1

Torts- vicarious liability of owner of a truck

G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988

Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro,
alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked
along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff
was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses
as he recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and
that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano
[driver] averred that he knows his responsibilities as a driver and further
contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate cause
of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner
which occupied a part of the highway and he did not even put a warning
sign.

Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his

insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party
plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that
the third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution,
indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their insurance contract which covers
the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily injuries and
damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is only liable for
the amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature since no
claim was made to it.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision,
stating that it is the petitioners who were negligent since they did
not exercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck is park on the
shoulder of the highway.

Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.

Ruling:
Yes!
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The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was

proven that the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from
their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this
warning sings was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and further
stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the brake
pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning signs, the truck
recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro bumped the
truck of petitioner.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180,
paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either
in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de
jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in
the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In
disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the
negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his
driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the
truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first
place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he
apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did
he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was
cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been
avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to
intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed,
and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the
respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of
the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial. The private
respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have
conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to
drive it.

In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro
failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary
liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we concede that the
diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the
supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the
 3

observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of

his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road
worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof
that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his
mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus
prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as
employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not
ceased.
 4

Ramos V. CA (1999)

G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999

Lessons Applicable: Personal Injury and Death (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

 June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman
underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after
being tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation performed
by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which
was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after
the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a
good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand
was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center together with her
husband went down with her to the operating room.
 Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.
 Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the
nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
 She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is
wrong.
 When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3
p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for
a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was since
then comatosed.
 She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her
brain for four to five minutes.
 She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage"
 Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
 Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra.
Perfecta Gutierrez
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 RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses

totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000
moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
 CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25
plus interest
ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages

HELD: YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private

respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of
the date of promulgation plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the
time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2)
P2,000,000 moral damages, 3) P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4)
P100,000 exemplary damages and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the
costs of the suit.

 The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a

question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a
certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given
inference.
 doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence - applicable in this case
 doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment
 As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly
intubate the patient according to witness Herminda
 With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her
testimony
 Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour
before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of
exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility
 Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired
special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to
testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by
practical experience.
 6

 Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which

led to anoxic encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug reaction
to the short-acting barbiturate was not accepted as expert opinion
 Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper
authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper
anesthesia protocols
 Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the
same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours
late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to
confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This
indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his
patient
 private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending
and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically
employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all
responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of
an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages.
 Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
 temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
 They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide
substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything
less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it
would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic
changes which her body would normally undergo through the years.
 Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has
been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now
 7

 Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the
victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real
one. Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be appropriate.
 Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of
the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000 are likewise proper.
 8

Transit, 2009
Facts:Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-
type jitney with plate number DKF-168.On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00
a.m., the said jitney figured in an accident at an intersection along Maharlika
Highway, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM
Transit passenger bus bound for Manila, bearing plate number DVG-557 and
body number 8030.The bus was driven by Eddie Dimayuga (Dimayuga).At
the time of the collision, Tans jitney was loaded with quail eggs and duck
eggs (balot and salted eggs).It was driven by Alexander M. Ramirez
(Ramirez).Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent,
and not observing traffic rules and regulations, causing the bus to collide
with the jitney which was then, with care and proper light direction signals,
about to negotiate a left turn towards the feeder or barangay road of
Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna going to the Poblacion.The jeepney
turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of eggs was
destroyed.Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized, incurring
expenses for medical treatment at thePagamutang Pangmasain Bay,
Laguna.Tan prayed for damages in the amount of P400,000.00 for the
damaged jitney,P142,210.00 for the destroyed shipment,P20,000.00 for
moral damages, attorneys fees of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court
appearance of counsel, and other reliefs warranted under the premises.In its
Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc. (JAM) admitted
ownership of the subject passenger bus and that Dimayuga was under its
employ.However, it denied the allegations in the Complaint, and claimed
that the accident occurred due to the gross negligence of Ramirez.As
counterclaim, JAM sought payment of P100,000.00 for the damages
sustained by the bus,P100,000.00 for loss of income, and P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees plusP3,000.00 per court appearance of counsel. The RTC
ruled in favor of Tan and the CA ruled in favor of JAM Transit,There was no
evidence as to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent in
connection with the vehicular accident.The CA held that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct evidence is nonexistent or not
accessible.

Issue:Whether direct evidence is needed to prove the omission or

negligence of Jam Transit.
Held:No,Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the JAM
passenger bus was overtaking the vehicles running along the right lane of
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the highway from the left lane, the available evidence readily points to such
fact.There were two continuous yellow lines at the center of the highway,
which meant that no vehicle in the said area should overtake another on
either side of the road.The double yellow center lines regulation, which this
Court takes judicial notice of as an internationally recognized pavement
regulation, was precisely intended to avoid accidents along highways, such
as what happened in this case.This prohibition finds support in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), Section
41(e).Furthermore, it is observed that the area of collision was an
intersection.Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 4136, likewise, prohibits overtaking or
passing any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any
intersection of highways, among others.Thus, by overtaking on the left lane,
Dimayuga was not only violating the double yellow center lines regulation,
but also the prohibition on overtaking at highway intersections.Consequently,
negligence can be attributed only to him, which negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by petitioner.This prima facie finding
of negligence was not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by Dimayuga.
Therefore, a finding that he is liable for damages to petitioner is
warranted.Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer
failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the section (culpa in
eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando)of its employees.To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee.To warrant an award of actual or compensatory
damages for repair to damage sustained, the best evidence should be the
receipts or other documentary proofs of the actual amount
expended.However, considering that it was duly proven that the jitney was
damaged and had to be repaired, as it was repaired, and that the cargo of
eggs was indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts expended or lost were
not proven, we deem it appropriate to award P250,000.00 by way of
temperate damages.Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,temperate damages
may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.The
Decision dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
89046 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Decision dated December 20, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No.
SC-3838 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION.
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CANTRE VS GO (GR NO. 160889 APRIL 27, 2007)

