Torts and Damages Cases October 22, 2020

Layugan v. IAC, 1988

Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo
Isidro,
alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the
Plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was
parked
along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck,
driven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result,
plaintiff
was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more
expenses
as he recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was
amputated and
that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime
income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and
Serrano
[driver] averred that he knows his responsibilities as a driver and
further
contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was the
proximate cause
of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a
manner
which occupied a part of the highway and he did not even put a
warning
sign.
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant
against his
insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-
party
plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff,
claimed that
the third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the former for
contribution,
indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their insurance contract
which covers
the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily injuries
and
damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is only
liable for
the amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature
since no
claim was made to it.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the

decision,
stating that it is the petitioners who were negligent since they did
not exercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck is park
on the
shoulder of the highway.

Issue:

WHETHER THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN APPLYING

THE DOCTRINE OF "RES IPSA LOQUITUR" WITH PROPER JURIS- PRUDENTIAL (sic) BASIS.

Ruling:

The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It

was
proven that the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4
meters from
their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of
this
warning sings was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver,
and further
stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the
brake
pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning signs, the
truck
recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro
bumped the
truck of petitioner.

This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management
of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 33 Or as Black's
Law
Dictionary 34 puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby
negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident
happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that
thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of
alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 133, 155.
Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of
negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an
agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of defendant, and
that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.

r. 43 Finally, once the actual

cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the
defendant, no
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the
circumstances have
been so completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be
made,
whatever the source of the evidence, 44 as in this case.

The SC held that the doctrine

of res ipsa loquitur, used as a defense here, need not be
applied since there was direct evidence to prove the
negligence of the driver of the oncoming truck.
Doctrine: It has generally been held that the presumption
of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of,
or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies
or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence
which is the cause of the injury complained of or where
there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the
accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on
the occurrence clearly appear.
Notes: That the rule was invoked as a defense is strange,
since it is usually used to establish negligence.

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is clear
that the
driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle
before he took it
on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right
was cut, and
could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our
mind, the fact
that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the
driver was
licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent
court, are not
sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts
established at
the trial 47 The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have
conducted a
thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the
circumstances
obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father
of a family in
the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his
driver to the
petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was
observed by Isidro
in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance
by Isidro of
the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be
directly in
charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is
paucity of
proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his
driver, Daniel
Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe
operation of his 9
truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as
employer treated in
Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Ramos v. CA, 1999

Action for damages- petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA
FACTS:
 June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust
woman
underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed
after
being tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation
performed
by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00,
which
was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid
after
the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will
get a
good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's
hand
was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of
the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center together with her
husband went down with her to the operating room.
 Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.
 Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw
the
nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
 She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something
is
wrong.
 When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position
and at 3
p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she
stayed for
a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was
since
then comatosed.
 She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in
her
brain for four to five minutes.
 She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage"
 Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
 Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra.
Perfecta Gutierrez5
 RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly
expenses
totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees,
P800,000
moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
 CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of
P93,542.25
plus interest
ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages
HELD: YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily
against private
respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed
as of
the date of promulgation plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up
to the
time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives;
2)
P2,000,000 moral damages, 3) P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4)
P100,000 exemplary damages and P100,000 attorney's fees; and,
5) the
costs of the suit.
 The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases
presents a
question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a
certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a
given
inference.
 doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the
proof of negligence - applicable in this case
 doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit
against a
physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment
 As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to
properly
intubate the patient according to witness Herminda
 With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with
her
testimony
 Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an
hour
before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of
exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility
 Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired
special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to
testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject
or by
practical experience.6
 Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen
deprivation which
led to anoxic encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug
reaction
to the short-acting barbiturate was not accepted as expert opinion
 Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the
proper
authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper
anesthesia protocols
 Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different
hospital at the
same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three
hours
late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no
time to
confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
This
indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his
patient
 private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending
and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not,
technically
employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all
responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the
hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of
an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of
wages.
 Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered
by
him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as
actual or
compensatory damages.
 temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual
or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct
phases.
 They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide
substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for
anything
less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an
award of
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be
reasonable.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting,
it
would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the
physiologic
changes which her body would normally undergo through the years.
 Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred.
She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now.

In the action for damages, the SC

held that the damage sustained presents a case for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Brain damage does not
normally occur in a gall bladder operation in the absence of
negligence. The anesthesia was under the exclusive control
of the doctors. The patient was unconscious, incapable of
contributory negligence. The presumption of negligence
arose, and remained unrebutted.
Doctrine: The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does
not normally happen absent any negligence in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of an
endotracheal tube. The instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal
tube, were all under the exclusive control of Dr. Gutierrez
and Dr. Hosaka. Thus the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can
be applied in this case. Res ipsa could apply in medical
cases. In cases where it applies, expert testimony can be
dispensed with.
Notes: Expert testimony may be dispensed with when res
ipsa loquitur applies. There were proof of negligence in this
case. Nonetheless, the doctrine was still applied.
Tan v. JAM Transit, 2009
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she was the owner of a
passenger
type jitney with plate number DKF-168.On March 14, 1997, at
around 5:00
a.m., the said jitney figured in an accident at an intersection along
Maharlika
Highway, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a
JAM
Transit passenger bus bound for Manila, bearing plate number DVG-
557 and
body number 8030.The bus was driven by Eddie Dimayuga
(Dimayuga).At
the time of the collision, Tans jitney was loaded with quail eggs and
duck
eggs (balot and salted eggs).It was driven by Alexander M. Ramirez
(Ramirez).Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent,
imprudent,
and not observing traffic rules and regulations, causing the bus to
collide
with the jitney which was then, with care and proper light direction
signals,
about to negotiate a left turn towards the feeder or barangay road
of
Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna going to the Poblacion.The
jeepney
turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of eggs
was
destroyed.Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized,
incurring
expenses for medical treatment at thePagamutang Pangmasain Bay,
Laguna.Tan prayed for damages in the amount of P400,000.00 for
the
damaged jitney,P142,210.00 for the destroyed
shipment,P20,000.00 for
moral damages, attorneys fees of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per
court
appearance of counsel, and other reliefs warranted under the
premises.In its
Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc. (JAM)
admitted
ownership of the subject passenger bus and that Dimayuga was
under its
employ.However, it denied the allegations in the Complaint, and
claimed
that the accident occurred due to the gross negligence of
Ramirez.As
counterclaim, JAM sought payment of P100,000.00 for the damages
sustained by the bus,P100,000.00 for loss of income, and
P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees plusP3,000.00 per court appearance of counsel. The
RTC
ruled in favor of Tan and the CA ruled in favor of JAM Transit,There
was no
evidence as to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent
in
connection with the vehicular accident.The CA held that the doctrine
of res
ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct evidence is nonexistent
or not
accessible.
Issue:Whether direct evidence is needed to prove the omission or
negligence of Jam Transit.
Held:No,Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the JAM
passenger bus was overtaking the vehicles running along the right
lane of 9
the highway from the left lane, the available evidence readily points
to such
fact.There were two continuous yellow lines at the center of the
highway,
which meant that no vehicle in the said area should overtake
another on
either side of the road.The double yellow center lines regulation,
which this
Court takes judicial notice of as an internationally recognized
pavement
regulation, was precisely intended to avoid accidents along
highways, such
as what happened in this case.This prohibition finds support in
Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), Section
41(e).Furthermore, it is observed that the area of collision was an
intersection.Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 4136, likewise, prohibits
overtaking or
passing any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any
intersection of highways, among others.Thus, by overtaking on the
left lane,
Dimayuga was not only violating the double yellow center lines
regulation,
but also the prohibition on overtaking at highway
intersections.Consequently,
negligence can be attributed only to him, which negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by petitioner.This prima
facie finding
of negligence was not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by
Dimayuga.
Therefore, a finding that he is liable for damages to petitioner is
warranted.Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or
injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer
failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the section (culpa in
eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando)of its employees.To
avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer
must
overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and
supervision of his employee.To warrant an award of actual or
compensatory
damages for repair to damage sustained, the best evidence should
be the
receipts or other documentary proofs of the actual amount
expended.However, considering that it was duly proven that the
jitney was
damaged and had to be repaired, as it was repaired, and that the
cargo of
eggs was indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts expended or
lost were
not proven, we deem it appropriate to award P250,000.00 by way
of
temperate damages.Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,temperate
damages
may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount
cannot be proved with certainty. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED.
SC held the bus driver was negligent
for overtaking when there were double yellow center lines
on the road, which means overtaking is prohibited. Res ipsa
loquitur was held applicable, since the incident could not
have happened in the absence of negligence, the bus was
under the control of the driver, and the jitney driver was not
contributorily negligent.
Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law
and does not constitute an independent or separate ground
for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary, a
mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it
furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the
burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.
Notes: While the SC stated that the doctrine was
applicable, it still examined the evidence proving the
negligence of the bus driver. This means that the doctrine
was not necessary in resolving the case.

