5. Psychological Incapacity upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to
A. Nature
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the
Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him.
1 2
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo and the Court of Appeal, Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein
private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did
not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by
Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989,
Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home
visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or
to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled
out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully,
by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence.
3
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
4
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
8
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under
 the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge
to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly,
the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself
can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article
1 of the Family Code, is that —
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a
love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity,
is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and
irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability
to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
1 2
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed
3
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N.
Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of
4 5
the Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa
6
de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. Out of their union, a
child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
7
On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null
and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
8
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
9
educational attainment and other events or things, to wit:
10
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their
marriage.
11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her
when in fact, no such incident occurred.
12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and
told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was
neither.
13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
14
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
15
occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
16
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the
17
truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were
only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
18
Blackgold.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make
it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
19
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on
20
unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates
to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated
from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not
21
change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the
other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be
22
based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy
was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to
suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the
foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
23
obligations.
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by
attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
24
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. She presented her version,
thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing
25
her husband.
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such
26
intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at
27
the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9
and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-
cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold
recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her
28
honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof
were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.
29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely
asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner,
and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.
30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from
her monthly budget of P7,000.00.
31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage,
the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance
was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological
32
incapacity on her part.
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute
the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
33
conducted by his assistant, together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive
Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were
34
not elicited from respondent.
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr.
Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable
35
because a good liar can fake the results of such test.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s
propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and
her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
36
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese
of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion
37
on the part of the parties. During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the
Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
38
discretion. Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was
39
upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have
been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality
of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It
40
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence
41
accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
42
thereof. The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the
veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that
43
such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still,
the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling
44 45
in Republic v. Court of Appeals (also known as the Molina case ), and indeed the Court of
46
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar. Since Molina was
decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of
47
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, even before Molina was handed down,
48
there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded
49
by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while
undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a
decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree
of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Issues:
WON petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial
court.
Ruling:
The factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great
weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered... that respondent
had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological
incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina... guidelines.
The present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of
his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and... the
Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained
in the trial court's decision.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she... kept petitioner in the
dark about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found
out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties
had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the... exasperated petitioner left his
wife.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual... help and support.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able
to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that
the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court,
but also by canonical bodies.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive... jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
FACTS:
On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te a
freshman in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. They
developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. On March 1996, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused but Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They
left Manila and went to Cebu that month. Edwards money lasted for only a month and they
could not find a job. On April 1996, they returned to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was away, Rowena threathened him that
she would commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle
brought the two to a court to get married. The couple continued to stay at Rowena’s uncles
place where Edward was treated like a prisoner and was not allowed to go out unaccompanied.
After a month, Edward escaped from the house and stayed with his parents. His family then hid
him from Rowena. On June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena and told her that they
should live with his parents but she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. On
January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City, for the annulment of
his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. On July 30, 2001,
the trial court rendered the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review,
the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling.
It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided
by petitioner. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina
case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on
certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity.
He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Yes. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Edward’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
B. Molina Doctrine
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in
the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court
1 The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
of Appeals its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds
they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back
and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited
by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking
chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same
bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see
her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow
pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her,
the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status
here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and
he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
 and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can
be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have
sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced
his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was
shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined
by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a
result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated
there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of
erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not
he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five
(5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his
penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the
2
parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt.
Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I - in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II - in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is
a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III - in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV - in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the
3
complaint shall always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court
and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since
their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each
other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of
both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he
did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and
it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within
the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
4
No. 112019, January 4, 1995).
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there
might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on
who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since
the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological
but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent
or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he
had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
5
capable of erection. Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to
prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
6
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did
not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not
physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time
(from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife,
purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599,
cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative
of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
7
contemplation of the Family Code.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness
and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is
— a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-
way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children
but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
Issue:
WON Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitute
psychological incapacity.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.
HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January
30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated
April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married
at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).2 Three
children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),3 Lyra, born
on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).5
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the
time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the
family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging
in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were
married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having
affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent
endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She
averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a
married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be
ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that
she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a
parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased
during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the
conjugal home on June 12, 1992.6
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court
issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to
determine if there was collusion between the parties.7 Only petitioner appeared at the
investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of
collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.8
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:9
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in
Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her
first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her
student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she
was no longer private respondents teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition
fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income
came from petitioners salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University.
Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the
buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he
would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because
her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private
respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks.
In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a
certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose
husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he
admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end
her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the
affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned
petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted
him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at
Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private
respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early
retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead
of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on
himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling
and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on
relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki;
Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary
at the Road Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for
quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on
September 15, 1989 (Exh. E).10 When petitioner confronted private respondent about his
relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle
University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral
concussion (Exh. F).11
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the
latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner.