Cantre vs Go
GR No. 160889 April 27, 2007

Facts: Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in obstetrics and

gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado memorial Hospital. She was the attending
physician of respondent Nora Go, who was admitted at the said hospital on
April 19, 1992. At 1:30am of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth
child, a baby boy. However, at around 3:30am Nora suffered profuse bleeding
insider her womb due to some parts of the placenta were not completely
expelled from her womb after delivery consequently, Nora suffered
hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure to 40/0.
Petitioner said the assisting resident physician performed various medical
procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora’s blood pressure. Her
blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a sphygmamometer.
While petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and stop
bleeding, she ordered a drop light to warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained
unconscious until she recovered. While in the recovery room, her husband,
respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gasping wound 2 1/2″ x 3 1/2″
in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He asked the nurses
what caused the injury. He was informed, it was a burn. An investigation was
filed by Nora’s husband and found out from the petitioner that it was caused
by the blood pressure cuff, however, this was contrary to the findings from a
medico-legal report which stated that it was indeed a burn and that a drop
light when placed near a skin for about 10mins could cause such burn. Nora
was referred to a plastic surgeon from the hospital and skin grafting was done
on her and scar revision but both still left a mark on Nora’s arm compelling
the respondent spouse to file a complaint for damages against petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the injury referred by Nora.

Held: Yes. The Hippocratic oath mandates physicians to give primordial

consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to
his precept, he is accountable for his acts. This is notwithstanding, courts face
a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians
are not guardians of care and they never set out to intentionally cause injury
to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because
where negligence exist and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right
to reparation for the damage caused.

In cases, involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor allows
the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the
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part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided
that the following requisites concur:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants;
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.

All of these three requisites were present in the case at bar.

Under the the captain of the ship doctrine, the surgeon in charge of the
operation is liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when
those are under the surgeons control.
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Dr. Victoria Batiquin, et. al vs Court of Appeals, et. Al

G.r. No. 118231 July 5, 1996

Facts:
Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's
private patient sometime before September 21, 1988. In the morning of
September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses,
performed a caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered
the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer
abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her
appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed
for her certain medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring. She
then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that
Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen
of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on
each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the
uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus,
embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of
a rubber glove. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of
rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that
she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's
testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber is a Medical
Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and
a Physician's Discharge Summary.

Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable

Held:
Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement
of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines
and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the
burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine
 13

can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are
present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were
bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the
foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of
negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, private respondent
Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending
piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could
only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr.
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption
of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr.
Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in
private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
The court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical profession
plays in the lives of the people and State's compelling interest to enact
measures to protect the public from "the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma. Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the
interest of his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his
best talent and skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered
the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code
and in contravention of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in the
general and members of the medical profession, in particular.
 14

Professional Services Inc. v. Agana

Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana

Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes
Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decisions
Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals

FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering
from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection
surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he
obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed
his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed
Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the
procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of
Operation: “sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done
but to no avail continue for closure” (two pieces of gauze were missing).
A “diligent search” was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil
then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but
the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr.
Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous
nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months of
consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of
cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5
in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring
Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she
sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found
in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of
Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable
for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body,
and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also
filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice
against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr.
Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the
cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI
 15

and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC
dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case
against Fuentes.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and
malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil’s negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors
were the ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the
correctness of the operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr.
Fuentes’ alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in
order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been
closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating
surgeon. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a
sponge in his patient’s abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay,
still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by
advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from
the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit.
What’s worse in this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain was an
ordinary consequence of her operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only
prove that a health care provider either failed to do something [or did
something] which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done
[or wouldn’t have done], and that the failure or action caused injury to the
patient.
 Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the
incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it
 Breach – failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient
 Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery
 Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury; could be traced from his
act of closing the incision despite information given by the attendant nurses
that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what established causal link: gauze
pieces later extracted from patient’s vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
 16

The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas’ does
not convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does
not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.

Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur

1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of
the defendant [DR. FUENTES] — LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS
WITH DR. AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in
complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:
 He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
 He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
 He ordered the closure of the incision
HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC
2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its
professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to
realize that modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and
regulating medical care to its patients, by employing staff of physicians,
among others. Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the
universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Court’s bases for
sustaining PSI’s liability:
 Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship


o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases,

an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire,
fire, power of control]
 Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in
somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and
specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from
passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded
 17

in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it vouched for
their skill and competence.
o

 If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars

the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape
liability for its agents’ acts.
 Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

o This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s liability
for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the
application of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI
failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect from
harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. PSI
failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the
note of the count nurse, and this established PSI’s part in the dark
conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.
o

PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the


report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried
on with the assistance of various hospital staff
o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice
medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the negligence
committed
 PSI also liable under NCC 2180


o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a

good father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil
 18

College Assurance Plan Phil. Inc., vs. Belfranlt Development Inc.

G. R. No. 155604
November 22, 2007

Facts:
College Assurance Plan Phil Inc. (CAP) leased the second and third floors
of its building to Belfranlt Development Inc. Fire destroyed the parts of the
building, including the third floor units being occupied by Belfranlt. The cause
of the fire was identified to be an overheated coffee percolator located in the
leased premises of Belfranlt.
CAP demanded Belfranlt to pay for actual damages caused by the fire.
However, the latter disclaimed liability, alleging that the fire was a fortuitous
event for which they could not be held liable.

Issue:
Whether or not the fire, which destroyed CAP’s building, is a fortuitous
event.

Held:
Fortuitous events are those events which could not be foreseen or which
though foreseen, were inevitable. In this case, it was the fault and negligence
of Belfranlt in using the coffee percolator that caused the fire. If the
negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the
fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof,
the fortuitous event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his negligence
 19

a.Plaintiff’s Negligence is the PROXIMATE CAUSE

Bernardo vs. Legaspi

Bernardo vs. Legaspi
Facts: Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collission of
plaintiff's automobile and that of the defendant. Defendant filed a cross-
complaint against the plaintiff claiming that the collission was due to
plaintiff's negligence. The trial court found both drivers negligence.

