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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997) 1
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and a
Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the declaration of the winning
bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by the
Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to accept. The petitioner
posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm
invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls under
the term national patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, WON
selling mere 51% shares and not the land itself can be considered part of
national patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is self-
executing which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The Constitution mandates
that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the
foreign firm, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the shares of MHC in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of
petitioner and execute the necessary clearances for the purchase of the
subject 51% MHC shares.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law
of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Tanada vs. Angara (G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997)2
FACTS:
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97
which resolved that the Senate concur, in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
The instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating
the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
1 ISSUE/S:
A. Fundamental Principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of Rights
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preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is a justiciable controversy?
2. WON the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene with Sec.19,Art. 2
and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. 12 of the Philippine Constitution?
3. WON the provisions of WTO Unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of
judicial and legislative power by the court and congress respectively?
4. WON there is grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
1. Yes. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that
it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The court however is limited “to
determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in
ratifying the WTO Agreement and shall not inquire upon the wisdom of the
President and Senate in ratifying the same.
2. No. The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
Furthermore, Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other
Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy –
“While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not
prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.”
3. No. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness
of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of
their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from
a convention or pact.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of the
oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith.
4. No. Grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to
show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. 
Wherefore, Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Domino vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999) 3
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that
he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1)
year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.   On 6 May 1998,
the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for
lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the
list of voters declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and
not of Quezon City acquire the nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least
one year immediately preceding the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present
petition of DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be
proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light of DOMINO’s
disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of
Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to
declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to
determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that
the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is
registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the
decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is
essential that there must be between the first and the second action identity
of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action.   winning, no matter how slim. It would be then a senseless sacrifice on the
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the
same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. 
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not
be deemed lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a
change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of
obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically
vest the position in the winning candidate.  41 A candidate must be proclaimed
and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a
member of the House of Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has not
been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of
the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of
Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal
which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may
not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.  It
would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority
or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative
of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him. 
Pamatong vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004) 4
FACTS:
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner seeks to
reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right
to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
WON the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for
public office" grants a constitutional right to run for or hold public office
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RULING:
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. Also, the "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not
self-executing.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office
may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions 9 of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and outlined instances wherein the
COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
the equal access clause is not violated.
Reasoning: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the
case of candidates for national positions because the election process
becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the
Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots.
These would entail additional costs to the government
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if
they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of
part of the State.
Yrasuegui vs. PAL (G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008) 5
FACTS:
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency"
extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately." 11
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under the Labor
Code.
2. WON the dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational disqualification defense.
3. WON the petitioner can invoke the equal protection clause guaranty
RULING:
1. Yes. It would fall under Article 282€ of the Labor Code. A reading of the
weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.
Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to
comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
2. Yes. Though generally, employment in particular jobs may not be limited
to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin. However, if the
employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job, the qualification is then considered valid
and referred to as bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
Applying the “Meiorin Test” in determining whether an employment policy is
justified, the following must concur: (1) the employer must show that it
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance
of the job;  (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
64
necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to
accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. The most important activity of
the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of
the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of
the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have
the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to
passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand
grueling flight schedules among other reasons.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
3. No. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Private actions, no
matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.91
People vs. Siton6
FACTS:
In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, lucidly shows that
there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants
and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the respondents (among other
women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male
customer. Hence, respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano
were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal.
In turn, the respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that
Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague.
2. WON Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the
Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus
permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
RULING:
1 No. The trial court in its assailed ruling relied on the underlying principles in
Papachristou vs. City of Jacksonville case:
First, that the assailed ordinance fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by a statute and;
Second, it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of
discriminatory law enforcement.
However, the aforementioned principles do not apply in the case at bar since:
The first principle finds no application here because under our legal system,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith and;
Second, the fear exhibited by the respondents, that unfettered discretion is
placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is assuaged by
the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than
certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. The requirement of
probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority
that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons
found to be violating Article 202 (2).   opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
Furthermore, it may be note worthy that the Jacksonville ordinance was
declared unconstitutional for provisions that are not found in the questioned
Vagrancy law in the case at bar.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is
legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to
maintain social order as an aspect of police power.  The legislature however,
must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to
prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and
know what acts it is his duty to avoid.  This requirement has come to be
known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that “a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”
2. No. Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither
does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed.  Offenders of
public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to
endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community.  Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act
indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
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Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally
offensive.  It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting
themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual,
under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being
of members of the community.
DLSU vs. CA7
FACTS:
The private respondents were involved in mauling incidents that were a result
of a fraternity war. On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board
issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the
supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON private respondents accorded due process of law?
RULING:
1. Yes. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating
school discipline, "[t]here are minimum standards which must be met before
to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case.
In the case at bar, the Private respondents were duly informed in writing of
the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board. They
were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in
fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the
evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce
evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered
all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its
resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to
due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard"
does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may
also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
Romualdez vs. Comelec8
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos and Erlinda Romualdez registered as new
voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, in spite of the fact that they were
and still are, registered voters of Quezon City. That being the case, they are
guilty of an election offense due to double registration under R.A. 8189,
otherwise known as the Voter’s Registation Act of 1996.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the petitioners are accorded due process of law
2. WON 45(j) of the Voter’s registration Act can be declared vague on the
ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
1. Yes. The petitioners are accorded due process of law.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by
private respondent (Section 261(y)(2) and (y)(5) of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 12 of the Voter’s Registration Act) are entirely different
from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the
COMELEC(.Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voter’s
Registration Act). The petitioners’ contentions are untenable.
The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is
couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support
the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189;
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that
the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely
different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as
charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and
the Informations filed before the RTC. Evidently, the informations directed to
be filed by the Comelec against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with
the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
2. No. Section 45(j) of R.A. No. 8189 cannot be facially invalidated as it is a
criminal statute.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a
criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. “On-its-
face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate as such invalidation
would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and
controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
having no factual concreteness.
Garcillano vs. Committees9
FACTS:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-
ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. On
October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one
of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its
hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not
only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the investigation.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. However, with
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, no effort was undertaken
for the publication of these rules.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of any amendment to the rules dispenses the
requirement of due publication of the rules of procedure in a legislative
inquiry.
RULING:
No. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
clear derogation of the constitutional requirement under Section 21, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of
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the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or
its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction
whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom,
practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Furthermore, the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
The law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Placido vs. NLRC10
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case aver that they were denied due process when PLDT
refused to furnish them a copy of the Investigation Report and grant them a
formal hearing in which they could be represented by counsel of their choice.
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard,
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements
of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioners were, among other things, given several
written invitations to submit themselves to PLDT’s Investigation Unit to
explain their side, but they failed to heed them. A hearing, which petitioners
attended along with their union MKP representatives, was conducted on June
25, 2001 during which the principal witnesses to the incident were presented.
Petitioners were thus afforded the opportunity to confront those witnesses
and present evidence in their behalf, but they failed to do so.
Mendoza vs. Comelec11
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of Governor of the
Province of Bulacan. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and
assumed the office of Governor, while the respondent seasonably filed an
election protest with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC approved the parties’ formal offer of evidence and then
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties
complied with the COMELEC’s order. The case was thereafter submitted for
resolution.
On March 2, 2009 the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes,
including those involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET).
ISSUE:
Whether there were proceedings within the SET premises, entitling the
petitioner to notice and participation, which were denied to him; in other
words, the issue is whether the petitioner’s right to due process has been
violated.
RULING:
No. The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as
an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. These are now commonly
referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings to wit;
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. xxx
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party
at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due
process, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay
requirements are applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set
forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision-making.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the
decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and
decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the
facts and the law upon which it is based.
After consideration of the respondents’ Comments and the petitioner’s
petition and Reply, we hold that the contested proceedings at the SET
("contested proceedings) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the
election contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation of
the parties
What took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC,
as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented
and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits.
To conclude, the COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party
of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the
provincial election contest.
Surigao Electric vs. ERC12
FACTS:
On March 19, 2007, the ERC issued its assailed Order, mandating that the
discounts earned by SURNECO from its power supplier should be deducted
from the computation of the power cost upon ascertaining that the Purchased
Power Adjustment (PPA) of SURNECO resulted to an over-recovery
amounting to PhP18,188,794.
ISSUE:
WON SURNECO was deprived of the opportunity to be heard in ordering it to
refund alleged over-recoveries arrived at by the ERC.
12
C. Due Process in General
5
TAU MU
RULING:
In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies,
which only ensured that the PPA mechanism remains a purely cost-recovery
mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric
cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve
the rates imposed by the electric cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC
simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in those
rates.
It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of police power, can regulate
the rates imposed by a public utility such as SURNECO.—
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the
police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and
regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property
is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to
be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to
promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by
the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is
continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
We likewise differ from SURNECO’s stance that it was denied due process
when the ERC issued its questioned Orders. Administrative due process
simply requires an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It means being given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment, and for this purpose, a formal trial-
type hearing is not even essential. It is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable chance to demonstrate their respective positions and to
present evidence in support thereof.
Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the electric
cooperatives’ monthly documentary submissions to substantiate their PPA
charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for other required
supporting documents and were allowed to submit them accordingly. In fact,
hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC conducted exit conferences
with the electric cooperatives’ representatives, SURNECO included, to
discuss preliminary figures and to double-check these figures for
inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition, after the issuance of the ERC
Orders, the electric cooperatives were allowed to file their respective motions
for reconsideration. It cannot claimed, therefore, that SURNECO was denied
due process.
Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism13
FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People
from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON petitioners possess locus standi
2. WON there is an actual case or controversy
3. WON RA9372 Regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its
validity
RULING:
It must be noted that in constitutional limitations, the power of judicial review
is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are
the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
1. Petitioners lack locus standi
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must
show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action.
Petitioners in this case have not presented any personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
13
C. Due Process in General
 6
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
TAU MU

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
"communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
While jurisprudence holds that transcendental public importance dispenses
with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, this does not apply in cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation.
2. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy.
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand"
in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some
form of expression protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech.
Hence petitions are dismissed.

Herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA

9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.
Lejano vs. People14
No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing
one.
FACTS:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is; only statutes on free speech,
Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused of the charges against them on the
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge.
Complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked
the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which
due process of law; as it seriously misappreciated the facts; and decided the
is overbroad because of possible"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
Section 21, Article III, that:
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
with narrow specificity."
same offense. x x x
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the
infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation
Vagueness vs. Overbreadth:
would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and
the will to fight.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
A motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible but only for
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
exceptional and narrow grounds such as when the court that absolved the
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
a mistrial has occurred.
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
ISSUE:
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine,
WON the complainant was able to specify the violations of due process or
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
committed.
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the
RULING:
vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals
No. Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court’s
will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain
appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses’
from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.
credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a
credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence
Facial Challenge vs. As-applied Challenge:
of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review
the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
al is final and can no longer be disturbed.
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G.
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
Vizconde’s motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.

3. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila15
permit a facial analysis of its validity
FACTS:
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the
RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and 14
C. Due Process in General
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is 15
D. Due Process and Police Power

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
Petitioners herein are operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila which
are directly affected by the said ordinance.
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the petitioners’ has legal standing
2. WON the petitioners have the requisite standing to plead for protection of
their patrons' equal protection rights.
3. WON the ordinance is unconstitutional
RULING:
1. Yes. Petitioners in this case are owners of establishments offering "wash-
up" rates and their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the
Ordinance. Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to
the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged
to support party's participation in the case.
2. Yes. The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial
system derived directly from the Constitution. In this jurisdiction, the extancy
of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause for a
petitioner's standing. Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of
several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third
party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance.
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an
exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v.
Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the
right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three
important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-
fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of
the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party;
and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his
or her own interests."Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the
petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage
of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened
by the enforcement of the Ordinance.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their
patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth
doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally
applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth
doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance
makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can
see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth. It is thus recognized that the petitioners have a right to assert
the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a
"wash-rate" time frame.
3. Yes. The said ordinance is unconstitutional.
3a. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. For an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day.
3b. The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due
process. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as
imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural
due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process
refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property However, if due process were confined
solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
7
TAU MU
government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive
due process then completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
3c. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due
process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4
test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products, to
wit;
First, the rational basis examination - laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Second, the intermediate review - governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
Third, applying strict scrutiny- the focus is on the presence of compelling,
rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that
the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is
the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant
the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet
as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as
well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers
were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Still, the Bill
of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day
without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence – that
accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people.
3d. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-
scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior
among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
protected will be curtailed as well. We cannot discount other legitimate
activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a
day. E.g. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or
hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes.
3e. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a
police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
Based on the foregoing facts, Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Office of the Solicitor vs. City of Manila16
FACTS:
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate
shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila.  The shopping malls
16
D. Due Process and Police Power
 8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
TAU MU

operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid
motor vehicles, they collect parking fees from the persons making use of exercise of POLICE POWER to protect the depositors, creditors,
their parking facilities, regardless of whether said persons are mall patrons or stockholders, and the general public.
not.
 
