Afgh%nist%n: Opium, the CIA %nd the K%rz%i

Administr%tion
by Peter D%le Scott

According to Peter D.le Scott, there is no point in deploring the exp.nsion of drug
production in Afgh.nist.n .nd the heroin epidemic gripping gre.t p.rts of the
world. Conclusions must be dr.wn from the est.blished f.cts: the T.lib.n
er.dic.ted poppy cultiv.tion; NATO promoted it; drug money corrupted the K.rz.i
government but it is especi.lly inside U.S. institutions th.t drug corruption is rife.
Therefore, the solution does not lie with K.bul but with W.shington.

VOLTAIRE NETWORK | 13 DECEMBER 2010

FRANAIS ESPAOL

In Afgh.nist.n, NATO curbs poppy cultiv.tion by the insurgents while protecting

th.t of its .llies.
Alfred McCoys import.nt new .rticle for TomDisp.tch (M.rch 30, 2010) deserves
to mobilize Congress for . serious rev.lu.tion of Americ.s ill-considered milit.ry
venture in Afgh.nist.n. The .nswer to the question he poses in his title C.n
Anyone P.cify the Worlds Number One N.rco-St.te? is .mply shown by his
impressive ess.y to be . resounding No! . . . not until there is fund.ment.l
ch.nge in the go.ls .nd str.tegies both of W.shington .nd of K.bul.

He .mply documents th.t

the Afgh.n st.te of H.mid K.rz.i is . corrupt n.rco-st.te, to which Afgh.ns .re
forced to p.y bribes e.ch ye.r $2.5 billion, . qu.rter of the n.tions economy;

the Afgh.n economy is . n.rco-economy: in 2007 Afgh.nist.n produced 8,200

tons of opium, . rem.rk.ble 53% of the countrys GDP .nd 93% of glob.l heroin
supply.

M.p of Afgh.nist.n showing m.jor poppy fields .nd intensity of conflict 2007-08.
milit.ry options for de.ling with the problem .re .t best ineffective .nd .t worst
counterproductive: McCoy .rgues th.t the best hope lies in reconstructing the
Afgh.n countryside until food crops become . vi.ble .ltern.tive to opium, .
process th.t could t.ke ten or fifteen ye.rs, or longer. (I sh.ll .rgue l.ter for .n
interim solution: licensing Afgh.nist.n with the Intern.tion.l N.rcotics Bo.rd to
sell its opium leg.lly.)

Perh.ps McCoys most telling .rgument is th.t in Colombi. coc.ine .t its pe.k
represented only .bout 3 percent of the n.tion.l economy, yet both the FARC
guerill.s .nd the right-wing de.th squ.ds, both .mply funded by drugs, still
continue to flourish in th.t country. To simply er.dic.te drugs, without first
prep.ring for . substitute Afgh.n .griculture, would impose intoler.ble str.ins on
.n .lre.dy r.v.ged rur.l society whose only signific.nt income flow .t this time
derives from opium. One h.s only to look .t the coll.pse of the T.lib.n in 2001,
.fter . dr.coni.n T.lib.n-led reduction in Afgh.n drug production (from 4600
tons to 185 tons) left the country . hollow shell.

On its f.ce, McCoys .rguments would .ppe.r to be incontrovertible, .nd should,

in . r.tion.l society, le.d to . serious deb.te followed by . m.jor ch.nge in
Americ.s current milit.ry policy. McCoy h.s presented his c.se with consider.ble
t.ct .nd diplom.cy, to f.cilit.te such . result.

The CIAs Historic Responsibility for Glob.l Drug Tr.fficking

Unfortun.tely, there .re import.nt re.sons why such . positive outcome is

unlikely .ny time soon. There .re m.ny re.sons for this, but .mong them .re
some unple.s.nt re.lities which McCoy h.s either .voided or downpl.yed in his
otherwise brilli.nt ess.y, .nd which h.ve to be confronted if we will ever begin to
implement sensible str.tegies in Afgh.nist.n.

The first re.lity is th.t the extent of CIA involvement in .nd responsibility for the
glob.l drug tr.ffic is . topic off limits for serious questioning in policy circles,
elector.l c.mp.igns, .nd the m.instre.m medi.. Those who h.ve ch.llenged this
t.boo, like the journ.list G.ry Webb, h.ve often seen their c.reers destroyed in
consequence.

