TOWARDS A BORDERLESS SUB-REGION IN A GLOBALIZED AGE: PROSPECTS

AND CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

The strategy for the economies survival of countries across the world has become very

relevant in modern times. This has brought to relevance the issues relating to Regional

Integration. It has given nations the options of cooperation and competition. It has

provided for participating states the options of promoting the best areas of specialization

whilst at the same time ceding to other participating nations products considered to be

within the purview of the strength of those other states. The fundamental idea of creating

a unified market, where products, services, and capital are guaranteed unrestricted

freedom of movement within the integrated area, is the most alluring aspect of

integration. This assurance covers the right to abode and to operate an establishment. We

have observed the resuscitation or expansion of current regional economic arrangements

as well as the emergence of new groups in the sub-Saharan African regions. The

aforementioned measures have interestingly paralleled current trends in the industrialized

and Western world, which have used economic integration as a tool for political and

socioeconomic growth. As a feasible framework for small and developing nations to

better organize themselves to survive economically and politically in a highly competitive

world, regional economic integration is becoming more widely acknowledged. The

European Union serves as the model for West Africa's economic integration approach.

The ECOWAS Treaty presents a collection that is strikingly comparable to the EU Treaty

in many ways. We live in a global village with close ties and economic engagements

across national boundaries, so it stands to reason that factors affecting the European
 Union's integration process have (The first page needs to be broken down into

paragraphs) a significant potential to affect other economies, particularly West Africa,

with its immature and underdeveloped integration experiment. This article will evaluate

and identify the factors that have made the ECOWAS experiment difficult to develop in

order to achieve the desired goals of economic integration. It will also advocate for

continuing the strategy in order to combat the sub region’s current deplorable and

intolerable economic conditions. The paper will further examine the impact of the

current EU crisis (I don’t think this is the focus of your study) through comparative

analysis, demonstrating whether or not the West African experiment can be protected

from its whims because the latter was designed along the lines of the former, and it will

highlight any lessons that can be drawn from it.

1.2 General Overview

The Francophone nations of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali,

Niger, Togo, and Senegal have already united under the common currency of the CFA

Franc, which is governed by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)

Central Bank. The West African Sub-region currently runs two currency regimes (Saleh

Nsouli, 2000). The nations of Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, on the

other hand, use their own national currencies. In reaction to the CFA Franc, these

Anglophone nations established a second monetary zone (WAMZ) in 2000 with the goal of

coordinating their monetary and economic policies in order to create a unified monetary

union and currency to be known as the Eco (Nnanna Joseph, 2000). In the long run, it is

anticipated that it will be simpler for the two currencies, the Eco and the CFA Franc, to

combine into a single West African ECOWAS currency. With the sole purpose of creating a
common union to be characterized by a common Central Bank and a unified currency to be

called the Eco in place of the current 5 existing national currencies, this second group of

countries seeks to converge under what is known as the second West Africa Monetary Zone

(WAMZ). The West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was established as a forerunner to

the Common West African Central Bank (WACB), which has all the transition and

implementation mandates as outlined, in order to lay the groundwork for the establishment

of a new Central Bank for the WAMZ that would be responsible for overseeing currency

and fiscal measures among the five nations in the second monetary zone. The second

monetary zone, originally set to launch on December 1, 2009, was delayed to January 1,

2015, and then to 2020 due mostly to member countries' failure to meet the majority of the

convergence criteria, despite earlier postponements. The new date was required as a

countermeasure to the activation and acceleration of all measures oriented towards the

fulfilment of the Eco's emergence, which would eventually lead to the emergence of the

West African common currency. Dr. Maiyaki stated that: For WAMI to propel its role in the

economic integration process being a convergence precondition itself, WAMI must

undertake a self-introspection, reviewing its capacity and organs, with a view to eliciting its

area of weakness and making out to strengthen same considering the new date for the take.

