CONFLICT OF LAWS-CASE DIGESTS ON

JURISPRUDENCE

1. ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEE, 43 PHIL 43

FACTS
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga and left property worth nearly P100,000.
The estate of the deceased was claimed by Cheong Seng Gee, an alleged legitimate child by a
marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. On the other hand, Mora Adong, the
alleged lawful wife of the deceased who married him in 1896 in Basilan, and her daughters are also
claiming as heirs of the decedent.
The conflicting claims to the estate were ventilated in the CFI of Zamboanga.
The trial judge reached the conclusion that the proof of the marriage of Tan Dit to the decedent was not
sufficient.
Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child.
On the other hand, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong
and the deceased had been adequately proved, but, under the laws of the Philippine Islands, it could
not be held to be a lawful marriage; thus, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural
children.
The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the
property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and
Rosalia.
Thus, both parties appealed.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the marriage between Tan Dit and the decedent is valid.
2. W/N the marriage between Mora and the decedent is valid considering that it is a Mohammedan
marriage.

RULING
First issue:
SC ruled that to establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary
to prove before the Philippine courts the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then
necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
THE PROOF PRESENTED IN COURT DID NOT SUSTAIN THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE OF TAN BIT AND
THE DECEDENT.
The Court noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of
Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of
truthfulness. The Court also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong
Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands.
The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the
deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the
deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
ALSO THERE IS NO COMPETENT TESTIMONY AS TO WHAT THE LAWS OF CHINA IN THE PROVINCE OF
AMOY CONCERNING MARRIAGE WERE IN 1895.
As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a
moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years
for forty years and the two cases are the same.
AS TO THE TESTAMENTARY RIGHTS OF CHEONG SENG GEE AS AN ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD,
SUCH WAS NOT PRONOUNCED AS AN ERROR SINCE THE OPPOSITORS FAILED TO ASSIGNED IT AS AN
ERROR AND MERELY KEPT SILENCE.

second issue:
YES. MARRIAGE MAY BE SOLEMNIZED BY EITHER A JUDGE OF ANY COURT INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME
COURT, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, OR PRIEST OR MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL OF ANY DENOMINATION . . ."
 "Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity
and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is to be
offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the worshipper,
as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of
every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a particular name.
A MOHAMMEDAN IMAN IS A "PRIEST OR MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL," AND MOHAMMEDANISM IS A
"DENOMINATION," WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE MARRIAGE LAW.
"NO PARTICULAR FORM FOR THE CEREMONY OF MARRIAGE IS REQUIRED, BUT THE PARTIES MUST
DECLARE, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PERSON SOLEMNIZING THE MARRIAGE, THAT THEY TAKE EACH
OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE."
The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the
creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The
latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or
repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as
to consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest were
addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the
Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as
husband and wife.
IT WAS SHOWN BY EVIDENCE THAT THE DECEDENT WAS MARRIED TO THE MORA ADONG ACCORDING
TO THE CEREMONIES PRESCRIBED BY THE BOOK ON MARRIAGE OF THE KORAN, BY THE MOHAMMEDAN
IMAN (PRIEST) HABUBAKAR. THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE IS ESTABLISHED BY ONE OF
THE PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE, THE MORA ADONG, BY THE IMAN WHO SOLEMNIZED THE MARRIAGE,
AND BY OTHER EYEWITNESSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS THE FATHER OF THE BRIDE, AND ANOTHER, THE
CHIEF OF THE RANCHERIA, NOW A MUNICIPAL COUNCILOR.
The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in
goods. From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the Chinaman
and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five children, two of whom,
Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third persons during his
lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private
and public documents. Thus, when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of
registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he gave
written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
THE COURT RULED THAT THE MARRIAGE WAS VALID. THE LAW OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS HAS LONG
RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION. VARIOUS RESPONSIBLE
OFFICIALS HAVE SO OFT ANNOUNCED THE PURPOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH
THE CUSTOMS OF THE MOROS, ESPECIALLY THEIR RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS.

Other digested version:

FACTS: Estate of Cheong Boo is claimed by two parties (1) his alleged legitimate child from a
marriage contracted in China in 1895, and (2) his alleged legitimate spouse from a marriage in
Basilan in 1896.
ISSUE: WON a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by a matrimonial letter is valid
in the Philippines
HELD: NO;
o To establish a valid foreign marriage, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the
Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact,
o and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
o There is a need for proof that is clear, strong and unequivocal so as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of such impediment (prior marriage).
2. LIM VS. COLLECTOR 36 PHIL 472

FACTS:
The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular Collector of Customs denied entry into
the Philippine Islands two children aged 8 and 14 years, respectively, under and by authority of the
Chinese Immigration, Laws, it appearing that the children arrived at the Port of Manila accompanied by
and in the custody of their mother, a Filipino woman;
The children were born in China, out of lawful wedlock; and that their father was Chinese.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Insular Collector of Customs may lawfully deny entry into the Philippines to the
2 children?

RULING
The Court by analogous reasoning to that upon which the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the wives and minor children of chinese merchants domiciled in the united states may enter that
country without certificates, these children must be held to be entitled to enter the philippine islands
with their mother, for the purpose of taking up their residence here with her, it appearing that she is
natural guardian, entitled to their custody and charged with their maintenance and education. (U. S.
vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459.)
SC is not aware of any chinese law which differentiates the status of infant children, born out of lawful
wedlock, from that of similar children under the laws in force in the philippine islands.
SC ASSUMES THAT IN CHINA AS WELL AS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SUCH CHILDREN HAVE THE RIGHT
TO LOOK TO THEIR MOTHER FOR THEIR MAINTENANCE AND EDUCATION, AND THAT SHE IS ENTITLED
TO THEIR CUSTODY AND CONTROL IN FULFILLING THE OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THEM WHICH ARE
IMPOSED UPON HER, NOT ONLY BY THE NATURAL IMPULSES OF LOVE AND AFFECTION, BUT ALSO BY
THE EXPRESS MANDATE OF THE LAW.
SC OPINED THAT CHINESE IMMIGRATION LAWS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO EXCLUDE
INFANT CHILDREN OF A FILIPINO MOTHER, BORN OUT OF LAWFUL WEDLOCK, SEEKING ENTRANCE TO
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAKING UP THEIR RESIDENCE WITH HER IN HER NATIVE
LAND.
We conclude, therefore, that, IT APPEARING THAT THE RESPONDENT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS IS
DETAINING THE PETITIONERS UNDER AN ERRONEOUS CONSTRUCTION OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS,
AND IT APPEARING FROM THE FACTS DISCLOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS THAT THESE
CHILDREN ARE ENTITLED TO ADMISSION INTO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, THE ORDER ENTERED IN THE
COURT BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED, AND IN LIEU THEREOF AN ORDER SHOULD BE ENTERED
DIRECTING THE DISCHARGE OF THESE CHILDREN FROM THE CUSTODY OF THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, WITH THE COSTS IN BOTH INSTANCES, DE OFFICIO.

