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of the American Academy of Religion
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Journal of the American Academy of Religion. LX/2
301
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302 Journal of the American Academy of Religion
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Apczynski: Belief and Proper Basicality 303
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304 Journal of the American Academy of Religion
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Apczynski: Belief and Proper Basicality 305
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306 Journal of the American Academy of Religion
5For a contemporary analysis and defense of this claim that a historical community may be the
bearer of a cultural heritage promoting particular forms of reality-apprehensions, see Edward Farley
(1975 and 1982).
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Apczynski Belief and Proper Basicality 307
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308 Journal of the American Academy of Religion
7Steuer notes here that Plantinga's "definition" of proper basicality does not ref
tion. Nonetheless Plantinga does argue that a criterion of proper basicality m
inductively from the practice of communities (1984:76).
8In Macintyre's terms (370-88) Steuer would be attempting to translate Planting
a universal language, thereby failing to discern its particularities-including i
belief in God as outlined above.
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Apczynski. Belief and Proper Basicality 309
by our reliance on them in our affirmation of beliefs we know. Even
with this, someone still may question to which particular community (o
subset thereof ) a person ought to adhere in order to ground properly her
beliefs. Is not Plantinga rather "hard-nosed" or even a bit arbitrar
about what a rational person's epistemic allegiance may be (Tilley:240)?
My contention is that he definitely is not, since his response is thor-
oughly reasonable and consistent when interpreted as I am doing: an
individual is justified primafacie in adopting the basic beliefs of the com
munity that in fact informs her beliefs on any matter. When framed i
this manner, I find it difficult to imagine any other rationally defensible
response to the question. For a Christian considering the truth of belie
in God this would require allegiance to some particular Christian
community.
Presumed throughout such an "inductive" approach to proper basi-
cality, of course, is the possibility of challenge and transformation in
person's basic beliefs. With respect to belief in God, then, the Christian
community provides relevant examples for conditions of proper basical
ity which serve as prima facie justification for the believer. Typically
Christian believer today would rely on several overlapping traditions of
inquiry with varying degrees of allegiance to each. It is easy to under
stand how such circumstances generate prima facie challenges to
believer's basic beliefs--challenges which may be the source of serious
anxiety and intellectual unrest. Yet it is precisely by being situated thu
with a commitment to a range of historical traditions with their substan-
tive claims to truth- about, say, the graciousness of God-that a perso
has the rational basis for a response to a challenge and the need for one
To put it another way, the logic of Plantinga's position holds that
... the only rational way for adherents of any tradition to approach
intellectually, culturally, and linguistically alien rivals is one that allows
for the possibility that in one or more areas the others may be rationally
superior to it in respect precisely of that in the alien tradition which it
cannot as yet comprehend. The claim made within each tradition that
the presently established beliefs shared by the adherents of that tradi-
tion are true entails a denial that this is in fact going to happen in
respect of those beliefs, but it is the possibility of this nonetheless hap-
pening which . . . gives point to the assertion of truth and provides
assertions of truth and falsity with a content. . . . (MacIntyre:388)
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310 Journal of the American Academy of Religion
9And when we do, we ought to recognize it for the Augustinianism it is, not th
it is not (Plantinga 1984:47).
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Apczynski. Belief and Proper Basicality 311
dialogue may continue confidently and responsibly in the way indicate
by Plantinga, namely by responding to specific challenges but no
understood to come from particular traditions of inquiry that deman
appropriately shaped responses.
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312 Journal of the American Academy of Religion
MacIntyre, Alastair
1988 WhoseJustice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame
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