Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Interpretation of the Constitution (Self Executing)

Title: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
G.R No: 122156

FACTS:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos is invoked by petitioner in its bid to
acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the
historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they
ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered
by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, GSIS
decided to sell through public bidding 30% - 50% of the issued and outstanding shares
of the respondent. Only 2 bidders participated, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bided for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition at the Supreme Court asking it to compel GSIS to
allow it to match the bid of the Malaysian Firm. The petitioner invoked Sec.10, second
paragraph, Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution stipulating the Filipino First Policy. It also
has identified the Manila Prince Hotel to be considered as a national patrimony.

ISSUES:
1. Is Sec. 10, second paragraph, Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution self-
executing?
2. Grating the provision is self executing, does Manila Prince Hotel fall under
the term national patrimony?
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement
the said provision?
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over a foreign corporation, in the sale of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation .

RULINGS:

Yes, Sec. 10, second paragraph, Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is self executing
and does not need an implementing legislation to take effect

A provision which lays down a general principle, such those found in Art.II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self executing. But provisions which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self executing.

Quite apparently, Sec 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such way as not
to make it appear that it is non self executing but simply for the purpose of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the constitution. Minor details maybe left to the legislature without impairing
the self executing nature of the constitutional provision.
 Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second
par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress
is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic,
the second paragraph can only be self executing as it does not by its language
require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self executing in one part and non
self executing in another.

Topic: Interpretation of the Constitution

Title: Oposa VS Factoran
Reference: 224 SCRA 792

Facts:

The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the
respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement
(TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in
the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest.
They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn
to a balanced and healthful ecology. the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such
as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table
as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may
be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance
and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction
of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led
to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Issues:
1. Whether the petitioners have legal standing (Locus standi)?
Ruling:

Legal Standing or Locus standi is the right of the litigant to be heard.

Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.
This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for all citizens of
the Philippines.

Topic: Interpretation of the Constitution

Title: Kilos Bayan VS Morato
Reference: GR: 118910

Facts:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35, 000 per terminal annually). 30% of
the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO
may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to
declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention:
1. ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.
2. It is still violative of PCSOs charter.
3. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding.
4. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution
5. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case.

Respondents reply:
1. ELA is different from the Contract of Lease
2. There is no bidding required
3. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO
4. PCSO does not have funds
5. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade
6. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

Issue:

1. Does the petitioner have legal standing (Locus standi)?

Rulings:

The petitioners have no legal standing.

(a) STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of
the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because
no constitutional issues were actually involved.
(b) LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the
same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling
cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same
but the cases are not.
(c) RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question
in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But
the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical
with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is
free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters
at issue.
(d) Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
determination of the petitioners standing.
(e) STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are
REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.
Standing: maybe brought by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who sue in public
interest- Whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy xxx - Valmonte v. PCSO: 1) direct and personal interest; 2) has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustained some direct injury and 3) has bee or is
about to be denied some right or privilege. -In the case at bar, there is no showing of
particularized interest or an allegation of public funds being misspent to make the action
of public interest.

Real party in interest: Whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit -Petitioners invoke Sec. 5, 7 and
12 of the Constitution. But they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but guidelines for legislation. They cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
(f) QUESTION of CONTRACT LAW: The real parties are those who are parties to
the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiary or are prejudiced in their
rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which
would positively result to them from the contract xxx.
(g) Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the
nature or validity of public contracts maybe made before COA or before the
Ombudsman.2. WON ELA is valid? (YES)(a) Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a
matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined to review.

(b) In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement.
Petitioner states that this would allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery
system. The Court held that the claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction of
statutes, the presumption is that in making contracts, the government has acted in good
faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power.
(c) It is also claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement. The Court held that is
also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of technology
would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association with the PGMC.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. Petition for prohibition,
review and/or injunction is dismissed.

Topic: Interpretation of the Constitution

Title: Francisco VS House Speaker
Reference: GR: 160261

Facts:
Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality
of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment
provided for by law.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question
has resulted in a political crisis.

