VI.

Adjudicatory Powers
A. Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone

Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, an
action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000
(the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such
jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive,
confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation
of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly
prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and
that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call
balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing
Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified
in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by
an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 25
This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments.26 Judicialx power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of
an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body

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exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner
is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188

Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary

school. As the school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the
Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at
said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating
class. With the school Principal, as chairman, and the members of the
committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat
and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively.
The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but
three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr.,
represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the
invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the
above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato,
committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic
Supervisor of the place.

Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of
teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to the real
grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by
means of certiorari.

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS? It is difficult, if not impossible,

precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is
considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the
law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. it is clear, however, that it is the
nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body
which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a
judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings
should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is
used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi
judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision,
whatever may be their public character.

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The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine.
The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of
legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of
administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the
exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise
of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to
determine those questions, he acts judicially.

Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. VS. Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA
433

Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease

and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and
superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed and registered with the OIC.

While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B.

Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of
gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters
to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these demands letters
forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the
contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written
notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease
and Dealer Agreement."

Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC
persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has
jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare
Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right
because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent
OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision
within which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil
Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied
it.

Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual
disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.

Held: the OIC has no jurisdiction. The contentions of petitioner are well-
founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no
express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and
decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It
is of course a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly

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empowered, administrative agencies like respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-
judicial powers.

As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):

" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative
boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions, but in
so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would
leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if
they are to be valid, only to those incidental to, or in connection with, the
performance of administrative duties which do not amount to conferment of
jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts."

B. Distinguished from judicial power

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as amass concerted actions"
to "dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to
undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the
DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last
call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no
response from the Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
"For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's
report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807."

Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory

powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violation involving civil or
political rights.

Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission
the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of
procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for

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contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity
from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation
or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. "x x 'It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law
is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA

162

Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB)

and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an
arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on
promotion.

Held: It is to be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary

arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the
original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. The state of our
present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties," while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders." Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision
of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal
from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Whats the ruling?

C. Distinguished from administrative function

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the
President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar

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salting" activities in the country. PADS issued search warrants against certain
companies.

Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the
1973 Constitution?

Held: the court ruled that PADS was not granted by law to issue a warrant of
arrest. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule making
It is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to
determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the
proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory.
A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act,
Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-
judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments.
As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or
the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the
Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute

all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the
above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a
thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous
use of coconut levy funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued
by President Aquino, the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the
President not only in the recovery of illgotten wealth or unexplained wealth
accumulated by the former President, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates but also in the investigation of such cases
of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from
time to time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary
investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating
petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that
the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.

Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has

the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and
corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
and other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.

Held: the court ruled in the negative. Considering that the PCGG, like the
courts, is vested with the authority to grant provisional remedies of (1)
sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is
indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and receivership, there
exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order,
freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it

6
and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured under
the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations promulgated by
the PCGG.
The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG may be divided
into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal
investigation stage is the fact finding inquiring which is usually conducted by
the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview
witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find sufficient
basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The
second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It is
at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient
evidence to bring a person to trial.
It is in such instances that we say one cannot be "a prosecutor and
judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the
complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with
impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a
public prosecutor.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be
promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for
intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the
Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary
investigation and take appropriate action.

Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80

Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas
and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of
the waters flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of
Sideco goes back to 1885 when the predecessor in interest of his father
constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the dam was afterwards
interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war, but again
reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas'
contention is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it appears that
they made application to the Director of Public Works, only to meet with the
opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works, with the approval
of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, granted the two Sarenas
the right, in preference to all other persons, to use the waters of the estero
Bangad. Sideco then took the proceedings to the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment was entered, dismissing the complaint and
the appeal of Sideco and confirming the decision of the administrative
authorities, with the costs against the plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the
correctness of the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its
judgment.

Issue: WON the Director of public works has jurisdiction over the case?

