Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Please find below the possible areas to be covered by the essay questions in the Labor and Social
Legislation(Pertinent ponencias of Justice Velasco have been highlighted):
A. Preliminaries
1. Labor rights protected and guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. (Sec. 3, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution)
a. Right to self-organization;
b. Right to collective bargain;
c. Right to collectively negotiate;
d. Right to peaceful concerted activities;
e. Right to strike in accordance with law;
f. Right to participate in policy and decision-making processes;
g. Right to security of tenure;
h. Right to human condition of work;
i. Right to a living wage;
j. Right to a just share in the profits.
2. Labor rights protected under the Labor Code. (Art. 3, Labor Code)
a. Right to self-organize;
b. Right to collectively bargain;
c. Right to security of tenure;
(J. Velasco) -The security guards right to security of tenure does not give him a
vested right to the position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to
change the assignment of, or transfer the security guard to, a station where his
services would be most beneficial to the client. Indeed, an employer has the right
to transfer or assign its employees from one office or area of operation to
another, or in pursuit of its legitimate business interest, provided there is no
demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges, and the
transfer is not motivated by discrimination or bad faith, or effected as a form of
punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. (Exocet Security and Allied
Services Corporation vs. Serrano, G.R. No. 198538, September 29, 2014)
d. Right to just and humane work condition.
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To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers and
employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining, no court or
administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or
other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code.
d. Workers representation and participation in policy and decision-making (Art. 255, LC)
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to such
rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to participate in
policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said
processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and
employers may form labor-management councils: Provided that the representatives of the workers in
such labor-management councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said
establishment. (As amended by Section 22, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers and
employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining, no court or
administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or
other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code.
e. Workers representation and participation in policy and decision-making (Art. 255, LC)
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to such
rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to participate in
policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said
processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and
employers may form labor-management councils: Provided that the representatives of the workers in
such labor-management councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said
establishment. (As amended by Section 22, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
B. Book I
1. Illegal Recruitment
Q. Can the accused object when two separate complaints for estafa and illegal recruitment is file against
him?
Answer: No. A person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this
is that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal
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intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter. (People v Saulo,
344 SCRA 605)
Q. Charito used to work as a nurse in Ireland. She chose to retire in the Philippines. She convinced a
number of nurses in their barangay apply in the hospital in Ireland where she used to work without
obtaining a license to do so?
Answer: No. Charito must obtain a license and an authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
Q. Will the number of persons recruited by Charito determine the action which may be instituted against
her?
Answer: Yes. There are two kinds of illegal recruitment:
1. There is simple illegal recruitment when
i. a person undertakes any recruitment activity as defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34; and
ii. a person does not have a license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
Q. Can a party impute that the principal foreign employer had knowledge that its agent solicited
applicants for employment on its behalf?
Answer: No. The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent to the
principal/employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent. There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be
bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its
owner cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divinas claims arising from the 2-year employment
extension. (Sunace v NLRC, G.R. No. 161757, Jan. 25, 2006)
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conclusive upon this Court. And even if it were true no money changed hands, money is
not material to a prosecution for a illegal recruitment, as the definition of recruitment
and placement in the Labor Code included the phrase, whether for profit or not. We
held in People vs. Jamilosa, 512 SCRA 340 (2007), that it was sufficient that the
accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment. Accused-appellant made representations that complainants would receive
employment abroad, and this suffices for her conviction, even if her name does not
appear on the receipts issued to complainants as evidence that payment was made.
(People vs. Valenciano, G.R. No. 180926 December 10, 2008)
Q. Carlito has a two-contract with Pacific Shipping Co. On his 6 th month, Carlito was informed that he
will be repatriated back to Manila. There was reason given for the pre-termination of the contract. What
benefits can Carlito invoke the pre-termination his overseas employment contract?
Answer: In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker's salary, the worker shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement if his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract. (Sec. 10, RA 8042, as amended;
Serrano v Gallant Maritime Service, Inc., GR 167614, March 24, 2009, which deleted the phrase or for
three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. for being unconstitutional)
Q. In anticipation of the need for manpower in the forthcoming Olympics in Brazil, Francisco was able to
establish a contact with Breezo, one of the contractors in the Olympic site which needed maintenance
personnel. Francisco started to advertise through the social media the manpower requirements of Breezo.
Was the act of Francisco proper?
Answer: No. Francisco is guilty of direct hiring of labor. The general rule is that direct hiring is not allowed
except through the Boards and Entities authorized by the Secretary of Labor.
The exception to the rule is when direct hiring is employed by the diplomatic corps;
international organizations; and such other employers as may be allowed by the Secretary of Labor.
2. Read the essential provisions of R.A. 8042 and 10022 on migrant workers
Q. Is there a need for a local recruitment agency to show that an OFW has been validly
dismissed from employment?
