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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L45127May5,1989

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,representedbytheProvincialFiscalofLeyte,petitioner,
vs.
HON.JUDGEAUXENCIOC.DACUYCUY,CELESTINOS.MATONDO,SEGUNDINOA,CAVALandCIRILOM.
ZANORIA,respondents.

TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforpetitioner.

AdelinoB.Sitoyforprivaterespondents.

REGALADO,J.:

Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase, of an alternative penal
sanctionofimprisonmentimposedbylawbutwithoutaspecificationastothetermordurationthereof.

Asaconsequenceofsuchlegislativefauxpasoroversight,thepetitionatbarseekstosetasidethedecisionofthe
thenCourtofFirstInstanceofLeyte,BranchIV,datedSeptember8,1976, 1pennedbyhereinrespondentjudgeand
grantingthepetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionwithpreliminaryinjunctionfiledbyhereinprivaterespondentsanddocketed
thereinasCivilCaseNo.5428,aswellashisresolutionofOctober19,1976 2denyingthemotionsforreconsiderationfiled
by the parties therein. Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670,
otherwiseknownastheMagnaCartaforPublicSchoolTeachers,andtheconstitutionalityofSection32thereof.

InacomplaintfiledbytheChiefofPoliceofHindang,LeyteonApril4,1975,hereinprivaterespondentsCelestino
S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the
MunicipalCourtofHindang,LeyteinCriminalCaseNo.555thereofforviolationofRepublicActNo.4670.Thecase
was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the
accusedtherein,pleadednotguiltytothecharge.Immediatelythereafter,theyorallymovedtoquashthecomplaint
for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment
prescribedfortheoffense.ThemotiontoquashwassubsequentlyreducedtowritingonJune13,1975.3OnAugust
21,1975,themunicipalcourtdeniedthemotiontoquashforlackofmerit.4OnSeptember2,1975,privaterespondentsfiled
amotionforthereconsiderationoftheaforesaiddenialorderonthesamegroundoflackofjurisdiction,butwiththefurther
allegationthatthefactschargeddonotconstituteanoffenseconsideringthatSection32ofRepublicActNo.4670isnulland
voidforbeingunconstitutional.InanundatedorderreceivedbythecounselforprivaterespondentsonOctober20,1975,the
motionforreconsiderationwasdenied.5

On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
beforetheformerCourtofFirstInstanceofLeyte,BranchVIII,whereitwasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.B622,torestrainthe
MunicipalJudge,ProvincialFiscalandChiefofPoliceofHindang,LeytefromproceedingwiththetrialofsaidCriminalCase
No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Subsequently,anamendedpetition 7allegedtheadditionalgroundthatthefactschargeddonotconstituteanoffensesince
thepenalprovision,whichisSection32ofsaidlaw,isunconstitutionalforthefollowingreasons:(1)Itimposesacrueland
unusualpunishment,thetermofimprisonmentbeingunfixedandmayruntoreclusionperpetuaand(2)Italsoconstitutesan
undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the
courtasifthelatterwerethelegislativedepartmentoftheGovernment.

On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein private respondents was related to Criminal
CaseNo.1978forviolationofPresidentialDecreeNo.442previouslytransferredfromBranchVIIItoBranchIVof
the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunate B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said
petitiontothelatterbranchforfurtherproceedingsandwhereitwassubsequentlydocketedthereinasCivilCase
No.5428. 8OnMarch15,1976,thepetitionerhereinfiledanoppositiontotheadmissionofthesaidamendedpetitions 9
but respondent judge denied the same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. 10 On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a
supplementarymemoranduminanswertotheamendedpetition.11

On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision holding in substance that
RepublicActNo.4670isvalidandconstitutionalbutcasesforitsviolationfalloutsideofthejurisdictionofmunicipal
and city courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary
investigation.

