Claude Fabinyi

November 11, 2016

Social Demography

Final Paper
 Population Aging and Religion

Throughout history, there have been two markedly different major demographic

transitions. The first demographic transition was characterized by decreasing fertility rates and

rapidly decreasing mortality rates, thus causing a rapidly expanding population. The second

demographic transition was characterized by below-replacement fertility rates and decreasing

mortality rates, thus causing a rapidly aging population (Lesthaeghe, 2014). Social

demographers assert that population and society interdepend, causing change in one another and

being changed by one another (Caldwell, 1996). Therefore, the demographic transitions are both

the cause of changes in society and the effects of previous changes in society. The first

demographic transition left many scholars fearful that humankind would overpopulate the planet

and exceed its ability to sustain life. In contrast, the second demographic transition has created a

new set of fears. Perhaps the greatest fear following the second demographic transition is the

proportion of people age 65 and over and those of working age.

The second demographic transition affected the composition of populations, leaving

many more people age 65 or older than any other time in human history. Accordingly, social

structures have undergone major changes. While social structures struggled to accommodate the

rapidly increasing population following the first demographic transition, new concerns have risen

regarding social structures abilities to cope with rapidly aging populations and decreasing

populations. This paper will evaluate three changes that have occurred in an ancient social

structure: religion. The age distribution of the religious population, the age distribution of the

nonreligious, and the potential ramifications of these distributional trends will be analyzed in

discussed in this paper with the intention of offering practical insight to those religious

institutions concerned for their continued operation and existence.

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 Historical Evaluation

Before addressing the present condition of the three foci of this paper, one must first

establish the history of religion in the United States. The religious history of the United States

will be summarized by looking at two definitive periods: pre-first demographic transition and

post-first demographic transition. These periods are characterized by growth, religious

adherence, and increasing religiosity.

Pre-First Demographic Transition

In 1800, ninety-four percent of the American population lived in rural areas, with each

woman giving birth to an average of seven children (Greenwood & Seshadri, 2002). The

economic advantages to having more children far outweighed the added expense in a primarily

agrarian economy. The cost of feeding and caring for an additional child was exponentially

offset by that childs labor on the farm. Because of this economic advantage, among other

factors, fertility rates in America before the first demographic transition were extraordinarily

high. However, simply having high fertility rates does not qualify a region or demographic as

being in a demographic transition. Rapidly decreasing mortality rates must accompany the high

fertility rates, which would result in an expanding population. However, during the early 1800s,

no such declines in mortality rates were being observed, thus broadly maintaining the population

and precluding the United States in the early 1800s from being considered as having undergone

the first demographic transition (Haines, 2008). The interdependence of society and population

during the early 1800s shaped the United States social institutions, including its religious

institutions.

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 Religion in the pre-first demographic transition United States served as a strong

socialization agent, along with family (Okon, 2012). The piety of colonists, however, greatly

varied. For example, in 1776, an estimated 17% of colonists were religiously adherent (Finke &

Stark, 1992). In 1850, the rate of religious adherence doubled to 34%, according to Finkes

(1992) analysis of historical records of church attendance. The increasing rate of religious

adherence characterized the pre-first demographic transition period in the United States. In

addition to the increasing rates of religiosity, the early 1800s religious sects were growing evenly

across age demographics, with little exception. In summary, the future of religion as foretold by

an early nineteenth-century scholar would be continuing growth, expansion, and importance.

Post-First Demographic Transition

The increasing religious attendance of the 1800s persisted through cultural and political

movements of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, such as abolitionism and

the suffrage movement. In 1940, with fifty-seven percent of the population living in urban areas

(Greenwood & Seshadri, 2002), fertility rates were nearer to two births per average white

woman. In 1850, a steep decline in mortality rates began (Haines, 2008), signaling the

demographic transition had hit its stride (Caldwell, Caldwell, Caldwell, McDonald, &

Schindlmayr, 2006). Approximately 45% of the population in 1940 indicated that they were a

member of a religious organization (Caplow, Hicks, & Wattenberg, 2000). The status of religion

in the post-first demographic transition is clear; religion maintained a strong presence with clear

trajectory for increasing attendance, religiosity, and religious adherence.

In summary, religion in the pre-first demographic transition and post-first demographic

transition United States demonstrated upward trends in growth, religiosity, and religious

adherence, which spearheaded the rapid growth of religious institutions.

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 Age Distribution of Religious Sects

Previous historical trends suggest that the growth of religion in the United States would

continue indefinitely. However, the rate of religious adherence plateaued in the 1980s and began

to decrease slightly (Finke & Stark, 1992). One possible explanation of this decreasing trend is

the relationship between population aging and the power of religion as a socialization agent.

Parental religious status most strongly indicates the religious status of an individual

(Bengston, Putney, & Harris, 2013). Logically, if parents are strong practitioners of their

religion, their children will also be strong practitioners of the same religion in most instances.