This was in response to the disturbing inability to meet these datelines and the current

struggles by the Countries of the WAMZ to meet with the criteria. Efforts to increase

intergovernmental collaboration and lessen the likelihood of regional disputes have been

successful over time with the many regional integration in Europe. Other initiatives have

reduced trade restrictions in the European regions and improved cross-border exchange of

capital, labour, goods, and services. Nevertheless, the sovereign debt crisis, which started in

2009 after the financial crisis of 2008, has forced nations in the Eurozone to enact austerity

measures to prevent total financial collapse, although the crisis is far from over (Mount,
 2012). The EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its crowning achievement, the

euro, have been severely tested by the recent global economic turmoil. The challenges of

the The second page will also have to be broken down into paragraphs)EU's unique political

status—no longer just a collection of nation-states but also not yet a fully realized federal

entity—are made clear by the Eurozone crisis. 2010's (McNamara). What is the anticipated

course of European integration after that? In view of the recent vote to remove Britain from

the union, what does the developing Eurozone crisis signify for the European Union's

overall geopolitical position? However, several key turning points and omens that will

influence the course of Europe's destiny can be outlined.

The key question is whether European leaders and voters are willing to modernize their

political institutions and provide them the tools they need to prevent future political,

financial, and economic disasters. I think you should present a bit of the European model as

it is rather than raising questions. The way these problems are overcome or not will have a

significant impact on the political future of European integration as well as the experiment

in West Africa, which is largely its replica.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Since they support sustainable development, the significance of regional integration

organizations in West Africa cannot be overstated. However, the regional integration

organizations in West Africa are implementing their agendas at different phases of

integration, therefore the idea of regional integration differs greatly. Nevertheless, achieving

continental economic and political union is the ultimate goal for the majority of African

region economic blocks. According to Haas which year, nations are convinced to move their

allegiances, expectations, and political activity to a new centre of power in order to realize

the reality of regional integration. In order to establish an effective and durable framework
for regional and continental integration that can serve as an effective tool for human

development as well as regional and continental security, West Africa continues to face

significant economic and developmental problems.

In order to identify, study, and assess the growing dynamics of the known regional

integration difficulties and prospects. Such phenomena as emigration, xenophobia,

international terrorism, globalization, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and China projects

in Africa, media and public opinion, multitude of RIAs, political leadership, State

sovereignty, donor aid dependency vis-à-vis poverty in Africa, refugees' problems, and

other emerging issues that complicate or present obstacles to regional integration in West

Africa call for a thoughtful analysis. In order to examine the new ones and determine the

future possibilities of these organizations, this can be done by evaluating the difficulties and

opportunities of regional integration in West Africa. You should also mention that political

instability, literacy levels in the sub-region and other cultural or contextual factors can make

it difficult for integration to happen.

1.4 Research Questions

1) What are the challenges for and prospects that limit regional integrations in Africa

(please confirm if you’re looking at Africa or West Africa)?

2) What challenges and prospects does the Regional Integration Arrangements offer for the

West African sub-region? in Africa face?

3) What are the specific challenges and prospects that face EAC? Please write this

abbreviation out in full.

 1.5 Research Objectives

Evaluating the barriers and possibilities that impede integration in Africa with a view to

making recommendations is the study's main goal. The following specific goals are set forth:

1) To identify the barriers and possibilities preventing regional integration agreements in

Africa.

2) To assess the difficulties and opportunities facing African regional integration

frameworks. 3) To look at and evaluate the obstacles to and opportunities for regional

integration that the EAC faces.

CHAPTER 2

THE PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES THAT LIMIT REGIONAL INTEGRATION

ARRANGEMENTS IN WEST AFRICA

2.1 Rationale for West African Economic Integration

The creation of a single economic space among the participating nations is the ultimate

objective of any economic integration agreement. Trade relations, as well as historical and

cultural linkages, may lead to financial and economic integration. Macroeconomic policies,

legal systems, and institutional structures must be harmonized in order to achieve nominal

and real convergence. West African integration has been essential and at the centre of the sub

regional leadership's political and economic vision from the post-independence era. The

leadership of the sub region was compelled to view economic integration as a key component

of their development plan due to the continent's fragmentation into small country

governments with a lack of economic coherence. The forces and difficulties of globalization

have brought this imperative ever more clearly into focus as countries, even the wealthy ones,

are constantly engaged in fierce competition for the world's limited resources. As a result, the
world's weaker countries continue to experience unjustified relegation and neglect. It's

notable that even the so-called advanced nations use the integration strategy to strengthen

their positions in this rivalry.