Issue: WON the plaintiff is negligent in handling his automobile.

Ruling: Complaint Dismissed.

Ratio: Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning

a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial
court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally
to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can
recover of the other for the damages suffered.
 20

FACTS:
A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open trench,
the excavation was due to the installation of an underground conduit system
by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover and any warning signs. As a
result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and their vehicle
was also damaged.

PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents own
negligence. Also, it alleges that L.R. Barte and company acting as an
independent contractor, should be responsible for the excavation was
performed by them. As for Barte, they alleged that they have complied with
the due standards in performing their work, and that it was not aware of the
accident involving the Estebans.

The Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were

negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for
damages. Upon respondent’s second motion to reconsideration, CA reversed
its decision, following he decision of Trial Court and held PLDT liable for
damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PLDT is liable.

HELD:
NO. We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original
decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack
of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent
omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the
accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of
the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew
of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these
excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation
but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards
the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a
duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act
would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot
charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity
that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
 21

opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes

to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost every day and had knowledge of the presence and location of the
excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to
danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden
of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The
facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action
has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if
contested, otherwise his action must fail.
 22

FACTS:
Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking
“media agua,” (downspout). He climbed up to the media agua which was just
below the 3rd floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet
through the said window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned around
and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an
electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel
to the edge of the media agua, electrocuting him and killing him.
His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the
company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. The Company appealed
to the CA, which affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the Company
now seeks to appeal.

ISSUE:
WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance of
its wires was the proximate cause of the death.

HELD:
No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the
stage for the cause of the injury to occur).
A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the
occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an
action if a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury
intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as
lacking in due diligence. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause
of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but
rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging
the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back
toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latter's length of 6 feet.
The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of
Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media
agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. So, he could not
 23

have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them.
But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him,
and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both
hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all
prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms
with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
 24

b.Contributory Negligence (Art. 2179)

-1719, January 23, 1907
Rakes v Atlantic (Torts)

RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY,
defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to
the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one
hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were
two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise
seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon
two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards
to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff,
the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that
defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain
spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car
either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what
extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two
particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work;
and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead
of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to
constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman
to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify
that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang
against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
 25

repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known
to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although
not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking
of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an

employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal
action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative
primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having been
taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an

employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not
adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known

as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was
incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured,
is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
 26

NPC v. Heirs of Casionan

National Power Corporation [NPC] v. Heirs of Noble Casionan [Parents

of Noble]
2008 / R.T. Reyes / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision
Defenses against charge of negligence > Contributory negligence of plaintiff

FACTS
In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69
kilovolts traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Eventually, some lines
sagged, thereby reducing their distance from the ground to only about 8-10
ft. This posed as a threat to passersby who were exposed to the danger of
electrocution. As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal
and written requests for NPC to institute safety measures to protect trail users
from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr. Banayot, NPC Area Manager,
informed the Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9 additional poles, and they
identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve the distance from its
deteriorating lines to the ground.
19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and
his co-pocket miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2 bamboo
poles, and they carried one pole horizontally on their shoulder, with Noble
carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead as they passed through the trail
underneath the NPC high-tension lines on their way to their work place. As
Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole
that he was carrying touched one of the dangling high-tension wires. Melchor
narrated that he heard a buzzing sound for only about a second or two, then
he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook him, but
Noble was already dead.
A post-mortem examination by the municipal health officer determined
the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation,
secondary to electrocution. There was a small burned area in the middle right
finger of Noble.
Police investigators who visited the site confirmed that portions of the
wires above the trail hung very low. They noted that people usually used the
trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires, and that the trail was the
only viable way since the other side was a precipice. They did not see any
danger warning signs installed. After the GM of NPC was informed of the
incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and put up warning signs around the
area.
Noble’s parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied being
negligent in maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that signs were
 27

installed but they were stolen by children, and that excavations were made to
increase the clearance from the ground but some poles sank due to pocket
mining in the area. NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could not
have been electrocution since Noble did not suffer extensive burns. NPC
argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence.
RTC decided in favor of Noble’s parents. RTC observed that NPC witnesses
were biased because all but one were employees of NPC, and they were not
actually present at the time of the accident. RTC found NPC negligent since
the company has not acted upon the requests and demands made by the
community leaders since 1991. CA affirmed RTC with modification–award of
moral damages was reduced from 100k to 50k, and award of attorney fees
was disallowed since the reason for the award was not expressly stated in the
decision.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Noble. NO; hence,
NPC is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.

RATIO
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his
own protection. There is contributory negligence when the party’s act
showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him
harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want
of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with
the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate causeof the injury.
The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for
his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. NCC 2179 provides
that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the injured party’s
contributory negligence.

Precedents + [non-]application to the case at hand

In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending
danger to health and body. In this case, there were no warning signs, and
 28

the trail was regularly used by people since it was the only viable way from
Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by DENR
in the area. In Añonuevo v. CA, the Court held that the violation of a statute
is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the
injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended
to be prevented by the statute. The fact that pocket miners were
unlicensed was not a justification for NPC to leave their transmission
lines dangling.

Damages awarded
 Noble’s unearned income of 720k [loss of earning capacity formula: Net
Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual income
– reasonable and necessary living expenses)]
 Exemplary damages of 50k [since there is gross negligence]
 Moral damages of 50k
 Negligence- is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury..

Contributory negligence- is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There
is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care
and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger.
It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of
the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who

is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. If
indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it
is proper to reduce the award for damages.
 29

Genobiagon v. CA
Effect of contributory negligence | October 12, 1989 | Griño-Aquino, J.

