The Tragedy of Great Power Politics John J. Mearsheimer University of ChicagoAnarchy and the Struggle for Power poe ag sn eit pres G meso enya al ‘Se pn et corr 0 porary orton sen ers peed ne en papi wa grarponen rhe a he oe Lsvorvenienssioqrsapiharvatirinatonispesia fecha eaiprntermtinieaeriecl ‘Sona pet pon manta poe ae a wee ose ang te ral ee hope, That impontan tsk eserved for ater chapters ‘yeaplanation for why great pomes we with each ter for power fn sve for ogerony i ecved fom ve astmptions about ‘he iternatonl system: None of hte simpons alone mandates that stats behave compete Takes togeter, however: they depict a word in which ses have consierble reason think and sometimes behave gresively pric, the tem encourages states lok or oppor Tanke to maize thelr power views ther states,How important ii that these aston be elt? Some sal ‘ss argue that the assumptions shat underpin theory nee not eo fox to seal: nee, the economist Milton Friedman maintains thatthe est eos “wil be found to Rave asuptons that ee wily aces ate descriptive representations ora and In genera the more sign. can the theory the more une he asumptionsAecingt this view. te explanatory power of theory i all that mater If uneatc ssumpdons lead to theory that tell usa lot about how the world woos sof no imporanee whether the undeying asimptas ate resi o not jet this view: ough tage that explanatory power ithe ut ‘teson fo asessng theories, | ao believe that a theory based Unrelste oF fase assumptions wl not explain much about how the vorld works Sound theres re sed on sound assump. acsordngy ‘ich of these five assumption isa reasonably acute representation ‘imporant spect of ei he ntrationa stem, Bedrock Assumptions Te ft mumps the nemo uem are wih docs notin hat chosen by der Wise a ten conto eatin ds word haraerued yey cope tion andar yt. however nt tyra ‘ng do wih conf an edn ice whch ae tat ‘yen compres independent sesh haven cena sry shove then Sorc. te word nbs i sae teu esa he rn bod nh terol rem: The nove The seond anunpon th et poner ent poses soe fesiv mary eb, which ves hem the ert oat fd poly eso each er Ste ep anu ech te atop sone ats ve marr ight da tae there more danger Asses may poe? uly ee sin he pre megoy ts pen soup ven ewe Anarchy andthe Struggle for Power 91 ho weapons the individuals in those tates could sl use Hee feet and ands wo tack the population of anes state Afr al oe every eck, ‘there ae two hands to choke it “The ted asumption that sates can never be certain about other sister intentions Specialy, no state can be sue tha another sae ll ot sets lensive mtr capability tata the fst sate This not ‘sy that ates necessary have hose tenons. Indeed all ofthe sates inthe pte maybe realy eign ut is imposible obese of hat Judgment becaeintesons are pole to divine with 10 percent ce tainty There are many pombe cases of ageeon and no sae can be sure tha another sate ot motivated by one of ther. Fanthermore Intention can change quel sa sate ntentions an be Heng one ay and hostile the next. Unersnty abou ntnions is unavoidable, which near ha sates can never be sare tate states donot have ollesive Intentions go along with ther tensive capa. ‘he fourth assumptions that survivals the primary solo reat pow es Specialy, tats sek 1 maintain thee terri integrity andthe hee domestic policl oder Survival dominates other Imotves because once ite scones sunk 19 be ina os tion to pursue eter aims, Soviet leader Jost Stan put the point well Ahring a ar scare fn 1927; “We can and must bald socsm in the [soviet Union, But in onder to do so we fist of Rave to exit States ‘anand do pursue oer gals of nue but ecu thelr mos impor ‘ant objec “The fith assumption i tht gest powers ae rational actors. They are aware of thee external envionment and they thnk stately about how o survive init In parila, they consider the preterences of other states and how their own bavi Hkly 0 alfec the behavior of those fer sss, and how the Behavior of hose other tates sey to alle {hel wn sate for survival Moreover states pay atention tothe Jong. ‘erm as wells the immediate consequences of her actions. ‘As emphasized, none of these ssumpuons alone dates that great powers as a general le sould behave apsesvely toward each othe ‘Theres surely the owt that some tate might have hose intentions,but he only sumption dealing ith specie modve hats ommn 19 allsates says that thee pencpl oboe fo suvive, which by selina ater harmless goal. Neverthe, when the ive assumptions ae mare topes they create powetlincenives fr gest power to think a at tlfensvely wth regu to cach ober. patil, tree general pats of tehavioe result eat eel, and power maximization, State Behavior ‘reat powers ear each er. Tey repair with spon and Atey worry that war might be inthe offing They ntcate danger. There stn room for rust among ates. For sure the level of er varies arse time and space bu it eat Be duced ta evil evel. Frm the per spective of anyone gest per ler great power are poeta ene mie. This pont is oswated bythe reaction of the Uned Kingdom and France to German reunieaton atthe end ofthe Cold We, Despite the fac that these thee states ad ben coals or almost foe year, both the United Kingdom and France immediatly began worrying about ‘he potential danges of united Germany The DOs of his fears thot 2 Wold where great powers ave he ‘apabily to ansck eachother and might hve the motive todo so, any state Bent on survival mast be 3 eat suspicious of oer aes ad rele {ant to rst them. Add thi the “91” problem-—the absence oe tral authority to which a detened sate can ten for helpsnd sates have even grater