Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the
Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant
in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an
eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and
Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo
City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It
was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference
by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the
couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents

or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few

days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as
a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time
by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up
to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding
of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it
was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its
report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set,
albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation,
stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of
the trial court. 4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for
its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import
of the provision.
Art. 35.

The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 36.

...

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose
B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment.

He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null
and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity,
there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent
but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor
Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee
used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under
the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages
Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot
be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground
for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that
insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack
or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation
of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the
marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a

ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not
and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
way of providing for divorce.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there
is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that

psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they

do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if
they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a
valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but
there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has
not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can
be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he
has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of
children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity
has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a
lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist,
who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding
of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a
help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval
in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if

the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage. 5
xxx

xxx

xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate

among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in
some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated
that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the
term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy
stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough
to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the
provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that
after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but
later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx

xxx

xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if
such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On

the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it
may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue
on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of
their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological
or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that
the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity"
because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason
why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even
under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law
and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to

the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive
or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their
answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still
valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice
Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1)

Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3)

Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten
years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs.
Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like
the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095.
1.

They are incapable of contracting marriage:

who lack sufficient use of reason;

2.
who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3.
who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive
for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law
prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on
how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm
was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of
a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem)

are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon,
novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf.
SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then
the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect
to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some
kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and
other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect,
which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could
be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to
deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the

procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount

to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be
declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the
person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact
deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility
of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso,
a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases").
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity

or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This

pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived
prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is
that
Art. 1.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a
man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1.
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Sec. 2.
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987
Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of
our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still
hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time,
much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him
who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89)
which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court
to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied
the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother
and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey
stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989 10 months. But during
this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did
he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as

he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his
wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff
filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will
be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was

examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether
he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at
the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by
the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion
between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141,
private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts
intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender

an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The
assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings.
When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner
to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by
the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between
the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva GonzagaReyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence
on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a

serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly

demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points
out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about
the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the
reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons,
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses
to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there
has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with
the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show
that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner
also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed
with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had
tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What
he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his

or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that
the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her
feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering
from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the
wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved
is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is
not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any

insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a

hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is
shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity,
our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need
to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin

Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as
a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila,
and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations
and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who
thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order
to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1.
That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2.
That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3.

That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4.

That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5.

That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6.
That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as
of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made
an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5
heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties
broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it
added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If
said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the

union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,

then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
(convincing) reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological

incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q
It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A

Yes, Your Honor.

There is no hope for the marriage?

There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q
Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with
other parties?
A

Yes, Your Honor.

Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality

traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was
a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness"
on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the
part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many
trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici
curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial
(Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family

Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical.

although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their

children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the

petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima,
Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but
only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained,
and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of
the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar

conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a

priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's
position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing
such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the
husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental
illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short
of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code
Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the
essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity
is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it
is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9,
1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be

shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability

may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion
of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability
and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1.
lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2.

reasons of public policy;

3.

special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special

cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the
Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with
the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which
entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into
another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable
to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code
and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio
or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it
did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the
same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the
major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order
for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of
due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and
therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania
laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary
for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time
of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing
short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came
after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during
the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to
assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses
were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in
Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the
failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this
Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in
declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the

husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his
wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it
was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to
fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the
lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
1
concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains
valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines

that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law
Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a caseto-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those)
1.

who lack sufficient use of reason;

2.
who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3.
who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to
the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one
must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36
of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological

incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in
nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur
only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned
Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of
absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to
divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed
turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no
less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the
State should regard marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2.
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1.
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant
not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set.
The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered
mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest
such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by
disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on
marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands
a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but
only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained,
and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of
the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the

appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own

judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's
position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing
such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the
husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental
illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short
of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code
Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the
essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity
is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it
is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9,
1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion
of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented

that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability
and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1.
lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2.

reasons of public policy;

3.

special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special

cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the
Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with
the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which
entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into
another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable
to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code
and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio
or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it
did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the
same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the
major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order

for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of
due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and
therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania
laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary
for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time
of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing
short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came
after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during
the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real

obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a

necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of

loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the

individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to
assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses
were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in
Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the
failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this
Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in
declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the
husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his
wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it
was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to
fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the
lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
1
concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains
valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines
that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such

incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law
Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a caseto-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those)
1.

who lack sufficient use of reason;

2.
who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3.
who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to
the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one
must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be

observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so

indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36
of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in

nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur
only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned
Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of
absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to
divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed
turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no
less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the
State should regard marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2.
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1.
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant
not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set.
The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered
mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest
such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by
disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on
marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands
a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1

Rollo pp. 25-33.

