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Why did Iran

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Introduction

This paper argues that the most important reason for Iran pursuing a policy

of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in the years 1990- 2005 was the role that key

individuals played in initiating a more conciliatory attitude, specifically Hatemi

Rafsanjani (President of Iran 1989-1997), and Mohammad Khatami (President of Iran

1997-2005) to a lesser extent. Nonetheless, the rapprochement cannot exclusively

be explained through an entirely individual level lens, but must also consider the

neoclassical realist theory, which incorporates a neorealist balance of threat theory

and domestic factors. The focus of this paper will be on Irans pursuit of the

rapprochement between the 1990 Gulf War and the 2005 election of Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad. Firstly, a review of the existing literature will be provided, which

assesses the importance of various literatures and their contribution to the empirical

argument, as well as what they fail to explain. Secondly, a theoretical framework will

be given, suggesting theories as to why countries pursue an alliance or

rapprochement in general. Thirdly, an empirical argument will be structured around

the theoretical framework, highlighting three key areas of exploration; firstly, the

centrality of Rafsanjani and Khatami to the rapprochement will be explained using

foreign policy analysis; secondly, under the neoclassical realist umbrella, the

neorealist balance of threat theory will focus on the reorientation phase,1

following Iraqs invasion of Kuwait; and thirdly, and under the same umbrella, Irans

dire domestic economic situation will be shown to have caused its leaders to

1
Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a
Penetrated Regional System, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 44

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bandwagon-for-profit.2 No one theory can be taken on its own, and so this paper will

show the interconnectedness of each theory, to the main cause of the

rapprochement, which were the catalytic roles played by Rafsanjani and Khatami.

Following the Iranian revolution in 1979, relations with Saudi Arabia almost

immediately turned hostile. However, after the economically devastating Iran- Iraq

War 1980-1988, and Iraqs invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 19903, a similarity of

interests between Iran and Saudi Arabia began to emerge, that carried through until

2005, culminating in the Cooperation Agreement in 1998 and Security Accord in

2001.4 These agreements do not just indicate a simple rapprochement, but if one

were to take Walts definition, an alliance: a formal or informal arrangement for

security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.5 The rapprochement is

of great interest due to the constant flux of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia

throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century. Iranian- Saudi Arabian

relations are vital not only to regional security, but to global economic security as a

whole, since the shared Strait of Hormuz is one of the busiest shipping lanes for one

third of the worlds oil.6

2
Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, The MIT Press, Summer 1994, p. 79.
3
The Iraqi Invasion; In Two Arab Capitals, Gunfire and Fear, Victory and Cheers, 3rd August 1990, The
New York Times, accessed at: [Link]
[Link]
4
Adel Al-Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State identity in Foreign policy Decision Making: The Rise
and Demise of Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement (1997-2009), London School of Economics, London,
October 2012, p. 207
5
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 12.
6
Charles G. Macdonald, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea: Political Interaction and Legal
Development in the Persian Gulf, Contributions in Political Science, Volume XV, No. 48, Conneticut,
Greenwood Press, 1980, p. 68.

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Literature Review

Toraifis paper studies the concept of state identity and its role in foreign

policy.7 Although a constructivist approach, it provides a useful insight into the rise

of Khatami as instrumental in the rapprochement process, and Ahmadinejad as

almost solely responsible for its demise.8 Toraifi also builds on Alon, who notes the

importance of both domestic and external factors, which shape a states foreign

policy decisions at any given time. Nevertheless, Toraifis main argument is not

greatly considered, since his constructivist simplification of the Sunni Shia divide will

be considered a constant non-variable because both states do not have the capacity

to keep a particular narrative going.9 While this does not explain why there would

be a rapprochement, the paper provides empirical evidence that can be used to

support the neoclassical realist argument, and more importantly, the role of

individual leaders.

Finding specific literature on the individual role of Rafsanjani and Khatami in

foreign policy decision-making proved to be difficult, although it is clear that much of

the research certainly points to the centrality of their role. Rakel applauds

Rafsanjanis necessary pragmatic approach for the economic reconstruction of Iran,

showing the crossover between domestic economic problems and the foreign policy

decisions of the leader.10 Ramazani also implies a clear link between Rafsanjani and

7
Al-Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State identity in Foreign Policy Decision Making, n.p.
8
Al-Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State identity in Foreign Policy Decision Making, p. 5.
9
Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, Stanford University Press, 1991, p. 54
10
Eva Patricia Rakel, Iranian Foreign Policy Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979-2006, Brill,
Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, Vol. 6, Issue 1, Brill p. 160-171.

