Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above
provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting
later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial
Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a
number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up
to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in
main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-
shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
 . . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say
"wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment.
He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that
lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage
null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to
read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only
a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity,
there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice
Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated
that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the
Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is
not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated"
in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages,
and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since
otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and
to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage.
Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the
very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained
that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation
of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because
they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice
Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should
be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the
marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when
the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated
that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been
cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested
that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage,
and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary
periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit
remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages.
Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy
stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that
"psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of
the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in
this case is to allow him to remarry.6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista
proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it
may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in
other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent
while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why
it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to
have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice
Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

 Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R.
No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like
the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to
be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent
for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed,
states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden
the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-
sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether
eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be
some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the
following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
 contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops
which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage:
the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota,
Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the
degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are
doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as
follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the
house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making
love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband
and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They
were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period,
there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time
or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same
 bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she
had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very
much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship
is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if
there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have
sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed
his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because
she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that
she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant,
will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out
that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch
and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without making
any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself
that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties,
there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a
product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But
in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact
with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of
whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a
review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual
relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
 meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such
refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, i.e.,
physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent would not want to have sexual
intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between
them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in
the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of
a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with
him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs.
Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from
incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation."
After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his
alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art.
68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as
a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14,
1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple
had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from
what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife,
but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora
Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of
the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal
and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of
the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant
case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr.
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better
for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other
but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing
at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions
of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such
failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting
and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano
to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court
of Pasay on September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. [2]

The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968; [3] Stephanie Janice born on September
9, 1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless,
acquired neither property nor debt.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had
extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security
Command and later a Jordanian national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to
petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.

Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration
of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of
general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. [7]

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and
found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final
detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the
two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. [8]

After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete
separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code,
without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that

I
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS
NULL AND VOID.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN
ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.

The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.[10]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002. [11] Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of
respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted
by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.

The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by
petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:

x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the
degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. [13]

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon
which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof.[14] It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children.

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 [17] of the Family
Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of
petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
 All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even
desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. [19] While we sympathize with petitioners marital
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be. [20]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., on official leave.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration
of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the
subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However,
he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize
their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection
with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether
there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. 9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 10 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR
(sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to
Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and
prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between
Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before
Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten
letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated
October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these documents
attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the
documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the
absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary
evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted
to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. 19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that
would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed
her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting
his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents,
therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for
the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration 20 of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As
such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or
incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States
penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between
spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State
does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an
individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws
on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration
of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the
subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However,
he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize
their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection
with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether
there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. 9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 10 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR
(sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to
Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and
prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between
Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before
Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten
letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated
October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these documents
attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the
documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the
absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary
evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted
to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. 19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that
would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed
her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting
his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents,
therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for
the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As
such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or
incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States
penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between
spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State
does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an
individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws
on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164435

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
VICTORIA S. JARILLO,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Petitioner,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
- versus -
September 29, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision [1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution [2] dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the

following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in
lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by
Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21,
TSN dated November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony
before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the
marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
 Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at
the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-
1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding
in Manila(Exh. E).

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.

xxxx

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria
Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX
(6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum.

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity
of accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This
aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2
August 2001.[3]

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo

was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both

Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her

marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that
petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to

Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court.This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to

Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners

contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far

back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioners

1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision

became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a

ground for the reversal of her conviction.However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of

Appeals,[4] denied reconsideration and ruled that [t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the

spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for

bigamy.[5]

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:
 V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE
CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE

CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT
THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL
JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38
BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE
LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the

petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In

her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground

for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her

arguments. InMarbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the Court categorically stated that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not
be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x

xxxx

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the
time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,[8] where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would
only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all
that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled.[9]
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be

affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid

defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been

judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the

second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent

jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy

make any difference.[10] As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically

void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain

reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a

second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.[11]

Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of

said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that [c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe

in fifteen years, while Article 91 states that [t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is

discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x .

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from

that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is

obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus, for

petitioners defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy

already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support

her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does

not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous
marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of
the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay. [13]

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from

the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents], as opposed to being

counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. [15] Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of

prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is

mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum

term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal

Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the

offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is

anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.The

modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. [16]

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised

Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6

months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within

the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed

penalty of prision mayorshould be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court

correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by

final judgment[17] to be void ab initio on account of the latters psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected

to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be

sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision

correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July

21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other

respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One

(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated
August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein
respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.

On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became
manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July
8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion
on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general
circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days
from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial
court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.

On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.

On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records
of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.

SO ORDERED.4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner
and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family.
Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and
child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents mental
incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on
hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months,
he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but
he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.

The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his
family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:

But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a
social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around
and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as
required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs.
Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national.

Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:

I
 The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano
to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case.10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute
psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the
instant petition.

We rule in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." 14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month
after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but
did not care at all to see his family.