2
Sixteenth Division composed of J., Segundino G. Chua, ponente and
chairman JJ., Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3

Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.

Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas.

5
The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion
of the RTC Decision is follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature,
irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an
infidel. These characteristics of respondent are based on petitioner's
testimony that the former failed to be gainfully employed after he was
relieved from the office of the Government Corporate Counsel sometime in
February, 1986. leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family.
Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned
both petitioner-mother and son except during the first few months of

separation when respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a
monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months. Respondent
is likewise dependent on his parents for financial aid and support as he has
no savings, preferring to spend his money with his friends and peers. A
year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a
house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They
then transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later
that they were actually renting the house with the respondent's parents
responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside from this. respondent
would also lie about his salary and ability. And that at present, respondent
is living with his mistress and their child. which fact he does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
turned sour if we look at the background of their relationship. During their
college days, when they were still going steady, respondent observed
petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to believe
then that she would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell
in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness. After
a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of some
differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were
working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair.
They became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature
respondent. Believing that they know each other much better after two
years of going steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It would
seem. therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other well and
were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties
cropped-up and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their
parts, petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to the situation.
This failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fighting's. In fact, even
with the intervention and help of their parents who arranged for their
possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up
because of their opposing and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of
them can accept and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives
in and instead, blame each other for whatever problem or
misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot be solely
responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted
because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife
which is unique and requisite in marriage.

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life.
(Article 1, Family Code). The unique element of permanency of union
signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the
parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully understand and accept the
(implications and consequences of being permanently) united in marriage.
And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among
others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt
understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus,
the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe mutual (love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to
observe) and perform these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will
most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate
situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73).
6

240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.

7
Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family
Code, First Edition, 1988.
8

TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.

9
The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of
the marriage tribunals of each archdiocese in the country. Aside from
heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent
president of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines,
Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of
Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also SecretaryGeneral of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines PCP II held
from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent
of a parliament or a constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and
where the ponente, who was a Council member, had the privilege of being
overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful discernments.
10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired
Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and the law practitioner.
Article XV

THE FAMILY
Sec. 1.
The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.
Sec. 2.
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the state.
Sec. 3.

The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their

religious connections and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty.
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3)

The right of the family to a family living wage and income;

(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the

planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
Sec. 4.
The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the
state may also do so through just programs of social security.
Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
13

Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.

14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the

other hand, the text used in Santos v. CA reads:
"Canon 1095.
xxx

xxx

They are incapable of contracting marriage:

xxx

3.
Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's
Memorandum is due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin
and both versions are differently-worded English translations.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1
Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.
2

Zwack , Joseph P. Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.

3
The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law
Society of America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.
4

Zwack, ibid., p. 47.

G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).

G.R. No. 119190 (1997).

VITUG, J., concurring:

1
Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy, In Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.
2

In Santos vs. Court Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.

Supra.

At pages 34-35.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which
dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C.
Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang,
Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).[2] Three children were born to them,
namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), [3] Lyra, born on May
22, 1985 (Exh. C),[4] and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). [5]
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to
private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the
latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the
filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to
support the family and contribute to the management of the household,
devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She
further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited
with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having
affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private
respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually
transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was

irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married

life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private
respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total
amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their
children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land
located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite,
purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private
respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12,
1992.[6]
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his
answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion
between the parties.[7] Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on
November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of
collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial. [8]
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:
[9]

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian

University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than
private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and
botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two
consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when
she was no longer private respondents teacher.On January 1, 1981, they
were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents
paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other
financial needs. The family income came from petitioners salary as a
faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented
her earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the
buy-and-sell of coffee, rice andpolvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it
was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering
orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and
had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private respondent often
had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting
cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two
love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She
knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi
Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having
an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to
end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private
respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his
promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and

their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner

accepted him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of saving
their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able
to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite
in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31,
1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the
company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of
spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent
the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months
of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his
smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner
discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different
women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie,
who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay,
a secretary at the Road Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias,
Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom
he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989
(Exh. E).[10] When petitioner confronted private respondent about his
relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was
confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite
on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F). [11]
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme
promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private
respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both
received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote,
Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).
[12]

