Vietnam-United

States Relations,
2022: A Reader
Carlyle A. Thayer

Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 5

April 20, 2023
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Vietnam-United States Rela0ons, 2022: A Reader

Table of Contents
Introduc2on ..................................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-China Rivalry and Impact on Vietnam ....................................................................... 1
U.S.-Vietnam Rela2ons Under the Biden Administra2on ................................................. 3
Biden’s U.S.-ASEAN Summit and Viet Nam’s Prime Minister ............................................ 5
Does Vietnam Risk U.S. Sanc2ons for its Military Ties with Russia? ................................ 6
Vietnam-U.S.- Rela2ons on the Eve of the 2nd U.S.-ASEAN Summit ................................. 7
Vietnam’s Prime Minister to APend 2nd U.S.- ASEAN Special Summit Hosted by President
Biden ................................................................................................................................ 8
Vietnam-U.S. Rela2ons and Impact on China-Vietnam Ties ........................................... 10
Vietnam-U.S.-ASEAN Rela2ons ATer the Special Summit .............................................. 11
Domes2c Repercussions of Vietnam’s Alignment with the United States: Hypothe2cal 13
Vietnamese Media Coverage of The White House Dinner for ASEAN Leaders .............. 14
USS Ronald Reagan and Vietnam, Nancy Pelosi and Taiwan: Any Linkage? ................... 17
Vietnam-U.S. Rela2ons: Two Cancella2ons in a Month?................................................ 20
U.S.-Vietnam to Hold 26th Human Rights Dialogue ........................................................ 21
U.S. Arms Sales to Vietnam? .......................................................................................... 23
Carlyle A. Thayer Biography ........................................................................................... 25

Introduction
This Reader covers Vietnam-United States rela2ons during the second term of the Biden
Administra2on. The most significant development concerned President Joe Biden’s hos2ng
the 2nd United States-ASEAN Summit in Washington, D.C. and the conversa2on between
President Biden and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh at the official White House dinner. The
Other issues included the cancella2on of the port visit by the USS Ronald Reagan aircraT
carrier and the 26th human rights dialogue

U.S.-China Rivalry and Impact on Vietnam

We request your assessment of U.S.-China compe22on and its impact on Vietnam in 2022.
We have three ques2ons:
Q1. How do assess U.S.-China compe22on at present? Will it become more intense in 2022?
ANSWER: U.S.-China compe22on will intensify this year and take the form of an intense
ac2on-reac2on cycle. In other words, China and the United States will respond to the ac2ons
of the other.
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Xi Jinping views the current domes2c polarisa2on of poli2cs in the United States as likely to
intensify in the run up to the mid-term elec2ons in November. In his view, this will hasten the
current decline of American power and influence globally and in the Indo-Pacific Region.
Xi’s assessment that the United States is in decline is bolstered by the pace of Chinese military
modernisa2on including the construc2on of more warships, aircraT and missiles and the
expansion of their capabili2es. The balance of military power will 2lt more towards China.
Many analysts forecast that China will step up its harassment and in2mida2on of Taiwan aTer
the Beijing Winter Olympics. China will con2nue to harass the Philippines to undermine its
alliance with the U.S. And China will con2nue to disrupt oil and gas explora2on by foreign
companies opera2ng in Indonesian and Malaysian waters claimed by China.
The United States will respond to China’s ac2ons by conduc2ng naval and air military exercises
in the Western Pacific and South China Sea in coopera2on with members of AUKUS and the
Quad. Also, the United States will step up diploma2c pressure and economic inducements on
regional states to counter China.
Q2. What are impacts of U.S.-China compe22on on Vietnam and your recommenda2ons for
Hanoi to mi2gate any nega2ve effects?
ANSWER: As a senior Vietnamese diplomat put it to me, Vietnam prefers the “Goldilocks
formula” (from an American’s child’s story) in its rela2ons with China and the United States.
Vietnam prefers that U.S.-China rela2ons not become “too hot” (close) or “too cold” (strained)
but “just right.” In other words, Vietnam can leverage differences between Beijing and
Washington when their rela2ons are strained.
Vietnam will find it more difficult to leverage rela2ons with Beijing and Washington if their
rela2ons deteriorate and become “cold.”
Vietnam should con2nue to promote its bilateral rela2ons with both China and the United
States, as well as mul2laterally through ASEAN and ASEAN-led regional mechanisms. However,
this approach is not sufficient.
Last year I aPended a presenta2on by a former head of state and renowned China expert
under Chatham House rules. His advice was that it was bePer to be “part of a gang” in dealing
with the major powers rather than ac2ng alone. This means Vietnam will have to adjust its
current strategy by placing more emphasis on mul2lateral diplomacy with selected regional
states such as India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines to mi2gate
compe22on between China and the United States.
Q3. Are there any new elements in U.S.-China compe22on to watch for in the new year? What
should Vietnam do to minimize their impact?
ANSWER: The most significant new element in U.S.-China compe22on in the Indo-Pacific is
the 2ghtening of the mul2polar system. In the past, the regional system was a loose form of
mul2polarity and this favoured Vietnam’s policy of diversifying and mul2lateralizing its
external rela2ons.
Now, the U.S. and its allies have come closer together in AUKUS and to a lesser extent the
Quad. Australia and Japan have stepped up their rela2ons through a defence Reciprocal
Access Agreement. China and Russia have also moved closer together in response. These
developments mean that Vietnam has less room to leverage its rela2ons among the major
powers.
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The most worrying aspect of 2ght mul2polarity is the poten2al linkage of a crisis in Taiwan
and a crisis in the Ukraine or vice versa. In other words, Russia or China could respond
opportunis2cally to a crisis involving Taiwan and Ukraine, respec2vely. Or, less likely, Moscow
and Beijing could collude to provoke a dual crisis to strain U.S. resources.
Vietnam should con2nue to support ASEAN centrality but as noted above this too is
insufficient. Vietnam should give serious considera2on to becoming a middle power with the
capacity to build coali2ons, ini2ate diploma2c sePlement of disputes, and influence the
regional security agenda. As a middle power, Vietnam should work to enhance the role of the
East Asia Summit as a mul2lateral security forum. The East Asia Summit comprises eighteen
members: ten ASEAN states and the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, New
Zealand, India, Russia and China.
“U.S.-China Rivalry and Impact on Vietnam,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 7,
2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/553134058/Thayer-U-S-China-Rivalry-and-Impact-
on-Vietnam.