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not
just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a
"mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction
between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects. While
we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any
sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the
following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill
the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24
October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage
of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse
and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was
born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition
for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the
adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single
member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon
show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner
later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of
their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When
he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since
her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant
lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since
there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the
foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She
presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband. 25

(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2)
years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials
with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was
a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after
office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez
Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter
if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts. 30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a
finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of
disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS
which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost
anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs
judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of
psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the
evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded
that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to
whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court
of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is
hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines
which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under
the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its
allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at
the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with
underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted
under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental
capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly,
among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given
which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such
rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino
opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under
Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time,
Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because
then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v.
Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief
Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in
any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the
auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently
applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative
intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts
in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly
acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted as
a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be
disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article
36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the
Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been
derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular
progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions
of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of
marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article
XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for
the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent
of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must
be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He
also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even
the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent
with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from
the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are]
terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit.
One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the
basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the
person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between
individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say
about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic)
that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We
all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid
jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations
of the marriage?

A- Yes, Maam.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she
loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses
as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents
psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about
almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent
and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to
give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the
psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration
of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she
kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth
after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated
petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief
that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was
dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable
to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the
evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage
cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3)
vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological
incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was
made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate
ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the
correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa
and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of
adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage
Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In
other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet,
we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn
from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter
would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the
appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify
to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.

The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any
other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of
the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition
of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological
incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference
to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent
on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of
the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the
time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception
of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date
the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be
divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and
the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue
prejudice to those cases tried before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in
those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the
trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception.
It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties
would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10)
years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological
incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church
tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first
place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

THIRD DIVISION

DIGNA A. NAJERA, G.R. No. 164817

Petitioner, Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

- versus - Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

EDUARDO J. NAJERA, VELASCO, JR.,

Respondent. NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 3, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A.
Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The facts are as follows:

On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains.[1]
 Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the
United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the
Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.[2] They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage as shown by the
following facts:
(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division of the
Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was
dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to
land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely
on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he came
home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He
took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words
against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.
(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every year, he
quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he
was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a
bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She was
treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.
(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother at
Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California,U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance
with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title
II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture
in favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and (4)
granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by publication as provided
under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer[3] wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and averred
that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the
subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money.As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award
of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[4] terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their
conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting an
investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties. [5] The initial hearing of the case was held on November 23,
1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina
R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon,
Pangasinan.
 Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a government agency in
Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage contract.[6] At the time of their marriage,
respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of
Pangasinan with a monthly salary ofP5,000.00. It was petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman at the
Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly
allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time
respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that
respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and returned home, he was drunk. However, there
was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in drugs.[7]
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house on
the lot.[8]
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioners sister.Respondent,
however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home at aroundmidnight, petitioner asked him about
the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the
kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the one
having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw
respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to
sustain injuries on different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10
minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone out and was hiding from him. When
she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the
highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and
proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a few hours, she went home.[9]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about 300 meters
away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She found that their personal
belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.[10]

Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan. [11]

Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner
learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment from him.[12]
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondents parents were separated.Respondents
brothers were also separated from their respective wives.[13]
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.[14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She
confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:

It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the
kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated from Respondents
father.This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana
habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.

His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-
seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and
anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.

Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality
Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-
 destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najeras psychological impairment as traced to his
parents separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage
to Petitioner Digna Aldana.

Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage
organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his impairment
grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage be annulled on
grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties
and responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.[15]

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of
the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality
disorder and uncontrollable impulses.[16]
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a
complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without
provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.[17]
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent,
but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant

Eduardo Najera;

2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and

respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint
Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.[18]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution [19] dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[20]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,268 SCRA 198.
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo
Najera.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same set
of facts established by petitioners evidence submitted before the trial court and therefore the same
conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in
Psychology.[21]
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent which is his
dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
 The Court is not persuaded.

Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
 This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." [24] The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. [25] In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychologicalcondition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. [27]

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to
satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of
respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28]Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to
prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist
Cristina Gates testimony:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality disorder. [D]id you
find any organic cause?
A No, sir.

Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents family] background, there was strong basis that
respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.

Q Did you interview the respondents family?

A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).

xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.

Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly affected, is this
curable?
A The chances are nil.

Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.

Q What is this organic damage?

A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
 Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline personality
disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-
destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.

Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?

A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.[29]

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or
grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for
more than one year are grounds for legal separation[30] only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004,twelve days before the decision
was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v.
Court of Appeals, thus:

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

Petitioners argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered
the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for
reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court
and correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded
to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he
did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia
followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required
by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from
grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract:
First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his
own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a
domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third,
he was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected
his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later
hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with
 her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his
drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and
attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked

the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the
Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence
from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under
Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-
appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants
mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said
witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an
attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal,
petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said
Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue.

True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should
be decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of
evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.

Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before
the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample
reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court. [31]

Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the
Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the
third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his
 right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with
moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered
from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name
and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage
on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological
incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February
23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondent, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Oppositor. Promulgated:

February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a
clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that

current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed,

totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004

Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering

organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as

the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a

sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of closeness

towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At

first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and

sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast

depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house

and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would

commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.[5]

On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The

two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out

unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. [7] At one point, Edward was

able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with them. Edward

relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward

talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward

must go home.[8]

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him

from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she

said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.[10]

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon

City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was

docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP)

of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled

hearings.[13]

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was collusion

between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. [14]

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the

following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian
at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He
is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds
of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in
the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be
handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly
remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of
Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did
not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a
pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the
Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to
have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that
with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their
intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems
with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to
get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live
together.Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent
seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner
reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a
friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The
parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back
and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole
family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner
stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to
commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and
then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to
file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be
able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of
frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties
to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But
when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was
threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he
should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even
made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[]
and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his
parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they
knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still
 studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate
home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his
share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not
knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to
live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of
his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be
able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped
tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-
founded.The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was
still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing
to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit
himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an
introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit
himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As
he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn
time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of

woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to
take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is
part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband
is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way
out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to
marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized
by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely
introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other
hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her
strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during
marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.[15]

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision [16] declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground

that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. [17] The Republic, represented

by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside
the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist

did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological

incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short
of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under

Article 36 of the Family Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the

OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. [23] The CA

later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution. [24]

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave

due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]

In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He

posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both

parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine

respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and

it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.[27]

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no

statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity

was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties

was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the

respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the

parties is null and void.[31]

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was

based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v.

Court of Appeals:[33]

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations.
The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the
Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal
 separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by
another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as

a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law.

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon
which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any
provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of
the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice
Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the
enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void,
without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.

Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.

xxxxxxxxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled
on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages,
thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the
Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the
Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and
void on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly
normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo
among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.[34]

In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:

 At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and to mentally
incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which
is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is clear
that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable .
. . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop
Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an invention of some churchmen who
are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined
that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art.
36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase and is incurable
but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special situations, hence, its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void
from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now
open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf
from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
 Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: 3.
(those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or
annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null
and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.

Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples
have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable
to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family
Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the
beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: Canon
#1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that
persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of
interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due
competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of
carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such
as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit

the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the

provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by

decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision

itself was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. [38]

Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It

refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants

that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 [40] of the

Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter

insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in

Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the second
and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if
somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable
according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house.The house
is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire
unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third
paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori
that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and
its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist.The contract is
invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The
psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes
this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect
to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of
nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the
incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has
studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are
there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the
hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these
persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal,
either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what
marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by
church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the
object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an
irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible
compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks
the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is
always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly
more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand
perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised
in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be
free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver.The house he
is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this
tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one
hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually
understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no
difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne,
another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the
object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the
object of consent: the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited,
supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with
the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The
decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only
with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The
decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity,
although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing
and evaluating of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral
impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies
and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is
qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment
dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile
tenetur.

xxxx

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of
initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so
self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let
alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the
spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance
of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the
other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable
only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be
deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of
procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person
diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have
understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his constitutional immorality.

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is
determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of
decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of
the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of
whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of
the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also
and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity
of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person,
precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that
he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality
disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is
interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the
right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of
the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may
give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in
marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood
to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978,
Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say
that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal
decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also
the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon
that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases,
such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a
person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly
does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to
 assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In
other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the
canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is
only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his
capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by
C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have
something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit
deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity.The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the
habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the
source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom. [42]

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a

marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of

Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.[44]

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court,

in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-

examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel

decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital

obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be

interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards

in Molina,[46] thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
 obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile
remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.[47]

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponenciaof then Associate

Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid,

Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that

each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts.

In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with

another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,

avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[48]

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much

regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-

case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church

tribunals.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving

all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. [50] The

unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity

and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic

social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be

bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,

schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically,

the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. [51]

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards

against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion

between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving

marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the

foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a

psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It

may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and

psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no

marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of

nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and

foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a

warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a

personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder

recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly

stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern

the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the

principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to

its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the

findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties

psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and

respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56]

 By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not

discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.[57]

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of
new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that
of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp
and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the
spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life;
i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope
with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he
or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment
at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
 competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time
the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was
entered into.[58]

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of

a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts,

there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the

totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must show a link,

medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a

thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and

incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in

the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to

refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of

the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that

both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and

antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as

follows

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and long-term
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to
interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable
by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An
individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character
traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some
individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other
people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other
individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated
or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent
behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral
stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at
the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in
intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or
fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of
antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality
disorders.Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic
factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low
cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and
a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine
oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
 Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality
for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that
38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals

who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise specified, that can be used for other
specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy
may be long-term.[64]

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others
comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be
unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of
their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are
wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning
in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.[65]

and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of
others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child
or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even
sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are
prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be
hidden prior to a public scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described
immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.
1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality disorders, the others being
borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.[66]

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of

both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses

deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living

together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without

advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even

when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get

approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being

abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is

insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear

direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder

makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,

her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the

conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and

domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they

contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and

the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the

Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

HEIRS OF JOSE LIM, G.R. No. 172690

represented by ELENITO LIM,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
DEL CASTILLO,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
JULIET VILLA LIM,
Respondent. March 3, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of

Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated June 29, 2005, which reversed and set aside the decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Lucena City, dated April 12, 2004.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners are the heirs of the late Jose Lim (Jose), namely: Jose's widow Cresencia Palad (Cresencia); and their children Elenito,

Evelia, Imelda, Edelyna and Edison, all surnamed Lim (petitioners), represented by Elenito Lim (Elenito). They filed a

Complaint[4] for Partition, Accounting and Damages against respondent Juliet Villa Lim (respondent), widow of the late Elfledo

Lim (Elfledo), who was the eldest son of Jose and Cresencia.