SUMMARY: An old lady was crossing a street at a

Cebu market when two rigs two meters apart were
approaching from a steep downgrade of the road.
Genobiagon’s rig (the one behind) was going fast
and was trying to overtake the one ahead, his rig
bumped the old woman, who consequently fell on
the road and died three hours later. Asked why he
bumped the old woman he answered, 'it was the
old woman that bumped him.' RTC and CA
convicted him of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Petitioner contends that the reckless
negligence of the victim was the proximate cause
of the accident which led to her death. SC held that
the doctrine of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases.

DOCTRINE: The alleged contributory negligence of

the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused.
"The defense of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence
of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence.”

ACT/OMISSION: Bumping an 80-year-old woman

INJURY: Old woman falling at the middle of the
road and dying hour later
NEGLIGENCE: Speeding and overtaking. No
contributory negligence on part of old woman.
CAUSATION: Reckless imprudence of Genobiagon
was the proximate cause.

SUMMARY:
● Rig driven by Gregorio Genobiagon bumped an 80-year-old woman who
was crossing a street at a market in Cebu.
 30

○ The rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old
woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her,
but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of
the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying
to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the
old woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road.
○ He continued to drive on, but by-stander Mangyao who saw the
incident shouted at the him to stop. He ran after Genobiagon when
he refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him
why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the
old woman that bumped him.'
○ Appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck
by his rig. The old woman was unconscious, and was then loaded
in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours
later.
● RTC and CA convicted him of homicide thru reckless imprudence.

ISSUE/RATIO: WON the doctrine of contributory negligence may

apply in criminal cases. - NO
● Petitioner contends that the CA erred:
○ in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the
proximate cause of the accident which led to her death;
○ in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of reasonable
doubt; and
○ in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the petitioner from
P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, although the circumstances of the
victim and the accused (petitioner) do not warrant such increase.
● The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not
exonerate the accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does
not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence,
since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects
of his own negligence.” (People vs. Orbeta, People vs. Quinones)
● Prevailing jurisprudence provides that indemnity for death in homicide
or murder is P30,000. Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is
increased to P30,000.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as

to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30,000.
Costs against petitioner.
 31

1. NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS

LAMBERT, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T.
CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG, respondents.
G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005

Facts:
The general rule is that drivers of vehicles who bumped the rear of another
vehicle are presumed negligent. But in this case Rey is an exception. Also
applied here is the rule on contributory negligence where the damages to be
awarded are mitigated.

The incident started when Rey went to his brother and borrowed the
latter’s motorcycle. He then invited his friend Rolly to roam around the
city. Rey drove the motorcycle without a protective helmet with Rolly as
backrider.

Around past 10 p.m. after eating supper at a restaurant and imbibing one or
two bottles of beer, Rey and Rolly traversed the highway going back to his
brother’s home at high speed. Upon reaching a barangay, they were
tailgating a Tamaraw jeepney owned by Nita and driven by Gardo. When the
jeepney was approaching the side road with Rey and Rolly following closely
behind, Gardo slightly veered to the right causing Rey to instinctively veer to
the left. But at this moment Gardo suddenly turned sharply to the left towards
the side of the road. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney
throwing Rey forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left front
door of the jeepney even as the motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney
veered back to the right and sped away. The incident resulted in the
instantaneous death of Rey and injuries to Rolly.

The heirs of Rey thus filed an action for damages against Nita the jeepney
owner for the death of Rey and damages to the motorcycle. After trial the
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rey finding that
Nita’s driver was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the damages for which Nita is liable. But the court reduced liability
by 20 percent in view of the contributory negligence of Rey.

ISSUE:
 32

Nita questioned this ruling. She claimed that the accident was entirely due to
the fault of Rey since his motorcycle bumped the rear of the jeepney and was
therefore presumed to be the cause of the accident. Was Nita correct?

HELD:
No. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn of Gardo without first establishing
his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life
of Rey and injured Rolly. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause
of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Gardo for without that
sudden left turn executed without precaution, the mishap in all probability
would not have happened. Drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another
vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident unless contradicted by
other evidence. In this case the said rule is contradicted by the sudden left
turn made by Gardo which proximately caused the collision.

The trial court is likewise correct in finding Rey guilty of contributory

negligence. But the ratio of apportionment of damages must be increased. It
was established at the time of the mishap that Rey (1) was driving the
motorcycle at high speed; (2) was tailgating the jeepney; (3) had imbibed one
or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. These
circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise
and injury to Rolly contributed to the same result. Considering these
circumstances, and pursuant to the ruling in the case of Rakes v. A.G. & P, 7
Phil. 359, the heirs of Rey shall recover damages only up to 50 percent of the
award of P611,355 consisting of burial expenses, death indemnity, moral
damages and loss of earning capacity.
 33

2006

PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY

G.R. NO.169891
DATE: November 2, 2006
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS:

Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen and daughter of Ehtel Brunty, visited

the Philippines. Before her departure, she with her Filipino host, Juan Manuel
Garcia, went to Baguio on board a Mercedez Benz driven by Mercelita,
around 12 midnight. On the other hand, a PNR train bound for Tutuban,
Manila left La Union station at 11pm. At around 2am, the Benz was
approaching the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac. The car was running at
a speed of 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle when it collided with the
PNR train. Brunty was rushed to the hospital, but was pronounced dead 10
minutes after arrival, while Garcia suffered severe head injuries.

A demand letter was sent to PNR which did not respond. A complaint for
damages was filed against it. PNR argues that since there is freedom of
control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is
obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to prevent
or avoid an unwanted accident from taking place.

RTC: PNR negligent; CA: affirmed

ISSUE/S: WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies

RULING: NO. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to
be the negligence of PNR, the doctrine finds no application in the instant
case.

PNR was negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety
device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track: (1.)
absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed
warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area.

Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR, it
would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad
crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the
Moncada side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a cockpit
arena. A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in
 34

knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more
so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the
PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area

This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for
its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the
safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because
public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.

There was a contributory negligence on the part driver of the Mercedez

Benz, Mercelita, as the place was not properly illuminated; one’s view was
blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was unfamiliar with the place, yet
he drove at 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle before arriving at the
railroad track. However, the effect of contributory negligence on the
mitigation of liability does not apply here. Both before the lower courts, no
damages were awarded to Mercelita and he did not appeal. There is neither
proof as to the relationship between Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty.
 35

Facts:
Eyewitness Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, at about 4:00
p.m., at the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City,
15-year old high school student Bithuel Macas, herein respondent, was
standing on the shoulder of the road. She was about two... and a half
meters away from the respondent when he was bumped and run over by a
Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca. Rosalinda and another
unidentified person immediately came to the respondent's rescue and told
Cimafranca to take the victim to the hospital. Cimafranca... rushed the
respondent to the Davao Medical Center.
Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. Records showed that the
Ford Fiera was registered in the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Medardo Ag.
Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened, he
was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged... that he sold the
vehicle to Engr. Rogelio Jalipa on March 28, 1994,[5] and turned over the
Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt to Jalipa, with the
understanding that the latter would be the one to cause the transfer of the
registration.
Issues:
(1) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim; and
(2) whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and
severally liable to the victim.
Ruling:
The petitioner contends that the victim's negligence contributed to his own
mishap. The petitioner theorizes that if witness Rosalinda Palero, who was
only two and a half meters away from the victim, was not hit by the Ford
Fiera, then the victim must have been so negligent as... to be bumped and
run over by the said vehicle.
In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim was
standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of the
highway.
The victim was just where he should be when the unfortunate event
transpired.
the registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to
someone else, is... primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage
or injury the vehicle may cause.
the policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner
who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by
 36

the vehicle. This is so as not to... inconvenience or prejudice a third party

injured by one whose identity cannot be secured.
Principles:
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is
partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full, but must proportionately bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for... the damages actually
caused by his negligence.
Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the
respondent was negligent.
 37

*Limitations on Contributory Negligence

Chance

oPicart vs Smith, supra

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the
bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across
the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart
has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is
here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular

case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not,
 38

then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is

not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute
the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a

result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side
of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
 39

oLapanday vs Angala, 525 SCRA 229

Facts:
On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-
903 driven by Apolonio Deocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a 1958 Chevy
pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala
(respondent) and driven by Bernulfo Borres (Borres). Lapanday
Agricultural... and Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab
which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez (Mendez). Deocampo
was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along
Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao
City. The... left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the
pick-up were damaged.
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorney's Fees
against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel[4] (Berenguel)
and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to
about five to ten kilometers per hour
(kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was
bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70
kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent
alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact.
Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the
speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent testified that Borres
made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at the
speedometer.
In its 3 March 1995 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 15 (trial court) ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants LADECO
and Apolonio Deocampo to solidarily pay the plaintiffs
The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast while following
the pick-up and that the crewcab's speed was the proximate cause of the
accident. The trial court observed that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away
from the point of impact despite Deocampo's claim that... he stepped on the
brakes moments after the collision. The trial court ruled that Deocampo had
the last opportunity to avoid the accident.
The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the
owner of the crewcab.
The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the trial court that Deocampo
was negligent. The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of last clear chance
and ruled that Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding the pick-up.
 40

The Court of Appeals also sustained the solidary liability of LADECO and
Deocampo. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the negligence of the driver is presumed to be the negligence of the
owner of the vehicle.
Issues:
Whether the provisions of Section 45(b) of Republic Act No. 4136[12] (RA
4136) and Article 2185 of the Civil Code apply to this case; and
Whether respondent is entitled to the damages awarded.
Ruling:
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Both Drivers are Negligent
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Deocampo was at
fault because he was driving very fast prior to the collision. The Court of
Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that Deocampo was running more
than the normal cruising speed. Both the trial court... and the Court of
Appeals noted that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from the point of
impact. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the
collision.
Petitioners allege that Borres did not take the proper lane before executing
the U-turn. Petitioners allege that Borres violated Section 45(b) of RA 4136
and it was his recklessness that was the proximate cause of the accident.
Section 45(b) of RA 4136 states:
Sec. 45. Turning at intersections. x x x
(b) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall approach such
intersection in the lane for traffic to the right of and nearest to the center
line of the highway, and, in turning, shall pass to the left of the center of the
intersection, except that, upon highways... laned for traffic and upon one-
way highways, a left turn shall be made from the left lane of traffic in the
direction in which the vehicle is proceeding.
Petitioners further allege that since Borres was violating a traffic rule at the
time of the accident, respondent and Borres were the parties at fault.
Petitioners cite Article 2185 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation.
 41

We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was at the
outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45(b) of RA 4136,
Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the
center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally... negligent. Borres
slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the U-turn. Deocampo
should have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo
admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20 meters away
from him.[13] Vehicular... traffic was light at the time of the incident. The
pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road.[14] Deocampo
could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast before the
collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court... of Appeals. We
sustain this finding since factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming
those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court.[15] Further,
the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. It would not have
happened... if Deocampo was not driving very fast.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance
applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity... to avoid the loss but failed
to do so is chargeable with the loss.[16] In this case, Deocampo had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear
vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to...
observe the vehicle in front of him.[17] Deocampo had the responsibility of
avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.[18] A U-turn is done at a much
slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running
straight... ahead.[19] Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was
not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only
driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon
seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the... brakes after the collision.
Petitioners are Solidarily Liable
LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severally liable with
Deocampo because it exercised due diligence in the supervision and
selection of its employees. Aside from this statement, LADECO did not
proffer any proof to show how it exercised due diligence in the... supervision
and selection of its employees. LADECO did not show its policy in hiring its
drivers, or the manner in which it supervised its drivers. LADECO failed to
substantiate its allegation that it exercised due diligence in the supervision
and selection of its... employees.
 42

Hence, we hold LADECO solidarily liable with Deocampo.