Since Alfred McCoy h.s done more th.n .nyone else to heighten public
.w.reness of CIA responsibility for drug tr.fficking in Americ.n w.r zones, I feel
.wkw.rd .bout suggesting th.t he downpl.ys it in his recent ess.y. True, he
.cknowledges th.t Opium first emerged .s . key force in Afgh.n politics during
the CIA covert w.r .g.inst the Soviets, .nd he .dds th.t the CIAs covert w.r
served .s the c.t.lyst th.t tr.nsformed the Afgh.n-P.kist.n borderl.nds into the
worlds l.rgest heroin producing region.

But in . very str.nge sentence, McCoy suggests th.t the CIA w.s p.ssively dr.wn
into drug .lli.nces in the course of comb.ting Soviet forces in Afgh.nist.n in the
ye.rs 1979-88, where.s in f.ct the CIA cle.rly helped cre.te them precisely to
fight the Soviets:
"In one of historys ironic .ccidents, the southern re.ch of communist Chin. .nd
the Soviet Union h.d coincided with Asi.s opium zone .long this s.me mount.in
rim, dr.wing the CIA into .mbiguous .lli.nces with the regions highl.nd
w.rlords."

There w.s no such .ccident in Afgh.nist.n, where the first loc.l drug lords on
.n intern.tion.l sc.le Gulbuddin Hekm.ty.r .nd Abu R.sul S.yy.f were in f.ct
l.unched intern.tion.lly .s . result of m.ssive .nd ill-.dvised .ssist.nce from
the CIA, in conjunction with the governments of P.kist.n .nd S.udi Ar.bi.. While
other loc.l resist.nce forces were .ccorded second-cl.ss st.tus, these two
clients of P.kist.n .nd S.udi Ar.bi., precisely bec.use they l.cked loc.l support,
pioneered the use of opium .nd heroin to build up their fighting power .nd
fin.nci.l resources.[1] Both, moreover, bec.me .gents of s.l.fist extremism,
.tt.cking the indigenous Sufi-influenced Isl.m of Afgh.nist.n. And ultim.tely
both bec.me sponsors of .l Q.ed..[2]

Gulbuddin Hekm.ty.r
CIA involvement in the drug tr.de h.rdly beg.n with its involvement in the Soviet-
Afgh.n w.r. To . cert.in degree, the CIAs responsibility for the present domin.nt
role of Afgh.nist.n in the glob.l heroin tr.ffic merely replic.ted wh.t h.d
h.ppened e.rlier in Burm., Th.il.nd, .nd L.os between the l.te 1940s .nd the
1970s. These countries .lso only bec.me f.ctors in the intern.tion.l drug tr.ffic
.s . result of CIA .ssist.nce (.fter the French, in the c.se of L.os) to wh.t would
otherwise h.ve been only loc.l tr.ffickers.

One c.nnot t.lk of ironic .ccidents here either. McCoy himself h.s shown how,
in .ll of these countries, the CIA not only toler.ted but .ssisted the growth of
drug-fin.nced .nti-Communist .ssets, to offset the d.nger of Communist
Chinese penetr.tion into Southe.st Asi.. As in Afgh.nist.n tod.y CIA .ssist.nce
helped turn the Golden Tri.ngle, from the 1940s to the 1970s, into . le.ding
source for the worlds opium.

Abdul R.sul S.yy.f

In this s.me period the CIA recruited .ssets .long the smuggling routes of the
Asi.n opium tr.ffic .s well, in countries such .s Turkey, Leb.non, It.ly, Fr.nce,
Cub., Hondur.s, .nd Mexico. These .ssets h.ve included government offici.ls
like M.nuel Norieg. of P.n.m. or Vl.dimiro Montesinos of Peru, often senior
figures in CIA-.ssisted police .nd intelligence services. But they h.ve .lso
included insurrection.ry movements, r.nging from the Contr.s in Nic.r.gu. in the
1980s to (.ccording to Robert B.er .nd Seymour Hersh) the .l Q.ed.-linked
Jund.ll.h[3], oper.ting tod.y in Ir.n .nd B.luchist.n.[4]
The K.rz.i Government, not the T.lib.n, Domin.te the Afgh.n Dope Economy

