[ G.R. No.

112019, January 04, 1995 ]

LEOUEL SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial

provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
“Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.”

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of

Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo [1] and the Court of Appeals, [2] Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting
later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal
Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo
City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he
was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not
last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of
the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses' family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start
a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where
the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents
or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of

America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 10 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through

counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of

nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly

been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed
a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the

complaint for lack of merit. [3]

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the

decision of the trial court. [4]

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-

compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of
non-forum shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the

very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel
asserts:

"x x x (T)here is no love, there is no affection for (him) because

respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage. Respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos is one such wife."

The Family Code did not define the term "psychological

incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

"‘Article 35 - The following marriages shall be void from the

beginning:

‘xxx xxx xxx.

'Article 36 - x x x
'(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.’

"On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,

Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say 'wanting in
sufficient use' instead of 'wanting in the sufficient use,’ but
Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say 'wanting in the
sufficient use.’ On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
they say 'wanting in sufficient reason.’ Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in
judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He
added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable.
Judge (Alicia Sempio ) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is
more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter
would make the marriage null and void and the former only
voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:

"‘That contracted by any party who, at the time of the

celebration, was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.'

"Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase 'was wanting in

sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage' refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

"Judge Diy raised the question: Since 'insanity' is also a

psychological or mental incapacity, why is 'insanity' only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration of nullity? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

"Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the

word 'mentally' be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, preferred to retain the word
'mentally.'

"Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to

psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one
but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.

"Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code,
the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages. Dean Gupit
said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.

"Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in

marriage cannot be cured.

"Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is 'insanity'
a ground for voidable marriage, while 'psychological or mental
incapacity' is a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are
lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

"On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase 'even
if such lack or incapacity is made manifest' be modified to read
'even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest.'

"Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the

marriage, it is not apparent.

"Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the

phrase 'psychologically or mentally incapacitated' -- in the first
one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all
the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.

“xxx xxx xxx

"Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological

incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand
the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
way of providing for divorce.

“xxx xxx xxx

"Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of

incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it
is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.

“xxx xxx xxx

"On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero

inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent.
In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is affected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent.
He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage,
which are completely different from each other, because they
require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for
marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however,
felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent
and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which
is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there
should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage
and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in
the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment
is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of
the consequence of marriage.

"Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not

cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated
that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be
a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

"Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still

insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they
invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not
a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not
be a help.

"Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a

lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when
there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. [5]

“xxx xxx xxx

"Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to

copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge
Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice
Caguioa remarked that the term 'incurable' has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
'psychological incapacity' can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that 'psychological incapacity' is incurable.

"Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it

is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on
if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations,
the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after
the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in
the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and
later becomes manifest.

"Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is

possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity
becomes manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow
him to remarry. [6]

“xxx xxx xxx

"Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

"’Article 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void
from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization.’

"Justice Caguioa suggested that ‘even if’ be substituted with

'although.' On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause 'although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization' be deleted since it may encourage one to create
the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.

"Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity
is not a species of vice of consent.

"Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:

"’On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
'psychological or mental impotence' is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as 'psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . '

"Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word 'mental'

precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
'psychological incapacity' refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.

"Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting,

they have decided not to go into the classification of
'psychological incapacity' because there was a lot of debate on it
and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a
special case.

"At this point, Justice Puno remarked that, since there have
been annulments of marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

"Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision

in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a
provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages
annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.

"Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be

retroactive or prospective in application.

"Judge Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.

"Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which
the Committee approved.

"The members voted as follows:

“(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.

“(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.

"(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

"Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive
period of ten years within which the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion. [7]

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision

Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has, in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been
quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon.
Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: [8]

"The Committee did not give any examples of psychological

incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code

of Canon Law, [9] which reads:

"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment

concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given
and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume

the essential obligations of marriage." (Underscoring supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation
or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treatise, [10] giving an

account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:

"The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any
doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A
strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

'Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage

because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/ 1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

‘...because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem

anomaliam psychicam)...' (cf. SCH/ 1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
pope (cf. SCH/ 1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

'because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas

naturae psychiae)'.

"So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological

anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. It
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage."

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity"

defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be
of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"

written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck,
the following explanation appears:

"This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to

commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can
be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in
legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b)
this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life
and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously
does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted
by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties."

Justice Sempio-Diy [11] cites with approval the work of Dr.

Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch
I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,

including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,"
quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of

marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are

established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must,
in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We

should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article
1 of the Family Code, is that -

"Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union

between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code." (Underscoring supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

"Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the

foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

"Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic

nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are no
doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all,

can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,

Melo, Quaison, Puno, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., dissenting opinion. Feliciano, J., on leave.

[1]
Per Judge Enrique Garrovillo.
[2]
Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justices Pedro Ramirez
and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.
[3]
Rollo, 37-42.
[4]
Rollo, 13-18.
[5]
Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.
[6]
Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2, 1986.
[7]
Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.
[8]
In her "Handbook on the Family Code."
[9]
Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986, 129-130; C
109

Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi:

1. qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;

2. qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et official

matrimonialia essentialia mutuo tradenda et acceptanda;

3. qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales

assumere non valent.
[10]
Ibid., 131-132.
[11]
Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.

SEPARATE OPINION

ROMERO, J.:

I agree that under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is

not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity of private respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision

Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter [1] dated April 15, 1985 of then
Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law
and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had

thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of
a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then
requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal
of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision

Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as -

‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and

a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.'

With the above definition, and considering the Christian

traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong,
the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the
idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds
available in the Canon law. It was thought that such an action
would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would
also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a
draft of provisions on such action for declaration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the
preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind
of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the
present Civil Code, to wit:

‘(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.'

as well as the following implementing provisions:

'Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.'

'Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.'
xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our

country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese
of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages
null and void on the ground of ‘lack of due discretion' for causes
that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce,
like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who,
because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot
support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by
an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among
husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly. x x x. (Underscoring
supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family

Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add
another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing
the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on
psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on
a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an
enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity.
Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing
at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like

any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this,
"the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed."[2]

Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-

case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law." [3]

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family [4] will

remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve
ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be
taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at
all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by
reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall
short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way
of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted
means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the
provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-
married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of
the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of
the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not
interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the
other.