Cantre v. Go, 2007

Petition for review on certiorari
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in obstetrics
and
gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado memorial Hospital. She was
the attending
physician of respondent Nora Go, who was admitted at the said
hospital on
April 19, 1992. At 1:30am of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her
fourth
child, a baby boy. However, at around 3:30am Nora suffered
profuse bleeding
insider her womb due to some parts of the placenta were not
completely
expelled from her womb after delivery consequently, Nora suffered
hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure to
40/0.
Petitioner said the assisting resident physician performed various
medical
procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora’s blood
pressure. Her
blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a
sphygmamometer.
While petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and
stop
bleeding, she ordered a drop light to warm Nora and her baby. Nora
remained
unconscious until she recovered. While in the recovery room, her
husband,
respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gasping wound 2 1/2″
x 3 1/2″
in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He asked
the nurses
what caused the injury. He was informed, it was a burn. An
investigation was
filed by Nora’s husband and found out from the petitioner that it
was caused
by the blood pressure cuff, however, this was contrary to the
findings from a
medico-legal report which stated that it was indeed a burn and that
a drop
light when placed near a skin for about 10mins could cause such
burn. Nora
was referred to a plastic surgeon from the hospital and skin grafting
was done
on her and scar revision but both still left a mark on Nora’s arm
compelling
the respondent spouse to file a complaint for damages against
petitioner.
The RTC ruled in favor of herein respondent, which the CA affirmed
with modification.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the injury referred by
Nora.
Held: Yes. The Hippocratic oath mandates physicians to give
primordial
consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to
live up to
his precept, he is accountable for his acts. This is notwithstanding,
courts face
a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because
physicians
are not guardians of care and they never set out to intentionally
cause injury
to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases
because
where negligence exist and is proven, it automatically gives the
injured a right
to reparation for the damage caused.
In cases, involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor
allows
the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of
negligence on the 11
part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury,
provided
that the following requisites concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence
of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the
defendant or defendants;
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.
All of these three requisites were present in the case at bar.
Under the the captain of the ship doctrine, the surgeon in charge of
the
operation is liable for the negligence of his assistants during the
time when
those are under the surgeons control.
Batiquin v. CA, 1996
The petitioners appeal from the decision5 of the Court of Appeals of 11 May 1994 in CA-G.R.
CV No.
30851, which reversed the decision6 of 21 December 1990 of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC)
of Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 9492.
Facts:
Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the
latter's
private patient sometime before September 21, 1988. In the
morning of
September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and
nurses,
performed a caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully
delivered
the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to
suffer
abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also
gradually lost her
appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who
prescribed
for her certain medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring.
She
then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho
suggested that
Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery. When Dr. Kho opened the
abdomen
of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an
ovarian cyst on
each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus
behind the
uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the
uterus,
embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be
a part of
a rubber glove. This was the cause of all of the infection of the
ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The
piece of
rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho
testified that
she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from
Dr. Kho's
testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber is a
Medical
Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's
Record, and
a Physician's Discharge Summary.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable
Held:
Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of
negligence. The rule, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a
particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the
requirement
of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely
determines
and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the
burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The
doctrine 13
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are
present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were
under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private
respondents were
bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause
of the
foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body,
which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of
negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, private
respondent
Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the
offending
piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that
such could
only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by
Dr.
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption
of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Dr.
Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of
rubber in
private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects
thereof.
The court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical
profession
plays in the lives of the people and State's compelling interest to
enact
measures to protect the public from "the potentially deadly effects
of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma. Indeed, a physician is bound to
serve the
interest of his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them
always his
best talent and skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner
endangered
the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid
ethical code
and in contravention of the legal standards set forth for
professionals, in the
general and members of the medical profession, in particular.
Professional Services v. Agana, 2007
Assailed in these three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari is the Court of
Appeals’
Decision2 dated September 6, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198
affirming with
modification the Decision3 dated March 17, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
96, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-43322 and nullifying its Order dated September 21, 1993.
FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of
bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to
be suffering
from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection
surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left
ovary, he
obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr.
Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes
showed
his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he
allowed
Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to
complete the
procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the
Record of
Operation: “sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done
but to no avail continue for closure” (two pieces of gauze were missing).
A “diligent search” was conducted but they could not be found. Dr.
Ampil
then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region,
but
the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the
surgery. Dr.
Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the
cancerous
nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months
of
consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she
was free of
cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of
gauze (1.5
in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted
this, assuring
Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened,
so she
sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze
was found
in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of
Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter
are liable
for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body,
and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique
Agana also
filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice
against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case
against Dr.
Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the
outcome of the
cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found
PSI15
and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC
dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case
against Fuentes.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and
malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY

RULING:
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE16
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas’
does
not convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this
doctrine does
not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur
1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of
the defendant [DR. FUENTES] — LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS
WITH DR. AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would
not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper
care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person
in
complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected
with the
operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the
following:
 He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
 He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
 He ordered the closure of the incision