U.S.-Vietnam Relations Under the Biden Administration

We are researching how U.S.-Vietnam rela2ons have progressed during President Biden's first
year in office. We request your assessment of the following ques2ons?
Q1. How would you characterize the development of U.S.-Vietnam rela2ons over President
Biden’s first twelve months in office?
ANSWER: U.S.-Vietnam rela2ons are in a steady state, shaped by the 2013 comprehensive
partnership and past agreements on defence coopera2on. For example, in 2011 the United
States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defence
Coopera2on in five areas – mari2me security, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, exchanges between defence universi2es and research ins2tutes, and UN
peacekeeping. A decade later these five areas of coopera2on remain the mainstay of defence
coopera2on.
In 2015, the two countries adopted a Joint Vision Statement on Defence Coopera2on that
included a list of twelve areas of coopera2on most of which were on-going. Except for the sale
of three former U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cuPers there have been no major new
developments but a con2nua2on of already agreed defence coopera2on.
In March 2021, the Biden Administra2on issued its Interim Na<onal Security Strategic
Guidance in which Vietnam was listed a priority security partner. Both Vice President Kamala
Harris and Secretary of Defence Lloyd Aus2n visited Vietnam in 2021 and raised the possibility
of eleva2ng bilateral rela2ons to a strategic partnership. Vietnam’s leaders sidestepped this
issue as premature because they do not have sufficient confidence and trust in the
domes2cally shaky Biden Administra2on.
Q2. There have been fewer personal interac2ons in 2021 than in Trump’s first year in office.
(PM Phuc was one of the first foreign leaders Trump spoke to aTer his victory and PM Phuc
visited Washington in 2017).
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Has the Biden Administra2on slightly snubbed Vietnam, focusing its efforts in Southeast Asian
instead on other countries? Or are US-Vietnam rela2ons now so stable that grand displays of
affec2on, such as what we saw under the Trump Administra2on, no longer needed?
ANSWER: The Trump and Biden Administrations are a study of contrasts. The Trump
Administration was laser focused on U.S. trade deficits and what it viewed as unfair trade
practices. Immediately after Trump came to office he withdrew the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership. Vietnam reacted with alacrity to protect its economic interests in
its largest export market. Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc successfully lobbied
for an invitation to The White House to try and assuage President Trump. PM Phuc made a
favourable impression. Vietnam basked in the sun when Trump picked Hanoi for his second
summit meeting with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un.
However, the bilateral relationship soured at the end of Trump’s term in office. In June 2019,
Trump told Fox News that “Vietnam takes advantage of us even worse than China… It's almost
the single worst abuser of everybody.” Trump Administration officials also accused Vietnam
of currency manipulation.
Both the Trump and Biden Administra2ons iden2fied Vietnam as a poten2al strategic partner.
However, the Biden Administra2on’s ini2al preoccupa2on was on the Middle East, and
Afghanistan in par2cular, rather than Southeast Asia.
The Biden Administra2on iden2fied ASEAN as key to the Indo-Pacific regional architecture.
However, in an early set-back, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s effort to hold a virtual
conference with his ASEAN counterparts while flying to the Middle East failed due to technical
problems with communica2ons.
The COVID-19 pandemic made it difficult for face-to-face mee2ngs, especially when the Delta
variant emerged. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Aus2n was forced to postpone a trip to
Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines. This resulted in compressed back-to-back visits to
Hanoi by Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary Aus2n. Also, it should be noted, Secretary
Blinken spoke by phone with Vietnam’s foreign minister Pham Binh Minh and his successor
Bui Thanh Son (as well as other counterparts in Southeast Asia).
However, Vietnam was not on the i2nerary of either Secretary Blinken or Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink when they visited Southeast Asia
later in the year. Because of President Biden’s ini2a2ve to host a Summit for Democracy
priority aPen2on was given to Indonesia and Malaysia. This leT Vietnam marginalised in the
process.
Q3. What’s the future of U.S.-Vietnam rela2ons under Biden? What might 2022 have in store?
ANSWER: U.S. Ambassador-designate to Vietnam Marc Knapper publicly pledged to promote
an upgrading of bilateral 2es during his Senate confirma2on hearings. His arrival in Hanoi
should give new impetus to raising bilateral rela2ons to a strategic partnership. There are
several thorny issues that must be resolved first – economic issues including Vietnam’s status
as a non-market economy and the trade imbalance, Vietnam’s dependency on Russia as the
source of its defence armaments, U.S. pressure on Vietnam to join the United States to
pushback against China in the South China Sea, and human rights.
The current crisis in Myanmar and how ASEAN Chair Cambodia handles this issue will receive
greater priority than upgrading rela2ons with Vietnam. Domes2c American poli2cs, especially
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the mid-term elec2ons in November, will weigh heavily on Hanoi’s delibera2ons on whether
or not to nego2ate a strategic partnership with the Biden Administra2on. If the Democra2c
Party loses control of Congress, Hanoi will view the United States as an unreliable partner.
“U.S.-Vietnam Rela2ons Under the Biden Administra2on,” Thayer Consultancy Background
Brief, January 18, 2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/553959888/Thayer-U-S-
Vietnam-Rela2ons-Under-the-Biden-Administra2on.

Biden’s U.S.-ASEAN Summit and Viet Nam’s Prime Minister

Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh will attend the U.S.-ASEAN summit in Washington D.C. later
this month scheduled for later this month. This is a good opportunity for Mr. Chinh and
President Joe Biden to discuss ways to elevate bilateral ties. We request your insight into the
following three questions:
Q1. Why is the summit being held now? The first was in early 2016 under the Obama
Administration.
ANSWER: There are three reasons why the United States wants to hold a summit with ASEAN
leaders. First, President Joe Biden, not Donald Trump, is president of the United States. Biden
has vast experience in foreign affairs and supports muiltilateralism in general and ASEAN-
centrality in the Indo-Pacific.
Second, the COVID-19 pandemic is sufficiently under control so international travel and face-
to-face summits are now possible.
Third, President Biden has been in office for a year and has just released the Indo-Pacific
Strategy of the United States. Scheduling a U.S.-ASEAN summit is part of the United States’
commitment to stay engaged in the region.
Initially, the Biden Administration wanted to hold the summit in January. At present there
seems to be a lack of consensus among ASEAN members about the timing of the summit.
Prime Minister Hun Sen, ASEAN Chair, is reported to have recommended a postponement
until mutual agreement is reached on the date.
Q2. How do you view the visit of the Vietnam’s Prime Minister? What could he offer or
request from the U.S. side if he meets with President Biden?
ANSWER: The U.S.-ASEAN Summit provides an opportunity for one-on-one meetings between
President Biden and ASEAN leaders. Vietnam is considered one of the top five priority
countries for the Biden Administration, the others include the Philippines, Thailand,
Singapore and Indonesia.
President Biden and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh both came to office early in 2021. Biden
will be in office for four years, while Chinh will be in office for five years. This is an opportune
moment for the two leaders to get to know each other and reach consensus on how to
cooperate to strengthen bilateral relations and deal with the most pressing challenges they
have in common.
Economic issues and the Ukraine crisis are likely to dominate the talks. President Chinh would
be most keen to learn about Biden’s forthcoming Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and what
role Vietnam could play. Chinh is already on record as supporting a new updated framework
for economic and trade cooperation with the United States.
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Prime Minister Chinh is likely to offer Vietnam’s cooperation and support to increase the role
of American companies and investors in Vietnam. Chinh could also reconfirm Vietnam’s
commitment to major purchases such as aircraft and equipment and LNG.
President Chinh will also welcome continued U.S. assistance combatting COVID-19 including
manufacturing vaccines in Vietnam, maritime safety and security, human resource
development and education and training, climate change, cyber security, the digital economy,
science and technology (pharmaceuticals and biotechnology), and the legacy of war.
Q3. What other issues are likely to be on the table between Mr. Chinh and Mr. Biden?
ANSWER: The two leaders will undoubtedly discuss the most pressing challenges and
opportuni2es in interna2onal affairs including the conflict in Ukraine, the impact of western
sanc2ons on Russia and their impact on the global economy, rela2ons with China, and the
possibility of ini2a2ng discussions on raising bilateral rela2ons to a higher level.
“Biden’s U.S.-ASEAN Summit and Viet Nam’s Prime Minister,” Thayer Consultancy Background
Brief, March 10, 2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/564263422/Thayer-Biden-s-U-S-
ASEAN-Summit-and-Viet-Nam-s-Prime-Minister.

Does Vietnam Risk U.S. Sanctions for its Military Ties with Russia?
We are preparing a report regarding the threat of sanc2ons under Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanc2ons Act on Vietnam. We request your assessment of the following
issue: What are the chances that Vietnam could be sanc2oned under CAATSA, and how much
of a threat do you think Hanoi takes this?
ANSWER: Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc2ons Act (August 2017) has been
on the books for four years and eight months. The United States faces a dilemma because it
is pursuing contradictory objec2ves. CAATSA aims at punishing Russian defence en22es with
sanc2ons because of Russia’s annexa2on of the Crimea and disrup2ng their arms sales by
threatening states who procure Russian arms, such as Vietnam. At the same 2me, the U.S.
seeks to enlist Vietnam as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific.
The then Secretary of Defense James Mats grasped this conundrum and sought waivers for
India, Vietnam and Indonesia. Waivers are not indefinite and can only be applied for a fixed
period of 2me. In order to qualify for a waiver Vietnam would have to demonstrate that it is
taking steps to reduce its dependency on Russian arms and military technology. Also, a
country that has connec2ons with Russian en22es implicated in hacking in the United States
cannot qualify for a waiver.
In 2018, reportedly, U.S. defence officials in the Trump Administra2on pressured Vietnam to
cuts its dependence on Russian arms and military technology or face the possibility of
sanc2ons. Vietnam was urged to buy American weapons instead. In September 2018, at the
conclusion of the annual Defence Policy Dialogue held in Hanoi, Vietnam stunned U.S. officials
by cancelling fiTeen military exercises planned for 2019. It is my assessment that Vietnam was
responding to American pressures by demonstra2ng its independence.
Nevertheless, Vietnam’s expenditure on arms procurements peaked in 2018 at US $333
million and decreased to US $72 million in 2021. Also, Vietnam has not made any big 2cket
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purchases from Russia since CAATSA was adopted, although it was rumoured to be in the
market for new ground aPack aircraT and fiTh genera2on fighters.
Vietnam’s vote against suspending Russia’s membership on the UN Human Rights Council and
the recent announcement that Russian and Vietnamese military planners agreed on a series
of military exercises involving combat training likely will dampen U.S. expecta2ons that they
can enlist Vietnam as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific at present.
In sum, as long as Vietnam con2nues to restrict its arms procurements from Russia it is unlikely
to be sanc2oned under CAATSA. However, the new raT of other U.S. sanc2ons against Russia
for its invasion of Ukraine raise complex new difficul2es for Vietnam in how to pay for arms
procurements and services from Russia without being penalised.
“Does Vietnam Risk U.S. Sanc2ons for its Military Ties with Russia?” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, April 20, 2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/571172267/Thayer-
Does-Vietnam-Risk-U-S-Sanc2ons-for-Its-Military-Ties-With-Russia.