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and
ROXAS & CO vs DAMBA-NFSW18
Human Rights conducted a joint investigation on which the following purpose
is included: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of shopping
FACTS:
malls of charging parking fees. The Committees found that the collection of
Petitioner voluntarily offered to sell its Hacienda Palico to DAR pursuant to
parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code and
CARL. Subsequently, it withdraw its offer believing said hacienda was already
is therefor [sic] illegal.  
converted as non-agricultural land, not covered by CARL, under PP1520
 
declaring the municipalities of maragondon and ternate in cavite province and
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information enjoining respondent
the municipality of nasugbu as a TOURIST ZONE and for OTHER
SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to
PURPOSES.
impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree
No. 1096.
HELD:
Hacienda Palico was not automatically converted as non-agricultural land.
ISSUE:
Under the whereas clause of PP 1520, it merely recognizes the potential
Whether or not compelling the respondent to provide parking spaces in their
tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone
malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general, free of charge
clearly does not allocated reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of
constitutes:
the zone for non-agricultural purposes.
1. A lawful exercise of police power or
CARL is both an exercise of police power and eminent domain. It prescribes
2. It is an unlawful taking of property without just Compensation?
retention limits for landowners and it provides for the compulsory acquisition
 
of private agricultural lands. Objective: the expropriation b4 us affects all
RULING:
private agricultural lands whenever found and for whatever kind as long as
1. The Court finds that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting
they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This
parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State
kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
would be acting beyond the bounds of police power. 
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino
 
nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
land-glutted owner.
regulating the use of liberty and property.  It is usually exerted in order to
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner.  The
power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit.  A fortiori,
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.  Police power CHEVRON vs BCDA19
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to ISSUE/S:
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the 1. Is the royalty charged by the BOD of the CDC(Clark Development
general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, Dorporation) a tax imposition or a regulation –police power?
such as opium and firearms. 2. Is royalty fee per liter unreasonable and grossly in excess of regulation
  costs?
2. Yes. Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking
facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of HELD:
parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties.  The State is not
1. Regulation-police power. The purpose is the determining factor. If it is
only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for
primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the
use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access
measure results in some form of regulation. If it is primarily to regulate,
to said parking spaces for free.  Such is already an excessive intrusion into
then it is deemed a regulation-police power, even though incidentally,
the property rights of respondents.  Not only are they being deprived of the
revenue is generated. In the case, from the declaration of policy, it can
right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further
be gleaned that the policy is issued, first and foremost, to ensure the
prohibited from profiting from its use  or even just recovering therefrom the
safety, security and good condition of the petroleum fuel industry within
expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking
the CSEZ.
facilities. 
2. No. Fuel is highly combustible which, if left unchecked, poses a serious
threat to the life and property. The reasonable relation between the fee
BSP vs ANTONIO-VALENZUELA17 imposed on a per liter basis and the regulation sought to be obtained is
that the higher the volume of fuel entering the said economic zone, the
ISSUE/S: greater the extent and the frequency of supervision and inspection
(1) Are banks entitled copies of ROE (report on examination) or audit required to ensure safety, security, and order within the zone.
findings?
(2) Is failure to furnished copy/copies of ROE to a bank is a violation of due
process?
ESPINA vs ZAMORA20
HELD:
ISSUE:
1. No. There is no provision in the law, nor sections in the procedures of
the BSP that shows that the BSP is required to give the (audited)banks 18
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
the copies of ROEs. POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due Process
and Police Power
2. No. Under the law, the sanction of closure could be imposed upon a 19
bank by the BSP even without notice and hearing. This “close now, and I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
hear later” scheme is grounded on the practical and legal considerations POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due Process
and Police Power
17 20
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due Process POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due Process
and Police Power and Police Power

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
Is RA 8762(Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2002) which allow foreign
nationals from engaging in the retail trade business under 4 categories,
unconstitutional(not a valid exercise of police power), because it runs afoul of
several provisions in the constitution(denial of Filipinos right to property and
due process)?
HELD:
No. The control and regulation of the trade in the interest of the public welfare
is of course an exercise of the police power of the state. RA 8762, merely
lessens the restriction or restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to
engage in an ordinary lawful business.
Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
In summary
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the 4
categories;
Second, only nationals from, or judicial entities formed or incorporated in
countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage
in ratial trade business; and
Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain
retailing activities outside their accredited stores thorugh the use of mobile or
rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling,
restaurants and sari2 stores and such other similar retailing activities.
SOLGEN VS AYALA21
FACTS:
The respondents, Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and
operate shopping malls while SM Prime constructs and leases building
structures.
The shopping malls that respondents operate have parking facilities in which
they collect parking fees from the persons making use of their facilities.
In May 2000, a joint investigation conducted by the Senate Committees on
Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights issued Senate
Committee Report No. 225 in which they find that the collection of parking
fees by herein respondents are contrary to the National Building Code. The
Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without specifying
whether it is free or not.
On 4 October 2000, the OSG, herein petitioner, filed a petition to the RTC of
Makati praying that the practice of respondents in charging parking fees is
violative of the National Building Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. Upon appeal, CA denied the
petition and likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of OSG is a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
HELD:
No. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking
facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of
parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only
requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use
as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to
21
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process
and Eminent Domain
9
TAU MU
said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the
property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to
use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from
its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance
and operation of the required parking facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of
parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the
same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition
amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of just
compensation.
ORTEGA VS CITY OF CEBU22
FACTS:
The spouses Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel of land. On May
23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted City
Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate ½
portion of such land, and appropriating for that purpose the amount of
P3,284,400.00. The amount will be charged against Account No. 8-93-310,
Continuing Appropriation, Account No. 101-8918-334.
Pursuant to said ordinance, Cebu City filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
before the RTC against the Spouses Ortega. RTC then declared that [Cebu
City] "has the lawful right to take the property subject of the instant case, for
public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just
compensation."
Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners, RTC issued
another order, ordering Cebu City to pay the spouses the sum of
P31,416,000.00 as just compensation for the expropriated land.
RTC’s decision became final and executory after Cebu City failed to perfect
an appeal on time. RTC then issued another order stating that Ordinance No.
1519 appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment of the subject lot is
chargeable to Account No. 101-8918-334 and is now subject for execution or
garnishment for it is no longer exempted from execution.
Cebu City filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of
Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case, contending that the price set by the
RTC as just compensation to be paid to the Spouses is way beyond the reach
of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. The motion
was denied by the RTC. Cebu City’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied.
By virtue of the said order, a Notice of Garnishment was served to Philippine
Postal Bank.
Cebu City then filed before the RTC a Motion to Dissolve, Quash or Recall
the Writ of Garnishment, contending that the account mentioned in Ordinance
No. 1519 is not an existing bank account and the garnishment of Cebu City’s
bank account with Philippine Postal Bank is illegal, because government
funds and properties may not be seized under writ of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgement, on obvious reason of public policy.
RTC denied the said motion and likewise denied its Motion for
Reconsideration.
On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to
Modify Judgement and to be allowed to withdraw from the Expropriation
Proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s denial of Cebu City’s
Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the
Expropriation Proceedings.
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2. Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank,
appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be LBP VS RUFINO23
subject to garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot covered by City
Ordinance No. 1519. FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners in equal share of a parcel of land.
HELD:
1. No. Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on Expropriation speaks of 2
By respondents’ claim, in 1989, they voluntarily offered the aforesaid property
stages:
to the government for CARP coverage at P120,000 per hectare. Acting
a. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
thereon, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a Notice of
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
Land Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21, 1996 declaring that out of
facts involved in the suit.
the total area indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares was subject to
b. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
immediate acquisition at a valuation of P8,736,270.40 based on the
property sought to be taken.
assessment of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

An order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation. Respondents having found the valuation unacceptable, the matter was
Its end then paves the way for the second stage—the determination of just referred by the provincial agrarian reform officer of Sorsogon to the DAR
compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order of expropriation puts an Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the conduct of summary administrative
end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn the proceedings to determine just compensation. DARAB then sustained LBP’s
respondents’ properties. Because an order of expropriation merely valuation upon respondents’ failure to present any evidence to warrant
determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the increase.
propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the payment of just
compensation. After all, there would be no point in determining just
On February 23, 1998, respondents lodged with Sorsogon RTC a complaint
compensation if, in the first place, the plaintiff’s right to expropriate the
for determination of just compensation. Respondents contended that LBP’s
property was not first clearly established.
valuation was not full and fair equivalent of the property at the time of its
taking.
Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the trial court fixing
just compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation. As applied to
LBP countered that the property was acquired by the DAR for CARP
the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment,
coverage in 1993 by compulsory acquisition and not by respondents’
much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage
voluntary offer to sell; and that it determined the valuation thereof in
of the expropriation proceedings.
accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1998 and pertinent DAR regulations.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the determination of just compensation
is a judicial prerogative. 7 In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, we
The trial court appointed the parties’ respective nominated commissioners to
declared:
appraise the property.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a

judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that
its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can
the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed
compensation.
Likewise, in the recent cases of National Power Corporation v. dela Cruz and
Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, we
emphasized the primacy of judicial prerogative in the ascertainment of just
compensation as aided by the appointed commissioners, to wit:
Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While
it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial
court may substitute its own estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid
reasons; that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to
the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly
inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a
substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason
at all.”
2. No. The proper remedy of [the Spouses Ortega] is to file a mandamus case
against Cebu City in order to compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact
an appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of the Spouses Ortega’s claim.
It is a settled rule that government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on
obvious consideration of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
Commissioner Jesus S. Empleo, LBP’s nominee, appraised the property
based on, among other things, the applicable DAR issuances, average gross
production, and prevailing selling prices of the crops planted thereon which
included coconut, abaca, coffee, and rice. He arrived at a valuation
of P13,449,579.08.
Commissioner Amando Chua of Cuervo Appraisers, Inc., respondents’
nominee, used the market data approach which relies primarily on sales and
listings of comparable lots in the neighborhood. Excluding the secondary
crops planted thereon, he valued the property at P29,925,725.
The trial court then found the market data approach to be more realistic and
consistent with law and jurisprudence on the full and fair equivalent of the
property. RTC then denied LBP’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Upon appeal, CA sustained RTC’s decision.
LBP contends that its determination should be given weight since its valuation
of the property was based on the factors mentioned in RA 6657 and the
formula prescribed by DAR; and the taking of private property for agrarian
reform is not a traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain as it also
involves the exercise of police power, hence, part of the loss is not
compensable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the market data approach should govern in the valuation of
the property.
HELD:
No. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several
factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657. These factors have been
translated into a basic formula in [DAO 6-92], as amended by [DAO 11-94],
issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and
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purposes of R.A. 6657. While the determination of just compensation involves
the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be
discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded
R.A. 6657, as amended, and it’s implementing rules and regulations.
In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial court, adopting
the market data approach on which Commissioner Chua relied, merely put
premium on the location of the property and the crops planted thereon which
are not among the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. And the trial
court did not apply the formula provided in DAR AO 6-92, as amended. This
is a clear departure from the settled doctrine regarding the mandatory nature
of Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR issuances implementing it.
LBP VS JOCSON24
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners of two parcels of tenanted rice land
located at Negros Occidental. The property was placed under the coverage of
the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which valued the compensation
therefor in the total amount of P250,563.80 following the formula prescribed
in PD No. 27 and EO No. 228.
The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03 after computing the 6%
annual interest increment due on the property per DAR Administrative Order
No. 13, series of 1994.
Finding the DAR’s offer of compensation for the property to be grossly
inadequate, respondent filed a complaint before the RTC, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), praying that petitioner and DAR be ordered to compute
the just compensation for the property in accordance with the guidelines laid
down in Section 17 of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1998.
In their respective Answers, petitioner and the DAR claimed that the property
was acquired by the government under its OLT program and their valuation
thereof constituted just compensation, having been made pursuant to the
guidelines set by E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27.
The RTC, after noting the report of the Commissioners appointed, fixed the
just compensation at P2,564,403.58.
Petitioner filed a MR of the SAC decision which was denied.
Upon appeal, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD No. 27 and EO No. 228, as claimed by petitioner, or RA
No. 6657, as claimed by respondent, should govern in determining the value
of the property.
HELD:
RA No 6657 should govern in determining the value of the property. Citing the
case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs Chico, the Court declared in no
uncertain terms that RA No. 6657 is the relevant law in determining just
compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it
more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the
property at the time of payment.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases
involving lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where
payment of just compensation had not been completed. When in the interim
R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full payment of just compensation, as in
the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation control.
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The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function, and the Court does not find the SAC to have acted
capriciously or arbitrarily in setting the price at P93,657.00 per hectare as the
said amount does not appear to be grossly exorbitant or otherwise unjustified.
For the Court notes that the SAC properly took into account various factors
such as the nature of the land, when it is irrigated, the average harvests per
hectare (expressed as AGP based on three normal crop years) at 117.73
cavans per hectare, and the higher valuation applied by the DAR.
EUSEBIO VS LUIS25
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land which was taken
by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and was used as a municipal road.
On February 1, 1983, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed
Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of
land. However, the Appraisal Committee assessed the value of the land only
at P150/sqm. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents requested the
Appraisal Commiitte to consider P2,000/sqm as the value of their land.
Respondent’s counsel sent a letter to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount
of P5,000.00/sqm as just compensation for respondents property. In his reply,
Mayor Eusebio said that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the
amount set by the Appraisal Committee.
Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents’ filed a complaint before the RTC
praying that the property be returned to them with payment of reasonable
rental for 16 years of use, or in the event said property can no longer be
returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC and denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not property taken without the benefit of expropriation proceeding
required by law in the taking of private property for public use can be
regained.
HELD:
Citing the case of Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals, the Court
emphasized that where private property is taken by the Government for public
use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe. The Court went on to remind government
agencies not to exercise the power of eminent domain with wanton disregard
for property rights as Section 9, Article III of the Constitution provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  
In Forform Development Corporation vs Philippine National Railways, the
court declared that recovery of possession of the property by the landowner
can no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly,
of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue
its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not
necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to
the landowner is the right of compensation. It is settled that non-payment of
just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of their expropriated lot. Herein respondents also failed to
question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until
the early 1990s).
The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation is that
set forth in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled that even if there are no
expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial
court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in
Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the
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appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for
the subject property. The Court reiterated its ruling in National Power
Corporation v. Dela Cruz that trial with the aid of commissioners is a
substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason
at all. It was also emphasized therein that although ascertainment of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners findings may only
be disregarded or substituted with the trial courts own estimation of the
propertys value only if the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly
inadequate or excessive.  1. WON owners of parcels of land are indispensable parties to an
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is
settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of
possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings,
it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
In this case, the trial court should have fixed just compensation for the
property at its value as of the time of taking in 1980, but there is nothing on
record showing the value of the property at that time. The trial court,
therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the subject land on the
price paid for properties in the same location, taken by the city government
only sometime in the year 1994.
City of Iloilo vs. Contreras and Javellana (G.R. No. 168967)26
Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against private respondent
Elpidio T. Javellana and Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as
mortgagee which sought to expropriate two parcels of land registered in
Javellana’s name to be used as a school site for Lapaz High
School. Petitioner alleged that the Subject Property was declared for tax
purposes to have a value of P60.00 per square meter, or a total value
of P43,560.00. Javellana also claimed that the true fair market value of his
property was no less than P220.00 per square meter. Petitioner was able to
take physical possession of the properties sometime in the middle of 1985.
Private respondent thus demanded his just compensation as well as interest.
Private respondent alleged that since he had not been compensated for the
Subject Property, petitioner’s possession was illegal, and he was entitled to
recovery of possession of his lots. Private respondent could only demand for
the payment of just compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not just compensation should be based on the fair market value of
a property at the time of the filing of complaint.
Held:
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent
to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Just
compensation is to be determined “as of the date of filing of the complaint”.
The reckoning date should be in 2004 because of the clear injustice to the
private respondent who all these years has been deprived of the beneficial
use of his properties. City of Iloilo is held liable for damages for taking private
respondent’s property without payment of just compensation.
RP vs. MANGOTARA27
FACTS:
Dona Demetria owns two parcels of land and has titles to prove ownership.
83 years later authenticity of said ownership was still in doubt and the
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government filed a case of expropriation against occupants of the land (not
really the owners, just renters). The occupants questioned the expropriation
case contending that expropriation cases can only be filed against owners,
not mere occupants, of the land. The government also filed a case of
Reversion against Dona Demetria’s heirs contending two parcels of land were
fraudulently acquired. The owners of the land questioned the case for
Reversion contending that, since they filed a case for Reconstitution of Titles
in 1914 and they still have said titles at present, the government has no right
to the land. 
ISSUE/S:
expropriation proceeding? NO
2. WON the government erred in filing both a case for expropriation and a
case for Reversion against the occupants and the owners of the land?
NO
3. WON, in filing the case for Reversion, the government is barred by res
judicata and prescription? NO
HELD:
1. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of
the property condemned. They include all other persons, owning,
occupying or claiming to own the property. When property is taken by
eminent domain, the owner is not an indispensable party to the
proceeding.
2. The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both
expropriation/reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. Rule
67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows filing of expropriation even
when “the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be
the Republic, although occupied by private individuals.”
3. (a prior case filed by an heir asking for a Reconstitution of titles was
granted and said titles are still with said heir up to the time of the filing of
the case for Reversion. They have titles to “prove” ownership. However,
the 1914 case for Reconstitution of Title never delved into the issue of
“ownership”, only reconstitution of title and it turns out said two lands
were questionably acquired by Dona Demetria. Government, then, still
has the right to impugn ownership claimed by Demetria and her heirs)
Elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State.
The indefeasibility of a Title over land previously public is not a bar to an
investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been
acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine w/n fraud
had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate
action for reversion may be filed by the government.
Republic vs. Mendoza (G.R. No. 185091)28
Facts:
PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since
1957 for its school.  However some portions of the property were registered in
the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza. The Republic claimed
that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa,
the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as
evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. The Mendoza’s claim,
on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use the
property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it.
Issue:
Whether or not the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the
subject property that it had used for a public school.
Held:
The Mendozas’ remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not
ejectment. It may be assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer
ownership of the land to the government but never got around to do so and
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the Republic itself altogether forgot about it.  Consequently, the Republic
should be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas’ formal
transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation. Where the
owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for
public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal
expropriation proceeding covering such property. As to the time when just
compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action
for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling.
LBP vs. Livioco (G.R. No. 170685)29
Facts:
Livioco offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,
189,870.00.  The voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) form submitted to the DAR
indicated that the said property is adjacent to residential subdivisions and to
an international paper mill. LBP set the price at P3.21 per square meter.
Livioco’s request for a reevaluation of the compensation on the ground that its value
had already appreciated from the time it was first offered for sale was denied by the
reason that there was already a perfected sale.
Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation
against respondents maintaining that the location of his property has become
predominantly residential hence he should be paid his property’s value as
such.
Issue:
Whether or not the compensation for respondent’s property was
determined in accordance with law.
Held:
In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian reform), the
property’s character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential
uses. Respondent himself admitted that his property was agricultural at the time he
offered it for sale to DAR in 1988. The coverage of RA 6657 only extends to
agricultural lands; respondent’s property should be conclusively treated as
an agricultural land and valued as such. LBP’s valuation is not in accordance
with Section 17 of R.A. 6675. It is reminded to adhere strictly to the doctrine
that just compensation must be valued at the time of taking.  The “time of
taking” is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of
his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic. Valuation of
property must be based on the values prevalent in 1994 for agricultural lands.
APO Fruits Corp. vs. LBP (G.R. No. 164195) 30
Facts:
AFC and HPI received separate notices of land acquisition and valuation of
their properties from the DAR-PARO. HPI and AFC rejected the valuations of
DAR-PARO for being very low. DAR requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26, 409,549.86 in AFC’s bank account
and P45, 481,706.76 in HPI’s bank account, which amounts the petitioners
then withdrew. AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just
compensation with the DARAB which the latter failed to act upon thus forcing
AFC and HPI to file separate complaints for determination of just
compensation. The RTC fixed the just compensation for the petitioners’
1,338.6027 hectares of land at P1, 383,179,000.00, with interest on this
amount at the prevailing market interest rates, computed from the taking of
the properties on December 9, 1996 until fully paid, minus the amounts the
petitioners already received under the initial valuation.
Issue:
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Whether or not just compensation was given to AFC and HPI.
Held:
The 5% initial payments made by the LBP when the petitioners’ landholdings
were taken, although promptly withdrawn by the petitioners, could not by any
means be considered a fair exchange of values at the time of taking; in fact,
the LBP’s actual deposit could not be said to be substantial even from the
original LBP valuation of P251,379,103.90. Deposits were not enough to
compensate the petitioners for the potential income the landholdings could
have earned for them if no immediate taking had taken place. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if the property is
immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of
both his land and its fruits or income. Petitioners were made to wait for more
than a decade after the taking of their property before they actually received
the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due them. When the
LBP took the petitioners’ landholdings without the corresponding full payment,
it became liable to the petitioners for the income the landholdings would have
earned had they not immediately been taken from the petitioners.
Spouses Abad vs. Fil-Homes Realty (G.R. No. 189239) 31
Facts:
On June 30, 2004, the City of Parañaque filed expropriation proceedings
covering the lots owned by respondents before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project
therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners. No payment had
been made to respondents for the lots therefore they still maintain ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not there was just compensation.
Held:
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized
housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the
constitutional provisions on social justice. the mere issuance of a writ of
possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer ownership of the
lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in
expropriation. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete
until payment of just compensation. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it
is necessary to pay the property owners the final just compensation. There is
even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents
prior to the City’s possession of the lots.
Dumlao vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-52245)32
Issue:
Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal
protection and due process rights.
Held:
No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification
based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case,
employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger
employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter
are not. 
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume
office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
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and Eminent Domain
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy
of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political elective echelons.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribed is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. There is
reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office
because there is the “need for new blood to assume relevance”. When
an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable
for the same government work.
The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid.
Quinto vs. COMELEC (G. R. No. 189698) 33
Facts:
R.A. 8676 provides that all elective officials are not deemed resigned upon
filing of their certificate of candidacy, however, appointive officials are
considered deemed resigned upon filing of the COC’s.
Issue:  the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Petitioner also illustrates that
Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is violative of
the equal protection clause.
Held:  Issue:
2009 Decision
Yes. Persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned upon filing
of CoCs, but not considering resigned all other civil servants, specifically
elective ones, the law duly discriminates against the first class (appointive
officials). Applying the four requisites of valid classification, the Court finds
that treatment of persons holding appointive officers as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of law (Requisite No. 2).
There is no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of law.
2010 Decision
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is not violative of the equal
protection clause.
There is substantial distinction. Elective officials are elected by his
constituents, if they are deemed resigned, the constituents will be affected.
On the other hand, in the case of appointive officials, they do not have
ordinary succession, thus, there will be vacancy during resignation.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore
germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to
preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also
thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC (GR No. 190582)34
Facts:
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds. LGBT
tolerates immorality, sexual immorality and will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. 
Issue:
Whether or not denying the application of Ang Ladlad is violative of the equal protection
clause.
Held:
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Yes. COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not
justified by the circumstances of the case. According to COMELEC, the
majority of Filipinos considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable. Such reason is sufficient to disqualify the petitioner.
Homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of equal protection
clause. Moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state
interest that is sufficient to satisfy the rational basis review under the equal
protection clause. LGBT has the same interest in participating in the party-list
system. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs.
Trillanes vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817)35
Facts:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’état in relation to the “Oakwood
Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year
term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court
that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still
pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already
conviction. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since
Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, whereas he is
indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
 
