US Airport Security After 9/11

In contrast to the wars between powerful nation states of the 20th century, the 21st

centurys conflicts feature asymmetric warfare, in which smaller countries or organizations

are at odds with larger, more powerful countries. One contemporary example is the US and

Al Qaeda. In the past, both sides generally followed rules1, so to speak, such as not killing

civilians. Now, however, with an imbalance of power between the adversaries, one of the

only ways the smaller antagonist can strike back is with terrorism, the use of violence and

intimidation, often against civilians, for political purposes. On September 11, 2001, a day

forever seared in the minds of Americans, Islamic terrorists took over four commercial

aircraft, crashing them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The occurrence of a

coordinated terrorist attack on such a large scale called into question the effectiveness of

systems supposedly designed to keep Americans safeparticularly, the air transportation

security system that the terrorists managed to bypass on that fateful day. Widespread fear and

weakened confidence led to many Americans purposely avoiding air travel. Unsurprisingly,

airport security was the industry that invited the greatest amount of change after 9/11, and the

changes in airport security policies, spending, and technology have brought heated public

debate. On the whole, the changes have strengthened air travel safety for Americans. In

relative terms, the post 9/11 airport security system is a definite improvement over the pre-

9/11 system. However, in absolute terms, airport security is not yet effective, cost efficient, or

morally sound.

1
Tansey, Roger. "A legal analysis of suicide bombing: blowing up the law of war?" Kennedy School
Review 5, no. 45+ (2004). Accessed February 29, 2016.
http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/whic/AcademicJournalsDetailsPage/AcademicJournalsDetailsWindow?failOverType
=&query=&prodId=WHIC&windowstate=normal&contentModules=&display-
query=&mode=view&displayGroupName=Journals&limiter=&currPage=&disableHighlighting=false&display
Groups=&sortBy=&search_within_results=&p=WHIC%3AUHIC&action=e&catId=&activityType=&scanId=
&documentId=GALE%7CA140790633&source=Bookmark&u=ingl29443&jsid=eeab4356883249176ed97d15
df02cc36.
 One of the first legislative efforts to improve airport security was the creation of the

Transportation Security Administration, or TSA, under the Aviation and Transportation

Security Act (ATSA).2 The Act instilled the TSA with the responsibility of securing all

modes of transportation.3 In response to the weaknesses in security brought to light by the

terrorist attacks, the newly created TSA evaluated procedures and modified every level of

security. The most substantial change was the federalization of the aviation industry, meaning

the responsibility of screening became solely that of the federal government. This change

resulted from both political and economic considerations.

According to Coughlin, the director of research at the Federal Reserve Bank, the shift

from private providers to government administration was a positive change. The previous

arrangement led to an underinvestment in security because it placed the financial burden of

security on airlines and airports.4 Airport security is a public good, meaning the market for

airport security contains positive externalities the extra benefits of airport security spill

over to the national public, including those who do not pay to gain such benefits. Though

increased security would benefit the public as a whole, from a private point of view,

increasing security would increase costs and lower efficiency, thus reducing revenue and

profit.5 With the federal governments takeover of the airport security industry after 9/11, the

amount of security provided increased to a more socially optimal amount.6 Because of this,

2
Steven J. Pecinovsky, "Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities
Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks: GAO-07-
375," GAO Reports: EBSCOhost (accessed January 31, 2016).
3
Ibid.
4
Paul Seidenstat, "Terrorism, airport security, and the private sector," The Review of Policy
Research 21.3, no. 275, (May 2004), accessed January 14, 2016,
http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/uhic/AcademicJournalsDetailsPage/AcademicJournalsDetailsWindow?failOverType
=&query=&prodId=UHIC&windowstate=normal&contentModules=&display-
query=&mode=view&displayGroupName=Journals&limiter=&u=ingl29443&currPage=&disableHighlighting=
false&displayGroups=&sortBy=&source=&search_within_results=&p=UHIC%3AWHIC&action=e&catId=&a
ctivityType=&scanId=&documentId=GALE%7CA116859671.
5
Ibid.
6
Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis, Aviation Security and Terrorism: A Review of the Economic
Issues, by Cletus C. Coughlin, Jeffrey P. Cohen, and Sarosh R. Khan, VOL. 48 5 (n.p.: Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Review, 2002), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2002/09/01/aviation-security-and-
terrorism-a-review-of-the-economic-issues/.
the government is able to invest in new security technology. Take, for example, the Qylatron

