Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.

FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and driven by Manalo to
bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck was detouch so the
driver steps on the brake as a result of which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face the south where it come from
and its rear face the north where it is going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of the
three passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of SanMiguel Tarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the case of Delos Reyes
was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery of civil damages
before the court of first instance impleading both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.

ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?

According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance in
this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where passengers demand
responsibility from a carries to enforce its contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was reinstated

Pantranco vs. Baesa

FACTS:
Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding
anniversary of the Baesa spouses
While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David
Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed
separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and
invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver.
CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid
the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence

HELD: NO.
Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant
liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be
raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages
For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who
allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the
peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it
there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger
When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have
assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching form the opposite direction
Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered

Pilippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form
of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said
funds in the current accounts of RMC with Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)
They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-
01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas
Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing complete trust
and confidence on PBC
Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are
always validated and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad :
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number -
retained by the bank
duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account
holder was left blank
After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the
duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account number
This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money
and later on filed in the RTC
RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable
CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by
not exercising the proper validation procedure-YES
2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by RMC - YES

HELD: 60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC

1. YES.
The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting
deposits should not relieve the PBC of responsibility
The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of
the account holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank
itself in its lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its
Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he
never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's
validation procedures until 7 years later
last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril
 where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, yet it
cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. In the
case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father
of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks
are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care
2. YES.
it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking
its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to
the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would
definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had
exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to
contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the
private respondent
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded

NAPOCOR vs. CA

Facts: On Nov. 4, 1967, a typhoon called Welming hit Central Luzon passing through
NAPOCORs Angat Hydro-Electric Project Dam in Bulacan. The water level had reach the danger
height of 212 meters above sea level and abruptly opened the spillway gates. This action by
NAPOCOR had an extraordinary large volume of water rushed and hit the installations and
construction works of ECI (Engineering Construction, Inc.) a contractor of NAWASA for its tunnel
in Bulacan. The negligent manner of opening the spillway gates by NAPOCOR had washed away,
lost or destroyed ECIs facilities and structures. NAPOCOR alleged that the destruction and loss
was due to force majeure.

Issue: WON NAPOCOR is liable for the destruction.

Ruling: Petition Dismissed

Ratio: NAPOCOR cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the
loss and damage even though the typhoon was an act of God. It was undoubtly negligent when it
only opened the spillway gates at the height of typhoon Welming when it knew very well that
it was safer to open it gradually. To be exempt from liability, NAPOCOR must be free from any
previous negligence.

Air France vs. Carrascoso

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from
Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over
in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white
man allegedly has a better right than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and
upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the
planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for
damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among
others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the planes pantry where
he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the planes journal the
following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded
damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first
class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because
allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note made by
the purser because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa
aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to
furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air
Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he
was already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first class
ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply
incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso,
there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public
duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of
public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Africa vs. Caltex

In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground
storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station and the fire spread and
burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly,
someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being transferred which caused the
fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory and no other explanation can be
had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo
Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction
speaks for itself) which states: where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured
person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of care.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses.
The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the
exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter
is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury complained of.

Republic vs Luzon stevedoring

Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon Stevedoring
Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current
of the Pasig after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and
consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force
majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an
obstruction to navigation.

Issue: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the
Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Held: There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as

the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in
so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not
impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen
stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it
therefore assured the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it
adopted turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages.
IN RE LAURETA
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using
contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the
case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the
Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in
fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the
Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that
Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division
on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again
addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to
another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the
Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioners Complaint
Issue:
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found
guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further
Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry
under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of
the Supreme Courts judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation
of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three
co-equal branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its
own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.

LazatinGarcia-Rueda vs. Pascasio

Facts: Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical

operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by
Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat Reyes was the
anesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, Florencio died of complications of unknown
cause, according to officials of the UST Hospital. Leonila requested that the NBI perform an
autopsy on her husbands body. The NBI found that he had died because of lack of care by the
attending physician in administering anesthesia. They recommended that Dr. Antonioand Dr.
Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City
Prosecutor. A series of nine prosecutors tossed the responsibility of conducting a preliminary
investigation to each other with contradictory recommendations (they played ping pong with
the case).Frustrated, Leonila led graft charges specically for violation of Section 3(e)of Republic
Act No. 3019 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor
of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman. On July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. Petitioner faults the
Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to nd that there exists probable
cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. In ne, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to
review the recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the
same.

Issue:1. W/N the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing tond that there
exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of RA 3019.

Held: No. The powers and functions of the Ombudsman are: investigatory powers, prosecutory
power, public assistance function, authority to inquire and obtain information, and function to
adopt, institute and implement preventive measures. As protector of the people, the Office of
the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints led in any
form or manner against public officials and to investigate any act or omission of any public
officials when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, and improper or in efficient.