incentive 49 for cach other. Moreover, thete Ino mechani, other than the possible el-interes of sh pats fr pu Ishing an agressr. Because is sometimes ic deter poem araresor, sates have ample reawon 10 tute tates and t Be prepare for wae wth them ‘The possible eonsequences of lng vc to aggression fanher amp Fyhe imporane of fear +3 masiatng ore a ork polis. Great aM rsdo not compete wih each oe si ieterational pcs were merely sm economic markerpace. Pata competion among tates is muh more dangerous busines han mere ecnomc intercourse the fam a Anarchy and the Sragle for Power 33 lead to wa, and war often mesns mas ilingon the hae as wells mais murder of evans tn extreme cies, war can even ea 10 the esuction a aes. The horble consequences of war sometimes cause states to view ach cer not just a competitors, bu as potentially deadly enemies, Poitical antagnie, i sor. tends wo be tense because the stakes ae great. iva, Recae other sates ae potenti has, and becuse there i no higher atuhory to come othr exe when they dal 911 sates can rot depend on oer for their own secur. Each sate tends 0s ise {vulnerable and alone, sn therefore it alms to provide for it we su ‘iva. Ininernaonal pois, God lps those who hep themseves. This emphasis on seep does not prechde states trom forming linces" But alliances ae ony temporary mariage of convenience: today's aliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today’s enemy Ilght be tomormws alliance partner, For example, the United stats fought with Cina and the Soviet Union agains Germany and Jaan in "Word Wi , but soon there ip-lopped enemies and partners and alle with West Germany and Japan agains China andthe Save Union sonal syste ao im to guarantee thei own Su sing the Cold Wa Sates operating in @sel-help word amon always act accorng 19 theron slbineest and do no subordinate thei interes tthe ster ‘tv of eer sates, oF 10 the interes f the so-aledinteatonal om munity, The resto espe: pays to be sel ina e-help world Tis ste tn the shor term swell the lng em, because tat ses inne short un, might ot be around fo the long hal “Avpchensive about the uma Intentions of oer sates, and aware that they oper nse system, states quickly understand thatthe best may to ese their sural st be she most powefl sate inthe system. The song sae lative ts potential va the es Mey ie isthat any of thoe val wi auack iad threaten is survival Weaker sees wl be ect plc flat wih more powerful states Because the weaker sates ase Hey osuller nila dels Indeed, te bgger the ap power between ny so sates, te es kel tat she weakersk the suonger. Neier Canad nor Meso for example, would ‘countenance attacking the Unie Sse, which s far more pert han hs neghbors. The ke suai so Be the ogemon in the system. AS Immanuel Kansai, te dese af every state, o fs ule to aie at candi of perpetual pace by conquering the whole wor tht vere pose" Suva woul then be almost guaranted. among them. and they make speci flor 0 maximive thee share of ‘word power. Specially they look for opportunist ale he talance otek Sates employ a vary of meanseconamic toma ad mltary—to shift the balanc of power in thee avo even i dong so powers another Hat los, gest powers end to have a Zer0-m me tay when dealing with eah ether. The wk ofcourse 1 be the wi "hs. the dsim that sates maximize relative power f anamoun 10 guing that sats ate spose to think otlensiely toward eer sates owes have agressive Intentions "Even when a reat power achieves sine mlary advantage ove is ower sops only when hegemony is achieved. The Sea that 2 great, eer igh el secure witout dominating the system, provided Ps ts difiat o asess how much rea power one state must have vere vale bene ects tice a mac power an aprepite ‘resold? Ori thre ines a mich power he mast number? The oot ofthe protien is that power calculations alone donot determine which ‘Second determining how much power i enough becomes even more complicated when great pers comterpl ted among the ten or wey year de the road The apse of ‘nivdual sates vary over me sometimes markedly. and its fen il Remember, few inthe Wes anncated the colaps of the Soviet Union| efor happened tn fact during the thst half ofthe Cok War many in| ester wealth han the American economy, which would suse a marked power staan the United States and i alles What the ature ols for Chins and Ria and what the blanc f pore wl lok Hk in 2020, Isc to foresee, Given the dfcuky of determining how much power is enough for sepsis ed retarted ee security isto achieve hegemony now. thus eliminaing ay poss 1y ofa challenge by anoer great power. Only 4 misguided state would ‘ough it aleady had stent power to sure. But even ia great ower docs net have the wherewithal Yo achieve hegemony (al that ‘ci, becsie sates ae almost alway beter wth more rather than es ome. In shoe tates do nat eon aie quo power ul hey co ec dominate the sytem. ‘All sacs ae nluenced by ths loge which means that not only do they lok for opportunites Yo tke advantage of one ances, they aka work ens that other sates donot ake advantage of them. Ae ll a states are deve by the same lg and most sates ae ely 0 re snes ukimately pay ate to defense a wel 36 fee. Tey think ‘shout congue themselves. tid they work to check agar sates from ning power tthe expense. This inexorably leads 1 @ ward of on San ecsty competion, where sates ate wiling toi chest, ade re force it Megs hen gain advantage over thet va, Peace, one eines that concep as sate of angulty or muta encod 00 yt res out inhi wor ‘Te “secur denna" which sone ofthe most well-known concepresin, The estence ofthe emma thatthe mesures a sate aks to