Perh.ps the best ex.mple of such CIA influence vi. drug tr.ffickers tod.y is in
Afgh.nist.n itself, where those .ccused of drug tr.fficking include President
K.rz.is brother, Ahmed W.li K.rz.i (.n .ctive CIA .sset), .nd Abdul R.shid
Dostum (. former CIA .sset).[5] The drug corruption of the Afgh.n government
must be .ttributed .t le.st in p.rt to the U.S. .nd CIA decision in 2001 to l.unch
.n inv.sion with the support of the Northern Alli.nce, . movement th.t
W.shington knew to be drug-corrupted.[6]

CIA m.p tr.cing opium tr.ffic from Afgh.nist.n to Europe, 1998. The CIA cite,
upd.ted in 2008 st.tes Most Southwest Asi.n heroin flows overl.nd through Ir.n
.nd Turkey to Europe vi. the B.lk.ns. But in f.ct drugs .lso flow through the
st.tes of the former Soviet Union, .nd through P.kist.n .nd Dub.i.
In this w.y the U.S. consciously recre.ted in Afgh.nist.n the situ.tion it h.d
cre.ted e.rlier in Vietn.m. There too (like Ahmed W.li K.rz.i . h.lf century l.ter)
the presidents brother, Ngo dinh Nhu, used drugs to fin.nce . priv.te network
th.t w.s used to rig .n election for Ngo dinh Diem.[7] Thom.s H. Johnson,
coordin.tor of .nthropologic.l rese.rch studies .t the N.v.l Postgr.du.te
School, h.s pointed out the unlikelihood of . counterinsurgency progr.m
succeeding when th.t progr.m is in support of . loc.l government th.t is
fl.gr.ntly dysfunction.l .nd corrupt.[8]

Thus I t.ke issue with McCoy when he, echoing the m.instre.m U.S. medi.,
depicts the Afgh.n drug economy .s one domin.ted by the T.lib.n. (In McCoys
words, If the insurgents c.pture th.t illicit economy, .s the T.lib.n h.ve done,
then the t.sk becomes little short of insurmount.ble.) The T.lib.ns sh.re of the
Afgh.n opium economy is v.riously estim.ted from $90 to $400 million. But the
U.N. Office on Drugs .nd Crime (UNODC) estim.tes th.t the tot.l Afgh.n .nnu.l
e.rnings from opium .nd heroin .re in the order of from $2.8 to $3.4 billion.[9]

Cle.rly the T.lib.n h.ve not c.ptured this economy, of which the l.rgest sh.re
by f.r is controlled by supporters of the K.rz.i government. In 2006 . report to
the World B.nk .rgued th.t .t the top level, .round 25-30 key tr.ffickers, the
m.jority of them in southern Afgh.nist.n, control m.jor tr.ns.ctions .nd
tr.nsfers, working closely with sponsors in top government .nd politic.l
positions.[10] In 2007 the London D.ily M.il reported th.t "the four l.rgest
pl.yers in the heroin business .re .ll senior members of the Afgh.n
government."[11]

The Americ.n medi. h.ve confronted neither this b.sic f.ct nor the w.y in which
it h.s distorted Americ.s opium .nd w.r policies in Afgh.nist.n. The Ob.m.
.dministr.tion .ppe.rs to h.ve shifted .w.y from the ill-.dvised er.dic.tion
progr.ms of the Bush er., which .re cert.in to lose the he.rts .nd minds of the
pe.s.ntry. It h.s moved inste.d tow.rds . policy of selective interdiction of the
tr.ffic, explicitly limited to .tt.cks on drug tr.ffickers who .re supporting the
insurgents.[12]

This policy m.y or m.y not be effective in we.kening the T.lib.n. But to t.rget
wh.t constitutes .bout . tenth of the tot.l tr.ffic will cle.rly never end
Afgh.nist.ns current st.tus .s the worlds number one n.rco-st.te. Nor will it
end the current world post-1980s heroin epidemic, which h.s cre.ted five million
.ddicts in P.kist.n, over two million .ddicts inside Russi., eight hundred
thous.nd .ddicts in Americ., over fifteen million .ddicts in the world, .nd one
million .ddicts inside Afgh.nist.n itself. Nor will it end the current world
post-1980s heroin epidemic, which h.s cre.ted five million .ddicts in P.kist.n,
over two million .ddicts inside Russi., eight hundred thous.nd .ddicts in Americ.,
over fifteen million .ddicts in the world, .nd one million .ddicts inside Afgh.nist.n
itself.