As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 12 Likewise, private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision but the same was limited only to the portion
thereof which sustains the validity of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670. 13Respondent judge denied both motions for
reconsiderationinaresolutiondatedOctober19,1976.14

Theinstantpetitiontoreviewthedecisionofrespondentjudgeposesthefollowingquestionsoflaw:(1)Whetherthe
municipalandcitycourtshavejurisdictionoverviolationsofRepublicActNo.4670and(2)WhetherSection32of
saidRepublicActNo.4670isconstitutional.

We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the constitutionality of the assailed
provisionofthelawinvolvedisnecessaryfortheadjudicationofthejurisdictionalissueraisedinthispetition.

1.ThedisputedsectionofRepublicActNo.4670provides:

Sec.32.PenalProvision.Apersonwhoshallwilfullyinterferewith,restrainorcoerceanyteacherin
theexerciseofhisrightsguaranteedbythisActorwhoshallinanyothermannercommitanyactto
defeatanyoftheprovisionsofthisActshall,uponconviction,bepunishedbyafineofnotlessthan
one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.(Emphasissupplied).

Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from P100.00 to
P1,000.00 or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable
penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no
equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the
discretionofthecourt.

Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress intended to be the duration of the
penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
power,andthattheabsenceofaprovisiononthespecifictermofimprisonmentconstitutesthatpenaltyintoacruel
andunusualformofpunishment.Hence,itisvigorouslyasserted,saidSection32isunconstitutional.

Thebasicprincipleunderlyingtheentirefieldoflegalconceptspertainingtothevalidityoflegislationisthatinthe
enactmentoflegislationaconstitutionalmeasureistherebycreated.Ineverycasewhereaquestionisraisedasto
theconstitutionalityofanact,thecourtemploysthisdoctrineinscrutinizingthetermsofthelaw.Inagreatvolumeof
cases,thecourtshaveenunciatedthefundamentalrulethatthereisapresumptioninfavoroftheconstitutionalityof
alegislativeenactment.15

ItiscontendedthatRepublicActNo.4670isunconstitutionalonthegroundthattheimposablebutindefinitepenalty
ofimprisonmentprovidedthereinconstitutesacruelandunusualpunishment,indefianceoftheexpressmandateof
theConstitution.Thiscontentionisinaccurateandshouldberejected.

Wenotewithapprovaltheholdingofrespondentjudgethat

Theruleisestablishedbeyondquestionthatapunishmentauthorizedbystatuteisnotcruelorunusual
ordisproportionatetothenatureoftheoffenseunlessitisabarbarousoneunknowntothelaworso
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
Basedontheprinciple,ourSupremeCourthasconsistentlyoverruledcontentionsofthedefensethat
the punishment of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual.
(Legardavs.Valdez,1Phil.146U.S.vs.Pico,18Phil.386Peoplevs.Garay,2ACR149Peoplevs.
Estoista 93 Phil. 647 People vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738 People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The
languageofourSupremeCourtinthefirstofthecasesitdecidedafterthelastworldwarisappropriate
here:

TheConstitutiondirectsthat'Excessivefinesshallnotbeimposed,norcruelandunusual
punishmentinflicted.'Theprohibitionofcruelandunusualpunishmentsisgenerallyaimed
attheformorcharacterofthepunishmentratherthanitsseverityinrespectofdurationor
amount, and apply to punishments which never existed in America, or which public
 sentimenthasregardedascruelorobsolete(15Am.Jur.,p.172),forinstancethere(sic)
inflictedatthewhippingpost,orinthepillory,burningatthestake,breakingonthewheel,
disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil.
906).16

Thequestionthatshouldbeasked,further,iswhethertheconstitutionalprohibitionlooksonlytotheformornature
ofthepenaltyandnottotheproportionbetweenthepenaltyandthecrime.

TheanswertheretomaybegatheredfromthepronouncementinPeoplevs.Estoista,17wherean"excessive"penalty
wasupheldasconstitutionalandwasimposedbutwitharecommendationforexecutiveclemency,thus:

... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances,thelawisnottobedeclaredunconstitutionalforthisreason.Theconstitutionalityofan
actofthelegislatureisnottobejudgedinthelightofexceptionalcases.Smalltransgressorsforwhich
the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a
situationasthisthatcourtsareadvisedtomakearecommendationtotheChiefExecutiveforclemency
orreductionofthepenalty...