Increases own Secu usually decrease the security of other states Ths ificl fora state wo icteas sown chances of sri! wih ‘out threatening the seal foe tates, John Her st introduced the secur der in 1950 atc nthe oul Worl oii Aer ‘sing the anarchic nature of internation pois, he writes, “Sing to sin security from. atack, (tes ae even o acquit more and ‘more power inorder to excape the impacto the power father. Tn turn, renders the oters more insecure and compel them to prepare for the wort. Since none can ever fee emily secure in such 8 word of| ‘competing unis, power competion ensis, andthe vous ree a Sc ryan power accumulation on." The implation of Her’ anasiss ‘eat: the best ay fora sate to sve in anarchy 5:10 ake advantage of| ‘ther sates and gain power at thelr expense, The best dlense i a good ‘oense Since hi mesg widely understood, ceaseless secu com Peto ensues, Unfortunately isle can be done wo arent the Secu ty lemma song states operat in anarchy Tr should be apparent irom this scuson that saying that sates ae omer mexmizestntamountw saying hat they eave abou relave Poomer not absolte power There an mporant dsincion here, esse states concerned about relative power behave diferey than do sates interested in abso power Sates hat maximize relative power fare concened primary withthe dstsbution of material capabilities tn paral, they ty to gai a age @ power advanage as possible over potential Deca power the Best means to survival in a danger ‘sword hs snes motivated by elatve poe concerns ae Hel 10 ong age gins in het ow power. fs gains ve val sates even reste power. for smaler atonal gains that neverees provide them Wit 3 power advantage ver thei al. States that maximize absolute meron the other hand ae only abut the sz of te own gals. not thove of eer ses. They ate not motivated By Balance power Logie at sca are concerned ith amassing power wkhoutrepard 0 how uch power oter sates control. They woul jump a the oppertunity for Tange ins even i va gad more i the del. Rewer, according 1 thslogc enor ameansto an end (survival) butan end ins Calculated Aggression There obviously ie roam for sutus que powers n a word where Nevertces. reat powers cannot always act on tel offensive inten: tons, because Behaviors nfluened not only by wat sales want, ut eer cere ing ofthe hl but not every sate has the wherewithal to compete for that oy postion, ch les achieve. Much depends on how rary marked power advantage over sal kel 0 Behave more sete sively because has the eapity as wells te incentive wo dso By consas great powers facing powerful opponents wil be es ncn o consider oesive action ad more concerned with deen ‘the exiting balance of power rm threats by thee more porter app alance in her awn favor, however, aod they wl ake advantage of Sain put she point well athe end of Word Wa “Everyone imposes Sates might alo have the capably o gain advantage over aval power but nevertiles decide thatthe perceived costs offense ate high and donot uy he expects benef tm shor great powers are not mindless aguresors so ent on glning reste hey charg hefloog tat reper Pcie et On the contrary, Beore great powers take aflemive ations. they ‘think cart aout the balance f power ad about how other states ‘he key hemes I the Benefits donot twig the isk, hey ih and wat fora mote propitious moment. Nord se nll 16 prove th overall poston. As ase reser ent In Chape 3,satessometnc imit dene seri ithe because end Ing more would being no suatese advanage or because spending mote Fun? To paraphrase Clin Fastwood sae has know ks inka 0 tet at ars aces thatNevertheless, gest powers micalculte rom tne wo tne becuse ey ‘on, States hardly ever have complete information about any station ‘hey confront. Tere ate two dtensons wo this problem. Potential aver snes have incenves to misrepresent theron strength oF weakness ‘nd to conceal their true ams. For example a weaker sate tng t0 te potential guess rom attacking On the ther anda state ben on ‘squession& kel o emphasize peaceful goals while exaggerating ts arms and this leaves self euerable to atack. Probably no national leader was beer at practng this kind of decepom than Adol ile tisure about how thei on mary fore, aswell 5 the avers Wil perform on the batted For example. eis sometimes dul 19 perform inthe face of enemy re, Reaetne manewers and war eames ate hep! but perfect ndators of wha kel o happen in acl combat. Fighting wars sa complicated busines in which it olen il ‘uk o pred outcomes. Remember that hough the Une States and ‘alles scored stunning and remarkably easy vciory against tn in 3 formldabe fe an put up som resistance bore nally sucumbing to American mary might sttesas well asales. For example, Germany bleed that it went War ‘gine France and Russa in the summer of 1914, the United Kingdom ‘would prokoy ty out of he ight Saar Hascin expected the United Satesto sands when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990 Both agers: sors gues wo, bu each had goo reas 1 think that ts iil jad rivals woul be easy 0 exploit and slate because each hail ners tn ghing Germany and intend was detente te gt somenne ea sume that burden. He sues gh. n sr ea power conan ‘nd themselves confontng stations in which they have to make impor tant desons wt incomplete ilormaton. Not spiny they some times make falty judgments and end up dlng themselves seus hae ‘Some defenv els go 0 fart suggest that the constants of the ‘mternationa sytem ace powerful that offense acy scot an that gressive great powers invatlaly end up being punished. AS noted ‘ey erate that 1) threstened ate balance against agpreors and saitely