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the foreign policy decision to bandwagon with Saudi Arabia, against the security

threat of Iraq.11 Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam gives even greater

support for the relationship between these two factors, and provides clear evidence

of personal favours between leaders of both states, which had reciprocal benefit for

their respective nations.12 Pipes and Clawson insinuate a link between Irans change

of leadership and parting from Islamic economic principles, showing the link

between individual leaders and domestic factors.13 This is supported by Maloney,

although she strongly criticizes Khatamis economic policy failures.14 Thalers foreign

policy analysis of the factional competition between different branches of Iranian

government provides an insight into the internal politics among Irans elite.

However, this paper does not have the scope to discuss such disagreements, and

thus the state will be seen as a single, unitary actor.15

Before explaining research relevant to the neorealist balance of threat

theory, it is important to clarify why the realist balance of power theory is not

included in this paper. Chubin and Tripps work provides a clear framework for a

balance of power triangle between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.16 However, far from

seeing the potential for a balance of threat bandwagoning scenario, they, like Gause
11
Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Irans Foreign Policy: Both North and South, Middle East Journal, Vol. 46,
No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 398.
12
Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell, Robert A. Guffey,
Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for US Policy,
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation-National Security Research Division, 2009, n.p.
13
D. Pipes and P. Clawson, Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbours, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1,
America and the World, 1992, p. 125.
14
Suzanne Maloney, Irans Political Economy Since The Revolution, Cambridge University Press,
2015, p. 312.
15
David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrol D. Green, Charlotte Lynch and Frederic
Wehrey, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyards: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, Rand
Corporation, 2010, p. xiv.
16
Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran- Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order, Adelphi Paper
304, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, November 1996, p. 3.

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choose instead to focus on the structural, geopolitical and ideational factors limiting

Irans cooperation with Saudi Arabia.17 This realist concept is relevant insofar as

there is indeed a balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabia, however this

does not explain why Iran underwent a rapprochement. Instead, Bahgats paper

provides an insight into how whilst relations were previously sour, the need to

incorporate the threat of Iraq into both of their security agendas has brought Iran

towards Saudi Arabia in the form of bandwagoning.18 Schwellers theoretical paper,

in conjunction with Maloneys empirical research, are perhaps the strongest sources

supporting the relationship between neorealist bandwagoning, and domestic

economic factors, as they incorporate Irans need to bandwagon with Saudi Arabia

for security and for profit.

Authors useful for studying domestic economic factors behind Irans

rapprochement include Gheissari, and Alnasrawi. Gheissari provides qualitative data

on infrastructure projects in Iran, which support the idea of Rafsanjani and Khatamis

economic policies being effective.19 Alnasrawi provides the quantitative background

for the diabolical state of the Iranian economy, following the Iran-Iraq war.20 Wendt

advocates an analysis of domestic factors; stating that nations interact as state-

society complexes, where societal grievances influence the states foreign policy.21

This is a relevant conclusion, since Iran had been suffering from war with Iraq in the

17
Gregory Gause III, Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf, Security
Studies 13, No. 2, Winter 2003/4, n.p.
18
Gawdat Bahgat, Iranian-Saudi Rapprochement: Prospects and Implications, World Affairs, Vol.
162, No. 3, Sage Publications, Winter 2000, p. 109.
19
Ali Gheissari, Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics, Oxford University Press, 2009, n.p.
20
Abbas Alnasrawi, Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No.
3, Taylor & Francis, July 1986, n.p.
21
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press 1999, p. 197-
198.

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1980s, and was constantly under economic and social hardship, particularly during

the 1990s full trade embargo by the United States of America.22 This points to

cooperation not necessarily being a choice, but rather a domestic economic and

political necessity for survival. This corroborates with Barnett and Levy who argued

states make alliances to secure material resources that can then be used to counter

domestic threats to the regime. 23Migdal offers a counter argument to this saying

public opinion in third world states often carries little influence, and bureaucracies

play only a minor role in foreign policy.24

Theoretical Framework

A review of the majority of Iranian foreign policy decisions made in

1990-2005 clearly shows that the centrality of the individual had an inexplicable link

with the foreign policy itself. Foreign policy analysis will be included in the argument