Ramos v ca

FACTS:

June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on an
operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she was fit
for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee
of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after
the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a
good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was held
by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the
Capitol Medical Center together with her husband went down with her to the operating
room.
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.
 Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda
becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.
When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken
to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm
incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then comatosed.
She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five
minutes.
She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage"
Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totalling
to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral
damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest
ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages

HELD: YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the
following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation plus a
monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or
miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages, 3) P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4)
P100,000 exemplary damages and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.

The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law
since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a
matter of law, permit a given inference.
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence - applicable in this
case
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon
which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment
As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient
according to witness Herminda
With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled
operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the
subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized
authorities on the subject or by practical experience.
 Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate
was not accepted as expert opinion
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols
Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as
Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his
patient
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the
control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages
in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of
such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home
without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be
reasonable.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would
normally undergo through the years.
Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a
comatose state for over fourteen years now
Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral
injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages
would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby
awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that
attorney's fees valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.

Dr rubi v sps soliman

FACTS:
OnJuly 7, 1993, respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the
mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC).Results showed that
Angelica was suffering fromosteosarcoma,osteoblastic type,a high-grade (highly malignant)
cancer of the bone which usually afflicts teenage children.Following this diagnosis and as primary
intervention, Angelicas right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the
tumor.As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimize the
chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading to other parts of the patients
body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo.Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to
another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.

OnAugust 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC.However, she died onSeptember 1, 1993,
just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration of the first cycle of the
chemotherapy regimen.Because SLMC refused to release a death certificate without full
payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of Angelica to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory atCampCramefor post-mortem examination.The Medico-
Legal Report issued by said institution indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock
secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation."

OnFebruary 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suitagainst petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr.
Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and
disregard of Angelicas safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of the
chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the
symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which
bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely demise.

On her part, Dr. Balmaceda declared that it is the physicians duty to inform and explain to the
patient or his relatives every known side effect of the procedure or therapeutic agents to be
administered, before securing the consent of the patient or his relatives to such procedure or
therapy.The physician thus bases his assurance to the patient on his personal assessment of the
patients condition and his knowledge of the general effects of the agents or procedure that will
be allowed on the patient.Dr. Balmaceda stressed that the patient or relatives must be informed
of all known side effects based on studies and observations, even if such will aggravate the
patients condition.

In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she
observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient died.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects to
the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence
of finding that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment

HELD: No

CIVIL LAW: Torts and Damages, Medical Negligence

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he
failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the
failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented
to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed
consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the
treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.

Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks
inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas
parents.Respondents could not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and
amputation of Angelicas lower extremity, that her immune system was already weak on account
of the malignant tumor in her knee. When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of
the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells,
decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is
reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that
the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the
procedure.In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patients reaction to the
chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the
physician.That deathcanpossibly result from complications of the treatment or the underlying
cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk
that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures,butsuch conclusion can
be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.

As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the
variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening
illness.On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents claim that petitioner told
them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner
who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of
chemotherapys success rate.Besides, informed consent laws in other countries generally require
only a reasonable explanation of potential harms, so specific disclosures such as statistical data,
may not be legally necessary.

The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot
thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances.Further, in a medical
malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the duty
and the breach of that duty through expert testimony.Such expert testimony must show the
customary standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.

PETITION DENIED.

Custodio et al vs Court of Appeals

Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio
and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to Mabasas house passes
through the properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around their
property. This effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios
and the Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with damages. Mabasa claims that he
lost tenants because of the blockade done by the families in front. The trial court ruled in favor of
Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent easement and
right of way and for Mabasa to pay just compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling
by awarding damages in favor of Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary
damages: P10k).
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.
HELD: No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left
because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was well
within his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement agreement,
either by contract or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build
the fence. It was only after the judgment in the trial court that the easement was created which
was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the just compensation. Santos did not commit
a legal injury against Mabasa when he built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as
basis for the award of damages. In this case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Valenzuela V. CA (1996)

FACTS:

June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the
direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked
along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and seeked help
She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was
suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she
slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground
She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was
replaced with an artificial one.
Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)]
RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and severally liable for damages
pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the
stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24,
1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August,
1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty
salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as
reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's employer
Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the
scene of the accident: Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk
and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)

SSUE:

1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO

2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO

3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO

If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could have
avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper
time and distance
it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a
collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both cars,
since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming
car was also on its right lane going to Cubao

2. NO.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection
emergency rule
an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone
or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help
her
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether
she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed
she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona
Car

3. YES.

Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the
servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of
its employee during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.
situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because
he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Paraaque was a bare allegation
which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he
really came from his officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and
his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss
sales and other work related strategies.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li

4. YES.

As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts discretion, we are of the opinion
that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the
extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a
result of Lis grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of
the accident.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body
would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and
adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy.
All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.