Respondent is Entitled to Moral Damages
We sustain the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded to
allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or amusement that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's
culpable action.[20] The trial court... found that respondent, who was on
board the pick-up when the collision took place, suffered shock, serious
anxiety, and fright when the crewcab bumped his pick-up. We sustain the
trial court and the Court of Appeals in ruling that respondent sufficiently
showed that he suffered... shock, serious anxiety, and fright which entitle
him to moral damages.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give any justification
for the award of attorney's fees. Awards of attorney's fees must be based on
findings of fact and of law and stated in the decision of the trial court.[21]
Further, no premium... should be placed on the right to litigate.[22] Hence,
we delete the award of attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 25 July 2001 Decision and 11 March 2002
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51134 with
MODIFICATION by deleting the award of attorney's fees.
 43

oHidalgo vs Balandan, 91 Phil 488

Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. v. Guillermo Balandan, Anselma Anila and CA

GR No. L-3422. June 13, 1952, J. Bengzon

Topic: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance

Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice-plant factory in San Pablo,
Laguna. In the factory, there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft deep, for
cooling purposes of its engine. There was no fence or top cover; the edges of
the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. The factory
itself was surrounded with a fence. However, the wide gate entrance was
continually open, and anyone could easily enter the factory. There was no
guard assigned on the gate.
Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old,
was playing with other boys his age when he entered the factory premises
through the gate. Mario Balandan then took a bath in one of the tanks of water
and, later on, sank to the bottom of the tank. He died of “asphyxia secondary
to drowning.” The CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo Enterprises maintained an
attractive nuisance and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid
accident to person entering its premises.

Issue: Whether or not a water tank is an attractive nuisance.

Held: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks are not classified as attractive
nuisance. Other issues such as whether it exercised reasonable precautions,
and if the parents were guilty of contributory negligence are immaterial.
Appealed decision reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises is absolved from liability.

Ratio:
One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting
thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the
child is technically a trespasser in the premises. This is the doctrine of
attractive nuisance. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition
or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so
enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach,
get on or use it, and this' attractiveness is an implied invitation to such
children.
The majority of American jurisprudence posits that the doctrine of
attractive nuisance is generally not applicable to bodies of water, whether
artificial or natural. The exception to this is if there is some unusual condition
 44

or artificial feature other than mere water and its location. Furthermore, in
Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co., the Indiana Appellate Court explained why
bodies of water are not considered as attractive nuisance. It ruled that children
have been instructed early on to exercise caution around bodies of water and
are presumed to know the danger.

Dissent of J. Pablo: Children are naturally curious and do not have perfect
knowledge of things. They are amazed by the natural attraction of the waters
and shall explore where their curiosity leads them unless there is something
that prevents them. As such, petitioners should have placed fences around
the ponds as an ordinary precaution. (Note: translated and paraphrased from
Spanish text)

oTaylor, supra INCOMPLETE

 45

c.Assumption of Risk

-2075, Nov. 29, 1949

MARGARITA AFIALDA, Plaintiff-Appellant

VS

BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, Defendants-Appellees

G.R. No. L-2075 [November 29, 1949]

Facts of the Case:

Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as

caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while
he was tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and consequently
died of his injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder sister who depended
on him for support, filed the action for damages. The complaint was
dismissed by the trial court upon granting a motion to dismiss filed by spouses
Hisole. Subsequently, the plaintiff had taken the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when

damage is caused to the animal’s caretaker.

Ruling of the Court:

Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage
caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had
been negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. In the case
at hand, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker,
who was paid for his work as such. Thus, it was his business to try to prevent
the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being
injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of
the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take
the consequences. Deceased does not fall within the ambit of “stranger”,
which is significant for the claim for damages under the said article.

Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come under
Article 1905 of the Civil Code but under the labor laws, i.e.
 46

Workmen’s Compensation Act. The complaint contained no allegation as to

constitute liability under the Civil Code nor the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Hence, it alleges no cause of action.

The order appealed from was affirmed.

 47

d.Fortuitous Event (Art. 1174)

[G.R. No. 71871. November 6, 1989.]

TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ v. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION

ON AUDIT.

Facts:

Petitioner Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC disbursing officer of the

Ternate Beach Project. On that unfortunate day, he encashed the checks for
the salaries and wages of the workers. However, it took him until afternoon
so he opted on going home for the night as it would be more practical than
heading straight to Ternate. On his way to Marilao, he was robbed. He tried
to chase after the robbers and caught up with one of them.

He requested to be relieved from money accountability and the

General manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority indorsed it to the
Regional Director of COA, until it reached the COA Chairman who denied the
request stating that Hernandez was negligent.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner Hernandez was negligent.

Ruling:

No. As for Hernandez’s choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate,

Cavite, one could easily agree that the former was the safer destination,
being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips to the two
places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he
should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that
time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent
person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in broad
daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of
other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of his
imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event
covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been
reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did.
 48

-87584

Southeastern College Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126389 – July 10, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondents are owners of a house near the petitioner’s four-story

school building along the same road. During a typhoon, the roof of the
petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away by strong winds,
landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’
house. In the aftermath, an ocular inspection of the destroyed building was
spearheaded by the city building official. In his report, he imputed negligence
to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building and improper
anchorage of trusses to the roof beams which caused the roof be ripped off
the building, thereby causing damage to the property of respondents.
Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based on
culpa aquiliana. Petitioner contested that it had no liability, attributing the
damage to a fortuitous event. RTC ruled in favor of respondents which was
affirmed by the CA. Hence present petition.’

ISSUE:

Whether or not the damage, in legal sense, can be attributed to a fortuitous

event.

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that petitioner is not liable, the damage being attributable
to a fortuitous event.