They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor,
Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).12
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their
eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their
children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)13 with F & C Realty
Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio
Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of
P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of
interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K)14 was executed in her
favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)15 was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter16 to private
respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved
futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type
jeepney17 and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told
private respondent of her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had
already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private
respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had been
unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University,
testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979,
petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said
she was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She
observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In
November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her
forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding
because she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then
unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their
marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends and
going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private respondent was a
habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued hanging out
with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was
beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to
private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that
private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.18
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision19 dismissing the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:20
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support
of her claim that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the
grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the
Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof.
Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological
incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include
the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not
have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under
Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the
gonorrhea transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5)
years after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of
Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45,
paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would
require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and
proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,21 the
Court of Appeals held:22
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of
marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited
drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-
husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-
husbands character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-
lucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-
husbands youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than
petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-
husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem
student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and
there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE
TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF
PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR
ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO
THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
should be annulled on the ground of private respondents psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that
private respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became
manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their
marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.23
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact
that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to
show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the
outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private
respondents parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although
he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his
employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital
life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He
indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner
concludes that private respondents condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their
union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due
to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate
court held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:25
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.27
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondents psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight
and even finality.28 Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and
arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective
support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These
matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,
dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1 2
1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the
3 Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which declared
the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
4
Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February
1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null
and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church
of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
5 due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our
civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as
a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
6
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
7
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
8
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better
for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other
but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
9
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
10
in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
11
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
12
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
13
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
14
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, Petitioner, v. WILSON G. MARCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 55588, which
disposed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is
hereby declared valid." 2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G.
Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in
accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties’ children. In the best interest and welfare of
the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of
respondent" .chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City
where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the
Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982
which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A);
and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1).
Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he
was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women’s Auxiliary Corps
under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when
she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a
good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel
and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with
him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chicken. While
she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was
able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted
him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came
to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought
refuge in her sister’s house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records,
153).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even
[beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, . . . 3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties
to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220
to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged
in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any
one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or
she was assuming, or as would make him or her . . . unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of
his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a
psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or
mental — not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was
assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable." 4
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
In her Memorandum, 6 petitioner presents for this Court’s consideration the following
issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation .
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent
is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of
the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue:
Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should
not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not
taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such
tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code 9 were laid down by this
Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it ‘as the foundation of the nation.’ It decrees marriage as legally
‘inviolable,’ thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be ‘protected’ by the state.
x x x issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their ‘I do’s.’
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
10chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: 11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue:
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present
case — including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister
and the social worker — was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided
under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not
for declaring a marriage void.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines in outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion
requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
G. R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001356
FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She
contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his
marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker,
staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning.
When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and
kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in
the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon
City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to give
him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the
morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for
slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null and
void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still
subsists.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
HELD:
(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence
showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article
36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid
down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal life by
the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of
Molina, additional procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for
annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial
decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the
case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.
ROBERT F. MALLILIN v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN, GR No. 192718, 2015-02-18
Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC
On March 7, 1996, RTC... denied the petition... n January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC...
decision "due to lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family
Code."
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such
marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such... incapacity
became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope
with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert
who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did
not appear during the trial.
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had
married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing
and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz...
had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to
keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who
washed... their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3)it was also her
sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror;
(4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous...
letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive
male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she
would contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva),
Guidance Psychologist
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for
marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of
Manila
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their
marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties
as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon 1095. This decision was... affirmed by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with
the CA.
The CA,... granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision.
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA
Issues:
whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luzwas psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed... and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of... the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.[7]
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,[9]the Court reiterated the well-
settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[10] based on Article 36 of the Family Code.Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be... psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert's evidence
failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the
alleged incapacity of Luz.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or
clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial.
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,[14] the Court stated that interpretations given by... the NAMT of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts,
still it is subject to the law on evidence.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce
sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
C. Other Perspective
[G.R. NO. 166562 : March 31, 2009]
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent
was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more
than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a
verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in
favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer
new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago.
MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Facts: Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred
that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look
for a job and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It
was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly
rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually
came from Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told
her his parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta
never enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should
not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta
asked Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to
leave and see if he would follow her. He did not.
Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s
testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given by his
mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who
examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused,
responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from
Marietta, the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality
Disorder characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own
decisions and dependency on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of
the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother who was the dominant figure in the
family considering that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. She added that
the problem began during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his
marriage. She stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the
responsibilities of a spouse, and incurable, because it began in early development and had
been deeply ingrained in his personality. She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities.
Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City
Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by
Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was
based solely on the information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged
psychological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent
and incurable.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision. Marietta, thus, brought the
case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his
marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held: Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his
Dependent Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. As
held in Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is
whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close relative,
and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is
no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by her expert
witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40
years experience in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly explained
in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009), “(b)y the
very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the
start of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal
sexual reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent
Personality Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early
development and a by-product of his upbringing and family life.
Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render
him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’ opinion that
Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to
embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a
child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High
Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise
disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence
on his mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo
was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder.
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others
to make most of his importantdecisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make
decisions regarding even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who
cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse, is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code.
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is
automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The
court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of
disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years.
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 165424 : June 9, 2009]
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner, v. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a
joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. However, they
started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing
respondent and started dating other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found
out that the marriage was not "fake."
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the
basis of his psychological incapacity.
RULINGS:
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court
reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity on a case-to-
case basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern of
dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently
belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to
agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or
doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that
was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been
shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders
him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared the
marriage null and void.
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16,
2008 resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 164493 : March 10, 2010]
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VS. ANGELITO SUAZO AND REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of
Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito's
marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the
Mayor of Biñan.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito's parents
after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked
for Angelito's relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was
most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted
because of Jocelyn's efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her
complaint:
Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated
parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by the
expert witness.
The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or
excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it
and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified.
The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality
syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally
show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or
irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to
work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
The Court fined the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in
setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not
have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality
disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must
be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do
not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or
mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to
be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual
findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn's main anchor in her present
appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA
correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the
present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the
petitioner.
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of
the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. The casual
acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s
good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes,
not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology
from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just
continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and
respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and
employed at the Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s
parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially,
respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first
child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed
expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent
stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner
mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had
resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game plan was to
venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including
the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young
family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping
that the situation will change. To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner
suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new
living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make
ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondent’s business floundered.
Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful.
Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family’s financial woes
and further straining the parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards
his family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent;
he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with
petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the
parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family
not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At
that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the
petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while
playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped
operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to
work for the family business. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their
family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their
family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation
on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on,
respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and
played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the
operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack
of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple
scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment
to “determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning.” As with all other attempts to
help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of
respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to
give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve.
Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.
 5
Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr.
Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC
granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground
of their psychological incapacity. The CA reversed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. –YES.
Whether the marriage should be declared null and void under Art. 36. –YES.
RATIO:
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity
in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern
of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses,
Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the
Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity
termed “psychological incapacity” which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively
function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential
duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and
support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to
entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that
respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to
fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless
victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is
weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he
did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing
was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one.
In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his
original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the
reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared
to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and
willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the
respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the
siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing
marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings. As previously adverted
to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner]
manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
[Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is
suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his
inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and
adult behavior. His being a “free spirit” associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no
anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe
stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or
the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and
closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe
sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his
weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making,
aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies
rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital
demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his
psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures
(sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with
his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached
attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to
a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others.
He feels that he is “different” and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the
discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social involvement,
which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from
interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better
when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not
really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a
small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in
expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within
but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social approval,
which could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and
over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already
feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of
interpersonal conflicts. Despite his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of
indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in
anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension
and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also
entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he
is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will
never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and
focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he can’t accomplish
anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further
aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish
anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis supplied)
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse,
and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic
features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse
and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV), instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality
disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the
following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social
situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of
another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug
of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of
a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not
necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we
find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we
find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R.
CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No
costs.
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
Tyrone Kalaw and respondent Malyn Fernandez met in 1973 and eventually married in Hong
Kong in 1976. They have 4 children. Tyron had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano, who gave birth
to a son in 1983. In 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her 4 children with Tyrone. Then
Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him 4more children. Nine years since the de
facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on Article 36. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr.
Healy, to testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the
factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing,
and her frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).
Malyn’s NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother. Dr. Gates based
her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s
sister-in-law), and their son. Fr. Healy characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity as grave
and incurable. He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as
the report of Dr. Dayan, Malyn’s expert witness. He clarified that he did not verify the
truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s “habits” because he believed it is the
court’s duty to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malynsuffers from psychological incapacity – No.
RATIO:
The burden of proving psychological incapacity ison the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that
the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological
disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at
the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
Petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the
alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary
evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner. What transpired between the parties is
acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation,
but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and
the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178741 : January 17, 2011
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, PETITIONER, VS. MYRNA F. MARABLE, RESPONDENT.
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at
Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 and
their marriage was blessed with 5 children.
Their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences.
Petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair,
and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the affair, their quarrels aggravated.
Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent
towards respondent. Petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City.
He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage
in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several
women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds and filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity
to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.
Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of
farm life at an early age. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had
seven other children. This caused petitioner’s mother and siblings to suffer immensely. He
further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he
joined. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child
lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.
Petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from
the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag’s report stated that petitioner is suffering from
“Antisocial Personality Disorder,” characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report
also revealed that petitioner’s personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting
from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for
needed attention. It was Dr. Tayag’s conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations.
The RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent on the ground of
petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
the CA reversed the RTC decision. CA denied MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD:
NO! CA’s decision was upheld.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or
inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has
contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36. The Court held, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the
psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the
marriage. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is
suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder. As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the
presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which
the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner’s marriage to respondent. It is
indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was
one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it
appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. In Santos v. Court
of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as
valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner's
psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.chanroblesvistuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS,
.JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
1
The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan
of the nullity of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and
Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a
marriage on the ground that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
established.
Antecedents
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal
2
Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina’s
3
hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.
4
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing
Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did
not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal
5
house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After conducting an investigation, the
6
public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in
petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she
spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores and
caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to
7
live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle
8
L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina, Dr. Reyes opined
that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr.
Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered
9
her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.
10
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, whereby she
admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s
consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and
that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live
11
there or to receive her share should the residence be sold.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the
plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos
de Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the
marriage of the parties from the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance
with this decision.
12
SO ORDERED.
The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her
family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the matter of
determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr.
Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of
13
Catalina’s psychological incapacity.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID,
DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA
concluded that Eduardo proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results of
the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been
"mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital obligations;"
and that Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven,
duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA
gravely erred because:
I - THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE
CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF
MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II - MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A
SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
III - ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.
IV - GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
V - THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE
REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINA’S INCAPACITY AND PROVE
14
THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE.
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to
15
the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina); and that
Catalina’s refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and their
adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her
marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the
conjugal home were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof
that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while her abandonment
would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the
neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s psychological
incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life,
attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that
there was not even a finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity; and that
there appeared to be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the
trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and Eduardo’s overseas deployment
that had required him to be away most of the time created the strain in the couple’s relationship
and forced her to seek her friends’ emotional support and company; and that her ambivalent
attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear children of her
own.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the
nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling
We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a)
a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or
her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must
16
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides
in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has
declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of
20
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the
21
incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological
incapacity.
22
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the
gravity and severity of Catalina’s psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the
23
celebration of their marriage.
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of
sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported
psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty evidence
that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.
To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving
the house without Eduardo’s consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of
their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo presented no other
witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-
serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was
submitted to a court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological
evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following portion of the
report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by
immaturity in several aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal
relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a relationship that
involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not have the
patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to
as they might end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people however usually
do not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and
they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their own lives and that of
their families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be
expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required in marriage. It is expected
that even with future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be
the background of the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up
as such.
xxxx
With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant
made, it is being concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her
as a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very
immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet
the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her
role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in
marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant
will still change because her traits have developed through the years and already ingrained
within her.
24
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’s
supposed psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source
of vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general
description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the report and court
testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought
about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various
acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also
discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital
duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her
childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an
25
age "beyond maturity."
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
26
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. We have explained this need in Lim v.
27
Sta. Cruz-Lim, stating:
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview,
and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and
prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative
force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a
28
basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet
with other persons, aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the
conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes’ report
lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary support for the conclusion
that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological incapacity to perform her
marital duties.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina.
The assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of
P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his
34
petition or to bring any action on her part, to wit:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant,
gravity and incurability of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I
evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such noticed that she is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife?
disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause
of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented A No, sir.
29
during trial.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend
What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalina’s immaturity the hearing of this case you filed against her, is it not?
and apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not
30
constitute psychological incapacity. To rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological A No, sir. I did not.
incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered
personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this
31
the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity. case?
32
Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo that there must be proof of a natal or supervening A None, sir.
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the
basic marital obligations, viz:
Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of
P50,000.00, please tell us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
A Yes, sir.
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.
abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of
the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of marriage which you filed against her?
the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that
A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely
33
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. Needless to state, Eduardo did not
adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis. Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division of
your conjugal properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties,
so that she will not pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed
against her, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is
no longer around here?
35
A Yes sir, it could be.
Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and
Eduardo.1âwphi1 To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of
conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was
unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave
her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her
unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so
also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition
for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue
of collusion between the spouses.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina,
we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
36
dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision
the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of
merit.
Costs to be paid by the respondent.
D. Retroactivity
Pesca v. Psca, GR No. 136921, 17 Apr 2001, supra
Antonio v. Reyes, supra
Ting v. Velez-Ting, supra
E. Damages
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her
answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.
1
Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent
null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property;
ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject
to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his
mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s
motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do
not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio,
the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same
would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties
appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a
quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains.

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is
26
now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 and has,
therefore, attained the age of majority.

With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now
be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has
attained the age of majority.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution
dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449),
are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the
retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s
shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained
but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not
of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals’
Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the
support pendente lite in favor of the parties’ son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and
ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.