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to attend the Senate sessions.
Held:
No. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Within the class of offenses covered by the
stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the
political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
ABAKADA v. Purisima (G.R. No. 166715) 36
Facts: 
Petit ioners are chall engi ng the constitutionality of R.A. 9335, a tax
reform legislation to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC . They contend that, by establishing a system of
rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of
the BIR and the  BOC i nto mer cenari es and  bounty hunters"
as  they wi ll do thei r  best onl y
i nc o n s i d e r a t i o n   o f   s u c h   r e w a r d s .   T h u s ,   t h e   s y s t e m   o f   r
e w a r d s   a n d i n c e n t i v e s   i n v i t e s cor rupt ion and underm ines
the  consti tutionall y m andated duty  of  these officials  and
employees.
Issue:
Whether or not the limitation of the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of BIR and BOC is violative of the
equal protection clause.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
Held:
N o . The classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 does not violate the equal protection clause. The subject of
the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically
pertain to the said agencies. The law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under
the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent
functions - taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane
and intimately related to the purpose of the law.  entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement. The
Soriano v. Laguardia (G.R. No. 164785)37
Facts:
The MTRCB gave a 20-day preventive suspension to Soriano’s And Dating
Daan TV program for defamatory utterances against an INC minister. Soriano
was later imposed with a three-month suspension from his TV program
Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension order by the MTRCB denied him
his right to the equal protection clause.
Held:
Petitioner next faults MTRCB’s preventive suspension order which made him
unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. Petitioner’s
position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all
persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed." It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as
hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place
himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing
administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof
that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that
which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If
the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner
remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not
become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. 
League of Cities vs. COMELEC (GR No. 176951)38
The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into
cities. Subsequently, the 12th Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001, amending Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million. 16
municipalities filed cityhood bills containing a common provision exempting all
the 16 municipalities from the P100million income requirement of R.A. 9009.
The cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the
Senate, and lapsed into law without the President’s signature. Said Cityhood
Laws directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites
to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the
conversion. Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
HELD:
2008 Ruling
Cityhood laws are violative of the equal protection clause. Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by R.A. 9009, does not contain any
exemption to theP100 million annual income requirement. Even if the
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exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely
states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No.
9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those
that are not exempted.
In the 11th Congress, the exemption which is based solely on the fact that the
16 municipalities had cityhood bills that were pending when RA 9009 was
enacted is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not
classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions,
rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of
the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly
situated. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The classification criterion − mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to
the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities
from converting into cities.
2009 Ruling
Petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by
virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP’s claim that the IRA of
its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion
into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit
of the constitutional guarantee. The favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
(16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20
million income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement
prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities
desirous to be cities. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from
the P100M income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality
occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009 and also to insure
that fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs making the
classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The non-retroactive
effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at the
time of its enactment because it is intended to apply for all time. The uniform
exemption clause would apply to all municipalities that had pending cityhood
bills before the passage of R.A. 9009 and were compliant with the LGC of
1991.
2010 Ruling
2008 ruling is reinstated. No substantial distinction between municipalities
with pending cityhood bills in the 11 th Congress and municipalities that did not
have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress
is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. Pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time
of passage of RA 9009therefore violating the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only (pendency of the
cityhood bills adverted to can no longer be repeated). Limiting the exemption
only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated.
2011 Ruling
There was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal
protection clause. The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely
to stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities"
and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities
and without municipalities. Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and
viability of respondents to become component cities of their respective
provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this
capacity and viability of the respondents to become the State’s partners in
accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for
cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component
city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to
exist.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government
units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA
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9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the Atty. Morales has been alleged of consuming his working hours filing and
creation of cities. attending to personal cases, such as administrative cases against employees
in his old sala, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. A spot
investigation was conducted by DCA Dela Cruz together with four NBI
agents, a crime photographer and a support staff in the office of Atty.
Chamber of Real vs. Romulo (G.R. No. 160756)39
Morales. The team was able to access the personal computer of Atty.
Morales and print two documents stored in its hard drive which were
Facts:
pleadings not related to his work. Atty. Morales's computer was seized and
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. is
taken to the custody of the OCA.
questioning the constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act 8424 and
the revenue regulations issued by the BIR to implement said provision and
Issue:
those involving creditable withholding taxes. Imposition of minimum corporate
Whether or not the pleadings found in Atty. Morales’ personal computer are
income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on
admissible in the cases against him.
sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets. CWT is being levied
only on real estate enterprises.
Held:
Atty. Morales argues that the pleadings were acquired from his personal
Issue:
computer without any valid search and seizure order and without his consent,
Whether or not the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection
such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it
clause.
violated his right to privacy. Consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search. To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the
Held:
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1)
The equal protection clause under the Constitution as applied in this case
the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
means that all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by
actual intention to relinquish the right. There is no showing that Atty. Morales
legislation based on a reasonable classification. The taxing power has the
had an actual intention to relinquish his right.  He may have agreed to the
authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation.
opening of his personal computer and the printing of files in the presence of
Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the spot investigation,
taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate
it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case
industry is a class and can be validly treated differently from other business
against said persons questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically
enterprises.
invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. The
Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against
him for it violated his constitutional right. The case has been dismissed for
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission (G.R. No. 192935) 40 insufficiency of evidence.

Facts:
EO No. 1 was issued by President Aquino to investigate reported cases of
People vs. Nunez (G.R. No. 177148) 42
graft and corruption of previous administration. The petitioners assail EO No.
1 is violative of the constitutional safeguard because it does not apply equally
Facts:
to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the
Laguna Police Detectives and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the
"previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in
house of Raul R. Nuñez based on reports of drug possession. Police officers
partisan hostility." To be accorded with validity, the commission must also
found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters,
cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to
and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing P4,610
that of former President Arroyo. 
inside appellant’s dresser. 
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not the Truth Commission is violative of the equal protection
Whether or not the search warrant was invalid for failing to state the exact
clause.
address to be searched.
Held:
Held:
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
The right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any
protection clause. For a classification to meet the requirements of
other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong
impliedly. This right has been deemed waived by Nunez for failing to raise
to the class. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the
investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration” only. The previous evidence obtained during trial.
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the
assailed executive order. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
DEL ROSARIO vs. DONATO, SR. (G.R. No. 180595, 5-MAR-2010) 43
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification.
HELD:
A judicially ordered search warrant that fails to yield the described illicit article
does not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating
In Re: Morales (A.M. No. .M. No. P-08-2519)41 testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant.
Facts: Their allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search
warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While in a motion to dismiss assumes as
true the fact alleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to
39 conclusions of law. Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
40 42
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
41 43
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
TAU MU

complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of

action.
PEOPLE vs. MAMARIL (G.R. No. 171980, 6-OCT-2010) 45
The allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious
manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice and other related
HELD:
words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the
The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide for
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the filing of counterclaims for damages against those who may have
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant
improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant. Consequently, the Del
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
Rosarios had the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained
seized.
or enforced search warrant. Unfortunately, their complaint, as worded, failed
to state a proper cause of action.
On the other hand, probable cause means such facts and circumstances
Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents wrongfully which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an
included him as respondent in their application for a search warrant since he offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor resided in it. But the rules the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to be residents of
the premises to be searched. If this were the case, criminals in possession of There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
illegal articles could simply use other people’s residence for storing such cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions obtaining in
articles to avoid being raided and searched. given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the
findings or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.