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Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use of
waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies must be
submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications through the
Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the Secretary thereon is final
"unless appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court within. thirty days after
the date of the notification of the parties of said decision. In case of such
appeal the court having jurisdiction shall try the controversy de novo." (See.
4.) A more extensive method is also provided, somewhat akin to our cadastral
system, which makes it the duty of the Director of Public Works to make a
technical examination of streams and to prepare a list of priorities. In the
performance of this work, the Director of Public Works or any official
especially authorized by him, may examine witnesses under oath, and can
issue for this purpose subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.)
Certificates signed by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications are
then granted each appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies from the
"decision" of the Director of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province
in which the property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety
days of the date of the publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)
DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL
RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications, containing as it does the
technical findings of officers especially qualified in irrigation engineering,
should invariably be made a part of the judicial record because (1) the
determination of these officials would be most useful to the courts, and (2)
the exact date of the decision is of moment since it decides whether the
appeal was taken in time.

Ocampo vs US 234 US 91

D. Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as

part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution
embodied the following pertinent provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the
like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip
from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately
preceding every examination day including the examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the
sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction

8
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional

Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105
is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations
will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by
depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last
three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that
they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and
psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting
the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the
respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If
corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be
it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed
by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses
should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the
respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by
all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate
means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.

E. Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-judicial

power

C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268

Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville

Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to
private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having
been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of
title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville
complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance
and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case
was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was denied by the
court contending that it had jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as
"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree,"
provides that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
authority to regulate the real estate trade and business.

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P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered
the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the
enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-
judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate

trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory

obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers

is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond
swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.

F. Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799

Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six

(6) employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having
allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass
of supplies and materials. Five of these six dismissed employees
appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals
to be illegal because affected without formal charges having been filed
or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the
remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary
proceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By
Resolution, the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was
indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC and affirmed the decision of the
CSC with a modification that it eliminated the payment of back salaries
until the outcome of the investigation and reinstatement of only 3
employees since the other two had died. The heirs of the deceased
sought execution of the order from the CSC which was granted. GSIS
opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC
does not have any power to execute its resolution or judgment.

Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.

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Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested
by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to
administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has
the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal.

The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779

adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of
procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to
the authority granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions.
The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or
responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies
and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light of all the foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny
to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or
order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should
be stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It would seem
quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is
carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge
cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the
grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus
renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the

initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation
of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may
be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as,
to all intents and purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative
proceedings a condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it
cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise.

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the

petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents,
from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua,
another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member
of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province
of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Commission.

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Issue : WON Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463

Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine

corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in
its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match
manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the
state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree
plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on
entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban
against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private
respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4)
containers of matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs,
and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore. Upon request
of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of
Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there
are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match
industry at reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court
of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a
temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of
Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and
"wood-derivative" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing
and releasing the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the case
asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36,
par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of
the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the

12
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce
the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting

the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an
administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the
court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience,
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized

administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial
review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable . . .

Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164

Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Baez offered to sell to petitioner

Enriqueto F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent
corporation. Private respondent suggested that petitioner pay a
reservation fee of P20,000.00, which would form part of the
consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale and which
amount was to be returned to the petitioner should the parties fail to
reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the respondent
corporation changed the terms of monthly amortization which resulted
in the demand of the petitioner for the return of his reservation fee.
Respondent refused to return the same and petitioner brought suit with
the RTC for a collection of sum of money. Respondents herein filed a
motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the
case. The same was denied and respondents appealed to the CA who
decided in their favor. Petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no
perfected contract of sale between the parties, the claim for recovery
of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts and not that of the HSRC.

13
Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation
fee.

Ratio : The RTC has no jurisdiction. Under Presidential Decree No. 1344,
the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving
refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in
said provision of law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale
and one that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law
should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money.
Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much
a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said
powers have since been transferred to the HLRB.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is

therein provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers, and dealers,
among others.

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial

functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to
its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of
said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored.
Since in this case the action for refund of reservation fee arose from a
proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Cario vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having

merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do;
and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights
had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no
power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the
mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike
and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not
the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure
of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes
despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances

14
 complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by
each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be
imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original

jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and
also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

G. Classification of adjudicatory powers

2. Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective powers of

public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the
revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws and
awards under;
3. Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit or
authorization;
1. Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt from or relax a
general prohibition, or authority to relieve from affirmative
duty. The licensing power sets or assumes a standard,
while the dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a
standard;
2. Summary powers. To designate administrative power to
apply compulsion or force against person or property to
effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to
authorize such action;
3. Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal having power
to determine the law upon a particular state of facts has
the right to and must consider and make proper application
of the rules of equity.

VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836

Facts :

Issue :

Ruling :

Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390

15
Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which
required her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic
was surprised for she was not aware of any case filed against her.
When she appeared at the date, time and place stated in the
subpoena, she was berated by the respondent and demanded 8K from
her. Said amount was the amount of the life insurance policy of one
Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued upon request by
Generosa Sandagan who sought the help of respondent because she
could not get a share of the proceeds of the life insurance policy of her
dead husband whose beneficiary was Caamic.

Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.

Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under

Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process
directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted
under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his deposition."
Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a form
for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued in
connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his
court nor for any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant
to law or by direction of this Court. It was designated for a specific
purpose, viz., administrative conference. That purpose was, in no way
connected with or related to some of his administrative duties because
he knew from the beginning that it was for a confrontation with the
complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for the latter to get a
share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was received
by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's
court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court
concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for
respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible
compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official
and absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely
related to his official functions and duties, accommodating the request
and using his official functions and office in connection therewith was,
by any yardstick, improper.

In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the

questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is
afforded his full rights of redress.

Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104

16
Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair
competition in the lower court. During the trial and after the
presentation of some of private respondents witnesses, they
requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as regards to the
books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena on
the ground that it can only be regarded as a fishing bill to discover
evidence against herein petitioner and that such is not applicable in a
case for unfair competition. The trial court denied the same.

Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a

case for unfair competition.

Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction

and damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for
infringement of a trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting
and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark,
as incident to, and a part of, his property right, and this rule applies in
cases of unfair competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair trader
is required in equity to account for and yield up his gains on a principle
analogous to that which charges as trustee with the profits acquired by
the wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust, and
defendant's profits are regarded as an equitable measure of the
compensation plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by
him.

in order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum,

" it must appear. by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or
document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and
material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper
or document containing such evidence has been so designated or
described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum" once
issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance therof
is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books.
documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf
the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of
production thereof.

In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the

subpoena duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the
complaint of private respondent for unfair competition.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was

charged with several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it

17
 opened 3 boxes without the presence of the persons and/or parties
indicated in its Resolution. After appearing and showing cause why
they should not be punished for contempt, the COMELEC sentenced
Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a
petition for review with the SC.

Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his
acts.

Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot

exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is
inherently judicial in nature. In proceeding on this matter, it only
discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for
contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial
in nature.

The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the
power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted
to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within
the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is
merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law
come under its jurisdiction.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the, administration of justice.

The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary

incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies
has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit
testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in
furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

VIII. The Power To Punish For Contempt

People v. Mendoza 92 Phil 570

Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152

IX. Power to impose penalties

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 Scotys Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762

Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's

Department Store situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was
owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen
Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller
filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above employers
alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her membership
in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said
employers had been questioning their employees regarding their
membership in said union and had interfered with their right to
organize under the law.

The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant
was dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious
disrespect to the management and her co employees so much so that
several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of
Manila who, after investigation, filed the corresponding informations
against her and the same are now pending trial in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller and
impose fine against the petitioner.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose

the penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.

Ruling: This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution.

It may be contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the
Court of Industrial Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to
criminal cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this
would be tantamount to amending the law which is not within the
province of the judicial branch of our Government.

In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the

penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in
ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations,
notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court" contained in section
2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the industrial court in so far as
it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should be
nullified.

The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of

Industrial Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates
those constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so because,
among other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the

19
 spirit and intention of this Act that the Court (of Industrial Relations)
and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law, or procedure." It
is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not be bound solely by the
evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all other
means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning
of well-informed persons which results must be made a part of the
record". All-this means that an accused may be tried without the right
"to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be convicted merely on
preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt.

CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524

X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction

A. Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600

Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity.

He filed an appealed contending that he married the victim therefore
his criminal liability should be extinguished. The Attorney-General
entered an opposition to said petition wherein, after discussing the
scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and Act No. 1773 of the
Philippine Legislature amending said article, he concluded that the
marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot extinguish his
liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.

Issue: Whether or not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of
abuse against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is
extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the offended party.

Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773
was that the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended
party should extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction,
abduction and rape and those involving offenses included in said
crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction or rape.
This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is extinguished in the
graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the
lesser crimes.

20
Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated
rape, it is only for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being
identical in every other respect, though of different degrees of gravity.
We therefore conclude that the crime of abuse against chastity is
included in the crime of rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773
and, consequently, the marriage of the accused with the offended
party in the present case has extinguished his criminal liability.

B. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing

quasi-judicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of

Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the
absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the
Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino
Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales.
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter
to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,**
protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its
mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it
was conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the
election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18,
1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to
be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of
Local Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was

denied by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us,
petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being
null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to

entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the
Federation of Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the
respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest,
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?

Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with

jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of
the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to

21
 promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the
Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to carry out department objectives, policies, functions,
plans, programs and projects;"

It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly

empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers. The
jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the
provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer
it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to
their determinations."

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or

even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local
Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect
involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the
constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the
President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary
has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election
of the officers of the katipunan.
To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than
the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over
local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the
barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the
ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.

I. Procedure to be followed

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

A. Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose
A. Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said
district, for having received the most number of votes, the petitioner
took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the
herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things,
that said respondent be declared elected member of the National

22
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said
position be nullified.

Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of

its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this
is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed in
behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests should be
filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate

rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule
of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also included. The incidental power
to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

B. Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30 lourdes

C. Technical rules not applicable

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337

Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of employment of
publics respondents. The arbitrations decision is appealed to the NLRC. Public
respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of the NLRCs decision on the ground

23
that the NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the
NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following reasons: (1) there
was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the hearings before the
arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and
respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were
rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.

Issue: WON publics respondents claim is tenable.

Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the
first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended
to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor
disputes. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is
annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch,
Iligan City for further proceedings.

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules
of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It
shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect
the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.

Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757

Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the defunct
Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null and
void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent Simplicio
C. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan,
Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position as policeman of the same
municipality with back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual
reinstatement.

24
Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio C.
Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission decided
Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of
the case.

Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the legal
requirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative case without
stenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the
proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Board
of Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for office
personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take note of the
proceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and
summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedure
should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and
defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an
administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and gven the opportunity
to adduce their respective evidence.

D. Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738

Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its powers in a
case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for review on
certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside the decision of the
SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of the certificates of stock of Philex and (b)
imposed fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.

Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory and
adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon
applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing), certificates of
registration of corporations, partnerships and associations (excluding cooperatives,
homeowners' associations, and labor unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances;
conduct inspections; and impose fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised
Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be
warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly replace the
subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in the names of the buyers"
clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The stockholders who
have been deprived of their certificates of stock or the persons to whom the forged
certificates have ultimately been transferred by the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to
initiate, if minded, an appropriate adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as
can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive jurisdiction would require an assertion

25
of a right by a proper party against another who, in turn, contests it. The proper
parties that can bring the controversy and can cause an exercise by the SEC of its
original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who are adversely
affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of stock. Any peremptory
judgment by the SEC, without such proceedings having initiated, would be
precipitat.

The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a P50,000 fine on
each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely different matter. This time, it is the
regulatory power of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its instant petition, can
no longer be deemed just a nominal party but a real party in interest sufficient to pursuant
appeals to this Court.
Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Intl Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
F. Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
G. Hearing
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
H. Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2. Clear and convincing evidence
Blacks Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3. Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4. Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I. Decision

26
 Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1. Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2. Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3. Finality, promulgation and notice of decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5. Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963
Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
J. Administrative appeal in contested cases
Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965
PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560
Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283
De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92
Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261
Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673
K. Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235
II. Due process of law in administrative adjudication
A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined

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 Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948
B. Cardinal primary requirements of due process
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256
Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489
C. Necessity for notice and hearing
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers Association vs Premiere Productions,
Inc., G.R. No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
D. Cold neutrality of a judge
Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261
E. Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due
process
Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34
RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420
Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103
F. Notice and hearing, when dispensed with
1. Where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like
the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, the
preventive suspension of public servant facing
administrative charges;
Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536
Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595
Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action;
where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice
to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer and the
replacement of a temporary appointee;
Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the
right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921
Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767
G. Notice and hearing in rate-fixing
Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46
H. Motion for reconsideration as a cure
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
i. Right to counsel, not a due process requirement
Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125
III. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

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 A. Definition and objective
Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
B. Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220
C. Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176
Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463
Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139
D. When doctrine does not apply
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
IV. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
A. Definition and purpose
Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344
Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657
Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132
B. Effect of failure to exhaust remedies
De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224
Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438
Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530
C. When applied
Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952
D. Exceptions to the doctrine
Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482
Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802
Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167
Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works
8 SCRA 179
Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794
Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151
Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92
Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796
Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553
Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210
Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116
Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338
Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623
Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490

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