The Ob.m. governments policy of selective interdiction .lso helps expl.in its
reluct.nce to consider the most re.son.ble .nd hum.ne solution to the worlds
Afgh.n heroin epidemic. This is the poppy for medicine initi.tive of the
Intern.tion.l Council on Security .nd Development (ICOS, formerly known .s The
Senlis Council): to est.blish . tri.l licensing scheme, .llowing f.rmers to sell their
opium for the production of much-needed essenti.l medicines such .s morphine
.nd codeine.[13]

The propos.l h.s received support from the Europe.n P.rli.ment .nd in C.n.d.;
but it h.s come under he.vy .tt.ck in the United St.tes, chiefly on the grounds
th.t it might well le.d to .n incre.se in opium production. It would however
provide . short-term .nswer to the heroin epidemic th.t is dev.st.ting Europe
.nd Russi. something not .chieved by McCoys long-term .ltern.tive of crop
substitution over ten or fifteen ye.rs, still less by the current Ob.m.
.dministr.tions progr.m of selective elimin.tion of opium supplies.

An unspoken consequence of the poppy for medicine initi.tive would be to

shrink the illicit drug proceeds th.t .re helping to support the K.rz.i government.
Whether for this re.son, or simply bec.use .nything th.t sm.cks of leg.lizing
drugs is . t.booed subject in W.shington, the poppy for medicine initi.tive is
unlikely to be endorsed by the Ob.m. .dministr.tion.

Afgh.n Heroin .nd the CIAs Glob.l Drug Connection

There is .nother import.nt p.r.gr.ph where McCoy, I think misle.dingly, focuses
.ttention on Afgh.nist.n, r.ther th.n Americ. itself, .s the locus of the problem:

At . drug conference in K.bul this month, the he.d of Russi.s Feder.l N.rcotics
Service estim.ted the v.lue of Afgh.nist.ns current opium crop .t $65 billion.
Only $500 million of th.t v.st sum goes to Afgh.nist.ns f.rmers, $300 million to
the T.lib.n guerrill.s, .nd the $64 billion b.l.nce "to the drug m.fi.," le.ving
.mple funds to corrupt the K.rz.i government (emph.sis .dded) in . n.tion
whose tot.l GDP is only $10 billion.

Wh.t this p.r.gr.ph omits is the pertinent f.ct th.t, .ccording to the U.N. Office
on Drugs .nd Crime, only 5 or 6 percent of th.t $65 billion, or from $2.8 to $3.4
billion, st.ys inside Afgh.nist.n itself.[14] An estim.ted 80 percent of the
e.rnings from the drug tr.de .re derived from the countries of consumption in
this c.se, Russi., Europe, .nd Americ.. Thus we should not think for . moment
th.t the only government corrupted by the Afgh.n drug tr.de is the country of
origin. Everywhere the tr.ffic h.s become subst.nti.l, even if only in tr.nsit, it h.s
survived through protection, which in other words me.ns corruption.

There is no evidence to suggest th.t drug money from the CIAs tr.fficker .ssets
f.ttened the fin.nci.l .ccounts of the CIA itself, or of its officers. But the CIA
profited indirectly from the drug tr.ffic, .nd developed over the ye.rs . close
rel.tionship with it. The CIAs off-the-books w.r in L.os w.s one extreme c.se
where it fought . w.r, using .s its chief .ssets the Roy.l L.oti.n Army of Gener.l
Ou.ne R.ttikone .nd the Hmong Army of Gener.l V.ng P.o, which were, in l.rge
p.rt, drug-fin.nced. The CIAs m.ssive Afgh.nist.n oper.tion in the 1980s w.s
.nother ex.mple of . w.r th.t w.s in p.rt drug-fin.nced.

