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Thayer Consultancy Background Brief:

ABN # 65 648 097 123


U.S.-Japan-South Korea
Trilateral Summit Implications
for the South China Sea

August 22, 2023

We are preparing a report on the implications of last Friday's Camp David Trilateral
Security Pact on China's aggression in the South China Sea.
In a statement, the three leaders criticized Beijing's "dangerous and aggressive
behavior" in the South China Sea. As Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo have drawn closer,
Beijing has responded with a series of moves that Washington views as provocative,
including increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea. Beijing is reportedly
constructing what appears to be an airstrip on Triton Island, claimed by Vietnam and
Taiwan. Recently, the Philippine Coast Guard released a video showing a Chinese
Coast Guard vessel firing a water cannon at one of its ships.
We request your insights into the following issues:
Q1. Will the Camp David summit drive Beijing to be more aggressive in the South China
Sea?
ANSWER: China’s aggressive policies in the South China Sea can be viewed on two
tracks.
The first track is China’s grey zone operations against specific littoral states – the
Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam – to assert Chinese sovereignty and to disrupt the
involvement of foreign companies in the exploration and production of oil and gas.
China’s grey zone operation are carefully modulated to fall below the use of armed
force to prevent escalation. China uses it preponderance of coast guard, maritime
militia and fishing vessels to harass and intimidate littoral states.
The second track is China’s response to the operations and multilateral exercises of
countries “from outside the region” in the South China Sea. China’s response takes
the form of annual naval exercises involving two or more theatre commands and
harassment of specific ships and aircraft flying over or sailing on the South China Sea.
Taken as a whole China’s activities form part of an action-reaction cycle designed to
deter an opponent and to signal Chinese prowess.
The navies of the United States and Japan have conducted combined exercises in the
South China Sea for several years before the Camp David Summit. In 2020, for
example, the U.S., Japanese ad Australian navies conducted five combined exercises
in the South China Sea. In July 2020, the South Korean navy joined for the first time.
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In sum, the Camp David Trilateral Partnership will not signal a new strategic
development so much as better planning, coordination and response to provocative
and aggressive actions by China. China will stage its own military exercises in response
perpetuating the action-rection cycle.
Q2. What do military exercises and increased ballistic missile cooperation between
the U.S., Japan and South Korea in the South China Sea means for China? How do you
expect China will respond?
ANSWER: Trilateral military exercises in the South China Sea are likely to be more
frequent and expand in scope with the inclusion of Australia and from time to time
other navies such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Each of these
exercises will be viewed by China as a provocative challenge to its security and
sovereignty.
China’s current and projected naval modernisation program will mean the naval
balance in the South China Sea will not be altered by stepped up naval collaboration
by the trilateral partnership.
Cooperation by the trilateral partners on ballistic missiles mainly relates to countering
the threat posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile in Northeast Asia and the East China
Sea. To the extent that the trilateral partnership results in greater interoperability and
proficiency in ballistic missile defence it will offset the threat posed by China’s ballistic
missiles. China’s response will be to improve it offensive capabilities and increase the
number of ballistic missiles it can deploy.
Q3. Will South Korea and Japan be punished economically by China as they get closer
to the U.S.?
ANSWER: China’s economy is stuttering, facing deflation, and slower rates of growth
for the near term. This is due in part to China’s domestic policies as well as a downturn
in global economic growth.
Japan and South Korea rank third and fourth among China’s major trading partners
after the United States and Hong Kong. China would only have to look at its failed
attempt to coerce Australia by imposing $20 billion in tariffs and other punitive
measures on Australian exports to realize that it would be extremely counter-
productive to impose economic sanctions on Japan or South Korea.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summit


Implications for the South China Sea,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, August
22, 2023. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To
remove yourself from the mailing list type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

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