Entry Experience Solution. The Qylatron uses radiation and chemical sensors to look for

explosives, and the software can be updated to search for new threats as they are identified.7

Unlike current technologies such as the Explosive Detection System (EDS), which has a

throughput rate of 150-200 bags an hour,8 the Qylatron can handle up to 600 bags an hour

with only four human operators.9 In October of 2015 the TSA announced that it would test

the Qylatron over the next 18 months as a possible future addition to airports.10

The divided responsibility in managing previous airport security, which made the

management haphazard at best, also made federalization an attractive option. Before 9/11,

aviation security was managed through a three party management system that included

airlines, airports, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).11 Previously, screening of

passengers and checked luggage was conducted under private contractors with individual air

carriers.12 The role of the FAA was to establish security regulations and oversee all

components of the security system to ensure compliance with the regulations.13 Paul

Seidenstat, professor of Economics and Public Management at Temple University, outlines

some problems that resulted from this system.14 For one, the fact that no single entity was in

7
Alex Davies, "The 49ers Test Qylurs Magic Machine That May Fix Airport Security," Wired,
(November 18, 2015), accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.wired.com/2015/11/the-nfl-tests-qylurs-magic-
machine-that-may-fix-airport-security/#slide-1.
8
Viggo Butler and Robert W. Poole, Jr., Re-Thinking Checked-Baggage Screening (n.p.: Reason
Public Policy Institute, 2002), accessed February 3, 2016,
http://reason.org/files/f9b5018689d607923c7ce0c624e7dd58.pdf.
9
Alex Davies, "The 49ers Test Qylurs Magic Machine That May Fix Airport Security," Wired,
(November 18, 2015), accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.wired.com/2015/11/the-nfl-tests-qylurs-magic-
machine-that-may-fix-airport-security/#slide-1.
10
Ibid.
11
Paul Seidenstat, "Terrorism, airport security, and the private sector," The Review of Policy
Research 21.3, no. 275, (May 2004), accessed January 14, 2016,
http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/uhic/AcademicJournalsDetailsPage/AcademicJournalsDetailsWindow?failOverType
=&query=&prodId=UHIC&windowstate=normal&contentModules=&display-
query=&mode=view&displayGroupName=Journals&limiter=&u=ingl29443&currPage=&disableHighlighting=
false&displayGroups=&sortBy=&source=&search_within_results=&p=UHIC%3AWHIC&action=e&catId=&a
ctivityType=&scanId=&documentId=GALE%7CA116859671.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
charge of security made holes in the security network more likely, and though in theory the

FAA oversaw airport and airline security, in reality, it did not rigorously enforce performance

standards or effectively disseminate threat information to the other two parties.15

From the federal governments viewpoint, federalization was also necessary to lessen

social dissent. The high turnover of underpaid, minimally trained employees, as well as the

tendency for air carriers to select low bid contractors to provide security made the pre-9/11

security framework an easy target for criticism.16 A Washington Post poll conducted shortly

after the attack indicated an overwhelming majority in favor of federalization, with 82% of

Americans supporting it.17 In the wake of the attack, many citizens, unable to trust the private

screeners who had failed to prevent the hijackings, were more than willing to sacrifice

convenience for safety in the form of increased security.18 Though security problems had

always existed, they did not attract the media or the publics attention until after the events of

9/11.19

Initially, the Republican White House and President Bush opposed the idea of

creating a new bureaucracy to consolidate transportation security responsibilities.20 However,

recognizing the need for swift legislation to address the publics concerns, they ultimately

relented, and the ATSA bill was signed into law on November 19, 2001.21 This decision

successfully invoked in the public a greater sense of confidence in the governments actions.