2.2. The Challenges of Economic Integration in West Africa

The progress of the fifteen ECOWAS nations varies significantly. Regarding the

implementation and timeline for removing customs obstacles, there are likewise three distinct

groupings. The first group consists of the wealthiest and most developed nations, including

Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Ivory Coast. The remaining eleven nations make up the second

group. Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea-Conakry have been classified as an

intermediate group. The Revised ECOWAS Treaty states that the community's goal is to

"promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity, with the purpose of

increasing and maintaining economic stability, fostering closer ties among members, and

contributing to progress and development on the African continent." The treaty, however,

does not mandate monetary union for the member states; rather, it offers monetary policy

harmonization, which is necessary to make sure that the community runs smoothly. In order

to accomplish this, the central banks of the ECOWAS States established the West African

Clearing House (WACH) in 1975, which was later changed into the West African Monetary

Agency (WAMA), an autonomous specialized agency of the ECOWAS with a foreign base.

In order to ensure an equitable division of the benefits and expenses of integration among the

community's many member states, a cooperation, compensation, and development fund was

also established. However, numerous research and reports on ECOWAS attest to the

ineffectiveness of this group. In light of this, "the desire to tackle everything only means that

nothing is done with no political resources and only limited financial resources." The African

Development Bank (AFDB) notes that ECOWAS's accomplishments and the development of

a system of collaboration have both been comparatively meagre in its report on the challenges
of integration in Africa. Trade inside the community hasn't been sparked, and it even appears

to be declining. Increased regional integration within ECOWAS faces clear challenges.

Impediments to escalating trade and monetary issues are examples of economic difficulties.

Member state weakness and even a lack of political will are examples of political difficulties.

Despite the fact that there are more than 20 multilateral cooperation schemes and sub-

groupings in West Africa (excluding various bilateral agreements between West African

States) and the obvious benefits of economic cooperation among member States, problems,

challenges, and obstacles that stand in the way of the achievement of the ECOWAS

objectives continue to be highlighted. The following are a few of these obstacles:

• The realization of the integration dream in the West African sub region is severely

hampered by the lack of adequate infrastructure in the form of roads, energy, power, rail,

telecommunications, and other links for the facilitation of the free movement of goods,

capital, services, and people, including the right of residence.

The fundamental cause of this predicament is the prevalence of weak industrial and

productive sectors in the majority of the member states, which is mostly caused by

inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure. Economic integration is the result of nation-states'

desires to pool their resources in order to achieve competitive advantages within the region.

The bigger issue here, though, is that establishing contacts with another country is difficult in

a place where infrastructure is so lacking.

• It is undeniable that the legal framework for the West African integration scheme lacks a

clear role for financial institutions, which has remained at the core of the reasons why the

long-awaited integration of the states of West Africa still exists only as a mirage. The treaty's

evaluation reveals a glaring lack of the provisions required to define and grant the respective

financial institutions specific roles and parameters sufficient to give them the formal
intervention edge needed to facilitate the essential provision of funds and policy to finance

and control the integration scheme's ambits to its intended destination. This trend has played

a significant role in the financial institutions' lack of urgency in addressing the integration-

related concerns. As things are, the financial institutions address the integration problems in a

random and discordant manner. The issue that the financial institutions face as a result of the

ECOWAS member states' failure to create a framework of cooperation runs parallel to the

aforementioned. One such system of collaboration is the creation of a shared monetary and

customs system, which will assist the sub-region expand its market and strengthen its

common currency. This has not been accomplished, and as can be seen at the borders, each

member nation of the sub-region still imposes its own customs tariff. As a result, there hasn't

been any increase in local trade, and given the way things are going, it may even be

declining. The ability of the financial institutions to develop productive areas of cooperative

engagement lowers as commerce declines. Further observation shows that the absence of a

unified Central Bank for ECOWAS limits the ability of financial institutions to carry out their

duty in the economic integration of West Africa. It is a well-known fact that the European

Central Bank (ECB) performed a key and pivotal role in the fields of monetary and economic

policy coordination, which made it possible for the member states of Europe to create a single

currency with ease. The shared Central Bank of West Africa States (BCEAO), which was

founded by the francophone countries of the sub region, had a sustained intermediation role

in helping the WAEMU countries reach their current level of macroeconomic stability.

However, because of inadequate processes and a lack of initiative on the part of the

governments, the ECOWAS experiment's construction of the ECOWAS Central Bank

continues only in name.