Thatthepenaltyisgrosslydisproportionatetothecrimeisaninsufficientbasistodeclarethelawunconstitutionalon
thegroundthatitiscruelandunusual.Thefactthatthepunishmentauthorizedbythestatuteisseveredoesnot
make it cruel or unusual. 18 In addition, what degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the
Constitutionhasstilltoawaitappropriatedeterminationinduetimesince,tothecreditofourlegislativebodies,nodecision
hasasyetstruckdownapenaltyforbeing"cruelandunusual"or"excessive."

Weturnnowtotheargumentofprivaterespondentsthattheentirepenalprovisioninquestionshouldbeinvalidated
as an 49 "undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretionofthecourtasifthelattterwerethelegislativedepartmentofthegovernment."

Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of
imprisonmentisamatterofstatutoryconstructionandnotanunduedelegationoflegislativepower.Itiscontended
thattheprohibitionagainstunduedelegationoflegislativepowerisconcernedonlywiththedelegationofpowerto
make laws and not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the
discretion,nottofixtheperiodofimprisonment,buttochoosewhichofthealternativepenaltiesshallbeimposed.

Respondentjudgesustainedthesethesesofpetitioneronhistheorythat"theprincipleofseparationofpowersis
notviolatedbyvestingincourtsdiscretionastothelengthofsentenceoramountoffinebetweendesignatedlimits
insentencingpersonsconvictedofcrime.Insuchinstance,theexerciseofjudicialdiscretionbythecourtsisnotan
attempttouselegislativepowerortoprescribeandcreatealawbutisaninstanceoftheadministrationofjustice
andtheapplicationofexistinglawstothefactsofparticularcases." 19Whatrespondentjudgeobviouslyoverlookedis
hisownreferencetopenalties"betweendesignatedlimits."

InhiscommentaryontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,Corwinwrote:

..Atleastthreedistinctideashavecontributedtothedevelopmentoftheprinciplethatlegislativepower
cannotbedelegated.Oneisthedoctrineofseparationofpowers:Whygotothetroubleofseparating
thethreepowersofgovernmentiftheycanstraightwayremergeontheirownmotion?Thesecondis
the concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private
persons.Lastly,thereisthemaximofagency"Delegatapotestasnonpotestdelegari."20

An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists in
caseswherediscretionisconferreduponsaidcourts.Itisclear,however,thatwhenthecourtsaresaidtoexercisea
discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and
which,whendiscerned,itisthedutyofthecourttofollow.21

SoitwasheldbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesthattheprincipleofseparationofpowersisnotviolatedby
vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in
sentencingpersonsconvictedofacrime.22

Inthecaseunderconsideration,therespondentjudgeerronneouslyassumedthatsincethepenaltyofimprisonment
hasbeenprovidedforbythelegislature,thecourtisendowedwiththediscretiontoascertainthetermorperiodof
imprisonment.Wecannotagreewiththispostulate.Itisnotforthecourtstofixthetermofimprisonmentwhereno
pointsofreferencehavebeenprovidedbythelegislature.Whatvaliddelegationpresupposesandsanctionsisan
exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within
specificordesignatedlimitsprovidedbylaw,theabsenceofwhichdesignatedlimitswellconstitutesuchexerciseas
anunduedelegation,ifnotanoutrightintrusionintoorassumption,oflegislativepower.
Section32ofRepublicActNo.4670providesforanindeterminableperiodofimprisonment,withneitheraminimum
nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of
discretiontofixthetermofimprisonment,withouteventhebenefitofanysufficientstandard,suchthattheduration
thereofmayrange,inthewordsofrespondentjudge,fromoneminutetothelifespanoftheaccused.Irremissibly,
this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as
appliedtothiscase,doesviolencetotherulesonseparationofpowersaswellasthenondelegabilityoflegislative
powers.Thistime,thepreumptionofconstitutionalityhastoyield.

