Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading (G.R. No.

L-14279)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines.
In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not
able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to
regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the
Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred
upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the
members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments
treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other
governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large
variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than
those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem
to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that
they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements
heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection
of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and
commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc.
Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in
acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with
respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
 BAYAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12
and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21,
Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty
to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities
should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article
XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
 Suzette Nicolas vs Alberto Romulo
October 29, 2011

578 SCRA 438 Political Law Constitutional Law Ratification of a Treaty Validity of the Visiting Forces
Agreement

**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo

On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said
crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against
our penal laws and the crime was committed within the countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty
between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other
petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified
by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.

ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a
matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to
produce Smith before the court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that
executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The
SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As
regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and
this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its
provisions
Lance Smith Case
Subic rape case
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Subic rape case, officially known as People of the Philippines vs. Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood, and
Daniel Smith, was a criminal case in the Philippines involving a Filipina and four United States Marines. It caught
wide media coverage and achieved political and international significance because of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) between the United States and the Philippines, which had been the subject of protests from the
beginning.

Initially, the accuser, Suzette Nicolas, alleged that she was gang-raped but after a few days, she then said that only
Lance Corporal Daniel Smith raped her. She said that just before midnight of November 1, 2005, Smith raped her
inside a moving Hyundai Starex van at Alava Pier in the Subic Bay Freeport where the Marines' ship was docked.
Nicolas also alleged that Smith's other companions, Lance Corporals Keith Silkwood were inside the van cheering
Smith on as it happened. Smith countered the charges saying that what occurred between him and Nicolas was
consensual sex.[1]

On December 4, 2006, after numerous court hearings over the course of a year that were open to the public and the
media, Judge Benjamin Pozon of the Makati City Regional Trial Court Branch 139 found Smith guilty of rape,
sentencing him to reclusin perpetua, a sentence of 40 years, while the three others were acquitted. [2] Smith was
confined in the United States Embassy in Manila, despite the judge's order that he be confined in a Philippine jail, and
despite protests from Nicolas's supporters.

On March 17, 2009, Suzette's mother submitted an affidavit from Suzette dated March 12, 2009 saying she wasn't sure
that she was raped. There was speculation of corruption and several organisations and congress people demanded an
investigation.[3][4][5] Following the submission of the affidavit, on April 23, 2009, the Court of Appeals headed by three
Filipino female Justices, Associate Justices Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Myrna
Dimaranan-Vidal, reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered Smith's immediate release, stating that "...a
careful and judicious perusal of the evidence on record does not convince the prudent mind about the moral certainty of
the guilt of the accused, hence we must acquit." The Court of Appeals stated that "If Nicole was really drunk, she
would have had a hard time rising up, much more standing up, or she would have just dropped, a common experience
among Filipino girls." The CA rejected the trial court's findings that "there may be forcible entry" to explain the
injuries in Nicole's genitals.[6][7][8][7][8][9]

Acquittal[edit]

On March 23, 2009, Manila Times, a Philippine newspaper, published the draft acquittal of the Court of Appeals in
favor of Smith even without Suzette's recantation.

According to the Dizon draft ponencia [47] Smith is "innocent beyond reasonable doubt." Court of Appeals Justice
Agustin Dizon, who retired on June 27, 2008, had written that the accused should be acquitted both on the technical
and substantive aspects.

Dizon said that the issues of "force and intimidation" and "unconsciousness" via "intoxication" cannot be appreciated
because such evidence failed to convince him to convict Smith. [48][49][50]

In the Dizon ponencia,[47] the justice pointed out that Smith could not be found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for rape
as the information on the charge sheet filed by the lawyers of Suzette showing "force and intimidation" appeared
questionable.

Force and intimidation are elements in the commission of the crime of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code.

"Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under of the following circumstances: [1] by using force
and intimidation; [2] when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious."

The prosecution filed the information on the basis of force and intimidation, but Justice Dizon noticed that the evidence
presented was "intoxication," which is interpreted as "deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious."

