DUMP: SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE (SHORT)

1. First, economic sanctions are ineffective because the regime leaders can bypass the costs.

Leaders mitigate the costs of sanctions by controlling the allocation of resources. As they

go down, they can redirect the economy so they still have access to goods making the rest

of the population bear the burden.

2. Second, leaders can maintain access to goods through illegal arms sales, drug smuggling,

and money laundering. For example, Kim Jong-Il in North Korea and Milosevic in

Yugoslavia conducted illegal activities to bust sanctions.

3. Third, turn it: the regime can use sanctions entrench its political power. Because the

leader has control over the resources, they can redirect the increasingly scarce resources

to supportive domestic political groups while they put the burden on opposition groups.

This consolidates political support while killing opposition. For instance, the Smith

regime in Rhodesia maintained its powers during sanctions by controlling the tobacco

market to create a winning coalition of industrialists.

4. Fourth, turn it: sanctions motivate the regime to become more oppressive and violent to

check back domestic protest. Because sanctions incentivize domestic violence motivated

by falling public conditions, the government is encouraged to be even more oppressive to

stop any anti-government insurgencies which further violates rights.

5. Fifth, turn it again: foreign pressure encourages the regime to crack down harder on

opposition groups. The leadership perceives foreign pressure as a threat to its legitimacy

and support to domestic opposition groups. Therefore, the regime is incentivized repress

opposition groups to demonstrate its resolve and strength to the public. For example,
 China viewed the threat of American sanctions as a threat to its regime stability so it was

more repressive to its citizens to maintain the status quo.

6. Fifth, turn it: the NEG gives a ruse of solvency which only harms solvency in the long

run. Since the demanded reforms are often a threat to the leader’s survival, they may

purge all of its opposition in the beginning and then negotiate an end to sanctions

Moreover, they can kill and jail opposition and then offer prisoner releases as bargaining

chips to end sanctions. China followed this strategy when they arrested political

dissidents before visits by American diplomats and then released them at politically

expedient times during official discussions.

7. Seventh, turn it: Economic sanctions trigger a “rally around the flag” effect as leaders use

economic pain to consolidate support for the regime. For example, sanctions increased

patriotic support for Mussolini’s military project. A study of sanctions against Israel,

Cuba, and Rhodesia by Jay Gordon shows that sanctions just strengthened the

determination of the target and resulted in political integration.

8. Eight, turn it: Economic sanctions encourage sanction busting which strengthens the

regime by fostering a state alliance with clandestine transnational actors for mutual gain.

In Yugoslavia, Milosevic subcontracted sanction busting tasks to those supportive of him.

This allowed him to command loyalty by providing preferential access to the rich

sanctions-busting trade which helped entrench the regime.