of individual leadership factors, since Foreign policy analysis is necessarily

concernedwith the actors involved in the states formal decision-making.25 Foreign

policy analysis will exclusively be used on the individual level to assess Rafsanjani

and Khatamis contribution to the rapprochement.26 Although realism is not talked

about in this paper, a realist assumption will be made: the state is seen as a unitary

and rational actor, rendering it unnecessary to analyse the role of the discrete

22
Chubin and Tripp, Iran- Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order, p. 43.
23
Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of
Egypt, 1962-73, International Organisation, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 370.
24
Joel S. Migdal, Internal Structure and External Behaviour: Explaining Foreign Policies of Third World
States, International Relations 4, May 1974, p. 519-520.
25
Al- Toraifi Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 35.
26
Chris Alden and Ammon Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches, Routledge, 2012, p. 2.

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components of government in order to assess state foreign policy.27 Hassan

supports this unitary view by suggesting the leader is the state: in the Arab world

there are no state-to-state economic agreements, only person-to-person ones.28

David Welch also suggests that foreign policy change can be linked to leaders fear

that continuing with the status quo will generate ever more painful losses. 29 Who

Leads Matters is an important theoretical study of how single dominant leaders

prioritise foreign policy as a means to entrench the well-being of the existing

regime.30 Welch also suggests that in periods of flux or instability, there is a strong

tendency for a contraction of authority to the highest levels of government, which

places a greater importance of the individual leader.31 This is evident in cases of

international security in the United States in regards to Trumps executive order on

immigration,32 as well as Iran, since foreign policy decisions are made almost

exclusively by the President. A question asked by Greenstein is would the

rapprochement have taken place if Rafsanjani [and/or Khatami] was not in

power?33 The answer to this question will form a key part of the empirical analysis

and ultimately argues that no rapprochement wouldve taken place without both

leaders.34

27
Alden and Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches, p. 3.
28
Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology, Cambridge
University Press, 2005, p. 281.
29
Alden and Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches, p. 12.
30
Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, Timothy M. Shaw, Who Leads Matters:
The Effects of Powerful Individuals, International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, Leaders, Groups, and
Coalitions: Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking, Wiley, Summer 2001, p.
85.
31
Hermann, et al., Who Leads Matters, p. 85.
32
Donald Trump Gets Tough on Refugees, 28th January 2017, The Economist, accessed at
[Link]
33
David P. Houghton, Political Psychology: Situations, Individuals, and Cases, Routledge, 2009, p.
101.
34
Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, Jack Levy, The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, Oxford
University Press, 2014, p. 314.

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The neoclassical realist theory incorporates both the neorealist balance of

threat theory and the domestic economic situation. Lobell states how leaders face a

two-level game, where they must respond to both the external international political

environment, and the domestic pressures from the state-society complex.35 The

neorealist case rejects the balance of power theory advocated by Waltz36, and

instead replaces it with Walts concept of balance of threat. Asymmetries of power,

whether economic or military can create threat perception and in the worse case

scenario, interstate conflict.37 Key to this is the bandwagoning theory which

involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions

to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role.38 In this case Iran, having

been weakened from war, is the state bandwagoning with the dominant power,

Saudi Arabia. An important tool that interconnects domestic economic factors and

bandwagoning is Davids work on omnibalancing. This builds on the neorealist

balance of threat theory and can be distinguished from bandwagoning as it

incorporates both external and internal threats to the leadership in particular, as

opposed to the state in general. This integrates the needs of states to balance

against both internal and external threats in order to survive.39 Barnett and Levy

build on this further in their assessment of Egypts alliance policy. Focusing on the

ruler of a state, their paper shows how leaders may actually prefer external

35
Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, The State, and
Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 7.
36
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, 1979, p. 127.
37
Lawrence Rubin, Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics, Stanford University Press,
2014, p. 8.
38
Stephen M. Walt, Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 2, Spring 1988, p. 282.
39
Stephen David, Explaining Third World Alignment, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2, Cambridge
University Press, January 1991, p. 236.

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alignments to internal mobilization as a strategy to provide for their security in the

face of external threats,40 as internal mobilization can risk domestic subversion,

should the policy fail, as indeed both leaders economic policies did to some extent.

This integrates balance of threat theory, domestic economic factors, and the role of

the individual leader, key to showing the interconnected reasons for Irans

rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.