Answer: (J. Velasco) YES. - Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local
employment or recruitment agencies and not the foreign employer, they should have
adduced additional evidence to convincingly show that Grans employment was validly
and legally terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the foreign-based employer
but also on the employment or recruitment agency for the latter is not only an agent of
the former, but is also solidarily liable with the foreign principal for any claims or
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liabilities arising from the dismissal of the worker. (EDI-SII vs. NLRC G.R. No. 145587,
October 6, 2007)
Q. Can a Filipino overseas worker invoke the provisions of the Labor Code in case he is retrenched?
Answer: Yes. The provisions of the Labor Code still apply to Filipino OFWs who have been deployed abroad
and are retrenched by the foreign principal. (Article 283, Labor Code, International Management Services v.
Legate (2012))
Q. What is the prescription period within which an OFW may file his monetary claims?
Answer: Article 291 is the law governing the prescription of money claims of seafarers, a class of overseas
contract workers. This law prevails over Section 28 of the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers which
provides for claims to be brought only within one year from the date of the seafarers return to the point of hire.
The prescriptive period is thus three years from the time the cause of action accrues. (Southeastern Shipping v.
Navarra, June 22, 2010)
Q. What factors are considered to ensure that a contract of employment of an OFW is perfected?
Answer: A contract approved by the POEA is deemed perfected at the moment (1) the parties come to agree
upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof (Consent, object and consideration).
The Court awarded moral damages and attorneys fees to the complainant OFW since after the perfection of the
contract, he was not deployed. The Court said that the action of International Management Services was tainted
with bad faith. ( Bright Maritime Corp v. Fantonial (2012))
C. Book II
1. Apprenticeship (Art. 58(a), Labor Code)
Q. If the company allowed individuals to work for at least three months and then executed
Apprenticeship Agreement on the 4th month, is the agreement valid?
Answer: No. Apprenticeship Agreement is not valid where complainants were hired as employees first before
the execution of apprenticeship agreement. The fact that the workers were already rendering service to the
company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as
far as the employees are concerned, especially since, prior to the apprenticeship, the employees performed tasks
that were usually necessary and desirable to the companys usual business.
Even assuming there was a valid apprenticeship, the expiration of the first agreement and the retention of the
employees was recognition by the employer of their training and acquisition of a regular employee status. The
second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement is a
violation of the Labor Codes implementing rules. (Atlanta Industries v. Sabolino (2011))
2. Learners
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3. Hiring of Minors, Article 139 (c)/ see also protection of handicapped workers (Art. 78, Labor Code)
Disabled workers are entitled to 75% of applicable minimum wage.
Incentives for employment of handicapped workers (Sec. 2, R.A. 7277)
PLEASE READ ON THE PROVISIONS OF KASAMBAY LAW
COVERAGE
ENTITLEMENT
PROCEDURE FOR REGISTRATION
LIABILITY FOR NON COMPLIANCE
D. Book III-
1. Classification of Employees
- Nature of seasonal employees
- Regularization of employees
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Q. How can an employer overcome the allegation that an employee has become a regular employee when
said employee was hired as a project employee?
Answer: A project employment contemplates on arrangement whereby the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking whose completion or termination has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee.
Two requirements need to be satisfied to remove the engagement from the presumption of regularity of
employment, namely: (1) designation of a specific project or undertaking for which the employee is hired; and
(2) clear determination of the completion or termination of the project at the time of the employees
engagement. The services of the project employees are legally and automatically terminated upon the end or
completion of the project as the employees services are coterminous with the project.
Q. Professor Mercado has been teaching Mathematics at the Unibersidad ng Pag-Asa (U.P.) for four
semesters on a probationary status. He hold a Bachelors Degree in Education and graduated cum laude.
He requested U.P. to regularize his employment so he can enjoy the benefits under the CBA of the faculty
members of U.P.. Can he compel U.P. to give him a regular status?
Answer: No. Mere completion of the four semester probation, even with an above-average performance, does
not guarantee that the teacher will automatically acquire a permanent employment status. The probationer can
only qualify upon fulfilment of the reasonable standards set for permanent employment as a member of the
teaching personnel. A school CBA must be read in conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations
governing faculty qualifications. (University of the East v. Pepanio, January 23, 2013)
Q. After undergoing her probationary period and with completion of 12 units for her masters degree in
education, Professor Cecilio insisted that he be regularized. Can she compel the school to issue her a
regular employment?
Answer: No. The requirement of a masters degree for attaining permanent full time faculty member status is a
reasonable qualification. (Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholasticas College, December 11, 2013)
Q. Is it proper to have both the teaching and non-teaching personnel of an academic institution to just
have one bargaining unit?