Vietnam-U.S.- Relations on the Eve of the 2nd U.S.-ASEAN Summit

As reported, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh will visit the United States shortly. We request
your apprecia2on of the following issues:
Q1. Current and future Viet Nam-US rela2ons
ANSWER: Vietnam-United States bilateral rela2ons currently are quite good now that
Ambassador Marc Knapper has taken up his post in Hanoi. Ambassador Knapper has been
quite ac2ve since his arrival, especially in mee2ng high-level officials, and preparing for Prime
Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s mee2ng with President Joe Biden, working visit to the United
States, and aPendance at the 2nd U.S. ASEAN Special Leaders’ Summit.
The future of U.S.-Vietnam rela2ons largely will be dependent on the mee2ng between
President Biden and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. Vice President Kamala Harris, Secretary
of Defense Lloyd Aus2n and Ambassador Marc Knapper have all raised the desirability of
raising rela2ons to a strategic partnership.
Q2. Vietnam’s role in ASEAN in general and at US-ASEAN Summit in par2cular
ANSWER: Vietnam, because it is poli2cally stable and has a strategic vision, probably plays a
more construc2ve role in ASEAN than some of its original founders. Vietnam is construc2ve
and prac2cal in trying to strengthen ASEAN, ASEAN-centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms.
The U.S. ASEAN Summit is likely to focus on a number of issues ranging from regional health
issues (mi2ga2ng COVID-19 pandemic and other infec2ous diseases, and building up the
health infrastructure, and human resource development), post-COVID economic recovery,
supply chains, digital economy, infrastructure, Mekong River development, and climate
change. These are all priority areas for Vietnam and Vietnam is likely to support mul2lateral
approaches to mee2ng these challenges.
Q3. Which topics will the US side want to discuss with the Vietnamese side during the Prime
Minister Chinh’s visit?
ANSWER: President will want to discuss con2nued U.S. support for COVID-19 mi2ga2on and
recovery (vaccines, pharmaceu2cals, biotechnology, human resource development, and
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support for the CDC regional office); a new economic framework agreement covering digital
trade, investment and U.S. market access; cyber security, and war legacy issues.
President Biden will raise foreign policy issues: a free and open Indo-Pacific, bilateral
coopera2on on mari2me safety and security, Myanmar, and the war in Ukraine.
Q4. If the US invites Vietnam to engage in its free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy more deeply,
how should Vietnam respond? Which fields should Vietnam join?
ANSWER: There are a number of issues that already overlap with U.S.-Vietnam and U.S.-ASEAN
rela2ons that are key to Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: transna2onal threats, health security,
connec2vity, regional prosperity through broad-based economic growth, secure supply
chains, energy, transporta2on, climate change, and people to people linkages.
Once the Biden Administra2on announces its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Vietnam
should quickly engage with the U.S. to give this ini2a2ve some momentum.
“Vietnam-U.S. Rela2ons on the Eve of the 2nd U.S.-ASEAN Summit,” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, May 9, 2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/573659948/Thayer-
Vietnam-U-S-rela2ons.

Vietnam’s Prime Minister to Attend 2nd U.S.- ASEAN Special Summit Hosted by President Biden
We're seeking your expert assessment on the upcoming trip of Vietnam’s Prime Minister to
Washington and the U.S - ASEAN Summit this week. Our ques2ons follow:
Q1. What are your expecta2ons for this first special summit in six years between ASEAN
leaders and a U.S president, given the current circumstances when Washington may have to
diversify its focus beyond the Indo-Pacific region? The last 2me all sides met face to face was
in February 2016.
ANSWER: . In 2015, ASEAN and the United States entered into a strategic partnership. They
adopted a Plan of Ac2on, 2021-25 to implement the partnership. The 2nd U.S.-ASEAN Special
Leaders’ Summit will mark a return to con2nuity in rela2ons since the 1st U.S.-ASEAN Special
Leaders’ Summit hosted by President Obama in Sunnylands in February 2016.
Under President Biden the U.S. undertook three major ini2a2ves to expand the strategic
partnership: health security, climate change mi2ga2on and economic coopera2on. Each of
these three ini2a2ves involves numerous projects and ac2vi2es.
In sum, the 2nd U.S.-ASEAN Special Leaders’ Summit will result in broad agreement on
coopera2on to address a number of major transna2onal challenges that both par2es share in
common. The agenda almost certainly will address COVID-19 recovery and health security,
economic recovery, supply chain security, digital economy, energy, connec2vity,
infrastructure, climate change, and people-to-people linkages.
President Biden will have to reassure Southeast Asian leaders that the United States will not
be distracted from its support for ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms by the war in Ukraine.
The fact that the Special Summit is being held at this 2me is evidence of U.S. commitment to
the region. President Biden wanted the summit earlier, in late March, but scheduling
difficul2es disrupted his plans.
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The Special Summit therefore will discuss the impact of the war in Ukraine on the global and
regional economy and how to maintain security in the Indo-Pacific.
Q2. Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh will also make an official visit to the U.S and
United Na2ons headquarters. The Prime Minister Chinh made two foreign visits in 2021 to
Europe for COP26 and Indonesia for the ASEAN Summit. However, this is his first foreign
visit since Covid-19 situa2on in Vietnam was under control na2onwide and the country
started to reopen.
Can you offer your assessment on the importance of this visit for U.S - Vietnam rela2ons?
Where do bilateral rela2ons with Vietnam lie in the U.S strategy for the region?
ANSWER: Both President Biden and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh took office at the start
of 2021 and they will both serve concurrently for several more years. Their mee2ng will
provide an opportunity to get to know each other in person. This is important.
The Biden Administra2on’s Interim Na<onal Security Strategic Guidance and Indo-Pacific
Strategy both iden2fy Vietnam as a poten2al partner for coopera2on on a wide-range of
issues. Already two high-level officials, Vice President Kamala Harris and Defense Secretary
Lloyd Aus2n, as well as Ambassador Marc Knapper, have conveyed to Vietnam’s leaders U.S.
interest in raising bilateral rela2ons to a strategic partnership. This is a complex and sensi2ve
issue. The two leaders may give their approval for senior officials to discuss the details.
Prime Minister Chinh has indicated Vietnam’s willingness to nego2ate an updated framework
for economic and trade coopera2on and to support American companies and investors in
coming to Vietnam. The U.S. will be keen to establish reliable supply chains.
Q3. What are the most challenging and the most promising factors in U.S - ASEAN rela2ons
now? Which has the poten2al for improvment?
ANSWER: The most promising factor in United States-ASEAN rela2ons is U.S. willingness to
expand its engagement with ASEAN to address COVID-19 mi2ga2on and public health,
transporta2on, women’s empowerment, energy, the environment and climate change.
The major area in need of improvement is certainty about U.S. economic engagement in the
region. It is clear the Biden Administra2on will not joint the Comprehensive and progressive
TransPacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The Biden
Administra2on has promised to issue a Framework on Economic Coopera2on strategy. It
would be fitng if this strategy were announced at the Special Summit. The Biden
Administra2on has indicated this strategy would incorporate proposals for high quality digital
commence. This is of immense importance to ASEAN and needs to be expedited.
Q4. How is Vietnam contribu2ng to the strategic rela2ons between the U.S and ASEAN? Can
Vietnam play a stronger leading role and if so on what issue(s)?
ANSWER: Vietnam is a strong supporter of mul2lateralism in general and ASEAN in par2cular.
Vietnam plays a construc2ve and proac2ve role in strengthening ASEAN as evident during its
term as ASEAN Chair. In other words, Vietnam and the U.S. share convergent views on the role
of ASEAN.
Vietnam can play a stronger role in promo2ng prac2cal diploma2c ini2a2ves to address
pressing security challenges such as the situa2on in Myanmar and the South China Sea.
Vietnam could urge ASEAN members to play a stronger diploma2c role in calling for an end to
figh2ng in Ukraine, humanitarian assistance for displaced persons, and nego2a2ons between
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the par2es directly involved. In par2cular, ASEAN should use its rela2ons with China to urge
Beijing to play a more proac2ve diploma2c role with Russia in ending the conflict in Ukraine.
“Vietnam’s Prime Minister to APend 2nd U.S.- ASEAN Special Summit hosted by President
Biden,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, May 10, 2022.
hPps://www.scribd.com/document/573661115/Thayer-Vietnam-s-Prime-Minister-to-Meet-
President-Biden-and-APend-2nd-U-S-ASEAN-Special-Summit.