College Assurance v. Belfranlt, 2007

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Belfranlt Development, Inc. (respondent) is the owner of Belfranlt Building in Angeles City,
Pampanga. It
leased to petitioners College Assurance Plan Phil., Inc. (CAP) and Comprehensive Annuity
Plans and
Pension Corporation (CAPP) several units on the second and third floors of the building. 3
On October 8, 1994, fire destroyed portions of the building, including the third floor units
being
occupied by petitioners. An October 20, 1994 field investigation report by an unnamed arson
investigator assigned to the case disclosed:
0.5 Origin of Fire: Store room occupied by CAP, located at the 3rd floor of the bldg.
0.6 Cause of Fire: Accidental (overheated coffee percolator). 4

Citing the foregoing findings, respondent sent petitioners on November 3, 1994 a notice to
vacate the
leased premises to make way for repairs, and to pay reparation estimated at P1.5 million.
After its third demand10went unheeded, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint against
petitioners
for damages. The RTC rendered a Decision dated April 14, 1999, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
[respondent] and against the herein defendants [petitioners].
Petitioners appealed to the CA which, in its February 28, 2002 Decision, modified the RTC
Decision, but still ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the principle of res ipsa loquitor applies in this case
Ruling:
The defense that the fire was a fortuitous event is untenable. It is undisputed that the fire
originated from appellants' stockroom located on the third floor leased premises. Said
stockroom was under the control of appellants which, on that fateful day (a Saturday),
conducted a seminar in the training room which was adjoining the stockroom. Absent an
explanation from appellants on the cause of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies.22
Even without the testimony of Fireman Sitchon and the documents he prepared, the finding
of the RTC
and CA on the negligence of petitioners cannot be overturned by petitioners' bare denial.
The CA
correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert testimony may be
dispensed
with35 to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the accident
is of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of the injury was
under the
exclusive control of the person in charge and c) the injury suffered must not have been due
to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 36 The fire that damaged
Belfranlt
Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a human act or
omission. It
originated in the store room which petitioners had possession and control of. Respondent
had no hand
in the incident. Hence, the convergence of these facts and circumstances speaks for itself:
petitioners
alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to ascertain it, and
respondent
having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely allege that the
cause of the
fire was the negligence of the former and to rely on the occurrence of the fire as proof of
such
negligence.37 It was all up to petitioners to dispel such inference of negligence, but their bare
denial only
left the matter unanswered.

The SC held that even without

such report, res ipsa loquitur may be applied. The fire was
not an spontaneous occurrence. It originated from the store
room, in the possession and control of College Assurance.
Belfranlt Development had no hand in the incident, and it
has no means to find out for itself the cause of the fire.
Doctrine: When the doctrine applies, it may dispense with
the expert testimony to sustain an allegation of negligence.
The inference of negligence is not dispelled by mere denial.
Notes: The case illustrates clearly the element of control in
the requisites for the application of the doctrine. Also, only
College Assurance has the knowledge of, or at least it had
the best opportunity to ascertain, the cause of the fire.

Bernardo v. Legaspi, 1914

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
dismissing the
complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by
plaintiff's
automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in causing a collision between his
automobile and that
of plaintiff. The court in its judgment also dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the
defendant, praying for
damages against the plaintiff on the ground that the injuries sustained by the defendant's
automobile in
the collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's machine, were caused by the
negligence of the
plaintiff in handling his automobile.
The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent
in handling
their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of
both as to
prevent either from recovering.1awphil.net
Upon the facts, as they appear of record, the judgment must be affirmed, as the evidence
clearly
supports the decision of the trial court. The law applicable to the facts also requires an
affirmance of the
judgment appealed from. Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness
contributes
to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes
thereof, he cannot
recover. This is equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by their negligent acts,
contributed
to the determining cause of the accident, neither can recover.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.itc-alf

Doctrine: Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his

own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence,
that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes
thereof, he cannot recover.

PLDT v. CA, 1989

FACTS:
A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open
trench,
the excavation was due to the installation of an underground
conduit system
by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover and any warning
signs. As a
result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and
their vehicle
was also damaged.
PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents
own
negligence. Also, it alleges that L.R. Barte and company acting as
an
independent contractor, should be responsible for the excavation
was
performed by them. As for Barte, they alleged that they have
complied with
the due standards in performing their work, and that it was not
aware of the
accident involving the Estebans.
The Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were
negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim
for
damages. Upon respondent’s second motion to reconsideration, CA
reversed
its decision, following he decision of Trial Court and held PLDT liable
for
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PLDT is liable.
HELD:
NO. We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its
original
decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due
to the lack
of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable
to negligent
omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented
the
accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the
public of
the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents
already knew
of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of
knowledge of these
excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the
excavation
but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside
lane towards
the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to
perform a
duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said
omitted act
would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private
respondents cannot
charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise
due and
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm
and necessity
that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own
protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance
or 21
opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence
he imputes
to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on
that street
almost every day and had knowledge of the presence and location
of the
excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his
wife to
danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his
imprudence.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the
burden
of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative
thereof. The
facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause
of action
has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the
same if
contested, otherwise his action must fail.
The SC found
that Esteban was negligent, since he did not exercise
reasonable care and prudence, when he already knew of the
perils of the road. Also, there was insufficient evidence
proving the negligence of PLDT. Esteban cannot recover.
Doctrine: Negligence, which is not only contributory to
the injury but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
accident, as one of its determining factors, precludes the
right to recover damages.
Notes: The presence of warning signs could not have
prevented the accident. The proximate cause would still be
the sudden swerving of the jeep. If the injury could have
been prevented by the warning signs, failure place them
may be the proximate cause.

Manila Electric v. Remoquillo, 1956

FACTS:
Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking
“media agua,” (downspout). He climbed up to the media agua which
was just
below the 3rd floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized
iron sheet
through the said window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he
turned around
and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact
with an
electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5
ft parallel
to the edge of the media agua, electrocuting him and killing him.
His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the
company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. The
Company appealed
to the CA, which affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the
Company
now seeks to appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance
of
its wires was the proximate cause of the death.
HELD:
No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it
set the
stage for the cause of the injury to occur).
A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives
rise to the
occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis
of an
action if a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the
injury
intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence
or as
lacking in due diligence. To us it is clear that the principal and
proximate cause
of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote
cause, but
rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around
and swinging
the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as
looking back
toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron
sheet,
considering the latter's length of 6 feet.
The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or
negligent act of
Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the
media
agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that
due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a
tinsmith or
carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. So, he
could not 23
have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger
lurking in them.
But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience
failed him,
and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron sheet
with both
hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing
all
prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging
his arms
with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.

