Thayer Consultancy Background Brief:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

ASEAN, China and the South
China Sea Issue
September 9, 2023

ASEAN member states once again failed to show a united response on the South China
Sea disputes and China's recent assertive activities. While four ASEAN members
(Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei) issued protests critical of China's
actions, the other six ASEAN member states were more circumspect.
Q1. What does ASEAN’s response to China's assertiveness in the South China Sea
mean for the relevancy of the bloc in the region and in the world?
ANSWER: ASEAN’s disunity on Chinese assertiveness the South China Sea has been on
display for over a decade after Cambodia, as ASEAN Chair in 2012, refused to include
a reference to the South China Sea in the Chairman’s Statement. For the first time in
ASEAN’s history no statement was issued.
This year, the Chairman’s Statement on the 43rd ASEAN Summit slightly modified the
Chairman’s Statement on the 42nd ASEAN Summit by adding these words in italics:
“concerns were expressed by some ASEAN Member States on the land reclamations,
activities, serious incidents in the area, including actions that put the safety of all
persons at risk.”
China is the major trading partner of all Southeast Asian states and many extra-
regional states. Global shipping that passes through the South China Sea is unmolested
by China. Chinese acts of intimidation and coercion against the Philippines, Vietnam
and Malaysia are viewed widely as matters between the states directly concerned and
a far lesser threat to security than the war in Ukraine, North Korean ballistic missile
testing, the conflict in Myanmar and the Taiwan issue.
Basically, ASEAN is a conflict-avoidance institution that operates on the basis of
consensus and a pace comfortable to all. This is widely understood. In sum, ASEAN’s
weakness and inaction on the South China Sea is viewed as its usual modus operandi.
Q2. What should ASEAN do in the future to stop China's assertive activities in the
South China Sea?
ANSWER: China’s Coast Guard is larger and heavier than all of the Southeast Asia’s
maritime law enforcement agencies combined. United action by ASEAN would be
ineffective.
 2

There is nothing ASEAN can do collectively to alter the “facts on the ground” except
name and shame China. However, China can easily exert pressure on ASEAN member
states to prevent consensus forming to take more assertive action.
Also, China could use punitive economic sanctions against any country that attempted
to stand up to China.
Any attempt to take action under international law will fail because of the lack of
enforcement measures. Action in the United Nations would by stymied by China’s veto
in the Security Council.
Q3. China keeps using a "New Cold War" narrative to prevent ASEAN nations from
getting close to the U.S. and western allies. Why does China think it's a good strategy?
ANSWER: China’s “New Cold War” rhetoric certainly hasn’t prevented the Philippines
from engaging with the U.S., Australia and Japan to counter China.
China’s “New Cold War” rhetoric plays into ASEAN states’ proclivity to pursue a policy
of non-alignment rather than take sides. Instead of openly opposing China, most
ASEAN states would prefer to stand back and urge dialogue and peaceful resolution
of disputes to South China Sea protagonists.
Q4. With China’s recent economic problems, will the U.S. be able to better woo ASEAN
members who are currently close to China?
ANSWER: China’s recent domestic problems are certainly one factor pushing Vietnam
to upgrade economic relations with the United States. China is the main trading
partner for most Southeast Asian states. However, there is little sign other ASEAN
members are motivated to follow Vietnam.
Besides, the U.S. is its own worst enemy. The U.S. under Donald Trump withdrew from
the Trans-Pacific Partnership. U.S. domestic public opinion is so wary of free trade
agreements that it is highly unlikely United States President Joe Biden would join the
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership or the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
President Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity is a weak reed that
is moving along slowly. The U.S. will not include market access measures.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN, China and the South China Sea Issue,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, September 9, 2023. All background briefs are
posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer.. To remove yourself from the mailing list
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002