 The West African sub-region's states don't speak the same language, which creates

linguistic complexity and gives rise to a variety of institutions, some of which are unique to
the language group. Even though it wasn't necessary, it would have been preferable to have a

single language platform in the area to lessen the barriers to lobbying and communication. In

West Africa, language has the regrettable ability to create barriers between people who view

one another as unique and unchangeable. The goal of the Economic Integration initiative is to

unite diverse individuals in order to take benefit of one another's respective advantages and

disadvantages. It is obvious that the locals' attitudes toward the language diversity haven't

exactly been helpful. The stark division between the colonial languages of English and

French is of much greater significance. When it comes to achieving the sub region’s

economic liberation, the influences of these two languages and the related colonial overlords

have been more competitive than cooperative.

• Many ECOWAS nations have experienced poor administration, political instability, and a

lack of political will on the part of some member state leaders. The integration project is still

in its infancy after more than 40 years. No country in the sub region has demonstrated

leadership, and everyone still holds the others in low regard. There is no denying that the

clear and unwavering commitment of member states beyond lip service and signing treaties

or protocols is a sine qua non for the formation of a meaningful integration experiment in the

sub area given that integration requires the cession of a certain amount of sovereignty. Our

politicians' inability to compromise or "give a little to get a lot" is reprehensible, as is their

staunch stance on sovereignty. The development of a new genre toward this unexplored

technique is desirable, and it is especially necessary for the larger countries in the sub region,

like Nigeria, to take the initiative and exercise leadership, otherwise the entire endeavour

would remain a mirage.

• The dream of West African Economic Integration has continued to be significantly

hampered by the existence of colonial links, different and unique administrative systems, as

well as the persistence of both local and international interests in maintaining the status quo.
A significant obstacle is the former colonial metropoles' meddling in the socio-political

affairs of West African nations in order to pursue and maintain the maintenance of Africa's

reliance on European norms and accessories to international relations. Former colonial

governments typically respond to any attempt at sub-regional grouping with inducements

and/or threats to deter potential members from upholding agreements. Each actor therefore

views the threat or inducements as being more advantageous than the cost or gain of adhering

to regional agreement.

• The existence of several tariff arrangements with various customs duty rates and the over-

dependence of many West African countries on revenue from import tariffs constitute yet

another significant barrier to the integration plan. This is demonstrated by the fact that tariffs,

which represent one of the main spheres of integration, are still highly discriminatory and

lack trust among the member states.

• Another obstacle to the integration approach is the existence of various currencies, some of

which are difficult to exchange. It is true that the idea of monetary integration is gaining

ground more quickly and offers a quick implementation framework when the integrating

nations agree to adopt the same currency, as this would open the door to convertibility,

unrestricted trade in goods and services, as well as the ability to pay customs duties.

Therefore, the member nations' continued use of their different currencies presents issues

with payment systems and convertibility, which in turn makes interstate business transactions

more challenging. Without a doubt, this impeded scenario delays West Africa's economic

integration's goal.

• The ongoing disputes, wars, and unrestrained violence provide another significant problem

because they have reduced the sub-region's ability to survive. Examples include the violence

in Liberia, the strife in Sierra Leone, the illegal coup in the Niger Republic, and most recently
the approaching Gambia election problem. Since there have been so many violent conflicts in

West Africa, famine, drought, damage, refugee issues, diseases, etc. are frequent occurrences

in the socioeconomic landscape. African conflicts have increased poverty on the continent,

slowed down sustainable economic growth and development, damaged physical

infrastructure, and depleted human capital. Conflicts in the sub region have also made it more

difficult for the nation, the region, and the continent to concentrate on integration and

development, and adversely affected the prospects for achieving the MDGs (Eleazu, 1978).

Therefore, in the long run, the enormous untapped cash that was intended to be utilized for

integration objectives is directed toward reconstruction in these nations that have been

devastated by war and drought. States find it challenging to focus and unite as a result.

• Another significant obstacle to the achievement of the ideal of integration is the tacit fear of

hegemony by the so-called bigger countries; in terms of population, GDP, industrialization,

and natural resource endowment, Nigeria dominates all other nations in the area. The claim is

that Nigeria will gain more from the integration approach than any other nation in the sub-

region and might become the market's most dominant nation. The French tends to provoke

this fear of domination as they strive to maintain their sphere of influence in the sub-region. 1

• The fact that ECOWAS member countries do not support or patronize one another to

increase trade in goods and services, as most of the goods that are produced by member

countries are still imported from outside the sub-region, has presented a major challenge for

the organization. This has made it easier for member nations to rely on external markets.