Rakes v, Atlantic Gulf, GR L-1719, January 23, 1907

This is an action for damages.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbor to
the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that
but one
hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that
there were
two immediately following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise
seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails
lay upon
two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces
or guards
to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the
plaintiff,
the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According
to that
defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a
certain
spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the
car
either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff,
breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to
what
extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In
two
particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued
his work;
and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car
instead
of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work
after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to
constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe
American rule.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they
not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman
to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the
workmen testify
that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all
the gang
against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that
he 25
repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of
the
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
made known
to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing
himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although
not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those
acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing
under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it.
this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the
sinking
of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the
liability of an
employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a
criminal
action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative
primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding
having been
taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of
an
employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not
adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine
known
as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the
injury was
incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured,
is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
The SC found that while he may not be
aware of the defects in the rail, his disobedience, which
placed him in danger, contributed to some degree to the
injury "as a proximate, although not as its primary cause."
He is thus entitled only to half the amount of damages.
Doctrine: Where the claimant contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence.
Notes: The court surveyed the common law rule of
contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery. The
reason for such rule is because of the difficulty in
measuring negligence and the extent to which it cause the
injury. The court, however, refused to apply it, ruling
instead that contributory negligence only reduces the
amount recoverable, a rule now in the Civil Code. The rule
was applied to actual damages in this case. Whether it may
be applied to other kinds of damages is not settled.

NPC v. Heirs of Casionan, 2008

This is a review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which found the
National
Power Corporation (NPC) liable for damages for the death of Noble Casionan due to
electrocution from
the company's high tension transmission lines.
FACTS
In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines
of 69
kilovolts traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Eventually,
some lines
sagged, thereby reducing their distance from the ground to only
about 8-10
ft. This posed as a threat to passersby who were exposed to the
danger of
electrocution. As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon
made verbal
and written requests for NPC to institute safety measures to protect
trail users
from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr. Banayot, NPC Area
Manager,
informed the Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9 additional poles,
and they
identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve the distance from
its
deteriorating lines to the ground.
19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995,
Noble and
his co-pocket miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2
bamboo
poles, and they carried one pole horizontally on their shoulder, with
Noble
carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead as they passed
through the trail
underneath the NPC high-tension lines on their way to their work
place. As
Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the
bamboo pole
that he was carrying touched one of the dangling high-tension
wires. Melchor
narrated that he heard a buzzing sound for only about a second or
two, then
he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook
him, but
Noble was already dead.
A post-mortem examination by the municipal health officer
determined
the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular
fibulation,
secondary to electrocution. There was a small burned area in the
middle right
finger of Noble.
Police investigators who visited the site confirmed that portions of
the
wires above the trail hung very low. They noted that people usually
used the
trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires, and that the
trail was the
only viable way since the other side was a precipice. They did not
see any
danger warning signs installed. After the GM of NPC was informed of
the
incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and put up warning signs
around the
area.
Noble’s parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied
being
negligent in maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that signs
were27
installed but they were stolen by children, and that excavations
were made to
increase the clearance from the ground but some poles sank due to
pocket
mining in the area. NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death
could not
have been electrocution since Noble did not suffer extensive burns.
NPC
argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own
negligence.
RTC decided in favor of Noble’s parents. RTC observed that NPC
witnesses
were biased because all but one were employees of NPC, and they
were not
actually present at the time of the accident. RTC found NPC
negligent since
the company has not acted upon the requests and demands made
by the
community leaders since 1991. CA affirmed RTC with modification–
award of
moral damages was reduced from 100k to 50k, and award of
attorney fees
was disallowed since the reason for the award was not expressly
stated in the
decision.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Noble. NO;
hence,
NPC is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
RATIO
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest
of
another, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his
own protection. There is contributory negligence when the party’s act
showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him
harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want
of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with
the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate causeof the injury.
The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for
his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. NCC 2179 provides
that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the injured party’s
contributory negligence.
Precedents + [non-]application to the case at hand
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an
act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an
impending
danger to health and body. In this case, there were no warning signs,
and28
the trail was regularly used by people since it was the only viable
way from
Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited
by DENR
in the area. In Añonuevo v. CA, the Court held that the violation of a
statute
is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause
of the
injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was
intended
to be prevented by the statute. The fact that pocket miners were
unlicensed was not a justification for NPC to leave their transmission
lines dangling.
Damages awarded
 Noble’s unearned income of 720k [loss of earning capacity formula: Net
Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross
annual income
– reasonable and necessary living expenses)]
 Exemplary damages of 50k [since there is gross negligence]
 Moral damages of 50k
 Negligence-is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury..
Contributory negligence- is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below
the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.
There
is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of
ordinary care
and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in
danger.
It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of
the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s
negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who
is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to
recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. If
indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim,
then it
is proper to reduce the award for damages.
Genobiagon v. CA, 1989
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. No. 09949-CR, dated
October 10,
1974, affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless
imprudence.
SUMMARY: An old lady was crossing a street at a
Cebu market when two rigs two meters apart were
approaching from a steep downgrade of the road.
Genobiagon’s rig (the one behind) was going fast
and was trying to overtake the one ahead, his rig
bumped the old woman, who consequently fell on
the road and died three hours later. Asked why he
bumped the old woman he answered, 'it was the
old woman that bumped him.' RTC and CA
convicted him of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Petitioner contends that the reckless
negligence of the victim was the proximate cause
of the accident which led to her death. SC held that
the doctrine of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases.
DOCTRINE: The alleged contributory negligence of
the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused.
"The defense of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence
of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence.”
ACT/OMISSION: Bumping an 80-year-old woman
INJURY: Old woman falling at the middle of the
road and dying hour later
NEGLIGENCE: Speeding and overtaking. No
contributory negligence on part of old woman.
CAUSATION: Reckless imprudence of Genobiagon
was the proximate cause.
SUMMARY:
● Rig driven by Gregorio Genobiagon bumped an 80-year-old
woman who
was crossing a street at a market in Cebu.30
○ The rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old
woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her,
but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of
the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying
to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the
old woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road.
○ He continued to drive on, but by-stander Mangyao who saw the
incident shouted at the him to stop. He ran after Genobiagon when
he refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him
why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the
old woman that bumped him.'
○ Appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck
by his rig. The old woman was unconscious, and was then loaded
in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours
later.
● RTC and CA convicted him of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
ISSUE/RATIO: WON the doctrine of contributory negligence may
apply in criminal cases. - NO
● Petitioner contends that the CA erred:
○ in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the
proximate cause of the accident which led to her death;
○ in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of reasonable
doubt; and
○ in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the petitioner from
P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, although the circumstances of the
victim and the accused (petitioner) do not warrant such increase.
● The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not
exonerate the accused. "The defense of contributory negligence
does
not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence,
since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the
effects
of his own negligence.” (People vs. Orbeta, People vs. Quinones)
● Prevailing jurisprudence provides that indemnity for death in
homicide
or murder is P30,000. Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner
is
increased to P30,000.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with
modification as
to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to
P30,000.
Lambert v. Heirs of Castillon, 2005
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43734, which affirmed the
June 29, 1993
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Civil Case No. 06-2086.
Facts:
The general rule is that drivers of vehicles who bumped the rear of
another
vehicle are presumed negligent. But in this case Rey is an
exception. Also
applied here is the rule on contributory negligence where the
damages to be
awarded are mitigated.
The incident started when Rey went to his brother and borrowed the
latter’s motorcycle. He then invited his friend Rolly to roam around
the
city. Rey drove the motorcycle without a protective helmet with
Rolly as
backrider.
Around past 10 p.m. after eating supper at a restaurant and
imbibing one or
two bottles of beer, Rey and Rolly traversed the highway going back
to his
brother’s home at high speed. Upon reaching a barangay, they were
tailgating a Tamaraw jeepney owned by Nita and driven by Gardo.
When the
jeepney was approaching the side road with Rey and Rolly following
closely
behind, Gardo slightly veered to the right causing Rey to
instinctively veer to
the left. But at this moment Gardo suddenly turned sharply to the
left towards
the side of the road. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the
jeepney
throwing Rey forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the
left front
door of the jeepney even as the motorcycle shot forward and the
jeepney
veered back to the right and sped away. The incident resulted in the
instantaneous death of Rey and injuries to Rolly.
The heirs of Rey thus filed an action for damages against Nita the
jeepney
owner for the death of Rey and damages to the motorcycle. After
trial the
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rey finding
that
Nita’s driver was negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate
cause of the damages for which Nita is liable. But the court reduced
liability
by 20 percent in view of the contributory negligence of Rey.
ISSUE:32
Nita questioned this ruling. She claimed that the accident was
entirely due to
the fault of Rey since his motorcycle bumped the rear of the
jeepney and was
therefore presumed to be the cause of the accident. Was Nita
correct?
HELD:
No. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn of Gardo without first
establishing
his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which
claimed the life
of Rey and injured Rolly. Proximate cause is that which, in the
natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
The cause
of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Gardo for without
that
sudden left turn executed without precaution, the mishap in all
probability
would not have happened. Drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of
another
vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident unless
contradicted by
other evidence. In this case the said rule is contradicted by the
sudden left
turn made by Gardo which proximately caused the collision.
The trial court is likewise correct in finding Rey guilty of contributory
negligence. But the ratio of apportionment of damages must be
increased. It
was established at the time of the mishap that Rey (1) was driving
the
motorcycle at high speed; (2) was tailgating the jeepney; (3) had
imbibed one
or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.
These
circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his
demise
and injury to Rolly contributed to the same result. Considering these
circumstances, and pursuant to the ruling in the case of Rakes v.
A.G. & P, 7
Phil. 359, the heirs of Rey shall recover damages only up to 50
percent of the
award of P611,355 consisting of burial expenses, death indemnity,
moral
damages and loss of earning capacity.
Doctrine: The underlying precept on contributory negli
gence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages
actually caused by his negligence. The determination of the
mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on
the circumstances of each case.
Notes: The case cited MH Rakes v. The Atlantic as regards
the mitigation of damages without discussing the reason
behind the proportionate reduction.

