ARATUC V. COMELEC
Before hearing, the canvass was
G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979
TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO,
CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED TAMULA,
MANGONTAWAR GURO and BONIFACIO
LEGASPI, petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII
(Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH DIMAPORO,
JESUS AMPARO, ANACLETO BADOY, et al.,
respondents
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the
decision of the respondent Comelec resolving
their appeal from the respondent Regional Board
of Canvassers for Region XII regarding the
canvass of the results of the election in said
region for representatives to the I.B.P. held on
April 7, 1978.
Facts: Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the
suspension of the canvass then being undertaken
by respondent Board in Cotabato city. A
supervening panel headed by Commissioner of
Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had conducted
of the complaints of the petitioners therein of
alleged irregularities in the election records in the
voting centers.
suspended. After hearing the parties, the Court
allowed resumption of the canvass but issued
guidelines to be followed but thereafter modified.
On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its
canvass and declared the result of the voting.
The petitioners brought the resolution of
respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing was
held on April 25, 1978, after which , the case was
declared submitted for decision.
In order to enable the Commission to decide the
appeal properly :
a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of
the voting records and registration records and in
the case of voting centers whose voting and
registration records which have not yet been
submitted for the Commission to decide to open
the ballot boxes; and
b. To interview and get statements under oath of
impartial and disinterested persons from the area
to determine whether actual voting took place on
April 7, 1978, as well as those of the military
authorities in the areas affected.
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its
resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring
the final result of the canvass.
Issue: WON there is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of
COMELEC.
Held: Under Section 168 of the Revised Election
Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections)
shall have direct control and supervision over the
board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section
175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be
the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies."
The fact of the matter is that the authority of the
Commission in reviewing actuations of board of
canvassers does not spring from any appellate
jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of
law, for there is none such provision anywhere in
the Election Code, but from the plenary
prerogative of direct control and supervision
endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of
Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too
well settled postulate to need any supporting
citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do
directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.
We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its
having extended its inquiry beyond that
undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the
contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly
and commendably asserted its statutory authority
born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis
the preservation of the purity of elections and
electoral processes and in doing what petitioner it
should not have done.
MACEDA V. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
G.R. No. 96266 July 18, 1991
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX
(Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON
CORPORATION, respondents.
Nature: Petition for nullification of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated December 5
and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings
conducted on the second provisional increase in
oil prices did not allow herein petitioner
substantial cross-examination, in effect, allegedly,
a denial of due process.
Facts: On August 2, 1990, private respondents oil
companies filed with the ERB their respective
applications on oil price increases.
On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order
granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter.
Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition
on September 26, 1990.
Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-
chief commenced on November 21, 1990. ERB
subsequently outlined the procedure as follows:
.. it has been traditional and it is the intention of
the Board to act on these applications on an
industry-wide basis, whether to accept, reject,
modify or whatever, the Board will do it on an
industry wide basis, so, the best way to have the
oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what
the applicants are asking for is to have all the
evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first and
then the examination will come later, the cross-
examination will come later..
Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of
proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross-
examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him
his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of
Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed
procedure resulted in the denial of due process.
Issue: WON the EBR acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held: Such a relaxed procedure is especially true
in administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in
matters of rate or price fixing is considered as
exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial,
function As such administrative agency, it is not
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence
governing court proceedings.
In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice
and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB
provides that
These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and
procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in
all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation
and/or any other proceedings within the
jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader
interest of justice, the Board may, in any
particular matter, except itself from these rules
and apply such suitable procedure as shall
promote the objectives of the Order.
We dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990,
reaffirming ERB's authority to grant provisional
increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to
Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, under Executive Order No.
172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not
preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a
provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its
final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it
permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or
(3) to deny the application.