Dizon reasoned that "intoxication" as defined under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code is an "alternative
circumstance," which means that it could either be aggravating or mitigating to the crime.

The justice wrote that "intoxication" could not be equated with "unconsciousness" or vice versa.

This line of reason gave rise to doubt whether or not Suzette was "unconscious" or "intoxicated." It will be recalled that
Suzette admitted getting drunk with Smith.
As a rule under the Article III, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the Bill of Rights, the accused has
to be informed of the charges filed against him.

One cannot be charged with one offense on this particular element force and intimidationof the crime while
presenting another element, intoxication.

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf," the law says. [48][49]

Doubt was inculcated in the mind of Dizon as to the factual circumstances of the crime of rape between Suzette and
Smith.

Dizon was not convinced that Suzette was raped at all.

He said that the use of force applied to Suzette was not apparent because she herself went to the vehicle voluntarily.

Smith alone allegedly committed the rape, without the participation of the other US soldiers inside the van.

The justice wrote that either way, the issues of "force and intimidation" and "unconsciousness" via "intoxication" could
not be appreciated because such amount of evidence could convince him to convict Smith.

Dizon wrote that Suzette was not deprived of reason after all, since she was aware of the details surrounding the crime
because at that exact moment she was drunk but not totally unconscious.

Hence, he decided to draft a ponencia, [47] on the front page of which ruled that Smith should be acquitted and that
justice must be served to all regardless of sex, race or creed. [48][49]

On May 2008, Court of Appeals Justice Celia Librea-Leagogo, the senior member of the division, did not sign the
Dizon ponencia[47] and asked for two months to review the case. Dizon was the junior justice of the division at the time.

Leagogo was "meticulous" about the Dizon draft and she allegedly feared that this might go against public opinion and
the Court of Appeals might be the subject of criticism.

Surprisingly, even before Dizon retired, Leagogo inhibited herself from handling the case, saying that she was a friend
of one of Smith's lawyers.

The justices who talked to Manila Times said they agreed with Dizon's draft ruling, but unfortunately, they added, he
ran out of time. He was not able to hand down the ruling before reaching the mandatory retirement age of 70.

These developments delayed the signing of the draft decision and forced the 17th Division to look for other members.
Meanwhile, time had run out for Dizon, as he was reaching retirement age.

The case was raffled anew, with Associate Justice Juan Enriquez coming in as the new member of the court's Special
Division. Enriquez, however, took the tack the others had taken for the same reason that one of Smith's counsels was
his friend. He was replaced by Justice Hakim Abdulwahid.

With the subsequent raffle of the case, the new ponente [51] replacing Dizon was Zenarosa, with Justices Mariano del
Castillo and Apolinario Bruselas as members.

Several appellate court justices who talked to Manila Times on condition of anonymity said that most of them support
the acquittal of Smith on the basis of the Dizon's draft.

The justices said they have seen several lapses in the conviction made by Makati Regional Trial Court Judge Benjamin
Pozon.

Their statements on the Dizon paper were confided to Manila Times by the Court of Appeals justices even before the
March 12, 2009 affidavit of desistance manifested by Suzette to the appellate court.

The Manila Time source said that the current ponente[51] of the case, Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa vowed to issue
her ruling before her retirement in August 2009.

The US Marine's appeal has been pending before the Court of Appeals for more than two years now, stalled by the
inhibition and retirement of justices assigned to handle the case. [48][49]
On March 26, 2009, Suzette's former lawyer, Evalyn Ursua, and Suzette's supporter on her rape case against Smith,
Teresita Ang-See, told Manila Times over the phone that they had asked Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez of the
appellate court to ferret out that source.

Ang-See personally went to the chambers of Vasquez on Wednesday to give him a copy of their petition to the Supreme
Court (SC) entitled "Petition for Investigation of the Execution of the Supposed Nicole Sworn Statement date 12
March 2009 and the Improper Release of the Court of Appeals Draft Ruling of Acquittal."