A poll conducted in 2002 by Gallup, a nonpartisan polling organization, found that 76% of

15
Ibid.
16
Gary J. Newkrik, Homeland Security: the business of preserving democracy not practicing it: an
Analysis of the Transportation Security Agencys Order Precluding Federal Airport Screeners From the
Collective Bargaining Process. Administrative Law Review 55 (4), American Bar Association: 82342 (2003),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40712159.
17
Andrew F. Hessick, "The Federalization of Airport Security: Privacy Implications," Whittier Law
Review 24 (2002), accessed February 4, 2016, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430959.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cullar, and Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy:
Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates. Stanford Law Review 59 (3), Stanford Law
Review: 673759 (2006), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040307.
21
Ibid.
respondents approved of the way George W. Bush was handling his job as president.22

Another poll conducted by Gallup in 2006 showed that 77% of respondents felt the new

security measures at airports since September 11, 2001 had been an effective part of the

governments overall strategy to prevent terrorism.23 In terms of funding, management, and

the governments reputation, federalization was a welcome change in the realm of airport

security.

Arguments against federalization tend to focus on a few, specific failures of the TSA

without recognizing any of its merits. For instance, Joe Wolverton II, J.D. cites the TSAs

failure to prevent a terrorist, Umar Abdulmutallab, from boarding a plane as a prime example

of the organizations failure to provide effective security.24 However, he cites no concrete

evidence that shows private screening would be superior to government-provided security.

After the responsibility of aviation security fell to the government, they made efforts

to improve emergency procedures. On the day of the attack, the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) were

slow to respond to the emergency.25 For example, the Presidents authorization to shoot down

the 4th plane would not have reached the military in time had the passengers not caused it to

crash.26 To improve communications and coordination, the Domestic Events Network, which

allows a variety of federal agencies and state authorities to communicate and monitor a

22
Frank Newport, "Americans Approve of Proposed Department of Homeland Security," Gallup (June
10, 2002), accessed February 4, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/6163/Americans-Approve-Proposed-
Department-Homeland-
Security.aspx?g_source=77%%20effective%20government&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles.
23
"Terrorism in the United States," Gallup (August 20, 2006), accessed February 4, 2016,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/terrorism-united-states.aspx.
24
Joe WolvertonII, "Insecure Americans: After 9/11, "homeland security" became a rationale for
dispensing with much convenience in airports and Fourth Amendment guarantees, but U.S. security is still
haphazard." New American (08856540) 26, no. 4: 10. MAS Ultra - School Edition, (EBSCOhost: 2010),
accessed January 31, 2016.
25
Kean H. Thomas and Hamilton Lee, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, (Washington, D.C.: 2004).
26
Ibid.
situation in real time, was established.27 The TSA also founded the Transportation Security

Operations Center, which operates around the clock to manage a multi-agency response in

the case of an in-flight security threat.28

The governments substantial efforts to increase airport security have not been in vain.

Terrorist attacks have measuredly decreased since 9/11. In a chart constructed with sources

from the International Civil Aviation Organization, International Air Transport Association,

and US Transportation Security Administration, the number of people injured or killed during

acts of unlawful interference have for the most part shown a downward trend from 2002 to

2010.29 However, this increase in national security might have come at too high a cost.

One goal of the ATSA was to reinforce security through massive investment in

capital equipment. Though this investment reduced the positive externalities discussed earlier,

the TSAs spending may have been excessive: the costs are exceeding the benefits. The TSA

requested some 1,800 scanners, which cost $2.5 billion, to operate at each airport, an act

many condemned because it led to inefficiency.30 Passengers and screeners now have to hand

feed luggage into the machines, an extremely slow and labor-intensive process. The

prolonging of the screening process is a huge economic loss for passengers.31 Bruce Schneier,

a computer security and privacy specialist, explained in 2004 that TSA security increased

delays by 19.5 minutes,32 and passengers value their time at $40 per hour. Another source of

cost-inefficiency comes from the fact that the current probability of attack is below 0.2%.