Video shows the CIAs Hmong Army led by Gen. V.ng P.o in .ction in L.os
Protection for Drug Tr.fficking in Americ.

Thus it is not surprising th.t the U.S. Government, following the le.d of the CIA,
h.s over the ye.rs become . protector of drug tr.ffickers .g.inst crimin.l
prosecution in this country. For ex.mple both the FBI .nd CIA intervened in 1981
to block the indictment (on stolen c.r ch.rges) of the drug-tr.fficking Mexic.n
intelligence cz.r Miguel N.z.r H.ro, cl.iming th.t N.z.r w.s .n essenti.l repe.t
essenti.l cont.ct for CIA st.tion in Mexico City, on m.tters of terrorism,
intelligence, .nd counterintelligence.[15] When Associ.te Attorney Gener.l
Lowell Jensen refused to proceed with N.z.rs indictment, the S.n Diego U.S.
Attorney, Willi.m Kennedy, publicly exposed his intervention. For this he w.s
promptly fired.15
A recent spect.cul.r ex.mple of CIA drug involvement w.s the c.se of the CIAs
Venezuel.n .sset Gener.l R.mon Guilln D.vil.. As I write in my forthcoming
book, Fueling Americ.s W.r M.chine,[16]
"Gener.l R.mon Guilln D.vil., chief of . CIA-cre.ted .nti-drug unit in Venezuel.,
w.s indicted in Mi.mi for smuggling . ton of coc.ine into the United St.tes.
According to the New York Times, "The CIA, over the objections of the Drug
Enforcement Administr.tion, .pproved the shipment of .t le.st one ton of pure
coc.ine to Mi.mi Intern.tion.l Airport .s . w.y of g.thering inform.tion .bout
the Colombi.n drug c.rtels." Time m.g.zine reported th.t . single shipment
.mounted to 998 pounds, following e.rlier ones tot.ling ne.rly 2,000
pounds.[17] Mike W.ll.ce confirmed th.t the CIA-n.tion.l gu.rd undercover
oper.tion quickly .ccumul.ted this coc.ine, over . ton .nd . h.lf th.t w.s
smuggled from Colombi. into Venezuel..[18] According to the W.ll Street
Journ.l, the tot.l .mount of drugs smuggled by Gen. Guilln m.y h.ve been more
th.n 22 tons."[19]

But the United St.tes never .sked for Guillns extr.dition from Venezuel. to
st.nd tri.l; .nd in 2007, when he w.s .rrested in Venezuel. for plotting to
.ss.ssin.te President Hugo Ch.vez, his indictment w.s still se.led in Mi.mi.[20]
Me.nwhile, CIA officer M.rk McF.rlin, whom DEA Chief Bonner h.d .lso wished to
indict, w.s never indicted .t .ll; he merely resigned.[21]

Nothing in short h.ppened to the princip.ls in this c.se, which prob.bly only
surf.ced in the medi. bec.use of the soci.l unrest gener.ted in the s.me period
by G.ry Webbs stories in the S.n Jose Mercury .bout the CIA, Contr.s, .nd
coc.ine.

B.nks .nd Drug Money L.undering

Other institutions with . direct st.ke in the intern.tion.l drug tr.ffic include m.jor
b.nks, which m.ke lo.ns to countries like Colombi. .nd Mexico knowing full well
th.t drug flows will help underwrite those lo.ns rep.yment. A number of our
biggest b.nks, including Citib.nk, B.nk of New York, .nd B.nk of Boston, h.ve
been identified .s money l.undering conduits, yet never h.ve f.ced pen.lties
serious enough to ch.nge their beh.vior.[22] In short, United St.tes involvement
in the intern.tion.l drug tr.ffic links the CIA, m.jor fin.nci.l interests, .nd
crimin.l interests in this country .nd .bro.d.