3. HASEGAWA V. KITAMURA, 538 SCRA 26, (2007)

FACTS
Nippon is a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the
infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines.
 The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon
assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of STAR project. When the STAR project was near
completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering
& construction supervision of the BBRI Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the
contract.
Hasegawa, Nippons general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the
company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by
the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamarus contract
was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the
RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippons contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese
nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of
Kitamarus ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of
lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not
applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put
in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE
W/N the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance &
damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on
the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship
rule, or forum non conveniens.

RULING
NO. IN THE JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS PROBLEMS, 3 CONSECUTIVE PHASES ARE INVOLVED:
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS.
Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While
jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not
always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether the law of a
state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issuejurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various
aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject
matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c
establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is
further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or
tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one
not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather
raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and
lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule. The Court finds the invocation
of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a
contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place
where a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of
the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by
them either expressly or implicitly. Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to
ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most
 substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court
should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile,
place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts
and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be
resolved.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are
rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that
of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, Nippons premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not
yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should
apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws
rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a
case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court
or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the
case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the
case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear
cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to
recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or
other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its
jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the
basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the
sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts
principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Other version:
FACTS:
Kitamura, initiated an action for specific performance and damages against Hasegawa and Nippon with
the RTC of Lipa City.
Nippon and Hasegawa moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
contract being enforced by Kitamura had been perfected in Japan, between and among Japanese
nationals.
They assert that the action shall be heard in the proper courts in Japan following the principle of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial
relationship to the parties following the state of the most significant relationship rule in Private
International Law.
RTC denied the MTD, and subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. On a petition for
certiorari to CA, it dismissed the petition. CA ruled that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not
applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put
in issue. CA declared that the trial court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci
solutionis. Having their motion for reconsideration denied, the petitioners interposed this petition for
review.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court validly exercised jurisdiction over the instant controversy, despite the fact
that the contract subject matter of the proceedings was entered into by and between Japanese
nationals, written wholly in the Japanese language and executed in Japan?
2. Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance
and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed
on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant
relationship rule, or forum non conveniens?
RULING:
1. YES, THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE.
In the instant case, petitioners, in their MTD, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by
law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, an action for specific performance and
damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.
What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule.
 The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
The Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of the change in theory, as explained
in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo.

2. Forum non conveniens cannot be used as a ground to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction
herein.
it is not a proper basis for a MTD because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as
a ground.
whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this
conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by
respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial
and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.
NOTES:
The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they elevated the
case to the appellate court. In the MTD filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the
RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will determine the
validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus. While not abandoning this stance in their petition before the appellate
court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense of forum non conveniens. On petition
for review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non
conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is the [state of
the] most significant relationship rule.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved:
1. jurisdiction,
2. choice of law, and
3. recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Corresponding to these phases are the following questions:
(1) Where can or should litigation be initiated?
(2) Which law will the court apply? and
(3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?
A. JURISDICTION: Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law
asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties.
The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to
apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum
contacts for one do not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other.
The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the
question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a
controversy, the following should be present:
1. it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent,
2. over the subject matter,
3. over the issues of the case and,
4. in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.
In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject
matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority
which establishes and organizes the court.
It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law.
It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter
submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
B. CHOICE OF LAW
 Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute,
they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to
be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue
in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called
for.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a
court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it:
1. dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case;
2. assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or
3. assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or
States.
The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws.
While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights
provided by foreign sovereigns.

4. RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL V. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., G.R. NO. 162894,

(FEBRUARY 26, 2008), 546 SCRA 555
FACTS
Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of
Connecticut, & Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract
BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects
in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.
Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged nonpayment
of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract.
The Labor Arbiter ordered BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzies money claims.
Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzies complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against
Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
 dredging project w/c he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and
Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1 company.
RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM NON CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC DENIED RAYTHEONS MOTION. THE CA AFFIRMED.
Raytheons contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved
are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines,
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ISSUES
(a) W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.
(b) W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.

RULING
(a) YES.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine
court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or
can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case
is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law & by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of
the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.
That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE COURTS, OR
ANY OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM HEARING THE CIVIL
ACTION.
JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair
to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant
case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

(b) NO.
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES,
MAY REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE MOST CONVENIENT OR
AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.
Raytheons averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction
over the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense.
While it is w/c the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require the courts desistance.
5. MANILA HOTEL CORP AND MANILA HOTEL INTL LTD. VS. NLRC G.R. NO.
120077, (OCTOBER 13, 2000), 343 SCRA 1
FACTS
Marcelo Santos was employed as a printer in a printing press in Oman when he received a job offer
from Palace Hotel in China for the same position and a higher pay.
Santos remained in correspondence with Palace Hotel while he was still in employed in Oman.
After negotiations, Santos accepted the offer and signed the contract with Palace Hotel (while still in
Oman). His contract provided that he will receive a monthly salary of $900 and the employment
contract should last for two years.
After he resigned from his Oman job, he went back to the Philippines. Thereafter, he left for China.
When Santos arrived in China, he signed an amended employment agreement (terms were not stated
in the case), and the agreement was also signed by Mr. Schmidt of Palace Hotel and noted by the VP of
Manila Hotel International Company Limited (MHICL). Santos commenced employment immediately.
After a short vacation leave, Santos returned to Palace Hotel and he was informed that he was going to
be terminated due to business reverses suffered by the company.
After a month, he was indeed terminated and all his benefits were paid to him. When Santos came back
to the Philippines, he filed a suit in the NLRC, naming Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and MHICL as
defendants.
To clarify the relationship of Palace Hotel and MHICL and MHC:

The NLRC awarded damages to Santos, but MHC and MHICL assailed NLRCs jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE
Did the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case at bar?

RULING
NO. The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely
foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that Santos is a Filipino citizen.
THE PALACE HOTEL AND MHICL ARE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. NOT ALL CASES INVOLVING OUR
CITIZENS CAN BE TRIED HERE.
The employment contract. SANTOS WAS HIRED DIRECTLY BY THE PALACE HOTEL, a foreign employer,
through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed.
HE WAS HIRED WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE POEA OR ANY AUTHORIZED RECRUITMENT
AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
UNDER THE RULE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A PHILIPPINE COURT OR AGENCY MAY ASSUME
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IF IT CHOOSES TO DO SO PROVIDED:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
THE CONDITIONS ARE UNAVAILING IN THE CASE AT BAR.
NLRCs jurisdiction fails because of the following reasons:

1. NOT CONVENIENT. NLRC is not a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case from
the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The
inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper DEFENDANTS, THE PALACE HOTEL AND
MHICL ARE NOT NATIONALS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Neither are they "doing business in the
 Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the
Philippines.
2. NO POWER TO DETERMINE APPLICABLE LAW OR DETERMINE THE PROPER FACTS. Neither
can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was
perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the
law of the place where the contract was made).
3. NEITHER CAN THE NLRC DETERMINE THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL AS ALL ACTS COMPLAINED OF TOOK PLACE IN BEIJING, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident
truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos'
retrenchment.
4. PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS, NO POWER TO EXECUTE DECISION. Even assuming that a
proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the
employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China
and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving
foreign employers. Neither Philippine courts do not have power over an employment contract executed
in a foreign country.
IF SANTOS WERE AN "OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER", A PHILIPPINE FORUM, SPECIFICALLY THE POEA,
NOT THE NLRC, WOULD PROTECT HIM. HE IS NOT AN "OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER" A FACT WHICH
HE ADMITS WITH CONVICTION.