Vietnam-U.S. Relations and Impact on China-Vietnam Ties

On the occasion of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh's working visit to the United States, we
request your assessment of the following three issues:
Q1. What role does the United States play in Vietnam's foreign policy?
ANSWER: The United States is one of the five most important countries in Vietnam’s foreign
rela2ons, alongside China, Japan, India and Russia plus the European Union.
The U.S. is Vietnam’s largest export market and Vietnam has a considerable surplus. China is
Vietnam largest trade partner and Vietnam has a considerable deficit.
The United States is a key source of science and technology innova2on including e-commerce
and digital economy. Vietnam needs increased U.S. foreign direct investment to create new
industries to spur the 4th Industrial Revolu2on in Vietnam.
The United States is a key provider of capacity building in human resources and educa2on
and training.
The United States, especially the Indo-Pacific Command, provides a balance to China in the
region and the South China Sea in par2cular. U.S. support for ASEAN, ASEAN-centrality,
ASEAN-led mul2lateral ins2tu2ons and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is vital for Vietnam.
Q2. Vietnam always tries to keep a balanced posi2on in its rela2onship with the U.S. and
China. However, in the current world context, will Vietnam s2ll be able to keep that balance
or have to take a side? Which side do you think Vietnam will pick – China or the U.S.?
ANSWER: Vietnam pursues a foreign policy of “diversifica2on and mul2lateraliza2on” of its
foreign rela2ons through seventeen strategic partnerships and a number of comprehensive
partnerships, including the United States.
Vietnam prefers a mul2polar balance in which all the major powers have poli2cal-diploma2c-
economic and security equity in Vietnam. Vietnam, in turn, guarantees that it will not align
with one or more major powers against another. Vietnam puts a lot of effort in developing its
interna2onal pres2ge by pursuing an independent and construc2ve foreign policy to insulate
itself from external pressures.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and growing isola2on and pariah status interna2onally is a major
challenge to Vietnam’s foreign policy. Vietnam is dependent on Russia for arms, military
equipment and technology and Russian diploma2c-poli2cal support as a permanent member
of the UN Security Council. The longer the war in Ukraine drags on the more Vietnam will be
exposed to western sanc2ons or Russia’s inability to supply needed arms and equipment,
 11

Vietnam’s rela2ons with Russia offer a useful counter-balance to China and the United States.
Vietnam will be put in a more difficult posi2on if Russia is further weakened or becomes more
dependent on China.
Q3. How might the rela2onship between Vietnam and China change aTer Prime Minister
Chinh's visit to the United States?
ANSWER: Vietnam will be bePer placed to deal with China aTer Prime Minister Chinh’s visit
to Washington because Vietnam’s bilateral rela2ons with the United States will take place in
the context of growing U.S.-ASEAN comprehensive engagement.
Vietnam will proceed cau2ously in raising its rela2ons with the U.S. for three reasons. First,
there are a number of issues, such as U.S. classifica2on of Vietnam as a non-market economy
and trade-tariff-related issues, that must be resolved first.
Second, the vola2lity of domes2c American poli2cs create a cloud of uncertainty over any
economic or other commitments President Biden makes to Vietnam. Vietnam is vulnerable
because of its defence dependence on Russia and record on poli2cal and civil rights.
Third, Vietnam will be very careful not to undertake coopera2on with the U.S. that Beijing
perceives as aimed at China.
If history is a guide, expect China and Vietnam to exchange high-level visits to advance their
comprehensive strategic coopera2ve partnership this year.
“Vietnam-U.S. Rela2ons and Impact on China-Vietnam Ties,” Thayer Consultancy Background
Brief, May 12, 2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/573909347/Thayer-Vietnam-U-S-
Rela2ons-and-Impact-on-China-Vietnam-Ties.

Vietnam-U.S.-ASEAN Relations After the Special Summit

We request your analysis of the 2nd U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit with respect to the following
issues:
Q1- How do you evaluate the outcome of the Special Summit with respect to Vietnam-U.S.
rela2ons and U.S.-ASEAN rela2ons?
ANSWER: U.S.-Vietnam rela2ons became strained at the end of President Donald Trump’s last
year in office over trade and related issues. The COVID-19 pandemic made diplomacy more
difficult by curtailing in-person mee2ngs.
Now that these impediments have been removed, Vietnamese and U.S. officials are able to
hold face-to-face mee2ngs and get to know and understand each other bePer. This facilitates
improved bilateral rela2ons. U.S. and Vietnamese officials will overlap in office over the next
two years and seven months. The Biden Administra2on’s first term in office will end in January
2025, while Prime Minister Chinh’s term will end in the first half of 2026.
Vietnam-U.S. rela2ons have been enhanced by Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s face-to-
face mee2ngs with President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and USAID
Administrator Samantha Power. In addi2on, other mee2ngs with high-ranking U.S. officials,
such as Vice President Kamala Harris, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Cabinet members,
and Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry, were invaluable to both sides in getng to know
each other’s priori2es and concerns. This will form the basis for future coopera2on.
 12

During Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s visit to Washington, the Biden Administra2on
demonstrated by word and deed that Vietnam occupies a prominent role in U.S. rela2ons with
Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Chinh was the only ASEAN leader personally received by
President Joe Biden at The White House. At this mee2ng President Biden made important
commitments to cooperate construc2vely with Vietnam.
The U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit was the first 2me in forty-five years that ASEAN heads of
government were received at The White House. The first Special Summit was held in
Sunnylands, California; while President Trump planned to hold the second Special Summit in
Las Vegas, Nevada but had to postpone it. The Washington venue established a precedent for
future high-level U.S.-ASEAN mee2ngs.
The leaders at the second Special Summit agreed to raise ASEAN-U.S. rela2ons to a
comprehensive strategic partnership in November on a par with China and Australia.
President Biden took this opportunity to fill a five-year gap by nomina2ng a U.S. Ambassador
to ASEAN. This is a significant recogni2on of ASEAN’s importance and its role in the Indo-
Pacific.
Q2 - What are the prospects for the bilateral and mul2lateral co-opera2on in the future with
respect to Vietnam-United States and U.S.-ASEAN, respec2vely?
ANSWER: it is important to note that Vietnam and the United States established a
comprehensive partnership in 2013. The strategic partnership serves as the basic framework
for bilateral rela2ons. As a result of Prime Minister Chinh’s visit, both sides laid out their future
commitments and expecta2ons.
President Biden reaffirmed the commitment of his Administra2on to cooperate with Vietnam
across a range of sectors including economy and trade, development, pandemic preven2on
and control, and climate change.
Prime Minister Chinh described the bilateral rela2onship as a “special rela2onship.” He
welcomed con2nued U.S. coopera2on in disease preven2on, digital transforma2on, climate
change mi2ga2on, and human resource training. PM Chinh also called on the United States to
strengthen coopera2on and support for Vietnam in developing a green economy, diversified
supply chains, and transi2on to sustainable energy.
In the coming years we will see much closer interac2on in these priority sectors.
The U.S. and ASEAN have been strategic partners since 2015 and current rela2ons are framed
by a Plan of Ac2on, 2021-25 and areas of future coopera2on included in the Chairman’s
Statement of the 9th ASEAN-United States Summit (October 26, 2021).
Future rela2ons will be shaped by the Joint Vision Statement adopted by the Special Summit
and agreement by both sides to raise rela2ons to a comprehensive strategic partnership in
November.
The Joint Vision Statement spelled out eight detailed areas of coopera2on: figh2ng the COVID-
19 pandemic and bePer health security, strengthening economic 2es and connec2vity,
promo2ng mari2me coopera2on, enhancing people-to-people connec2vity, suppor2ng sub-
regional development, leveraging technologies and promo2ng innova2on, addressing climate
change, and preserving peace and building trust.
President Biden commiPed the United States to provide $150 million in new ini2a2ves,
including $60 million in mari2me security and $40 million in clean energy infrastructure.
 13

“Vietnam-U.S.-ASEAN Rela2ons ATer the Special Summit,” Thayer Consultancy Background

Brief, May 15, 2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/574876868/Thayer-Vietnam-U-S-
ASEAN-Rela2ons-ATer-the-Special-Summit.