PNR v. Brunty, 2006

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No.
47567 and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed
decision
affirmed with partial modification the ruling 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 20,
directing petitioner Philippine National Railways (PNR) to indemnify respondents Ethel
Brunty and Juan
Manuel M. Garcia for the death of Rhonda Brunty, and to pay actual and moral damages,
attorney’s fees
and cost of suit.
FACTS:
Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen and daughter of Ehtel Brunty,
visited
the Philippines. Before her departure, she with her Filipino host,
Juan Manuel
Garcia, went to Baguio on board a Mercedez Benz driven by
Mercelita,
around 12 midnight. On the other hand, a PNR train bound for
Tutuban,
Manila left La Union station at 11pm. At around 2am, the Benz was
approaching the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac. The car was
running at
a speed of 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle when it collided
with the
PNR train. Brunty was rushed to the hospital, but was pronounced
dead 10
minutes after arrival, while Garcia suffered severe head injuries.
A demand letter was sent to PNR which did not respond. A
complaint for
damages was filed against it. PNR argues that since there is
freedom of
control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it
is
obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to
prevent
or avoid an unwanted accident from taking place.
RTC: PNR negligent; CA: affirmed
ISSUE/S: WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies
RULING: NO. The proximate cause of the injury having been
established to
be the negligence of PNR, the doctrine finds no application in the
instant
case.
PNR was negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary
safety
device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad
track: (1.)
absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the
installed
warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area.
Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed
by PNR, it
would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad
crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from
the
Moncada side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a
cockpit
arena. A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have
difficulty in 34
knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight
curve, more
so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part
of the
PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area
This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for
damages for
its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman,
or
semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of
the
safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it
because
public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.
There was a contributory negligence on the part driver of the
Mercedez
Benz, Mercelita, as the place was not properly illuminated; one’s
view was
blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was unfamiliar with the
place, yet
he drove at 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle before arriving at
the
railroad track. However, the effect of contributory negligence on the
mitigation of liability does not apply here. Both before the lower
courts, no
damages were awarded to Mercelita and he did not appeal. There is
neither
proof as to the relationship between Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty.
he SC
found the car driver contributorily negligent, but did not
mitigate the liability of PNR to Brunty. Her relationship
with the driver was not established.
Doctrine: To hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs
of an impending danger to health and body. To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a
causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence
of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.
14 of 50B2015 Review Operations
TORT & QUASI-DELICT
Torts & Damages
Notes: Causal link between negligence and injury is
included in the definition of contributory negligence. Also,
the negligence of the driver was external to the liability of
PNR to Brunty. As such, it does not mitigate such liability.

Cadiente v. Macas, GR 161946, Nov. 14, 2008

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated September 16, 2002 and the Resolution 2
dated
December 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64103, which affirmed the
Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 23,723-95.
Facts:
Eyewitness Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, at
about 4:00
p.m., at the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in
Davao City,
15-year old high school student Bithuel Macas, herein respondent,
was
standing on the shoulder of the road. She was about two... and a
half
meters away from the respondent when he was bumped and run
over by a
Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca. Rosalinda and another
unidentified person immediately came to the respondent's rescue
and told
Cimafranca to take the victim to the hospital. Cimafranca... rushed
the
respondent to the Davao Medical Center.

Issues:
Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the
victim

Ruling:
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear
the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages
actually
caused by his negligence.17
In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the
shoulder,
which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder
was
intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or
unloading
passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass through the
said
uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much
as slowing
down, took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the
shoulder, and
recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was just where he should be
when the
unfortunate event transpired.133
Cimafranca, on the other hand, had no rightful business driving as recklessly as she did. The
respondent
cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the
cemented part of
the highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run him over. Thus, we
are unable
to accept the petitioner's contention that the respondent was negligent.

Picart v. Smith, 1918

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his
pony
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith
approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant
neared the
bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning
of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of
the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the
right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he
did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to
the other
side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left,
that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing
that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in
such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across
the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse
fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the
horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from
liability Picart
has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a
civil
obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is
here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same
situation? If not, 38
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a
given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would
constitute
the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm
as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the
actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight
of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a
given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present
case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed
in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized
that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side
of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also
negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
The SC
found the automobile driver negligent, since a prudent man
should have foreseen the risk in his course and that he had
the last fair chance to avoid the harm.
Doctrine: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
Lapanday Corp. v. Angala, 2007
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 25 July 2001 Decision2 and 11 March
2002
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51134 which affirmed in toto the RTC’s
decision.

