Religion and different social groups

Religious organisations and movements tend to attract more members or believers from some groups than
others. The main social divisions linked to religious belief and participation are social class, gender,
ethnicity and age. The relationship between social groups and religiosity shall be examined, asking questions
such as how does social class influence religious belief? Why do women appear to participate more than
men in most religions and spiritual groups? How closely is ethnicity associated with differences in religious
affiliation? And do people get more religious as they age?

Social class and religiosity

Evidence suggests that different types of religion tend to appeal to different social classes. However, the
evidence is not clear-cut and there is no straightforward relationship.
Marxist theories of social class and religion
According to Marxists, religious participation and social class are closely related. Marx (1844) described
religion in capitalist societies as the 'opium of the people'. He saw it as acting like a drug by giving its
followers a false sense of well-being and distorting reality. Marx argued that religion started in the subject
classes as a way of coping with oppression, but it was later adopted by the ruling classes as a way of
justifying their advantaged position in society. Marx, therefore, argued that all classes believed in religion,
although for different reasons. As the subject class (the proletariat in capitalist societies) developed greater
class consciousness, they could potentially lose some of their religious beliefs. This leaves open the
possibility that higher classes (particularly the ruling class, or the bourgeoisie under capitalism) might
become more religious than subject classes.
Max Weber, class and religious beliefs
Sociologists highlight the links between social class and different types of religious organisation. This idea
originated in the work of Weber (cited in Christiano, Swatos and Kivisto, 2008) who believed that different
classes tended to develop different types of religious belief and that this was linked to different religious
organisations.
Weber distinguished between different theodicies (religious explanations) for suffering on earth.
 Some religions have a theodicy of misfortune, which claims that wealth and worldly success are
indicators of evil. This type of belief tends to be associated with religious organisations that are
popular with lower social classes.
 By contrast, a theodicy of good fortune suggests that worldly success indicates virtue. This is
associated more with higher classes.

Social class and religious organisations

Evidence suggests a link between different types of religious organisation and their members' social class.
 Churches aspire to include members from all social classes. Because of its size, members of a church
are drawn from all classes in society, but the upper classes are particularly likely to join because
churches are often closely connected to the established political order. For example, the Roman
Catholic Church in the Middle Ages had important political, educational and social functions.

 Denominations tend to be slightly anti-establishment, as they have broken away from the religious
mainstream. However, Wallis (1984) noted that they are respectable organisations and therefore
appeal most to the upper working class and the lower middle class. They are not usually closely
 identified with the upper classes.

 Sects have traditionally recruited the most disadvantaged people in society. They require members to
give up their previous life, so those with much to lose are unlikely to join. They tend to appeal to the
deprived because membership offers a way of coping with disadvantage by finding meaning and a
sense of self-worth within the sect. Wallis (1984) argued that in the 1960s and 1970s, sects also
began to appeal to the 'relatively deprived' middle class of affluent students who were seeking
compensation for their lack of a spiritual life.

 World-affirming new religious movements (Wallis, 1984) such as TM are positive about mainstream
society. Their religious practices tend to facilitate social and economic success. Cults such as
Scientology offer services to their followers but require little commitment. Both world-affirming
new religious movements and cults appeal to the successful and affluent who want to become even
more successful.

 Cult movements such as the Unification Church involve their followers or believers fully and are
similar to sects in opposing mainstream society. Consequently, they tend to attract the disadvantaged
or relatively deprived.

 According to Heelas (1996), New Age movements tend to appeal to the middle class (particularly
women). Hunt (2004) and Bruce (2002) believe that they attract those in expressive professions
such as the media, teaching and counselling who believe in self-improvement.
Evaluation
In the USA, detailed data are available on social class, religious belief and participation. However, there is a
shortage of such data in many other countries. It is therefore difficult to assess the accuracy of claims about
class and different religious organisations. Consequently, most of the claims discussed here should be
treated as hypotheses rather than as well-supported theories. Furthermore, class intersects with other social
divisions, particularly gender, ethnicity and age, in shaping religious belief and participation.
 Gender and religiosity
Statistical evidence suggests that women tend to be slightly more religious than men on a global scale. The
Pew Research Center (2016) estimated that globally, 83.4% of women identified with a faith group
compared with 79.9% of men. In 61 of 192 countries, women were at least two percentage points more
likely than men to express a religious affiliation, but there were none in which the reverse was true.