It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a

PEOPLE vs. TUAN (G.R. No. 176066, 11-AUG-2010) 44 showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing
HELD: court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following: (1) it
must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;
TAN vs. SY TIONG GUE (G.R. NO. 174570, 15-DEC-2010) 46
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
HELD:
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
Even if an information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the
searched and persons or things to be seized.
same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner
cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary to
In People vs. Aruta, the Court defined probable cause as follows: “Although
petitioner’s contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any
probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued.
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 4.
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. It
which may be anywhere in the Philippines. Thus, a search warrant may be
ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man
issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal
rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies
knowledge and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the
on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining
the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it
emanated from the same incident.
must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact
seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items
will be found in the place to be searched. A magistrate’s determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference TY vs. DE JAMIL (G.R. No. 182147, 15-DEC-2010) 47
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining HELD:
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably For one, while it is the consistent principle in this jurisdiction that the
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the
sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this case. filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case;
such determination is subject to judicial review where it is established that
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the grave abuse of discretion tainted the determination. 
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the 45
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was 46
accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
composed of several rooms. AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
44 47
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
 18
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
TAU MU

For another, there is no question that the Secretary of Justice is an alter ego relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended.  Probable cause has been
of the President who may opt to exercise or not to exercise his or her power defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
of review over the former’s determination in criminal investigation cases.  As belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
aptly noted by Agent De Jemil, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
Secretary of Justice is, under the doctrine of qualified political agency, prosecuted.  After all, probable cause need not be based on clear and
presumably that of the Chief Executive unless disapproved or reprobated by convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable
the latter. belief—probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than
bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.
Chan v. Secretary of Justice delineated the proper remedy from the
determination of the Secretary of Justice.  Therein, the Court, after
expounding on the policy of non-interference in the determination of the
existence of probable cause absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part
ANIAG vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 104961, 7-OCT-1994) 48
of the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice, however, concluded,
citing Alcaraz v. Gonzalez and Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of
FACTS:
Appeals, that an aggrieved party from the resolution of the Secretary of
Pursuant to the Gun Ban, the Sergeant-at-Arms wrote to petitioner,
Justice may directly resort to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of
requesting the return of the two firearms issued to him. Thereafter, petitioner
discretion, thus:
instructed his driver to pick the firearms from petitioner’s house and return
 
them to Congress. Upon heading to the Congress, the driver was
x x x [T]he findings of the Justice Secretary may be reviewed through a
apprehended at a checkpoint. The car was searched and the gun was found
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on the allegation that he acted
neatly packed in their cases.
with grave abuse of discretion.  This remedy is available to the
aggrieved party.
ISSUE:
Whether ANIAG can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return
As petitioners strongly argue, even if the branded LPG cylinders were indeed
to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms
owned by customers, such fact does not authorize Omni to refill these
issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless
branded LPG cylinders without written authorization from the brand owners
search of his car. NO.
Pilipinas Shell, Petron and Total.  In Yao, Sr. v. People, a case involving
criminal infringement of property rights under Sec. 155 of RA 8293,  in
HELD:
affirming the courts a quo’s determination of the presence of probable cause,
NO. Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP
this Court held that from Sec. 155.1of RA 8293 can be gleaned that “mere
conducted the search. According to him, without warrant and without
unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection
informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen searched his car.
with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to
The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of
cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be
Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept
considered as trademark infringement.” The Court affirmed the presence of
in the trunk of the car. Thus, the search of his car that yielded the evidence
infringement involving the unauthorized sale of Gasul and Shellane LPG
for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. 2, Art. III of the
cylinders and the unauthorized refilling of the same by Masagana Gas
Constitution.
Corporation as duly attested to and witnessed by NBI agents who conducted
the surveillance and test-buys.  
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued
 
by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a
Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that Omni refilled various branded LPG
search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in
cylinders even if owned by its customers but without authority from brand
cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view,   as well
owners Petron, Pilipinas Shell and Total shows palpable violation of BP 33,
as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared
as amended.  As aptly noted by the Court in Yao, Sr. v. People, only the duly
are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative
authorized dealers and refillers ofShellane, Petron Gasul and, by
of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
extension, Total may refill these branded LPG cylinders.  Our laws sought to
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
deter the pernicious practices of unscrupulous businessmen.
merely limited to a visual search. 
The issue of ownership of the seized branded LPG cylinders is irrelevant and
hence need no belaboring.  BP 33, as amended, does not require ownership The records do not show that the manner by which the package was bundled
of the branded LPG cylinders as a condition sine qua non for the commission led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention
of offenses involving petroleum and petroleum products.  Verily, the offense either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction
of refilling a branded LPG cylinder without the written consent of the brand from Arellano when the car was stopped and searched. Given these
owner constitutes the offense regardless of the buyer or possessor of the circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not
branded LPG cylinder. thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction.
The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership,
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that
to be seized. Petitioners cannot deny that the seized LPG cylinders were in
they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission
the possession of Omni, found as they were inside the Omni compound.
of a crime in the vehicle to be searched.   The existence of probable cause
 
justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each
In fine, we also note that among those seized by the NBI are 16 LPG
case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in situations
cylinders bearing the embossed brand names
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
of Shellane, Gasul and Totalgaz but were marked as Omnigas.  Evidently,
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to
this pernicious practice of tampering or changing the appearance of a
flee. 
branded LPG cylinder to look like another brand violates the brand owners’
property rights as infringement under Sec. 155.1 of RA 8293.  Moreover,
tampering of LPG cylinders is a mode of perpetrating the criminal offenses We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police
under BP 33, as amended, and clearly enunciated under DOE Circular No. officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably
2000-06-010 which provided penalties on a per cylinder basis for each corroborated by other attendant matters.
violation.
 
Foregoing considered, in the backdrop of the quantum of evidence required 48
to support a finding of probable cause, we agree with the appellate court and II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, which conducted the preliminary AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
investigation, that there exists probable cause for the violation of Sec. 2 (a) in Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of Moving Vehicles

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20)
meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No.
2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do
so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that
certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike
forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package
or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the
policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action
then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the
security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.
Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
The warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the warrantless search cannot be used as evidence in
any proceeding.
EPIE vs. ULAT-MARREDO (G.R. No. 148117, 22-MAR-2007) 49
FACTS:
Upon receiving a call from an informant that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB
117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber, the PNP
swiftly established a checkpoint. As the jeepney was spotted, the PNP
flagged it down but the jeepney did not stop. Hence, they chased the jeepney
loaded with vegetables, beneath it are the pine lumbers. Pine lumbers were
also carried without any valid permit to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether the police officers have a probable cause to believe that the subject
vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped
and searched without warrant. YES.
HELD:
YES. Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in
violation of the above provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with
judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes derogation of
a constitutional right.
 
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions.   In People v. Sarap,
we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without
warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the
evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.   The only requirement in these
exceptions is the presence of probable cause.   Probable cause is the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable,
discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched.   In People v. Aruta, we ruled that in warrantless searches,
probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or
belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.  There is
no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for its
determination varies according to the facts of each case.
We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential
informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney with Plate No.
AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet.
The lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was
then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney.   At
around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the vehicle.  They
flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it
reached Shilan, La Trinidad.  A search of the vehicle disclosed several
pieces of Benguet pine lumber.  Petitioners could not produce the
required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.
49
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of Moving Vehicles
19
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In People v. Vinecarao, we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after
noticing a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police
officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with
their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on
the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were
officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were
instruments of some offense.   This ruling squarely applies to the present
case.   Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that respondent
judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless search is valid and that the
lumber seized is admissible in evidence against petitioners.
PEOPLE vs. TUAZON (G.R. No. 175783, 3-SEPT-2007) 50
FACTS:
Upon receiving through phone call a confidential information that a Gemini
car bearing plate no. PFC 411 would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu
in Mariville Subd., Antipolo City, the PNP then dispatched a team of
policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance. Upon arriving to the place
stated, they saw the Gemini car and flagged it down, 5 sachets of shabu were
then found on the driver’s seat, 2 more were also found in appellants pocket
when he was frisked.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest. YES.
HELD:
YES. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance
of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary or that they were moved by ill-will.
In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, this Court had the occasion to elucidate
on the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the
requirement of search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis
of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We
might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought."
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to
moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to
conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the
aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to
indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment.
Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving
vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police
authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at
all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the
warrantless search of a vehicle.
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, the term "probable cause" was explained to
mean –
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
50
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of Moving Vehicles

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the
case.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to
the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the
warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential
informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville
Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to
Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the
informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in
the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car,
they saw a gun tucked in appellant’s waist. Appellant did not have any
document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more
strengthened the police’s suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car,
they found on the driver’s seat plastic sachets containing white powdery
substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish
probable cause for the warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual
admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the
evidence against him on the ground that the same was obtained through a
warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the
police. It was only proper for the trial court to admit said evidence. 
PEOPLE vs. MARIACOS (G.R. No. 188611, 16-JUN-2010) 51
FACTS:
The O.K. bag that was described to have in it the marijuana as reported by a
confidential informant was found by the policeman. He then asked the other
passengers in the jeepney who owns the bag, but nobody knew. Meanwhile,
as the jeepney reached its destination, the bag was carried by accused-
appellant, hence, the police caught them up and introduced himself as a
policeman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was probable cause to warrant the warrantless arrest.
YES.
HELD:
YES. Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure
shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Bagista, the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
51
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of Moving Vehicles
20
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the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions
to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer
effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of
probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without
probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against
the person arrested.
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis
of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the
impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity.
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be
obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other
immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search
is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since
they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case
is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about
to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the
search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough
time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant’s
arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported
from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to
intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the
secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that
a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave
for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the
packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest — A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used
or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest.
Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of
Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.
Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is
also valid.
PEOPLE vs. AGULAY (G.R. No. 181747, 26-SEPT-2008) 52
FACTS:
A certain informant went to the police station to report about a certain “Sing”
who had been selling shabu. A police entrapment team was then formed.
Upon entrapment, the informant pointed the target pusher to poseur-buyer.
Poseur-buyer was then introduced to Sing, bought shabu, made the signal,
then the team rushed to the crime, Sing was then frisked, and 2 sachets of
shabu were found.
ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant was arrested in a legitimate “buy-bust” operation.
YES.
HELD:
YES. It is a well-established rule that an arrest made after
an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid “warrantless arrest,” in line with the provisions of Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been
accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers.  In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. [16]  If carried
out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust
operation deserves judicial sanction.[17]
There are eight (8) instances when a warrantless search and seizure is valid,
to wit:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3)
searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration,
customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5)
searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6)
where the prohibited articles are in “plain view;” (7) searches of
buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
regulations; and (8) “stop and frisk” operations. 
52
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search Incident to a Valid Arrest
21
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Considering that the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is beyond question,
the subsequent warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, were
permissible.  The search, clearly being incident to a lawful arrest, needed no
warrant for its validity.  Thus, contrary to accused-appellant's contention, the
contraband seized from him, having been obtained as a result of the buy-bust
operation to which the defense failed to impute any irregularity, was correctly
admitted in evidence.
On this premise, this Court has laid down the “objective” test in scrutinizing
buy-bust operations.  In People v. Doria,[31] we said:
 
We therefore stress that the “objective” test in buy-bust operations
demands that the details of the purported transaction must be
clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug
subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was
made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase
the drug, the payment of the “buy-bust” money, and the delivery
of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police
officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure
that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense. x x x.
CHING vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 177237, 17-OCT-2008) 53
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the arrest of the petitioner was illegal. NO.
2) Whether or not the search conducted on the premised is illegal. NO.
3) Whether or not the buy-bust operation against the petitioner was a
sham. NO.
HELD:
1) NO. According to the records, the entrapment operation started when
Police Chief Suan received information from an informant that the latter
was arranging a drug deal with Ching. Since the transaction was to be
carried out almost immediately, Police Chief Suan no longer required the
conduct of a surveillance operation to verify the information. Police Chief
Suan lost no time in briefing his men. He then assembled a team to
apprehend Ching in the arranged drug deal. He designated SPO1
Cadoy to act as the poseur-buyer and gave him the marked money to be
used in the transaction. Inspector Arsenal was also tasked to lead the
group in the target area. Police Chief Suan was monitoring his men
nearby the area and communicated to them through a radio. Although
he did not witness the actual sale, he was able to recount the incidents
prior and immediately after the buy-bust operations.
2) NO. This Court observed in many cases that drug pushers sell their
prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not,
in private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, drug
pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse,
openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the time and venue
of the sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts constituting sale and
delivery of the prohibited drugs.
3) NO. The rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment does not
require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest
pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court 47 which states:
SEC. 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Having established that the buy-bust operation is factual and legitimate,
the subsequent warrantless arrest of Ching and as well as the
warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs was permissible, thus:
53
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search Incident to a Valid Arrest

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is
not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long
been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners.
The prosecution was able to establish the abovementioned rule.
PEOPLE vs. RACHO (G.R. No. L-186529, 3-AUG-2010) 54
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search, which yielded the alleged contraband, was lawful
HELD:
NO. The showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design is
required. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant
had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant
was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing
or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the
informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would
have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have
been confiscated.
PEOPLE vs. ARANETA (G.R. No. 191064, 20-OCT-2010) 55
HELD:
The “objective test” in buy-bust operation was overcome. We therefore stress
that the “objective” test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown.  This
must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher,
the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale.  The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not
through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the “buy-
bust” money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant
alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense.  Criminals must be caught but not at all cost.  At the same time,
however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into
ignoring the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime.  If there is
overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal
proclivity, then this must also be considered.  Courts should look at all factors
to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far
as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
[6]
 [Emphasis supplied]  behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the
members of the buy-bust team performed their duties in a regular manner. It
was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith and credit to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
 
The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible.   A search
warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust
operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of,
and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for
the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-
54
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search Incident to a Valid Arrest
55
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search Incident to a Valid Arrest
22
TAU MU
bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of
their criminal plan.  In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been
proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided
due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
ABENES vs. CA (G.R. No. 156320, 14-FEB-2007) 56
HELD:
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain
view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence. 18 The "plain view" doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
ESQUILLO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 182010, 25-AUG-2010) 57
HELD:
That law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant may
conduct a search is settled.  The same, however, admits of
exceptions,viz :
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of
vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4)
searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.20 (emphasis underscoring
supplied)
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among
other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or
contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves
a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to
take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police
officers constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of
the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's possession - later
56
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When things seized are within
plain view of a searching party
57
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When things seized are within
plain view of a searching party; d.) Stop and Frisk

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
voluntarily exhibited24 to the police operative - was undertaken after she was
interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin
introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer.  And, at the time of her
arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to
flee after the police officer had identified himself.
PEOPLE vs. MARTINEZ (G.R. No. 1911366, 13-DEC-2010) 58
FACTS:
Upon the receipt of the report, police authorities and members of the SWAT
team hied to Trinidad Subd., Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from the people in
the area, the house of the accused was located. As the police officers entered
the gate of the house. However, nothing from outside the house could be
seen what is happening inside, such as the alleged paraphernalia and plastic
sachet of shabu on the table while they were outside the premises of the
property of accused. Before entering, they only relied on the information that
that there was an ongoing pot session inside the house of accused.
Thereafter, they immediately barged in and arrested accused.
ISSUE:
1. WON there was an express waiver on the part of the accused. NO.
2. WON the items were seized in plain view. NO.
HELD:
1. The accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
fails to raise such issue before arraignment. However, this waiver is
limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional
guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into
their houses, papers and effects. X x x the constitutional
guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all
searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the
following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant – (i)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
“plain view”; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances.
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 s clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs
(a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require
probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be
valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not
fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest
is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at
the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did
they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants
committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have
escaped from a penal establishment.
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrest without
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion
are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual
facts, that is supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested.
58
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When things seized are within
plain view of a searching party, e.) Express Waiver
23
TAU MU
2. Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view.
The elements of plain view are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance
considering that the identity and address of one of the accused were
already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining
the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have
been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being
illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal.
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded. The subject items seized
during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the
verycorpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of
the accused.
POSADAS vs. CA (G.R. No. 89139, 2-AUG-1990) 59
FACTS:
Pat. Ungab and Pat. Umpar, both members of INP of the Davao Metrodiscom
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force were conducting surveillance along
Magallanes St., Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a “BURI” bag and they
noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance. They then checked the buri bag and found a revolver, rounds of
live ammunition, and tear gas. Petitioner failed to show the necessary license
or authority to possess the same. Thereafter, he was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions.
ISSUE:
1. WON there was a lawful arrest or search and seizure. YES.
2. WON the arrest is justified by stop and search. YES.
HELD:
1. An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private
person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know
that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he
was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant.
2. There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is
the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by
this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been
stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his light against unlawful search
and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
59
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and Frisk