ers them and 2) there can offense deense blanc that ‘sally heavily he toward the defense, tus making conus expecially tical Geet powers therlre shoul be content with the exiting bal ance of power and not try t change it by fore. Aer allt makes ine Sense fora tact nate a war tha ely ols that would be se ening helene hie b concent cad on pecs te lance of power” Moreover. cause agresirs slo succeed sates should undestand tat secunty is abundant, and thus there so god state reason fo wanting move power inthe fis place, In a world tere conquest seldom pay, stats should have relly Deg inten tons coward each oer. they do not. hese delensve rea reason & prota pobonous domestic polis, not smart calculations shout howto uarantee ones sect In an anarchic worl “hese sno question that systemic tos constrain agpemion, epe- ily balancing by threatened snes But defensive rele exagTe ‘ose restainng frees? nee, the hsxcal record povies itl up ot for thelr aim that fens rarely succeeds. One sty estimates that ‘here were 6 war betwen 1615 an 1980, and he inkiator won 39 times which ashes int abou 60 percent success ate” Turing to specie cates, Oto von Bisse nied Germany by wining railery ‘coin apnnst Denmark in 1864, Asia in 1866, and France 0 1870, and the United States a we know it oday was eeated in goad pat by conquest inthe nineteenth entry: Conquest certainly pa big vidends fn these cases Nex Germany won wars against Pland i 1939 and France ln 1940, bu lst othe Soviet Union Retmeen 1941 and 1945, Conquest tintely di nat pay for the Third eich, but if Hier ha restrained himself ster the fal of France and had ot Invade the Soviet Union,conquest proba Would have pid andiomely forthe Na tn shor the histor recon shows that olfense sometimes scceeds and some times doesnot. The tick for 3 sophisti power maximier sw fre ‘out when to ate ad when 1 seat powers 961 hive emphasize, seve wo gan power over ther has and hopfully become hegemons: Once a state ahives tat xa poston. Becomes a tats Quo pomer. More needs oe sl however about the mesing of hegemony that 0 power that it dominates all te other ‘Atipemon sutesin the stem. No other tat hs the milary wherewithal to pat ‘ipa seius ight against In esenceahgemon the nly great ower Inthe sytem, A sate tht substantially more powertl than the oer sat powers in the system snot hegenon, bea i fee by defn tion her grea owes The United Kingdom inthe mid-nineteenth cen tury for example sometimes clled 2 hepemon. But Ht was not a hegemon.Beeause there were ure gent posers in Earope at the time—Austia, France. Pri and Rusi—and the United Kingom did ‘ot dominate them in ay mening way fc, sing that pero the nied Kingdom considered France to be aSerous trea othe blanc of ‘omer: Eure in the niteenth entry was ull. ne unipol. Hegemony means dannnation othe yer, whichis usual interpret ‘ello mean the enie woe pose, however, to apply the concept ‘ofa stem mire narrowly and ne 9 deserve pata rons. su {as Europe, Ness Asi, andthe Westem Hemiphee- Thus one can Siningush between sib! genom, which dominate the world, and rial egra, which dominate distinc geographical areas. The nied Sates bas been 8 reponal egemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hue years. No other sae in the Ameria as ul sient litany might wo challenge Ht whichis why the Une stares is dey recognized athe nly eat power ins epion. Anarchy and the Sugg for Power >My argument, whic develo at lng in subsequent chapters. hat except or the une event wherein one sate acheves eat nuclear superior, ts vinwlly impossible for any sate to achieve global Reve mony. The pencil impediment to world domination the dict of rojecting power across the words oceans onto the tereory a sv seat power The Unie states, for example the mont perl ate on ‘he planet today, Butt doesnot dominate Europe and Northeast Asa the way does the Wester Hemipher, andi has no inten fying to eonquer and contol those dant regions mainly beau ofthe stomping Power of water Indeed there i ean 0 think that the American ii lary commitment to Europe and Northeast AS ight wither away ever the next dae tn shoe, there has never ben a global hegemon. and there not ely tobe one anime oon ‘The best outcome a great power can hope for tobe a tena eg ‘mon and posily contol another region that is neaby and accesible overland, The United States the only replonal heeron in moderns tory, although ater sates have fought mor wats n pursuit fren hegemony: imperatJapan in Northeast Asia, and Napoleonic France Wielmine Germany. and Next Germany in urope. Bu none suceeded ‘he Soviet Union, hich flactd in Europe ad Northeast Asia, hea ‘ened 0 dominate both of those reglans during the Cold War. The Soviet Unlon might also have atempeed to congue the alc Fenian Gull region, with which it shared 3 border. But eve if Mou ad bee able ‘0 dominate Europe, Northeast Asa and the Feria Gall, which never came close o doing. i sill would have been unable to congue the [Wester Hemisphere and Become ate slab hegeton Sates that achieve regional hegemony sect preven rst powers ‘ther rons frm dapat thie feat. Regional geen eter ‘words donot want pets. Thus the United Stats, for example, played a ey role in preventing tinge Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nat Germany, and the Soviet Union frm ink ronal supemacy Regional hegemonsatiempe to ceckaspting hegemens n ther rons because they fear Ua iva ret power shat dominates its own re il be a especially power foe thats est He 0 eas bleinthe fcartul great powers backyard, ReplonalIgesons prefer that ‘here be est two great powers located together in her