Art 1174 of the Civil Code states that: “Except in cases expressly specified
by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when
the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable”

To be liable for a fortuitous event, the respondent must prove that petitioners
were negligent, with which they fall short, merely relying on the report of the
city building official. This is the same official that have approved the building
plans of petitioner, who made clear that there were no prior complaints
regarding the building. Since storms are common in the country, the part of
 49

the building in question should have failed against stronger typhoons that
preceded said storm, which it had not. Furthermore, petitioner was able to
present evidence that regular maintenance was carried out. Respondents also
failed to support the claim of the actual loss they suffered, merely relying on
estimates without considering that wear and tear of respondents’ home which
may have had a contributory effect to the damage. Petition is granted and
challenged decision is reversed.
 50

e.Last Clear Chance

FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the
bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across
the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart
has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is
here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
 51

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular

case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute
the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a

result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side
of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
 52

-7664, Aug. 29, 1958

Lessons Applicable: Neglignce (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 July 5, 1952 1:45 p.m.: For the 4th or 5th time, Dominador Ong, a 14-
year old high school student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and
Eusebio, went to Metropolitan Water District's recreational swimming
pools charging a nominal fee (P0.50 for adults; P0.20 for children)
 4:35 p.m.: Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the
locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke
 Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving
Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he
left the pool to get a bottle of coke.
 Lifeguards Manuel Abaño (8 am - 12 nn;2 pm - 6 pm) and Mario
Villanueva (7:30-11:30 am;2:30 to 4:30 pm) were on duty
 4-5 pm: there were about 20 bathers inside the pool area and Manuel
Abaño was going around the pools to observe the bathers in compliance
with the instructions of his chief
 4:40-4:45 p.m: some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather
by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under
water for quite a long time
 Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening so
he immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the
apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom
 The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately
applied manual artificial respiration
 Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance,
followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being called
by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep
carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving
he injected the boy with camphorated oil
 After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao
from the University of the Philippines
 Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration, and when
this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two
oxygen tanks were exhausted
 Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator, but the
same became of no use because he found the boy already dead. The
doctor ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.
 The autopsy of Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal Division
of the NBI found that the death was due to asphyxia by submersion in
water.
 lower court: dismissed the complaint
 53

 Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong: failure of the lifeguard Abaño to

immediately respond to their call may and even if it be assumed that the
deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, defendants
may still be held liable under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the
reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do
so

ISSUE: W/N the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of Metropolitan Water District and/or its employees

HELD: NO. decision appealed from is affirmed

 Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable
negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming
damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the
fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of
one of his employees
 The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged
is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the
party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury
 Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial
court, which we find supported by the evidence: "There is (also) a strong
suggestion coming from the expert evidence presented by both parties
that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water was only 5.5 feet
deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against
the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and
which to his drowning. As a boy scout he must have received instructions
in swimming. He knew, or have known that it was dangerous for him to
dive in that part of the pool."
 54

FACTS: Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo
at the wheel, as it approached a bridge going towards the direction of Davao
City. At about that time, the cargo truck, Zacarias coming from the opposite
direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after
crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence
of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical
injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the
truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,\ was extensively
damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the
asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped
on its wheels on the road.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the
late Engineer Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck with
the CFI of Bohol.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint “for insufficiency of

evidence”

The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on the

plaintiffs’ appeal, reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias
to be negligent and his negligence “gave rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and
solidary.” It therefore ordered “the defendants jointly and solidarily to
indemnify the plaintiffs
The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for a
reversal of the judgment of the IAC which, it is claimed, ignored or ran
counter to the established facts
ISSUE:

1. WON the decision o fthe IAC was erroneous

2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case

HELD: , the appealed judgment of the IAC is hereby REVERSED

1. YES

The SC found Calibo negligent instead, because of the following:

 55

1. it is alleged that at the time of the collision, the truck was occupying 25
cm of the jeep’s lane. However it was found out that the center stripe of the
road is misaligned and with the correct calculation of the width of the road,
the truck on still on its proper lane and it was actually the jeep who is
intruding the truck’s lane.

2. Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Zacarias had acted
negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane
upon the coming of the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, as
has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep’s way
as said Court would have had him do. And even supposing that he was in
fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still
30 meters away cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent action.

3. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the

police, Calibo’s companions, Roranes and Patos, who suffered injuries on
account of the collision, refused to be so investigated or give statements to
the police officers is a “telling indication that they did not attribute the
happening to defendant Zacarias’ negligence or fault.” 7
The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter;
there are also quite a few significant indicators that it was rather Engineer
Calibo’s negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Zacarias
had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later confirmed
in his written statement at the police headquarters that the jeep had been
“zigzagging,” which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically
at the time. The other investigator also testified that eyewitnesses to the
accident had remarked on the jeep’s “zigzagging.” There was also testimony
that Calibo was drunk while driving the jeep.

2. YES

Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of

Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in
failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was,
the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable
responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each
other’s vehicle from a distance of 150 meters. The truck had been brought
to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the
logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial
doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his
 56

turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had
sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per
hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve
and leave him a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the
1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of facts.
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his
employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the
evidence supports the latter’s additional defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not
be undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record which
has not been controverted.

NOTES:
It must be pointed out, however, that IAC also seriously erred in holding the
petitioners Agad and Felix Lim solidarily liable for the damages awarded in
its appealed decision, as alleged owners, with petitioner George Lim, of Glan
People’s Lumber and Hardware, employer of petitioner Zacarias. This
manifestly disregarded, not only the certificate of registration issued by the
Bureau of Domestic Trade identifying Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware as
a business name registered by George Lim, but also unimpugned allegations
into the petitioners’ answer to the complaint that Pablo S. Agad was only an
employee of George Lim and that Felix Lim, then a child of only eight (8)
years, was in no way connected with the business.