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private

respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private
respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate
and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) [13] with F
& C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel
of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias,
Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after
full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from
monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K) [14] was executed in
her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) [15] was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten
letter[16] to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that
her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also

stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney [17] and to
divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also
told private respondent of her intention to file a petition for the annulment of
their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners
letter. By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their
children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for
the Middle East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had been
unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine
Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition for
annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced
private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said
she was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in
accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending
most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner
asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming
wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the
wedding because she thought private respondent was not ready for
married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple
appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long
thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends and
going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private
respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with
different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also
confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten
up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro
tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling
with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to
his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.[18]
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision [19] dismissing the
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion
of the decision reads:[20]
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the
petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid
reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment
thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a
marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as
constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the
petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the
petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after
petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The
provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in
conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful
reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of
this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this ground,
as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by
the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996,
rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the
ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court of Appeals held:[22]
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage,
must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic
sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are
not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove
that her respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellants
declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands
character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the
happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant

herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very

good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitionerappellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her
respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondenthusband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8,
1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened
after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed
at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE
AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO
PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE
PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE
AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY
PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private
respondents psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner
failed to show that private respondents psychological incapacity existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the
acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their
marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity

becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[23]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[24] we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed
to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent
was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was
presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic
marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent
was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a

psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the
outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for
his family. Private respondents parents and petitioner supported him
through college.After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he
availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and
spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their
marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative
to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and
later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents
condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and
defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity
or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state, and not merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious
feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:[25]
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra)
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
precise cause of private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in
order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.[26] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.[27]
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of
Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with regard to

the non-existence of private respondents psychological incapacity at the

time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality.[28] Only
where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary
can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon
petitioners contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the
amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive
ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,
dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner
may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
HERNANDEZ vs. CA
GR# 126010, December 8, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario
Hernandez were married and have 3 children. Petitioner filed before the
Tagaytay City RTC a petition for annulment of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity of Mario. Allegedly, from the time of their
marriage up to the time of filing of the suit, Mario failed to perform his
obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the
household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his
friends. Further, Mario, after they got married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he sired an illegitimate child while having different affairs
leading to petitioner having STD. Despite petitioners allegations, the RTC
dismissed the petition ruling that her grounds were not those mentioned in
A.55 of the Family Code. It held that fraud must exist at the time of
celebration of the marriage. HELD:Psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. The law confines psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity/
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under A.55, FC.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G.
MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no
requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage
between the parties is hereby declared valid." [2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution
denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and

respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig
City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best
interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1)
on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu
at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in
Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the
other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge
from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy
Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from
the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987
and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however
prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a
good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they

would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He
would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would
also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling"
and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make
deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang.When she was
discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994,
when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she
did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she
saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who
came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at
the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as
contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver,
went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child,
Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a
house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU,
Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D.,
for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the
appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towardsappellee and their
children, x x x."[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this
wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of
the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as
set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the
petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about
the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the
parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would
make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in
the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness
or sufficiently proven by an expert.Similarly, there is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable." [4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the

following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the
findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a
respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply
because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of
all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of
the Petition."[7]

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological

examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that
were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to
perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by
the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent,
who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application
and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of
the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the

celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095."[10]

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated

by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented
in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed
to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and
not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. [12] At best,

the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal

separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this
Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation
in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure
of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975

February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April
22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring
the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino
Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church
in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on
October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on
January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982. 3 Their
birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
located at the back of the house of their in-laws. 4 A week after the wedding,
Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear
for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again.
During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking
sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife
to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard
from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a
manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on
October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was
issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. 8 Since
Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the
Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10,
and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish
jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for
presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda
testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only
witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her
husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house
of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and

Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now,
and that she pitied Erlinda and the children. 10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving
the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing
whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that
should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed
submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an
investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's
manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a
decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article
36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and
void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter
into his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have
become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set
Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered
since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was
presenting controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to
comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order
dated August 21, 1991 as follows: 13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this
Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General.
The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and
abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is
abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing that
these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of
celebration of the marriage.

In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his
wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and
whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family
for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the
husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These
findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage
and became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits
are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be
incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to
fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these
are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to
assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for
divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve
marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for
Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole
assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE
TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 15 affirming the
decision of the trial court, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he
failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but
because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a
criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is
continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with
the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992
Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of

Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous
and incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her
Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were
proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he
is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
ofa priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the
following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have

given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity

need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June
13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code20as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code 21 in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-

General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon
1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to
comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed
to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further,
the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged.
The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to
present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was
prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of
the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the
ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein
that "Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in
order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.