Alan S. Miller and John P. Hoffman —Risk and religion

Miller and Hoffman (1995) note two main types of sociological explanation for women's greater
religiosity.
1. Differential socialisation
According to the differential socialisation view, 'females are taught to be more submissive, passive and
obedient and nurturing than are males and these attributes are associated with higher levels of religiosity'
(Miller and Hoffman, 1995). These characteristics are more often found in traditional religious beliefs. For
example, religions such as Christianity emphasise obedience to God and characteristics such as being loving,
which are associated with female gender roles. Male roles place less emphasis on these characteristics. This
theory is supported by USA-based evidence discussed by Miller and Hoffmann which indicates that men
who are submissive, passive, obedient and nurturing tend to be more religious than other men.
2. The structural locations of women and men (their location in the social structure)
According to this view, women are less involved in the labour force than men and more involved in raising
children. Not only do women have more time for church-related activities but their lower-level involvement
in paid work also gives them a greater need for the sense of personal identity which religion can provide.
Some US research suggests that religion is seen as a household activity. Socialising children by taking them
to church can be regarded as an extension of female childcare roles.
These two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the socialisation of females and males tends to
lead to them occupying different social locations, which in turn reinforces gender differences. However,
Miller and Hoffman argue that these explanations cannot fully explain the gender differences in religiosity.
They quote research which suggests that, even when socialisation and structural location are taken into
account, women are still more religious than men.
They argue, therefore, that a third factor, attitude to risk, is also important. There is nothing to lose by
being religious. However, not being religious can be seen as risk-taking behaviour because it risks not
getting God’s protection or condemnation to hell after death. Using survey-based research from the USA,
Miller and Hoffman show that women are less willing to take risks as compared to men. Furthermore, both
men and women who are more against risk taking have higher levels of religiosity. They conclude that
women's greater concern about risk is an important additional factor, alongside socialisation and structural
location, in explaining women's greater religiosity.
Evaluation The argument put forward by Miller and Hoffman that women have more time for church-
related activities is highly debatable given that a great deal of research suggests that women spend more
time on housework and childcare than men. Furthermore, rates of female participation in the labour market
are high in nations such as the USA and the UK, making it questionable whether women lack a sense of
occupational identity.
Steve Bruce — religion and secularisation
Bruce (1996) suggests that women's socialization into the nurturing aspects related to traditional femininity,
together with their child-bearing and child-rearing experiences, make them less confrontational, less
aggressive, less goal-oriented, less domineering, more cooperative and more caring. This would explain
their greater involvement not just in the mainstream denominations, but also in religious sects, and the New
Age spiritual beliefs. Many women are attracted to the 'healing, channelling and spirituality' side of New
Age beliefs because these are more in keeping with female gender roles. The minority of men involved in
the New Age tend to be more interested in the paranormal than in the more feminine aspects of the
movement.
According to Bruce, there is a division in the modern world between the public sphere (of paid work,
politics and so on) and the private sphere (the domestic world of the family and personal life). Bruce
believes that as a result of secularisation (the decline in the significance of religion in society), religion has
become less important in the public sphere and increasingly confined to the private sphere, which is more a
female sphere. As a result, women have tended to become more religious than men. Since men’s social roles
are mainly in the public sphere, they are more likely to give less importance to religion.
To Bruce, religion has declined less among women than men. However, the type of religion that has retained
an appeal for some women varies by social class. Working-class women tend to retain stronger religious
beliefs than middle class women. Lack of control over their lives makes them identify more with an all-
powerful God or in 'obscure forces beyond their control', such as fortune telling and superstition. By
contrast, middle-class women have more experience of controlling and improving their own lives.
Consequently, they tend to follow religions that allow more individual autonomy, and forms of spirituality
which facilitate personal development. They are attracted to New Age beliefs that promote self-growth and
development.