Domestic Repercussions of Vietnam’s Alignment with the United States: Hypothetical

We are wri2ng an analysis of a hypothe2cal Vietnamese pivot away from China. We request
your input into the following issues:
Q1. What would be the impact on domes2c poli2cs in Vietnam if Hanoi was to join a counter-
China alliance, such as the Quad or entering a security agreement with the United States?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s sudden alignment with the United States appears implausible at the
present and would only occur if Vietnam’s leaders felt that na2onal sovereignty and/or
territorial integrity were at stake. In 2014, at the height of the Hai Yang Shi You 981 crisis,
re2red senior officials pushed for an extraordinary mee2ng of the party Central CommiPee to
“exit China’s orbit” and lean towards the United States. China caught wind of this, ceased
opera2on and withdrew the mega oil drilling plaxorm. This defused the crisis and no
emergency mee2ng of the Central CommiPee was held.
If, in the absence of a threatening Chinese provoca2on, Vietnam’s leaders reached consensus
that Vietnam should align more formally with the United States and/or enter into some
arrangement with the Quad, this would be well-received by the general public in Vietnam.
Vietnam’s one-party state is well-primed to use state mass media to offer a patrio2c ra2onale
for this shiT.
Alignment with the U.S. in such circumstances would not be a popular move with elements of
the military-security blocs and elements of society who produce and sell goods to China.
Q2. Would the Vietnam Communist Party be able to control any na2onalist sen2ment
alignment with the U.S. would create?
ANSWER: Recent public opinion polling by ISEAS Singapore reveals that Vietnamese
respondents listed the United States as the second most trusted country in the Indo-Pacific
aTer Japan. Na2onalist sen2ment now and in the future would support leaning towards the
United States in the face of Chinese pressure or provoca2ons in the East Sea.
Opposi2on to a pro-American shiT would likely take the form of open lePers to party leaders
and pos2ngs on social media. Public protests would be sparsely aPended. Restric2ons would
be put on the media preven2ng them from covering public protests.
The Ministry of Public Security would monitor and exercise control over any public protests.
Q3. What domes2c poli2cal problems might a geopoli2cal shiT create, and how much is this
a factor in Hanoi’s thinking on foreign policy?
ANSWER: China would react to any pro-U.S. shiT by Vietnam’s leaders by imposing selec2ve
curbs and restric2ons on Vietnamese exports to China and Chinese tourists going to Vietnam.
China would also selec2vely disrupt bilateral coopera2ve programs currently underway. China
would also apply pressure in the East Sea by selec2vely harassing resupply vessels to islands
or DK1 Service support structures.
 14

China would ins2gate a combined diploma2c and public propaganda campaign warning that
the United States would take advantage of this situa2on to engineer peaceful evolu2on of V
ietnam’s socialist regime to a mul2party democra2c one.
China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner and enjoys a considerable trade surplus. Pressure
on this front would harm Vietnamese producers and suppliers. There is no quick fix so
Vietnam’s leaders would have to manage disgruntlement by those who were disadvantaged
un2l new markets were found.
In sum, if Vietnam’s leaders decided to align more closely with the United States and/or enter
into some coopera2ve arrangement with the Quad this would not lead to massive public
protests that would threaten regime survival. Pockets of the military and public security
establishment would oppose such a move but it is unlikely that their dissent would cause party
leaders to alter course.
“Domes2c Repercussions of Vietnam’s Alignment with the United States: Hypothe2cal,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, June 7, 2022.
hPps://www.scribd.com/document/579879112/Thayer-Domes2c-Repercussions-of-
Vietnam-s-Alignment-With-the-United-States.

Vietnamese Media Coverage of The White House Dinner for ASEAN Leaders
We are draTing a report on an event at the White House last month. President Biden hosted
a dinner for Southeast Asian leaders as part of the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit. The White
House advised the media that the event was closed to the press, but video footage from inside
the dining room ended up on Vietnamese state media hours aTer the dinner ended. This
footage was used by almost all of the largest state-run outlets in their reports about the event.
We want to understand what mo2vated such behavior and its poten2al consequences. We
request your assessment of the following issues:
Q1. Do you think this was a diploma2c blunder on Vietnam’s part? If so, how seriouswas it?
ANSWER: I have reviewed all the links listed in the Appendix, in some cases replaying them or
freezing specific pictures to look more closely.
The White House Daily Guidance dated 12 May states that the dinner for the leaders of ASEAN
countries and ASEAN Secretary General hosted by President Biden “will be closed to the
press.” The media was obviously permiPed to film the arrival of leaders as they were greeted
individually by President Biden on the steps to The White House. The press was present when
a group photo was taken on the lawn of The White House. It is also clear that the media were
permiPed to enter the State Dining Room to film ASEAN leaders walking in and taking their
seats. Leaders hosted by President Biden were accompanied by interpreters. They sat in chairs
immediately behind their leaders at the dining table.
The official Cambodian coverage showed President Biden rise and offer a toast to his guests
before the meal was served. This was shot from the head of the table on Biden’s leT side in
order to capture Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, ASEAN Chair, seated directly opposite
Biden on the right side. The footage ended with Hun Sen rising along with the other leaders
to respond to President Biden’s toast.
 15

The Vietnamese media focused on the pre-dinner conversa2on between President Biden,
seated in the middle of the table on the far side of the dining room, and Prime Minister Pham
Minh Chinh, who was seated on President Biden’s immediate leT. There was also some brief
footage of their conversa2on aTer the entrée was served. The angle of this shot was taken
further down the right side of the table facing President Biden and focused across the table
on Biden and Prime Minister Chinh in conversa2on. The footage briefly captured Na2onal
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan putng food on his fork and ASEAN guests opposite ea2ng.
It seems reasonable to surmise that aTer the toast, White House staff announced to the media
that they should leave and began escor2ng them out of the State Dining Room as the entrée
was served. I can only speculate that an accredited Vietnamese media representa2ve briefly
delayed his departure in order to capture addi2onal footage of President Biden and Prime
Minister Chinh in conversa2on.
Video footage of this episode clearly shows a White House official (perhaps a Secret Service
Agent) standing in the corner at the end of the table to President Biden’s leT. It seems
improbable that any Vietnamese media representa2ve (or official from the Vietnamese
delega2on) could have remained in the State Dining Room and filmed aTer the entrée was
served. None of the footage I reviewed showed leaders ea2ng their main meals.
A close review of video footage shows that Vietnamese media repeatedly played a loop of
Biden and Chinh in conversa2on thus giving the impression that they talked longer. The brief
footage shot aTer the entrée was served, which shows Jake Sullivan ea2ng, was focused on
Biden and Chinh, was also replayed in a loop.
It would appear that the media were cleared from the State Dining Room as the first course
was served. This process does not appear to have taken place as expeditiously as possible in
which case The White House needs to review its handling of this matter. If a Vietnamese
cameraman tarried to get a different angle for his video he was likely spotted and escorted
from the room without incident. This incident does not amount to major breach of protocol.
If a breach of protocol occurred there are several ways it could have been handled – a face to
face comment to the individual(s) concerned, or a note to the accredited media agency
involved (VTV or VNA).
Q2. Could this incident impact on Vietnam’s reputa2on?
ANSWER: On the face of it, it is highly doubtful that this particular event was such a major
breach of protocol as to affect bilateral relations or undermine Vietnam’s international
reputation. This type of matter is between The White House/Department of State and the
individual and his/her media agency concerned not the Vietnam government.
Q3. Does Vietnam have a strong desire for its leader to be seen shoulder to shoulder with the
U.S. president? What objec2ve was served by releasing the video footage? What kind of
message did Vietnam want to send?
ANSWER: The Vietnamese media have a strong incentive to portray any overseas visit by
Vietnam’s prime minister positively. Accordingly, the Vietnamese media gave coverage to the
official limousine flying the Vietnamese flag transporting Prime Chinh to the White House;
President Biden greeting Prime Minister Chinh on the steps of the White House; the group
photo of ASEAN leaders with President Biden on the lawn of the White House; Prime Minister
 16

Chinh entering the State Dining Room; and the pre-dinner conversation between Biden and
Chinh.
The intention behind this media coverage was to portray Vietnam’s high international
standing and prestige and demonstrate that its leader can meet on equal terms with the
President of the United States. One message was loud and clear – President Biden has a lot
of affection for the Vietnamese people.
Q4. Does this episode indicate that Vietnam was willing to risk violating diplomatic protocol
and common courtesy to serve its own interests?
ANSWER: When all the footage is taken as a whole this appears as “much ado about nothing.”
There is no evident breach of diplomatic protocol or common courtesy.
The Vietnamese media cannot be faulted for taking the photo opportunity of filming their
Prime Minister seated next to and talking with President Biden before the start of dinner. The
fortuitous seating arrangements, with Biden and Chinh at the centre of the dining table seated
next to one another, lent itself to elevating the status of Vietnam’s prime minster in the eyes
of its intended audience back home in Vietnam and Vietnamese living abroad.
Q5 What do you think about the role of state media outlets in this episode? Did they function
as a propaganda arm of the Vietnamese state?
ANSWER: Of course Vietnam’s state media is the propaganda arm of the one-party state. They
could be accused of overplaying the importance of Prime Minister Chinh’s greeting by
President Biden on the White House steps. Biden greeted each ASEAN leader in the same
manner as they arrived.
I have already noted that Vietnamese state media played loops of Biden and Chinh talking
with one another thus giving the impression of a longer conversation.
Q6. A fact sheet by the U.S. Department of State describes the U.S. and Vietnam as “trusted
partners with a friendship grounded in mutual respect.” Another fact sheet by the White
House says the two countries “have overcome a difficult past to become trusted partners.”
How can Vietnam be trusted if it’s not willing to play by the rules that others accept?
ANSWER: An alleged minor breach of protocol – if that was what it is – by one Vietnamese
media outlet should not be blown out of proportion. There was no evident duplicity on the
part of Vietnamese news media or any person in the official Vietnamese delegation.
APPENDIX
Cambodian Na2onal Television TVK
hPps://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=781756816164357 (from
9:29 to 10:10)
ANTV
https://youtu.be/nZsA41pcOHA (from 2'43 - 4'04)
Nhan Dan TV
https://nhandantv.vn/thu-tuong-pham-minh-chinh-gap-tong-thong-hoa-ky-jos-biden-
d202399.htm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uR-6BFLIVdo&t=211s
 17