6. PHILSEC. INVESTMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS, 274 SCRA 102 (1997)

FACTS
Ducat obtained two separate loans from Ayala and Philsec in the sum of $2.5M secured by shares of
stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, 1488 Inc. undertook the obligation to pay by virtue of
a Warranty Deed with a Vendors Lien. Through the latter, 1488 Inc. sold to Athona Holdings
(Athona) a parcel of land in Texas while Philsec and Ayala extended a $2.5M loan to Athona to
partially cover the value of the $2.8M lot.
Athona executed a promissory note in favour of 1488 Inc. worth $.3M to complete the payment for
the lot. After all these transactions, Ducat was released by Philsec and Ayala of his loan.
Athona failed to pay the $.3M promissory note.
1488 Inc. sued Athona, Philsec and Ayala for the payment of the $.3M.
The case was filed in Texas. While the Texas case was pending, Philsec filed a complaint to recover
a sum of money with damages in a Makati RTC against Ducat.
Ducat, on the other hand, filed and was granted a MTD on the basis of litis pendentia and forum
non conveniens.
The trial court also held that it had no jurisdiction over 1488 Inc. because the action was neither in
rem nor quasi in rem, accompanied by the fact that the said defendant was a non-resident.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUES
1. Does a judgment in a US court bar actions to be instituted in Philippine courts? (i.e. Can the foreign
judgment constitute res judicata?)
2. Did CA err in dismissing the case based on the principle of forum non conveniens?

RULING
1. It depends. The FOREIGN JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GIVEN THE EFFECT OF RES JUDICATA WITHOUT
GIVING THE ADVERSE PARTY AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPEACH IT ON GROUNDS STATED IN RULE 39,
50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: WANT OF JURISDICTION, WANT OF NOTICE TO THE PARTY,
COLLUSION, FRAUD, OR CLEAR MISTAKE OF LAW OR FACT.

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was
after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on
grounds allowed under the law.
IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO INITIATE A SEPARATE ACTION OR PROCEEDING FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS THAT THERE IS OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT, IN
ORDER FOR THE COURT TO PROPERLY DETERMINE ITS EFFICACY.
This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to ACTIONS IN PERSONAM, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a FOREIGN JUDGMENT MERELY CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE
JUSTNESS OF THE CLAIM OF A PARTY AND, AS SUCH, IS SUBJECT TO PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private
respondents.
The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was
even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented
thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S.
court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered
would constitute res judicata.

2. Yes.
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, 1, which does not include forum non
conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the courts desistance.
In this case, the TRIAL COURT ABSTAINED FROM TAKING JURISDICTION SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF
THE PLEADINGS FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PHILSEC IS A DOMESTIC CORPORATION AND DUCAT IS A FILIPINO,
AND THAT IT WAS THE EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE LATTERS DEBT WHICH WAS THE OBJECT OF THE
TRANSACTION UNDER LITIGATION.
The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the
U.S. case.
7. PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES V. TODARO, 524 SCRA 153 (2007)

FACTS
Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with
Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc.
(PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig
(Klepzig).
Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is
principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company
established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the
company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and
quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL;
and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI;
Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company
engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate production;
he resigned from Betonval in February 1996;
in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with
their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines;
Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to
an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for
two to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete
operations should the company decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its
operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a
permanent basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that
the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed
the MTD which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE
W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a
presence of a foreign element

RULING
NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In
the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx
[a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as
to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce
its decision."

The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a
ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance; and that the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination,
hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
 Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action but SC
held that there was cause of action, to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also argued in this case that
jurisdiction is with the NLRC and not with the RTC. SC held it was with RTC, SC has consistently held
that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved
which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective
bargaining agreement, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction.

8. LAUREANO V. CA, 324 SCRA 414 (2000)

FACTS
Laureano, Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with
Singapore Airlines [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.
He was then accepted.
In 1982, Singapore Airline, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17)
expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement.
Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised
them to take advance leaves.
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its excess.
It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible
promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified.
Unfortunately, Laureano was not one of the twelve.
Laureano instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
Singapore Airline moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, Laureano filed the instant
case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the RTC.
CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it held that the action has already prescribe, the prescriptive
period was 4 years and action was filed beyond the prescriptive period.

ISSUES
(a) W/N Philippine law must be applied and not Singaporean law.
(b) W/N action has already prescribe.
RULING
a. PHILIPPINE LAW MUST BE APPLIED.
SC quoted the findings of the RTC, it says: "Neither can the Court determine whether the
termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to
show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case.
As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial
notice of the laws of Singapore.
The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the
burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should
be applied."
Also Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
court. On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from
raising further the issue of jurisdiction.

b. YES. Neither Article 1144 nor Article 1146 of the Civil Code is here pertinent.
What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code.
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that
petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more
than 4 years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
Where the money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the
Court held that the language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to
'money claims specifically recoverable under said Code' but covers all money claims arising from an
employee-employer relations"

9. WILD VALLEY V. CA, 342 SCRA 213 (2000)

WRITTEN & UNWRITTEN LAW
FACTS
In February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc.,
private respondent, arrived in Venezuela, to load iron ore.
Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar
del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River.
He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.
Captain of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with
the pilot Vasquez, the vessel's third mate, and a helmsman when the vessel left the port at
1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988.
Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations. It was then that the watch officer called the
master to the bridge. At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River,
thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by Wildvalley Shipping
Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the RTC of Manila against
Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of
Philippine Roxas) for DAMAGES in the form of unearned profits, and interest.
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley
Shipping Co., Ltd.
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest with the private
respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed

ISSUE
Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar

RULING
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law.
WRITTEN LAW falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "UNWRITTEN," the oral testimony of expert
witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the
courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, MAY BE EVIDENCED BY AN OFFICIAL
PUBLICATION THEREOF OR BY A COPY ATTESTED BY THE OFFICER HAVING THE LEGAL
CUSTODY OF THE RECORD, OR BY HIS DEPUTY, AND ACCOMPANIED, IF THE RECORD IS
NOT KEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES, WITH A CERTIFICATE THAT SUCH OFFICER HAS THE
CUSTODY. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office." (Underscoring supplied)

The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It
must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.