Rulings:
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods
of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among
the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There
exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence
and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.
Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all
the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings,"
this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a
misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of redden do singula singulis
by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on
the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar
rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's
moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is
most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court
which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The
Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But
just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station
in life.
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Topic: Political Question, Interpretation of the Constitution

Title: Santiago VS Guingona
Reference: GR: 134577

Facts:
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court,
seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate
and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents
and the solicitor general to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from notice. On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor
general submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the
Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on
September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition
and deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on
September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a
filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. However, for special and important reasons
or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has
allowed exceptions to this doctrine. In fact, original petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the
Senate President and the Speaker of the Househave been recognized as exceptions to
this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer,
convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the
time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows:

10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)

7 members - Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of

the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)

1 member - Liberal Party (LP)

1 member - Aksyon Demokrasya

1 member - Peoples Reform Party (PRP)

1 member - Gabay Bayan

2 members - Independent

----------

23 - total number of senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as
independent.)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F.
Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco
S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor
Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President
of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who voted for Sen. Fernan were the Majority
while those who voted for him was the Minority.
 During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party --
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day,
the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering
privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed
to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a
letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President
formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution?

Rulings:
1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction over the petition
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has
jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper
House. The term majority, when referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does
not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

2. No
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President
and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art.
VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by the Court.
Topic: Political Question
Title: Bondoc VS Pineda
Reference: 201 SCRA 792

Facts:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio
Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth
District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members,
3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of
Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).
Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura

received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly
helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting
LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.

Issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein?

Rulings:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating theElectoral Commission
was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence
even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to
party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member
of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of
the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the
Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short
of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

Topic: Separation of powers

Title: Angara VS Commission on Elections
Reference: 63 Phils. 136

Facts:
In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo
and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly in the first district of Tayabas. The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for
the said district for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in
office. A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner. The
petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the
Electoral Commission.

Issues:
1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the issue?
2. Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein
petitioner.

Rulings:
The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that
its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments
of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than
the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a
certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments.
The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. This power of
has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that The Electoral Commission
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly. In view of the deliberations of the framers of
the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Ynsua. The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission is hereby denied.
Topic: Separation of Powers
Title: Gonzales VS Office of the President
Reference: GR: 196231

Facts:

A criminal and administrative case was filed against P/S Ins. Roalndo Mendoza before
the office of the Ombudsmand. Herein petitioner Emelio Gonzales III acting as deputy
Ombudsman required the PNP/NCR to turn over the relevant documents and evidence.
Meanwhile while the case was pending. Herein P/S Mendoza was suspended from
work. The case was not decided in due time which prompted Mendoza to take the law
into his own hands. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the
tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the
death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of
government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC),13 chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by
Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive
sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate
in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent constitutional body. The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to
petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the President (OP) for further
determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper
administrative proceedings. Petitioner Gonzales alleged, however, that on February 4,
2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced his suspension for one year due to
his delay in the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration. Hence,
believing that the OP had already prejudged his case and that any proceeding before it
would simply be a charade, petitioner no longer attended the scheduled clarificatory
conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to Proceedings22 on February 7, 2011.
Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with the proceedings
and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision. , petitioners asseverate that
the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the
Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that
they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the
constitutional attributes of said office.

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor
who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman?

Rulings:
Yes the Office of the President has the disciplinary power over the Deputy
Ombudsman. 6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. While the
Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those
officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely
and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section
21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus: Section 8. Removal; Filling of
Vacancy.-(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the
President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after
due process. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute,
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A
construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.33 Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in
truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts,
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment

Topic: Separation of Powers

Title: Vera VS Avelino
Reference: 77 Phils. 192

Facts:
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the
Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason
of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Tarlac, the voting of the said region did not
reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved
referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero,
who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest
number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commission on Elections shall not be sworn,
nor seated, as a member of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed
against their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who
instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their
seats and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the
pendatum resolution.

Issue:
1. Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine
whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of
powers, holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to
suspension of the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such
suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the
Philippine Senate, this petition should be denied.
As was explained in the Alejandro Vs Quezon case, we could not order one branch of
the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would establish judicial
predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances woven into our
institutional set up.