[1]
Written pursuant to the request of Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro during the March 23, 1985 joint meeting of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committees at the UP Law Center for comments on P.B. 3149
(Pacificador Bill) on Divorce, P.B. No. 1086 (Monfort and Collantes Bill) on
Recognition of Church Annulments of Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on
Additional Grounds for Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation and P.B.
No. 1350 (Kalaw Bill) on Equal Rights of Filipino Women which were pending
before her Sub-Committee.
[2]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48.
[3]
J. A. V. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 37 (1988).
[4]
As quoted in the majority opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

PADILLA, J.:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as

Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on
the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as
the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown

to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one
essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with
her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not
been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit
with his wife, herein private respondent.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term

"psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of
the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for
nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the broad term "psychological incapacity" can

open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an
easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.

In the case at bench, it has been abundantly established that

private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific
behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to wit:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United
States to call up her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in

July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing
that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her
whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the

Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia;
there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had
elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner
or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her
answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible
and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit
evidence.

A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in

marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are
overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an
incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty
of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be
instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband
and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between
the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each
other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least
have regular contacts with the other to inform the latter of his/her
condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia

Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with
petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact,
her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to
know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of
living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an

unmistakable indication of psychological incapacity to comply
with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.

It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court

to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and
compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical
purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the

ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect, directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate
children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his
wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is

a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not
constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus
deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in
his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital
obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the

marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
 [ G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996 ]

EMILIO TUASON, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS

AND MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside
the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner’s appeal from an order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No.
3769.

This case arose from the following facts:

In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed

with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner
Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged
that she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from
this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage,
petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and
wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical
injuries on private respondent which impelled her to file a
criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner
used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and
sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been
rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984, he
left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in
succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife;
that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal
support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees
of their children compelling private respondent to accept
donations and dole-outs from her family and friends; that
petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of
their assets and incurring large obligations with banks, credit
card companies and other financial institutions, without private
respondent’s consent; that attempts at reconciliation were made
but they all failed because of petitioner’s refusal to reform. In
addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private
respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the
conjugal properties from further dissipation. [1]

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As

affirmative defense, he claimed that he and private respondent
were a normal married couple during the first ten years of their
marriage and actually begot two children during this period; that
it was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal
differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity
due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata;
that due to the "extreme animosities" between them, he
temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in
1984; that it is private respondent who had been taking
prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man; that
petitioner’s work as owner and operator of a radio and television
station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various
women in media and the entertainment world; and that since
1984, he experienced financial reverses in his business and was
compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of
the conjugal shares in exclusive golf and country clubs.
Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the
conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal
partnership.

After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30,

1990. Private respondent presented four witnesses, namely,
herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage
counselor of both private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita
Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Any. Jose F. Racela
IV, private respondent’s counsel. Private respondent likewise
submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper
articles of her husband’s relationship with other women, his
apprehension by the authorities for illegal possession of drugs;
and copies of a prior church annulment decree. [2] The parties’
marriage was clerically annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which was affirmed by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.[3]

During presentation of private respondent’s evidence, petitioner,

on April 18, 1990, filed his Opposition to private respondent’s
petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership of gains.

After private respondent rested her case, the trial court

scheduled the reception of petitioner’s evidence on May 11,
1990.

On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a

counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground
that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to
return on the first week of June.[4] The court granted the motion
and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.[5]

On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of

private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived
his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring

the nullity of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and
awarding custody of the children to private respondent. The
court ruled:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage
contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on
June 3, 1972 is declared null and void oh initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec.
36 of the Family Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be
recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the
marriage was contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro
Manila where the marriage is annulled.

The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and
the defendant is hereby awarded to the plaintiff.

The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of

the other effects of annulment as provided for under Arts. 50 and
51 of the Family Code of the Philippines." [6]

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August

24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the decision.

On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for

Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to
Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties." [7] Petitioner opposed the
motion on October 17, 1990[8]

Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new
counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from
judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.

The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991. [9]

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the

trial court denying his petition for relief from judgment. On July
29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the order of the trial court. [10]

Hence this petition.

The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment

is warranted under the circumstances of the case.
We rule in the negative.

A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38,

Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

"Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from

judgment or other proceedings thereof. - When a judgment or
order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a
party in a court of first instance through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and
in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside."

Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the

Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good,
substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. [11] If the
petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine
the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted
therein.[12]

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to

private respondent had already become final and executory
when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period.
Petitioner however claims that the decision of the trial court was
null and void for violation of his right to due process. He
contends he was denied due process when, after failing to
appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to
have waived his right to present evidence and rendered
judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent.
Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground
that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation
reasons."[13] In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he
attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of
the Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center which
states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for
treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center
at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police.[14] The
records, however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did
not inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court
rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country
for which reason the decision became final and executory as no
appeal was taken therefrom.[15]

The failure of petitioner’s counsel to notify him on time of the

adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is
negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of
record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of
counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the
loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face. [16]

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to

inform the trial court of petitioner’s confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the
scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his
former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the
court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case
deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the
negligence of petitioner’s counsel, the order of the trial court was
never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.

Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due

process. He may have lost his right to present evidence but he
was not denied his day in court. As the records show, petitioner,
through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below.
He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private
respondent’s witnesses and even submitted his opposition to
private respondent’s motion for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.[17]
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is
allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other
available or adequate remedy. When a party has another
remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new
trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he
was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he
cannot avail himself of this petition.[18] Indeed, relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive
the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.[19]

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious

defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in actions
for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting
officer should intervene for the state because the law "looks with
disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of
marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to
appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and
inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.[20]

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

"Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute

nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment

shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment."

xxx
"Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or

fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."[21]

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default

is fraught with the danger of collusion. [22] Hence, in all cases for
annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare
him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. [23]
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application
for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his
own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.[24] Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. [25] Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good,
solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
concern alone of the family members.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was
not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer.
Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the
cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively
participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings
and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is
crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized
by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of

marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is
no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or
fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we
are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent’s

witnesses, particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto,
as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he
were able to present his evidence, he could have testified that
he was not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten years,
he and private respondent lived together with their children as
one normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his
family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work
as owner and operator of a radio and television corporation
places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject for
malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts,
according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for
annulment of his marriage to petitioner.

Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the

existence or non-existence of petitioner’s psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on
us.[26] Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court’s
factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondent’s witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner’s defenses are
clearly and manifestly erroneous.[27]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision
dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
37925 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

[1]
Amended Complaint, Records, pp. 22-30.
[2]
Records, pp. 96-118.
[3]
Exhibits "O", and "P"; Records, pp. 113-118.
[4]
Records, pp. 126-127.
[5]
Id., p. 128.
[6]
Id., pp. 132-133.
[7]
Id., pp. 136-139.
[8]
Id., pp. 143-145. Despite petitioner’s opposition, the court, on September 9,
1991, granted said motion and declared the establishment between husband
and wife of the regime of complete separation of property and adjudicated to
private respondent the conjugal home and lot on which the conjugal home
stands.
[9]
Id., pp. 215-216.
[10]
CA-G.R. CV No. 37925, Rollo, pp. 33-40.
[11]
Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280 [1991]; Torno v. Court of
Appeals, 166 SCRA 742 [1988].
[12]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 7.
[13]
Petitioner’s Reply to Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 110.
[14]
Records, pp. 151-152.
[15]
Petitioner’s Reply to Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 110.
[16]
Palanca v. American Food Mfg. Co., 24 SCRA 819 [1968]; Duran v.
Pagarigan, 106 Phil. 907 [1960].
[17]
Court of Appeals Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 38.
[18]
Somoso v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 654, 660 [1989]; Ibabao v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 76 [1987]; Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation v. Lood, 110 SCRA 205 [1981].
[19]
Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 86; Manila Electric Co. p.
Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 201 [1990].
[20]
Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 15.
[21]
Taken from Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
were also taken from Article 85 of the Old Civil Code.
[22]
Dean Francisco Capistrano, member of the Civil Code Commission, cited
in I Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 1026 [1973].
[23]
Rule 18, Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation. - If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated.
[24]
San Gabriel v. San Gabriel, (CA) 56 O.G. 3555, Nov. 27, 1959.
[25]
Sec. 12, Article II.
[26]
cf. Periquet, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 238 SCRA 697, 710
[1994].
[27]
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Aruego, 102 SCRA 530 [1981]; Bank of
the Philippine Islands v. de Coster, 47 Phil. 594 [1925].
 [ G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997 ]

CHI MING TSOI,PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND

GINA LAO-TSOI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a

marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife

against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial
Court's decision on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly
denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial
court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals [1] in its decision
are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were
preponderantly established:

"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant

at the Manila Cathedral, xxx Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

"After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at

the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.

"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room
for the first night of their married life.

"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations,

that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.

"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where

they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all
invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided
her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping
on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together
in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not
even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical

examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

“The results of their physical examinations were that she is

healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband’s
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential.
No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.

"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet

homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she
had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and
to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very
much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically
and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is
still very young and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if
either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any
defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology
or scienceK

"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,

1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever
he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.

"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid

because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.

"The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His

penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated
there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and
he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to

find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters,
the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no

collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated.”[2]
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as
VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of
the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt.
Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this
decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
"SO ORDERED. "

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's

decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no

sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual

communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties

decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-

89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no
independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between
the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard
acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by
the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties
in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since
it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for
annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.[3]

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified
under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a
testimony. After such evidence was presented, it became
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that
since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as

stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not
want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is
no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that
he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth.
We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court
is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995)." [4]

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding

that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the
reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
psychological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, - i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, - why private respondent would not want to have
sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on

record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted
to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private
respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have

discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing
her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to
have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is
nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or
discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is
no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.[5]
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological
but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent,
it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity."[6]
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

"An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the

husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with
him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he
occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his rights even though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111
Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it
were true that it is the wife who was suffering from incapacity,
the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate
testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.

"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the

evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not psychological incapacity,
and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After
almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with
his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not
posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches,
is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code.”[7]

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art.
68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno,
120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy
is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner

and private respondent. That is - a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed
by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit
amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which

the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.

[1]
Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo
Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 20-24.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Rollo, p. 34.
[5]
Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C”.
[6]
Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family
Code of the Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.
[7]
Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.
 [ G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009 ]

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, PETITIONER, VS. ROWENA

ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, RESPONDENT, REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition.

Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having
realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should
be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was
formulated--free in form and devoid of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19,
2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of
the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of

respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.
Edward was then initially attracted to Rowena's close friend; but,
as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman. [3]

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood

one another and developed a certain degree of closeness
towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months
after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope.
At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila
and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]

However, Edward's P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their

pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast
depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they
decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle's
house and Edward to his parents' home. As his family was
abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him
that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle's place.[5]

On April 23, 1996, Rowena's uncle brought the two to a court to

get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. [6] The two
then continued to stay at her uncle's place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner--he was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena. [7] At one point, Edward
was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that
they should stay at their parents' home and live with them.
Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that
he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own.
Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that
Edward must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena's
uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from
Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for
him.[9]

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by

his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said
that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways.[10]

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a

petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter's psychological incapacity. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11,
2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between
the parties.[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and
deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the
scheduled hearings.[13]

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report

stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between
the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. [14]

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both

parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following
findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male

adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He
finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last
1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married to and
separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented
himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to
his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the
grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181
P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business

and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the
business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable,
and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of
the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet
and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of
meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales
Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because
of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not
stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a
full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to
isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days
as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a

lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to

petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family
and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that
[time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should
elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not
prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is
rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously
brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for
the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea
and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at
the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to
locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment.
The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek
help from petitioner's parents. When the parties arrived at the
house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the
country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the
meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a
few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone
and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold,
respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again.
Respondent would call by phone every now and then and
became angry as petitioner does not know what to do.
Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case
against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper.
Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and
at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her.
And so on April 23, 1996, respondent's uncle brought the parties
to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was
made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner
actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house

until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the
parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow
petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many
ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent
even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will
commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent
even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish,
the authorities should look for him at his parents[Û¥] and
relatives[Û¥] houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was
able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his
predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving
him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that
he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew
about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,]
after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner
offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner's parents
while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and
claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a
separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She
also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share
of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a
new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the
petitioner already settled his differences with his own family.
When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose
for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing
the home of his parents. He told her already that he was
disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not
be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not
have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting
petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate
lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be

undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up
was caused by both parties['] unreadiness to commitment and
their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and
fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with
herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach's Sentence Completion Test
MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally

immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital
vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to

be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage.
He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life.
He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and
displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with
other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that
he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a
relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by
her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the
reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of

the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought
that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband
is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really
no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself

and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage
should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case
presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently
clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is
extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by
his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful,
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward
convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave,
severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only
manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to
take.[15]