reo, bese thelr proximity wil force them 1o emcee theaters cach oer ater than onthe tant hegeron, rte, a potential hegemon emerges among then. te ther ‘reat powers in that rin might Be able to contain it by themes, lining hed gern o remain solely on the seins. Of ose i the teal gest posers were able wo do the Job, the dant hegeron ‘would take the appetite measures to deal wih he thestering state “The Unite States a5 note, has assumed that burden on four separate occasions in he twentieth cea, wich why is commonly refered tas anolshore balancer” Ins, thee sstion for any great power io be the only eon al negemon in the word, That sate would be a Satus quo power, ani ‘woul po to considerable lengths 10 preserve the existing dition of ‘poe. The United Sates sn ha enviable potion ty: Ht donates the Wesem Hemisphere an there Hegeman in any’ othe the work, But if eon egemon confronted witha eet compet tor it mould ao longer bea sats qu power. nded aul! wo 10 co sirable engi to weaken and maybe even destoy Han val. OF ours, both regana sero would be motivated by tha log which ‘woul! make fora ete secure eompaion between them. ha reat powers fear ech thera ental apet of fe the ne: national system, But 36 noted, the level of fear varies fom case «ase For example, the Soviet Union word much ess about Germany in 1930 thant i in 1939, How sh sats ea ach oer mates wea cause the amount of fear Between ther largely determines the severity ‘ofthe security competion, aswel te roby ha they wil fight 2 ‘ste The more profound she fae, the more intense she scanty com Peston, andthe mote Mkly fe Wa. The lage straihvlorma: a aed Anarchy and the Straggle for Power state wil look especialy hat fo ways o nance is sec an i wil be spose 1 purse ky poles 0 achive that end. Thereoe ii important to undesiand what causes states fer ech the sce os Jncensey, Fear among great powers devs rm he fc st hey inva have some ofensive itary capt that hey an se aaist ch er, and the fat tha one can never ceran thither sae donner use that power aginst nese Moreover, because states peat nan anatle system, ther Is no might watchman to whom they can tur fr lpi another great power atacks them. AlhoUgh anarchy and uncer tout other ste intentions cette an ied evel of fear among states hat leads to powering bavi they cna acount for ‘why sometimes tat evel oer rete tha ther ines. The reason ‘that anarchy and the ticahy of discerning sae intedons re cnstant ‘acs of ie and consants canoe explinvarton. The capilty that sates have otreaten cach tc however. vais rom ae case and it Is the Key fcr that dees ear levels up ad down Specialy the more omer a sale possess, the more fear Renee anni va Gexmany, fr example, was much move power at heen f the 19305 than it was atthe decade begining which why the Soviets became nee fearful of Germany oer the couse ofthat decide ‘hisiscusion of how power alec fea prompts the question Whats ome? Its important to distinguish beoween potential and actu joer ‘A sate’ pte pomer hase on the ate ofits population a level of its wea. These nwo aes ae the sain building locks of ile tay power Wealthy vas With large populations an usually ul orm ate mar frees: sates atl power is embeded mini in my andthe ac and naval forces that dc support Armies ae the tal ingredient of itary per because they are the pina ise ment for conquering and conioling tetory—the paramount poli ‘jective in a world of tere states. In short, the key component af ary might even nthe nua age and pow. omer considerations ae she intent ol fear among sates three ‘main ways. Hist, tl tates that poses nuclear forces that ca suvve aular tak ad etait apainst ire Hkly to fear each theres shan itshen sme states had no muclesr means. During the Cold War, lor ‘xa, he lve ear tereen the superpomers probaly would have ‘been sustancally greater nla weapons iad not ben invented. The Topic here simple: bectne ncear Weapons can nt devasating desteucion on aval ate ina shor evo of ime, aucear-ammed als ‘eg ob elu fight with each oer, which means tat each Side mil ve lest reason to fea he eter than would otherwise be she fase, But asthe Cold War demonstrates, this does not mean that Wat tesmeen lar power i lngeethinkable: they sll have reason to fear ach tee Secon, when reat pers are separated by lg bods of watt, hey ‘sully do not have mich eles apaliy agains each oer, regard Jesse elatve of her armies. Large bees of water ae formidable sods that case sitet powerprojectin problems for atacking ‘mies. For example, the stoping power of water explains in god part why the Unite Kingdom and the United states (since becoming great ome 1898) have never been invaded by anther great power. I ako frnlaite why the United Stats as never tried to conquer testy in europe or Nortesst Asa, and why the United Kingdom has never tempted to dominate the European continent. Great powers located on the sme landoas are 3 much beter postion to attack and conquer cach oer. Thats peclly tbe of tats that share a common border. Therefore ret powers sepia by water ae kel 1 ea each ther lest et pers that an get at each ther oer lan “Thi the datsbution of power among the sales in the system a0 nach ates se vee off.” The key ihe whether powers {buted more ors even among the reat powers or whether there are shorp power asym The configuration of power that generates the ‘mos fear sa multipolar syste that contin poten egemon—what cal “unbalanced mula.” ‘poten epemon sore than just the st power sate he system. isageat power with s0 much atl mia cpatity and so uch potent power that it sands 4 good chance of dominaiog and controling al ofthe