The neoclassical realist theory also sees foreign policy responses as a product

of tacit state-society coordination.41 This can incorporate social factors, but more

relevant in this case are the economic factors. Domestic economic factors will in this

case reflect on the leaders foreign policy stance. To this end, Schwellers work on

bandwagoning for profit provides a broader definition of bandwagoning to

incorporate not just security interests, but economic threats as well: the goal of

bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted.42 Building on

Larson, Schweller explicitly argues that states will bandwagon with global or regional

hegemonic powers as part of a policy to improve ones own economic welfare.43 For

example, the South East Asian states bandwagon with China for economic gain.44

Whilst looking at Jordans relations with other Arab states, Brand also points out that

alliance formation may come about as a response to threats to state financial

40
Barnett and Levy, Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments, p. 370.
41 Lobell et al., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy,, p. 27.
42
Schweller, Bandwagoning For Profit, p. 74.
43
Schweller, Bandwagoning For Profit, p. 77.
44
Charles Chonghan Wu, Hierarchy and Bandwagoning in Asia- The Rise of China and its Grand
Strategy in the Post-Cold War era, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 2009, p. 14.

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solvency.45 This is also backed up by Davids tool of omnibalancing, and the

neorealist balance of threat theory as well: The claim that fragile elites often

bandwagon with secondary adversaries to counter their principal domestic

[economic] threats is consistent with Walts general argument that states balance

against the most dangerous threat to their survival.46 Thus the relationship

between the neorealist balance of threat theory, and domestic economic concerns

can clearly be seen. And since the importance of the President is so great in Iran, this

also shows the pervasiveness of the individual leader as well.

Research Design

Despite relatively less literature focusing on this period of Saudi Arabia and

Irans relationship, there were no difficulties concerning the quantity and

accessibility of resources. Irans rapprochement was chosen as a case study of

assessing alliance behavior because it shows that despite some fundamental, non-

variable differences in identity and ideology, Iran still pursued warmer relations with

what others would see as an uneasy neighbour. The explanation of Irans

rapprochement also provides a useful insight into the alliance behavior of Middle

East states, with a similar outcome if one were to compare Iraqs relationship to

Saudi Arabia after 2005, when Ahmedinejads hardline attitude prompted Saudi

Arabia to reestablish closer relations with Iraq. This case study shows that no one

single theory can be used to explain alliance behavior. Given more time and space,

45
Laurie A. Brand, Jordans Inter Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1994, p. 15-16.
46
Schweller, Bandwagoning For Profit, p. 77.

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this paper would take into greater account the structure of the Iranian political

system, which would help explain the conflicting messages received by Saudi Arabia

from Iranian officials,47 as well as the significant friction between the President and

the Guardian Council, who vetoed 100 pieces of legislation against Rafsanjani.48 The

viewpoint of Saudi Arabia would also be an important addition to the topic, as

although it was Iran that pursued rapprochement, it was Saudi Arabia who received

it and reciprocated the rapprochement. Finally, the fourth part of the relationship

triangle-web, the United States of America must be added into the equation, since

Irans relations with Saudi Arabia is strongly influenced by the relations of both

states with the Unites States.49 Further still, in addition to these empirical

considerations, this paper has left out constructivist and realist theories, both of

which have implications on the extent of the rapprochement. Despite Iran openly

offering Saudi Arabia the use of its missiles, Saudi Arabia still felt Iran to be an

unreliable ally, even after the Security Agreement, which points to their grounding in

realist balance of power theory, and constructivist identity conflict.50 Thus this case

study was selected out of the desire to explain one of the key turbulent

relationships, in the complex cobweb of Middle East friends and foe.

47
Prince Turki al-Faisal, 1st November 2010, in Al- Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State Identity in
Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 167.
48
Maloney, Irans Political Economy Since the Revolution, p. 185.
49
Chubin and Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order, p. 3.
50 Al- Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 215.