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision [16]
declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground
that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal. [18]

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003

Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside
the trial court's ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist
did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. [22] The CA faulted
the lower court for rendering the decision without the required
certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG's reasons
for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004
Resolution.[24]

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition

for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits
that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondent's psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties' psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that
there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound
by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it
during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the
pleadings, the trial court orders and notices. [27]

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the
annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of
the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise
not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And
the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on

Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties
is null and void.[31]

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and

charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision

Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based
on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v.
Court of Appeals:[33]

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision

Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then
Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law
and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had

thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of
a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then
requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal
of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision

Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
—

`a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and

a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.'

With the above definition, and considering the Christian

traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong,
the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the
idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds
available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action
would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would
also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a
draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the
preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind
of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the
present Civil Code, to wit:

`(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

`Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.'

`Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.'

xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese
of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages
null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes
that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce,
like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who,
because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot
support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by
an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among
husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly. [34]

In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision

read:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration."

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has

dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases
refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent;
it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that

psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term

"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is
an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the

inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining

void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage

as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under

"special cases and special situations," hence, its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a

ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the

time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of

essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the

provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal
provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because
of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes

only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid
and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state,
the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage
null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a
valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil

Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to
enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by
Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbo--freed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet
unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such

anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code--and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent
from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to be `capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons `be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon
#1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and
external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called `lack of due discretion' and `lack of
due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person
did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying
out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony."

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s

and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality
and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to
the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for
annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several
cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of
marriage was probably not present in persons who had
displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature
of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota
itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after
the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the
time of the ceremony.[36]

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of

psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit
the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. [37] The law is
then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.[38]

Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase "psychological incapacity"

is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article
68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the
most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp

conceptual distinction must be made between the second and
third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the
essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose
wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that
they are capable according to positive law to enter such
contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house.
The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the
conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire
unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated
by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does
not deal with the psychological process of giving consent
because it has been established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of
their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3
deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not
exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object.
The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient.
The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object
which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this
distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of
consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may
be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not
capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of
the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota
in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage
arising from pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from
others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual

anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of
intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so - that is to say, they arise from
certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and
they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher
faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free
human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is
abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature
which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are
not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania,
satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties
remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have
an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage
freely. The question though is whether such a person can
assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he
may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage
issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather
than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually

confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts
were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c.
Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent,
is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under
these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely
the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is
always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion?
It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable,
to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would
be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised
in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more
correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an
object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted
down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani

seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled
mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction
between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the
inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of
marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications.
They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent
consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting
an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal
judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of
consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According
to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing
and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the
object of consent: the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of

Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is
possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist
in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an
intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of
things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a
nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty
not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and
especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The
decision concludes that a person in such a condition is
incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity,
although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating
of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it

was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or
psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the
personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment
dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the
subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact,
to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of
fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad
impossibile tenetur.

xxxx

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when

either or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or
maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to
begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and
sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to
the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or
maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a
spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the
other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of
the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing
or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial
security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not
the place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete

circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect,
the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of
assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person

as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not
only at the moment of decision but also and especially during
the moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to
constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether
a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage
in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at
matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in
facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of
the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as
regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others
that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably
disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel)
is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation,
especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are
taken advantage of in order to achieve one's ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as

essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the
communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are
basically centered around the good of the spouses and of the
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume
any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some
cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships
in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and
antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear

under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage - that is to say, is homosexuality
invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to
understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of
marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with
charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This
is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision,
the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only
to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third
paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations
with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due
discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect
the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the
homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of
marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so
much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be

addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the
opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of the
contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in
the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which
impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by
C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense
only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in
his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these
obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one's
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this
invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to
be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the
habit, while one accepts as given one's psychic constitution. It
would seem then that the law insists that the source of the
incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of
freedom.[42]

Conscious of the law's intention that it is the courts, on a case-

to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a
marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court's judgment of annulment in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are
final and binding on the appellate courts. [44]

Again, upholding the trial court's findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi
v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted,
as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in
Molina,[46] thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the

following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological--not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who

are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due
to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family

Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally-- subject to our law on evidence--what
is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and

purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church--while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other--shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court's

membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as
aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations,
but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on `all fours' with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court." [48]

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, [49] the

Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much
regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to

impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court
was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." [50]
The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account
of the personality disorders of the said individuals. [51]

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the
remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards
against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. [52] The Court
should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's

psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article
36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the
same is void from the very beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery,
the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses

should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and
foremost, because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity
operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the
normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again
marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a
would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the
risk of the latter's disorder recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the

abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55]
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties' whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6)

months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner's behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondent's, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder.[56]

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the

primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.[57]

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of
a psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of

marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered
a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient

psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations
of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the
right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life;
i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological
or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of
the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the
other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other
oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-
giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a
physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities.
The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according
to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the
ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements

necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital

commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological

conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding

conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone

who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on
any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already

detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis
was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem
to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry
out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into
civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into." [58]

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of

presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60]
asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for

emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. [62]
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest
the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an
option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology,
to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case.
The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties'
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological

assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the
findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders--
to repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.
We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses
personality disorders as follows--

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are

characteristic of a person's recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to
isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental
stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships
and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through
adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An
individual may have more than one personality disorder at a
time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality

disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in
which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with
other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and
often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other
individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent.
Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-
esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health

viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality disorders.
These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories
and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages

of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal
and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality,
rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was
thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in
intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found
little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain
stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a

genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline
personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin
studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline

personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid
5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts.
Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit
eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph

(EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many
years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A
study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least
marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a
control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric

Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality
disorders are categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality

disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to
have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and

passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder

not otherwise specified," that can be used for other specific
personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify
as any of the specific personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have

long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following

manner--

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent

and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-
esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments. At times they
actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early

adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important
decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people
even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. [65]

and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows--

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is

intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness
or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a
tendency to blame others. There is often a façade of charm and
even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for
mistreatment of others and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they

also may befit some individuals who are prominent in business
or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for
the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was

referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral,
guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987),
anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic.[66]

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders

considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground
of both parties' psychological incapacity. We further consider
that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses'
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality

disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty
doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons
around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of
his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and
has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the

respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on

certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the
January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate
Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo,
pp. 23-36.
[2]
Id. at 38-39.
[3]
TSN, September 12, 2000, p. 2.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 2-3.
[6]
Records, p. 8.
[7]
TSN, September 12, 2000, pp. 3-4.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id. at 4.
[11]
Records, p. 1.
[12]
Id. at 24.
[13]
Id. at 36-37.
[14]
Id. at 39.
[15]
Id. at 48-55.
[16]
Id. at 61-66.
[17]
The dispositive portion of the RTC's July 30, 2001 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
plaintiff EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE and defendant ROWENA ONG
GUTIERREZ UY-TE, officiated by Honorable Judge Evelyn Corpus-
Cabochan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 82, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on April 23, 1996, NULL AND VOID, ab initio, on the ground of the
couple's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; and
dissolving their property regime in accordance with law, if there is any.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the City Civil Registry of Valenzuela
City where the marriage took place and City Civil Registry of Quezon City
where this decision originated for proper recording.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 66.)
[18]
Records, pp. 67-68.
[19]
Supra note 1.
[20]
The dispositive portion of the CA's August 5, 2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed decision dated
July 30, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 106, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-00-39720, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the
marriage between petitioner-appellee Edward Kenneth Ngo Te and
respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te VALID and SUBSISTING. The
petition is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35.)
[21]
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[22]
Executive Order No. 209, entitled "The Family Code of the Philippines,"
enacted on July 6, 1987.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 28-35.
[24]
Supra note 2.
[25]
Rollo, p. 79.
[26]
Id. at 95-104.
[27]
Id. at 100-102.
[28]
Id. at 82-93.
[29]
Supra note 21.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 86-92.
[31]
Supra note 22.
[32]
Id.
[33]
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
[34]
Id. at 38-41. (Italics supplied.)
[35]
Supra note 21.
[36]
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 681-685.
[37]
Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-
108, quoting Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
1998, p. 37.
[38]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 31.
[39]
Id.
[40]
Article 68 of the Family Code provides in full:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[41]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 34.
[42]
Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments,
2000 ed., pp. 110-119.
[43]
326 Phil. 169 (1996).
[44]
Id. at 182.
[45]
334 Phil. 294, 300-304 (1997).
[46]
Supra note 21.
[47]
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 676-680.
[48]
Id. at 680.
[49]
See Republic of the Philippines v. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No.
171042, June 30, 2008; Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No.
167523, June 27, 2008; Lester Benjamin S. Halili v. Chona M. Santos-Halili,
et al., G.R. No. 165424, April 16, 2008; Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294,
February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August
2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049,
April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No.
168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123; Zamora v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 19; Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396; Republic v. Cuison-Melgar,
G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R.
No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No.
167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572; Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No.
152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R. No.
158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano,
G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468
Phil. 900 (2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626 (2003); Choa
v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002); Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001);
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425;
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000); Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76.
[50]
See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 668.
[51]
Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological
Incapacity, 2006 ed., pp. 14-16, cites the following:
"Canon 1095, 3 concerning psychological incapacity pointed out cases of
various psychological disorders from the Roman Rota as enumerated below
(Fr. Bacareza, 1999).
"6.1. From the 1917 Code of the Second Vatican Council

1. Coram Teodori in Italy on January 19, 1940 on Nymphomania.

2. Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.
3. Coram Heard in Quebec on January 30, 1954 on Lethargic
Encephalitis.
4. Coram Mattioli in Quebec, Canada on November 6, 1956 on General
Paralysis.
5. Coram Sabbatani in Naples, Italy on June 21, 1957 on
Nymphomania.
6. Coram Mattioli in Rome on November 28, 1957 on Schizophrenia.
7. Coram Lefebvre on December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.
8. Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961 on Schizophrenia.

"6.2 From the Second Vatican Council to the Promulgation of the 1983
Code
 9. Coram Monsigneur Charles Lefebre on the following:

a. Homosexuality,
b. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,
c. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis, and
d. Affective Immaturity and Passive Dependent Personality.
10. Coram Monsigneur Lucien Anne on February 25, 1969 on
Lesbianism.
11. Coram De Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.
12. Coram Jose Maria Pinto Gomez on the following:

1. Serious Paranoid Schizophrenia (November 26, 1969),

2. Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March 18, 1971),
3. Vaginismus or Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)
4. Neurasthenic Psychopath (April 20, 1979)
5. Sexual Disorder (December 3, 1982)
13. Coram Bruno on the following:

0. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania (December 15, 1972)

1. Sexual Neurosis (March 27, 1981)
2. Psychoneurosis (December 17, 1982)
14. Coram Jose Maria Serrano Ruiz on the following:

. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis (April 5, 1973)

a. Lack of Interpersonal Integration (April 15, 1973)
b. Immature Personality (July 9, 1976)
c. Psychic Immaturity (November 18, 1977)
d. Depressive Neurosis (July 12, 1978)
e. Obsessive-Compulsive Personality (May 23, 1980)
f. Frigidity (July 28, 1981)
g. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
15. Coram Ewers on the following:

0. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)

1. Sexual Neurosis (April 4, 1981)
16. Coram Pariscella on the following:

. Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis (February 23, 1978)

a. Homosexuality (June 11, 1978)
17. Coram Fiore (May 27, 1981)
18. Coram Agustoni (March 23, 1982)

"6.3. After the Promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law

 19. Rotal Case No. 41:c. Colagiovanni on March 3, 1983 on
Homosexuality
20. Rotal Case No. 42 c. Huot on July 18, 1983 on Alcoholism and
Immature Personality.
21. Rotal Case No. 43: c. Giannechini on July 19, 1983 on
Homosexuality.
22. Rotal Case No. 45: c. Colagiovanni on November 22, 1983 about an
ex-priest who was a "liar, cheat and swindler" (Anti-Social
Personality)
23. Rotal Case No. 46: c. Stankiewiez on November 24, 1983 on
Homosexuality.
24. Rotal Case No. 47: c. Egan on March 29, 1984 on Hysterical
Personality.
25. Rotal Case No. 48: c. Di Felice on June 9, 1984 on Psychic
Immaturity.
26. Rotal Case No. 49: c. Pinto on May 30, 1986 on Alcoholism and
Gambling.
27. Rotal Case No. 50: c. Giannecchini on December 20, 1988 on
Hypersexuality-Nymphomania.