Answer: No.: An academic institution should have two bargaining units: one for academic personnel;
and another for non-academic personnel. The differences, however, between the two categories of
employees are no substantial enough to warrant a dismissal of a petition for certification election, seeking
an election for only one unit. The remedy is to hold two certification elections. (Holy Child Catholic
School v. HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS, July 23, 2013)
Q. If a probationary employee was illegally dismissed, what is the basis of the computation of his
backwages?
Answer: The computation of backwages of a probationary employee should not cover the entire period from
the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement. The computation of
backwages shall end upon the end of the probationary employment.
The lapse of the probationary employment without any appointment as a regular employee of the employer
effectively severed the employer-employee relationship between the parties. (Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons
Supermarket Corp. v. Ranchez, January 19, 2011)
Q. Cristina was initially hired by Abet Laboratories Inc. (ALI) on a probationary basis. She has been
on probation for the past two years. Under the Employees Handbook, an employee who has consistently
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rendered above average performance for a probationary period of two years will automatically become a
regular employee. Cristina requested that she be regularized. ALI refused to regularize Cristina and
instead, it terminated her employment. Cristina instituted an action against ALI. Will the case prosper?
Answer: Yes. The employers violation of its own company procedure for termination renders the termination
procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of nominal damages. The adequate performance of ones duties is,
by and of itself an inherent and implied standard for a probationary employee to be regularized; such is a
regularization standard which need not be spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every case. (Abbot
Laboratories vs. Alcaraz, July 23, 2013)
Q. Mr. Santos is a well-known publicist. Pursuant to the By-Laws of ABC Company, the Board of
Directors created the position of Communications Manager and it engaged the services of Mr. Santos for
said position. Is Mr. Santos considered a corporate officer?
Answer: No. A position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order to be considered as a corporate
office. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or under a By-Law enabling provision is not enough to make a
position a corporate office.
Q. As an ordinary corporate officer, can Mr. Santos be terminated at will by ABC Company?
Answer: No. The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers who may be ousted from office at will,
on one hand, and ordinary corporate employees who may only be terminated for just cause, on the other hand,
do not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on the manner of creation of the office. ( Matling
Industrial v. Coros, October 13, 2010)
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Q. Mr. Reyes is a stockholder of XYZ Company. Being an accountant, the company hired him as its
Comptroller, a position not provided for in the companys By-Laws.
Mr. Reyes is listed as an officer in the General Information Sheet of the Company.
The company terminated his services because he found to be remised of his responsibility as Comptroller.
Can Mr. Reyes file an intra-corporate suit before the RTC for his dismissal?
Answer: No. The contents of the General Information Sheets, which identifies the employee as an
officer of the company could neither govern nor establish the nature of the office held by the employee
and his appointment thereto. The mere fact that the complainant employee was a stockholder of the
company does not necessarily make the action an intra-corporate controversy. (Cosare v. Broadcom Asia,
February 5, 2014)
Q. Mr. Alden Richards, an American citizen, was hired by Aldub Company as a Marketing Specialist. He
has worked for the company for two years. The company terminated the services for Mr. Richards
because the Human Resources Manager of the company found out that he does not have any Alien
Employment Permit. Mr. Richards sued the company for illegal dismissal. Will the case prosper?
Answer: No. A foreigner who alleged illegal dismissal and sought to claim under our labor laws is required to
establish first that he was qualified and duly authorized to obtain employment within our jurisdiction. A
requirement for foreigners who intend to work within the country is an employment permit. With the failure of
Mr. Richards to obtain his Alien Employment Permit warrants the dismissal of his labor complaint. (McBurnie
v. Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc., October 17, 2013)
Q. Mr. Ricardo Sanchez is a referee engaged by the UAAP. Is he an employee of the UAAP?
Answer: No. The contractual stipulations do not pertain to, much less dictate, how and when the referees will
blow the whistle and make calls. They merely serve as rules of conduct or guidelines in order to maintain the
integrity of the professional basketball league. (Bernante v. PBA, September 14, 2011)
Q. Ms. Ay is a talent of Showcase, a noontime show of a popular television network. Is she considered an
employee of the television network company?
Answer: No. As a talent, Ms. Ay Ay is considered not an employee of the television network company.
However, production assistants, drivers/cameramen and security guards of the network company not being
talents are considered employees. (Fulache v. ABS-CBN, January 21, 2010; Television and Production
Exponents v. Servaa, January 28, 2008; ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Nazareno, Sept. 26, 2006)
2. Labor Contracting
- Requisites
- What is an independent contractor agreement?
- Service contractor
-labor/job contractor
- Rights under labor contracting
Q. A complaint was lodged against Top Company by a group of laborers alleging that the company does
not have sufficient capital to operate as an independent contractor. During the hearing, Top Company
presented its Certificate of Registration with the DOLE. Is the Certificate of Registration sufficient proof
to establish that it is an independent contractor?