ether arest powers i egon f the work A en hegemon need nave the wherewithal o fight al iva atone, butt must have excelent prospects of eesti each opponent lone, an god prospects of defeating re ol then in tem. The Key ‘elatonsip, however. isthe power gap between the peti hegemon ‘nd thesecond mos powerful tate in he system tte mast bea marked sap been them. To quay aa potenti eg by some reasonably ange margn—he mast formidable acy 8 well a ‘hemos latent power among athe sates lcte in eon Boles the power configuration that paces the last amount of fear among the great powers, skh not nelle amount by any cans. Fea tends to be les aut in pony, bese sere is sally rough balance of power bese the 0 major sats In the system. Mulpoir systems without 9 potent Negemon wha Fil “anced mulipleiey” ate sil key 6 ave power asynmescs among thelr members: although these asymmetries wll ot be as pronounced a the 2s created bythe presence ofan aipring egemon, Therefore. balanced mulpotty is Hel generat ex fear than unblnced makipoay but ore fae ha poy. This cussion of how the level of ear betwen great powers vais i changes in the dsubuson of power, not with sxesment aout ach othe’ inetions ass a rated pint When a ate surveys i ‘vironment to determine whih states pose a teat i survival focwses mainly on the lensve cash of ote as not thee Itemons As emphasized carer nttons ae ulkimaely unknowable, so sates wore aout thelr uv mast make worse aisumptons| shout her al lntentions apa however, nat ony can be meas ‘ured but abo determine whether ot ot val ste saris tet Short reat powers balance pnt capable not intentions ‘reat powers obviously lance against states with formidable miltary forces because that elensve milary capability is the tangible veo 1 ‘ir survival ur great power ab pay all atenan o how much Istent power sal states conta cae rich aalpopulos aes usally am an do but poerfl aris. Thus, seat powers end te aes‘with lage populations and rapidly expanding economies, even these sates have nr yet rated thr welin noir igh, —coeeatatiaiaeamnm mca bt Spam eaeeneenenine cna ganna re ‘Shine tet sc Tey eins espe Seg ce = he nse ot mene nora nce -romerremmnammensninrees aren ng —ccnacnanarenas ‘aneasodasaneneese cio tse on-scuysoa, but st has ie o say abou hen. save for one longa the requste behavior ‘moran pia slates an pursue them doesnot coi with balance power loge, wich ste the ese Indeed the past ofthese noa-secuty qoae someines complements the hunt for elave ower For example, Nac Germany expanded into taste Burope for bth ecg and reat reasons an the superpow fs competed with eachother during the Cold War for sna reasons Furthermore, grester economic prosper tavarably means greater weal which assign nplctons for sci, bucause wean ‘he foundation of mary power. Waly sates an lord power i tary fore, which enbance a sate’ pronpecs lo sural As the ole ‘economist Jaco Viner noted mote than fy years ap, “ee Is lone zum harmony” berween wealth ati pret. Navona uieation noth ral that wualy complement the pursuit power For example the tuned Geman sate tha emerged n 1871 was more powerful han the Sometimes the pursuit of non security goals has harly any etlet on ‘he balance of power one Way’ oF the oer. Haman ight intervention ‘esl thi dexriton Rect they fend to Be sme operations ‘at cost le and do no deat tom a reat power’ prospects oe su ‘oa. Far beer oe or worse states are rarely wing t expend blood and ‘tear to protect loreign populations rom gos abuses including geno tide. For insane, dept cms that Americ foreign pc inked fone hundred yearn which U.S. solders were kiled In acon on a humantorlan mission, And in tat cite, the low oa mer eighteens ers nan infamous fightin October 1993 so traummtied Ameren policymakers that they immediatly pula US. oops ot of Somali std then tele to intervene in Renda the sing of 1994, when eth ne Hu went on a genocidal rampage agains thelr Tut neitibors | ‘Stopping hat genocide would have en elt asy at would Mave ad willy no elect onthe positon ofthe United of power Yet thing was de. In short lou res does ot = seribe human righ imervenons, does noc necessary prseie them, pomer gn whic ase aes aly ct accnding tthe dates realism, For example. despite the US. eomaitment spreading democa cy tees he globe, helped ovetiow democraticalycected govem- rent and embraced num of authoraran regimes dig the Cold "War when Ameria policymakers fe that these actions would hep co ‘hele amipathy for communism and formed an allance with the Soviet Unlon against Nex Germany. “I cnt tke communism.” Frain Rocaevet erase, ttt defeat ter I woud bold ads withthe Devil In he same way. Sain repeatedly demonstrated that when bis lol preferences clashed with power conseratons, the later won out Ty take the mst Binant example of bis reali, the Soviet Union formed a non-ageresson pact with Nal Germany in August 1939—the Iniamous Moloros-ibbentzop Pact—ia hopes thatthe aprerent would at est temporary suey Hier eit wnbidons br escen BOPand tum the Wehrmacht ioward France an the United Kingdom When _sreat pvters contont a eis thre n short they pay ie tention 10 ‘logy as they seach fr lace partners. Secu alo trump wealth when thor two sols confit, Beene “delence as Adam Smith wrote in The We of Nations, io much more importance than opulence." Smith provides a ood susaton a hoe snes Bove when fred 0 choose between wealth and relative power 1 16S, England put nto ele he faous Navigon Act. roectons lepton designed to damage Hol’ commere and imately ple ‘he Dutch economy. The lepton mandated sha al gods imported to ‘England be cart ether in Engl ships or