has maintained

a strangulating influence on its former colonies, especially through its quasi-colonial

institution known as the Commonwealth. Equally, a throve of its recently declassified

information demonstrates its horrific role in the genocide against Igbo people during the

Nigerian Civil War; a colossal atrocity in which at least a million Igbo children were

deliberately starved to death to advance the economic interest of the British state. The neo-

colonial allegiances (and forced alliances) of African countries to their former colonizers will

pose an enormous challenge to the development and consolidation of a continental free-trade

area, as many of these allegiances are both institutionally linked and deeply rooted. Many

African states remain both institutional and commercial outputs of their former colonizers

and without breaking up these neo-colonial relationships, the fate of the AfCFTA is

indeterminate.

2. The Chinese Factor.

The massive economic presence of China on the continent is also certain to provide a

significant challenge to the proposed free-trade region. China has aggressively increased its

investments and consolidated its power in Africa since the late 20th century. Many African

states have received loans from it that are both low-interest and interest-free (but typically

collateralized). It has made significant investments in infrastructure projects like roads, trains,

and airports all over the continent. In addition, China helped finance the building of the new

African Union Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and established its first military

outpost there in Djibouti. With annual commerce of more than $200 billion, it is currently

Africa's largest trading partner, displacing other significant economies. It is estimated that

more than 10,000 Chinese firms operate currently in the continent, with a value of over $2

trillion. It is also noted that Africa has displaced Asia as the biggest market for China's

construction contracts overseas. Recently, China announced a Belt and Road Africa

infrastructure development fund worth $1 billion and an additional $60 billion aid package

for African countries. The Belt and Road infrastructure fund is designed to overcome

physical and digital infrastructure deficits across Eurasia and Africa. It targets several

kilometers of construction in new highways and rail lines, as well as power plants, airports,

and telecommunication systems.

Most of these investments are completely controlled by Chinese companies, while others rely

on joint ventures between Chinese companies and the nations they are operating in. Chinese

traders have also inundated African markets with inexpensive (and occasionally subpar and

fake) goods, forcing out local businesses. Chinese immigration to the continent is at an all-

time high, and new Chinatowns are establishing themselves all over the continent as part of

an insurgent conquest of African economies. By 2014, over one million Chinese people are in

Africa building what some have described as "a new empire". The Chinese Mandarin
language and culture are gaining ground particularly among the youth in many African

countries, funded mostly through the quasi-imperialist Confucius Institute.

However, most importantly, China has entrenched its economic interests in Africa through a

series of free-trade zones it has secured from several African states. In Nigeria, the Lekki

Free Trade Zone in the country's megacity, Lagos, is being developed in collaboration with

Chinese investors to get foreign investors, particularly from China, to move their

manufacturing to Nigeria. The first phase of this project will cost $5 billion and cover an area

of 3,000 hectares of land. While the Lagos State government of Nigeria holds 40 percent of

this investment, the other 60 percent is held by Chinese investors. Construction on this free-

trade zone, which started in 2007 as part of a strategy to consolidate economic and trade

cooperation between China and Nigeria, has gone to an advanced stage and a few Chinese

companies have started operations in the area. Similar functional Chinese free-trade zones,

industrial parks, and export processing zones have also been developed in many other African

countries, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa. In these free-trade zones,

Chinese companies are offered exemptions from taxes and tariffs as incentives to move their

companies to Africa. They also receive other financial incentives and business benefits,

which are often not extended to indigenous corporations. Unarguably, China has become an

indispensable economic behemoth in Africa. Given its entrenched economic interests and

investments and the multi-year management contracts it holds for many of its infrastructural

investments in the continent, it is hard to see how Chinese investors and merchants will be

displaced or excluded from participating both actively and dominantly in the emerging

African free-trade area.

3. Coordination among Member States:

The AfCFTA involves 54 African Union member states, each with its own economic,

political, and regulatory systems. Coordinating and harmonizing policies and procedures
among these diverse countries can be challenging. Ensuring effective communication,

consensus-building, and cooperation among member states requires strong institutional

mechanisms and sustained engagement.

4. Dispute Settlement Mechanism

The creation of an impartial and effective institution is necessary for the dispute settlement

mechanism of the AfCFTA to operate effectively. There are significant obstacles to

overcome in developing the required capability, finding qualified candidates, and

guaranteeing the availability of financial resources.

5. Infrastructural Deficits

Inadequate infrastructure, including transportation networks, energy supply, and digital

connectivity, hinders efficient trade flows within Africa. Limited infrastructure capacity and

poor connectivity increase transportation costs, result in delays, and limit the movement of

goods and services. Addressing infrastructure deficits and investing in cross-border

infrastructure projects are necessary to unlock the full potential of the AfCFTA.

6. Trade Imbalances and Unequal Development.

African countries have varying levels of economic development and industrial capacity.

Some countries may face challenges in competing with more advanced economies, leading to

potential trade imbalances. Addressing these imbalances and ensuring equitable development

across the continent will be essential to ensure that the benefits of the AfCFTA are shared by

all member states.

CONCLUSION.

This paper has extensively evaluated the legal and institutional framework of the Africa

Continental Free Trade Area in light of its functional missions, opportunities, and challenges.

Although the AfCFTA concept is excellent, there are valid doubts regarding its viability and
success. Good law cannot be put into effect if the political institutions are saddled with

onerous rules that create gridlock in the decision-making process. Additionally, good laws

don't enforce themselves. They demand effective enforcement actions. Immediately

implementing AfCFTA law into domestic law in member states can aid in law enforcement.