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots
to destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban
centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about
by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse
by the men in uniform in the same manner that all governmental power
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at
military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar,
there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and
it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in
the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
useless, futile and much too late.
PEOPLE vs. MENGOTE (G.R. No. 87059, 22-JUN-1992) 60
FACTS:
Shortly after a phone call received in the Western Police District, that there
was a suspicious-looking persons (one of whom was holding his abdomen,
and both men looking from side-to-side) at the corner of Juan Luna and North
Bay Boulevard, Pat. Mercado and Alberto Juan proceeded to the said place
and approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the
other lawmen surrounded them. Suspects were searched, and one of them
was found a revolver with live bullets in the chamber, the other (MENGOTE)
had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. They were then turned
over to the HQ for investigation. Thereafter, they were accused of violation of
PD 1866.
ISSUE:
1. WON the warrantless arrest was valid. NO
2. WON the evidence obtained was inadmissible evidence. YES
HELD:
60
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and Frisk
24
TAU MU
Warrantless search in broad daylight of a person merely looking from
side to side and holding his stomach is illegal.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time
of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side
to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed
or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in
their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not
necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the
part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense
had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The
question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested
by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a
place not exactly forsaken?
A person may not be stopped and frisked in broad daylight on a busy
street on mere unexplained suspicion.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them
innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and be was holding his
abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as
the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their
suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they
were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the
informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who
were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not
explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on
the impending crime.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the
Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of
Mengote's supposed involvement therein. As for the illegal possession of the
firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this
only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
MANALILI vs. CA (G.R. No. 113447, 9-OCT-1997) 61
FACTS:
Due to the information that drug addicts were roaming the area of Kalookan
City; a surveillance was conducted by Pat. Espiritu and Pat. Lumabas. Upon
reaching the city, they alighted from the official car of the Police Station.
Thereafter, they chanced upon a male (MANALILI) whose eyes were reddish
and was walking in a swaying manner. Manalili tried to avoid them; policemen
approached him and introduced their selves as police officers. Police then
asked what Manalili was holding in his hands, but he tried to resist. Espiritu
again asked Manalili of what he was holding, then the latter showed his wallet
and allowed Espiritu to examine the same. Espiritu took the wallet and
examined it, found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside; kept it.
Thereafter, an examination was conducted to Manalili and to the confiscated
marijuana. Results are all positive.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid warrantless search and arrest. YES.
HELD:
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the
general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 the Court held that there were many instances where a search
and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk.
61
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and Frisk

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during
their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk
along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was
a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on
drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's
possession.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner
effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when
he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver
of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable
search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right
to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or
constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish
the right. 26Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence
from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case,
however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to
raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case
is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by
petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal.
VEROY vs. LAYAGUE (G.R. No. 95630, 18-JUN-1992) 62
FACTS:
As the Veroy Spouses already lived in Quezon City; left their house in Davao
City under the care of two houseboys and Edna Sooguilon (only the key to
the kitchen was left, keys to the bedrooms were still kept by spouses); Capt.
Obrero contacted Luisa Veroy asking for perimission that they would search
her house because of the report they received that their was being used as
safehouse of rebel soldiers. Luisa responded and gave her permission that
the search be conducted, but it should be done in the presence of Major
Macasaet. True enough, upon the search being conducted, a gun, bullets,
clothes of men and a book entitled “Islamic Revolution Future Path of the
Nation” were all found in the house. An arraignment was then set and an
information was filed against petitioners for violation of P.D. 1866.
ISSUE:
WON there was the petitioners validly waived their right against warrantless
search and seizure. NO.
HELD:
Where permission to enter a residence was given to search for rebels, it
is illegal to search on the rooms therein and seize firearms without a
search warrant. None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The
reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly
being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt.
Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because
he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This
shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he
did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek
permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa
Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample
time to procure a search warrant but did not.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they
are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having
been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle.
They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action
against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant,
62
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, e.) Express Waiver
25
TAU MU
still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must
be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness
there isno crime.
PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS (G.R. No. 170233, 22-FEB-2007) 63
FACTS:
PO3 Fami and SPO3 Cabling conducted a stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter St., Brgy. Pag-asa,
Olongapo City. They received an information that a person would make a
delievery of marijuana dried leaves; person was described for them to
recognize. While stationed thereat, they saw a male (Nuevas) fit to the
decription, alight from a motor vehicle; was carrying a bag. Fami and Cabiling
accosted Nuevas and informed him that they were police officers; Nuevas
and Fami conversed in the Waray language. Thereafter, Nuevas informed
Fami that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, and
two other male persons (Inocencio and Din). Later on, Nuevas pointed to the
police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried
leaves and bricks wrapped in blue cloth. Shortly, Nueva disclosed where the
two other male persons would deliver the marijuana. Then, they all went to
the place, Fami and Cabiling then introduced themselves as police officers;
asked Din what he was carrying, replied that it was Nuevas’, Fami then took
the bag and upon inspection, founf marijuana packed in newspaper.
ISSUE:
1. WON there was consent on the part of Nuevas for the warrantless
search. YES.
2. WON there was consent on the part of Din and Inocencio for the
warrantless search. NONE.
HELD:
The SC held that the search conducted in Nueva’s case was made with his
consent. In Din’s case, there was none.
1. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the
plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be
seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal
liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag
and even revealed his ‘associates,’ offering himself as an informant. His
actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find
excuses, blame others and save oneself even at the cost of others’ lives.
2. The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered
his right against unreasonable searches. While it may not be contrary to
human nature for one to be jolted into surrendering something
incriminating to authorities, Fami’s and Cabling’s testimonies do not
show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami and
Cabling did not testify on Din’s composure—whether he felt surprised or
frightened at the time—which fact we find necessary to provide basis for
the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any permission made
by the police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by
Din for the officers to search it. It is worthy to note that in cases where
the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police authorities
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to
be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear
and positive proof.
Inocencio’s supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was
sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that
Din was carrying.58 Taking a look at an object, more so in this case
peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the same as taking
possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to
Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or
even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to
show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag
and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio
was firm and unshakeable in his testimony that he had no part in any
delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
63
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, e.) Express Waiver

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. However, it must be
seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in
a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5)
the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of
the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental
that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. OGARIO (G.R. No. 138081, 30-MAR-2000) 64
HELD:
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,  this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line of
[10]
cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any
competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and
forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to
enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of
Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure
and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded
from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known
as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora
and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised
concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of
Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose
decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular courts
still retain jurisdiction "where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause, there
is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs
jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture proceedings." [11] They overlook the fact,
however, that under the law, the question of whether probable cause
exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional
Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove
to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel were
imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they
may exercise the power to effect customs’ searches, seizures, or
arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative hearings.
It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate issuance of writs of
injunction, the Supreme Court issued on June 25, 1999 Administrative
Circular No. 07-99 to all judges of lower courts entitled re: exercise of
utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in issuance of temporary
64
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of Warehouse in
Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce custom laws
26
TAU MU
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. The circular states
in part:
Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared
in Mison v. Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y express
provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the
Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof
or stifle or put it to naught."
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is
immediately disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
RIETA vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 147817, 12-AUG-2004) 65
HELD:
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be
made even without a warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff
laws.  Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code
specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land,
enclosure, warehouse, store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box
or envelope or any person on board; or to stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law
SALVADOR vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 146706, 15-JUL-2005) 66
HELD:
The Constitutional provisions (Section 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable.  Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where
searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. 
These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2)
search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest.
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special
mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to
verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in
the vicinity of the airport.  In other words, the search made by the PAF team
on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search.  As
such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search
warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.
The power of the State to foul any fraudulent schemes resorted to by
importers who evade payment of customs duties clearly recognized
In Papa vs. Mago involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers
who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are
authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo
or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that
the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the
tariff and customs law.  They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of
any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles,
as in the case at bar.
The search of a moving vehicle is recognized on this jurisdiction as a
valid exception to the requirement for a search warrant. We recall that at
the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on board
a moving PAL aircraft tow truck.  As stated earlier, the search of a moving
vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
requirement for a search warrant.  Such exception is easy to understand.  A
search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
65
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of Warehouse in
Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce custom laws
66
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of Warehouse in
Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce custom laws
 27
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
TAU MU

dwelling house or other immobile structure.  But it is impracticable to obtain
a warrant when the search is conducted in a mobileship, aircraft or other
motor vehicle since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
violation of R.A. 6425 and was consequently convicted by the RTC, thus this
appeal. The appellant contends that the evidence against him is not
admissible as evidence because it was obtained in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication.

ISSUE
People vs. Rolando De Gracia67
Whether or not there has been a violation of the appellant’s constitutional
G.R.Nos.102009-10,July 6,1994
right thereby making the obtained evidence inadmissible.
FACTS:
RULING
On the height of the coup d’etat in December 1989 headed by the elements
No. There has been no violation of the appellant’s Constitutional Right,
of Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-
specifically his right against unreasonable search and seizure. It must be
SFP) against the Government, a team from the Intelligence Division of the
noted that the evidence obtained was not procured by the state through its
NCR Defense Command conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales office
law enforcers or other authorized government agencies but through a private
in Quezon City pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that
individual acting in his private capacity and without the intervention and
said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
participation of State authorities. In the absence of governmental interference,
communication command post. While conducting the said surveillance, a
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
group of 5 men approached the car of the surveillance team and started firing
State. Furthermore, the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
at them. As a consequence, a searching team was sent to raid the Eurocar
government and its agents, not upon private individuals.
Sales office (without search warrants because of the disorder during that time
and the courts are consequently closed.) where they found ammunitions,
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
dynamites and “molotoy” bombs. As a result of the raid, the appellant who
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However,
was found to be a former Philippine Constabulary and 2 other men who were
if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
janitors of the said building were arrested.
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
The accused appellant herein was charged in two separate informations for
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion,
not the law enforcers, is involved.
and for attempted homicide which were tried jointly by the RTC of Quezon
City. Appellant was convicted for the first charge, but was acquitted of the
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
latter. He was then sentenced to serve the penalty of *reclusion perpetua, *
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
with a recommendation that he be extended with executive clemency after
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the
serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior. Thus this appeal.
same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged.
The appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal
possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have either physical or
constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess
the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the Waterous Drug vs NLRC69
ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely employed asan G.R.NO. 113271; 16 OCT 1997
errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of a certain Col.
Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims FACTS:
that intent to possess is necessary before one can be convicted under Antonia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received
memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R.
ISSUE: Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the
Whether or not there has been a valid search and seizure in this case. latter's accounts as it was a prohibited practice and not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this
RULING: would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not
Yes, given the circumstances, the instant case falls under one of the authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
exceptions against a warrantless search. The military operatives in this case
had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their negligence". In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS
action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery
no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The of medicines without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990,
trial judge himself manifested that on the day when the raid was conducted, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an
his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., wherein it
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. was found that there was a discrepancy in the per bottle price of Voren
tablets between the recent and previous Purchase Orders. Upon verification,
the discrepancy showed that the cost per bottle in the recent Purchase Order
was overpriced.
People vs. Andre68
G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991
The Accounting Department of Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. then
confirmed that the refund for the jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets
FACTS:
was paid to Ms. Catolico. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check
The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, attempted to send 4
but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overpriced.
gift wrapped packages containing marijuana through a packing and forwarder
company owned by Anita Reyes and her husband Job Reyes. The appellant
However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, Pharmacy Clerk, she
disguised the said packages by stacking it with books, gloves and cigars.
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms.
However before delivery of the package, as a Standard Operating Procedure,
Catolico.
Mr. Job Reyes opened the boxes for final inspection and found marijuana
leaves inside. He then reported the incident to the NBI and sent a sample of
As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the
the suspected marijuana leaves for examination. The NBI Forensics was
envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang
able to determine that the samples were indeed marijuana leaves and so they
ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been
seized the package and located the appellant. The appellant was charged for
pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
67
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures - (G) Exigency
68 69
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons (H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
TAU MU

Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her computed at one month's salary for every year of service.
explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension. However, before the In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at
48-hour extension expires, she was informed she would be placed on one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as
fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from
YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged decision and
that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier resolution of the National Labor Relations except as to its reason for
incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, *viz*., that the evidence against
private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of
On 5 March 1990, Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against
memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico unreasonable searches and seizures which was set aside.
filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May
1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice
People vs. Mendoza70
against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because
301 SCRA 66
petitioners failed to "prove what alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to
show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without
FACTS
just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension
On November 11, 1988, Octavio Mendoza, his wife Cecilia and their 10-year
illegal but disallowed reinstatement.
old daughter Charmaine went to the birthday party of a relative of Octavio in
Mcdo, Harrison Plaza. During the party, Octavio left without telling his wife
Petitioners appealed the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because
and kid, and went to KFC.
the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and
that there was no just cause to terminate her services.
Since Cecilia and Charamaine couldn’t find him in the party, they went home
in Las Pinas. They arrived home at 7 pm and left again to go to Cecilia’s
The NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
parents in Bacoor to bring perfume. Octavio still was not home.
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from
her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the
They got home around 9pm and saw Octavio’s car parked in the garage of
check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-
their neighbor. All the lights were opened but the front door was locked. After
employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the
a while, Octavio opened the back door and let them in. He was drunk and told
check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of
Charmaine to get cold water and douse him. She followed and was instructed
Article III of the Constitution.
to go to her room. She went and got ready for bed. She heard her parents
arguing about them leaving the party without Octavio. Afterwards, she heard
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the
three gunshots, ran to their room and saw her mom on the floor bleeding. She
dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal
also saw her dad hide a gun under the bed.
suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the
aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Octavio then called his brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac. When Gabac
arrived, they all brought him to Perpetual Help Hospital where Cecilia was
Having their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed special civil
declared dead on arrival. The policemen investigated Gabac and found a .38
action for *certiorari*, which is anchored on the following grounds:
caliber revolver in his waist. Gabac told them that Octavio handed it over to
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of
him as soon as he arrived at the crime scene. Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio
facts.
learned of his daughter’s death and that valuables were being taken away
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
from her house. He and his sons decided to go there and decided to remove,
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the
together with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including
1987 Constitution.
accused-appellant's personal effects such as memorandum receipt and
mission order authorizing Mendoza to carry weapon.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the
At court, Charmaine testified that she saw her father hide the gun under the
Constitution, under the Bill of Rights
bed. In her second testimony, she said she saw no such act. Octavio also
denied that he killed his wife and that he owned that gun. He said that the
RULING
memorandum receipt and mission order were illegally procured by Eusebio in
The Court held that Catolico was denied due process. Although Catolico was
violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service
in the memorandum issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and
ISSUE
that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were
Was Octavio’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
joined through said letters.
violated when Eusebio took the memorandum receipt and mission order and
brought it to court?
The Court also held that Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. The burden is
on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee.
RULING
However, in the case at bar, WATEROUS failed to discharge that burden
The court held that Eusebio did not violate Octavio’s constitutional right
which resulted in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
against unreasonable search and seizure. The constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to immunity of one’s
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed
person from interference from THE GOVERNMENT and it cannot be
because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for
extended to acts committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. In the case at bar,
petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge
the articles were discovered by Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio, a private
since it appears that Catolico’s dismissal is based on hearsay information.
individual. Besides, other evidence proved his guilt. Test showed nitrate in his
hands and the testimony of his daughter was accorded great weight. He was
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its
charged of the crime parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of
decision, that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
the use of an unlicensed firearm.
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as
counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives
rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. People vs. Bongcarawan 71
384 SCRA 525
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's 70
reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly (H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
FACTS
Accused Basher Bongcarawan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
He was found with the possession, custody and control of eight packs of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), without the corresponding license
or prescription.
The contraband article was discovered incidentally when the vessel security
personnel, Mark Diesmo, addressed the complaint of one Lorena Canoy that
her jewelry were missing and she suspects that her co-passenger
(Bongcarawan) at cabin no. 106 was the culprit. With his consent, he was
bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. The security personnel then asked
the accused to get his baggage and requested to open it. When the accused
opened his baggage it was found that there are eight small plastic packs
containing white crystals which the security personnel suspected that it was
shabu. The item was then turned over to the Philippine Coast Guard.
On the defense of the accused, he averts that the contraband article was not
his but belong to Alican “Alex” Macapudi as he was requested by the former
to bring the Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan.
He also claimed that the security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase
when he refused to do the same, when he was asked by the security
personnel, as he did not know the secret combination lock.
ISSUE
WON there is a violation on the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
RULING
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It
should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case
of *People v. Marti*, “in the absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.” The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as
a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State
to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by
the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the
suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search
and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered
as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are
armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in
the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state
tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and
until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
People of the Philippines vs. Leila Johnson72
G.R. No. 138881 Dec. 18, 2000
FACTS
On July 26, 1998 accused 58 year-old Mrs. Leila Johnson was due to fly back
to the USA after visiting her family in the Philippines. While inside the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport waiting for her departure, she was subjected to
71
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
72
(I) Airport Security
29
TAU MU
routine frisking by Olivia Ramirez, a lady frisker on duty. When Ramirez
frisked Mrs. Johnson, she felt something hard on the accused abdominal
area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty
girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, she reported the matter to her
superior which directed her to take accused to the rest room and asked
accused “to bring out the thing under her girdle.” There, accused brought out
three (3) plastic packs later found out to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
or “shabu” totaling to 580.2 grams without corresponding license or
prescription to possess or use said regulated drug. Thereafter, she was
immediately arrested.
The Regional Trial Court, Br 110, Pasay City found accused guilty of violation
of Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A.
No. 7659 sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
WON accused constitutional right against search and seizure was violated
when she was subjected to airport security procedure of frisking.
RULING
No. The court held that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The
methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at
the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against
the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto.
Further the court held that the accused was validly arrested without warrant
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited.
People of the Philippines vs. Susan Canton73
G.R.No. 148825. December 27, 2002
FACTS
On February 12, 1998 at about 1:30pm accused, Susan Canton was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a departing passenger bound for
Saigon, Vietman. When she passed through the metal detector booth, a
beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian
employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism
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(NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention, saying
“Excuse me ma’am, can I search you?” Upon frisking the accused, Mylene
felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand
under the skirt of accused, pinched the package several times and noticed
that the package contained what felt like rice granules. When Mylene passed
her hand, she felt similar packages in front of accused genital area and
thighs. She asked Susan to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and
said: “Money, money only.” Mylene forthwith reported the matter to her
supervisor on duty.
Her supervisor instructed to bring accused to a comfort room for a thorough
physical examination. There they discovered (3) three packages individually
wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which after examination
turned out to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (totaling 998.2809
grams), of a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or license.
The trial court rendered a decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drug Act), as amended, and sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1M. Accused filed a MR
and/or New Trial as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge. The trial court
issued an order denying the same. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the warrantless search and seizure of the shabu were violative of her
constitutional rights.
RULING
No. The Court do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent
seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest accused, were violative of
her constitutional rights. Though Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. …
Sec. 3….
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
However, the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute. There are recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence:
(1)search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case
is a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid
search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235
reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,” which
shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air
carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures.
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The Court also found the ruling in *People v. Johnson* *(see previous
case)*to be applicable to the instant case, which involves similar facts and
issues.
People vs. Conde74
356 SCRA 478
FACTS
On appeal is the decision dated December 15, 1993, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City finding accused Oscar Conde, Allan Atis
and Alejandro Perez, Jr., guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of *reclusion
perpetua *with the accessory penalties under the law.
On May 25, 1992 at about 8:00 AM, the accused block the path of the two
Indian Nationals on a motorcycle. One of the men, later identified as Oscar
Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions
approached and stabbed the Indians. Allan Atis took the goods which were
being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the stabbing, the four men
fled from the crime scene. Of the four assailants, only three were identified.
On May 30, 1992, the police arrested the three accused. Police recovered the
weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went
to the police station to talk to the accused. These weapons were discovered
inside her bag after a routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that
they did not have a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused.
Nor did they have a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's bag and
when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the
stolen items. The three denied the accusations and presented alibis that
Alejandro Perez, Jr. went to Pulang Lupa Cemetery and visited the graves of
his uncle and grandfather. From the cemetery, they went home where they
drank some beer until late afternoon. Oscar Conde testified that he was
mending his fish net at Barangay Polo Street, Paranaque when the crime was
committed. Allan Atis stated that he was in MCU where he worked as a
construction worker for certain Romy Ramos when the incident occurred.
ISSUE
WON the arrest of the appellants were illegal.
RULING
The records of the case will show that the arrests of the appellants came after
the lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen committing the crime. At the
time they were arrested, the police were not armed with any warrants for their
arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without warrant,
namely:
(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present in this case. Appellants were
merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any
crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had just been committed. Five
days had already passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot
also be said that the arresting officers had probable cause based on personal
knowledge. PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects
from Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants. The third circumstance
is patently not present. The lapse of five days gave the police more than
enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant
of arrest. Clearly, appellants' rights provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution were violated.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their constitutional rights prior to their
arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from assailing
the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the
Information against him before his arraignment. When the appellants entered
their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to question any
irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process.
Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should had been
made before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for appellants to
raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information
upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful
restraint of liberty.
Valmonte vs. De Villa75
G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989
FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
and political development of the National Capital Region.  As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.  vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP)
sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners
contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to
make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation
of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?
 
RULING
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizures. (The Court, voting 13-
2, DISMISSED the petition.)
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in
other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government,
in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
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3) Constitutionality of checkpoints and “areal target zonings”
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True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by
the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort
and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
VALMONTE vs.DE VILLA76
G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
FACTS
In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners' petition for
prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and
their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Petitioners have filed the
instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision. 
ISSUE
RULING
The Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED.
The routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's
right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a
rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long as the
the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search.
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender
or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.
The Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor
condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The
Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government
employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that
power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the
possibility of its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a
different "ball game" to be resolved in the constitutional arena.
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become
aware of how some checkpoints have been used as points of thievery and
extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the increased prices of
foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and
other urban centers, are largely blamed on the checkpoints, because the men
manning them have reportedly become "experts" in mulcting travelling
traders. This, of course, is a national tragedy .
But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the
men in uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume that the men
in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are assigned to the
checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a
military "concoction." It behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of their
men assigned to these checkpoints. For no system or institution will succeed
unless the men behind it are honest, noble and dedicated.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen
is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law. And the
courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man
checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority
and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts;  7 This
tenet should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by higher
military authorities.
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PEOPLE VS. EXALA77
221 SCRA 494 (1993)
FACTS
On November 2, 1982, a private jeepney driven by the accused-appellant,
Restituto Bocalan,was stopped at a police checkpoint for routing inspection
regarding unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. Along with Bocalan
were his co-accused Jaime Fernandez and Rodelio Exala. Pfc. Ricardo
Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the
occupants if there were firearms inside, and in which the occupants answered
in the negative. Pfc. Galang then noticed a black bag inside the jeepney, as
he became suspicious, he asked the occupants of what the bag contained,
but nobody answered. Pfc. Galang then opened the bag and found a number
of marijuana. Thereafter, the accused were brought to the police station for
further investigation. The accused were all charged for violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended. Bocalan now assails his conviction. He
contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against
him since it was obtained through a warrantless search.
ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless search was valid and legal, thus proper in
using the marijuana as evidence for convicting the accused (Bocalan) of the
crime charged against him.
HELD
Yes. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that
it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue was never raised in the
proceedings. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on
the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search.
Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of
the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course
thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence. But
even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still appellant's contention
deserves scant consideration. There are indeed instances where search and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. The
instant case is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a
military or police checkpoint. The checkpoint in the instant case was
established in line with "Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to
search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of
unauthorized persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the
occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang
noticed a black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what
the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that
moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously
quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang.
The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such
peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which did
not appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive
search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited
stuff. Significantly, there was no sign of any protest or objection to the search.
The accused remained silent even after their arrest. Their submissive stance
after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any
protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their
professed innocence but also confirms their acquiescence to the search.
Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
GUANZON vs. DE VILLA78
181 SCRA 623 (1990)
FACTS
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the
military and police officers represented by public respondents from
conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
Petitioners allege that the saturation drives abused their human rights.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives"
are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the
subversives are hiding. Raiders, without any search warrant or warrant of
arrest went destroying the doors of the houses of the petitioners rousing them
from their sleeps early in the morning. The public respondents stressed two
points, First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation
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drives. And second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a
deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.
ISSUE
Whether or not the saturation drives were unconstitutional.
HELD
The case did not rule on the constitutionality of the saturation drives. Instead,
the case was remanded to the lower court for further reception of evidence.
The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority and
substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of
policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. Where a violation of human
rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of
the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power
of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of
the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition
where the petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police
actions, where no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given,
and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as
long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened. On one
hand, Under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution it is stated that “The
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” There
can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the
nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of
the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must
conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such
drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the
people affected by such actions. According to the court, Saturation drives and
other police measures are not illegal, the problem only arises in the manner
on which the police action is executed.
ABENES vs. CA79
G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007
FACTS
Three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City, created a team composed
of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint in
Barangay Danlugan, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was
then being implemented by the COMELEC.
The Team leader SPO3 Pascua coordinated with the Barangay Chairman of
Danlugan, and the team put up a road block with the marking "COMELEC
GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the road block were required by the
team to stop and their occupants were then politely requested to alight in
order to allow routine inspection and checking of their vehicles. Motorists who
refused the request were not forced to do so.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying to
pass through the check point was stopped by the team and directed to park at
the side of the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could not be seen
through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of the team,
knocked on the vehicle’s window and requested the occupants to step down
for a routine inspection. The eight occupants, which included the accused-
appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay Chairman of Tawagan Norte,
Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from the vehicle.
SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was
tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to the
policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then
asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry the
firearm, and whether his possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being
enforced by the COMELEC. Accused answered in the affirmative. The
policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to
support Abenes’ claim. He could not show any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo
confiscated Abenes’ firearm, which was later identified as a Norinco .45
caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347, including its magazine containing
seven live ammunitions.
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Subsequently SPO3 Pascua brought Abenes to the PNP Headquarters.
A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives License
Processing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City disclosed that Abenes is not a
registered nor a licensed firearm holder.
ISSUE
1. Was the check-point validly established?
2. Was the petitioner’s constitutional right against unlawful search and
seizure violated?
RULING
The Court upheld the validity of the checkpoint.
the production of the mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that
the checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections;
and, the circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted
its seizure without a warrant.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded
as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced
by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if
its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would
also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend
to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be
able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3
Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious,
such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers
thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights
inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting
its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this
is what the situation demands.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain
view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law
enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they
particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the
policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain
view and discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the
vehicle.
GAANAN vs.IAC80
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
FACTS
Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for
direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him.
This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as
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TAU MU
requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment
operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged
Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in
Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation
would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line.
RULING
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner was acquitted of the
crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic
equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to
carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
"crossed lines". An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone and
who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police
authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of
using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of
the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such
mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the
meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of
a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to
imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an
alien?
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA
No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of
the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Further, our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons
such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate,
blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly
be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar
nature. An extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. 
STONEHILL vs DIOKNO81
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
FACTS
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against
petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing
peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties
“books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject
of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
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Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations
and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents,
papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to
deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the
searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as
evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents
and papers.
ISSUE
Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid.
RULING
The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al.
The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of
the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the
proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers
or board members of the corporation.
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. It provides;
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the
case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere
allegation that Stonehill et al  committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest
order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as
alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made
of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.”
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether
the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever
their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The
Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against
a defective search warrant is emphasized.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also,
to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it
is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
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Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an
illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would
suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility  of securing their conviction,
is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the
illegality had been committed.
PASTRANO vs. CA82
G.R. No. 104504 October 31, 1997
FACTS
A group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Mañoza, then intelligence
operations officer of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Naranjo, at
Oroquieta City. They reported having seen Clyde Pastrano beaten up by his
father, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but
expressed fear of the petitioner who, according to them, had firearms. Clyde
Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had been the victim of foul play.
Two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife also saw Capt. Mañoza,
seeking his assistance in connection with the death of their brother Clyde.
The brothers reported that their father and his common-law wife were keeping
unlicensed firearms in their house. They executed a joint affidavit which they
stated that they had personal knowledge of the fact that their father Pedrito
Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of different calibers in the bedroom
of his house.
On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Mañoza applied
for a search warrant on the same day.
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge Teodorico M.
Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of Oroquieta City (Branch I) issued a
search warrant which Capt. Mañoza and his men later served at the
residence of Pedrito Pastrano at Capitol Drive, Oroquieta City. Seized from
petitioner's dwelling was a sack containing the following:
One (1) Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum with Serial No. 07345. Made in Germany
ROHMGMBH SONTHEM/BRENZ;
One (1) round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum;
One (1) Revolver Cal. 32 with Serial No. 233833 Colt Made in U.S.A.;
Six rounds of live Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.
On the basis of the evidence thus seized, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano y
Capapas and his common-law wife, Erlinda Ventir y Sanchez, were charged
with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition as penalized under P.D.
No. 1866, §1.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico Durias is
invalid for failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution.
RULING
The Court held that petitioner waived any objection based on the illegality of
the search.
Petitioner assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the judge
had examined the complainant and his witnesses by means of searching
questions in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126, §4 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 126, §4 indeed requires the examination of the complainant and his
witnesses to be put in writing and under oath. But although this is a ground
for quashing a search warrant in this case, petitioner did nothing to this end.
He did not move to quash the information before the trial court. Nor did he
object to the presentation of the evidence obtained as being the product of an
illegal search.
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Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the search. As
held in People v. Omaweng, the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly.
The Court find that the prosecution clearly established the elements of the
crime charged and that the Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.
ABERCA vs. VER83
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
 
FACTS
Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver had ordered the
Task Force Makabansa of the AFP to conduct "preemptive strikes against
known communist terrorists'' underground houses" in Metro Manila. The TFM
raided some places using defective warrants; they seized personal
belongings of petitioners; they had been interrogated in violation of their right
to silence and to counsel; they had been tortured and intimidated. Petitioners
asked for payment of damages for violations of their constitutional rights.  ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military
personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution.
RULING
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights.  The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention.  What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.  actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for
damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of
the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when the action (for
injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any
act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers
or authority arising from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial
of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year. 
Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for
injuries suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of their private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. 
               