[52]
Justice Padilla's Dissenting Opinion, Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 33, at 36-37; Ancheta v. Ancheta, supra note 49, at 917.
[53]
Supra note 34.
[54]
See Article 36 of the Family Code; see also Justice Carpio's Dissenting
Opinion, Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004,
423 SCRA 272, 299.
[55]
Supra note 49, at 370.
[56]
Records, pp. 54-55; TSN, November 7, 2000, pp. 5-6.
[57]
Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-
Dagupan, explains in Marriage Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that "[s]tandard
practice shows the marked advisability of Expert intervention in Marriage
Cases accused of nullity on the ground of defective matrimonial consent on
account of natural incapacity by reason of any factor causative of lack of
sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due discretion and inability to assume
essential obligations--although the law categorically mandates said
intervention only in the case of impotence and downright mental disorder x x
x." (p. 106).
[58]
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 685-688.
[59]
Supra note 49, at 88; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note
49, at 743.
[60]
Supra note 49, at 850; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note
49, at 742; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 49, at 526; Zamora v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 49, at 27; Paras v. Paras, supra note 49, at 96-97.
[61]
The Court, however, by saying--
[T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on
descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never
conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to
have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f
what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x"
xxxx
Obviously, Dr. Guanzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified
to, as these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was
working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one
side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and
unreliable.
Dr. Guanzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to
assess petitioner's character, not only through the descriptions given by
respondent, but also through the former's at least fifteen hours of study of the
voluminous transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a
whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find
his assessment of petitioner's psychological state sorely insufficient and
methodologically flawed.

in Choa v. Choa (Supra note 49, at 190-191), in effect, required the personal
examination of the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.

[62]
Psychologists of the Psychological Extension Evaluation Research
Services (PEERS) enumerate the segments of the psychological evaluation
report for psychological incapacity as follows:

 Identifying Data: Personal Information

 Referral Question: Data coming from informants and significant
others (psychologists, psychiatrists, physicians, parents, brothers,
sisters, relatives, friends, etc.).
 Test Administered (Dates): List by name
 Background Information:

Current Life Situation: Presenting complaint (personal and marital conflict),

history of problem, and consequences in client's life.
Life History Information: Childhood development, educational history,
vocational history, medical history, sexual and marital history, personal goals.
  Behavior Observations: Description of client, relationship with
examiner, and test related behaviors.
 Interpretation of Test Results:

Intellectual Functioning: Wechsler tests, Stanford-Binet, etc. Obtained IQ

scores and specific strengths and deficits.
Cognitive Functioning: Rorschach, TAT, MMPI, etc. Perception of reality or
perceptual efficiency, conceptual organization, psychological needs, conflicts,
preoccupations, suspiciousness, hallucinations, or delusions.
Emotional Functioning (MMPI, Rorschach, etc.): Liability of emotions, impulse
control, predominant concerns like aggression, anxiety, depression, guilt,
dependency, and hostility.
Relationship Patterns (MMPI, Rorschach, TAT, etc.): Problem areas in work
or school, friendships, intimate relationships, difficulties such as immaturity,
irresponsibility, cooperativeness, sociability, introversion, impulsivity,
aggression, dangerousness to self or others.
Defenses and compensations: Evidence of any strength, any coping
mechanisms, or any useful compensation that might be helping the client
maintain himself/herself.

 Integration of Test Results with Life History: Presenting a clinical

picture of the client as a total person against the background of his
marital discords and life circumstances. Hypotheses posed through
the referral question and generated and integrated via test results
and other reliable information.
 Summary, Conclusion, Diagnosis, Prognosis:

Summary: Emphasis should be on conciseness and accuracy so that the

reader can quickly find the essential information and overall impression.
Conclusion: Integrating the material (data) into a more smoothly stated
conceptualization of the client's personality and problem areas as regards
root causes and characteristics as ground for nullity of marriage.
Diagnosis: Diagnostic impression is evolved form the data obtained, formed
impression of personality disorders, and classified mental disorders based on
the criteria and multi axial system of the DSM IV.
Prognosis: Predicting the behavior based on the data obtained that are
relevant to the current functioning of the client, albeit under ideal conditions.

 Recommendation: Providing a careful specific recommendation is

based on the referral sources and obtained data in dealing with a
 particular client that may be ameliorative, remedial, or unique
treatment/intervention approaches. As to psychological incapacity,
specific recommendation on the nullity of marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code and expertise and clinical judgment of the
Clinical Psychologist should be given emphasis. (Ng, Apruebo &
Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, supra
note 51, at 179-181.)

[63]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.
[64]
Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental Health, 1993 ed., pp. 291-
th
292. See Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy, Psychology, 7 ed., 2006,
pp. 613-614, defining personality disorders as "long-standing, inflexible ways
of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional
styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning
in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and
for others. Some psychologists view personality disorders as interpersonal
strategies or as extreme, rigid, and maladaptive expressions of personality
traits." (Citations omitted.)
[65]
Id. at 131.
[66]
Id. at 50-51.
[67]
Supra note 65.
[68]
Supra note 66.
 [ G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010 ]

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VS. ANGELITO SUAZO

AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo

(Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the
January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The
reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyn's marriage with
respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in
June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time. After
months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and
some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents
sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought
them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and
Angelito's marriage was arranged and they were married on
March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito

lived with Angelito's parents after their marriage. They had by
this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked
for Angelito's relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other
hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn
urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted
because of Jocelyn's efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter

found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now
have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn

filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above
historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her
complaint:

xxxx

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in

July 1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels
which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the
part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries
upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal
of the defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive
drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and
intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July
1987;

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started

from the time of their marriage and became very apparent as
time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and
incurable;

xxxx

Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he

submit himself to a psychological examination with psychologist
Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).

The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court
found that no collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her
aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in

her petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating
she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she
remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared
that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were
married.

Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent

before you got married?

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will

you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got
married?

