FTUI KI-KE

DTM 30.09.2014/07.10.2014

PROCESS & SAFETYRELATED DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL PROCESS STAGES

Physical and Health Occupational Hazards in any large scale Chemical

/Hydrocarbon Processing Industry (CPI/HPI) can be broadly classified into the
following categories:

i. Mechanical Risks

ii. Electrical Risks

iii. Fire/Explosion Risks

iv. High /low Temperature Exposure Risks

v. Toxic/Carcinogenic Chemicals Exposure Risks

vi. Corrosive/Reactive/Radioactive Chemicals Exposure Risks

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Scenario 1: Wood panel cutting process

A team of two workers operates a cross-cut saw machine.
Their work includes loading wood panel onto the machine, cutting the
wood and unloading the cut wood. They also need to repair and
maintain the machine regularly as well as to change the blades of the
machine.

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Scenario 2: Wall exterior plastering work

A group of three workers was instructed to do plastering work at

exterior wall at first floor of the building. Their work includes erecting
working platform, wall plastering with concrete and do clearing work.

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I suppose that I
should have done that
HAZOP Study!

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Port Kembla Ethanol Tank Fire, NSW, Australia,

28th January 2004

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Buncefield Incident (UK) December 2005.

In the early hours of Sunday 11

December 2005, a number of
explosions occurred at
Buncefield Oil Storage Depot,
Hemel Hempstead,
Hertfordshire

At least one of the initial

explosions was of massive
proportions and there was a
large fire, which engulfed a
high proportion of the site

Over 40 people were injured;

fortunately there were no
fatalities

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Buncefield Fuel Storage before incident

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Buncefield during the incident

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Buncefield after the incident

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Buncefield Incident
Off-Site Consequences
Significant damage to commercial and residential neighbours
2000 people evacuated
Sections of M1 Motorway closed
Very large smoke plume over Southern England Air pollution
Large quantities of foam and water contaminated water courses
and ground water
HSE/EA investigation determined the direct cause (initiating event) as
follows:
Tank 912 . overflowed at around 05.30 hours .. while
being filled at a high rate
Large vapour cloud formed and flowed off-site
First explosion at 06.01 hours
There were multiple root causes (failures) identified
Many related to management system failures
Still some unanswered questions
Why was there so much explosive force?
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Dubai Dry Dock Incident

On 27 March, 2002 in Dubai there was a breach and failure in

one of the dock gates that caused uncontrolled flooding in the
dry dock.

Several vessels were set on blocks inside the dry dock at the
time of the failure. The vessels included the large vessel "Key
Bermuda," a cargo barge and the accommodation barge "SEP
350.
The dry dock gates failed at 09.30 during a working day.

The dock is 500 metres long by 100 metres wide and 11 metres
deep.

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Dubai Dry Dock Incident
Everything looks normal!!

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Dubai Dry Dock Incident

Moments after the first breach at 09:30 on 27.3.02

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Dubai Dry Dock Incident
Larger vessels coming off the blocks

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Dubai Dry Dock Incident
Cargo barge getting ready to roll. Many trapped
inside, a few on deck getting ready to jump

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Dubai Dry Dock Incident

KEY BERMUDA coming off blocks. INDRA-1

swinging towards rig

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Dubai Dry Dock Incident

Accommodation barge SEP 350 sinking

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SEP 350 touching bottom Dubai Dry Dock Incident

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Dubai Dry Dock Incident
The aftermath. Official reports account for 26
persons killed.

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HAZOPS = Hazard and Operability Studies

Metode utk identifikasi(dan assessment) berbagai

permasalahan yang dapat menyebabkan risiko bagi manusia
atau peralatan, atau upaya preventif terciptanya kelancaran
operasi.

Metode sistematik dan bersifat kualitatif dengan penggunaan

katabantu (guide-words)

Membutuhkan kemampuan dari multi disiplin ilmu

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Kenapa harus dilakukan ?

Untuk memeriksa kondisi proses dengan metodologi identifikasi

masalah secara lebih efektif.

Untuk identifikasi proses bermasalah dengan tujuan yang lebih

luas, tidak hanya terkait dengan safety.

Untuk penghematan cost jika dilakukan improvisasi aliran

proses secara efisien dan mengurangi shutdown yang tidak
terjadwal.

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Kapan harus dilaksanakan ?

Pendekatan analisa / study HAZOP dapat digunakan untuk beberapa

fase dari umur pabrik, akan tetapi secara ideal metode ini digunakan
pada saat fase final design pada proyek pembangunan pabrik baru.

Sesudah dilakukan study HAZOP, hasilnya dapat divalidasi ulang

secara rutin (biasanya 5 tahun sekali) untuk meyakinkan bahwa hasil
analisa yang dilakukan tetap sesuai dengan standar keselamatan dan
keandalan proses, permasalahan baru yang ada selama proses
revalidasi akan diidentifikasi serta diatasi dengan penambahan /
perbaikan safeguards.
Sesudah terjadi kecelakaan atau pergantian / modifikasi peralatan
sangat disarankan untuk dilakukan analisa HAZOP ulang.