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Empirical Analysis

Foreign policy analysis has provided the necessary means to analyse the importance

of Rafsanjani and Khatami in the rapprochement process. The change brought about

by Rafsanjani can be seen as a reaction to the huge social discontent with the

existing theocratic regime, which suggests that David Welchs point with regard to

fearing the status-quo to be true. Toraifi describes how Khomeinis passing in 1989

meant the two countries saw prospects for normalization [under a reformist leader],

showing the impact of the absence of a radical leader.51 As a result, instead of

retaining hardline social and economic policies, Rafsanjani alone moved towards

more liberal economic policies and deregulation.52 The change was a personal

reflection of Rafsanjani wishing to demonstrate competency and consistency in his

pragmatism.53 In regards to bandwagoning with Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the

rapprochement, Rafsanjani himself took a political risk by publically stating we have

no objection to [the foreign forces] obstructing [Iraqs] aggression54, something

over which religious members of the government may have had objections. This

personal risk to state ideology was carried on through the Khatami period, since

both Iran and Saudi Arabia had a common interest in keeping Iraq under control. 55

It was Khatami who really tested the bounds of Presidential authority, enforcing a

nonideological aspect of Irans foreign policy,56 promoting a good neighbour

51
Al- Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 18.
52
Ehteshami, The Foreign Policy of Iran, in Anoushivaran Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch,
The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Lynne Reinner, 2001, p. 290
53
Mahboubeh F. Sadeghinia, Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf: With Special Reference to
Irans Foreign Policy, Ithaca Press, Reading, 2011, p. 161.
54
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, p. 301.
55
Rakel, Iranian Foreign Policy Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution, p. 177.
56
Thaler, et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyards, p. 26.

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policy,57 and establishing a Dialogue Among Civilizations.58 Indeed, Khatami was

earlier forced out of Rafsanjanis cabinet for being too liberal.59 This shows the

extent to which Khatami went to appear a successful foreign policy leader. This

appearance was an important cover, since both Rafsanjanis and Khatamis

presidencies were mired with economic failure. 60 Economic growth was still strongly

tied to oil prices, and it fluctuated roughly in correlation, from 12% in 1991, to 0% in

1994, and 7% in 2002.61 There was much violence under Rafsanjanis following his

Foreign Exchange crisis in 1993, and inflation crisis in his second 5-year plan.62

Furthermore, under Khatami, unemployment doubled in 5 years, despite oil

revenues rising after 1999. Thus foreign rapprochement was used to cover up

domestic economic policy failures, which proves Davids theory of omnibalancing to

threats both internal (economic) and threats external (Iraq). Whilst most analysis

shows the rapprochement derives from Khatami and his Security Agreement, this is

partially false, since relations began to thaw in 1991, six years before Khatamis

election, when Rafsanjani became President.63

Secondly, the geostrategic position of Iraq presents the most direct threat to

Irans security.64 In a purely securitized perspective, Chubin and Tripp describe how

57
Wehrey et al., Saudi Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam, p. 20.
58
Anoushivaran Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Irans Foreign Policy: From Khatami to
Ahmedinejad, Ithaca Press, 2011, p. 121.
59
Maloney, Irans Political Economy Since the Revolution, p. 263.
60
Al- Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 207.
61
Gheissari, Contemporary Iran, p. 7.
62
Fariba Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran, trans. Jonathan Derrick, London: Hurst & Company, 1999,
pp. 29-53.
63
Gwenn Okruhlik, Saudi Arabian- Iranian Relation: External Rapprochement and Internal
Consolidation, Middle East Policy, Vol X, No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 114.
64
Thomas Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy,
Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 104.

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at any one moment the theoretical triangle between Iran, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq,

means two states constrain the other.65 Thus, Iraqs internationally condemned

invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990, presented an opportunity for Iran to win the

favour of Saudi Arabia, who like Iran, began to fear Iraqs hegemonic ambitions to

take over the Gulf region. Despite the opportunity to help Mohammad Bakr al-

Hakims Shia uprising in Iraq, Iran chose to bandwagon with the Saudi Arabia-USA

coalition.66 Thus this bandwagoning showed how Irans foreign policy responses to

external insecurity do not fit the realist paradigm, since it chooses to bandwagon

rather than balance against Saudi Arabia.67 This shows that Bahgats analysis,

mentioned in the literature review, to be true. Further still, what started off as a

short term Iranian policy of isolating Iraq through rapprochement with Saudi Arabia,

continued to guide Irans foreign policy after the ceasefire.68 With Iraq outlawed

from Gulf politics, Irans prevalence and importance vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia was

enhanced.69 This also proves part of Davids omnibalancing theory, which appeases

secondary adversaries. As a result, the bandwagoning theory is central to the Iran-

Saudi Arabia rapprochement immediately after the Gulf War. To return to

Greensteins question- had Rafsanjani not led the reformists to a rapprochement,

and instead hardline Islamists in government remained in power, remnants of

Khomeinis absolutism would likely have prevailed.70 Thus Rafsanjanis role in this

bandwagoning was essential.