stp owned by the couiry ‘ems, hie measure woul! Badly damage thei shinning the cesta Ingreien i ther economic ces. ou, the Navigation Act would ure Englands economy aswell manly because would rab England of the bent of fce trade, “The act of malgtion” Smith wrote, “snot ‘favorable orig commerce, or 1 the growth of that opulence that can llth commercial regulations of England” because it id moe damage 10 ‘he Duteh economy than tothe Engst economy, and inthe mitseven: the ecu of England he dam ssoretines made that great pers ca traced rea ee by working sogeter 1 bull an international ode hat fosters eae andj. Word peace it would appens, can only nance atte's rospenty and secur Americ poll leaders pad considerate lip ser fee oth line of argument over the course ofthe eweaneth century ‘September 1993 that “atthe bth of hs organization 48 yeas agp seneration of ted leaders om many nations stepped forward to ongnlee Anarchy andthe Suuggle for Power 49 ‘yamted to usa moment ofeven pete opportunity. Let ws res that sve dream lpger et ensure tat the wold We pas 1 ou densest ser nmr abundant han the one we nai od. This here nowihsanding, wea powers donot work roger to Promote world ode or it wn sabe. Istead, cach eek o maximizes ‘wn share of wold power, which is kel to cath withthe goal of een ing at ssaining stable tnernconalorders:* Tis otto say that rest pers never aim io prevent wars and eep the peace. On the con- tay they work hard 0 deter wars in which they Would he key ve sim. tn such cases, however. state behavior avenlgely by nario ‘aleulatons abou elaive power, not by a commitment 0 bul a word lower independent ofa sate or interes. The United Stats lor exam le devoed enormous resources to detersng the Soviet Union rm star czpscated commute peoumting pee arouse bt because Americ leaders fated that a Sov victory woul ead 0-2 “Me price international oder that obtains 3 any dime byproduct ofthe et-nteesed bavi of the system’ great power: "The configuration of he system in oer words, the unintended conse quence of tat power cunt competion. no the reso sates acting togeier to organize peace. The establishment of the Co War order in Europe tlsrates this point. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States tended wo exalsh no oid they work ogether 0 ceate la fac each superpower worked had inthe ery yeas of he Cold War to ‘in power at the expense ofthe other, while preventing the aber rom doing ews.” The jstem that emerged in Europe inthe aermath of Wor Wari yas the unplanned consequence of ntens security come ‘on hereon the spew. ‘Although that intense superpone lry ends along withthe Cold War 4 198, Ruse andthe United States have not worked together ocean ‘the present onder in Burope. The Ute States, for exampe, bas reece fou of hand vasous Russian proposals 10 make the Organization fr Secury and Cooperaon in Euope the cent owaniing pilaf uropcan secursy (eplacng the U'S-dominated NATO). Furthermoreusa as deeply opposed to NATO expan, which i vewed asa serous threat to Russian security. Recoprng that Rusa’ weakness would pre- ‘dude any realation, however the United States ignored Rusia’ ences ‘nd pushed NATO to ace the Crech Republic, Hungary. end Poland as new members. Rusa has so oppose US. poy in the Hallas over the est decade, especally NATO 1999 war apaint Yuga. Again the ‘Une Stats as paid te tension to Rasa’ concen an has taken este dems necessary t bring peace t that volatile repo. nly is won noting ha although Rusa is dead set gatos! allowing te United ‘Stats o deploy balls mii deers its highly ely that Washington il deploy sch syst tt jd oe chilly ese, For sure, great power aly wl sometines pode a sabe itera inal onder as happened dung the Cold War, Nevertheless. the gest powers wll coin loking for opportunites to incense Ue share of word power and a avorable station ass, they will move to under mine hat sable order Conse tow hard the United States worked dr ing the ate 198Ds 0 weaken the Soviet Unon and big down the be ‘onder tht had emerged in Europe dig the ater prof he Cold War ‘ot ouse the states hat stando lone per wil work to deter aggression id preserve the exiting der. Bu eel ves wl eels, revoli sound flance-a- power loge ot seme commitment to worl peace. Great powers cannot commit themselves 0 the pursuit of 3 peat formula for bolstering peace. Cerin ternational relations schols have never reached cnseasos on what the Blueprint shoul ook ke tn fc, seems thee ae abot as many tore nthe cases war and peace asthe ae scholars staying the sje. But more important, ol ‘yates are unable wo agree of how to create a able wo For exan- eat the Pars Peace Conference ater World War. inportntdilerences over how 1 ete sbi Europe vied Georges Clemence, David Loyd George. and Woodrow Wison" In parc, Clemenceau wis etermined 1 impose harsher terms on Germany over the Rhineland than was ther Lloyd George or Wik, while Hoyd George stood out as the harstiner on Gennan reparations. The Tey of Veriley. not sur rising dle to promote Europea stability, Anarchy and the Strate for Power 51 -urhermore, conser Ameren thinking on how to acicve tb in Eurpe inthe eal days of the Cold WE” The key slements fora st ean drabe sytem were in place by the eaey 1950s, Tey ince the dson of Germany, the postoning of American ground forces i Wester Europe to deter a Soviet tak and ensuring that West Germany would not seek to develop nuclear weapons. Officials in the Truman Achninraon, however, dlayreed about whether 2 dvided Germany woul bea source of pee or war For example, Goong Kennan and Fool Nie, who helt ponant postions ia he Slate