• The leaders of the ECOWAS member states' attitudes toward national sovereignty are

another obstacle. These leaders have differing ideologies and psychological traits. Being

newly independent, the majority of states had a strong desire to uphold and demonstrate their

national sovereignty and integrity in relation to other African States. The adoption of national
1
Vuho C.V Op. cit
currencies, national central banks, national airways, national shipping lines, national stock

exchanges, etc. was a result of this tenacious grip on sovereignty. Although these were

regarded as the physical representations of nationhood and sovereignty, they evolved into

signs of attachment that could not be expressed outside of national boundaries.

• Leaders in Africa are likewise quite concerned about the continent's debt problem. The

capacity for economic integration in Africa is harmed by the effects of the debt crisis and the

externally enforced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). Underdevelopment appears to

have taken on a terrifying scale in the area as a result of the debt issue (Fawole, 1992). At the

end of 2004, the entire amount of outstanding debt was estimated to be $330 billion in

nominal terms, and African countries were still making payments of more than $30 million

per day on loans taken out over the previous 30 years. As a result, African nations divert

precious resources from economic and the social sectors and instead use them to pay off debt.

Currently, it is expected that the daunting issues of external debt and the accompanying SAP

packages imposed by the IMF will be enough to wreak unimaginable havoc on the already

weakened economies of West Africa, preventing the achievement of both regional and

economic development in Africa, even if domestic macroeconomic mismanagement and

political instability alone do not obstruct the realization of economic integration.

• Another issue is that member nations frequently neglect to include the business sector, mass

movements, and civil society in the integration process, which exacerbates the flaws in the

integration mechanism. The community's citizens are not properly informed about its goals,

and the state and local governments do not offer any encouragement to the community's

private sector and civil society to ensure that they have a better understanding of one another

and can work together more effectively to achieve the community's goals. In light of the

foregoing, it can be concluded that West Africa's growth is largely constrained by social,

political, and cultural issues. This has posed the biggest challenge to the fulfilment of
regional cooperation and integration. 6. West Africa's Integration Prospects and Strategic

Visions has noted that the current political unrest, economic stagnation, and social unrest in

Africa are symptoms of a leadership crisis. If this is true for individual nations, it is also true

for the process of regional integration. The emergence of greater leadership could provide the

direction and vision required as well as serve as an example of the sacrifice and dedication

required in any cooperative venture. But not all nations have the same understanding of the

value of collaboration. It appears that certain people need to be encouraged, convinced, and

pushed ahead by others. One wonders why finding a solution to the issues has not been the

top priority of ECOWAS member states given the benefits that can be obtained from West

African economic cooperation and the fundamental role that it could play in the development

of each African nation. In reality, proponents of further regional economic integration have

convincingly shown that the "essential criteria on which the arguments and conclusion

against ECOWAS are built on some of the exact factors which the West African countries are

desirous of changing through economic integration. Several leaders and nations in West

Africa have the good fortune to share a strong commitment to the vision of regional

integration. In order to fulfil their financial duties to the community, some member states

have always been more diligent than others. The more dedicated states have taken the

initiative to start significant regional cooperation initiatives and programs. Regarding

formulas for calculating financial contributions, trade liberalization schedules, or

compensation formulas for the loss of tariff revenue, some community arrangements have

required special sacrifices from some member states; the acceptance of these arrangements is

a glaring example of solidarity and community spirit. According to some analysts, West

Africa must embrace a flexible type of regional cooperation carried out pragmatically and ad

hoc basis due to the region's low economic development and some countries' disregard for

regional integration under ECOWAS. This claim has been backed up by the achievements of
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Association of South East Asian

