Group 1

1. Export Competition:
A. Preliminary agreement: Removal of all export subsidies, effective immediately for

developed countries and with a 3-year phase out period for developing countries
 2. Domestic Support:
OTDS Amber Blue De Minimus
Australia Developed 80% Developed 90% --- Developed to 1%
over 5yr. Developing 60% Developing to
Developing 50% 5%
over 5yr.
Japan EU 70% --- --- ---
USA/Japan 60%
Australia 50%
(has OTDS?)
Developing 45%
Brazil Differential EU 70% USA/EU/AUS Developed to
treatment for Japan/USA 60% to 2.5% 2.5%
developed Brazil/Others Developing to
Developing to
developing 45% 5% 6.7%
countries LDC Unlimited
EU EU 75% EU 70% Developed to Developed 2.5%
Japan/USA 66% Japan/USA 60% 2.5% Developing 6.7%
Others 50% Others 45% Developing to
5%
India Differential USA to 2007 --- Developed to
treatment for levels 2.5%
developed and EU 90% Developing to
developing Developing 30% 10%
countries (immediate or LDCs Unlimited
gradual?) Special boxes for
food security and
stockholding
China Developed --- --- ---
Immediate
elimination
Developing
Phaseout
elimination
USA Differential --- --- ---
treatment for:
Developed AUS,
EU, Japan, USA
Developing
Burkina Faso
Emerging
Economies China,
India, Brazil
Burkina --- --- --- ---
Faso
 Tentative proposal agreed by all countries:

OTDS AMS De minimis Blue box

EU 75% 70%
US, Japan 66% 60%
Australia 50% 45% 2,5% 2,5%
Other 5 countries 6,7% 5%
Burkina Faso Exempted

Under review: 1) Special box for India, 2) Blue box share of 5% for Japan
Food security box:
1. All measures taken by the developing countries for poverty alleviation, rural

development, rural employment and diversification of agriculture should be exempted

from any form of reduction commitments; (India

2. Flexibility to be given to developing countries in the manner of providing subsidies to

key farm inputs, which nevertheless should continue to be accounted for in the

Non-product specific support AMS calculations; (India

3. ln addition to the provisions contained in Article 6.2 of Agreement on Agriculture,

relating to agricultural investment and input subsidies, Product specific support given to

low income and resource poor farmers should also be excluded for AMS calculations;

(India
Cotton?
1. December 2008 modalities

A. Trade-distorting domestic support for cotton would be cut by more than for the

rest of the sector. The text includes a formula reflecting this, based on a formula

proposed by the Cotton Four African countries in 2006. (Par.54) (Unchanged)

B. Mathematically, the formula says that if a countrys general Amber Box cut is

Rg, then, the percentage cut for cotton = Rg + ((100-Rg)x100)/3xRg

C. E.g., if the US Amber Box reduction is 60%, as above, then its cut in Amber Box

support for cotton would be 82.2% i.e. (60+(40x100/180))%. That is unchanged

and remains unsettled.

D. Blue Box support for cotton would be capped at one-third of what would be the

normal limit (Par.55). (Unchanged)

E. Developing countries with Amber and Blue Box commitments would make two-

thirds of developed country cuts for cotton and over a longer time period (Pars.57

and 58). (Unchanged, although the chairpersons introduction does refer to cotton

and the need to make progress on this critical issue)

2. Current Proposals
A. Elimination of all cotton subsidies (Burkina Faso,
i. Production-related domestic support over three years
B. Amber Box spending cut by half of the percentage difference between the agreed

overall cut and the complete elimination of support entirely (Burkina Faso,
C. Blue Box spending on cotton to be capped at a third of the final ceiling (Burkina

Faso,
3. Market Access:
1. Duty-free quota-free access for LDCs (Burkina Faso,
2. Special and differential treatment for developing countries (India, Brazil, US, EU,
A. All WTO members consider products of interest to developing countries, in

particular least-developed countries, when making tariff reductions (US,

B. To give special consideration to least developed countries when they implement

tariff reduction commitments (US,

3. Duty-Free, quota-free access for LDC cotton (Brazil, Burkina Faso, EU,
4. To denominate bindings and applied rates on a specific or ad valorem basis, without the

use of complex tariffs or combinations of tariffs (US,

5. To eliminate the transitional special agricultural safeguard as defined in Article 5 of the

Agreement on Agriculture (US,

Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs)

1. Should be eventually abolished (India, Brazil,

2. In the intervening period, there should be substantial expansion of TRQs administered by

developed countries (India,

3. To subject all tariff-rate quotas to substantial increases through progressive

implementation of annual commitments over a fixed period (US,

4. There should also be greater transparency in administration of TRQs by:
A. Prescribing guidelines for complete uniformity across countries and products

