‘A volume in the series Cornel Stats Sect Airs cited by Robert J. Art Rober Jest ‘Stephen M. Wat ‘ful is of ties inthe saris appears at heen ofthe Book Causes of War Power AND THE Roots of ConFLIcT STEPHEN VAN Evera Cornell University Press(1) Introduction ‘Questions Avonasso, Way Ty ARSE ‘Whatcnanes the rst wars osemtimes? Othe uss which were preventable! What are the key eaubes of ture arn ow ca hoe ‘was best be prevented? “These re the questions addres, They are at new. Devising chemes to prevent war has een posopher industry fr centuries Dante Al hr, Willa Pea the abe dean Pere, are Kant Jeremy Be (Garo ees Oa pre ty aed appre ped apt the founder te fk modern chlo pole cence US clu War setran who sought to prevent war and hoped the tidy of polis would ofer answers? Stil ater the international pois abd embraced war prevention se prime fos during rapid growth afer World Wari ‘Shy though, chlars have made scant progres the problem. vast erate cm the causes of war as appre bt this erature says ile ee ea a sarin crm et Iain trp nod sore danas nc hats he wag See phoma eee ceca Seca eeeenas naa Ros ew ans Hapa ip nnn Soe eae ene menace See ee Seer ne rao uluss shout hw war canbe prevented Most ofthe many causes htt entific ant be manipulated for amp, human isin the nate he do ‘mesic eonome rpiteal sate of sates othe dstbuton of poner Songs) Many hypotheses that ent manipula sass Rate not Ie ested avn eps retort them, Acordingy these wings are largely ignored by opinion leaders policymakers ard pee groupe Meanie tailed peace doss—fr example disarmament pci, Ad lage rent on inratoa insti tesa contra a for laek of beter aerate aan abort our ck of hypotheses on the hss wa sane but ums ful Those ling tor ols to peevent earl nd aim plekngs Acco ‘ng my main pros resto propos presciptvey sl pees on war crust hyphens tha point twa cnes tht fae ‘Bi be reduced oraddreaed by countess Tr te goa eh ere err eee ee = ti Rea a Copy cca {ew aa Proof War esha mg Roth elon Wl mays hc ame a {No Se ie F979) Sue ate eae TW asm. Te Ong ge ‘rath Retry Ree Longman 88) pan Berd Ba a ont ie we ac ge) eos lane apn a ews The tage Hae say a anal Srl oy rh ys rt wang he sea nhbaperier eects Incas dred wo hw eae al a er Ugg ae pennant nf Sed eri r ase catrerscne pe meh ener ee ae Sahara seen: et cy Pec ata re eae Seuss eee ‘apn uy of cane eens an ic pte archon ne ‘Bibs etter ainattn "lt ssa a ane nM at oe et Seeee ee een cere Scien pose fas ha ey PRN bl rt exiting hypothe that ave been underappreinte or ueerdeve- ped and propose 3 few new ones Il tot ese hypothe a app {thom toxplat history, ne policy prsepons, and pri the fate. Tse rc criteria tse the hes expe {platy poner, How tach war can the hypetess explain? How ‘wil The explanatory power fa hypothesis sanction of tee tbls: "importance. explanatory range and its reak-word aplcabty. I Foetut How strongly does the causal phenomena of he Rypothss Fecthe cause phenomenon?” An important hyped points oa tong, use tat ne that bas large ets The grater oie precio, the grater the explanatory power. Explatory mage How many cases of Phctenera docs hom tc Thc ier Be ngs of lech por {na the rete theesplanatory rage of he pothesis Mest sca seen theories have aro tnge but few gem expsin many dere Some Applica the causal phenomena that the hypotheses com ‘asin the rel word? Hl cormon ae the concions ut ned 9 ‘operate? Thermore prevalent he cause and is condi, the greater theese plnatry power Evensmpectan tat tong) ates have ie explana {ory power they aerarein he eal word or hey equ tre hohe Curaions to operate A weaker sus an have mar eaplanatory power {the aun ands required conditions are common. Te ast prevalence of {hecauses and codon of hypothes overs say explain a ton hr caren an fre prevalence governs bit texan pre cnvand future vents 2 Precip rice. Can thew cate that the hypothesis ents tempat” Int can ts elects be mitigated by fem counter sre? Presepiely ich hypothees point cass ta an be manip ined or hose efits con be mitigated Dep tsi How wl does he hypothesis tify cis lay Te urbe the cause Stands rom ws props ect the grt te err es eens anee ee Seo sone eam ‘Sopp Sil on ton at & open ere ware he DV al See yee eee Teepe eee ee me Care eae eae ae eras Sere TNT Se See eee et Seen ee marries Sigg ee achdooetanaritany te blsatletion tole. A politician once explained her section lo “diet ‘etenough votes” This true bu unsttying A good explanation would roe wy ahe dd ot get enough vote. Task ve questions ofthe hypetieses I examine 1) How ca they be (eset? Wt eitcem erbium enclose Predictions might devised? (2) Do they paspelninay tess? lest vee Fypotheses using singe cave studies in Chapters 5.46 and 7)-() Hom _ratathtrexplanatory power? Thats how large eel nportance ow eae Seley gel er ell ont ey eo rece ee ret inteational poles?) Ar they saying?) What poly pr Sponsor