Nations (ASEAN), and the loose agreement with the Latin American Economic System

(SELA). Analysis of West Africa's integration experience within ECOWAS reveals a dismal

track record in terms of the poorly carried out community projects. The terms of the amended

treaty establishing the supranationality principle are not being implemented. A number of

protocols are broken, especially those that deal with the free flow of people and products. The

current state of affairs demonstrates all too plainly how vitally inadequate a plural-national

community's sense of belonging is. The degree to which the Executive Secretariat succeeds in

advancing West Africa's development will determine the success of ECOWAS initiatives and

the political commitment of member states. This fundamental idea emphasizes the necessity

of cogent community initiatives and policies that are realistic, practical, and capable of

advancing regional integration. To that purpose, programs emphasizing the advantages will

need to be developed for collective action. The Executive Secretary will need to identify the

top priority intervention areas within which steps will be taken in conjunction with particular

state efforts. While overall ECOWAS's efforts to integrate West Africa have, as already

mentioned, plainly fallen short of expectations, there are some encouraging signals that point

to greater future prospects for ECOWAS. These include things like "recent events in West

Africa's political and economic scene, which have gradually helped to remove the main

barriers to integration." Among these are:

• The gradual withdrawal of the state from sectors of productive activity and the recognition

that the private sector must be the mainstay of growth and economic integration;

• The adoption of a strategy for accelerating the ECOWAS process of integration in order to

create a single regional market based on trade liberalization, to establish a single market for

goods and services across the region;

• The synchronization of ECOWAS and WAEMU initiatives in relation to the quickening of

West Africa's integration process;

• Restructuring of the ECOWAS Fund and Executive Secretariat with an eye toward

streamlining their operational processes.

• West Africa appears to have the institutional framework required to advance regional

integration with the passage of the African Economic Commission (AEC) treaty and the

amendment of the ECOWAS treaty, but the future direction and success of that process

cannot be taken for granted.

• Harmonizing monetary policies, improving macroeconomic management, and eventually

replacing the region's weak, non-transferable domestic currencies with a single regional

currency all require monetary integration.

• Since the lack of stable and coherent policies in these areas makes regional integration less

successful in other ways, regional integration should also include collaboration in the social,

cultural defence and political spheres. The need for comprehensive examination of these

other aspects of regional integration is well demonstrated by developments in the EU. This

section looks okay but I will suggest you beef it up a bit. Also please organize it according to

sub-sections if possible using the research objectives as a guide.

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

3.1. Conclusion

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has laid out a hydra-headed,

multifaceted integration plan of integration for the States through the treaty in areas of

possible cooperation between themselves. When implemented, this plan would ultimately be

the driving force behind all of their successful endeavours. In order to establish a

development index or barometer for the West African sub-region, these categories appear to

have primarily encompassed the entirety of the most strategic national human endeavour

desired under any economic integration program. Without a doubt, the accomplishments that

would be noted in these areas would indicate that the West African sub-region's development

goals have been met.

The EU has been contending with a slow-moving but unstoppable crisis since the global

economic collapse of 2008, which has highlighted the problems with their unified currency,

the euro. The prolonged financial crisis caused by the European debt crisis has made it

challenging for several Eurozone nations to refinance their sovereign debt without the help of

outside parties. Despite the austerity measures implemented to prevent the Eurozone’s

catastrophic financial collapse, the crisis is far from over. There can be no denying that the

countries of West Africa have little to no choice but to join in given the heated competition

among countries to maximize their market advantages over rivals through the policy of

integration. Even the prosperous nations of the world, which would have otherwise been

complacent, are embracing the plan to sharpen their advantages over and above their

competitors, therefore these nations must embrace this alternative totally and with unrelenting

devotion. It would appear that Africa's choice for regional economic union is essentially non-

existent for West Africa to catch up with this race. It is even more concerning when you

consider that other international integration experiments not only rely on the internal markets

they have developed through integration, but also unfairly benefit from the large and plentiful

markets that are prevalent in West Africa at the expense of the West African countries. The

production and manufacturing base and potentials of the region have been practically

destroyed by this crippling and unacceptable status quo, which has, in the long run, reduced it

to a consumption economy that depends on imports from markets that are already subject to

intense competition brought on by the vehicle of integration from elsewhere.

Thus, it follows logically that the West African people, governments, and countries have an

excellent opportunity to drastically alter their mind-set and adopt the strategy of economic

integration as a solution to the myriad socioeconomic and development issues that have long

plagued the region. To propel this process and put the region's people out of poverty and
misery, ECOWAS and its institutions need to be well-positioned, well-funded, and given the

authority to do it.

The conclusion should re-cap the purpose of the research with the various research

objectives. Then paragraph by paragraph, let us know what you found according to the

various research objecties. You also need to make some recommendations. This means you

need to read more to beef this section up too.

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