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Answer: No. A contractors Certificate of Registration is not sufficient proof that it is an independent
contractor. A Certificate of Registration issued by the Department of Labor and Employment is not conclusive
evidence of such status. The fact of registration simply prevents the legal presumption of being a mere labor-
only contractor from arising. (Babas v. Lorenzo Shipping, December 15, 2010)
3. Wage Formulation
Q. What is the effect of a Wage Boards setting of an across the board wage increase?
Answer: (J. Velasco) - The Court held that a RTWPB commits ultra vires and
unreasonable act when, instead of setting a minimum wage rate, it prescribes a wage
increase cutting across all levels of employment and wage brackets: In the present case,
the RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage rate by the floor-wage
method or the salary-ceiling method in issuing the Wage Order. The RTWPB did
not set a wage level nor a range to which a wage adjustment or increase will be added.
Instead, it granted an across-the-board wage increase at P15.00 to all employees and
workers of Region 2. In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority by extending the
Wage Orders to wage earners receiving more than the prevailing minimum wage rate,
without the denominated salary ceiling. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Wage
Order granted additional benefits not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727 (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Nasipit Employees Labor Union,
G.R. No. 162411, June 27, 2008)
E. Book IV
1. Death Benefits of Seafarers
Q. Can a claim for death benefits be denied even if the injury was sustained in the course of his work?
Answer: Yes. Failure of an injured seafarer to comply with medical checkup within three days from repatriation
is not entitled to receive death benefits. The Court ruled that it could not find a direct link that pneumonia being
the cause of death based on the Death Certificate was triggered by the tetanus caused by the injury sustained by
the seafarer. (Crew and Management International Inc and Selena Inc. V. Jina T. Soria (2012))
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Q. What does total disability mean?
Answer: (J. Velasco) -It has been held that disability is intimately related to ones
earning capacity. It should be understood less on its medical significance but more on
the loss of earning capacity. Total disability does not mean absolute helplessness. In
disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity. Thus,
permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. (Oriental
Shipmanagement Co. Inc. vs. Bastol, G.R. No. 186289, June 29, 2010)
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F. Book V
1. Unions and Registration
- Process of registration
- Grounds for denial of registration
Q. What is the effect of withdrawal of membership after the application for registration has been filed?
Answer:: The subsequent affidavits of retraction (withdrawal of membership) will not retroact to the time of
the application for registration or even way back to the organizational meeting.
Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires the list of names of all the union members of an independent union
comprising at least 20% of the bargaining unit. This should not be equated with the list of workers who
participated in the organizational meetings (par [b]). (Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club v. CA, March 18,
2010)
Q. Can both the supervisory and rank-and-file employees be affiliated with the same labor organization?
Answer: Yes. The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in a union does not nullify its legal
personality as a legitimate labor organization. (Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-
SUPER) v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011)
Q. Can both the supervisory union and the rank-and-file employees union be affiliated with the same
labor federation?
Answer: Yes. As amended by R.A. 9481, the Labor Code now allows a rank and file union and a supervisory
union of the same company to be part of the same federation for the following reasons:
An employer cannot ignore the existence of a legitimate labor organization at the time of its voluntary
recognition of another union. The employer and the voluntarily recognized union cannot, by themselves, decide
whether the other union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments.
(Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Hon. Secretary of Labor, August 14, 2012)
San Miguel Foods v. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union, August 1, 2011: The test of grouping
is community or mutuality of interest.
There should be only one bargaining unit for employees involved in dressed chicken processing and workers
engaged in live chicken operations.
Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the tasks of each division are actually interrelated
and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.
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agent relationship. Moreover, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved
in a different forum.(Cirtek Employees Labor Union- FFW v. Cirtek Electronics (2011))
Q. What is the effect of the employees withdrawal from union membership before and
after the filing of a petition for certification election?
Answer: (J. Velasco) - As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these mostly undated written
statements submitted by Ventures on March 20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its
petition for cancellation of registration, partake of the nature of withdrawal of union
membership executed after the Unions filing of a petition for certification election on March
21, 2000. We have in precedent cases said that the employees withdrawal from a labor
union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed
voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be
involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union
membership done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate
such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the
registration of the union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the
BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of
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retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight. (Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club
vs. Court of Appeals, 616 SCRA 116, G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010)
Review the following aspects in Labor Relations:
- coverage of CBA
- conduct of CBA
- relate to kinds of employees, (Art. 82, Book V)
- prescription of action on ULP
- liability for just/authorized cause, see Art. 282
- constructive dismissal
- reinstatement, grounds
- payroll reinstatement
- entitlement to back wages (applicable rules/ maximum amount)
- Notice to Strike (period, grounds)
Rule on participation of union officers and union members in illegal strike:
(J. Velasco) - Regarding the Union officers and members liabilities for their
participation in the illegal picket and strike, Art. 264(a), paragraph 3 of the Labor Code
provides that [a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status x x x. The law
makes a distinction between union officers and mere union members. Union officers
may be validly terminated from employment for their participation in an illegal strike,
while union members have to participate in and commit illegal acts for them to lose
their employment status. Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof of the
participation of the striking employees in the commission of illegal acts during the
strikes. (NUWHRAIN-Dusit Nikko Hotel Chapter vs. CA 570 SCRA 598, G.R. No.