Manila Times told Ang-See and Ursua that the story it ran on March 23, 2009 was a product of "enterprise journalism",
not of a supposed conspiracy to help the cause of Smith. It reserved its right not to name the source of the "leaked draft
decision".

Ang-See said that their petition before the High Tribunal was an administrative complaint for disbarment of the justices
who had shown bias for the acquittal of Smith.

Ursua said that she had filed the petition not as a lawyer for Suzette but as a citizen of the Philippines and as an officer
of the court.[50]

On 23 April 2009, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed Smith's conviction, saying that no evidence was presented in
court to show that the American had employed force, threat and intimidation on Nicole. The court ruled that Smith's
sexual tryst with "Nicole" was "a spontaneous, unplanned romantic episode", and that they were "carried away by their
passions."

The Court of Appeals also said that "Suddenly the moment of parting came and the marines had to rush to the ship. In
that situation, reality dawned on Nicole what her audacity and reckless abandon, flirting with Smith and leading him
on, brought upon her".

"That must have been shattering, but added to this was the mocking moments she heard from inside the van; leave that
bitch! or words to that effect-which really broke her as she shouted back in denial: I am not a bitch," it said.

The court said: "No evidence was introduced to show force, threat and intimidation applied by the accused upon Nicole
even as prosecution vainly tried to highlight her supposed intoxication and alleged unconsciousness at the time of the
sexual act."[7][8][9]

"As in this case, a careful and judicious perusal of the evidence on record does not convince the prudent mind about the
moral certainty of the guilt of the accused, hence, we must acquit," read the CA decision.

The CA said the Makati Regional Trial Court ignored and overlooked circumstances surrounding the intoxication of
Nicole and contusions on her body when it convicted Smith of the crime of rape.

"The degree of Nicole's supposed intoxication was not clearly established," read the CA decision.

The CA said Dr. Kenneth Go, a toxicology expert, testified in court that no blood test was conducted on Nicole, which
could have proven her intoxication.

"The degree of Nicole's supposed intoxication was not clearly established," read the CA decision.

"From the narration, after draining all those drinks of Sprite Vodka, B-52s, Singaporean sling, B-53 and half a pitcher
of Bullfrog, although feeling dizzy, she danced with Smith through all four songs for about 15 minutes. She did not
drop on the floor nor did she vomit."

The CA said the trial court based its findings of Nicole's intoxication on "mere observations of witnesses," not on
scientific grounds.

"If Nicole was really drunk, she would have had a hard time rising up, much more standing up, or she would have just
dropped, a common experience among Filipino girls," read the CA decision.

The CA rejected the trial court's findings that "there may be forcible entry" to explain the contusions in Nicole's
genitals.

"Even in consensual sex, contusions could be inflicted by finger grabs, as in Nicole's case," the CA decision quoted the
testimony of Dr. Rolando Marfil Ortiz II, who was presented as medico legal officer.

Citing a 1999 case, the CA said, "When there appears on record that the trial court has overlooked, ignored or
disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance that, if considered, would alter the results, this Court
may disregard the findings of the trial court and make its own conclusion."

The CA described as "deceptive posturing" the portrayal of Nicole as "a demure provinciana lass." [52]
"Tearfully, bewildered, alone and confused, in a strange place, dumped in a curb literally with her pants down, she
remembered her mother and what she would say," read the CA decision. "She remembered too, her boyfriend Brian.
She had to hit back in the only way she could to salvage, at least, a vestige of her self-esteem." [52]

The acquittal was written by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa. Two other women Associate Justices of the
Court of Appeals' Special 11th Division Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal concurred with
the decision.[7][8][9]
 Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest
G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines
through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate,
hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its
discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the
copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of
the President.

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the
country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this
power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be
valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure
the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.
 ABAYA vs. EBDANE

Facts:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines, through their respective representatives, namely, Mr.
Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Republic of the Philippines, and then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be
extended to the Philippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our countrys economic stabilization and
development efforts.