It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section
 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the
documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the
copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case.

With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence
rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.

There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only the diligence
required of a good father of a family in accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil
Code, thus:
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order or command of the harbor
pilot on board. The master of the Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop
the vessel, mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were navigating normally before the
grounding of the vessel. Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was
very familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and that he does not
even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco River.

10. SANTOS III VS. NORTHWEST ORIENT LINES, 210 SCRA 256 (1992)
FACTS
This case involves the Proper interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as
follows:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal
place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or
before the court at the place of destination.

The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in
San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled
departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his return to San
Francisco.

On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for
his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was
informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-
listed.

Petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. it contended that the complaint could be instituted only in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties, before:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;
2. the court of its principal place of business;
3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made;
4. the court of the place of destination.

The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal
place of business. Neither was the petitioner's ticket issued in this country nor was his destination
Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
ISSUE
(1) The constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention; and
(2) The jurisdiction of Philippine courts over the case.

RULING
On the issue of Constitutionality:

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took
effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution
No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio
Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950.
The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955,
President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto.
"to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in
good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government
and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

On the issue of Jurisdiction:

By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by
aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation" shall mean
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure
and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a
transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High Contracting Parties . . .

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United States
to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four places where an action for damages
may be brought.

Whether Article 28(1) refers to jurisdiction or only to venue is a question over which authorities are
sharply divided. While the petitioner cites several cases holding that Article 28(1) refers to venue
rather than jurisdiction, there are later cases cited by the private respondent supporting the
conclusion that the provision is jurisdictional.
In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a
dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be
established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has
jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be
governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is allowed to be
filed under Article 28(1). By specifying the three other places, to wit, the principal place of business
of the carrier, its place of business where the contract was made, and the place of destination, the
article clearly meant that these three other places were not comprehended in the term "domicile."
11. NATIONAL RENTAL VS. SZUKHENT ET AL., 375 U.S. 311 (1964)
FACTS
Petitioner, a corporation with its principal place of business in New York, sued respondents, residents of
Michigan, in New York, claiming that respondents had defaulted in payments due under a farm equipment
lease. The last paragraph of the contract provided that "the Lessee hereby designates Florence Weinberg
as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New York." The
respondents were not acquainted with Florence Weinberg, and she had not expressly undertaken to
transmit notice to them. The Marshal delivered two copies of the summons and complaint to Florence
Weinberg. That same day she mailed the summons and complaint to the respondents, together with a
letter stating that the documents had been served upon her as the respondents' agent. The petitioner
itself also notified the respondents by certified mail of the service of process upon Florence Weinberg. The
District Court quashed service of the summons and complaint, holding that, although Florence Weinberg
had promptly notified the respondents of the service of process and mailed copies of the summons and
complaint to them, the lease agreement itself had not explicitly required her to do so, and there was
therefore a "failure of the agency arrangement to achieve intrinsic and continuing reality." The Court of
Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE
Whether the person upon whom the summons and complaint were served was "an agent authorized by
appointment" to receive the same, so as to subject the respondents to the jurisdiction of the federal court
in New York

RULING
Yes. We need not and do not in this case reach the situation where no personal notice has been given to
the defendant. Since the respondents did in fact receive complete and timely notice of the lawsuit pending
against them, no due process claim has been made. The question presented here is whether a party to a
private contract may appoint an agent to receive service of process within the meaning of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4 (d) (1), where the agent is not personally known to the party, and where the agent has
not expressly undertaken to transmit notice to the party.

The purpose underlying the contractual provision here at issue seems clear. The clause was inserted by the
petitioner and agreed to by the respondents in order to assure that any litigation under the lease should be
conducted in the State of New York.

Florence Weinberg's prompt acceptance and transmittal to the respondents of the summons and complaint
pursuant to the authorization was itself sufficient to validate the agency, even though there was no explicit
previous promise on her part to do so.

We deal here with a Federal Rule, applicable to federal courts in all 50 States. But even if we were to
assume that this uniform federal standard should give way to contrary local policies, there is no relevant
concept of state law which would invalidate the agency here at issue. In Michigan, where the respondents
reside, the statute which validates service of process under the circumstances present in this case
contains no provision requiring that the appointed agent expressly undertake to notify the principal of the
service of process. Similarly, New York law, which it was agreed should be applicable to the lease
provisions, does not require any such express promise by the agent in order to create a valid agency for
receipt of process.

It is argued, finally, that the agency sought to be created in this case was invalid because Florence
Weinberg may have had a conflict of interest. This argument is based upon the fact that she was not
personally known to the respondents at the time of her appointment and upon a suggestion in the record
that she may be related to an officer of the petitioner corporation. But such a contention ignores the
narrowly limited nature of the agency here involved. Florence Weinberg was appointed the respondents'
agent for the single purpose of receiving service of process. An agent with authority so limited can in no
meaningful sense be deemed to have had an interest antagonistic to the respondents, since both the
petitioner and the respondents had an equal interest in assuring that, in the event of litigation, the latter
be given that adequate and timely notice which is a prerequisite to a valid judgment.

Dissent:
The record on the motion to quash shows that the Szukhents had never had any dealings with Mrs.
Weinberg, their supposed agent. They had never met, seen, or heard of her. She did not sign the lease,
was not a party to it, received no compensation from the Szukhents, and undertook no obligation to them.
In fact, she was handpicked by the New York company to accept service of process in any suits that might
thereafter be filed by the company. Only after this suit was brought was it reluctantly revealed that Mrs.
Weinberg was in truth the wife of one of the company's officers. I disagree with that holding, believing
that:

(1) Whether Mrs. Weinberg was a valid agent upon whom service could validly be effected under Rule 4 (d)
(1) should be determined under New York law and that we should accept the holdings of the federal district
judge and the Court of Appeals sitting in New York that under that State's law the purported appointment
of Mrs. Weinberg was invalid and ineffective. No federal statute has undertaken to regulate the sort of
agency transaction here involved. It is to the law of New York - the State where this action was brought in
federal court, the place where the contract was deemed by the parties to have been made, and the State
the law of which was specified as determining rights and liabilities under the contract - that we should turn
to test the validity of the appointment.

I agree with the district judge that this agency is invalid under the laws of New York. The highest state
court that has passed on the question has held that, because of New York statutes, the designation by a
nonresident of New York of an agent to receive service of process is ineffective; the court, in denying an
order for interpleader, held that only residents of New York can make such an appointment, and even then
only in compliance with the terms of the controlling statute.;

(2) if, however, Rule 4 (d) (1) is to be read as calling upon us to formulate a new federal definition of
agency for purposes of service of process, I think our formulation should exclude Mrs. Weinberg from the
category of an "agent authorized by appointment . . . to receive service of process." If Rule 4 (d) (1) is to
be read as requiring this Court to formulate new federal standards of agency to be resolved in each case
as a federal question, rather than as leaving the question to state law, I think the standards we formulate
should clearly and unequivocally denounce as invalid any alleged service of process on nonresidents based
on purported agency contracts having no more substance than that naming Mrs. Weinberg. State courts in
general quite properly refuse to uphold service of process on an agent who, though otherwise competent,
has interests antagonistic to those of the person he is meant to represent.

12. INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. VS. WASHINGTON, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
FACTS
Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes and other footwear. It maintains places of business in
several states, other than Washington, at which its manufacturing is carried on and from which its
merchandise is distributed interstate through several sales units or branches located outside the State of
Washington.

Appellant has no office in Washington and makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise
there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in
intrastate commerce. During the years from 1937 to 1940, now in question, appellant employed 11 to 13
salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers located in St. Louis. These salesmen
resided in Washington; their principal activities were confined to that state; and they were compensated by
commissions based upon the amount of their sales.

The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders from prospective
buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appellants office in
St. Louis for acceptance or rejection, and when accepted, the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped
f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state. All the merchandise shipped into
Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from which collections are made. No salesman has
authority to enter into contracts or to make collections.

The Supreme Court of Washington was of opinion that the regular and systematic solicitation of orders in
the state by appellants salesmen, resulting in a continuous flow of appellants product into the state, was
sufficient to constitute doing business in the state so as to make appellant amenable to suit in its courts.
But it was also of opinion that there were sufficient additional activities shown to bring the case within the
rule frequently stated, that solicitation within a state by the agents of a foreign corporation plus some
additional activities are sufficient to render the corporation amenable to suit brought in the courts of the
state to enforce an obligation arising out of its activities there. The court found such additional activities in
the salesmens display of samples sometimes in permanent display rooms, and the salesmens residence
within the state, continued over a period of years, all resulting in substantial volume of merchandise
regularly shipped by appellant to purchasers within the state.

Appellant also insists that its activities within the state were not sufficient to manifest its presence there
and that in its absence the state courts were without jurisdiction, that consequently it was a denial of due
process for the state to subject appellant to suit.... And appellant further argues that since it was not
present within the state, it is a denial of due process to subject it to taxation or other money exaction.

ISSUES
1. Does the Washington court have jurisdiction over International Shoe?
2. Does International Shoe have presence in Washington?

RULING
Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power
over the defendants person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now that the capias ad
respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he should have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Since the corporate personality is a fiction although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a
fact, it is clear that unlike an individual, its presence without, as well as within, the state of its origin can
be manifested only by activities carried on its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say that
the corporation is so far present there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or
the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the
terms present or presence are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporations agent
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those
demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as to make it
reasonable, in the context of the federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there. An estimate of the inconveniences which would result to the
corporation from a trial away from its home or principal place of business is relevant in this connection.

Presence in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there
have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no
consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given. Conversely, it
has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of
single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporations behalf are not enough to subject it to
suit on cause of action unconnected with the activities. To require the corporation in such circumstances to
defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has
been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process.

There have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities.

We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state upon an agent whose
activities establish appellants presence there was not sufficient notice of the suit, or that the suit was so
unrelated to those activities as to make the agent an inappropriate vehicle for communicating the notice. It
is enough that appellant has established such contacts with the state that the particular form of
substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual. Nor can we
say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by registered mail at its home office was not
reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit.

Appellant having rendered itself amendable to suit upon obligations arising out of the activities of its
salesmen in Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in personam to collect the tax laid upon
the exercise of the privilege of employing appellants salesmen within the state. For Washington has made
one of those activities, which taken together establish appellants presence there for purposes of suit,
the taxable event by which the sate brings appellant within the reach of its taxing power. The stat thus has
constitutional power to lay the tax and to subject appellant to a suit to recover it. The activities which
establish its presence subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax.

13. PERKINS VS. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING CO 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. CT.
413 96 (1952)

FACTS

Perkins, a non-resident of Ohio, filed two in personam cases in an Ohio court. Among those he sued is
Benguest Consolidated (Benguet), a sociedad anima organized in the Philippines where it owns and
operates gold and silver mines. Perkins sued to collect an amount in dividends and damages she claimed
to be due her as a stockholder of Benguet.

Benguet has been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general
business. Its president, while engaged in doing such business in Ohio, has been served with summons in
this proceeding. Benguet, for its part, sought to quash the summons served upon their president. The
courts have sustained the motions to quash.
ISSUE

Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
precludes Ohio from subjecting a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of its courts in this action in
personam

RULING

No. Ohio is free to decline or take jurisdiction over the corporation. To begin with, Benguet is a foreign
corporation according to Ohio law. The Federal Constitution does not compel Ohio to open its courts to
such a case, even though Ohio permits a complainant to maintain a proceeding in personam in its courts
against a properly served nonresident natural person to enforce a cause of action which does not arise out
of anything done within the State.

As a matter of federal due process, the business done by the corporation in Ohio was sufficiently
substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain the cause of action against it, though the
cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio.

14. MCGEE VS. INTERNATIONAL LIFE INS. CO.355 U.S. 220 (DECEMBER 16,
1957)

FACTS

Lulu McGee, was the mother of Lowell Franklin who purchased a life insurance policy from Arizona-based
Empire Mutual Insurance Company that named McGee as the beneficiary. In 1948, International Life
Insurance Co. ("International"), a Texas corporation, agreed to assume Empire's insurance obligations.

International mailed a reinsurance certificate to the Franklin in California, offering to insure him according
to the terms of the Empire policy. Franklin accepted the offer and paid premiums from California until his
death in 1950. When Franklin's mother tried to collect on the policy, the insurance company refused to
pay, claiming Franklin had committed suicide. McGee brought suit in California, and sought to enforce it in
Texas. The Texas Court, however, refused to enforce the judgment by the California Court for the collection
of the proceeds of the life insurance policy.

Note that International had conducted no other business in California except for this one policy.

ISSUE

Can California exercise jurisdiction over a International, whose contacts with that state are limited to a
single act or contract?

RULING

Yes. A state may exercise jurisdiction over a party whose contacts with that state consist of only a single
act, provided that that act is what gave rise to the claim for which jurisdiction is being sought, and was
deliberately directed toward the state.

The court relied on the fact that the suit was based on "substantial connection" with California, particularly
the facts that the contract was delivered to McGee's son while he was a resident of California, International
continued to maintain a financial relationship with McGee's son by collecting his premium payments, and
that the policy holder was a resident of the state when he died.

The court also gave weight to California's interest in protecting its residents as consumers of insurance
policies, and validated the long arm statute which gave the California courts their power of jurisdiction
over out of state companies by declaring that California had a "manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents.

15. WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. VS. WOODSON 444 U.S. 286 (1980)

FACTS

Spouses Harry and Kay Robinson, residents of New York, who had purchased a car from Seaway
Volkswagen, a retailer in New York, brought a suit against the retailer and its wholesale distributor, in the
District Court for Creek county, Oklahoma. The Robinsons claimed that the injuries which they suffered in a
car accident in Oklahoma were caused by the defective design and placement of their automobiles gas
tank and fuel system. Seaway Volkswagen and Worldwide Volkswagen both incorporated and doing
business in New York, asserted that Oklahomas exercise of jurisdiction over them would violate the
limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by the due process clause. Seaway and Worldwide Volkswagen
sought a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial judge from exercising in
personam jurisdiction over them. The writ was denied on the ground that personal jurisdiction was
authorized by Oklahomas long-arm statute allowing an Oklahoma courts exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over a tortfeasor who causes injury in Oklahoma by an act or omission outside Oklahoma if he
regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Oklahoma.

ISSUE

W/N Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the controversy? NONE

RULING

As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant only as long as there exist minimum contacts between the defendant and the
forum state. The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.

The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of reasonableness or

fairness. We have said that the defendants contacts with the forum State must be such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Thus, the Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgement in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations. Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate
before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; even if the forum state is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to
render a valid judgement.

Apply these principles to the case at hand, we find in the record before us a total absence of those
affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction.
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services
there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges either through salespersons or through advertising
reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at
wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or
seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated
occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single
Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing
through Oklahoma.

It is argued, however that because an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose it was
foreseeable that the Robinsons Audi would cause injury in Oklahoma. Yet foreseeability alone has
never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.
Because we find that petitioners have no contacts, ties or relations with the State of Oklahoma the
judgement of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed.

16. CALDER VS. JONES, 465 U.S. 783 (MARCH 20, 1984)

Brief Fact Summary. Respondent, Shirley Jones, brought a libel suit in a California state court against
Petitioners, Calder et al. Petitioners South and Calder are Florida residents who argue that California courts
lack personal jurisdiction over them.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state has personal jurisdiction over any party whose actions intentionally reach
another party in the state and are the basis for the cause of action.

Facts. Petitioners South is a reporter, and Petitioner Calder is president and an editor, of Petitioner National
Enquirer. South wrote an article that accused Respondent of a drinking problem that was so severe that it
affected her acting career. Calder reviewed the article and edited it to its final form for publication.
Respondent brought a suit for libel, and South and Calder challenged Californias personal jurisdiction since
neither had any physical contacts with California, particularly as it pertained to this article. South did rely
on sources from California, and Respondents life and career were centered in California. The district court
cited Petitioners rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as trumpeting Due
Process Clause concerns. The appellate court reversed because First Amendment arguments are irrelevant
to jurisdictional analysis.

Issue. The issue is whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and Calder through their
targeting of Respondent with this article.

Held. The United States Supreme Court held that California had personal jurisdiction over Petitioners. The
first step in the analysis is to determine the focal point of the harm suffered, and that was in California. The
Court then determined that Petitioners actions intentionally aimed at a California resident, and the injuries
suffered would be in that state.

Discussion. Petitioners argued that, because they were merely employees of the libelous newspaper, their
case was analogous to a welder who works on a boiler in Florida that subsequently explodes in California.
The Court distinguishes this by noting that unlike the welder they intentionally targeted the California
contact.

Other version

Calder v. Jones

465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct.1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)

Plaintiff/Respondent: Shirley Jones

Defendant/Petitioner: Calder

Rule of Law: A state has personal jurisdiction over any party whose actions intentionally reaches another
party in the state and is the basis for the cause of action.

Facts:

-Defendant South is a reporter, and defendant Calder is president and an editor, of National Enquirer.
-South wrote an article that accused P of a drinking problem that was so severe that it affected her acting
career. Calder reviewed the article and edited it to its final form for publication.

-P brought a suit for libel in CA. South and Calder challenged Californias personal jurisdiction since neither
had any physical contacts with California, particularly as it pertained to this article.

-Ds are Florida residents who argue that California courts lack personal jurisdiction over them.

-South did rely on sources from California, and Ps life and career were centered in California.

-The district court cited Ds rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as
trumpeting Due Process Clause concerns.

-The appellate court reversed because First Amendment arguments are irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis

Issue: Whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and Calder through their targeting of
Respondent with this article?

Holding: California had personal jurisdiction over Petitioners

Reason: The first step in the analysis is to determine the focal point of the harm suffered, and that was in
California. The Court then determined that Petitioners actions intentionally aimed at a California resident,
and the injuries suffered would be in that state
17. KEETON VS. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC. ET AL, 465 U.S. 770 (MARCH 20,
1984)

FACTS

Keeton (NY) brought a libel suit against Hustler Magazine (Ohio) in New Hampshire, alleging jurisdiction by
reason of diversity of citizenship. Keetons only connection with New Hampshire is the circulation there of
a magazine that she assists in producing. Hustler Magazines contacts with New Hampshire consist of
monthly sales of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its nationally published magazine.

ISSUE

Whether or not New Hampshire has jurisdiction

RULING

YES. Hustler Magazines regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support an
assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. The fact that Keeton has
very limited contacts in New Hampshire does not defeat jurisdiction, since a plaintiff is not required to have
minimum contacts with the forum State before that State is permitted to assert personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant.

Here, where Hustler Magazine has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it
must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its
magazine, and since Hustler Magazine can be charged with knowledge of the single publication rule, it
must anticipate that such a suit will seek nationwide damages. There is no unfairness in calling Hustler
Magazine to answer for the contents of its national publication wherever a substantial number of copies
are regularly sold and distributed.
18. ASAHI METAL INDUSTRY CO VS. SUPERIOR COURT, 480, U.S 102
(FEBRUARY 24, 1987)
FACTS
Asahi Metal Industry Co. was an international corporation based in Japan, which
manufactured a valve used in the manufacture of motorcycle wheels.
These valves were bought by Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., a Taiwanese distributor.
One of these valves was alleged to have failed, causing an accident in the State of
California.
As a result of the accident the driver of the motorcycle sustained serious injuries and his
wife, who was riding on the motorcycle as a passenger, was killed.
The accident victim sued Cheng Shin in a California state court, and Cheng Shin in turn
filed a third-party complaint (impleader) seeking indemnification from Asahi.
Asahi contested California's personal jurisdiction over Asahi, but the California courts
found jurisdiction based on Asahi's alleged awareness of the international distribution of its
products.
Specifically, Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin's summons.
The California Superior Court and the California Supreme Court both denied the motion,
leading Asahi to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Does Asahi have minimum contacts with California such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice?

RULING
NO
The Supreme Court applied a five-factor test in determining whether "traditional notions of fair
play" would permit the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign (meaning out-of-state)
defendant:

1. What is the burden on the defendant?

2. What are the interests of the forum state in the litigation?
3. What is the interest of the plaintiff in litigating the matter in that state?
4. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate efficiency?
5. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate policy interests?