163942 November 11, 2008)
Q.What are the responsibilities of a union official and a union member in an Illegal
Strike?
Answer: (J. Velasco) It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater than
that of the members. They are tasked with the duty to lead and guide the membership in
decision making on union activities in accordance with the law, government rules and
regulations, and established labor practices. The leaders are expected to recommend
actions that are arrived at with circumspection and contemplation, and always keep
paramount the best interests of the members and union within the bounds of law. If the
implementation of an illegal strike is recommended, then they would mislead and deceive the
membership and the supreme penalty of dismissal is appropriate. On the other hand, if the
strike is legal at the beginning and the officials commit illegal acts during the duration of the
strike, then they cannot evade personal and individual liability for said acts. (Toyota Motors
Phils. Corp. Workers Association vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, G.R. Nos.
158798-99 October 19, 2007)
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Q. An ordinary employee who participated in an illegal strike cannot be terminated
from employment but may be terminated upon proof that he committed illegal acts.
Who has the burden of proof?
Answer: (J. Velasco) The Court said that its ruling in Association of Independent Unions
in the Philippines v. NLRC lays down the rule on the liability of the union members:
Decisive on the matter is the pertinent provisions of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code
that: [x x x] any worker [x x x] who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. [x x x] It can be
gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an
ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the
striker who participated in the commission of illegal act[s] must be identified. But proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the
circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the court ruled Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion
Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof on the participation of the
striking employee in the commission of illegal acts during the strikes. (supra)
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Q. Can a mass leave be considered a Strike?
Answer: (J. Velasco) NO. -The term Mass Leave has been left undefined by the Labor
Code. Plainly, the legislature intended that the terms ordinary sense be used. Mass is
defined as participated in, attended by, or affecting a large number of individuals;
having a large-scale character. While the term Leave is defined as an authorized
absence or vacation from duty or employment usually with pay.
Thus, the phrase mass leave may refer to a simultaneous availment of authorized
leave benefits by a large number of employees in a company. It is undeniable that going
on leave or absenting ones self from work for personal reasons when they have leave
benefits available is an employees right. (Naranjo v. Biomedica Health Care Inc, 681
SCRA 438, G.R. No. 193789 September 19, 2012)
Q. Is a certificate of non-forum shopping a requisite in a certification proceeding?
Answer: No. There is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping in the Labor Code or in the rules.
A certification proceeding, even though initiated by a petition, is not litigation but an investigation of a non-
adversarial and fact-finding character. Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct
requiring relief, but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. (SAMMA-LIKHA v. SAMMA Corporation,
March 13, 2009)
Q. How will the Labor Arbiter rule if malice was not alleged in a complaint for unfair labor practice?
Answer: Dismiss the case. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that the employer
was motivated by ill-will, bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor. The employer must have acted in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy causing social humiliation, wounded feelings or
grave anxiety. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively
with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the
proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open
mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement. (Manila Mining Corporation
Employees Association v. Manila Mining Corp., September 29, 2010)
Q. With the adoption of cost cutting measures, Eduardo was part of manufacturing that was retrenched
by the company. Can Eduardo ask for reinstatement?
Answer: No. Retrenchment in good faith is not an unfair labor practice. The fact that the retrenchment program
was implemented on a company-wide basis shows that the scheme was not calculated to stymie union activities.
(Pepsi Cola Products v. Molon et al., February 18, 2013)
Q. Jerusalem Corp. (JC) has been providing new chairs to its sewing crew for the past five years. On
the sixth year, JC stopped providing new chairs. Can the company be charged with unfair labor practice
for withdrawal of this regular provision?
Answer: No. Removal of chairs, which had been provided for more than three decades, was not ULP. The
rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. (Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca Cola Bottlers,
April 15, 2013)
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Since the CBA stated that any benefit not expressly provided for in the CBA shall be deemed as purely
voluntary acts, and shall not be construed as obligation of the company, its subsequent removal was valid. The
long practice did not convert it into an obligation or a vested right in favor of the union. Chairs are not
considered benefits and are not therefore covered by the prohibition against diminution.
Q. Who has the burden of proof in a case when there is allegation that the registration of the labor union
was attended with fraud?
Answer: The party who instituted the action has the burden of proof.: The charge that a labor organization
committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious charge that should be clearly
established by evidence and the surrounding circumstances.