In conclusion, it must also be stated that there is no doubt of this Court’s

power to review the assailed decision of the IAC under the authority of
precedents recognizing exceptions to the familiar rule binding it to observe
and respect the latter’s findings of fact. Many of those exceptions may be
cited to support the review here undertaken, but only the most obvious —
that said findings directly conflict with those of the Trial Court — will suffice.
In the opinion of this Court and after a careful review of the record, the
evidence singularly fails to support the findings of the IAC which, for all that
appears, seem to have been prompted rather by sympathy for the heirs of
the deceased Engineer Calibo than by an objective appraisal of the proofs
and a correct application of the law to the established facts. Compassion for
the plight of those whom an accident has robbed of the love and support of a
husband and father is an entirely natural and understandable sentiment. It
should not, however, be allowed to stand in the way of, much less to
influence, a just verdict in a suit at law.
 57

-51, Nov. 14, 1989

Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7
other people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a
picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa
spouses
 While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about
20 kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila,
encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
with it.
 As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar
Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries.
Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages
arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
 PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the
accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
 CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who
had the chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence

HELD: NO.
 Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to
defeat claim for damages
 For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that
the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident
was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it
 there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger
 When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on
his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder
on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return
the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the
opposite direction
 58

 Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few
seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
 last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered
 59

f.Prescription (Art 1146)

-41767, Aug. 23, 1978

Ferrer vs. Ericta

No. L-41767. August 23, 1978

SUMMARY:
An action for damages based on a quasi-delict must be filed within four (4)
years from the date the quasi-delict is committed (Art. 1146, par 2, Civil
Code). Dennis Pfleider, a sixteen-year old son of defendants Mr. and Mrs.
Francis Pfleider, caused physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer who was a
passenger in a pick-up car driven by the said Dennis Pfleider. The incident
occurred on December 31, 1970. The action for damages was filed by the
plaintiff against the defendants on January 6, 1975. The defendants claimed
that the action had already prescribed. The court ruled that there is no issue
of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription. The complaint
alleges that the accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff
Annette Ferrer occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the
action for damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages
arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years.
The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the
date of the accident. The action was properly dismissed.

FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up
car. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 31, 1970, their son,
defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was then only sixteen (16) years of age,
without proper official authority, drove the for pick-up, without due regard to
traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent injury to persons or damage to property. The pickup car was
overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then
a passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required medical
treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more than two (2) years;
that as a result of the physical injuries sustained by Annette, she suffered
unimaginable physical pain, mental anguish, and her parents also suffered
mental anguish, moral shock and spent a considerable sum of money for her
treatment. They prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse them for
actual expenses as well as other damages.

The complaint was only filed on January 6, 1975.

 60

At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only Ferrer and counsel were present. As
such the Pfleiders were declared in default and the court rendered judgment
against them. Upon filing a motion for reconsideration, respondent judge,
without setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving
defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint states no
cause of action because it does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with
his parents at the time of the vehicular accident, considering that under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity the
mother, are only responsible for the damages caused by their minor children
who live in their company; and (b) that the defense of prescription is
meritorious, since the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the
date of the accident, and the action to recover damages based on quasi-delict
prescribes in four (4) years. Hence, the instant petition for mandamus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by
private respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.

RULING:
Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved
in the defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead
prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the defense of
prescription. The defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense raises
issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading.

It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same
is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this particular
instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been
declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows
that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is based is already
barred by the statute of limitations.

In the present case, there is no issue of tact involved in connection with the
question of prescription. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that
the accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff Annette Ferrer
occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for damages
was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical
injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. The four-year period
begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus DISMISSED, without

pronouncement as to costs.
 61

KRAMER v CA,
G.R. No. L-83524, October 13, 1989

FACTS: April 8, 1976- F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners
Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from
Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago,
the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia
Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish
catch.

After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine
protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard.
The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the
proximate cause of the maritime collision.

The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish
catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the
private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines
during the collision.

May 30, 1985 (9 years after the incident) - The petitioners instituted a
Complaint for damages against the private respondent the Regional Trial Court

RESPOPNDENTS: PETITIONERS:
He argued that Contended that
under Article maritime
1146 of the Civil collisions have
Code, the peculiarities and
prescriptive characteristics
period for which only
instituting a persons with
Complaint for special skill,
damages arising training and
from a quasi- experience like
delict like a the members of
maritime the Board of
collision is four Marine Inquiry
years. He can properly
maintained that analyze and
 62

the petitioners resolve. The

should have filed petitioners
their Complaint argued that the
within four years running of the
from the date prescriptive
when their cause period was
of action accrued, tolled by the
i.e., from April 8, filing of the
1976 when the marine protest
maritime collision and that their
took place, cause of action
accrued only
the Complaint filed on April 29,
on May 30, 1985 1982, the date
was instituted when the
beyond the four- Decision
year prescriptive ascertaining
period. the negligence
of the crew of
the M/V Asia
Philippines had
become final,
and that the
four-year
prescriptive
period under
Article 1146 of
the Civil Code
should be
computed from
the said date.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period for filing the complaint has
been prescribed

RTC: CA:
The trial court Private
observed that in respondents
ascertaining should have
negligence immediately
relating to a instituted a
maritime complaint for
 63

collision, there is damages based

a need to rely on on a quasi-delict
highly technical within four years
aspects from the said
attendant to marine incident
such collision, because its
and that the cause of action
Board of Marine had already
Inquiry was definitely
constituted ripened at the
pursuant to the onset of the
Philippine collision.
Merchant Marine
Rules and
Regulations

The trial court

went on to say
that the four-
year prescriptive
period provided
in Article 1146 of
the Civil Code
should begin to
run only from
April 29, 1982,
the date when
the negligence of
the crew of the
M/V Asia
Philippines had
been finally
ascertained.

HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4)
years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed.

RATIO: In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 17 this

Court held as follows-

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
 64

whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;

b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right;
and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs
or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen
...

From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be
counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time
of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the
plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an

administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was
caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action
for damages.
 65

August 14, 2019

66