27
Steven J. Pecinovsky, "Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities
Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks: GAO-07-
375," GAO Reports: EBSCOhost (accessed January 31, 2016).
28
Ibid.
29
James Ott, "Assessing Risk Aviation Security Since 9/11." Aviation Week & Space Technology 173,
no. 32: 48. MAS Ultra - School Edition, (EBSCOhost: 2011), accessed January 31, 2016.
30
Viggo Butler and Robert W. Poole, Jr., "Re-Thinking Checked-Baggage Screening" (n.p.: Reason
Public Policy Institute, 2002), accessed February 3, 2016,
http://reason.org/files/f9b5018689d607923c7ce0c624e7dd58.pdf.
31
Mark G. Stewart and John Mueller, "Cost-benefit analysis of airport security: Are airports too
safe?," Journal of Air Transport Management, no. 35 (2014), PDF.
32
Bruce Schneier, "Harms of Post-9/11 Airline Security," Schneier on Security(blog), (March 29,
2012), accessed February 3, 2016, https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/03/harms_of_post-9.html.
This means all increased security beyond adding more TSA lines, more training, and

shatterproof glass would be superfluous. In fact, there would have to be one terrorist attack

per year in order for the legislation to be fully cost-effective.33

The huge investment in capital equipment led to overuse of technology and

insufficient training of their operators, creating an imbalance between the number of

machines and the number of qualified people operating them. Even state-of-the-art screening

equipment is of limited value if the people who operate the equipment are not well trained.

Dr. Adrian Schwaninger, Head of Research at the University of Zurich, examines this

relationship between operator and machine. At the Aviation Security (AVSEC) World

Conference in 2004 he presented results from studies over four years which showed that

threat detection in X-ray images can be significantly improved by training screeners based on

visual cognition, object recognition, and psychophysics.34 He concludes that any investment

into equipment must be complemented by investments into human factors in order to use

modern technologies to their full potential.35

Furthermore, because the ATSA focused on increasing the quantity rather than quality

of human labor, the use of resources was not cost-effective. The Congressional Budget Office

(CBO) estimated that about 7000 federal law enforcement officers would be deployed due to

the new legislation, at a cost of about $1.5 billion.36 The CBO claimed that the increase in the

number of staff employed was ineffective. Because of the need to increase staff numbers,

33
Jack K. Riley, Air Travel Security Since 9/11, publication no. CP-635, Corporate Publication (n.p.:
RAND Corporation, 2011), http://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP635.html.
34
Diana Hardmeier, Franziska Hofer, and Adrian Schwaninger, "The Role of Recurrent CBT for
Increasing Aviation Security Screeners Visual Knowledge and Abilities Needed in X-ray Screening" (paper
presented at The 4th International Aviation Security Technology Symposium (Symposium 2006), Omni
Shoreham Hotel, Washinton, Columbia, United States, November 27, 2006), accessed January 26, 2016,
http://www.casra.ch/uploads/tx_tvpublications/HarHofSch2006b.pdf.
35
Ibid.
36
Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis, "Aviation Security and Terrorism: A Review of the Economic
Issues," by Cletus C. Coughlin, Jeffrey P. Cohen, and Sarosh R. Khan, VOL. 48 5 (n.p.: Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Review, 2002), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2002/09/01/aviation-security-
and-terrorism-a-review-of-the-economic-issues/
most of the workers employed were only paid minimum wage.37 This not only resulted in

high turnover rates, but also increased the employees misconduct rate.38 There has been

increased theft, smuggling, and falling asleep on duty in US airports.39 George Frederick

from the University of Kansas describes airports with additional security as overstaffed and

states that the excessive layers of management and miscommunication cause inefficiency and

reduces liability.40

Acknowledging that the terrorists had taken control of the planes cockpit with only

box cutters on 9/11, legislation also increased the number of air marshals from 33 to 2,800.41

Though the intention of the legislation was valid, the execution was flawed: the massive

increase in air marshals had a similar effect to the increase in screeners. Clay Biles, a trainer

of air marshals, criticized this. Prior to the change in legislation, the standard for selecting air

marshals was as high as the top 1% marksmen in the world, but because of the sudden

increase in demand for air marshals, the FAA was forced to provide each air marshal with

less training.42 Charles Mann, a journalist for Vanity Fair, also states that the employment of

huge numbers of air marshals is cost-inefficient; the repetitive nature of the job results in high

turn-over rates and therefore the training of new officers is becoming increasingly