(India,
i. Adopting a common base period for calculating domestic consumption for

minimum market access commitment by the developed countries (India,

ii. Mandatory filling up of TRQs by developed countries (India,
iii. Stricter application of the MFN principle in allocation of TRQs with

special preference being given to developing countries having less than $

1000 per capita annual income (India,

5. Allocation of TRQs should be for specific products and not for aggregated commodity

groups (India,
6. To establish disciplines to improve functioning of tariff-rate quotas, including specific

mechanisms that trigger when tariff rate quota fill remains below a fixed level (US,

7.
Tariff Cuts

1. 54% overall tariff cut for developed countries: (Brazil, EU,

2. 36% overall tariff cut for developing countries (Brazil, EU,

Brazil, EU:

Developed Small, Vulnerable

Countries Developing Countries Economies (SMEs) RAMs
Band Range (%) Cut (%) Range (%) Cut (%) Cut (%) Cut (%)
A 0-20 48-52 0-30 32 34.7 22 24.7 24.5 27.2
B 20-50 55-60 30-80 36.7 40 26.7 30 29.2 32.5
C 50-75 62-65 80-130 42.7 41.3 31.3 33.3 33.8 35.8
D >75 66-73 >130 44 48.7 34 38.7 36.5 41.2
54% 36%
Note: LDCs exempt from any cut

Australia:

Option 1: Market Access/Tariff Reduction (steeper cuts on higher

tariffs)

Bound
Country Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Tariff

0 - 10% 30% 20% 15% 10% 10%

10 - 20% 50% 30% 20% 15% 15%

EU, US, AUD, Japan
20 - 30% 60% 40% 30% 20% 20%

30% > 70% 50% 40% 20% 20%

Developing 0 - 20% 5% 5% 2% 2% 1%
Countries

20 - 30% 15% 10% 5% 5% 2%

 30 - 40% 20% 15% 10% 5% 2%

40% > 25% 20% 15% 5% 5%

0 - 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

20 - 30% 5% 2% 2% 2% 2%
LDCs
30 - 40% 5% 5% 2% 2% 2%

40% > 5% 5% 5% 2% 2%

Sensitive and Special Products

1. Sensitive:
A. 1% sensitive products exclusion (Brazil,
B. Sensitive products would be subject to smaller cuts (2/3) than non-sensitive

products (Brazil, EU,

C. [Dutiable] Tariff lines allowed: 8% (10% for countries with 30% or more of their

tariff lines in the top tier) (EU,

2. Australia:

Option 1: Sensitive List (For All Countries)

Country Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6

EU

US
50% 20% 20% 5% 5%
Australia

Japan

Developing Countries 20% 10% 10% 5% 5%

LDCs Exempted

3. Special:

A. Products of developing countries reductions would be offset by preferential tariff

quota (Brazil,

B. Treat special products as a temporary transitional mechanism (Brazil,

C. Self-designated by developing countries (Brazil,

i. Must meet certain requirements:

a. Food security (Brazil, EU,

b. Livelihood interests (Brazil,

c. A significant proportion is produced on small farms (EU,

d. A significant proportion of farmers are employed producing the

product (EU,
 e. A significant proportion of farmers are low income and the

product accounts for a significant proportion of total agricultural

income (EU,

f. A significant proportion of agricultural tariff revenue comes

from the product (EU,

D. Special Products: 12% of products may be designated as special, with 4%

subject to no cuts, 4% to cuts of 15%, and 4% to cuts of 25% (EU,

4. Anti-concentration clause: no country may concentrate all its flexibilities in one

particular sector (effectively avoiding liberalization in this sector) (EU,

Brazil:

SVE (Small
RAMS
Developed Developing Vulnerable (Acceded
Countries Countries LDC Economies members)

Sensitive Product 2% 6.70%

14% lines/;
40% no cut & 60%
Special Product Ineligible with 15% cut
Cut from next higher tier applied
Tariff Escalation In top tier add 6 % points to the cut
Cotton 0 if originating from LDC
Special Safeguard Mechanism

1. Special Safeguard Measure for LDCs/Developing countries (Burkina Faso, India, Brazil,
2. A separate safeguard mechanism on the lines of the Special Safeguard provisions (Article

5 of AoA) including a provision for imposition of Quantitative Restrictions under

specified circumstances, should be made available to all developing countries irrespective

of tariffication in the event of a surge in the imports or decline in prices and to ensure

food and livelihood security of their people; (India

3. New Special Safeguard mechanism (SSM) applicable to 2.5% of tariff lines, which would

allow countries to increase custom tariffs temporarily to help domestic industry (Brazil,

4. Special Safeguard Mechanism would be applied on both a quantity and a price basis

(Brazil,