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Process HAZOP
Teknik HAZOP pada dasarnya dikembangkan untuk menilai (assess)
plant dan sistem proses

Human HAZOP
- Salah satu jenis HAZOP yang lebih spesifik
- Lebih fokus pada human errors daripada technical failures
Procedure HAZOP
- Tinjauan dari prosedur yang digunakan atau rangkaian operasional
- Biasa juga disebut SAFOP = SAFe Operation Study

Software HAZOP
Identifikasi berbagai kemungkinan kesalahan yang
dikembangkan dalam bentuk software

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Proses HAZOP

Tinjauan dari P & ID dan/atau diagram alir

Perincian dari sistem kedalam hal-hal yang utama (perpipaan dan

alat-alat utama pabrik)

Penerapan guide-words (contoh; more) pada perbedaan

parameter-parameter proses (contoh; flow) untuk
mengidentifikasi berbagai penyimpangan yang mungkin terjadi

Standardisasi guide-words

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Terminologi HAZOP
Design Intent :
Fungsi yang telah ditetapkan/dirancang agar proses operasi dapat berjalan
normal.

Guide Word :
Kata-kata singkat yang membantu untuk mengarahkan jalannya diskusi pada
saat meninjau suatu parameter proses / membantu brainstorming saat
mengidentifikasi process hazards. Contoh : NO, MORE, LESS, HIGH, dll.

Parameter :
Rujukan/ukuran proses tertentu yang ditinjau. Misal : TEMPERATURE,
PRESSURE, FLOW, dll.

Deviation :
Penyimpangan proses dari design intent yang ada (merupakan gabungan
dari Guide Word dan Parameter)

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Terminologi HAZOP

Cause :
Alasan yang dikemukakan mengapa suatu penyimpangan dapat terjadi.

Consequence :
Akibat atau sesuatu yang dihasilkan dari penyimpangan yang terjadi.

Safeguards / Control :
Sistem yang dibuat atau pengendalian secara administratif untuk mencegah
suatu penyimpangan terjadi atau mengurangi consequences yang terjadi
sebagai akibat penyimpangan (deviation).

Hazard Category :
Nilai / bobot risiko bahaya yang ada. Biasanya digunakan Hazard Risk
Assessment Matrix

Recommendations :
Rekomendasi untuk perubahan design, prosedur operasi atau untuk study
lebih lanjut.
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Process HAZOP Guide-words

Guide-word Keterangan Example

NO / NOT Negasi (sangkalan) penuh No flow
dari suatu kesepakatan when production is expected

MORE Meningkat secara Higher temperature than

kuantitatif designed
LESS Menurun secara kuantitatif Lower pressure than normal

AS WELL AS Meningkat secara kualitatif Other valves closed at the

same time (logic fault or
human error)
PART OF Menurun secara kualitatif Only part of the system is shut
down
REVERSE Logika yang berlawanan Back-flow when the system
dari suatu kesepakatan shuts down
OTHER THAN Subtitusi penuh Liquids in the gas piping
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Selected Parameters with Applicable Guide Words

-Flow (no, more, less, reverse)

-Temperature (higher, lower)

-Pressure (higher, lower)

-Level (none, higher, lower)

-Composition (none, more, less, as well as, other than)

- Action (sooner, later, insufficient, longer, shorter)

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HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY

In simple terms, the Hazop study process involves applying in a

systematic way all relevant keyword combinations to the plant in
question in an effort to uncover potential problems. The results are
recorded in columnar format under the following headings:

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Deviation
The keyword combination being applied (e.g. Flow/No).

Cause
Potential causes that would result in the deviation occurring. (e.g.
"Strainer S1 blockage due to impurities in Dosing Tank T1" might be a
cause of Flow/No).

Consequence
The consequences that would arise, both from the effect of the
deviation (e.g. "Loss of dosing results in incomplete separation in V1")
and, if appropriate, from the cause itself (e.g. "Cavitation in Pump P1,
with possible damage if prolonged").

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F2

Liquid
butane F4
feed
P1 v3

F1
compressor
A1

v1 %C
4 M
motor
L1
F3

T1 v4
steam
v2 T

condensate Parallel tubular air

reactors with
cooling

P3

P2
v5

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NODE: Concentrate on one location in the process

PARAMETER: Consider each process variable individually

(F, T, L, P, composition, operator action, corrosion, etc.)

GUIDE WORD: Pose a series of standard questions about deviations

from normal conditions. We assume that we know a safe normal
operation.

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NODE: Pipe after pump and splitter

PARAMETER*: Flow rate

GUIDE WORD: Less (less than normal value)

DEVIATION: less flow than normal
All group
CAUSE: of deviation, can be more than one members focus
on the same
CONSEQUENCE: of the deviation/cause issue
simultaneously
ACTION: initial idea for correction/
prevention/mitigation

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Fired heaters are used in process plants and have many

potential hazards. Lets perform a HAZOP study!

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Example: Fired Heater

1. Discuss the first entry in the HAZOP form
2. Select another guide word for the parameter
3. Select a different parameter for the same node
4. Select a different node/parameter/guide word

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The HAZOP procedure may be illustrated as follows:

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Process HAZOP worksheet

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Steps in a HAZOP

1. Select a node, define its purpose and determine the process safe limits.
2. Select a process guideword.
3. Identify the hazards and their causes using the deviation guidewords.
4. Determine how the hazard is "announced", i.e., how the operator knows
a safe limit has been exceeded.
5. Estimate the consequences (safety, environmental, economic) of each
identified hazard.
6. Identify the safeguards.
7. Estimate the frequency of occurrence of the hazard.
8. Risk rank the hazard, with and without safeguards.
9. Develop findings and potential recommendations.
10. Move on to the next process guideword, or to the next node if the
guideword discussion is complete.

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Example of Node Selection

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Node Purpose Descriptions

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Generally the following parameters will be used:

Flow Rate;
Flow Quantity (for batch operations);
Pressure;
Temperature;
Level (when vessels and tanks are a part of the node);
Composition; and
Phase.

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Hazard Causes

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Consequences

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