The Court finds that fair play would be violated because:

o The burden on the defendant is severe because the corporation would have to travel from
Japan to California and defend itself under the laws of a foreign country.
o The plaintiff is not a California resident, and thus Californias interests in the case are
diminished. California can enforce its interest in having safe products in its state indirectly
by applying pressure to direct suppliers of goods to California, who in turn will apply
commercial pressure to their suppliers.
o Cheng Shin has not shown that California is a more convenient forum than Japan or Taiwan
in which to pursue its claim.
o Jurisdiction is not necessarily in the best interests of the other countries involved.
o Jurisdiction is not warranted by any international policy considerations, if they even exist.

Because an assertion of jurisdiction would disturb the "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice," the decision of the California Supreme Court was reversed and the judgment of
California Court of Appeal (California's intermediate appellate court) was effectively reinstated.
19. BENSUAN RESTAURANT CORPORATION VS. RICHARD B. KING, DOCKET NO.
96-9344, (SEPTEMBER 10, 1997)

Bensusan Restaurant Corporation, the plaintiff, owned the Blue Note jazz club in New Yorks Greenwich
Village, and owned a federal trademark registration for the mark THE BLUE NOTE. The defendant,
Richard King, operated The Blue Note, a small club in the college town of Columbia, Missouri, and had
used that mark on a local basis since 1980 several years prior to use of Blue Note by the now-famous
New York club. Although the New York jazz club had obtained a federal registration for the Blue Note mark
in 1985, the Missouri club could continue to use the name within its local area based on the Missouri club's
prior use of the name.

In April 1996, the Missouri club began operation of a website (http//www.throughport.com/cyberspot) that
offered general information about Kings club, including a calendar of events and ticketing information.
Tickets could not be ordered via the Internet; instead, one could order tickets for an advertised event by
telephone and then pick-up the tickets in person at a box office in Columbia, Missouri. The Missouri clubs
website also included a hyperlink to the website for Greenwich Villages Blue Note club, while also offering
a disclaimer that "The Blue Notes Cyberspot should not be confused with one of the worlds finest jazz
clubs, the Blue Note, located in the heart of New Yorks Greenwich Village. If you should find yourself in the
Big Apple give them a visit.

The New York jazz club viewed the Missouri club's website on the Internet as an expansion of use of the
Blue Note name outside of the local area, and raised this objection with King. In response, King removed
the second sentence of the disclaimer and the hyperlink from his website.
The operator of the New York jazz club sued the operator of the Missouri jazz club for trademark
infringement in New York.

Trial Court Proceedings Edit

Looking to New Yorks long-arm statute, the court inquired whether Kings operation of a website on a
server in Missouri represented the commission of a tort in New York. Although a New York user could
access the Missouri Clubs website to obtain event ticket information, a purchase of tickets required calling
the Missouri club via its website-advertised telephone number and picking up the tickets at the Columbia,
Missouri box office.

The court stated that "[t]he mere fact that a person can gain information on the allegedly infringing
product is not the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise making an effort to
target its product in New York." Consequently, the district court concluded that any tortious action of
trademark infringement would arise in Missouri rather than in New York.

In examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over King would satisfy due process, the court asserted
that creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide or even
worldwide but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state. The court
distinguished the CompuServe v. Patterson case based on the observation that the facts in CompuServe v.
Patterson,[1] were vastly different from the present action. Unlike the software developer in CompuServe,
King did not direct any contact to or have any contact with New York, nor did he intend to avail himself of
the benefits of New York.

Thus, the court held that King's operation of the website was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
New York long-arm statute, and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the precepts of
constitutional due process. Significantly, the court found that the owner of the Missouri club was only
trying to attract local patrons by the club's operation of its website, and dismissed the action for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

20. COMPUSERVE INC. VS. RICHARD PATTERSON, NO. 95-3452, (JULY 22, 1996)
FACTS
CompuServe is a computer information service headquartered in Columbus, Ohio.
It contracts with individual subscribers, such as the defendant, to provide, inter alia, access to
computing and information services via the Internet.
Defendant, Richard Patterson, is a resident of Houston, Texas who claims never to have visited
Ohio.
He subscribed to CompuServe, and he also placed items of "shareware" on the CompuServe system for
others to use and purchase.
When he became a shareware "provider," Patterson entered into a "Shareware Registration
Agreement" ("SRA") with CompuServe.
The SRA incorporates by reference two other documents: the CompuServe Service
Agreement ("Service Agreement") and the Rules of Operation, both of which are published on the
CompuServe Information Service.
Both the SRA and the Service Agreement expressly provide that they are entered into in
Ohio, and the Service Agreement further provides that it is to "be governed by and
construed in accordance with" Ohio law.
The SRA asks a new shareware "provider" like Patterson to type "AGREE" at various points in the
document, "[i]n recognition of your online agreement to all the above terms and conditions." Thus,
 Patterson's assent to the SRA was first manifested at his own computer in Texas, then transmitted to
the CompuServe computer system in Ohio.
From 1991 through 1994, Patterson electronically transmitted 32 master software files to
CompuServe.
These files were stored in CompuServe's system in Ohio, and they were displayed in different
services for CompuServe subscribers, who could "download" them into their own computers and, if
they chose to do so, pay for them. Patterson's software product was, apparently, a program designed
to help people navigate their way around the larger Internet network.
CompuServe began to market a similar product, however, with markings and names that Patterson
took to be too similar to his own. Thus, in December of 1993, Patterson notified CompuServe
(appropriately via "E-mail" message) that the terms "WinNAV," "Windows Navigator," and "FlashPoint
Windows Navigator" were common law trademarks which he and his company owned. Patterson stated
that CompuServe's marketing of its product infringed these trademarks, and otherwise constituted
deceptive trade practices. CompuServe changed the name of its program, but Patterson continued to
complain.

After Patterson demanded at least $100,000 to settle his potential claims, CompuServe filed this
declaratory judgment action in the federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio, relying on the
court's diversity subject matter jurisdiction. Patterson responded pro se with a consolidated motion to
dismiss on several grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. Patterson also submitted a
supporting affidavit, in which he denied jurisdictional facts, including his having ever visited Ohio.

ISSUE
Did CompuServe make a prima facie showing that Patterson's contacts with Ohio, which have been almost
entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient, under the Due Process Clause, to support the district court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him?

RULING
Yes. Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific in nature, depending on the nature of the
contacts in a given case. In the instant case, because CompuServe bases its action on Patterson's act of
sending his computer software to Ohio for sale on its service, CompuServe seeks to establish such specific
personal jurisdiction over Patterson.
The crucial federal constitutional inquiry is whether, given the facts of the case, the nonresident defendant
has sufficient contacts with the forum state that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction would comport
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." This court has employed three criteria to make
this determination: First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the
forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the
defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant
must have a substantial enough connection with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant reasonable.

"Purposeful availment" requirement: The question of whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of doing business in the forum state is "the sine qua non for in personam jurisdiction." The
"purposeful availment" requirement is satisfied when the defendant's contacts with the forum state
"proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection' with the
forum State," and when the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he "should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." This requirement does not, however, mean that a
defendant must be physically present in the forum state.