hem? /Ancesent ADWANCED, ANSWERS OFFERED “This book concentrates on war causes relat to the haricter and di Strong infunce de probably and intensity of wat they are re allan and they remain underused and underoppeeiatt dope 3 rowing iterate that adresses her® Thomas Scheling notes tha the [S"somehang we might cal he inherent propensity toward peace oar ‘nie in weaponry he geography andthe military organization of he tie This volume develops Sehalings Wea by exploring five specie ypotheses is, area hon sates lp als optimism tout out 1: Warmer wh teat tana 's, War mate hey hen he tine poe of aes cts apy — {hag hen wows oppor and valet age Hy. Ware mort when eu te cama, wh he ‘tla sures enable stato pte or ae ther ners Hs Warmer when cong nan ‘These hypotheses have been discussed blore but they Rave not boon fully developed an thr regi fae ben undestited. None ave rete en mania an wach "em ling. Arwen fee Hn vty Pn 8 36 ul ‘een wel tne, (For sdetails! summary ofthese hypotheses, ee the Appendix) F Chaps» “ale Opimis” anges th wa i re key wen gor ‘rments exaggerate thrown chances winning res od wa or whe ‘hey undrestimate the cost of wat Io lesing se oul ovens the out ere, le wouk often deli to ight Catal al that esi he fe ‘gto ede nl rent may war ‘Chap , Jump the Gun” suc ht wars markaly more Wkly shen the st ie to mobilize or atck asthe advantage Ast more “ndanige rely causes reciprocal ea frp attache man da fer ascribed to tut t dows ae ther sro Ganges ade sae Ibanch preemptive atlas to prevent an opponent rm geting nthe st ‘low In leads ste to concn thet epablites and iene, rm fear tat open plays stent or eetance nul tiger another pre Comptve stack. These deception mpese diplomacy and make hse op Imm and inadvertent war re ely Since some ven ao ae fave plausibly stemmed fom dangers ase by ror peeved st nave vantages he 740 War of Ausra Sccsion, Wola Wa Hier 90 ‘Muck on Norway, the US-China leh during the Korean War nd te ‘Arabs wars f 936, 1967 a 17 ‘Chapee .Tower Shit” angus hat tations in the rai power of tats windows") cause wr by tempting sates to launch preventive ‘ack by aceerting diplomacy to urate pds, ah by making Hee nents es valuable I declning Stes tink ar iy Iter, hey te "couse they prefer war ovo warner Or they har pmacy, ase Ingo resolve disputes beer the power wanes eter making wares tas of hate inthe procs Or they give up on diplomacy altogether "cause they doubt he val of agreement earn Da ing tte el rek agreements made oa erst grow stronger Asa test diplomacy bres down and disputes ester, wating teruptin wa. Nine sor ware nce 3738 have apy stemmed fom dangers ase by windows or {ae perceptions of windows ‘Chapler,"Camlative Resources” anges tht wats or ily when respures ane cumulative (hat ae highly alate). Some resource Fig cumulant can be readily red toseize me sours Ofets are les so Sates must compete moe ewe for corel ee more cule tive rscuren cue heir noe spells fre gainers Hence "ho greater the umulatsity fconquerable sources, the greater the sk elon Chapter 6 “Offense, Dlenso and the Seat Dslemana” argues that wars tarsmarelkly when cncstn cay Far onset ea master Rot Salo tin pte an Ee Cet aS self la rc CaS nh 38 bl perceptions area sound guid tothe impacto actual power eal Power Felis create outcomes trough th mpact am preps of power alti which in ta shape outeomes. Theatre, perceptions of aly wl Correlate with outcomes ut ajptve elites ase lence we can gouge ‘he impact of fat move advange, window, and offence dominate by asking what flows when they aeblieved presen, wheter oh they fetal are. Second, evidence onthe ele perepton sheds ight on the cope and ets of misperceptions of thee phenomena, Do hypoth ‘soa Hand M5 gn stent eect to rame dangers hl aise When frstmove advantages, windows, an ofeee dominance ate falsely per ‘ved? We can adress this question by tracking the sop ai fe These perceptions ‘A background forthe hook [aio examined a number of other wars nd surveyed European international Mnory since the French Revolt ‘hit wars were surveyed inal tcling those examined in cose td fen I Teese on menern wars rather than ancient wats hodetn war ‘Thisbook starts with immediate ouses of wir ad then nove to moe mot cases ofthese ces, Chapters mera danger (ale optim tht Stems in prt rom dangers outed in Chapters and fie move advan {ageand easy conquest). The dangers eames in Chapters and 5 (st ‘move advanoge windows, and resource cumulatviy) ale sem pry From easy cong “This ordering principle Set allowed preci. Soe phenomens men- ined erly couse phenomena mentona ater Bat n general the Book moves om medi tomore emo causa the problem af ny con (goes ramed sa prime case ter danger he anc encaryy net sconifvac Wa tabnext Nur la ee tg ii Reman ‘esr Us ch ry Cae Le A i Eeprtopen OespeAme r ob e c fa SoD A ra hs ir {oy hoa arte Wn Aa We Rofo eens tect il aim nr aa an bl