The petitioner (the party that filed the Petition for Cancellation) has the burden of proof. (Yokohama Tire Phils.
v. Yokohama Employees Union, March 10, 2010; Heritage Hotel Manila v. PIGLAS-Heritage, October 30,
2009)
Q. Can employer terminate the employment of union members during the Freedom Period?
Answer: No. The mere signing of the authorization in support of a Petition for Certification Election before the
freedom period, is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of union members under the Union
Security Clause respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period.
(PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Taeca, August 9, 2010)
Q. What is the effect if the employer and the company extends its 5-year CBA?
Answer: While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year term together with all other CBA
provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the unions
exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive
bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the
workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five
years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is
effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBAs
first five years. (FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (FVCLU-
PTGWO) v. Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General
Labor Organizations (SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO), November 27, 2009)
Q. Can the personality of the petitioner labor be collaterally attacked in the same certification election
proceeding?
Answer: No. The legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification
election proceedings. The remedy is to file a separate action for cancellation of the unions registration/legal
personality. (Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v. Charter Chemical and
Coating Corp., March 16, 2011)
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than just an act of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.
(Eastern Telecoms v. Eastern Telecoms Employees Union, February 8, 2012)
F. Book VI
1. Just Cause
Jonas Michael R. Garza v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc., et al.,G.R. No. 180972. January 20, 2014: The
burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for valid cause. Unsubstantiated accusations or
baseless conclusions of the employer are insufficient legal justifications to dismiss an employee. The
unflinching rule in illegal dismissal cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof. Embezzlement and
failure to remit collections can only be sustained if the employee actually collected the amounts due to the
company.
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2. Authorized Cause
Q. The principle of loss of trust and confidence as a cause to terminate employment are
applicable only to which employees?
Answer: (J. Velasco) Loss of confidence, as a ground for dismissal, is premised on the
fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or of trust and
confidence. As such, the employee must be invested with confidence on delicate matters,
such as the custody, handling, or care of the employers money and other assets.
Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal was never intended to provide employers
with a blank check for terminating their employees. Such a vague, all-encompassing pretext
as loss of confidence, if unqualifiedly given the seal of approval by this Court, could readily
reduce to barren form the words of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Having
this in mind, loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees
occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is
routinely charged with the care and custody of the employers money or property. To the
first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives
to lay down management policies [effect personnel movements] x x x or effectively
recommend such managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. (Aromin vs.
NLRC 553 SCRA 273, G.R. No. 164824 April 30, 2008)
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Q. Will the pendency of a criminal case justify the termination of employment of an employee?
Answer: No. A first notice which stated that the employment contract had expired but likewise made general
references to alleged criminal suits filed against the employee is non-compliant with the twin-notice
requirement.
An employees guilt or innocence in a criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or authorized
cause for the employees dismissal. The pendency of a criminal suit against an employee does not, by itself,
sufficiently establish a ground for an employer to terminate the employees services.(United Tourist Promotion
v. Kemplin, February 5, 2014)
Q. Will lending a company I.D. to allow a relative to avail of shuttle bus service of the company justify his
dismissal?
Answer: No. An employees act of lending his I.D. card to a relative who was an applicant at the employer
company (to allow the relative to have free pass for the shuttle bus) was considered as insufficient ground for
termination, despite the guilt of the employee.
Reinstatement WITHOUT backwages was ordered, because: (1) dismissal of the employee was too harsh a
penalty; (2) the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee. (Integrated Microelectronics v.
Pionilla, August 28, 2013)
Jonas Michael R. Garza v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc., et al.,G.R. No. 180972. January 20, 2014: The
burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for valid cause. Unsubstantiated accusations or
baseless conclusions of the employer are insufficient legal justifications to dismiss an employee. The
unflinching rule in illegal dismissal cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof.
One of CCBPIs policies requires that, on a daily basis, CCBPI Salesmen/Account Specialists must account for
their sales/collections and obtain clearance from the company Cashier before they are allowed to leave company
premises at the end of their shift and report for work the next day. If there is a shortage/failure to account, the
concerned Salesmen/Account Specialist is not allowed to leave the company premises until he settles the same.
In addition, shortages are deducted from the employees salaries. If CCBPI expects to proceed with its case
against petitioner, it should have negated this policy, for its existence and application are inextricably tied to
CCBPIs accusations against petitioner. In the first place, as petitioners employer, upon it lay the burden of
proving by convincing evidence that he was dismissed for cause. If petitioner continued to work until June
2004, this meant that he committed no infraction, going by this company policy; it could also mean that any
infraction or shortage/non-remittance incurred by petitioner has been duly settled. Respondents decision to
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ignore this issue generates the belief that petitioner is telling the truth, and that the alleged infractions are
fabricated, or have been forgiven. Coupled with Macatangays statement which remains equally unrefuted
that the charges against petitioner are a scheme by local CCBPI management to cover up problems in the Naga
City Plant, the conclusion is indeed telling that petitioner is being wrongfully made to account.