However, this postulate cannot serve as a means of understanding the declining religiosity in the

United States. If this were true, there would be no measurable decline in religiosity or self-

identified religion, which is in stark contrast to the observed trends (Pew Research Center, 2015).

The degree of parental religious adherence cannot explain the changing religious landscape in

the United States, inviting competing explanations of the plateaued and then declining religious

trends. A potential explanation hinges upon the interaction between religion as a socialization

agent and the demographic structure of America.

The United States is comprised of six living generations: the Greatest Generation, Silent

Generation, Baby Boomers, Generation X, Millennials, and Centennials (McCrindle &

Wolfinger, 2010). Each generation shared life experiences and societal structures with their

cohorts. For example, the Greatest Generation (1901-1926) demonstrated community-

mindedness, strong morality, and strong loyalty to social structures, including religion (Novak,

2015). Baby Boomers (1946-1964) were the first individualistic generation. They were also

generally positive about hierarchical structures and more positive about trusting authority.

Generation X (1965-1980) followed the Baby Boomers. They are highly individualistic and

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open-minded, generally distrusting of large institutions, such as religion, and do not share a

global sense of the common good. Millennials and Centennials are the children of Generation X,

and espouse the generalities of the values of Generation X (Wimer, 2016). Each generation

shared a different sense of collectivism and a different perception of organized structures, such

as organized religion.

The Baby Boomers, a large proportion of the population, arguably drove the increasing

religiosity through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. However, the increasing trend ceased in the

1980s, the first decade that Generation X reached an age to choose autonomously their religious

adherence practices. Generation X, a highly individualistic generation distrusting of social

structures and organization, departed from their parents religious patterns and decreased their

participation in religious services or their involvement with their religious sect (Hout, 2016).

However, the decreases in Generation Xs religiosity is insignificant in comparison to

Millennials. Generation X, a generation who valued intellectual autonomy and freedom of

choice, did not instill in their children, Millennials, the unwavering allegiance to religious

structures. The prioritization of freedom and autonomy reduced the influence of religion as a

socialization agent in the United States. The aging Baby Boomers, a strongly religiously

affiliated group, are nearing the end of their expected lifespan. Without the generational

allegiance to social structures, there are not enough individuals from Generation X and

Millennials to replace the departing Baby Boomers, thus enabling a decrease in the membership

of religious organizations. Therefore, religions decreasing socialization power is associated

with shared generational values and embraced ideology across generations, as well as the

likelihood that these values and ideologies are transferred across generations.

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 The aging population and its generational interplay with the socialization power of

religion surely affect the future of religious sects. Up until this point, religion has been viewed

collectively. However, thousands of religious denominations and affiliations exist within the

United States. This paper will analyze three Christian sects: Roman Catholicism, Mainline

Protestantism, and Evangelical Protestantism.

The Catholic population is increasingly aging. The Catholic population is older than the

average American, with a median age of 49 years and 46 years, respectively (Lipka, 2015). In 8

years, the median age of the Catholic population has risen 4 years, indicating that the median age

of Catholics is steadily increasing (Lipka, 2015). With respect to the previous assertion of

generational differences in religion, the Catholic population is becoming disproportionately

comprised of the Baby Boomers and the Silent Generation. Approximately 48% of Catholics are

Baby Boomers and the Silent Generation. Comparatively, Millennials comprise 22% of

Catholics. Generation X and Millennials are not replacing the dying Catholics in equal parts,

thus enabling a disproportionately skewed older Catholic population. Of the 7,061 Catholics

sampled by the Pew Research Center, 20% were 65 or older compared to 17% who were 18-29

years old (Pew Research Center, 2015).

Evangelical Protestants are not immune to the trend of the aging religious. Millennials

comprise 23% of Evangelical Protestants, while Baby Boomers (35%) and the Silent Generation

(14%) comprise 49% of Evangelical Protestants (Pew Research Center, 2015). People age 65 or

older comprise 20% of Evangelical Protestants, compared to only 17% of people age 18-29.

Evangelical Protestants share the same distribution across ages as Catholics, indicating that the

issue of the aging religious is not synonymous with the level of religious organization.

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 Mainline Protestants are also rapidly aging. Of the 5,946 Mainline Protestants sampled

by the Pew Research Center, 26% were 65 or older (Pew Research Center, 2015). The Baby

Boomers and the Silent Generation comprise 53% of Mainline Protestants, while Millennials

only comprise 20% of the 5,946 sampled. Both Catholics and Mainline Protestants are aging

more rapidly than members are joining their ranks, with Mainline Protestants edging out

Catholics in their pace of aging. Of all the religious groups surveyed by the Pew Research

Center, Mainline Protestants have the greatest percentage of Baby Boomers (36%).