There is no question that Patterson himself took actions that created a connection with Ohio in the instant
case. He subscribed to CompuServe, and then he entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement
when he loaded his software onto the CompuServe system for others to use and, perhaps, purchase. Once
Patterson had done those two things, he was on notice that he had made contracts, to be governed by
Ohio law, with an Ohio-based company. Then, he repeatedly sent his computer software, via electronic
links, to the CompuServe system in Ohio, and he advertised that software on the CompuServe system.
Moreover, he initiated the events that led to the filing of this suit by making demands of CompuServe via
electronic and regular mail messages.

The real question is whether these connections with Ohio are "substantial" enough that Patterson should
reasonably have anticipated being haled into an Ohio court. Patterson entered into a written contract with
CompuServe which provided for the application of Ohio law, and he then purposefully perpetuated the
relationship with CompuServe via repeated communications with its system in Ohio. Patterson was a third-
party provider of software who used CompuServe, which is located in Columbus, to market his wares in
Ohio and elsewhere. This was a relationship intended to be ongoing in nature; it was not a "one-shot
affair." Patterson sent software to CompuServe repeatedly for some three years, and the record indicates
that he intended to continue marketing his software on CompuServe.

Cause of action arising from Patterson's activities in Ohio Requirement: The cause of action in the instant
case concerns allegations of trademark or trade name infringement and unfair competition. Patterson's
contacts with Ohio are certainly related to the operative facts of that controversy. He used that system to
advertise his software and sell it. The proceeds of those sales flowed to him through Ohio. It is
uncontroverted that Patterson placed, marketed, and sold his software only on Ohio-based CompuServe.
Thus, any common law trademark or trade name which Patterson might have in his product would
arguably have been created in Ohio, and any violation of those alleged trademarks or trade names by
CompuServe would have occurred, at least in part, in Ohio.

The reasonableness requirement: A court must consider several factors in this context, including "the
burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum state, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, and the
interest of other states in securing the most efficient resolution of controversies." It may be burdensome
for Patterson to defend a suit in Ohio, but he knew when he entered into the Shareware Registration
Agreement with CompuServe that he was making a connection with Ohio, and presumably he hoped that
connection would work to his benefit. Further, Ohio has a strong interest in resolving a dispute involving an
Ohio company, which will involve the Ohio law on common law trademarks and trade names. CompuServe
alleges that more than $10 million could be at stake in this case, and it also contends that this case will
have a profound impact on its relationships with other "shareware" providers like Patterson, who also
directed their activities toward Ohio-based CompuServe.
21. RUSH VS. SAUCHUK, 444 US 320 (1980)
FACTS
While a resident of Indiana, Savchuk was injured in an accident in Indiana while riding as a passenger
in a car driven by Rush, also an Indiana resident.
After moving to Minnesota, Savchuk commenced this action against Rush in a Minnesota state court,
alleging negligence and seeking damages.
As Rush had no contacts with Minnesota that would support in personam jurisdiction, Savchuk
attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by garnishing the contractual obligation of State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm) to defend and indemnify Rush in connection with such
a suit.
State Farm, which does business in Minnesota, had insured the car, owned by Rush's father, under a
liability insurance policy issued in Indiana.
Rush was personally served in Indiana, and after State Farm's response to the garnishment summons
asserted that it owed the Rush nothing, Savchuk moved the trial court for permission to file a
supplemental complaint making the garnishee, State Farm, a party to the action.
Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.

ISSUE
May Minnesota courts obtain jurisdiction over both Rush and State Farm by virtue of a
quasi in rem jurisdiction?

RULING
No.
A STATE MAY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY EXERCISE QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION OVER A
DEFENDANT WHO HAS NO FORUM CONTACTS BY ATTACHING THE CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION OF AN INSURER LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE TO DEFEND AND
INDEMNIFY HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUIT.
A State may exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant only if the defendant has
certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In determining whether a particular exercise of state court jurisdiction is consistent with due process,
the inquiry must focus on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."
Here, the only affiliating circumstance offered to show a relationship among Rush,
Minnesota, and this lawsuit is that Rush's insurance company does business in the State.
However, the fictional presence in Minnesota of State Farm's policy obligation to defend and
indemnify Rush -- derived from combining the legal fiction that assigns a situs to a debt, for
garnishment purposes, wherever the debtor is found with the legal fiction that a corporation is
"present," for jurisdictional purposes, wherever it does business -- cannot be deemed to give the
State the power to determine Rush's liability for the out-of-state accident.
The mere presence of property in a State does not establish a sufficient relationship
between the owner of the property and the State to support the exercise of jurisdiction
over an unrelated cause of action, and it cannot be said that the defendant engaged in any
purposeful activity related to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair,
just, or reasonable merely because his insurer does business there. Nor does the policy
provide significant contacts between the litigation and the forum, for the policy obligations pertain only
to the conduct, not the substance, of the litigation.

22. BANCO ESPAOL FILIPINO VS. PALANCA, 37 PHIL. 921 (1918)

FACTS
 Engracio Palance Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El
Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died without returning
again to the Philippines.
The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was
necessary to give notice by publication.
The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known
address, which is in Amoy, China.
It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement.
after publication in a newspaper of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was
rendered. The decision was published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as
the highest bidder. This sale was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court
to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or
over the subject of the action.

ISSUE
Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action?

RULING
Yes.
Jurisdiction may refer to
(1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind
of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or
(2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON IS ACQUIRED BY THE VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE OF A
PARTY IN COURT AND HIS SUBMISSION TO ITS AUTHORITY, OR IT IS ACQUIRED BY THE
COERCIVE POWER OF LEGAL PROCESS EXERTED OVER THE PERSON.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE LITIGATION MAY RESULT
EITHER FROM A SEIZURE OF THE PROPERTY UNDER LEGAL PROCESS, WHEREBY IT IS
BROUGHT INTO THE ACTUAL CUSTODY OF THE LAW, OR IT MAY RESULT FROM THE
INSTITUTION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS WHEREIN, UNDER SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF LAW, THE
POWER OF THE COURT OVER THE PROPERTY IS RECOGNIZED AND MADE EFFECTIVE.
For properties the court may not physically take into custody, the court may exercise an in rem
jurisdiction over such, at the instance of the person claiming to be the owner, in order to adjudicate the
title of the owner against the world.
THE ACTION TO FORECLOSE A MORTGAGE IS SAID TO BE A PROCEEDING QUASI IN REM, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that
nature and is substantially such.
THE ACTION QUASI IN REM DIFFERS FROM THE TRUE ACTION IN REM IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE
THAT IN THE FORMER AN INDIVIDUAL IS NAMED AS DEFENDANT, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE
PROCEEDING IS TO SUBJECT HIS INTEREST THEREIN TO THE OBLIGATION OR LIEN
BURDENING THE PROPERTY.
The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

The action being quasi in rem, the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter. The failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not an irregularity
that amounts to a denial of due process of law and even if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this
case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law
unconditionally requires. This is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.