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of
violent nature before you got married (sic), is there any signs
(sic) of violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Q. Even to other people?

A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn's testimony.

When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical

interpretation of his behavior?

A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent

during the time of the marriage the respondent is suffering from
anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe
apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-
standing before the marriage.

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the

petitioner?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no

pattern of lying when I examined her, the petitioner was found to
be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship
with respondent.

Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a
statement rather on the last page, last paragraph which state: It
is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between
the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual
celebration of marriage. Respondent('s) immature, irresponsible
and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of
having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the
diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it
interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring, concern
and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-
standing in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder
was present at the time of the wedding and became manifest
thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain
what does chronic mean?

A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has

been there long before he entered marriage apparently, it came
during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop
(sic).

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such

because psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but
to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have
this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind of
disorder.

Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present
during the wedding or at the time of the wedding or became
manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, ma'am."

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on

Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without

any employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the
respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of

psychological disorder (sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not

admit that they are suffering that kind of disorder (sic).

Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers

a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital

relation to the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the

parents (sic)?

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due

respect more often than not he even shouted at them for no
apparent reason (sic).

Court:

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the

respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated

by the respondent (sic).

Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person

itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of personality
affect the other party (sic).

Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner

(sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not the
respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do not have
peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year
and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to
work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the
petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the five
months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took
sustainance of the vices. (sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown

love to the petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain

the marital relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices
thru the petitioner (sic).
Court:

Q. What are the vices?

A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital

obligation?

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-

Social Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing person. [4]

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she

prepared. The Report pertinently states: [5]

Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO,

a petitioner for "Nullity of Marriage" versus ANGELITO D.
SUAZO

GENERAL DATA

[This pertains to Jocelyn's]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3 rd year

high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings.
Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic,
womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent.
It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was
also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was
described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles
were part and parcel of their day to day living.

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is

adequately suppressed so much so that it does not create inner
tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional
image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable
of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain
in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward

for a better future in spite of difficulties she had gone through in
the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she
set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her
capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her
interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her
tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping
mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends
appropriately.

REMARKS :

[Already cited in full in the psychologist's testimony quoted

above][6]

The Office of the Solicitor General - representing the Republic of

the Philippines - strongly opposed the petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the
RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test
Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that

a person may be considered as psychologically incapacitated,
there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a
person to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as
"immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment
and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of
the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next
drinks" (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39,
1988 ed.)

The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of

the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing - that the
petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the
respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love
and respect to the petitioner manifested by the former's being
irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of
all - a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the
misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one
year and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.

In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the
start of her married life with the respondent, she already suffered
from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and
that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative
of her husband to sustain the latter's niece (sic) and because
they were living with her husband's family, she was obliged to do
the household chores - an indication that she is a battered wife
coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic)
husband's family.

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be

attributed to the fact that at the time of their marriage, she and
her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage
by her relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never
developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the
respondent blamed the petitioner's family for said early marriage
and not to his own liking.

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological

incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:

The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the

psychologist' testimony quoted above] would only tend to show
that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological
incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic

vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the
Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the

testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the
psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not
a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is psychological incapacity on
the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and,
therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological

incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and conjecture and
without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater
tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the
surname of the respondent, although they are now separated,
and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a
slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage
with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will
be an instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the
serious anti-social behavior of herein respondent. [8]

THE CA RULING

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA

reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the

guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs
Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological
incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically
identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the
evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however,
the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children,
relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to
prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation
of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and
psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that

the respondent was psychologically incapable of entering into
the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of
marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the
wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband,
and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the
respondent may have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still
necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper
psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified.
The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering
from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the
marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner,
anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the
respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or
irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or
refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on
the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless
marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a
permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his
ability to engage in productive work and more stable
relationships with another. The element of permanence or
incurability that is one of the defining characteristic of
psychological incapacity is not present.

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under
the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the
respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for
this reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in
Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the
inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the
foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The
concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to
legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to
separate and divorce.

THE PETITION

Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge

and seek the reversal of the CA ruling based on the following
arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it

totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the
marriage null and void - Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to
be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that
"the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-
existence of petitioner's psychological incapacity at the time of
the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court);
petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondent's witnesses vis-à-vis petitioner's defenses are clearly
and manifestly erroneous";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological
incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a
wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by
statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three
conditions that would make a person unable to contract
marriage from mental incapacity as follows:

"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment

concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to
be mutually given and accepted;

(3) who

are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of

matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature."

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms

to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary
functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based
on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower
court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes
psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the
OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is
opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only
in name.

Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to

nullify Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
 THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no

reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no
basis exists to declare Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito a nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage

contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended

application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept -
psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the
contractual obligations of marriage - without any concrete
definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must
therefore apply the law based on how the concept of
psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in
jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological

incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."[10]

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the

interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court of
Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties or one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of

the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on

the basic requirements of Santos.[13]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is

no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article
36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.[15]

Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even

to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the
court's interpretation or construction establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity

of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect.
Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family

Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if

any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of
the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all
the evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly
stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of
evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the
pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony
and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of
the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the
declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must
be proved.

All cases - involving the application of Article 36 of the Family

Code - that came to us were invariably decided based on the
principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and
jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-
Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted

the Family Code did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
itself was taken from the Canon Law. [18] Te thus assumes it a
basic premise thatthe law is so designed to allow some
resiliency in its application.[19]

Te then sustained Santos' doctrinal value, saying that its

interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the law's intention that it is the courts, on a case-
to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a
marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court's judgment of annulment in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final
and binding on the appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial court's findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi
v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said

that the resiliency with which the concept should be applied and
the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all
sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged,

not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not

suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following
Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that
should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20]
follows Te's lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon
Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages:[21]

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular

root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto
the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties.
They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also
a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax
this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The
need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or
clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts
shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22]

merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary
approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the

primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.

xxxx

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of

presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for

emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the

current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code,
what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to
confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness
that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. [25] It
is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral
element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations - must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect
in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of
the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same
may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. [27]

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but
iterations of Santos' juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos' continuing
doctrinal validity.
The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyn's evidence insufficient to

establish Angelito's psychological incapacity to perform essential
marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own
examination of the evidence on record, which we were
compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial
court and the appellate court's appreciation and evaluation of
Jocelyn's presented evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologist's testimony and the psychological report

did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability
of Angelito's alleged psychological condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the

expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the
psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based
on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated
Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect manner -
she derived all her conclusions from information coming from
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted.
Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist
heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary
worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the
more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e.,
that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of

the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is
not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is
desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all
instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the
parties. For a determination though of a party's complete
personality profile, information coming from persons intimately
related to him (such as the party's close relatives and friends)
may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article
36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not
totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly
expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist,

using meager information coming from a directly interested
party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the report
or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth
and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a
party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In
short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely
on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity
exists.