Petitioners alleged that Jose was the liaison officer of Interwood Sawmill in Cagsiay, Mauban, Quezon.Sometime in 1980, Jose,

together with his friends Jimmy Yu (Jimmy) and Norberto Uy (Norberto), formed a partnership to engage in the trucking business.

Initially, with a contribution of P50,000.00 each, they purchased a truck to be used in the hauling and transport of lumber of the

sawmill. Jose managed the operations of this trucking business until his death on August 15, 1981. Thereafter, Jose's heirs,

including Elfledo, and partners agreed to continue the business under the management of Elfledo. The shares in the partnership

profits and income that formed part of the estate of Jose were held in trust by Elfledo, with petitioners' authority for Elfledo to use,

purchase or acquire properties using said funds.

Petitioners also alleged that, at that time, Elfledo was a fresh commerce graduate serving as his fathers driver in the trucking

business. He was never a partner or an investor in the business and merely supervised the purchase of additional trucks using the

income from the trucking business of the partners. By the time the partnership ceased, it had nine trucks, which were all registered

in Elfledo's name. Petitioners asseverated that it was also through Elfledos management of the partnership that he was able to

purchase numerous real properties by using the profits derived therefrom, all of which were registered in his name and that of

respondent. In addition to the nine trucks, Elfledo also acquired five other motor vehicles.

On May 18, 1995, Elfledo died, leaving respondent as his sole surviving heir. Petitioners claimed that respondent took over the

administration of the aforementioned properties, which belonged to the estate of Jose, without their consent and approval.

Claiming that they are co-owners of the properties, petitioners required respondent to submit an accounting of all income, profits

and rentals received from the estate of Elfledo, and to surrender the administration thereof. Respondent refused; thus, the filing of

this case.

Respondent traversed petitioners' allegations and claimed that Elfledo was himself a partner of Norberto and Jimmy. Respondent

also claimed that per testimony of Cresencia, sometime in 1980, Jose gave Elfledo P50,000.00 as the latter's capital in an informal

partnership with Jimmy and Norberto. When Elfledo and respondent got married in 1981, the partnership only had one truck; but
through the efforts of Elfledo, the business flourished. Other than this trucking business, Elfledo, together with respondent,

engaged in other business ventures. Thus, they were able to buy real properties and to put up their own car assembly and repair

business. When Norberto was ambushed and killed on July 16, 1993, the trucking business started to falter. When Elfledo died on
May 18, 1995 due to a heart attack, respondent talked to Jimmy and to the heirs of Norberto, as she could no longer run the

business. Jimmy suggested that three out of the nine trucks be given to him as his share, while the other three trucks be given to

the heirs of Norberto. However, Norberto's wife, Paquita Uy, was not interested in the vehicles. Thus, she sold the same to

respondent, who paid for them in installments.

Respondent also alleged that when Jose died in 1981, he left no known assets, and the partnership with Jimmy and Norberto

ceased upon his demise. Respondent also stressed that Jose left no properties that Elfledo could have held in trust. Respondent

maintained that all the properties involved in this case were purchased and acquired through her and her husbands joint efforts

and hard work, and without any participation or contribution from petitioners or from Jose. Respondent submitted that these are

conjugal partnership properties; and thus, she had the right to refuse to render an accounting for the income or profits of their own

business.

Trial on the merits ensued. On April 12, 2004, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Ordering the partition of the above-mentioned properties equally between the plaintiffs and heirs of Jose Lim
and the defendant Juliet Villa-Lim; and

2) Ordering the defendant to submit an accounting of all incomes, profits and rentals received by her from said
properties.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA.

On June 29, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's decision, dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of merit. Undaunted,

petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,[5] which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution[6] dated May 8, 2006.

Hence, this Petition, raising the sole question, viz.:

IN THE APPRECIATION BY THE COURT OF THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES, CAN THE
TESTIMONY OF ONE OF THE PETITIONERS BE GIVEN GREATER WEIGHT THAN THAT BY A FORMER
PARTNER ON THE ISSUE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE OTHER PARTNERS IN THE PARTNERSHIP?[7]

In essence, petitioners argue that according to the testimony of Jimmy, the sole surviving partner, Elfledo was not a partner; and

that he and Norberto entered into a partnership with Jose. Thus, the CA erred in not giving that testimony greater weight than that

of Cresencia, who was merely the spouse of Jose and not a party to the partnership.[8]

Respondent counters that the issue raised by petitioners is not proper in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the

Rules of Civil Procedure, as it would entail the review, evaluation, calibration, and re-weighing of the factual findings of the CA.

Moreover, respondent invokes the rationale of the CA decision that, in light of the admissions of Cresencia and Edison and the

testimony of respondent, the testimony of Jimmy was effectively refuted; accordingly, the CA's reversal of the RTC's findings was

fully justified.[9]
We resolve first the procedural matter regarding the propriety of the instant Petition.