Facts:
On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate
no. PEC-
903 driven by Apolonio Deocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a 1958
Chevy
pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala
(respondent) and driven by Bernulfo Borres (Borres). Lapanday
Agricultural... and Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the
crewcab
which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez (Mendez).
Deocampo
was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were
running along
Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards
Lanang, Davao
City. The... left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper
of the
pick-up were damaged.
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and
Attorney's Fees
against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel[4]
(Berenguel)
and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing
down to
about five to ten kilometers per hour
(kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when
it was
bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around
60 to 70
kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact.
Respondent
alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact.
Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the
speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent testified
that Borres
made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at
the
speedometer.
In its 3 March 1995 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City,
Branch 15 (trial court) ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants
LADECO
and Apolonio Deocampo to solidarily pay the plaintiffs
The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast while
following
the pick-up and that the crewcab's speed was the proximate cause
of the
accident. The trial court observed that the crewcab stopped 21
meters away
from the point of impact despite Deocampo's claim that... he
stepped on the
brakes moments after the collision. The trial court ruled that
Deocampo had
the last opportunity to avoid the accident.
The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was
not the
owner of the crewcab.
The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the trial court that
Deocampo
was negligent. The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of last
clear chance
and ruled that Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding the
pick-up.40
The Court of Appeals also sustained the solidary liability of LADECO
and
Deocampo. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Article 2180 of
the Civil
Code, the negligence of the driver is presumed to be the negligence
of the
owner of the vehicle.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this case
Ruling:
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear
chance
applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
negligent
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity... to avoid the loss
but failed
to do so is chargeable with the loss.[16] In this case, Deocampo
had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the
rear
vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position
to...
observe the vehicle in front of him.[17] Deocampo had the
responsibility of
avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.[18] A U-turn is done
at a much
slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to
running
straight... ahead.[19] Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if
he was
not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not
only
driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes
even upon
seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the... brakes after the
collision.

Lapanday's crewcab
bumped a pick-up on its rear, causing damage to said
vehicle. Upon complaint, the SC held that both vehicles
were at fault: the crewcab was speeding and the pick-up
was on the wrong lane when it tried to make a U-turn. Both
being negligent, the doctrine applies. The crewcab, which
was the rear vehicle, had the last clear chance of avoiding
the collision.
Doctrine: The doctrine of last clear chance states that
where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.

Hidalgo v. Balandan, 91 Phil 488

This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc.
to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife, damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their
son Mario
Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice-plant factory in
San Pablo,
Laguna. In the factory, there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft
deep, for
cooling purposes of its engine. There was no fence or top cover; the
edges of
the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.
The factory
itself was surrounded with a fence. However, the wide gate
entrance was
continually open, and anyone could easily enter the factory. There
was no
guard assigned on the gate.
Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3
years old,
was playing with other boys his age when he entered the factory
premises
through the gate. Mario Balandan then took a bath in one of the
tanks of water
and, later on, sank to the bottom of the tank. He died of “asphyxia
secondary
to drowning.” The CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo Enterprises
maintained an
attractive nuisance and neglected to adopt the necessary
precautions to avoid
accident to person entering its premises.
Issue: Whether or not a water tank is an attractive nuisance.
Held: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks are not classified as
attractive
nuisance. Other issues such as whether it exercised reasonable
precautions,
and if the parents were guilty of contributory negligence are
immaterial.
Appealed decision reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises is absolved from
liability.
Ratio:
One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who
fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting
thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the
child is technically a trespasser in the premises. This is the doctrine of
attractive nuisance. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the
condition
or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of
age, is so
enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
approach,
get on or use it, and this' attractiveness is an implied invitation to
such
children.
The majority of American jurisprudence posits that the doctrine of
attractive nuisance is generally not applicable to bodies of water,
whether
artificial or natural. The exception to this is if there is some unusual
condition 44
or artificial feature other than mere water and its location.
Furthermore, in
Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co., the Indiana Appellate Court
explained why
bodies of water are not considered as attractive nuisance. It ruled
that children
have been instructed early on to exercise caution around bodies of
water and
are presumed to know the danger.
Dissent of J. Pablo: Children are naturally curious and do not have
perfect
knowledge of things. They are amazed by the natural attraction of
the waters
and shall explore where their curiosity leads them unless there is
something
that prevents them. As such, petitioners should have placed fences
around
the ponds as an ordinary precaution. (Note: translated and
paraphrased from
Spanish text)

oTaylor, suprA INCOMPLETE

Plaintiff’s assumption of risk/volenti non fit injuria
Afialda v. Hisole, 1949
This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. T
Facts of the Case:
Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as
caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21,
1947, while
he was tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and
consequently
died of his injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder sister who
depended
on him for support, filed the action for damages. The complaint was
dismissed by the trial court upon granting a motion to dismiss filed
by spouses
Hisole. Subsequently, the plaintiff had taken the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when
damage is caused to the animal’s caretaker.
Ruling of the Court:
Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for
damage
caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable
only if he had
been negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. In
the case
at hand, the animal was in custody and under the control of the
caretaker,
who was paid for his work as such. Thus, it was his business to try
to prevent
the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including
himself. Being
injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the
risks of
the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take
the consequences. Deceased does not fall within the ambit of
“stranger”,
which is significant for the claim for damages under the said article.
Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come
under
Article 1905 of the Civil Code but under the labor laws, i.e. 46
Workmen’s Compensation Act. The complaint contained no
allegation as to
constitute liability under the Civil Code nor the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.
Hence, it alleges no cause of action.
The order appealed from was affirmed.
In an action based on Article 1905 against the
owner, the SC held that being injured by the animal under
his care was one of the risks of the occupation which the
caretaker voluntarily assumed and for which he must take
the consequences. It held that Article 1905 does not apply.
Doctrine: Article 1905 names the possessor or user of the
animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause,"
since he has the custody and is in a position to prevent it
from causing damage.
Notes: The caretaker voluntarily and knowingly assumed
the inherent risk when he agreed to be employed as such.