VGP (Chinh Phu VN)

https://media.chinhphu.vn/video/tong-thong-joseph-biden-luon-danh-nhieu-tinh-cam-cho-
dat-nuoc-va-con-nguoi-viet-nam-16507.htm
VNA Vietnamese
https://vnews.gov.vn/video/thu-tuong-pham-minh-chinh-gap-tong-thong-joe-biden-
38960.htm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOD98iYExHE
VNA English
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ijuTvcA3h0
VNA French
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAbc1R9HUd0
VTV1
https://media.chinhphu.vn/video/tong-thong-hoa-ky-don-tiep-cac-nha-lanh-dao-asean-
16508.htm
https://vtv.vn/video/thoi-su-19h-vtv1-13-5-2022-559216.htm
(full newscast, May 13) (from 15’27 – 18’49)
VTV4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=20z7YXcHb70&t=219s
VTV4 English
https://youtu.be/WDksMCPvI_o (from 3'50 - 4'12)
VTV4 French
https://youtu.be/zQcP-ZSfwWQ?t=250 (from 4'10 - 5'20)
VTV4 Russian
https://youtu.be/04O-kE--7tE (from 9'12 - 10'16)
Zing News
hPps://zingnews.vn/video-tong-thong-my-2ep-cac-nha-lanh-dao-asean-tai-nha-trang-
post1316731.html
“Vietnamese Media Coverage of The White House Dinner for ASEAN Leaders,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, June 29, 2022.
hPps://www.scribd.com/document/581883287/Thayer-Vietnamese-Media-Coverage-of-
the-White-House-Dinner-for-ASEAN-Leaders.

USS Ronald Reagan and Vietnam, Nancy Pelosi and Taiwan: Any Linkage?
The aircraT carrier USS Ronald Reagan was planning to visit Vietnam this month but its visit
has also been cancelled, apparently because of China's protest.
 18

You must have heard all the ruckus over Nancy Pelosi's rumoured visit to Taiwan which
apparently may be cancelled aTer the Chinese hit the roof. Are these two events linked? We
request your assessment of the following two issues:

Q1. Do you think China's coercion tac2cs and threats work?

ANSWER: On 5 July, Radio Free Asia reported that the Nimitz-class aircraT carrier USS Ronald
Reagan (CVN-76) would visit Vietnam in the second half of July. Seventeen days later, Radio
Free Asia reported that the visit was called off ci2ng two anonymous Vietnamese sources. As
of this wri2ng there has been no official confirma2on by the U.S. Pacific Fleet. In the
mean2me, the USS Ronald Reagan transited the South China Sea and docked in Singapore
without visi2ng Vietnam.
In the absence of further informa2on, it is only possible to speculate. It is more likely that
Vietnam cancelled the visit than the United States. Vietnam may have done so for a
combina2on of two reasons.
First, Vietnam has always given declaratory support to the presence of the U.S. Navy in the
South China Sea as long as it contributes to peace and security in the region. Given China’s
public comments cri2cizing the United States for being the root cause of tensions and
instability in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and China’s military exercises in the waters
around Hainan island and the Paracels, Vietnam likely assessed that it was inappropriate at
this 2me to host a visit by the USS Ronald Reagan.
There were reports that the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) might visit in May but nothing
eventuated. The last visit by a U.S. Navy carrier was in March 2000 when the USS Theodore
Roosevelt (CVN-71) called in at Da Nang.
An addi2onal factor – and this is only specula2on – Vietnam might have been responding to
what it perceived as a slight to its sovereignty by non-public U.S. pressure/cri2cism for its
stance on the war in Ukraine and dependence on Russia.
Second, Vietnam likely cancelled the visit because of direct non-public Chinese diploma2c
pressure. When the U.S. first proposed annual visits by a nuclear-powered aircraT carrier
Vietnam only agreed to occasional visits to signal that it was not aligning with the U.S. against
China. In sum, Chinese pressure on Vietnam only reinforced Hanoi’s evalua2on that current
U.S. naval opera2ons were roiling the waters.
To speculate further, it is unlikely the United States cancelled the visit because (1) the USS
Ronald Reagan was needed elsewhere due to rising tension with China or (2) to show U.S.
displeasure over Vietnam’s stance on the war in Ukraine which likely was perceived in
Washington as pro-Russian fence sitng.
In sum, Chinese threats and coercive tac2cs do have an impact in the case of Vietnam but only
as part of Hanoi’s decision-making calculus not to be seen as taking sides at a 2me of rising
global and regional tensions.
Q2. Should the U.S. stand up against China's bullying or should it adopt some of the "Nixonian
flexibility" as suggested by Henry Kissinger?
 19

ANSWER: Henry Kissinger argued that China should not become a global hegemon. He also
argued that the Biden Administra2on was influenced too much by nega2ve domes2c
percep2ons of China and the Biden Administra2on should take a long-term view of China’s
permanence. He also warned against endless confronta2ons.
In March 2021, President Biden issued the Interim Na<onal Security Strategic Guidance. This
document declared, “this agenda will… allow us to prevail in strategic compe22on with China
or any other na2on” and that the United States “would hold… China to account.” The Interim
Na<onal Security Strategic Guidance also stated, “We also recognize that strategic
compe22on does not, and should not, preclude working with China when it is in our na2onal
interest to do so.”
With respect to Taiwan, the Biden Administra2on’s Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,
issued in November 2021, stated:
We will also work with partners inside and outside of the region to maintain peace
and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including by supporting Taiwan’s self-defense
capabilities, to ensure an environment in which Taiwan’s future is determined
peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of Taiwan’s people. As we
do so, our approach remains consistent with our One China policy and our
longstanding commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint
Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.
The Biden Administra2on also approved arms sales to Taiwan and in February dispatched a
high-level delega2on of senior re2red U.S. officials to Taipei to provide reassurance. The Biden
Administra2on is currently reviewing Trump-era tariffs on Chinese goods and President Biden
is preparing for a tele-conference with President Xi-Jinping later this month.
It is in this context that on 19 July the Financial Times broke the news that Speaker Nancy
Pelosi was considering adding Taiwan to her i2nerary in August when she is scheduled to visit
Japan, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. This announcement provoked a strong reac2on by
the spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Jijian, who declared, “If the U.S.
insists on going its own way, China will take firm and forceful measures to firmly safeguard
na2onal sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
The case of Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s puta2ve visit to Taiwan is not a formal part of the Biden
Administra2on’s strategy towards China and Taiwan. Speaker Pelosi is an independent actor
in the U.S. poli2cal system and does not need President Biden’s permission to travel. For
example, Pelosi was due to visit Taiwan in April but had to cancel when she tested posi2ve for
COVID-19. China’s Foreign Minister responded to reports that Pelosi would visit Taiwan at that
2me with these words, “If the U.S. House speaker, a poli2cal leader of the United states,
deliberately visits Taiwan, it would be a malicious provoca2on against China’s sovereignty and
gross interference in China’s internal affairs, and would send an extremely dangerous poli2cal
signal to the outside world.”
Chinese threats were taken up a notch aTer President Biden revealed publicly on 20 July that
the U.S. “military thinks it’s (Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan) not a good idea right now.” The following
day Wang Webin, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, intoned, “China will act strongly
to resolutely respond to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s planned trip to Taiwan and take
countermeasures should the US side insist on making the visit. We mean what we say… If
Speaker Pelosi visits Taiwan, it would seriously violate the one-China principle and the
 20

s2pula2ons in the three China-US joint communique[s] and harm China’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.”
Subsequently, as reported by the Financial Times on 24 July, Chinese officials privately issued
“stark private warnings” to the Biden Administra2on that “were significantly stronger than the
threats that Beijing has made in the past when it was unhappy with US ac2ons or policy on
Taiwan” even “sugges2ng a possible military response.”
The current tensions over Speaker Pelosi’s puta2ve visit to Taiwan puts the Biden
Administra2on in a no win situa2on. If Pelosi decides not to add Taiwan to her August i2nerary,
it will appear to China and U.S. allies alike that President Biden has backed down in the face
of Chinese in2mida2on. Republican Senators Lindsey Graham and Robert Menendez, who
have already introduced the Taiwan Policy Act 2022 advoca2ng military support, will lambast
Speaker Pelosi and President Biden for being weak on China.
If Speaker Pelosi decides to visit Taiwan, Xi Jinping will have no recourse but to provoke a crisis
to demonstrate China’s resolve. This will put further strain on U.S.-China rela2ons and
undermine efforts underway by Biden to find some common ground with China.
In sum, the strategic policy documents cited above indicate that the Biden Administra2on is
pursuing its own policy of flexibility in dealing with a much more powerful and asser2ve China
than Henry Kissinger faced when he was in office.
It should be noted that the Biden Administra2on has not yet had to respond to a major
incident of Chinese bullying. The Biden Administra2on also has not gone out of its way to
provoke a confronta2on with China. Reportedly, both the Department of Defense and the
Na2onal Security Council have advised Speaker Pelosi not to go to Taiwan. If Pelosi decides to
go and China throws down the gauntlet, this will be the first test for President Biden to call
China to account and push back against its bullying.
“USS Ronald Reagan and Vietnam, Nancy Pelosi and Taiwan: Any Linkage?” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, July 24, 2022.
hPps://www.scribd.com/document/583877436/Thayer-USS-Ronald-Reagan-and-Vietnam-
Nancy-Pelosi-and-Taiwan-Any-Linkage.