Socialization processes of religion and generational cohorts effects are most succinctly

summarized by analyzing the distribution of generational cohorts within Hinduism. Generation

X, as previously described, are particularly individualistic and open-minded. This open-

mindedness infiltrated the religious domain. The Pew Research Centers Religious Landscape

Survey (2015) reported that Hindus in the United States are 50% comprised of Millennials. In

addition, Generation X comprises 40% of Hindus. The Silent Generation and Baby Boomers

comprise only 9% of American Hindus, indicating that the likelihood of identifying with

Hinduism is strongly linked with generational cohorts.

In summary, religious groups are uniquely affected by the trend of the aging religious.

Mainline Protestantism is most strongly affected, following by Evangelical Protestantism and

Catholicism. Spirituality centered religious groups, such as Hinduism, demonstrate the influence

of generational cohorts on religious affiliation, specifically as religion as a socialization agent

can be affected by a parents generational cohort. The proliferation of organized religion among

the Baby Boomers and Silent Generation mirror their espousing of community-centered ideals,

in contrast to Millennials and Generation X espousing individualistic, spiritually centered ideals.

These interplays strengthen the relationship between demography and society.

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 Age Distribution of the Non-Religious

The aforementioned analysis reports that organized religion is disproportionately

comprised of the more aged generations, specifically Baby Boomers and the Silent Generation.

If demographic trends and generational cohorts are influential on an individuals religious

affiliation, the prevalence of the non-religious among the Millennials and Generation X will

inversely reflect the prevalence of the religious among the Silent Generation and Baby Boomers.

In 2014, those who responded as not being affiliated to a religious group (religious

nones) were comprised of 44% millennials and 28% Generation X (Pew Research Center,

2015). This accounts for 72% of all of those who identify as religiously unaffiliated. Baby

Boomers and the Silent Generation comprise 27% of those who are religious unaffiliated. The

disproportionately young religiously unaffiliated further reinforce the assertion that generational

cohorts are highly influential in the strength of religion as a socialization agent. Those that are

age 50 or older comprise only 28% of the religiously unaffiliated, in contrast with 72% of those

between age 18 and 49.

The reported trend suggests that the religiously unaffiliated are growing and will continue

to do so, as the proportion of Mainline and Evangelical Protestantism and Catholicism within the

overall population will be reduced as the Baby Boomers and Silent Generation are removed from

the population. Generation X and Millennials have acknowledged the importance of intellectual

independence, autonomy, and individuality. These values reduce the socialization power of

religious groups, as they are the antithesis of those values. Barring any reversal in prioritization

of values, these trends are expected to continue, barring any unforeseen demographic or societal

change.

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 Effects of the Aging Religious

With the current demographic composition of the religiously affiliated, the future of the

United States as a primarily Christian nation is no longer a certainty. The decreasing proportion

of Millennials and Generation X among organized religions, such as Mainline Protestantism,

Evangelical Protestantism, and Catholicism, indicate that the future of these institutions depends

on the adaptability to these trends.

To combat the demographic trends, organized religions should make the utmost effort to

appeal to Millennials and Generation X. These appeals should reflect the values adopted by the

generational cohorts. For example, conformity and intellectual smothering are not likely to gain

traction among younger generational cohorts, as these are not the values generally adopted. In

previous historical conditions, conformity and reduced intellectual inquiry were appealing and

reflective of the generational cohorts. However, religious groups are often limited in their ability

to appeal to younger generations because of theological limitations. For example, Catholicism is

not able to change more controversial stances (such as abortion, homosexuality, etc.) because

their belief is rooted in their fundamental stance as a religion. This structural inability to alter

views that may be unattractive to younger generations inhibits Catholicisms appeals to younger

generations, perhaps exacerbating the future hardships of a rapidly diminishing population.

In addition to appealing to younger generations, primarily aged religious groups should

acknowledge the demographic reality that has transpired. Rather than denying decreasing

attendance and an aging congregation, the religious groups should first recognize the

demographic trends. Upon acknowledging the problem, steps may be taken to rectify the

complex issue.

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 Conclusion

The interdependence of demography and society are demonstrated in the relationship

between population aging and the future of religious organizations. Changes in religious

adherence throughout history have followed an upward trajectory until the 1980s. The 1980s

and its respective generational cohort departed from previously upheld values, such as a moving

to individualism from collectivism, respectively. The demographic reality since the 1980s shows

an increasing proportion of the population that reports as religious unaffiliated. This increasing

unaffiliated religious population is disproportionately comprised of the younger generations,

with a mere 10% of the older generations identifying as religiously unaffiliated. Organized

religions, such as Catholicism, Mainline Protestantism, and Evangelical Protestantism are

disproportionately over age 65. The disproportion will have ramifications for their future

existence, potentially resulting in a more secular United States.

In conclusion, the demographic reality of an aging population has not left religion

unaffected. The aging religious population has not been able to replace their departures with

new arrivals. Barring major demographic transitions or immigration patterns, the future of

religion in the United States does not appear to be regressing toward the good ol days, when

neighborhoods would congregate once a week for a religious and social gathering. Organized

religions should mind the demography, as it so clearly has ramifications for their future

operations.

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