Hernandez v. COA, GR. 71871, NOv. 6, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC disbursing officer of the
Ternate Beach Project. On that unfortunate day, he encashed the
checks for
the salaries and wages of the workers. However, it took him until
afternoon
so he opted on going home for the night as it would be more
practical than
heading straight to Ternate. On his way to Marilao, he was robbed.
He tried
to chase after the robbers and caught up with one of them.
He requested to be relieved from money accountability and the
General manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority indorsed it to
the
Regional Director of COA, until it reached the COA Chairman who
denied the
request stating that Hernandez was negligent.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Hernandez was negligent.
Ruling:
No. As for Hernandez’s choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and
Ternate,
Cavite, one could easily agree that the former was the safer
destination,
being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips to
the two
places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court
feels he
should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical
at that
time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and
prudent
person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in
broad
daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the
presence of
other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of his
imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous
event
covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been
reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did.
Southeastern College v. CA, 1998
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1
promulgated
on July 31, 1996, and Resolution 2 dated September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals 3 in
CA-G.R. No.
41422, entitled "Juanita de Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et al. vs. Southeastern College, Inc.",
which affirmed but
reduced the moral damages awarded by the RTC from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. 4
The Resolution
under attack denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Private respondents are owners of a house near the petitioner’s
four-story
school building along the same road. During a typhoon, the roof of
the
petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away by strong
winds,
landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
respondents’
house. In the aftermath, an ocular inspection of the destroyed
building was
spearheaded by the city building official. In his report, he imputed
negligence
to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building and
improper
anchorage of trusses to the roof beams which caused the roof be
ripped off
the building, thereby causing damage to the property of
respondents.
Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages
based on
culpa aquiliana. Petitioner contested that it had no liability,
attributing the
damage to a fortuitous event. RTC ruled in favor of respondents
which was
affirmed by the CA. Hence present petition.’
ISSUE:
Whether or not the damage, in legal sense, can be attributed to a
fortuitous
event.
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that petitioner is not liable, the damage being
attributable
to a fortuitous event.
Art 1174 of the Civil Code states that: “Except in cases expressly specified
by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when
the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable”
To be liable for a fortuitous event, the respondent must prove that
petitioners
were negligent, with which they fall short, merely relying on the
report of the
city building official. This is the same official that have approved the
building
plans of petitioner, who made clear that there were no prior
complaints
regarding the building. Since storms are common in the country,
the part of 49
the building in question should have failed against stronger
typhoons that
preceded said storm, which it had not. Furthermore, petitioner was
able to
present evidence that regular maintenance was carried out.
Respondents also
failed to support the claim of the actual loss they suffered, merely
relying on
estimates without considering that wear and tear of respondents’
home which
may have had a contributory effect to the damage. Petition is
granted and
challenged decision is reversed.
the SC
ruled that typhoon is a fortuitous event, and that the
College was not negligent. If the roofing were not firmly
anchored, it could not have withstood previous typhoons.
Doctrine: In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a
person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the
loss may have been occasioned. When the effect is found to
be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it
be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act – the
whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from
the rules applicable to fortuitous events.
Notes: The case traced the history of fortuitous event from
Partidas. It also cited Tolentino, stating the fortuitous events
may be produced by by nature or by act of man.

Picart v. Smith, 1918

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his
pony
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith
approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant
neared the
bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning
of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of
the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the
right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he
did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to
the other
side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left,
that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing
that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in
such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across
the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse
fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the
horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from
liability Picart
has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a
civil
obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is
here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same
situation? If not, 38
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a
given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would
constitute
the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm
as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the
actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight
of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a
given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present
case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed
in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized
that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side
of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also
negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
The SC
found the automobile driver negligent, since a prudent man
should have foreseen the risk in his course and that he had
the last fair chance to avoid the harm.
Doctrine: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.

Sps. Ong v. MWD, GR L-7664, Aug. 29, 1958

FACTS:
 July 5, 1952 1:45 p.m.: For the 4th or 5th time, Dominador Ong,
a 14-
year old high school student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben
and
Eusebio, went to Metropolitan Water District's recreational
swimming
pools charging a nominal fee (P0.50 for adults; P0.20 for children)
 4:35 p.m.: Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to
the
locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke
 Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool
leaving
Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter when
he
left the pool to get a bottle of coke.
 Lifeguards Manuel Abaño (8 am - 12 nn;2 pm - 6 pm) and Mario
Villanueva (7:30-11:30 am;2:30 to 4:30 pm) were on duty
 4-5 pm: there were about 20 bathers inside the pool area and
Manuel
Abaño was going around the pools to observe the bathers in
compliance
with the instructions of his chief
 4:40-4:45 p.m: some boys who were in the pool area informed a
bather
by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming
under
water for quite a long time
 Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same
happening so
he immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved
the
apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom
 The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño
immediately
applied manual artificial respiration
 Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance,
followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being
called
by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a
jeep
carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon
arriving
he injected the boy with camphorated oil
 After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr.
Ayuyao
from the University of the Philippines
 Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration, and
when
this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two
oxygen tanks were exhausted
 Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator,
but the
same became of no use because he found the boy already dead.
The
doctor ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.
 The autopsy of Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal
Division
of the NBI found that the death was due to asphyxia by submersion
in
water.
 lower court: dismissed the complaint53
 Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong: failure of the lifeguard Abaño to
immediately respond to their call may and even if it be assumed that
the
deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident,
defendants
may still be held liable under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for
the
reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed
to do
so

ISSUE: W/N the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to
the
negligence of Metropolitan Water District and/or its employees
HELD: NO. decision appealed from is affirmed
 Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable
negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming
damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by
the
fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed,
or of
one of his employees
 The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged
is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been
discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the
party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury
 Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the
trial
court, which we find supported by the evidence: "There is (also) a
strong
suggestion coming from the expert evidence presented by both
parties
that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water was only
5.5 feet
deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead
against
the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned,
and
which to his drowning. As a boy scout he must have received
instructions
in swimming. He knew, or have known that it was dangerous for
him to dive in that part of the pool."
Glan People's Lumber v. IAC, 1989
FACTS: Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with
Calibo
at the wheel, as it approached a bridge going towards the direction
of Davao
City. At about that time, the cargo truck, Zacarias coming from the
opposite
direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59
yards after
crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a
consequence
of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained
physical
injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side
of the
truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,\ was
extensively
damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side
on the
asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck
stopped
on its wheels on the road.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children
of the
late Engineer Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo
truck with
the CFI of Bohol.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint “for insufficiency of
evidence”
The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9
on the
plaintiffs’ appeal, reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It found
Zacarias
to be negligent and his negligence “gave rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both
primary and
solidary.” It therefore ordered “the defendants jointly and solidarily
to
indemnify the plaintiffs
The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for
a
reversal of the judgment of the IAC which, it is claimed, ignored or
ran
counter to the established facts

ISSUE:
WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case
Ruling:
YES
Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the
part of
Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of
Zacarias in
failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as
it was,
the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable
responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear
chance.
Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of
each
other’s vehicle from a distance of 150 meters. The truck had been
brought
to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these
facts the
logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what
judicial
doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the
accident,
while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by
stopping in his 56
turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he
had
sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty
kilometers per
hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity
of
avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck
to swerve
and leave him a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete
a
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and
applied in the
1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of
facts.
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and
his
employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or
not the
evidence supports the latter’s additional defense of due diligence in
the
selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and
wig not
be undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record
which
has not been controverted.
the SC found that the
drivers had a full view of each other at 150 meters, and the
truck stopped at 30 meters. Calibo had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident, which he failed to seize. The truck
driver is thus not liable.
Doctrine: The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as
valid and complete a defense to accident liability today as it
did when invoked and applied in Picart v. Smith, 1918.
Notes: The case affirmed the applicability of the doctrine
of last clear chance in this jurisdiction.