Antonio M.ri. Cost., he.d of the UN Office on Drugs .nd Crime, h.s s.id th.t
Drugs money worth billions of doll.rs kept the fin.nci.l system .flo.t .t the
height of the glob.l crisis. According to the London Observer, Cost. s.id he h.s
seen evidence th.t the proceeds of org.nised crime were "the only liquid
investment c.pit.l" .v.il.ble to some b.nks on the brink of coll.pse l.st ye.r. He
s.id th.t . m.jority of the $352bn (216bn) of drugs profits w.s .bsorbed into
the economic system .s . result. Cost. s.id evidence th.t illeg.l money w.s
being .bsorbed into the fin.nci.l system w.s first dr.wn to his .ttention by
intelligence .gencies .nd prosecutors .round 18 months .go. "In m.ny inst.nces,
the money from drugs w.s the only liquid investment c.pit.l. In the second h.lf of
2008, liquidity w.s the b.nking systems m.in problem .nd hence liquid c.pit.l
bec.me .n import.nt f.ctor," he s.id.[23]

A striking ex.mple of drug clout in W.shington w.s the influence exercised in the
1980s by the drug money-l.undering B.nk of Credit .nd Commerce Intern.tion.l
(BCCI). As I report in my book, .mong the highly-pl.ced recipients of l.rgesse
from BCCI, its owners, .nd its .ffili.tes, were Ron.ld Re.g.ns Tre.sury Secret.ry
J.mes B.ker, who declined to investig.te BCCI;[24] .nd Democr.tic Sen.tor
Joseph Biden .nd Republic.n Sen.tor Orrin H.tch, the r.nking members of the
Sen.te Judici.ry Committee, which declined to investig.te BCCI.[25]

In the end it w.s not W.shington th.t first moved to termin.te the b.nking
.ctivities in Americ. of BCCI .nd its illeg.l U.S. subsidi.ries; it w.s the
determined .ctivity of two outsiders W.shington l.wyer J.ck Blum .nd
M.nh.tt.n District Attorney Robert Morgenth.u.[26]

Conclusion: The Source of the Glob.l Drug problem is not K.bul, but W.shington

I underst.nd why McCoy, in his desire to ch.nge .n ill-f.ted policy, is more

decorous th.n I .m in .cknowledging the extent to which powerful Americ.n
institutionsgovernment, intelligence .nd fin.nce.nd not just the K.rz.i
government, h.ve been corrupted by the perv.sive intern.tion.l drug tr.ffic. But I
believe th.t his t.ctfulness will prove counter-productive. The biggest source of
the glob.l drug problem is not in K.bul, but in W.shington. To ch.nge this
sc.nd.l will require the .iring of f.cts which McCoy, in this ess.y, is reluct.nt to
.ddress.

In his m.gisteri.l work, The Politics of Heroin, McCoy tells the story of C.rters
White House drug .dvisor D.vid Musto. In 1980 Musto told the White House
Str.tegy Council on Drug Abuse th.t we were going into Afgh.nist.n to support
the opium growers in their rebellion .g.inst the Soviets. Shouldnt we try to .void
wh.t we h.d done in L.os?[27] Denied .ccess by the CIA to d.t. to which he
w.s leg.lly entitled, Musto took his concerns public in M.y 1980, noting in . New
York Times op-ed th.t Golden Crescent heroin w.s .lre.dy (.nd for the first time)
c.using . medic.l crisis in New York. And he w.rned, presciently, th.t this crisis
is bound to worsen.[28]

Musto hoped th.t he could .chieve . ch.nge of policy by going public with .
sensible w.rning .bout . dis.strous drug-.ssisted .dventure in Afgh.nist.n. But
his wise words were powerless .g.inst the relentless determin.tion of wh.t I h.ve
c.lled the U.S. w.r m.chine in our government .nd politic.l economy. I fe.r th.t
McCoys sensible mess.ge, by being decorous precisely where it is now
necess.ry to be outspoken, will suffer the s.me f.te.