Linda Woodhead — female religiosity and secularisation

Woodhead (2005) believes that processes of secularisation and the decline in Christianity have influenced
Western societies, but they can only be understood with reference to gender. From the 19th century,
modernisation led to a process of rationalisation in which people calculated the best and most rational
means to achieve given objectives rather than relying on faith or tradition to guide their actions. This had a
'corrosive effect' on religion, as it left little room for the non-rational faith required by religion. However,
this process largely affected men. The housewife role became increasingly important for middle-class
women and this isolated them to some extent from rationalisation. Women were not 'absorbed into
rationalized values' and so were less likely than men to become disillusioned with the church's teachings.
Church attendance among men declined and women became the majority of those involved in churches.
Churches became 'increasingly feminized or domesticized'. They placed more emphasis on 'love, care and
relationships' and less on God as an all-powerful and punitive ruler. However, they continued to reinforce
male power through paternalistic images of God as a 'loving father'. As churches became feminised, they
lost prestige and became even less appealing to most men.
Religion and different spheres of life
By the 1970s in Western societies, many married women were returning to the labour force and were
increasingly exposed to the rationalised culture of paid work. This led to a rapid decline in churchgoing
among women. Woodhead believes that the changes in women's lives largely account for the decline of
Christian churches and denominations in Western countries since the 1970s. However, women are still more
interested than men in religion and spirituality, for a number of reasons.
1. Women are still less involved in the public world of work than men. More women than men work part-
time and women are still much more likely to have the main responsibility for childcare.
2. Woodhead argues that there are three rather than two spheres in contemporary societies. These are:
 primary institutions such as those associated with work and politics
 secondary institutions associated with caring for others, including the family and religion
 an individual sphere in which people are concerned with their own autonomous and individual
selves.
Religion remains relevant to those women whose lives are based in secondary institutions. Given this,
women are still more likely than men to be involved in churches and denominations.
3. New Age beliefs also tend to be dominated by women. Woodhead argues that this helps to resolve a
contradiction between 'traditional' female roles in the home and more 'masculine' roles in the workplace. In
paid work, your sense of self largely derives from your position or job, whereas in family roles your sense of
self is more concerned with relationships with others (as wife, parent and so on). New Age beliefs allow this
tension to be bypassed because they create a new 'type of selfhood in which identity is not dictated by social
position and experience, but discovered from within. The contradiction between roles in primary and
secondary institutions is resolved by seeking your identity in the individual sphere.

Religion and ethnicity

Most evidence suggests that members of minority ethnic groups in Western countries such as Britain are
more likely than majority ethnic groups to see themselves as religious; religions that are mainly followed by
minority ethnic groups are more likely to be practised by believers; and their religion is more likely (in most
respects) to influence their lives. However, there are exceptions to these tendencies.
John Bird — explanations for high levels of religiosity
Bird (1999) identifies five important reasons for the higher levels of religiosity among minority ethnic
groups in Britain:
1. Many ethnic groups 'originate in societies with high levels of religiosity'. For example, Bangladesh and
Pakistan have high levels of religious observance and belief. First-generation immigrants tend to bring these
high levels of religiosity to the UK.
2. For minority ethnic groups, religion can 'act as a community solidarity'. Solidarity based on religious
affiliation can perform important social functions for new migrants, giving them ‘a point of contact in a new
country, a source of marriage partners, social welfare and so on'.
3. Bird argues that 'Maintaining a religious commitment is also a way to maintain other aspects of cultural
identity such as language, art, patterns of marriage, cooking and so on'. Religion and minority ethnic
cultures can be mutually reinforcing.
4. The importance of religion can be maintained through socialisation and 'there is often strong family
pressure to maintain religious commitment’.
5. Some minority ethnic groups might also have strong religious beliefs because it helps them cope with
oppression. Disadvantaged minority ethnic groups tend to be working-class, and their religious beliefs can
be seen as a response to their position in the social structure. Bird suggests that Pentecostalism might
perform a dual function for British African Caribbeans. First, it can be 'a way to adjust to a society in which
(they) face discrimination and social injustice'. Pentecostalism can act as the 'opium of the people'. Second,
it can also help people to combat disadvantage by improving their social and economic position. For
example, Ken Pryce (1979) pointed out that Pentecostalism encouraged hard work and saving, which could
result in Pentecostalists gaining greater economic security.