Verily, the evaluation and calibration of the evidence necessarily involves consideration of factual issues an exercise that is not

appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of law,
because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence

introduced in and considered by the tribunals below.[10] When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are

conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following

recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[11]

We note, however, that the findings of fact of the RTC are contrary to those of the CA. Thus, our review of such findings is

warranted.

On the merits of the case, we find that the instant Petition is bereft of merit.

A partnership exists when two or more persons agree to place their money, effects, labor, and skill in lawful commerce or business,

with the understanding that there shall be a proportionate sharing of the profits and losses among them. A contract of partnership

is defined by the Civil Code as one where two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a

common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.[12]

Undoubtedly, the best evidence would have been the contract of partnership or the articles of partnership. Unfortunately, there is

none in this case, because the alleged partnership was never formally organized. Nonetheless, we are asked to determine who

between Jose and Elfledo was the partner in the trucking business.

A careful review of the records persuades us to affirm the CA decision. The evidence presented by petitioners falls short of the

quantum of proof required to establish that: (1) Jose was the partner and not Elfledo; and (2) all the properties acquired by Elfledo

and respondent form part of the estate of Jose, having been derived from the alleged partnership.

Petitioners heavily rely on Jimmy's testimony. But that testimony is just one piece of evidence against respondent. It must be

considered and weighed along with petitioners' other evidence vis--vis respondent's contrary evidence. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight,

credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered synonymous with the term "greater weight of

the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." "Preponderance of evidence" is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in

opposition thereto.[13] Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence,

thus:

SECTION I. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight
of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which
they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

At this juncture, our ruling in Heirs of Tan Eng Kee v. Court of Appeals[14] is enlightening. Therein, we cited Article 1769 of the Civil

Code, which provides:

Art. 1769. In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:

(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other are not partners as to third
persons;

(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners or co-
possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;

(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing
them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived;

(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is a prima facie evidence that he is a partner in
the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:

(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise;

(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business;
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by installments or
otherwise.

Applying the legal provision to the facts of this case, the following circumstances tend to prove that Elfledo was himself the partner

of Jimmy and Norberto: 1) Cresencia testified that Jose gave Elfledo P50,000.00, as share in the partnership, on a date that coincided

with the payment of the initial capital in the partnership; [15](2) Elfledo ran the affairs of the partnership, wielding absolute

control, power and authority, without any intervention or opposition whatsoever from any of petitioners herein; [16] (3) all of the

properties, particularly the nine trucks of the partnership, were registered in the name of Elfledo; (4) Jimmy testified that Elfledo

did not receive wages or salaries from the partnership, indicating that what he actually received were shares of the profits of the

business;[17] and (5) none of the petitioners, as heirs of Jose, the alleged partner, demanded periodic accounting from Elfledo during

his lifetime. As repeatedly stressed in Heirs of Tan Eng Kee,[18] a demand for periodic accounting is evidence of a partnership.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to adduce any evidence to show that the real and personal properties acquired and registered in the

names of Elfledo and respondent formed part of the estate of Jose, having been derived from Jose's alleged partnership with Jimmy

and Norberto. They failed to refute respondent's claim that Elfledo and respondent engaged in other businesses. Edison even

admitted that Elfledo also sold Interwood lumber as a sideline. [19] Petitioners could not offer any credible evidence other than their
bare assertions. Thus, we apply the basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral evidence, the former carries more

weight.[20]
Finally, we agree with the judicious findings of the CA, to wit:

The above testimonies prove that Elfledo was not just a hired help but one of the partners in the trucking
business, active and visible in the running of its affairs from day one until this ceased operations upon his
demise.The extent of his control, administration and management of the partnership and its business, the fact
that its properties were placed in his name, and that he was not paid salary or other compensation by the
partners, are indicative of the fact that Elfledo was a partner and a controlling one at that. It is apparent that the
other partners only contributed in the initial capital but had no say thereafter on how the business was
ran. Evidently it was through Elfredos efforts and hard work that the partnership was able to acquire more
trucks and otherwise prosper. Even the appellant participated in the affairs of the partnership by acting as the
bookkeeper sans salary.

It is notable too that Jose Lim died when the partnership was barely a year old, and the partnership and its
business not only continued but also flourished. If it were true that it was Jose Lim and not Elfledo
who was the partner, then upon his death the partnership should have
been dissolved and its assets liquidated. On the contrary, these were not done but instead its operation
continued under the helm of Elfledo and without any participation from the heirs of Jose Lim.

Whatever properties appellant and her husband had acquired, this was through their own concerted efforts and
hard work. Elfledo did not limit himself to the business of their partnership but engaged in other lines of
businesses as well.

In sum, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and the ruling of the CA as they are amply supported by the law and by

the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated June 29, 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

JORDAN CHAN PAZ, G.R. No. 166579

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
JEANICE PAVON PAZ,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 18, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
 The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the 9 August 2004[2] and 26 November 2004[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80473. In its 9 August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Jordan Chan Pazs (Jordan) appeal of the 13
May 2003 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (trial court), which granted respondent Jeanice Pavon Pazs
(Jeanice) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. In its 26 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Jordans
motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19 years old while Jordan was 27 years old. In January 1997,
they became a couple and, on 10 May 1997, they were formally engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3 July 1997, and their
church wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son, Evan Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight,
Jeanice left their conjugal home on 23 February 1999.