expensive.43

37
Charles C. Mann, "Smoke Screening," Vanity Fair, (December 20, 2011), accessed February 3,
2016, http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112.
38
Michael Pearson, Ed Payne, and Rene Marsh, "Report: TSA employee misconduct up 26% in 3
years," CNN, (August 1, 2013), accessed February 4, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/31/travel/tsa-
misconduct/index.html?iref=allsearch.
39
George H. Frederickson and Todd R. LaPorte, "Airport Security, High Reliability, and the Problem
of Rationality," Public Administration Review 62 (n.p.: Wiley, 2002), accessed February 4, 2016,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3110168.
40
Ibid.
41
Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis, "Aviation Security and Terrorism: A Review of the Economic
Issues," by Cletus C. Coughlin, Jeffrey P. Cohen, and Sarosh R. Khan, VOL. 48 5 (n.p.: Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Review, 2002), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2002/09/01/aviation-security-
and-terrorism-a-review-of-the-economic-issues/
42
Clay W. Biles, "How 9/11 Changed The Federal Air Marshal System," Business Insider (New York,
NY), December 16, 2013, accessed February 4, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/5-ways-federal-air-
marshals-have-changed-since-911-2013-12.
43
Charles C. Mann, "Smoke Screening," Vanity Fair, (December 20, 2011), accessed February 3,
2016, http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112.
 Another important aspect of increasing aviation security is determining passenger risk

levels. In a process called prescreening, passengers are compared to a government watch list

to see if they pose security risks even before they step foot in the airport. None of the 19

hijackers of 9/11 were on the governments 12-person no-fly list at the time.44 Consequently,

the federal government realized that effective prescreening depends on accurate watch lists,

and thus watch lists were considerably expanded and consolidated into a terrorist-screening

database maintained by the FBI.45 The Terrorist Watchlist now contains over 420,000

individuals, and there are over 16,000 individuals on the No-Fly List.46 However, there are

still many concerns regarding the prescreening process, such as the accuracy of the names

included in the watch lists, the lack of uniform identity-matching procedures, and disclosure

of watch list information outside the government.47

Concerns over privacy also extend to the passenger screening process, an area in

which airports struggle to find a balance between privacy and safety. For example, there is

much controversy over the pat downs that began after 9/11. There are a few instances in

which pat downs has made going through airport security a humiliating experience for

passengers. One such case was when a pat down was performed on Michelle Dunaj.48 She

asked if they could go to a more private area for the search, but was refused, even though

officers are required to grant such requests of privacy.49 TSOs often receive complaints about

44
Steven J. Pecinovsky, "Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities
Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks: GAO-07-
375," GAO Reports: EBSCOhost (accessed January 31, 2016).
45
Ibid.
46
"Terrorist Screening Center." The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Last modified September 2001.
Accessed February 26, 2016. https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9-11/just-the-facts-
1/terrorist-screening-center.
47
Steven J. Pecinovsky, "Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities
Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks: GAO-07-
375," GAO Reports: EBSCOhost (accessed January 31, 2016).
48
Press, The Associated. "Michigan Woman Dying of Leukemia Embarrassed by TSA Pat-down at
Seattle Airport." Daily Times, October 10, 2012. Accessed February 4, 2016.
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/dying-woman-embarrassed-tsa-pat-down-airport-article-
1.1178975.
49
Ibid.
inappropriate touching, and although in theory women are given the choice of waiting for a

female screener to come, in actuality, female screeners are sometimes unavailable.

However, what many might not think about is the fact that pat downs are unpleasant

for both the conductor and the receiver. Many Transportation Security Officers, or TSOs,

point out that they themselves greatly dislike pat-downs, having to touch other people all day,

all year. They claim that people instantly believe the women are the victims and the officers

are the perpetrators, painting a false picture of the true situation. An anonymous agent asserts

that it is hurtful to be called names and abused for just trying to do their jobs.50 Many

officers agree with his sentiment that they are simply professionals trying to do their jobs and

should not be treated unjustly for doing so.51

The TSAs full body scanner, a device designed to detect harmful objects on a

persons body, has also raised concerns about privacy. The reason is that the scanner

produces an image that essentially shows the passengers naked body the high frequency

waves from the scanner penetrate clothing.52 A transgender woman, born as a man, claims

she was detained at Orlando Airport because of an anomaly detected by the full body

scanner, an experience that left her humiliated.53

Despite complaints, the scanners have generally proven effective in detecting

dangerous objects. In a report by the International Foundation for Protection Officers, author

Alycia Taylor provides statistical data from the Department of Homeland Security stating