Pantranco v. Baesa, 1989

In this Petition, Pantranco North Express Inc. (PANTRANCO), asks the Court to review the
decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05494-95 which affirmed the decisions of the Court of First
Instance of
Rosales, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 561-R and Civil Case No. 589-R wherein PANTRANCO
was ordered
to pay damages and attorney’s fees to herein private respondents.c

FACTS:
 Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and
7
other people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to
a
picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the
Baesa
spouses
 While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of
about
20 kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to
Manila,
encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and
collided
with it.
 As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter
Maricar
Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from
injuries.
Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for
damages
arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
 PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause
of the
accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection
and
supervision of its driver.
 CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico
who
had the chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize
with
reasonable care and competence
HELD: NO.
 Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the
purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense
to
defeat claim for damages
 For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show
that
the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the
accident
was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of
due
care, have been aware of it
 there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of
the
impending danger
 When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was
encroaching on
his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
shoulder
on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will
return
the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form
the
opposite direction58
 Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few
seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
 last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided
by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered.
Doctrine: For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary
to show that the person who allegedly had the last
opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence
of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been
aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or
injury if he does not know or could not have known the
existence of the peril.

Ferrer v. Ericta, GR L-41767, Aug. 23, 1978

SUMMARY:
An action for damages based on a quasi-delict must be filed within four (4)
years from the date the quasi-delict is committed (Art. 1146, par 2, Civil
Code). Dennis Pfleider, a sixteen-year old son of defendants Mr. and
Mrs.
Francis Pfleider, caused physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer
who was a
passenger in a pick-up car driven by the said Dennis Pfleider. The
incident
occurred on December 31, 1970. The action for damages was filed
by the
plaintiff against the defendants on January 6, 1975. The defendants
claimed
that the action had already prescribed. The court ruled that there is
no issue
of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription. The
complaint
alleges that the accident which caused the injuries sustained by
plaintiff
Annette Ferrer occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed
that the
action for damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for
damages
arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within
four years.
The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed or the
date of the accident. The action was properly dismissed.
FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider were the owners or operators of a Ford
pick-up
car. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 31, 1970,
their son,
defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was then only sixteen (16) years of
age,
without proper official authority, drove the for pick-up, without due
regard to
traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary
precaution to
prevent injury to persons or damage to property. The pickup car
was
overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who
was then
a passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required
medical
treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more than two
(2) years;
that as a result of the physical injuries sustained by Annette, she
suffered
unimaginable physical pain, mental anguish, and her parents also
suffered
mental anguish, moral shock and spent a considerable sum of
money for her
treatment. They prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse
them for
actual expenses as well as other damages.
The complaint was only filed on January 6, 1975.60
At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only Ferrer and counsel were
present. As
such the Pfleiders were declared in default and the court rendered
judgment
against them. Upon filing a motion for reconsideration, respondent
judge,
without setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving
defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint
states no
cause of action because it does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was
living with
his parents at the time of the vehicular accident, considering that
under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity the
mother, are only responsible for the damages caused by their minor
children
who live in their company; and (b) that the defense of prescription
is
meritorious, since the complaint was filed more than four (4) years
after the
date of the accident, and the action to recover damages based on
quasi-delict
prescribes in four (4) years. Hence, the instant petition for
mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of prescription had been deemed
waived by
private respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.
RULING:
Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to
dates involved
in the defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically
plead
prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the
defense of
prescription. The defense of prescription, even if not raised in a
motion to
dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense
raises
issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading.
It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if
the same
is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this
particular
instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had
been
declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence
shows
that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is based is
already
barred by the statute of limitations.
In the present case, there is no issue of tact involved in connection
with the
question of prescription. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647
alleges that
the accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff Annette
Ferrer
occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for
damages
was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from
physical
injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. The four-
year period
begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the
accident.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus DISMISSED,
without
pronouncement as to costs.

Kramer v. CA, 1989

The principal issue in this Petition for Review is whether or not a Complaint for damages
instituted by
the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by
the statute of
limitations.
FACTS: April 8, 1976- F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the
petitioners
Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from
Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape
Santiago,
the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V
Asia
Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping
Lines, Inc.
As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking
with it its fish
catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective
marine
protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard.
The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of
determining the
proximate cause of the maritime collision.
The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish
catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the
private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines
during the collision.
May 30, 1985 (9 years after the incident) - The petitioners instituted a
Complaint for damages against the private respondent the Regional
Trial Court
RESPOPNDENTS: PETITIONERS:
He argued that
under
Article
1146 of the Civil
Code, the
prescriptive
period for
instituting a
Complaint for
damages arising
from a quasi
delict like a
maritime
collision is four
years.
He
maintained that
Contended that
maritime
collisions have
peculiarities and
characteristics
which only
persons with
special skill,
training and
experience like
the members of
the Board of
Marine Inquiry
can properly
analyze and 62
the petitioners
should have filed
their Complaint
within four years
from the date
when their cause
of action accrued,
i.e., from April 8,
1976 when the
maritime collision
took place,
the Complaint filed
on May 30, 1985
was instituted
beyond the four
year prescriptive
period.
resolve. The
petitioners
argued that the
running of the
prescriptive
period was
tolled by the
filing of the
marine protest
and that their
cause of action
accrued only
on April 29,
1982, the date
when the
Decision
ascertaining
the negligence
of the crew of
the M/V Asia
Philippines had
become final,
and that the
four-year
prescriptive
period under
Article 1146 of
the Civil Code
should be
computed from
the said date.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period for filing the complaint
has
been prescribed
RTC:
CA:
The trial court
observed that in
ascertaining
negligence
relating to a
maritime
Private
respondents
should have
immediately
instituted a
complaint for 63
collision, there is
a need to rely on
highly technical
aspects
attendant to
such collision,
and that the
Board of Marine
Inquiry was
constituted
pursuant to the
Philippine
Merchant Marine
Rules and
Regulations
The trial court
went on to say
that the four
year prescriptive
period provided
in Article 1146 of
the Civil Code
should begin to
run only from
April 29, 1982,
the date when
the negligence of
the crew of the
M/V Asia
Philippines had
been finally
ascertained.
damages based
on a quasi-delict
within four years
from the said
marine incident
because its
cause of action
had already
definitely
ripened at the
onset of the
collision.
HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within
four (4)
years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict
is
committed.
RATIO: In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration,
17 this
Court held as follows
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action,
which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by 64
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right;
and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs
or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has
arisen
...
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must
be
counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time
of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the
plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an
administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision
was
caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can
file an action
for damages.
The SC held that the action is barred by prescription,
to be reckoned from when the cause of action accrued. The
aggrieved party need not wait for the determination of an
administrative body.
Doctrine: The prescriptive period begins from the day the
quasi-delict is committed. The right of action accrues when
the following concurs: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created, (2) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect
such right, and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.
Notes: In cases where more than 2 vessels are involved,
the decision of BMI might be needed, since determination
of negligence is technical and more difficult.

HENSON, JR., UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. G.R. No.

223134, August 14, 2019
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 13, 2015
and the
Resolution3 dated February 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 138147,
which
affirmed the Orders dated June 10, 2014 4 and September 22, 20145 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati
City, Branch 138 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10-885, ruling that the suit filed by respondent UCPB
General
Insurance Co., Inc. (respondent) has yet to prescribe, and resultantly, allowing the inclusion
of petitioner
Vicente G. Henson, Jr. (petitioner) as party-defendant to the same.