On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was
psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage.According to Jeanice, Jordans psychological incapacity
was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become
violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.

Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and spending a great deal
of time with his friends. Since Jordan worked in their family business, Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play
Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on
and attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with
his friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan also demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers
for their son.

At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but that the quarrels turned for the worse and Jordan became
increasingly violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her with a pair of scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22
February 1999, Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice added that
Jordan has not provided any financial support or visited their son since she left their conjugal home.

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his
impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability.[5] Gates concluded that Jordanspsychological maladies antedate their marriage
and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordans personality disorder appears
to be grave and incorrigible.

JORDAN DENIED JEANICES ALLEGATIONS. JORDAN ASSERTED THAT JEANICE EXAGGERATED HER STATEMENTS
AGAINST HIM. JORDAN SAID THAT JEANICE HAS HER OWN PERSONAL INSECURITIES AND THAT HER ACTIONS
SHOWED HER LACK OF MATURITY, CHILDISHNESS AND EMOTIONAL INABILITY TO COPE WITH THE STRUGGLES
AND CHALLENGES OF MAINTAINING A MARRIED LIFE.

JORDAN ALSO OBJECTED TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT OFFERED BY JEANICE. JORDAN POINTED OUT THAT HE
WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO ANY INTERVIEW OR PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS BY GATES. JORDAN ARGUED THAT GATES
CONCLUSIONS WERE MERE SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND SUPPOSITIONS FROM THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED
BY JEANICE.JORDAN ALLEGED THAT IT WAS PATENTLY ONE-SIDED AND IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS IT WAS
BASED ON HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JEANICE WHICH WERE OBVIOUSLY SELF-SERVING. JORDAN SAID HE WANTS
JEANICE BACK AND PRAYED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.

THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT

ON 13 MAY 2003, THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED JEANICES PETITION. THE TRIAL COURT DECLARED THAT JORDANS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, WHICH WAS SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED AS BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER,
DEPRIVED HIM OF THE CAPACITY TO FULLY UNDERSTAND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE MARITAL BOND. THE
TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE, PARTICULARLY ARTICLES 68[6] AND 70[7] OF THE FAMILY CODE. THE TRIAL COURT
ALSO DECLARED THAT JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, BEING ROOTED IN HIS FAMILY BACKGROUND,
ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE AND THAT WITHOUT ANY SIGN OF REFORMATION, FOUND THE SAME TO BE GRAVE
AND INCURABLE.

THE DISPOSITVE PORTION OF THE TRIAL COURTS 13 MAY 2003 DECISION READS:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DECLARING THE MARRIAGE

BETWEEN PETITIONER JEANICE PAVON PAZ AND RESPONDENT JORDAN CHAN PAZ CELEBRATED
ON JULY 3, 1997 AND SEPTEMBER 21, 1997 AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE WITH ALL THE EFFECTS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE COUPLES ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTIES [SIC] SHALL BE DISSOLVED IN THE MANNER HEREIN PROVIDED. AND THE CUSTODY
OVER EVAN SHALL REMAIN WITH THE PETITIONER, WITHOUT REGARD TO VISITATION RIGHTS OF
THE RESPONDENT AS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD. FURTHERMORE, THE PARTIES ARE JOINTLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUPPORT OF THEIR MINOR CHILD EVAN GUABERT PAVON PAZ.

LET COPIES OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRARS OF QUEZON CITY AND PASIG CITY
RESPECTIVELY AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO, CRP, LEGAL DEPARTMENT) EDSA, QUEZON
CITY.

SO ORDERED.[8]

On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.[9] The trial court promptly approved Jordans appeal.

ON 10 FEBRUARY 2004, JEANICE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS.[10] IN HER
MOTION, JEANICE SOUGHT THE IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OF JORDANS APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT JORDAN
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 20 OF A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC[11] WHICH PROVIDES:

SEC. 20. APPEAL.

(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
ON 9 AUGUST 2004, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED JORDANS APPEAL. ACCORDING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS,

THE RULES STATE IN MANDATORY AND CATEGORICAL TERMS THAT THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL IS A PRE-CONDITION BEFORE AN APPEAL FROM THE DECISION IS ALLOWED. THE

COURT OF APPEALS ADDED THAT WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, IT ADMITS NO ROOM FOR

INTERPRETATION BUT MERELY FOR APPLICATION.

JORDAN FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN ITS 26 NOVEMBER 2004 RESOLUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS
DISMISSED THE MOTION.

HENCE, THIS PETITION.

IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 22 JUNE 2005, WE DENIED JORDANS PETITION FOR FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY
SHOW THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTIONS AS
TO WARRANT THE EXERCISE BY THIS COURT OF ITS DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION.[12]

On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. While Jordan admits that he failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts 13 May 2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should not have
been strictly applied against him because it took effect only on 15 March 2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the
trial courts 13 May 2003 Decision. Moreover, Jordan enjoins the Court to decide the case on the merits so as to preserve the sanctity
of marriage as enshrined in the Constitution.