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the

psychologist's report and testimony simply provided a general
description of Angelito's purported anti-social personality
disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion
or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave.
These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can
they be found in her testimony.

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito's personality

disorder is chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted
with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even
during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not
developed. However, she did not support this declaration with
any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on
the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a
dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the
psychologist's own equivocation on this point - she was not firm
in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it was
simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly
suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn's assumed
knowledge of Angelito's family background and upbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the

questions of why and to what extent was Angelito's personality
disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder
on Angelito's awareness of and his capability to undertake the
duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the

more important concerns or requisites of psychological
incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn's
cause.

b. Jocelyn's Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the

psychological report and the psychologist's testimony impel us to
proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn's testimony, to find out
whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a
finding of Angelito's psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn's testimony to be insufficient.

Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito's habitual drunkenness,
gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings
she received from him - all of which occurred after the marriage.
Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed
no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a
personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest
stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged
physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these
beatings exactly took place - whether it was near or at the time
of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a
clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the
law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological
incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while

indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves,
show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations
that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to
be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of
proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a

different treatment. While we may concede that physical
violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality
patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be
evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in
the present case under our finding that the opinion of the
psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore,
that Jocelyn's account of the physical beatings she received
from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the
requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment,

whose factual bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the
factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is
Jocelyn's main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not
therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the
CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to
the facts and the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for

lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Abad, and Perez, JJ.,

concur.

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, and concurred in by
Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and Associate Justice Santiago Javier
Rañada (both retired).
[2]
Penned by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.
[3]
TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 16-17.
[4]
TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 15-22.
[5]
Record, pp. 36-39.
[6]
Parenthetical notes supplied.
[7]
The RTC enumerated the requisites as follows: (1) that psychological
incapacity refers to no less than a mental not physical incapacity; (2) that the
law intended psychological incapacity to be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to marriage; and (3) that the
psychological condition must exist at the time of the marriage and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. See
citation at note 9.
[8]
Parenthetical notes supplied.
[9]
310 Phil 21 (1995).
[10]
Id. at 39-40.
[11]
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[12]
Id. at 676-680.
[13]
See Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id. at 850.
[16]
408 Phil. 713, 720 (2001).
[17]
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
[18]
Id. at 213.
[19]
Id.
[20]
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009.
[21]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
[22]
A step that Te, a Third Division case, could not have legally undertaken
because the Molina ruling is an En Banc ruling, in light of Article VIII, Section
4(3) of the Constitution.
[23]
Supra note 16, pp. 231-232.
[24]
Supra note 19.
[25]
See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, and Padilla-Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009.
[26]
Id., Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua.
[27]
Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272,
288-289.
 [ G.R. NO. 162368, July 17, 2006 ]

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, PETITIONER, VS. BRIX

FERRARIS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner

Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and
February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error.

On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,

Branch 151 rendered a Decision [1] denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris.
The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not
amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil
Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove
infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in
an Order[2] dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated
that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed [3] in

toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were
incurable and already presen t at the inception of the marriage. [4]
The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony
failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological
incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder;
that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or
supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. [5]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied [6] for lack of

merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for
failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed
any reversible error.

Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. [7] The

Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment [8] but
failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's
motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.

After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the

OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a

given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. [9] Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.[10] It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court,[11] save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of
the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or
when there is a misappreciation of facts, [12] which are unavailing
in the instant case.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity

of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.[13] As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[14] It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,[15] which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of

marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish respondent's psychological condition.
Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not
agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that
those are incurable.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence

showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called
marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-
seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady.
To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and
even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not
all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was
happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent.
In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only
when they started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent
could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational.
Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy.
x x x.

xxxx

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her
diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant
type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such
mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x
x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that
respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the
petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's
answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that
such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having
difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed
problematic history of respondent's parents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was
really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of
respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's
character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and,
thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of
course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent's
supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before
the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against
petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of
establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[16]

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the

"leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[17] where therein respondent

preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on
whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[18] that habitual

alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage
void based on psychological incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and

appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy
however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage,
however, is not a null and void marriage. [19] No less than the
Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of
the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.[20]

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity"

under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to
be taken as distinct from Articles 35, [21] 37,[22] 38,[23] and 41[24]
that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the
marriage void ab initio, or Article 45[25] that would make the
marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately
as if the law were indifferent on the matter. [26] Article 36 should
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. [27] Neither it
is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.[28]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for

reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying
the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez,, Callejo, Sr.,

and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur

[1]
Rollo, pp. 96-99. Penned by Judge Franchito N. Diamante.
[2]
Id. at 101.
[3]
Id. at 9-19. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and
concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Danilo B. Pine.
[4]
Id. at 17.
[5]
Id. at 18.
[6]
Id. at 7.
[7]
Id. at 208-227.
[8]
Id. at 228.
[9]
Concurring Opinion of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 680 (1997).
[10]
Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. Manila Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106.
[11]
Domingo v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 812,
817.
[12]
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, February
11, 2005, 451 SCRA 63, 69.
[13]
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
[14]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40 (1995).
[15]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at 677.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 111-113.
[17]
Supra note 9 at 669 & 674.
[18]
377 Phil. 919, 931 (1999).
[19]
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441
SCRA 422, 439.
[20]
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508,
522.
[21]
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to
do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
[22]
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
[23]
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for
reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to
the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted
child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed
that other person's spouse or his or her own spouse.
[24]
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
[25]
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage
was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted disease found to
be serious and appears to be incurable.
[26]
Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 9 at 690.
[27]
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra note 19 at 439.
[28]
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 13.