Q.What is the rationale behind the summary nature of proceedings before Labor
Arbiter?
Answer: (J. Velasco) In Iriga Telephone Co, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
286 SCRA 600 (1998), the Court discussed the reason why it is discretionary on the part of
the Labor Arbiter, who, motu proprio, determines whether to hold a hearing or not.
Consequently, a hearing cannot be demanded by either party as a matter of right. The parties
are required to file their corresponding position papers and all the documentary evidence and
affidavits to prove their cause of action and defenses. The rationale behind this is to avoid
delay and curtail the pernicious practice of withholding of evidence. (Oriental
Shipmanagement Co., Inc. vs. Bastol, supra)
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merits of the case, has relaxed this rule on, and excused the late posting of, the appeal
bond when there are strong and compelling reasons for the liberality, such as the
prevention of miscarriage of justice extant in the case or the special circumstances in
the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved. After all,
technical rules cannot prevent courts from exercising their duties to determine and settle,
equitably and completely, the rights and obligations of the parties. This is one case where the
exception to the general rule lies. (Semblante vs. CA, 19th Division, G.R. No. 196426, August
15, 2011)
Price v. Innodata (2008): Where contract of employment, being a contract of adhesion, is ambiguous, any
ambiguity therein should be construed strictly against the party who prepared it.
Sofio v. Valenzuela (2012): When the labor arbiters decision has become final, party who prevailed already
attained a vested right to said judgment. They had to rely on the immutability of judgment.
INC Shipmanagement, Inc. Captain Sigfredo E. Monterroyo and/or Interorient Navigation Limited v.
Alexander L. Moradas, G.R. No., January 15, 2014: Having established through substantial evidence that
respondents injury was self-inflicted and, hence, not compensable pursuant to Section 20 (D) of the 1996
POEA-SEC, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the NLRC in upholding LAs decision to
dismiss respondents complaint for disability benefits. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
Jurisdiction: NLRC
INC Shipmanagement, Inc. Captain Sigfredo E. Monterroyo and/or Interorient Navigation Limited v.
Alexander L. Moradas, G.R. No., January 15, 2014: In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion is required. To note, considering that substantial evidence is an evidentiary threshold, the Court, on
exceptional cases, may assess the factual determinations made by the NLRC in a particular case.
The Court ruled that NLRC had cogent legal bases to conclude that petitioners have successfully discharged the
burden of proving by substantial evidence that respondents injury was directly attributable to him. Records
bear out circumstances which all lead to the reasonable conclusion that respondent was responsible for the
flooding and burning incidents. While respondent contended that the affidavits and statements of the
vessels officers and his fellow crew members should not be given probative value as they were biased, self-
serving, and mere hearsay, he nonetheless failed to present any evidence to substantiate his own theory.
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the corroborating affidavits and statements of the
vessels officers and crew members must be taken as a whole and cannot just be perfunctorily dismissed as
self-serving absent any showing that they were lying when they made the statements therein.
United Placement v. NLRC (1993): Review powers of NLRC are limited only on issues raised on appeal.
Hence, it is grave abuse of discretion for the NLRC to resolve issues not raised on appeal.
Insular Hotel Employees Union- NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel (2010): Procedurally, the first step to
submit a case for mediation is to file a notice of preventive mediation with the NCMB.
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JURISDICTION: DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTORS
BPI v. BPI Employees Union (2012): In ruling in favor of the union in a voluntary arbitration, the Court held
that the CBA is the contract between the parties. All provisions and conditions for availment of benefits should
be made clear. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the employees.
Santuyo v. Remerco Garments, March 22, 2010: Article 217(c) of the Labor Code requires labor arbiters to
refer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to the grievance machinery provided therein and to voluntary
arbitration.
Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be referred first to the grievance
machinery and, if unresolved within seven days, they shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.
Continental Steel v. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Montano: Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA
provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the
intentions thereof.
(J. Velasco) Under Art. 129 of the Labor Code, the power of the DOLE and its duly
authorized hearing officers to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages
and other monetary claims and benefits was qualified by the proviso that the complaint not
include a claim for reinstatement, or that the aggregate money claims not exceed Php5, 000.
RA 7730, or an Act Further Strengthening the Visitorial and Enforcement Powers of the
Secretary of Labor, did away with the Php5,000 limitation, allowing the DOLE Secretary to
exercise its visitorial and enforcement power for claims beyond Php5,000. The only
qualification to this expanded power of the DOLE was only that there still is an existing
employer-employee relationship. (Bombo Radyo Phils. Inc. vs. Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012)
Chris Garments Corporation v. Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Chris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO,
January 12, 2009: The Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed the first petition as it was filed
outside the 60-day freedom period. Subsequently, another petition for CE was filed, this time within the
freedom period.