Deparment, believed that a divided Genmany woul! be a source of Sosy, where Secretary of State Dean Acheson disagreed with them. Un the 19505, ment to dlend Presiden senhower sought end Wester Europe and to provide Wes Germany wih is own maces eterent. This poly, which was never fly adopted, nevertheless caused etn cries of signa insabity im Eorpe, a ed ely 1 0 1958-59 and 196151 Second, great powers cant put ae power conidratons and work tw promote Intemational peace caw Hey cate sure tha the tlre wil succeed, thelr atm als they are key 10 pay 2 steep ie foc having neice the bance of power beans an aggresor ‘ype athe door there wil be no answer when hey sal 911. Tha sa ik few states are willing to un. Metlore. prudence dates that they have according to rast gi This line of reasoning acount for Why collective sect heres, which cl fe atest pt apie narow eo ‘erm about the bln of pone and stead atin acodance with the Iroader interes ofthe international cman, ivaiably die arbi re might conctude tom the precedg dcusson that my theory docs no allow fr any cooperation among the reat powers. But ths ‘mcuson would be wong Ste can cooperate although cooperation sometimes dic wo achieve and aways ict o suai, Two ttre Inti cooperation: considerations about relative gains and cance abouening” Ultimately, great powers ve ima fundamentally competitive ‘woad where they vew each other a ec least potent enemies snd they therefore ook o gain pomer at cach thers expense sins wil be asribued bermeen them. They ca think about he dvson in terms of ether absolute or relive gains (recall the dstintion made cater Bereen pursuing ether absolute power or relative poe, the ‘concep here isthe sme) With absolute gain. each side i ccerned wih maximizing Is own pois and cares ile about how much the ter sid gains Hoses in the dea. Each de cates abou the heron 1o the extent that the ther sides behavior alles owen prospect or ‘etseving maximum profits. With selaive gins. onthe ober hand ech side considers nt only ts owe nvidia, ut aio how wel it fares compared othe the se, Because great powers care deeply abou the balance of power, their ‘inking focuses on relive gains when they consider cooperating with ter sates. Fr sure, each se tre omnes bole gins stil itis more important for 2 sate to make sure that t dacs n0 worse and Deehps bee. than the eer state any agrerent. Cooperation is moe dic to achieve, however, when ise ae attuned to relative ‘uns rather than absolute guna This is because tates concermed about solute gins have o make sre hat he pe expanding. hey ae ge tg ates some portion ofthe Ices, whereas sates hat wory about relative gains most pay ctl attention 9 ow the pi vied which complicates cooperative eos CConcems stout chesing ako hinder cooperation, Great powers are ‘en reluctant ene no cooperative agreements for et tha the eer sige wil cheat on the aprernent and san 8 signi advantage, Ths ‘once especialy aut inthe mia ea, casing a “spec pl of efecto,” because the nature of ailiaey weaponry allows fo api sis in he balance of power Such a development cou create a window of opportunity fr she sate that cheats oni a deve defeat on ts ii These bares to cooperation notwithstanding srs powers do cope tm realist worl. Balance power lg often causes great powers 40 “Anarchy an te Seu for form allances and cooperate against common enemies. The United Kingdom, France, and Russ, for exami, weve ales aglnst Geemany ‘before and daring Work War, Sales somctimes cooperate guns up on td stato Germany and the Soviet Union agains oan 939° More recently. Serbia 2nd Croatia agreed wo conquer and divide Bosnia ecen them, although the Unie States and is Buropean allies preven sie ram exeiting er agrerent Rialsas wel sales cooperate ‘Mera, deals canbe stuck tat roughly rele the dstibuion of ower and sas eonems stout chet The varlous anne control agreements ‘qed by the superpowers ding the Cold War israte hs ois. "The hom line, however, that noperation lakes place Ina world thats competitive ats core—one where aes have pomertl incentives to ake advanage of other sates This point graphically highiphed by the sate of European politics n he forty yar beloe World Wa L.The ext power cooperated fequent during this perio, but that did not ‘op the ftom going 1 War on Avgust 1, 19142" The United States and the Soviet Union alo cooperated considerably during Wold War I but that cooperation di aot prevent the outbreak of the Cold Wee shoaty slter Germany and Span were deleted. Perhaps most amazingly. there {vas sgn economic and lary cooperation between Nazi Germany fant the Soviet Union during the two years before the. Wehrmacht tiacked the Rod Army." No amount of cooperation can eliminate the ‘ominating lope of securty competion, Genuine peace or 2 word In which ates do no compete foe power. not Ikely 25 longa the state system zemains anarchic ST ee ore Tet ptr nce pve ee cotana ucica cine ad oc rp" 90 aa epee cae i recht bee eae ft il este he, a aa a he‘ipl moive behing reat power behavior survival. In anarchy, however ‘he dese to survive encourages states to behave gars No doe my ‘theory casily sates at more orks aggresive om the bat of there omic or plial systems. Offensive zeatsen makes only 3 handel of sumptions abou ret powers and these asumions apply equally £0 reat power. Except for difeences in how much power each at on trols the theory wets al sates lt 1 have now laid ou the loge explaining why sates Sek to gun as much power a posse over ther vals hae sid ite, Bower sbout the objeto that pusul: power sel The next to chaper provide a euiled cussion ofthis important subject