The assailed resolution recommended the award to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation of the
contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the
improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres (Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the length of 79.818
kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.The DPWH caused the publication of the Invitation to Prequalify
and to Bid for the implementation of the CP I project, in two leading national newspapers, namely, the Manila Times
and Manila Standard on November 22 and 29, and December 5, 2002.

A total of twenty-three (23) foreign and local contractors responded to the invitation by submitting their accomplished
prequalification documents on January 23, 2003. In accordance with the established prequalification criteria, eight
contractors were evaluated or considered eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the opening of the respective
bid proposals, it was announced that the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) was in the amount of
P738,710,563.67.

The bid goes to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation was corrected from the original P993,183,904.98
(with variance of 34.45% from the ABC) to P952,564,821.71 (with variance of 28.95% from the ABC) based on their
letter clarification dated April 21, 2004.

The petitioners anchor the instant petition on the contention that the award of the contract to private respondent China
Road & Bridge Corporation violates RA 9184, particularly Section 31 thereof which reads:

SEC. 31. Ceiling for Bid Prices. The ABC shall be the upper limit or ceiling for the Bid prices. Bid prices that exceed
this ceiling shall be disqualified outright from further participating in the bidding. There shall be no lower limit to the
amount of the award.

The petitioners insist that Loan Agreement is neither an international nor an executive agreement that would bar the
application of RA 9184. They point out that to be considered a treaty, an international or an executive agreement, the
parties must be two sovereigns or States whereas in the case of Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, the parties are the
Philippine Government and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from the
Japanese Government.

The respondents however contend that foreign loan agreements, including Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, as executive
agreements and, as such, should be observed pursuant to the fundamental principle in international law of pacta sunt
servanda. The Constitution, the public respondents emphasize, recognizes the enforceability of executive agreements in
the same way that it recognizes generally accepted principles of international law as forming part of the law of the
land.34 This recognition allegedly buttresses the binding effect of executive agreements to which the Philippine
Government is a signatory. It is pointed out by the public respondents that executive agreements are essentially
contracts governing the rights and obligations of the parties. A contract, being the law between the parties, must be
faithfully adhered to by them. Guided by the fundamental rule of pacta sunt servanda, the Philippine Government
bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligations under Loan Agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not the the loan agreement violates RA 9184.

Ruling:

The court ruled in favor of the respondents.

Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding through
executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress. executive agreements, They sometimes take the
form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols.

The fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is, in fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA
9184 as it provides that [a]ny treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to
which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed, the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects
financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works for
the CP I project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation.
 Peoples Movement for Press Freedom vs. Manglapus
GR 84642, September 13, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioners, consisted of members of the mass media, were seeking information from the Presidents
representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
A collision between governmental power over the conduct of foreign affairs and the citizens right to
information.

ISSUE:
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege?

HELD:
The Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the President is the sole organ of the nation
in its negotiations with foreign countries. The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with
foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information."
 CASE DIGEST - AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO

Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-
Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting
a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and
services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our
commitments to the WTO.

The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and
Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives
on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on
the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country
being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue
concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.

Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the
Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress

2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.

3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on
transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.

Rulings:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party et
al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and
prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino
et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists
of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto.

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11
September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic.
Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on
petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a
treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after
the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of
the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.

It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized
that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant
concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national
interest.

In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: We are
aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against
any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against
the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would
strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
 Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x
x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those
considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.

RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between
the USA and the RP.

Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by
then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted
to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between
the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33
other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for
the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third country, the [US]
will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP]
will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its intent
to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring,
or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the
advice and consent of the US Senate.

In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations that
are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03
cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and
jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted
form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as
follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to
record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid
the process of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On
the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High
Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement
Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. x x x

It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement
itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of
concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the
fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American
criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the
RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x
The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its
national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.
Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the
formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of
things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine
laws and the Rome Statute.
 TANADA v. ANGARA
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said
agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as
reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic
sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives
foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation
of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to
restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise
of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry
and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of
membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic
sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.