2. Prescription of Actions
- Illegal dismissal without any legal bar: 4 years
- Money claims without legal bar: 3 years
- Termination of employment: 4 years (Art. 1146, Civil Code)
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(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge
or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute
a suit;
(3)lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit;
(4)injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or t he suit is not held barred. In Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA
98 (1997), we explained that there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.
(Associated Labor Unions (ALU) vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156882, October 31, 2008)
Goodrich v. Ativo (2010): Courts look with disfavor on quitclaims. Exceptions to the general rule on quitclaims:
1. Employee executes quitclaim voluntarily
2. There is fraud or deceit on the part of the employer
3. Consideration for quitclaim is credible and reasonable
4. Contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law
Villaruel v. Yeo Han Guan, June 1, 2011: Separation pay under Article 284 presupposes that it is the employer
who terminates the services of the employee found to be suffering from disease. It does not apply to a situation
where it is the employee who severe his or her employment ties.
Nippon Housing v. Leynes, August 3, 2011: A complaint for illegal dismissal filed prior to the lapse of the six-
month period (off-detailing/floating status) and/or the actual dismissal of the employee is generally considered
premature.
Answer: (J. Velasco) In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of
quitclaims and waivers of employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should
contain the following:
(1) A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;
(2) The benefits of the employees are possible with corresponding amounts, which the
employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount;
(3) A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino
or in the dialect known to the employees- that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are
forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the benefits which are due them under the
law;
(4) A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had
fully understood the contents of the document and that their consent was freely given without
any threat, violence, duress intimidation, or undue influence executed on their person. It is
advisable that the stipulations be made in English and Tagalog or in the dialect known to the
employee. There should be two (2) witnesses to the execution of the quitclaim who must also
sign the quitclaim. The document should be subscribed and sworn to under oath preferably
before any administering official of the Department of Labor and Employment or its regional
office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or the labor attach in a foreign country.
Such official shall assist the parties regarding the execution of the quitclaim and waiver. This
compromise settlement becomes final and binding y under Article 227 of the Labor Code.
(EDI-SII vs. NLRC G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007)
3. MODES OF APPEAL
GENERAL RULE: THE ABSENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP MAY NOT BE
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
INC Shipmanagement, Inc. Captain Sigfredo E. Monterroyo and/or Interorient Navigation Limited v. Alexander
L. Moradas, G.R. No., January 15, 2014: The Courts jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the CA via
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the proper venue
to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. This rule, however, is not ironclad and a departure
therefrom may be warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of
the NLRC and LA, as in this case. In this regard, there is therefore a need to review the records to determine
which of them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.
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The prevailing rule under Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC on compensation and benefits for injury or
illness was that an employer shall be liable for the injury or illness suffered by a seafarer during the term of his
contract. To be compensable, the injury or illness must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the
contract. However, the employer may be exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the cause of the
seamans injury was directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act as provided under Section 20 (D)
thereof, to wit:
D. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the
seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act, provided however, that the employer can prove that
such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to seafarer.
Hence, the onus probandi falls on the petitioners herein to establish or substantiate their claim that the
respondents injury was caused by his willful act with the requisite quantum of evidence.
Q: Can a question of fact be raised in appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule
45?
Answer: (J.Velasco). At the outset, it is clear that the issue submitted for resolution is a
question of fact which is proscribed by the rule disallowing factual issues in appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. This is explicit in Rule 45, Section 1 that
petitions of this nature shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Petitioner would like the Court to examine the pleadings and documentary evidence extant
on the records of the Labor Arbiter to determine if said official indeed made a finding on the
existence of alleged employer-employee nexus between the parties based on the facts
contained in said pleadings and evidence. Evidently this issue is embraced by the
circumscription. (St. Martin Funeral Jomes vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 142351 November 22, 2006)
Q. Will the sale of a company asset give rise to a preference of credit in favor of its
employees in accordance with Art. 110 of Labor Code?
Answer: (J. Velasco) NO. -We agree with the company that a judgment lien over the subject
properties has not legally attached and that Art.110 of the Labor, in relation to Arts 2242,
2243, and 2244 of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits, does not cover
the subject properties. Art. 110 of the Labor Code applies only to cases of bankruptcy
and liquidation. Likewise, the abovementioned articles of the Civil Code on concurrence
and preference of credits properly comes into play only in cases of insolvency. Since
there is not bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding to speak of, much less a liquidation of the
assets of DWUT, the Union cannot look to said statutory provision for support. (Associated
Labor Unions (ALU) vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156882, October 31, 2008)
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