JEANICE ALSO FILED AN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2005.[13]

IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2005, WE GRANTED JORDANS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND REINSTATED THE PETITION.[14]

JEANICE FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 5 JUNE 2006, WE DENIED
JEANICES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF MERIT.[15]

ON 7 AUGUST 2006, JEANICE FILED A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 2006, WE DENIED JEANICES SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF MERIT AND REMINDED JEANICE THAT A SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING.[16]

THE ISSUE
THE ONLY ISSUE LEFT TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER JORDAN IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY

WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

THE RULING OF THIS COURT

THE PETITION HAS MERIT.

JEANICE FAILED TO PROVE JORDANS

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

JEANICES PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS ANCHORED ON ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY

CODE WHICH PROVIDES:

A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY ANY PARTY WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION, WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE, SHALL LIKEWISE BE VOID EVEN IF SUCH INCAPACITY BECOMES MANIFEST ONLY AFTER
ITS SOLEMNIZATION.

IN SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS,[17] THE COURT FIRST DECLARED THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MUST BE

CHARACTERIZED BY (A) GRAVITY; (B) JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE; AND (C) INCURABILITY. IT MUST BE CONFINED TO
THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR

INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MARRIAGE.[18]

IN DIMAYUGA-LAURENA V. COURT OF APPEALS,[19] THE COURT EXPLAINED:

(A) GRAVITY IT MUST BE GRAVE AND SERIOUS SUCH THAT THE PARTY WOULD BE INCAPABLE OF
CARRYING OUT THE ORDINARY DUTIES REQUIRED IN A MARRIAGE;

(B) JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE IT MUST BE ROOTED IN THE HISTORY OF THE PARTY ANTEDATING THE MARRIAGE,
ALTHOUGH THE OVERT MANIFESTATIONS MAY EMERGE ONLY AFTER THE MARRIAGE; AND

(C) INCURABILITY IT MUST BE INCURABLE, OR EVEN IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THE CURE WOULD BE
BEYOND THE MEANS OF THE PARTY INVOLVED.[20]
IN GRANTING JEANICES PETITION, THE TRIAL COURT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF GATES TO SUPPORT ITS

CONCLUSION THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL

OBLIGATIONS. GATES DECLARED THAT JORDAN WAS SUFFERING FROM BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER AS

MANIFESTED BY HIS BEING A MAMAS BOY AND THAT SUCH WAS GRAVE AND INCURABLE, ROOTED IN HIS FAMILY

BACKGROUND, [AND] ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE.

ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTY TO BE DECLARED PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED

SHOULD BE PERSONALLY EXAMINED BY A PHYSICIAN OR A PSYCHOLOGIST, THERE IS NEVERTHELESS A NEED TO

PROVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY THROUGH INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PERSON

ALLEGING SAID DISORDER.[21]

CORRESPONDINGLY, THE PRESENTATION OF EXPERT PROOF PRESUPPOSES A THOROUGH AND IN-DEPTH

ASSESSMENT OF THE PARTIES BY THE PSYCHOLOGIST OR EXPERT, FOR A CONCLUSIVE DIAGNOSIS OF A GRAVE,

SEVERE AND INCURABLE PRESENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[22]

IN THIS CASE, THE COURT NOTES THAT THE REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF GATES ON JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY WERE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON HER INTERVIEWS WITH JEANICE AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF JEANICES TESTIMONY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[23] GATES ONLY DIAGNOSED JORDAN

FROM THE STATEMENTS OF JEANICE, WHOSE BIAS IN FAVOR OF HER CAUSE CANNOT BE DOUBTED. GATES DID NOT

ACTUALLY HEAR, SEE AND EVALUATE JORDAN. GATES TESTIFIED:

Q- AS A LAST QUESTION MADAM WITNESS. SO ALL IN ALL YOUR CONCLUSIONS HERE ON PAGE 1 TO
PAGE 5 OF YOUR REPORT ARE ALL BASED ON THE STATEMENT AND PERCEPTION OF THE
PETITIONER (JEANICE) ON THE RESPONDENT (JORDAN)?

A- YES MAM.[24]

Consequently, Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying

on.[25] Gates testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable. [26]

MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT, JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SO GRAVE AND SO PERMANENT AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF THE AWARENESS OF THE DUTIES
AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MATRIMONIAL BOND. AT BEST, JEANICES ALLEGATIONS SHOWED THAT JORDAN
WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, INSENSITIVE, OR EMOTIONALLY IMMATURE. THE INCIDENTS CITED BY JEANICE DO NOT SHOW
THAT JORDAN SUFFERED FROM GRAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MALADIES THAT PARALYZED JORDAN FROM COMPLYING
WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES TO RENDER A MARRIAGE VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS
DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY, NOT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT OR DIFFICULTY, MUCH LESS ILL WILL.[27] THE MERE
SHOWING OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[28]

IN PEREZ-FERRARIS V. FERRARIS,[29] WE SAID:

AS ALL PEOPLE MAY HAVE CERTAIN QUIRKS AND IDIOSYNCRASIES, OR ISOLATED

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN PERSONALITY DISORDERS, THERE IS HARDLY A
DOUBT THAT THE INTENDMENT OF THE LAW HAS BEEN TO CONFINE THE MEANING OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND
SIGNIFICANCE TO MARRIAGE.[30]

Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior which showed that Jordan indeed suffers from
Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan psychologically
incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.