Peter D.le Scott

See the following .rticles on rel.ted subjects:

Alfred W. McCoy, "C.n Anyone P.cify the Worlds Number One N.rco-St.te? The
Opium W.rs in Afgh.nist.n."
Peter D.le Scott, "Americ.s Afgh.nist.n: The N.tion.l Security .nd . Heroin-
R.v.ged St.te"
Peter D.le Scott, "M.rti.l L.w, the Fin.nci.l B.ilout, .nd the Afgh.n .nd Ir.q
W.rs"
Jeremy Kuzm.rov, "Americ.n Police Tr.ining .nd Politic.l Violence: From the
Philippines Conquest to the Killing Fields of Afgh.nist.n .nd Ir.q"
MK Bh.dr.kum.r, "Afgh.nist.n, Ir.n .nd US-Russi.n Conflict"
Peter V.n Agtm.el, "All You Need is Heroin: U.S. Troops in Their Own H.nd"

[1] Eventu.lly the United St.tes .nd its .llies g.ve Hekm.ty.r, who for . time
bec.me .rgu.bly the worlds le.ding drug tr.fficker, more th.n $1 billion in
.rm.ments. This w.s more th.n .ny other CIA client h.s ever received, before or
since.

[2] Scott, The Ro.d to 9/11, 74-75: Kh.lid Sh.ikh Moh.mmed, s.id by the 911
Commission to h.ve been the true .uthor of the 9/11 plot, first conceived of it
when he w.s with Abdul S.yy.f, . le.der with whom bin L.den w.s still .t odds
["9/11 Commission Report", 145-50]. Me.nwhile sever.l of the men convicted of
blowing up the World Tr.de Center in 1993, .nd the subsequent New York d.y of
terror plot in 1995, h.d tr.ined, fought with, or r.ised money for, Gulbuddin
Hekm.ty.r. The French version of The Ro.d to 9/11 is entitled L. Route Vers le
Nouve.u Dsordre Mondi.l.
Tim Weiner, Blowb.ck from the Afgh.n B.ttlefield, New York Times, M.rch 13,
1994].

[3] Jund.ll.h terrorists tr.ined in P.kist.n, Volt.ire Network, 20 October 2009.

[4] Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, July 7, 2008.

[5] New York Times, October 27, 2009.

[6] Steve Coll, Ghost W.rs: The Secret History of the CIA, Afgh.nist.n, .nd Bin
L.den, from the Soviet Inv.sion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press,
2004), 536. At the st.rt of the U.S. offensive in 2001, .ccording to Ahmed R.shid,
The Pent.gon h.d . list of twenty-five or more drug l.bs .nd w.rehouses in
Afgh.nist.n but refused to bomb them bec.use some belonged to the CIAs new
NA [Northern Alli.nce] .llies (Ahmed R.shid, Descent into Ch.os: The United
St.tes .nd the F.ilure of N.tion Building in P.kist.n, Afgh.nist.n, .nd Centr.l
Asi. [New York: Viking, 2008], 320).

[7] St.nley K.rnow, Vietn.m: A History (New York: Penguin, 1997), 239. Cf. New
York Times, October 28, 2009.

[8] Thom.s H. Johnson .nd M. Chris M.son, Refighting the L.st W.r:
Afgh.nist.n .nd the Vietn.m Templ.te, Milit.ry Review, November-December
2009.

[9] The .lert re.der will notice th.t even $3.4 billion is less th.n 53 percent of the
$10 billion .ttributed in the previous p.r.gr.ph to the tot.l Afgh.n GDP. These
estim.tes from diverse sources .re not precise, .nd c.nnot be expected to jibe
perfectly.

[10] Afgh.nist.n: Drug Industry .nd Counter-N.rcotics Policy, Report to the

World B.nk, November 28, 2006, emph.sis .dded.

[11] London D.ily M.il; July 21, 2007. In December 2009 H.rpers published .
det.iled ess.y on Colonel Abdul R.zik, the m.ster of Spin Bold.k, . drug
tr.fficker .nd K.rz.i .lly whose rise w.s .betted by . ring of crooked offici.ls in
K.bul .nd K.nd.h.r .s well .s by overstretched NATO comm.nders who found
his control over . key border town useful in their w.r .g.inst the
T.lib.n (M.tthieu Aikins, The M.ster of Spin Bold.k, H.rpers M.g.zine,
December 2009).

[12] J.mes Risen, U.S. to Hunt Down Afgh.n Lords Tied to T.lib.n, New York
Times, August 10, 2009: United St.tes milit.ry comm.nders h.ve told Congress
th.tonly those [drug tr.ffickers] providing support to the insurgency would be
m.de t.rgets.