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the PWHC
had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of
Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.  committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely denied
PP vs. DELA CRUZ84
G.R. No. 182348, November 20, 2008
FACTS
In the morning of October 20, 2002, an informant tipped off the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher
Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo,
Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. They saw Boy Bicol by a
table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted "Boy Bicol sumuko ka na
may warrant of arrest ka. Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a
shootout and was fatally shot. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer
pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended
accused-appellant. They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital
weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the
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table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the markings "CVDC," the initials of accused-
appellant, on the bag containing the seized drug.
Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from
the hideout was sent to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for
examination and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. He was thus separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for
illegal possession of firearm.
According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicol's house having
been asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicol's motorcycle. While accused-
appellant was there, persons who identified themselves as police officers
approached the place, prompting accused-appellant to scamper away. He
lied face down when gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him get
up. He saw the police officers searching the premises and finding shabu and
firearms, which were on top of a table or drawer.
When he asked the reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was
because he was a companion of Boy Bicol. He denied under oath that the
gun and drugs seized were found in his possession and testified that he was
only invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house.
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and
 
ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.
RULING
The Court ruled that since the accused-appellant was not in possession of the
illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid.
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.--A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a),
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to
be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
Accused-appellant's act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have
been sufficient basis for his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the
prosecution was not able to adequately prove that accused-appellant was
possessing the firearm, the prosecution's charge was weak absent the
presentation of the alleged firearm. He was eventually acquitted by the trial
court because of this gaffe. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation
targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be
committing any offense.
PEOPLE v. AGOJO85
GR. NO. 181318 APRIL 16, 2009
FACTS
AGOJO was arrested via a buy-bust operation, wherein he was selling and
delivering (4) plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly
known as "shabu,", with a total weight of 206.32 grams, a regulated
dangerous drug. AGOJO also have in his possession, custody and control
one (1) caliber .45 pistol Ithaca with defaced serial number, one (1) magazine
and seven (7) rounds of live ammunitions for caliber .45, without having
secured the necessary license and/or permit from the proper authorities to
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possess the same. Subsequently, he waqs convicted by the trial court and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. On the other hand, AGOJO
assails his arrest by giving his own version of the story, that he was in fact
framed-up by the buy-bust team.
ISSUE
Whether or not the ARREST of AGOJO is proper even though the ARREST
was made WITHOUT A WARRANT?
RULING
In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being in flagrante delicto, the
existence of discrepancies in the serial numbers of the buy-bust money and a
prior attempt to frame him up as proofs of the frame-up. However, the fact
that the arrest was not in flagrante delicto is of no consequence. The arrest
was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and,
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b)
cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless
arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. A review of the records shows that
both requirements were met in this case.
People vs. Tan G.R. No. 182310 December 9, 2009 86
Facts: Francisco "Bobby" Tan, his wife and one of his daughters was killed at
their residence. The suspects of the brutal killing was his two illegitimate sons
by another woman, herein respondents, Archie and Jan Michael (Jan-Jan)
who are living with them.
According to respondents, prior to the incident they climbed down the high
concrete fence of the compound at about 12:45 a.m to go out. They returned
home at around 3:30 a.m. Respondent Jan-Jan entered the house ahead of
his brother. On reaching the door of his room at the end of the hallway, he
noticed his stepsister Katherine, lying on the floor near the master’s bedroom.
As Jan-Jan switched on the light in his room, he beheld her lying on a pool of
blood. He quickly stepped into the master’s bedroom and there saw his
father, Bobby, lying on the bed with his chest drenched in blood. Almost
simultaneously, respondent Archie who had come into the house after his
brother Jan-Jan noticed that the door of his room, which he locked earlier,
was partly open. As he went in and switched on the light, he saw his
stepmother Cindy, lying in her blood near the wall below the air conditioner.
A few days after the incident police officers from the Regional CIDG
submitted their investigation report to the City Prosecutor’s Office of Iloilo
City, which pointed to respondents as principal suspects on the killing of their
parents and stepsister. Separate information’s for two (2) murders and
parricide were filed at RTC against respondents.
Thereafter respondents filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause with a prayer to suspend the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them.
Judge Globert Justalero, took over the RTC, and thereafter, reversed the
order of the previous presiding judge. He found probable cause against
respondents and ordered the issuance of warrants for their arrest.
Respondents filed the present petition for certiorari with the CA. CA granted
the petition, set aside the RTC order of Judge Justalero, and annulled the
warrants of arrest issued. The CA also dismissed the criminal cases against
the respondents.
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Issue: WON there was probable cause to issue a warrant for the arrest of
respondents.
Held: What is probable cause? Probable cause assumes the existence of
facts that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a
crime has been committed and that it was likely committed by the person
sought to be arrested. It requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and
convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less
stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as
the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court
has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest.
Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents is merely circumstantial.
The prosecution evidence shows that they had motive in that they had been
at odds with their father and stepmother. They had opportunity in that they
were still probably home when the crime took place. Archie took two pairs of
new gloves from his car late that evening. Cindy was apparently executed
inside Archie’s room. The separate rooms of the two accused had, quite
curiously, been wiped clean even of their own fingerprints. A trial, unlike
preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side
after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on
cross-examination. What is important is that there is some rational basis for
going ahead with judicial inquiry into the case. This Court does not subscribe
to the CA’s position that the prosecution had nothing to go on with.
Ong vs. Genio G.R. No.182336 December 23, 200987
Facts: Petitioner Elvira O. Ong filed a criminal complaint against respondent
Jose Genio for Robbery. The information states that respondent carry away
kitchen and canteen equipment as well as her personal things valued at Php
700,000.00.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of Probable Cause
Pursuant to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and, in View of
Compelling Grounds for the Dismissal of the Case to Hold in Abeyance the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest (Motion to Dismiss).
RTC of Makati City dismissed the case because the other elements of the
crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either
violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not
specifically alleged in the Information filed. The RTC held that the evidence
on record failed to establish probable cause to charge respondent with the
crime of Robbery. 
Issue: WON the court erred in not finding probable cause to merit the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and dismissal of the case.
Held: Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
clearly provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. ' Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued
by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case
of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and
the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing
of the complaint or information.
Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon the filing of
an Information, has the following options:
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause;
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(2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and
(3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the
issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the
information.
It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. This, the RTC judge clearly complied with in this case. 
People vs Pepino GR No. 183479 June 29, 2010
Facts: On October 18, 1997 in Quezon City, Metro Manila accused/appellant
Pepino, Daisy and Pelenio (died in a shootout) kidnap Anita Ching, a
businesswoman, and brought her to a safehouse for the purpose of
demanding ransom in the amount of P500,000.00, after which it was paid the
victim was released.
An information for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with serious illegal
detention was filed against accused.
RTC, by Decision found Pepino and Daisy guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal and accomplice, respectively, of the crime charged.
Pepino did not testify, and for that matter presented no evidence to defeat or
attenuate the charge or evidence brought against him. All he did in his
defense was to raise the constitutional presumption of innocence, and to
present his kins (Renato, Larex, Zeny to testify that they and Pepino were
illegally arrested. He challenged his warrantless arrest for kidnapping as
illegal.
Issue: WON accused Pepino was illegally arrested.
Held:
Pepino assails his conviction on, among others, the illegality of his arrest.
The court opines that as to the alleged illegality of Pepino’s arrest, it is settled
that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely raised
in a motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing
which he is deemed to have waived. Since Pepino did not raise such alleged
irregularity early on, he is now estopped.
Rebellion vs People G.R. No. 175700 July 5, 2010 88
Held: Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We
note that nowhere in the records did we find any objection interposed by
petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been
consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity
of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 5 In this case, petitioner
was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during
the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his
arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying
his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause
for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a
trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused.
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
individual under any of the following circumstances:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense;
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(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Pineda-Ng vs. People G.R. No. 189533 November 15, 201089
Facts: On December 19, 2007, an Information for Qualified Theft was filed
against: Richard Francisco, Branch Mgr. of private complainant Philippine
Business Bank, Mailada Marilag-Aquino; and petitioner Ma. Imelda Pineda-
Ng.
The prosecution found that Aquino had drawn and issued the seven (7)
checks in favor of petitioner amounting to P8,735,000.00. Petitioner
presented these 7 checks for payment before the bank by virtue of her Bill
Purchase Accommodation facility through Francisco, who, in excess of his
authority, approved the payment of these checks despite the fact that the
same were actually drawn from Closed Accounts and/or drawn against
insufficient funds.
At first, Judge Reyes found probable cause to hold Francisco liable, while
ordered the dismissal of the case against Aquino and petitioner for absence
of probable cause. Aggrieved, the bank filed its MR.
Judge Reyes, acting on the bank’s MR, issued an Order reversing her earlier
ruling, this time finding probable cause against Aquino and petitioner and
directing the issuance of warrants of arrest to all the accused. No bail was
recommended.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA, which was denied for lack of
merit.
Hence, this Petition ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the CA for decision
and resolution which are inconsistent with and not supported by the law, the
facts, and the settled jurisprudence laid down by the SC on the matter of filing
of criminal cases against the accused where there is no evidence sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that an offense was committed.
Issue:
WON there is probable cause in this case.
Held:
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of
the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and
reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating
officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt
and requires more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence which would
justify a conviction.
The general rule is that this Court does not review factual findings of the trial
court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court sets aside
the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial court judge on the existence of
probable cause, such as cases when the Court finds it necessary in order to
prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly
administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the
application of the exception.
Moreover, we respect the findings of the CA when it held that Judge Reyes
did not solely rely on the findings of the City Prosecutor in reversing her
earlier Order. We observed, among others, that when Judge Reyes quoted
our ruling in People v. CA, she underscored a portion thereof, clearly
indicative of her reliance on said jurisprudence. Thus, it cannot be validly
argued that Judge Reyes simply and blindly adhered to the recommendation
of the City Prosecutor in rendering the assailed Order, bereft of any factual
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and legal basis. Furthermore, we also accord respect to the factual findings of
the City Prosecutor and the CA that petitioner indeed encashed these
allegedly anomalous checks. Suffice it to state that a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction – it is enough that there is a reasonable belief that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
People vs, Martinez G.R. No. 191366 Dec. 13, 201090
Held: Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both
require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be
valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested.
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no
probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to
arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that
the accused had just committed an offense.
People vs. Quebral G.R. No. 185379 Nov. 27, 200991
Held:
The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a person may be arrested even
without a warrant only a) if he is caught in the act of committing a crime, b) if
he has just committed a crime and the arresting officer pursued him, or c) if
he escaped from a legal confinement. But in the first two instances, the officer
must have personal knowledge of the facts underlying the arrest. The target
person’s observable acts must clearly spell a crime. If no crime is evident
from those acts, no valid arrest can be made. An informant whispering to the
police officer’s ear that the person walking or standing on the street has
committed or is committing a crime will not do. The arresting officer must
himself perceive the manifestations of a crime.
As the lower court aptly put it in this case, the law enforcers already had an
inkling of the personal circumstances of the persons they were looking for
and the criminal act they were about to commit. That these circumstances
played out in their presence supplied probable cause for the search. The
police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. Since
the seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is admissible in evidence
against the accused.
People vs. Ara G.R. No. 185011 Dec. 23, 200992
Held: One of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has committed,
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AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 7. Requirements for
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AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule
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AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule
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is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence
of a peace officer or private person.
It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest
accused-appellants.  Probable cause, in warrantless searches, must only be
based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed.  There is no hard and fast rule or fixed
formula for determining probable cause, for its determination varies according
to the facts of each case. Probable cause was provided by information
gathered from the CI and from accused-appellants themselves when they
instructed PO1 Ayao to enter their vehicle and begin the transaction. The
illegal sale of shabu inside accused-appellants’ vehicle was afterwards clearly
established. Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers were
justified in making the arrests as accused-appellants had just committed a
crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao. Talib and Musa were also frisked
for contraband as it may be logically inferred that they were also part of Ara’s
drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further strengthened by
Musa’s attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.
Esquillo vs People G.R. No. 82010 Aug. 25, 201093
Held:
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a
valid search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions,
viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of
vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4)
searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among
other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Lumanog vs. People G.R. No.182555 Sept. 7, 201094
Held:
The police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on 19 June 1996 or six days
after the killing. Six days is definitely more than enough to secure an
arrest warrant, and yet the police opted to arrest Joel and the other
accused, without any warrant, claiming that it was conducted in "hot
pursuit." In law enforcement, "hot pursuit" can refer to an immediate pursuit
by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the warrantless arrrest of Joel,
made six days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of "hot pursuit."
The question now is whether the successive warrantless arrests of the
accused are legal. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
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AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule
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b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the above instances is present in this case: (1) the accused were not
arrested in flagrante delicto; (2) the arrest was not based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officers that there is probable cause that the
accused were the authors of the crime which had just been committed; (3) the
accused were not prisoners who have escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while their case is pending. There is no
question that all the accused were apprehended several days after the crime
while doing ordinary and unsuspicious activities. There is also no question
that the police had no personal knowledge of probable cause that the
accused were responsible for the crime which had been committed. The third
situation is inapplicable since the accused are not prison escapees.
Considering these facts, there is indeed no justification for the warrantless
arrests effected by the police in their so-called "hot pursuit." Such warrantless
arrest, therefore, amounts to a violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The police investigation work in this case, which led to the unlawful
warrantless arrest of the accused, is nothing but sloppy: (1) they chose to rely
solely on the sworn statement of one eyewitness (Alejo); (2) they failed to
obtain any description of the suspects from other eyewitnesses, including the
owner of the Kia Pride which was forcefully obtained by the suspects as a
get-away car; (3) they showed Alejo a picture of Joel to assist him in
identifying the "suspect"; and (4) they arrested the other accused based
entirely on the illegally extracted extrajudicial confession of Joel.
People vs Araneta G.R. No. 191064 Oct. 20, 2010 95
Held:
The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant
or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and
the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling,
dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust
team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is
a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a
form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose
of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
People v Penaflorida 551 SCRA 111 (2008)
Facts: SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the
Investigation and Operation Division of the PNP station in Tigaon, Camarines
Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being
transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante, chief of police in Tigaon, then
organized a team composed of Competente as team leader, SPO2 Callo,
SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the
police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon.
They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged
appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper
together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in
appellant’s possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took
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AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule
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photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where
he was booked.
Major Lorlie Arroyo, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory Regional
Office No. V, was presented as an expert witness to identify the subject
marijuana leaves. She related that after taking a representative sample from
the 928-gram confiscated dried leaves, the same was tested positive of
marijuana.
Appellant denied the accusations against him. That on his way home, they
met Boyet Obias (Obias) who requested appellant to bring a package
wrapped in a newspaper to Jimmy Gonzales, he placed it in the basket in
front of his bicycle and Gonzales proceeded to the Tiagon town proper. On
his way home, he was flagged down by the police and was invited to go with
them to the headquarters.
TC ruled that there was violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, hence, the
instant case is now before this Court on automatic review.
In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he had
freely and consciously possessed marijuana. One of the issues raised is that,
upon receipt of the information from the asset, the police officers
should have first investigated and tried to obtain a warrant of arrest
against appellant, instead of arbitrarily arresting him.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the appellant is tenable?
Ruling: No.
The police was tipped off at around 1:00pm that appellant was transporting
marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest
warrant as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime.
The arrest as effected after appellant as caught in flagrante delicto. He
was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with him the contraband,
hence, demonstrating that a crime was then already being committed.
Under the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that
appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is
justified.
Article II, Section 4 of RA No. 6425, as amended by RA No 7659, states:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker in any of such
transactions. x x x.
Jurisprudence defines “transport” as “to carry or convey from one place to
another.” In the instant case, appellant was riding his bicycle when he was
caught by the police. He admitted that he was about to convey the package,
which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales.
Appellant, denies any knowledge that the package in his possession
contained marijuana. But TC rejected his contention, noting that it was
impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of the package
because “marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma which
would have alarmed him.”
Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to declare that being
mala prohibita, one commits the crime under RA No. 6425 by mere
possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or
knowledge thereof is not necessary.
Finally, the lower courts correctly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos by virtue of the
amendment to Section 4, RA No. 6425 by RA No. 7659.
TC’s decision is affirmed.
People vs. Sembrano G.R. No.185848 Aug. 16, 2010 96
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
Held: On the legality of the warrantless arrest, We reiterate that appellant
was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment
operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with the
provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing
warrantless arrests, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been
accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust
operation, such as the one involving appellant, deserves judicial sanction.
Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure
conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances.
The search, incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its
validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu recovered during
the legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and were properly admitted
in evidence against him.
Appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-up are both self-serving and
uncorroborated, and must fail in light of straightforward and positive testimony
of poseur-buyer identifying him as the seller of shabu. The twin defenses of
denial and frame-up hold little weight vis-à-vis the strong evidence gathered
by the prosecution in proving his complicity to the offenses. To recall, PO1
Manaol’s testimony was corroborated on material points by PO1 Bagay, who
identified appellant as the one who handed the sachet of shabu to PO1
Manaol after being handed two (2) One Hundred Peso bills. Contrary to the
defense’s claim, it is not impossible for a buy-bust operation to be conducted
in broad daylight, as in the case at bar. Frame-up, like denial, is viewed by
this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted.
People vs. Racho G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010 97
Held:
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be
discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of
his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless
search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue.
Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the
case, we must abide with jurisprudence that appellant, having voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his
right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over his person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot,
in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband
was lawful.
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and
any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
be made without warrant, b.) Exceptions to strict enforcement, 1. Illegal
Possession of guns or drugs
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AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
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7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article
III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be
sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted,
despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his
arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As
earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless
arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.
PEOPLE vs. BIYOC 532 SCRA 20198
Facts:
At 4pm of Dec 5, 2000, private complainant AAA was in a room on the 2 nd
floor of the family house taking care of here one year old sister. Her father,
herein appellant, entered the room and touched here genitals, after which he
told her to lie down on the floor.
Overcome by fear, AAA did lie down on the floor as told. Appellant at once
pulled her short pants down and touched her genitals again, after which he
went on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Appellant was
not able to fully penetrate AAA’s vagina, however, as her elder sister BBB
went up the 2nd floor and saw appellant sitting in front of AAA who was lying
down, face up. Appellant immediately warned BBB not to tell their mother
about what she saw. After BBB left appellant inserted his penis inside AAA’s
vagina.
BBB lost no time to report that same day to her mother CCC, live-in partner of
appellant, what she saw, CCC thus immediately confronted AAA who did
confirm that appellant had inserted his penis inside her vagina that afternoon,
and that appellant had been doing the same act to her since she was nine
years old. Incensed, CCC accompanied AAA the following day, December 6,
2000, DSWD to report the incident, and also to the police officers.
PO1 Javier, together with AAA and CCC thereafter proceeded to the family
home and on their way, they met appellant. PO1 Javier at once informed him
of his rights, arrested him and brought him to the police station. AAA’s and
CCC’s statements were thereupon taken.
TC ruled that appellant is guilty for the crime of rape. In his brief, appellant
raised the issue that the trial court failed to consider the fact that the
accused’s arrest was legally objectionable. He claims that his arrest was
illegal because a “warrantless arrest was effected even before the statement
of the private complainant was taken.”
Issue
WON the contention of the accused-appellant is correct?
Ruling
NO. Objections to the legality of arrests must, however, be made prior
to the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise, they are considered
waived.
We have also ruled that an accused may be stopped from assailing the
illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information
against him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in
his arrest may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court as what was done by the appellants in the instant
case. Not only did they enter their pleas during arraignment, but they also
actively participated during the trial which constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity in their arrest.
In the present case, appellant failed to question the illegality of his arrest
before entering his please, hence, he is deemed to waive the same.
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TAU MU

