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Thayer Consultancy Background Brief:

ABN # 65 648 097 123


Did the Barbie Movie Actually
Depict China’s Nine Dash Line?
July 26, 2023

We are writing a report on Vietnam banning the Hollywood movie, Barbie, as it had a
scene depicting the "nine dash line" in the South China Sea. We request your response
to the questions below.
Q1. Why did Vietnam ban the movie? The Philippines, for example, did not
despite expressing indignation over the depiction of the imaginary line.
ANSWER: Vietnam’s Central Council of Feature Film Evaluation and Classification
banned the Barbie movie because it allegedly portrayed a map of China’s nine-dash
line claim to the South China Sea that was shown repeatedly throughout the screening
of the film (see Appendix below).
China first officially tabled the nine-dash line map to the United Nations Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009. Since the Arbitral Tribunal Award in
2016 in the case brought by the Philippines against China, China has printed the nine-
dash line in Chinese
passports and promoted
the map on t-shirts,
desktop globes of the
world and other means.
Vietnam reacted by
refusing to stamp Chinese
passports with the
offending map and issued
visas on a separate sheet
of paper. Vietnam also
has taken an aggressive
stance against any public
displays of the map.
It has yet to be determined that the “world map” shown in the Barbie movie (pictured
left) is actually a deliberate depiction of China’s nine-dash line claim to the South China
Sea and that its inclusion in the movie is an endorsement of China’s claim. Warner
Brothers says the map is a child-like representation. Since the film has been released
for public viewing, I am unaware of any report that indicates dialogue in the film
supports China’s claim.
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Q2. How legitimate are China's sweeping claims on the South China Sea based on the
"nine dash line" it has arbitrarily imposed?
ANSWER: The original Chinese map was issued in 1947 by a domestic ministry of the
Republic of China (ROC), then in power in Peking, contained eleven dashes. The dashes
were meant to illustrate an area of Chinese historic influence that should be protected
against the return of European imperial powers after the Second World War.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopted the map after it was founded in 1949.
In 1952 it removed two of the dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf). In 2009, the
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set a deadline for signatories to
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to submit claims for
an extended continental shelf. Malaysia and Vietnam each made separate
submissions as well as a joint submission. Both China and the Philippines lodged
objections. China appended a map to its submission showing its nine-dash line claim.
International law experts note that this map did not conform to international
standards of cartography, in particular in the depiction of international boundaries.
International law experts note that there are discrepancies between maps of the
South China Sea issued by mainland China from the original map issued by the ROC.
The PRC maps moved the nine-dash lines closer to the coastlines of littoral states.
In 2013, the Philippines lodged a claim to the Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII of
UNCLOS to determine its entitlements to maritime zones as an archipelagic state in
the face of Chinese encroachments and to determine the status of land features in the
Spratly archipelago (islands, rocks, low tide elevations).
In 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal issued an Award that ruled that China’s claims to historic
rights had been superseded by UNCLOS and that China’s claims to the South China Sea
were in excess to what it was entitled under international law. Further, the Arbitral
Tribunal ruled that no land feature in the Spratly Islands was an island under
international law.
Under UNCLOS, signatories agree to compulsory dispute settlement and are given four
options – International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, International Court of Justice,
Arbitral Tribunal, and Special Arbitral Tribunal. If a signatory does not indicate an
option, the Arbitral Tribunal is the default. Neither China nor the Philippines indicated
their options.
UNCLOS also makes provision on how to handle a dispute if one of the parties to the
dispute elects not to participate. The chairman of the International Tribunal on the
Law of the Sea appoints a judge to represent the absent party. All judges are instructed
not to make inferences when a party chooses not to participate. Under UNCLOS, the
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal is final, cannot be appealed and must be complied with
immediately.
China refused to participate in the proceedings and it refused to comply with the
Award.
China’s nine-dash line is ambiguous. The nine lines are not connected. No details are
provided about latitude and longitude. It is unclear whether China is claiming all the
water and land features with the nine lines or just the land features.
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Under UNCLOS, a state is entitled to maritime zones based on the land it occupies;
this includes the coastline at low tide and islands in the sea. These land features are
entitled to 12 nautical mile territorial sea and a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf (exceptions are made for natural prolongations
beyond 200 nm).
Under UNCLOS an island is a land feature completely surrounded by water at high tide
that is capable of human habitation and has an economic function. Otherwise the land
feature is a rock (above water at high-tide) or a low-tide elevation or rock that is
completely submerged at high tide. Exclusive Economic Zones cannot be claimed from
rocks and low tide elevations.
Since 2016, China has sent out conflicting messages about what it claims in the South
China Sea. China claims historical waters off Natuna Islands in Indonesia’s EEZ and off
Laconia Shoals in Malaysia’s EEZ. China appears to have backed off its claims to all the
water in the South China Seas enclosed in its nine-dash line. China claims all the land
features within the nine-dash lines and draws straight base lines around them to
create a single unit. China claims all the waters inside its base lines as internal waters
and claims sovereign jurisdiction over waters extending seaward from its baselines.
China refers to its present claims as the four shas (island groupings) – Pratas (occupied
by Taiwan), Macclesfield Bank (completely submerged), Paracels (occupied by the
PRC) and the Spratlys (occupied by Vietnam, Malaysia, China and the Philippines).
In late 2019, Malaysia tabled a second claim to an extended continental shelf to the
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Malaysia’s actions precipitated
a cascade of submissions from Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines each followed
by an objection by China. Southeast Asia’s littoral states are in agreement in rejecting
the legality of China’s claims. They were backed by submissions from the United
States, Australia and a joint submission by France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
Finally, China often claims it was the first to discover, name, occupy and administer all
the presently occupied land features in the South China Sea. This is patently false. The
most egregious is Zengmu reef in Malaysia’s EEZ. China claims this shoal as its furthest
land feature in the South China Sea. The reef lies at least 20 metres under water.
Zengmu is a transliteration of James, the name on British Admiralty maps drawn up
during the colonial era.
Q., Given China's intransigence on the South China Sea disputes, do you see any
chance of a resolution of the long-running problem in the future?
ANSWER: The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) first raised its concern
about the South China Sea in 1992 when Vietnam and China clashed in the waters
near Vanguard Bank. ASEAN raised its concerns a second time in 1995 when China
occupied Mischief Reef in the Philippines’ EEZ. In 2002, China and ASEAN members
agreed on a Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) that set
the objective of achieving a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
In August 2018, ASEAN members and China reached agreement on a landmark Single
Draft Code of Conduct in the South China Sea Negotiating Text. The Single Draft
Negotiating Text has just completed the second of three readings. The Code of
Conduct (COC) is aimed at managing not settling maritime disputes. At least five
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major issues need to be resolved for an effective and binding COC: the geographic
scope and disputed areas of coverage, the legal status of the COC, binding dispute
resolution mechanism, enforcement mechanism, and the role of third parties.
Even if these issues are resolved, they will not address on-going militarization of the
South China Sea and strategic rivalry between China and the United States. The best
that can be hoped for is an effective system of deterrence that prevents China from
using force against claimant states.
APPENDIX

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Did the Barbie Movie Actually Depict China’s
Nine Dash Line?,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 26, 2023. All background
briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the
mailing list type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

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