50
Aaron Smith to CNN newsgroup, "TSA Pat Downs: 'Horrible' Screener Job gets Worse," (November
23, 2010), accessed January 26, 2016, http://money.cnn.com/2010/11/22/news/economy/tsa_screener/.
51
Ibid.
52
S. Oka et al., "Latest Trends in Millimeter-Wave Imaging Technology," Progress in Electromagnetic
Research Letters 1 (2008).
53
James Queally, "Transgender Woman says TSA Detained, Humiliated her Over Body
'Anomaly'," (Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2015), accessed February 4, 2016,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-tsa-transgender-20150921-story.html.
that 7 million terrorist items similar to those used during 9/11 have been confiscated through

the use of screeners since 2002.54

In spite of these statistics, Bruce Schneier, a renowned security expert, argues that the

majority of changes implemented by the TSA are security theater, which prioritizes easing

public fears over combating terrorism and protecting public safety.55 Part of this show

includes focusing on specific threats, such as making passengers take off their shoes to

prevent another shoe bomber from boarding.56 Schneier likens this to banning red shirts

simply because a terrorist wore a red shirt the threat is not reduced, as terrorists will shift

their focus elsewhere, but it still feels as if something is being done.57

Instead of only making changes based on weaknesses exploited by terrorists in 9/11,

security organizations should also continually respond and adapt to new risks. According to a

report by the Government Accountability Office, the TSA and other federal agencies

responsible for security should follow a risk management approach.58 The Congress, the

Executive Branch, and the 9/11 Commission all agree that a risk-based approach would

ensure that finite resources can be effectively allocated to high security priorities.59 For

example, in a move to try to allocate resources to high-risk individuals while easing the

process of security for low-risk passengers as much as possible, the TSA created its Pre-

check program in 2011.60 Frequent fliers who meet certain security criteria and citizens who

54
Alycia B. Taylor and Sara Steedman, "The Evolution of Airline Security Since 9/11" (n.p.:
International Foundation for Protection Officers, 2003), accessed February 4, 2016,
http://www.ifpo.org/resource-links/articles-and-reports/protection-of-specific-environments/the-evolution-of-
airline-security-since-911/.
55
Charles C. Mann, "Smoke Screening," Vanity Fair, (December 20, 2011), accessed February 3, 2016,
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Steven J. Pecinovsky, "Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities
Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks: GAO-07-
375," GAO Reports: EBSCOhost (accessed January 31, 2016).
59
Ibid.
60
Tim Hume, "'Safe-list' travelers get fast track through airport security," CNN, March 23, 2012,
http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/NewsDetailsPage/NewsDetailsWindow?failOverType=&query=&prodId=OVIC
&windowstate=normal&contentModules=&display-
query=&mode=view&displayGroupName=News&limiter=&u=ingl29443&currPage=&disableHighlighting=fal
apply for the US customs Global Entry program can speed through security and avoid taking

out liquids or computers and taking off their shoes.61 As Tom Hendricks, Senior Vice

President of Safety, Security, and Operations for the Air Transport Association puts it,

Instead of looking for a needle in a haystack, were trying to make the haystack smaller.62

The essence of the risk-based model is the difference between uniform screening and

selective or multi-level screening. In selective screening, high-risk passengers are subjected

to closer scrutiny with more sensitive and specialized technologies while low-risk passengers

are subjected to lower levels of scrutiny.63 Similarly, multi-level screening creates multiple

levels of security that differ either randomly or based on risk level.64 Poole and Passantino

argue that the current model of uniform screening is a waste of security resources, since not

every passenger is equally likely to be a threat.65 A similar report by Butler and Poole also

advocates passenger inspection based on risk groups.66 McLay, Lee, and Jacobson examine

the Multi-level Passenger Screening model and conclude that having layers of security rather

than uniform screening is more effective in deterring terrorist attacks; if several members of a

group of threats are prevented from boarding, a terrorist attack could be prevented, thus it is