Vietnam-U.S. Relations: Two Cancellations in a Month?

According to a State Department source earlier this month, the USS Ronald Reagan would
become the third US aircraT carrier to visit Vietnam. The visit was scheduled for the laPer half
of this month. Vietnamese sources, however, reported that the scheduled visit to Danang has
been canceled due to concerns about a possible Chinese aPack on Taiwan.
Q1. What are your comments about the cancellation of the visit by the USS Ronald Reagan?
What do you think might have led to the cancellation? Who is the most likely decision-making
side?
ANSWER: It is my assessment that Vietnam took the initiative to cancel the scheduled visit of
the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier because of rising tension in the South China Sea. From
the very beginning, when the United States first proposed visits by nuclear powered aircraft
carriers, Vietnam rejected annual visits out of concern this might send the wrong signal to
China that Vietnam was tilting towards the U.S. Vietnam’s policy has been to welcome a U.S.
 21

Navy presence in the South China Sea as long as it contributed to regional peace and security.
At the present time, given China’s strong verbal condemnation of the U.S. as the cause of
regional insecurity, China’s conduct of short-notice military exercises, and likely Chinese
diplomatic pressure on Hanoi, Vietnam decided to opt out and cancel the visit.
Q2. A visit by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Vietnam was also planned in July
around the time Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was scheduled to visit. Blinken's visit
was also cancelled. What do you make of the cancellation of visits to Vietnam by the USS
Ronald Reagan and Secretary Blinken? What factors do you think influenced it?
ANSWER: When I first heard that Secretary Blinken’s visit had been cancelled, I contacted my
network of Vietnam-based sources as well as current and retired U.S. officials. I quickly
learned that the visit had been postponed. However, there were a variety of conflicting views
on what caused this. The most plausible explanation from a reliable source was that the
postponement had nothing to do with Vietnam but arose from scheduling issues in the White
House related to President Biden. Secretary Blinken visited Thailand instead.
The most recent senior U.S. official to visit Hanoi was Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman who
met with Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son and other officials on 13 June. According to a read
out issued by the Department of State, her visit went well. She discussed the US-Vietnam
comprehensive partnership, praised Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s successful visit to the
United States to aPend the US-ASEAN Special Summit, welcomed Vietnam’s par2cipa2on at
the launch of the Biden Administra2on’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and pledged
con2nuing efforts to address war legacy issues. In sum, bilateral rela2ons appear to be on a
good track and no issue at that 2me stands out that would have caused the cancella2on of
Secretary Biden’s visit. This was a very low-key affair. One Vietnamese diplomat said privately
that no visit by Blinken was [officially] scheduled.
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Hanoi from 5-6 July. His visit was announced on
4 July on the same day that I heard Secretary Blinken’s visit was postponed. A check of the
State Department’s Public Schedule does not reveal any announcement that Secretary Blinken
would visit Vietnam at this 2me. On 5 July, the Public Schedule showed that Secretary Blinken
would visit Indonesia and Thailand from 6-11 July. Blinken visited Bangkok from 9-10 July. Both
Lavrov and Blinken aPended the G20 ministerial mee2ng in Jakarta so I don’t think Lavrov’s
stopover in Hanoi was the reason for Blinken to postpone his visit.
*On July 29, the Department of State announced that Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken will
travel to Cambodia (August 3-5), and the Philippines (August 6).
“Vietnam-U.S. Rela2ons: Two Cancella2ons in a Month?” Thayer Consultancy Background
Brief, July 27, 2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/584850835/Thayer-Vietnam-US-
Rela2ons-Two-Cancella2ons-in-a-Month.

U.S.-Vietnam to Hold 26th Human Rights Dialogue

The 26th U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue will be held on November 2 in Hanoi, Vietnam.
The dialogue will cover a wide range of human and labor rights-related issues, including
freedom of expression and associa2on; freedom of religion or belief; rule of law and legal
reform; and the rights of members of marginalized popula2ons, including ethnic minority
groups, LGBTQI+ persons, and persons with disabili2es, as well as individual cases of concern.
 22

We request your assessment prior to the dialogue.

Q1. What should we expect from this dialogue, in the context that Vietnam has just been
elected a member of the United Na2ons’ Human Rights Council?
ANSWER: The dialogue will be a set piece affair. Both sides will present their long-standing
posi2ons on a wide variety of human rights issues. They will both agree that con2nued
dialogue is important. Vietnam takes an expansive view of human rights as including the
aPainment of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, ending poverty, and gender equality.
The U.S. primarily will address religious freedom and civil and poli2cal rights.
Reference to the 2013 agreement on comprehensive partnership between Presidents Barrack
Obama and Truong Tan Sang indicates that at this year’s dialogue the two sides will take note
of the other side’s view and leave it at that. For example, the 2013 agreement stated: “The
Presidents took note of the benefits of a candid and open dialogue to enhance mutual
understanding and narrow differences on human rights. They emphasized the importance
of protection and promotion of human rights. President Truong Tan Sang informed President
Obama of Vietnam’s efforts and achievements in promoting human rights and rule of law
and in protecting the rights of religious believers… Both sides reaffirmed their commitment
to uphold the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
Q2. Vietnamese Communist Party’s Chief Nguyen Phu Trong is visi2ng Beijing, and Vietnamese
newspapers have emphasized that China is a top priority in Vietnam’s foreign policy. What
impact does this have on the U.S. approach to its rela2ons with Vietnam, especially on
Vietnam’s human rights issues?
ANSWER: General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s comments that China is a top foreign policy
priority should not be read that China is the only top priority. Given their geographical
propinquity, trade rela2onship and China’s rising power acknowledging China as a top priority
goes without saying.
When Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited
Hanoi in October this year he discussed expanding their comprehensive partnership to a
strategic partnership. This goal puts constraints on U.S. ability to pressure Vietnam on human
rights.
Q3. Do you think that on this occasion the U.S. will pressure Vietnam to release some ac2vists,
such as Pham Doan Trang, or Nguy Thi Khanh?
ANSWER: It is very likely the U.S. has lobbied Vietnam in advance of the 26th human rights
dialogue to release certain detained prisoners of conscience. The Department of State issued
a press statement in August that noted “[t]he United States is deeply concerned by the upheld
convic2on and nine-year prison sentence of renowned Vietnamese author and journalist
Pham Doan Trang.”
If unconfirmed reports that Vietnam is lobbying the U.S. for a visit by President Joe Biden in
November are true, Vietnam could, as it has in the past, suddenly release Trang (or other
prisoner of conscience) and fly her to exile.
Q4. How important is this dialogue for ac2vists and civil society in Vietnam?
ANSWER: The U.S.-Vietnam dialogue, like other human rights dialogues between Vietnam and
the EU and Australia, for example, are important to the morale of pro-democracy and civil
society ac2vists in Vietnam. It is common for U.S. officials to meet with civil society
 23

representa2ves on such occasions. The Department of State’s media note of 30 October states
“[t]he U.S. delega2on will also hold discussions with government officials and members of civil
society in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi.”
It is doubxul that any major developments will result from such mee2ngs. Vietnam prevented
prominent ac2vists from mee2ng President Obama during his visit in 2013. Other ac2vists
have been physically prevented from entering the grounds of the U.S. Embassy.
Q5. Vietnam and the U.S. have had many human rights dialogues. But the human rights
situa2on in Vietnam has not improved, if anything it has become worse according to
interna2onal human rights organiza2ons. Do you have any comments on this?
ANSWER: The suppression of pro-democracy and civil society ac2vists has deteriorated in
Vietnam since the 13th na2onal party congress in January 2021. A State Department press
statement issued on 25 August noted that the con2nued deten2on of Pham Doan Trang “is
the latest instance in an alarming paPern of arrests and sentencing of individuals in Vietnam
for peacefully expressing their opinions.”
Q6. ATer this dialogue, what immediate ac2ons should the U.S. take towards Vietnam?
ANSWER: It is likely that Vietnam will announce some general steps it will take in the future.
In 2013, for example, President Sang told President Obama “that Vietnam was prepared to
sign the United Nations Convention Against Torture by the end of the year and stated that
Vietnam would invite the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2014.”
Vietnam honoured both these commitments. The U.S. should press Vietnam to follow up on
any new commitments made at the 26th human rights dialogue.
The Biden Administration declared on 30 October that “[t]he promotion of human rights is
an essential element of U.S foreign policy and a key to our ongoing engagement with
Vietnam.” However, because the U.S. is seeking to raise bilateral relations to a strategic
partnership, and enlist Vietnam in its strategy to create a free and open Indo-Pacific, there
are practical constraints on how far the U.S. can pressure Vietnam without having a counter-
productive effect.
China’s party General Secretary Xi Jinping picked up on this when he told General Secretary
Nguyen Phu Trong during his visit this week, “[t]he Chinese and Vietnamese parties should
persist in working for the happiness of the people and the progress of mankind, push
forward socialist modernization with all their might, and never let anyone interfere with our
progress or let any force shake the institutional foundation of our development.”
“U.S.-Vietnam to Hold 26th Human Rights Dialogue,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
November 1, 2022. hPps://www.scribd.com/document/605437917/Thayer-US-Vietnam-to-
Hold-26th-Human-Rights-Dialogue.