LIKEWISE, JEANICE WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH CERTAINTY THAT JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY WAS MEDICALLY OR CLINICALLY PERMANENT OR INCURABLE. GATES TESTIMONY ON THE MATTER
WAS VAGUE AND INCONCLUSIVE. GATES TESTIFIED:

Q - NOW IS THIS DISORDER CURABLE?

A - IF ITS CONTINUING TO THE PRESENT THEREFORE ITS PERSEVERERATIVE BEHAVIOR. THEN THE POSSIBILITY OF
COUNTERING THE SAME MIGHT BE NIL.[31]

GATES DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN HOW SHE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT JORDANS CONDITION WAS
INCURABLE.

IN SUM, THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY JEANICE FAILED TO SHOW THAT JORDAN WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS AND THAT SUCH
INCAPACITY WAS GRAVE, INCURABLE, AND EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE.

IN REPUBLIC V. CABANTUG-BAGUIO,[32] WE SAID:

THE CONSTITUTION SETS OUT A POLICY OF PROTECTING AND STRENGTHENING THE FAMILY AS THE BASIC SOCIAL

INSTITUTION AND MARRIAGE AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE FAMILY.MARRIAGE, AS AN INVIOLABLE INSTITUTION

PROTECTED BY THE STATE, CANNOT BE DISSOLVED AT THE WHIM OF THE PARTIES. IN PETITIONS FOR THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE LIES ON

THE PLAINTIFF. ANY DOUBT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE EXISTENCE AND CONTINUATION OF THE

MARRIAGE AND AGAINST ITS DISSOLUTION AND NULLITY.[33]

WHEREFORE, WE GRANT THE PETITION. WE SET ASIDE THE 9 AUGUST 2004 AND 26 NOVEMBER 2004 RESOLUTIONS

OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. WE REVERSE THE 13 MAY 2003 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,

BRANCH 69. THE MARRIAGE OF JEANICE PAVON PAZ TO JORDAN CHAN PAZ SUBSISTS AND REMAINS VALID.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
 VALERIO E. KALAW, G.R. No. 166357
Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 19, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the existence
of these facts.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R.

CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually

married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and

Jaime Teodoro (Jay).

Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March

1983.[5]

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.[6]Meanwhile, Tyrone started

living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented

house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of

them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.[9]

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation.Malyn acceded only to learn later

that Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and

Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their

father.[11]

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article

36 of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations

at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and

irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:

1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;

2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and

3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]

During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law,
Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra

(Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.[15] At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a

towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with

adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.[16] They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on

Malyns psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her

frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).[17]NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her

wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.[18]Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.[19]

Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family

background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model.[20]

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son

Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.[22] He

explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the

point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of

prioritizing her familys needs.

Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological

incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones familial duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized

Malyns psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]

He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert

witness.[25] He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts

duty to do so.[26] Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.

Malyns version

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged.

She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And in those instances, she always

had Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her.[29] She maintained that she did not neglect her

duties as mother and wife.

Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive

husband.[30] On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called

up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded

to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that

Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house.[31] She never returned to their conjugal home.

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery

that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.[32]

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after

partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully

clothed at that time.[33] Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress.[34]

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of the

children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).

As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug

dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.

Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled

from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of her mahjong habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones

sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They

encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions

are summarized below:

The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage
even after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts,
flowers, and affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the minute she
started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that
she was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when
she begins to care for a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and
feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when
he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for
fun dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
 Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short
temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends
tha[n] he was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families
with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly
galloped out of control Their individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.[38]

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe,dependency, narcissism, and

compulsiveness.[39]

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship

with her kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable

to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]

Childrens version

The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would

accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling

abandoned.

The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on

her mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in school.[43]

The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While they did not

live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and

would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle

Verde whenever any of them was sick.[45]

Other witnesses

Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the couple

appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.[46]He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for

drugs and was not a drug dependent.[47]

Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to

Tyrones version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway.He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or

Malyn half-naked.[48]

Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on

nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.[49]

Social worker

The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor

children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn;[50] and
Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with their children, she

recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was

shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that even after

Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was only

granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.[51]

On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de facto separation, simply left the children for several years with only

a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad.[52] The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his

second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn.Given this history during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not

find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform

the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what
it entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties
psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]

The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]

Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both

parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to

picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a

legal separation.[57] Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of

NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.[60]

Petitioners arguments

Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to

appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to

perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-

obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;[61]

b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her

essential martial obligations;[62] and

 c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family

background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]

Respondents arguments

Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.[65]She argues that the

testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient

to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]

She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn.

Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys testimony, on the other

hand, was based only on Tyrones version of the facts.[68]

Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of

psychological incapacity with factual findings.

Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to

Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69] She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be

void on the basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice.[70] Her manifestation and

motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]

Issue

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.[72] The burden

of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or

behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential

obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.[74]

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two

supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners

allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.

Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to

her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually

proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result.Respondent admittedly played

mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent

refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with

the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their

mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong

sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not

able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents

mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that

respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need

for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with

friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs

with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to

prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with

obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute

psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for

concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair

assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and

parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of

them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her

children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial

duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is

nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the

CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations,

testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses,

and the weight of the evidence.The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological

incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of

themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a

marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution

in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.