se&displayGroups=&sortBy=&source=&search_within_results=&p=OVIC&action=e&catId=&activityType=&
scanId=&documentId=GALE%7CA283952900.
61
Ibid.
62
James Ott, "Assessing Risk Aviation Security Since 9/11." Aviation Week & Space Technology 173,
no. 32: 48. MAS Ultra - School Edition, (EBSCOhost: 2011), accessed January 31, 2016.
63
Laura A. McLay, Sheldon H. Jacobson, and John E. Kobza, "The Tradeoff between Technology and
Prescreening Intelligence in Checked Baggage Screening for Aviation Security" (n.p.: Springer Science +
Business Media, 2007), accessed February 3, 2016, DOI10.1007/s12198-007-0010-8.
64
Ibid, 335.
65
Ibid.
66
Butler, Viggo, and Robert W. Poole, Jr. "Re-Thinking Checked-Baggage Screening". N.p.: Reason
Public Policy Institute, 2002. Accessed February 3, 2016.
http://reason.org/files/f9b5018689d607923c7ce0c624e7dd58.pdf.
not necessary to prevent all threats from boarding their flights.67 Even the TSA has admitted

that selective screening may result in better security at US airports.68

However, Billy Vincent, former head of security for the FAA and president of

Aerospace Services International, claims that US policymakers will not allow for a truly

effective risk-management system.69 He believes a certain degree of racial and ethnic

profiling is needed to identify individuals, but US policymakers are sometimes hesitant to use

these sorts of measures out of a sense of ethics.70 As a result, a potentially useful

prescreening program, Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening (CAPPS), was rejected

due to the need to adhere to political correctness.71

Therefore, the effectiveness of the risk-model may be limited by ethical concerns. An

inevitable implication of the risk-based model is racial profiling, because race is an important

factor in the prescreening process that determines passenger risk levels. Deborah Ramirez, a

professor of Race at Northeastern University who also works with the Department of Justice,

states that before 9/11, racial profiling was a definite violation but this orthodox view was

questioned after 9/11.72

There will always be a compromise between privacy and safety. The tradeoff can lead

to a loss of effectiveness if privacy it taken too much into account, or a loss of public

approval if privacy is not adequately taken into account. Sometimes a compromise can be

67
Laura A. McLay, Sheldon H. Jacobson, and John E. Kobza, "The Tradeoff between Technology and
Prescreening Intelligence in Checked Baggage Screening for Aviation Security" (n.p.: Springer Science +
Business Media, 2007), accessed February 3, 2016, DOI10.1007/s12198-007-0010-8.
68
Ibid.
69
James Ott, "Assessing Risk Aviation Security Since 9/11." Aviation Week & Space Technology 173,
no. 32: 48. MAS Ultra - School Edition, (EBSCOhost: 2011), accessed January 31, 2016.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Deborah Ramirez and Jack Levin, "Profiling Terrorists Not the Answer," Boston Herald, November
7, 2001, accessed February 4, 2016,
http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/NewsDetailsPage/NewsDetailsWindow?failOverType=&query=&prodId=OVIC
&windowstate=normal&contentModules=&display-
query=&mode=view&displayGroupName=News&limiter=&u=ingl29443&currPage=&disableHighlighting=fal
se&displayGroups=&sortBy=&source=&search_within_results=&p=OVIC&action=e&catId=&activityType=&
scanId=&documentId=GALE%7CA7983618
made. For example, full body scanners now have software installed that produce much less

revealing images, appeasing the public while still providing a high level of security.73

Compared to what was in place before 9/11, the revamped airport security system is

definitely an improvement. Federalization allowed for greater funding for security endeavors

and increased public confidence. Efforts to maintain accurate watch lists and develop

effective emergency procedures represent moves in the right direction. However, many areas

of Americas current airport security are still lacking, meaning that though security

comparably improved, it was only a shift from inadequate to acceptable. To further

strengthen airport security and improve efficiency, policymakers should focus on improving

the quality of human labor and on constantly evaluating and adapting to risk. These

improvements in security unfortunately come at some cost to individual privacy and race

neutrality, and may lead to certain individuals being unfairly singled out at airports. However,

some minimal unfairness may be cost effective as well as tolerable. Though experts may

disagree on specific points, one thing is certain: 9/11 was a defining moment in American

history, a moment that set off development in airport security that is still ongoing today.

73
Ashley Halsey, "New Airport Software to End Naked Scanner Images," The Seattle Times (Seattle,
WA), July 20, 2011, accessed February 26, 2016, http://www.seattletimes.com/travel/new-airport-software-to-
end-naked-scanner-images/.
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