ALFREDO M. DE LEON vs. HON. BENHAMIN B.
ESGUERRA (153 SCRA 602) Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary
Case Digest
In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the
other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
On February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986,
signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B. Esguerra designating
Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum with the
same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay
Councilmen. De Leon along with the other petitioners filed a petition to declare
the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the respondents from taking
over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners maintained that OIC Gov.
Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace them under the 1987
Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6) years in pursuant to
Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
Issue: Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?
Ruling:
The effectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was
signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987 Constitution was already in
effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in Section 27 of its
Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section
2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with
the 1987 Constitution.
Wherefore, the designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was
declared NO LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ for Prohibition is
GRANTED enjoining respondents perpetually from ouster/take-over of
petitioners position subject of this petition.
GR No. 83896 February 22, 1991
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in
any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.cralaw
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree
of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
FACTS:
(1) Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order
No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent
provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a
member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold
not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation
shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies
of which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they ( sic) must relinquish the excess position in
favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any
official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-
owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the
boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.
This Executive Order, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions which is against Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution.
They also contend that the said provision is absolute and self-executing.
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by
petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13,
Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
(2) The disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the
constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII,
the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of
the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference
to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned
therein are concerned.
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. For such attendance,
therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the
form of per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism.
(4) Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-
time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If
maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability and
expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other governmental offices or employment.

ISSUE: Whether or notSection 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general underSection 7, par. (2),
Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

HELD: Petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null
and void and is accordingly set aside.

RATIO:
(1) Practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government
was strongly denounced on the floor of the BatasangPambansa.
(2) One of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the
campaign for its ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that the
scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the
government and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom
would be discontinued.
(3) It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision
of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone,
but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument.
(4) The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as
covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned
official's office. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue
of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. The ex-
officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003. year period.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review,
crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss
the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or
on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the
one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a
political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering
that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of
this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in
2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously
sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the
controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the
two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests
the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which
is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of
a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from
both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue
that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the
JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated
filing of the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine
qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal
branch of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief
Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have
locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief
Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of
aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts
ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek
judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution
is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but
that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the
JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that
is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC
be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified.
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or
the eventual strategic partner, will provide management expertise or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered
to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder,
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a managers check
as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that
the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition
before the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays
down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution,
is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently,
if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy.
Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present
case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912,
a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For
sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel.
In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be
to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood
to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors
must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group
willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross
errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would
rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let
the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal
of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and
DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the
purpose.
Ramon Gonzales vs COMELEC
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution.
It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day
that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued
that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals
to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general
election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress
when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In
this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that
said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political
question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political
question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general
election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to
amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are
not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are
inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That
being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not
actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly.
Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act
of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on
a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a
general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be
scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection. They should be able to compare the original proposition
with the amended proposition.
IMBONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar, J.
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as
such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which
shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the
Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that
the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates
from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and
expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2.
Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire
law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said
R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and
set the parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the
constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact
implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such
details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative
power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application
with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due
process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of
the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates.
The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public
office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly,
par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the
restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights
remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement
of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.
GR No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions
of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for
the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution.
After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A
RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September
30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that
it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November
8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being
that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions
subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide
for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the
ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a
power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the
people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be
drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention violative to the Constitution.
HELD: NO.
All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted
to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the
voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the
nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of
the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole.
In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the
merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with
this requirement.
Occena V. COMELEC G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
1. The petitioners, namely, Samuel Occena and Ramon Gonzales, members of
the Philippine BAR and delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention are
suing as taxpayers.
2. In the prohibition proceedings, they challenged the validity of three(3)
Batasang Pambansa Resolution, which consists of the following:
(a) Proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes;
(b) dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly;
(c) amendment to the article on the Commission on Elections.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the 1973 constitution is a fundamental law.
2. Does the Interim Batasang Pambansa have the power to propose
amendments?
3. What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as a standard for
proper submission?
to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement
of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained.
Resolution 1 was approved by a vote of 122 to 5; Resolution 2 was approved
with a vote 147 to 5 with 1 abstention, and; Resolution 3 was approved with a
vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. As to the requisite standard for a proper
submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the
period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people
so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to
the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the
matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision:
"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. Thus any argument to the
contrary is unavailing. WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of
merit. No costs.

Held:
1. Citing the case of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary where they dismissed
the petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification with a
vote of six(6) to four(4), the Supreme Court said:
This being the vote of majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
constitution being considered in force and effect (in force and effect on January
17, 1973). With such the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, and with the
recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only
entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts are resolved. The 1973 constitution is a
fundamental law.
2. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable.
The applicable provision of the 1976 amendment is quite explicit, which reads:
The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members
shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the Members thereof." One of such powers is precisely that of
proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested
the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be
ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments.
3. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits
as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far
as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when,
as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on
16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period
for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the
President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous
PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner
of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed
inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos
issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas
clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative
body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to
the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the
regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly
purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court
en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The
Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power,
so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that
power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to
the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in
sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the

Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the
terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution,
to lift term limits of elective officials, by peoples initiative. Delfin wanted
COMELEC to control and supervise said peoples initiative the signature-
gathering all over the country. The proposition is: Do you approve of lifting the
term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections
4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article
X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution? Said Petition for Initiative will first be
submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of
registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen.
Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not
the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
This deliberate omission indicates matter of peoples initiative was left to some
future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of
peoples initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
d. Peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision
thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for
peoples initiative.
ISSUE: Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution.
HELD: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover peoples initiative on amendments to the
Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article
XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution,
is not self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for
its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the
word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant
to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c)
does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the
case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. The argument that the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope.
Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law
which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance
or resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to
the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of
emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4]
Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.
It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a
petition solely intended to obtain an order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfins movement and
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be
conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress
to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly
vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters.
Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its
filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of
by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning
undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.
Calderon v Carale
Gr No. 91636 April 23, 1992
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.cralaw
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
FACTS:
(1) This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the
permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by said RA 6715, stating:
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners
shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the
nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor
Arbiters and
Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
(2) Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the
issue in this case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent
appointments to the respondents without submitting them to the CA for
confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments of such appointments.The Solicitor
General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor
Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers
of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to
governmentofficers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whoseappointments require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of
no legal force and effect.
RATIO:
(1) To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
(1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and
(2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President.
(2) It is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with
what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive
would want it interpreted.
Lambino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution
under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4
of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional

requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy
of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago
which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of
the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.