Ontheforegoingconsiderations,andbyvirtueoftheseparabilityclauseinSection34ofRepublicActNo.4670,the
penaltyofimprisonmentprovidedinSection32thereofshouldbe,asitishereby,declaredunconstitutional.

Itfollows,therefore,thatarulingontheproperinterpretationoftheactualtermofimprisonment,asmayhavebeen
intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested
applicationofthesocalledruleorprincipleofparallelism,wherebyafineofP1,000.00wouldbeequatedwithone
yearofimprisonment,doesnotmeritjudicialacceptance.Afine,whetherimposedasasingleorasanalternative
penalty,shouldnotandcannotbereducedorconvertedintoaprisontermitistobeconsideredasaseparateand
independentpenaltyconsonantwithArticle26oftheRevisedPenalCode.23Itislikewisedeclaredadiscreteprincipal
penaltyinthegraduatedscalesofpenaltiesinArticle71ofsaidCode.Thereisnorulefortransmutationoftheamountofa
fineintoatermofimprisonment.NeitherdoestheCodecontainanyprovisionthatafinewhenimposedinconjunctionwith
imprisonmentissubordinatetothelatterpenalty.Insum,afineisasmuchaprincipalpenaltyasimprisonment.Neitheris
subordinatetotheother.24

2.Ithasbeentheconsistentrulethatthecriminaljurisdictionofthecourtisdeterminedbythestatuteinforceatthe
timeofthecommencementoftheaction.25

WiththedeletionbyinvalidationoftheprovisiononimprisonmentinSection32ofRepublicActNo.4670,asearlier
discussed,theimposablepenaltyforviolationsofsaidlawshouldbelimitedtoafineofnotlessthanP100.00and
not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which court may properly exercise
jurisdictionthereover.Whenthecomplaintagainstprivaterespondentswasfiledin1975,thepertinentlawthenin
forcewasRepublicActNo.296,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.3828,underwhichcrimespunishablebyafineof
notmorethanP3,000.00fallundertheoriginaljurisdictionoftheformermunicipalcourts.Consequently,Criminal
CaseNo.555againsthereinprivaterespondentsfallswithintheoriginaljurisdictionoftheMunicipalTrialCourtof
Hindang,Leyte.

WHEREFORE,thedecisionandresolutionofrespondentjudgeareherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Criminal
CaseNo.555filedagainstprivaterespondentshereinisherebyorderedtoberemandedtotheMunicipalTrialCourt
ofHindang,Leytefortrialonthemerits.

SOORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, MelencioHerrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento,Cortes,GrioAquinoandMedialdea,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1Rollo,80105.

2Ibid.,117138.

3Ibid.,2530.

4Ibid.,31.

5Ibid.,3738.

6Ibid.,1924.

7Ibid.,5661.

8Ibid.,5.

9Ibid.,6263.

10Ibid.,6462.

11Ibid.,6879.
 12Ibid.,106112.

13Ibid.,113116.

14Ibid.,117138.

1516Am.Jur.2d,631.

16Rollo,9899.

1793Phil.647(1953).

1824C.J.S.11871188.

19Rollo,98.

20CitedinBernas,TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,Vol.II,1988Ed.,73.

2116Am.Jur.2d,902.

22Ohioexrel.Lloydvs.Dollison194U.S.445,citedin16Am.Jur.2d,903.

23Peoplevs.Basalo101Phil.57(1957).

24Peoplevs.Crisostomo,5SCRA1048(1962)Peoplevs.Ignacio,13SCRA153(1965).

25Peoplevs.Paderna22SCRA273(1968)Peoplevs.Mariano,etal.,71SCRA600(1976)Lee,et
al.vs.Hon.PresidingJudge,etc.,etal.,145SCRA408(1986).

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