U.S. Arms Sales to Vietnam?

We are wri2ng a report on the state of play of talks between the United States and Vietnam
aTer Vietnam’s Interna2onal Arms Expo on possible U.S. arms supplies. What is the
importance of discussions on the possible supply of more sophis2cated weapons than those
shipped so far to Vietnam?
 24

ANSWER: According to U.S. defence sources, Vietnam’s Air Defence-Air Force (ADAF)
conducts more training exercises with the United States than with any other country,
including Russia. The bilateral defence relationship is particularly strong between the ADAF
and the United States Air Force (USAF) at the senior level.1
In June 2021, the U.S. agreed to sell Vietnam T-6 Texan trainer aircraT and in December it was
officially announced that Vietnam would procure twelve T-6s, with five to six aircraT delivered
in 2024 and the remaining aircraT in 2027.2 This sale means that the USAF will become the
leading U.S. service engaged with the Vietnamese military.
The sale of the T-6s comes with a training and maintenance package for ADAF personnel as
well as training modules in logis2cs, flight safety, avia2on medicine and English language.
In June 2019, U.S. Embassy officials in Hanoi were quoted as saying that the T-6 sale
“represented a strategic shiT from Russia to the United States ‘under the nose’ of China and
would be a major part of helping Vietnam move away from dependence on Russian weapons
and corrup2on, as well as China’s influence.”3
In an2cipa2on of the sale of the T-6 trainers, the U.S. began training the first Vietnamese Air
Force pilots in special purpose English language in 2016, followed by a fiTy-two week military
pilot training course. The first pilot graduated at the end of May 2019.4
Currently, the USAF admits two-three ADAF airmen annually in an avia2on leadership program
that lasts for three years and takes two to three students at a 2me. This program will have to
be ramped up as it is es2mated that fiTy ADAF trainees wil be needed to produce thirty pilots
to fly the twelve T-6s.
The USAF Avia2on Leadership Program includes training in managing partnerships, avia2on
culture and safety, air competence, risk management, maintenance and English -language
training to meet interna2onal standards.
Vietnam’s acquisi2on of the T-6s trainers and par2cipa2on in the USAF Avia2on Leadership
Program could lay the founda2on for the sale of U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle fighters at the end of
this decade.
“U.S. Arms Sales to Vietnam?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, December 15, 2022.
hPps://www.scribd.com/document/615043297/Thayer-U-S-Arms-Sales-to-Vietnam/

1
This Background Brief draws on Stephen Burgess, “The US–Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership and the Key
Role of Air Force Relations,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, December 2021,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870567/the-usvietnam-comprehensive-partnership-and-
the-key-role-of-air-force-relations/.
2
Viet Anh, “US to sell trainer aircraft to Vietnam,” VnExpress, June 6, 2021,
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/us-to-sell-trainer-aircraft-to-vietnam-4288916.html and Viet Anh, “US to
send 12 military training aircraft to Vietnam,” VnExpress, December 9, 2022,
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/us-to-send-12-military-training-aircraft-to-vietnam-4546311.html.
3
Burgess, “The US–Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership and the Key Role of Air Force RelaYons.”
4
Vu Anh, “First Vietnam military pilots graduating US training course,” VnExpress, June 4, 2019,
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/first-vietnam-military-pilots-graduating-us-training-course-3933647.html
and Nguyen Hoang, “Vietnamese air force pilot graduates from US aviation leadership program,” VnExpress, June
7, 2019, https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnamese-air-force-pilot-graduates-from-us-aviation-leadership-
program-3935165.html.
 25

Carlyle A. Thayer Biography

Professional Background
Carlyle (Carl) Alan Thayer is Emeritus Professor of Politics, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales
(UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra.
He is also Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered
in Australia in 2002 that provides political analysis of current regional
security issues and other research support to selected clients.

Professional Career
Carl Thayer was educated at Brown University where he majored in Political Science (B.A.
1967). He holds an M.A. in Southeast Asian Studies from Yale (1971) and a PhD in International
Relations from The Australian National University (ANU, 1977). He studied Thai language at
The University of Missouri at Columbia (1965), Vietnamese language at Yale and Cornell
(1969-71), and Lao and Vietnamese languages at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
(1971). Thayer also holds a Certificate in National Security from the Institute of Political
Science, Christian Albrechts Universität, Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany (1987).
After graduating from Brown, Carl served in the Republic of Vietnam with the International
Voluntary Services (1967-68) and as a volunteer secondary school teacher in the Republic of
Botswana with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (1968-69).
He began his professional career as a Tutor in Department of Asian Civilisation at the ANU
(1973-74). He commenced his academic career as Lecturer at the Bendigo Institute of
Technology, Victoria in 1975 (renamed the Bendigo College of Advanced Education in 1976).
In 1979, he joined The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and taught first in its Faculty
of Military Studies at The Royal Military College-Duntoon (1979-85) and then at the Australian
Defence Force Academy (1985-2010). He served as Head of the School of Politics from 1995-
97. In 1998, he was promoted to full Professor. During 2007-08 and 2010 he directed Regional
Security Studies at the Australian Command and Staff College while teaching at UNSW
Canberra. Upon retirement in 2010 he was conferred the title Emeritus Professor.
Thayer served three major periods away from UNSW@ADFA:
• From 1992-95, he was seconded to the Regime Change and Regime Maintenance Project,
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,
ANU to conduct research on Vietnamese domestic politics.
• From 1999-2002, he was granted ‘leave in the national interest’ to take up the position of
Professor of Southeast Asian Security Studies and Deputy Chair of the Department of
Regional Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), U.S. Pacific
Command, Hawaii. He revised the curriculum for the Executive Course and was an original
contributor to the Senior Executive Course (two-three star/vice-ministerial level).
• From 2002 to 2004, Carl was seconded to Deakin University as On-Site Academic Co-
ordinator of the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Australia’s senior defence course,
at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College,
Weston Creek.
 26

During his career, Professor Thayer undertook special study leave at the ANU’s Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre; Harvard’s Center for International Affairs; International Institute of
Strategic Studies in London; Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn
University in Thailand; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore; and the Department
of Political Science at Yale.
In 1993, in a career highlight, he was appointed a United Nations observer for elections in
Cambodia.
Service to the Profession
Thayer was a founding member of the Vietnam Studies Association of Australia and served
three terms as National Secretary/Treasurer (1994-98). He also served as National Secretary
of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (1996-98).
Professional Recognition
In June 1971, Thayer was the Graduate School flag bearer for the 270th commencement
ceremonies at Yale University.
In 2003, Thayer was conferred the Joint Meritorious Service Award by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for his contributions to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, U.S.
Pacific Command.
In 2005, Thayer was appointed the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor of Southeast
Asian Studies at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, D.C.
In 2006, Thayer was awarded the Rector’s Commendation for Excellence in Classroom
Teaching at UNSW Canberra.
In 2008, Thayer was appointed the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies conjointly at the Center for International Affairs
and Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
In 2014, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the 2nd Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum in Da Nang, Vietnam.
In 2015, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the ASEAN-China Joint
Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC Seminar-Workshop on the
Implementation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC-SCS) in Manila, The Philippines.
In April 2015, Thayer was appointed Eminent Person by the Department of Defence Australian
Civil-Military Centre, to facilitate the East Asia Summit mandated Rapid Disaster Response:
Lessons Learned Seminar held in Sydney in September that was attended by senior officials
from fifteen countries. Thayer wrote the Seminar Discussion Paper.
In April 2020, Professor Thayer was inducted into the Marquis Who’s Who Biographical
Registry and in Marquis Who’s Who Top Professionals.
In 2023, Professor Thayer was the Mace Bearer for graduation ceremonies at UNSW
Canberra.
Source: hPps://research.unsw.edu.au/people/emeritus-professor-carlyle-alan-thayer