Steve Bruce — cultural defence and cultural transition

Bruce argues that minority ethnic groups are more likely to engage in religious activity than the ethnic
majority, mainly due to social reasons rather than as an expression of deep religious commitment. According
to Bruce, religion enables:
1. cultural defence, where an ethnic group is protecting its sense of identity and maintaining ethnic pride
through religion; or
2. cultural transition, where an ethnic group uses religion to cope with the upheaval of migration.
These two processes can work together as immigrant minority ethnic groups try to both adapt and defend
their religious/cultural heritage. For example, Meredith McGuire (2002) describes how Vietnamese-
American Buddhists simultaneously attempt to continue socialising their children into their culture and also
to gain acceptance in US society. She describes how, in 'Houston, Texas, the Vietnamese community has
created their Temple with many features reminiscent of Vietnam'. However, the Temple is also used as a
community centre, assisting people to integrate into US society — for example, by facilitating networking to
help people find jobs. In such centres, minority ethnic groups can 'negotiate a Buddhist religious identity and
work to have it accepted as legitimate in their new community'.
Decline or revival in ethnic minority religions?
Bruce argues that, over time, minority ethnic groups in many Western societies become more integrated and
are increasingly influenced by the wider secular society. As a consequence, their religious beliefs will
decline.
George Chryssides (1994) argues that, in Britain, the religions of immigrant groups and their descendants
have had three main paths open to them:
 Apostasy, when a particular set of religious beliefs is abandoned in a hostile environment. For
example. a Sikh might convert to Christianity.
 Accommodation, when religious practices are adapted to take account of the changed situation. For
example, a Sikh might remove his turban because he believes it could improve his chances at a job
interview.
 Renewed vigour, when the religion is reasserted more strongly as a response to actual or perceived
hostility towards it. For example, parents might insist on strong religious orthodoxy from their
children.
Chryssides acknowledges that minority ethnic religions have faced difficulties in Britain. They have had to
establish places of prayer and deal with situations in which religious observation might be difficult.
However, he argues that the general pattern has been characterised by accommodation and renewed vigour
rather than apostasy. Buildings have been bought and converted into mosques and temples, and religious
beliefs and practices have been retained or adapted rather than abandoned. For example, many Muslim
women have found ways to dress modestly while incorporating Western elements into their clothing.
 Age, generation and religiosity
Evidence suggests that, in most countries, the young tend to be less religious than the old. For example, the
World Values Survey (discussed in Burkimsher, 2008) found that younger people (classified as those under
30 years) were less likely to say they attended places of worship than older people (those aged 50 or over) in
the majority of countries surveyed.
Reasons for age differences in religiosity
David Voas and Alasdair Crockett (2005) identified three possible explanations for age differences in
religiosity. The differences could be due to age, a period effect or the progressive decline of religion.
1. Age. Many commentators have suggested that people tend to get more religious as they get older and see
themselves as coming closer to death. Religious belief might also be affected by life events such as having
children. Parents might return to active involvement in religion because they think it is important for their
children's socialisation.
2. A period effect. Those born in a particular period (a cohort) might be particularly likely or unlikely to be
religious because of specific events or social changes during the era in which they grew up. For example,
Peter Brierley (2006) notes the rapid decline in churchgoing among the young in the 1990s and argues that
'Those in "Generation Y", defined by some as those born in the 1980s, are a cohort with little spiritual
interest and focused on "happiness".
3. The progressive decline of religion could mean that each generation is less religious than the previous
one. Supporters of this view generally favour the secularisation thesis.

Evidence
Voas and Crockett examined data from the British Social Attitudes survey to consider which of these
theories was most plausible. The data allowed them to see whether a cohort was more or less than other
cohorts and whether their attitude to religion changed as they aged.
Voas and Crockett found little evidence that people became markedly more religious with age, or that
specific cohorts were becoming less religious. Instead, they concluded that in Britain 'change has occurred
because each generation has entered adulthood less religious than its predecessors'. This was partly because
each generation was less likely to socialise their children into religious beliefs than the previous generation.
Voas and Crockett's conclusions on the theory of secularisation may not apply to all types of religious and
spiritual beliefs. For example, Heelas et al. (2005) claim that New Age spiritual beliefs are growing rapidly
despite few young people being involved, because people do not usually start to engage with such
spiritualities until middle age.
Marion Burkimsher (2008) identified similar patterns across many, but not all, countries. She examined
statistical evidence from the European Values Surveys of 2002, 2004 and 2006 and the World Values
Surveys of 1995 and 2004. She found that evidence from 'stable developed countries' (including Western
Europe) suggested that recent generations were less religious than earlier generations. Although there was
generally a decline in religiosity among people in their early 20s, and a slight increase in their late 20s,
attendance did not generally increase after the age of 30. There was, therefore, little evidence of increased
religiosity as people aged.
However, in some ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe and in much of Africa, there is evidence of
increased religiosity among the young. In the USA, youth attendance fell between 1980 and 1995 but rose
again between 1995 and 2000. Furthermore, Puerto Rico, Mexico and Brazil have all had rising rates of
attendance among the young.
Key terms

Differential socialisation The contrasting ways in which females and males are brought up within and outside the family.