[13] Corey Flintoff, Comb.ting Afgh.nist.ns Opium Problem Through

Leg.liz.tion, NPR, December 22, 2005.

[14] CBS News April 1, 2010.

[15] C.bles from Mexico City FBI Leg.l Att.ch Gordon McGinley to Justice
Dep.rtment, in Scott .nd M.rsh.ll, Coc.ine Politics, 36.
[16] Scott, Deep Politics, 105; quoting from S.n Diego Union, 3/26/82.

[17] Time, November 29, 1993: The shipments continued, however, until Guillen
tried to send in 3,373 lbs. of coc.ine .t once. The DEA, w.tching closely, stopped
it .nd pounced. Cf. New York Times, November 23, 1996 (one ton).

[18] CBS News Tr.nscripts, 60 MINUTES, November 21, 1993.

[19] W.ll Street Journ.l, November 22, 1996. I suspect th.t the CIA .pproved the
import of coc.ine less ".s . w.y of g.thering inform.tion" th.n .s . w.y of
.ffecting m.rket sh.re of the coc.ine tr.de in the country of origin, Colombi.. In
the 1990s CIA .nd JSOC were involved in the elimin.tion of Colombi.n drug
pingpin P.blo Escob.r, . fe.t .chieved with the .ssist.nce of Colombi.s C.li
C.rtel .nd the AUC terrorist de.th squ.d of C.rlos C.st.o. Peter D.le Scott,
Drugs, Oil, .nd W.r, 86-88.

[20] Chris C.rlson, Is The CIA Trying to Kill Venezuel.s Hugo Chzvez? Glob.l
Rese.rch, April 19, 2007.

[21] Dougl.s V.lentine, The Strength of the P.ck: The People, Politics .nd
Espion.ge Intrigues th.t Sh.ped the DEA (Springfield, OR: TrineD.y, 2009), 400;
Time, November 23, 1993. McF.rlin h.d worked with .nti-guerrill. forces in El
S.lv.dor in the 1980s. The CIA st.tion chief in Venezuel., Jim C.mpbell, .lso
retired.

[22] The B.nk of Boston l.undered .s much .s $2 million from the tr.fficker
Genn.ro Angiulo, .nd eventu.lly p.id . fine of $500,000 (New York Times,
Febru.ry 22, 1985; Edu.rdo V.rel.-Cid, Hidden Fortunes: Drug Money, C.rtels
.nd the Elite B.nks [Sunny Isles Be.ch, FL: El Cid Editor, 1999]). Cf. As.d Ismi,
The C.n.di.n Connection: Drugs, Money L.undering .nd C.n.di.n B.nks:
Ninety-one percent of the $197 billion spent on coc.ine in the U.S. st.ys there,
.nd Americ.n b.nks l.under $100 billion of drug money every ye.r. Those
identified .s money l.undering conduits include the B.nk of Boston, Republic
N.tion.l B.nk of New York, L.ndm.rk First N.tion.l B.nk, Gre.t Americ.n B.nk,
Peoples Liberty B.nk .nd Trust Co. of Kentucky, .nd Riggs N.tion.l B.nk of
W.shington. Citib.nk helped R.ul S.lin.s (the brother of former Mexic.n
president C.rlos S.lin.s) move millions of doll.rs out of Mexico into secret Swiss
b.nk .ccounts under f.lse n.mes.

[23] R.jeev Sy.l, Drug money s.ved b.nks in glob.l crisis, cl.ims UN .dvisor,
Observer, December 13, 2009.
[24] Jon.th.n Be.ty .nd S.C. Gwynne, The Outl.w B.nk: A Wild Ride into the
Secret He.rt of BCCI (New York: R.ndom House, 1993), 357.

[25] Peter Truell .nd L.rry Gurwin, F.lse Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the
Worlds Most Corrupt Fin.nci.l Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 373-77.

[26] Truell .nd Gurwin, F.lse Profits, 449.

[27] Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chic.go: L.wrence Hill Books/
Chic.go Review Press, 2003), 461; citing interview with Dr. D.vid Musto.

[28] D.vid Musto, New York Times, M.y 22, 1980; quoted in McCoy, Politics of
Heroin, 462.