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must
Valdez v People 538 SCRA 611 (2007) 99
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
Facts: Bautista testified that at around 8:00pm of March 17, 2003, he was
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 21 Here, petitioner’s
conducting the routing patrol along the National Highway La Union together
act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was
with Aratas and Ordono when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight
finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away
from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared
as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus
as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had
approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They
just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of
criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away
Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by
but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly
contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that
dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity
petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.
enough to validate his warrantless arrest. 26 If at all, the search most
permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the
Police Inspector Laya, the forensic chemist who conducted the examination
case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring
of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that
based on petitioner’s behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following
the specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the substance
Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s
weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of
outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the
marijuana. The charges were denied by petitioner. TC ruled in favour of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
prosecution.
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
In appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the
Ruling in Issue No. 2
crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues,
albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against
Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest
him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search
his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he
cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible
warrantless search which was not lawful.29 As we pronounced in People v.
in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Bacla-an —
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal arrest? YES. What is the effect of
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
the declaration of illegal arrest?
following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence:
(1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches
Ruling: At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find
(4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search)
any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The
valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot
person. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.30
basis of his acquittal.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the
warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. Evaluating the
warrantless search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had
evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as
v. Court of Appeals31 —
well.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e.,
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant;
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature
transferred from one confinement to another.
of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took
xxx
place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod,
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and
not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at
freely and voluntarily given.
the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an
offense.20 The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to
warrantless arrest.
exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon
99 the guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the
be made without warrant, d.) Effects of Declaration of Illegal Arrest determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to
extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-
bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." 52 In the
same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and public
officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the
highest degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for the law.
SC reversed the decision of the lower courts and acquitted the accused.
PEOPLE vs. SANTOS 555 SCRA 578100
Facts:
On March 8, 2003, the SDEU operatives of the Pasig City Police conducted a
buy-bust operation in a residential area along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, on
the basis of reports that a certain alias Monching Labo was selling illegal
drugs in the said locality. Accompanied by a confidential informant, the police
team, proceeded to the ratget area at around 1:15 to 1:20 a.am. PO3 Carlo
Luna was to act as the poseur-buyer, whereas the other members of the
team were to serve as his backup.
The informant the pointed to 2 pesons standing along the target area, one of
whom was Monching Labo, later indentified as appellant Ramon Catoc
Picayo. After approaching , the informant introduced PO3 Luna as a shabu
customer to one of the persons, later identified as appellant Jerry Santos.
Appellant Santos then asked PO3 Luna how much worth of shabu he was
buying and asked for the money. PO3 Luna gave appellant Santos the buy-
bust money consisting of a pre-marked p100 bill. Santos handed this money
to appellant Catoc, who took out from his pocket a sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance, which he handed back to
appellant Santos. When Santos gave the plastic sachet to PO3 Luna, the
latter nabbed the former and introduced himself as a policeman.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in convicting the, as their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that the prosecution
failed to prove that a buy-bust operation took place and that their arrests
without warrant were not legally effected.
Issue
WON the arrest was legally effected?
Ruling
YES. The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal lacks
merit. The Court notes that nowhere in the records did we find any objection
by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior to their arraignment. We
have held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity
of the conviction of the accused. It is much too late in the day to complain
about the warrantless arrest after a valid information ha been filed, the
accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him.
Nevertheless, our ruling in Pp vs Cabugatan provides that:
The rule is settled that an arrest made after entrapment does not require a
warrant inasmuch as it Is considered as valid warrantless arrest pursuant to
Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.
Ople v Torres 293 SCRA 141 (1998)101
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that this Court invalidate Administrative Order
No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Indentification
Reference System” on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is
100
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When
arrest may be made without warrant, d.) Effects of Declaration of Illegal
Arrest
101
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10.
Privacy & 11. Privacy of Communications
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usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not AO No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy.
Ruling: Yes.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that “every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbours and other persons” and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, and recognizes the privacy of letter and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the
Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual
Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we rescind from the premise that the right to privacy is
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution; hence, it is the burden of
government to show that AO No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. AO No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce,
if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transaction and misrepresentations by
person seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of AO No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of AO No. 308
which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present
danger.
AO No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. That lack of proper safeguards in this regard od AO No. 308 may
interfere with individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to
track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the date encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill
of Rights seeks to prevent.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in
a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources –
governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at
bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by
issuing AO No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of
basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that AO No. 308 gives the government
the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is
timely to take not of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the disturbing
result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of
his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-
keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget.” Oblivious to
this counsel, the dissents still say we shout not be too quick in labelling the
right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the
right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
In Re Sabio 504 SCRA 214 (2006)102
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
Facts: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
Philippine Senate Resolution No.455, “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation
on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,
approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and
PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and
Narciso Nrio to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006
and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res.
455. However, said invitation was refused by them, invoking 4 (b) of EO No. 1
which provides that, “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on
Public Services issued an Order directing Major General Jose Balajadia
(Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the
approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees’
members.
In GR No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its
directors and officers alleged among others that the subpoena violated
petitioners’ right to privacy and against self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or not the subpoena violated petitioners’ rights to privacy.
Ruling: No.
One important on the Congress’ power of inquiry is that “the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” This is just
another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be “subject to the
limitations placed by the Constitution on government action.” As held in
Barenblatt v United States, “the Congress, in common with all other branches
of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed
by the Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the context of
this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.”
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these
zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in
accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord
to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
“constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but also
from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy” and “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at
least two guarantees that explicitly create zone of privacy. It highlights a
person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right to determine what, how
much, to whom and when information about himself shall be
disclosed.” Section 2 guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.” Section
3 renders inviolable the “privacy of communication and
correspondence” and further cautions that “any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.”
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion. Applying this determination to these
cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation; and
second, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate’s
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly “on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
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Corporation (POTC), Philippines Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in the operation by their respective board of directors.”
Obviously, the inquiry focuses on petitioners’ acts committed in the discharge
of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable
expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation
where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public
concern and over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v Mutuc, the Court, in line with
Whalen v Roe, employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that
there was no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and
minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of
honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration. In
Valmonte v Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public figures, the
Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to
closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of
the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over
the right to privacy of financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the
PHILCOMSAT, PHC, and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the
conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling
reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and
officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to
prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination
regarding PCGG’s efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy
on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate
Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by
respondent Senate Committees.
SJS vs DDB 570 SCRA 410 (2008)103
Facts: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
Issue1: Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices in violation of right to privacy.
Ruling: No.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution intrudes. In this case, the office
or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized
by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search
or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v Torres, is the
enabling law, authorzing a search “narrowly drawn” or “narrowly focused?”
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA
9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
103
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provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would
unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject
of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The
goal is to discourage drug use by not telling advance anyone when and who
is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the
employee concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in
the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the work place.”
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee’s privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall
employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results.
But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR
issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
“need to know” basis; that the “drug test result and the records shall be kept
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the tests results.” Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in
the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the
youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to
achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting an resolutely
pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social economic lines. And it
may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal
drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor’s dream were it not for
the illegal and immoral components of any such activities. The drug problem
has already abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug
trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to
this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use
among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing
being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a
reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labour under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service Law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA
9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
Issue2: Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses is in violation of right to
privacy.
Ruling: Yes.
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
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mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they
seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to
the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6)
years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antiethical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged,
by the bare fact of being hauled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right
to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Lee vs CA G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010104
Held:
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad
testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable
and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral
examination concerning the Lee-Keh children’s theory that she had illicit
relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and
oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of
documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has
a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule
21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena
duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the
time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of
the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose
behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the
production thereof.
Manila Electric Company vs. Lim G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010 105
Held:
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the
guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners,
does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
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105
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial
complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the
truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this
age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as
a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its
intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing
Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario
that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.
It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer
- a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of
habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’
refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as
"highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And
she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the
real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Zulueta v CA 253 SCRA 699 (1996)106
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers seized were admissible in
evidence.
Ruling: No.
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful
order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
106
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11.
Privacy of Communications
45
TAU MU
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouse by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while
the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent if
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from
the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing
to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
In Re Alejano 468 SCRA 188 (2005)107
Facts: This case results from the Oakwood incident in July 2003.
One of the petitioners’ argument is that the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center violated the detainees’ right to privacy when ISAFP officials opened
and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one
of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a
sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the
ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits
the infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights unless authorized by law. The
Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Issue:
Whether or not the officials of ISAFP Detention Center violated detainees’
right to privacy of communication.
Ruling: No.
The opening and reading of the detainees’ letters in the present case did not
violate the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not
in sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as
it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection
of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner
who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel
when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the
letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between
the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read
the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of
the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s
privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not
to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detainees is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.
KMU v Director 487 SCRA 623 (2006)108
Facts: On 13 April 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420
(REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING
FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE
SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES). Petitioners alleged that EO 420 is
107
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11.
Privacy of Communications
108
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11.
Privacy of Communications
 46
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo
TAU MU

unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional provisions on the right to
privacy.
(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the
owner’s consent.
(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or
penalties for any violation of its provisions.
(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the
necessity of EO 420.
Issue: Whether or not EO 420 violates the constitutional provision on the
right to privacy.
Ruling: No.
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental
functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of
these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been
no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and
recording of personal identification data.
decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this
ground that the petition is granted by this Court.”
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems
and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO
420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not
already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive
issuance in Ople v Torres sought to establish a “National Computerized
Identification Reference System,” a national ID system that did not exist prior
to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card
issuance system where none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable, and user-friendly
to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under
the President’s constitutional power of control over government entities in the
Executive department, as well as under the President’s constitutional duty to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
 
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since
petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain
against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored
for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data,
and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection,
recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data
collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO
420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind,
nature, and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems.
Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14
specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government
entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven
less data than what Supreme Court’s ID shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities

prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of
personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section
5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:

a. The date to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for
purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to
those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in
violation of a person’s right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under
this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification
system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated
as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization of the
Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced
security features and cryptographic technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be
required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under
such conditions as the participating agency issuing the
identification card shall prescribe.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly

limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the
existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to
the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy.
Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO
420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and
exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v Torres is not
authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case, the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of
safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter
required legislation. As the Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v Torres, “The voting is