Structural location The position of different social groups within the social structure - for example, the greater involvement of
men in full-time paid employment than women.

Attitude to risk The extent to which individuals are willing to expose themselves to social practices, beliefs and situations that
carry a possibility of danger.

Public sphere The social world outside the family and personal life.

Private sphere The social world inside families involving personal relationships.

Secularisation A process involving a decline in the social significance of religion.

Modernisation The process of moving from traditional society to a modern developed society.

Rationalisation A process in which people calculate the most efficient means to achieve given objectives rather than relying on
faith or tradition to guide their actions.

Primary institutions Institutions associated with work and politics.

Secondary institutions Institutions associated with caring for others, such as the family and religion.

Individual sphere The sphere of social life concerned with individual identity.

Cultural defence An ethnic group using religion to reinforce and maintain ethnic identity and pride.

Cultural transition An ethnic group using religion to cope with social change and migration.

Apostasy Abandoning a set of religious beliefs in a hostile environment.

Accommodation Adapting religious beliefs in response to a changed environment.

Renewed vigour An increase in the intensity of religious feelings in response to perceived hostility.

Age The length of time a person has lived.

Period effect The effects of being born in a particular era on social beliefs and practices.
Cohort A group of people born in a particular time period.

Summary
1. Marxists believes that religion originates among subject classes to help them cope with oppression, but it
is also adopted by the ruling classes to justify their position.
2. Weber argued that different theodicies appealed to different social groups. A theodicy of misfortune
attracts lower classes and a theodicy of good fortune attracts higher classes.
5. Hunt argues that socially mobile groups tend to join liberal religious organisations and social groups who
feel under threat tend to join more conservative organisations.
4. Churches aspire to attract members from all classes but tend to be predominantly middle-and higher-class
institutions because they generally support the establishment.
5. Denominations tend to appeal to the upper working class and lower middle class, while sects generally
attract the disadvantaged or the relatively deprived.
6. World-affirming new religious movements appeal to the all affluent. The New Age mainly attracts
middleclass professionals, particularly women in expressive professions.
7. Statistical evidence suggests that women tend to be more religious than men in all types of religious
organisation in most countries.
8. Miller and Hoffman explain gender differences in terms of gender socialisation, the structural locations of
men and women, and men's greater willingness to take risks.
9. Bruce argues that secularisation has led to religion being largely confined to the private sphere, in which
women are more involved than men.
10. Woodhead believes that secularisation has impacted on men more than women, which has resulted in
churches becoming feminised and appealing to women more than men. New Age beliefs appeal to women
because they help women to develop a new sense of selfhood which bypasses the contradiction between
their family and work roles.
11. The religion of minority ethnic groups in countries such as Britain is closely connected with the ethnicity
and countries of origin of first-generation immigrants. Most minority ethnic groups in Britain tend to be
more religious than their White counterparts.
12. Bird explains higher levels of religiosity among minority ethnic groups in terms of ethnic origins,
community solidarity, cultural identity, socialisation and oppression.
13. Bruce argues that religion acts as a form of cultural defence or a way of coping with transition to a new
society. In his view, minority ethnic religions in the UK will decline over time. However, Chryssides
suggests that they can develop in three ways: apostasy, renewed vigour or accommodation.
14. Statistical evidence suggests that, in most countries, young people are less religious than older people.
Voas and Crockett suggested that the statistical patterns could be due to people getting more religious as
they age, a period (or cohort) effect or secularisation.
15. Data from the British Social Attitudes survey suggest that, in Britain, secularisation is the main cause of
age differences in religiosity, However, Heelas claims that New Age beliefs are growing rapidly, despite
relatively few young people being involved.
16. Burkimsher found that secularisation is affecting most industrialised countries, but in Eastern Europe
and Africa there is evidence of young people becoming more religious.