65
Chubin and Tripp, Iran- Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order, p. 3.
66
Ramazani, Irans Foreign Policy, p. 398.
67
Gheissari, Contemporary Iran, p. 331.
68
Al- Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 166.
69
Chubin and Tripp, Iran- Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order, p. 20.
70
Al- Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 18.

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It is during periods of crisis that domestic politics influences a states foreign

policy most heavily.71 Firstly, the Iranian government estimates the Iran-Iraq war

cost the state $200 billion up to the end of 1984 alone.72 In addition, exports had

collapsed by 25%,73 manufacturing was running at 40% capacity,74 inflation was 29%,

per capita income had shrunk by 45%,75 and consumer prices rose 600% offsetting a

120% increase in wages.76 During the war, Rafsanjani even managed to convince

Khomeini to pursue foreign aid, directly contradicting the Supreme Leaders desire

for isolationism, to achieve true independence.77 This points toward the desperate

need for Iran to move towards a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, which may be

described as an economisation of foreign policy.78 This disproves Migdals theory

that the society has little influence on state policy. Such was the extent of

Rafsanjanis efforts, and Khatamis later on, that Saudi Arabia boycotted the US-

sponsored MENA Economic Summit in Doha, to show its solidarity with Iran, and a

$15 million joint industrial committee was set up, which boosted bilateral trade from

$90 million in 1999 to $248 million in 2001.79 Saudi Arabia even purchased Iranian

military equipment, and further still, there were $550 million in commercial

exchanges by 2005.80 This appears to be the perfect example of a leader looking to

foreign policy to solve persistent domestic economic problems, which threaten their

own leadership, proving Barnett and Levys theory that leaders conduct foreign

71
Al- Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 24
72
Alnasrawi, Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War, p. 883.
73
Maloney, Irans Political Economy Since the Revolution, p. 194.
74
Maloney, Irans Political Economy Since the Revolution, p. 194.
75
Maloney, Irans Political Economy Since the Revolution, p. 194.
76
Iran Times October 16th 1992, in Kaveh Ehsani, Tilt But Dont Spill: Irans Development and
Reconstruction Dilemma, Middle East Report, November/December 1994, Vol. 24, No. 13, p. 21.
77
Ehteshami and Zweiri, Irans Foreign Policy, p. 9.
78
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, p, 290.
79
Okruhlik, Saudi Arabian- Iranian Relation,p. 117-119.
80
Al- Toraifi, Understanding the Role of State Identity p. 208.

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policy with the view to maintaining power.81 Moreover, the fact that it was

Khatamis visit to Jeddah which led to a chain of regional and security agreements,

including 202 clauses covering terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking, and

immigration, shows the importance of the Iranian President in conducting state

relations, on an individual level, as suggested by Hassan. This also reaffirms

Schwellers theory that states bandwagon not just out of security, but also out of the

desperate need for economic gain. Indeed, once Iraq had been humiliated by its

defeat in the First Gulf War, and invasion in 2003, it is most likely that throughout

the time period the rapprochement was driven not by security considerations, but

by domestic economic considerations, which may render omnibalancing as less of a

factor.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on the case study of Iran pursuing a rapprochement with

Saudi Arabia, and has shown that the role of the individual leaders, Rafsanjani and

Khatami, are the most important reason for that rapprochement. In addition, this

paper has also shown the important role that neoclassical realist theory plays in

explaining the rapprochement. In particular, the balance of threat theory shows how

Iran did indeed bandwagon with Saudi Arabia, out of fear from Iraq, proving Bahgats

contentions to be true. Through a domestic economic analysis, one can see the

desperate need for Iran to pursue Schwellers theory of bandwagoning for profit.

Thus Wendt was correct in assuming a state-society complex, whereby the domestic

can influence foreign policy to some degree. Barnett and Levys theory of leaders

81
Rakel, Iranian Foreign Policy Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution, p. 177.

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wanting to gain material resources to protect their own power, also holds true. This

can also be seen from the leaders perspective, both of whom feared a continued

status quo of Islamic expansionist, yet isolationist policies. Indeed the centralization

of power in the Iranian hierarchy, and the individual nature in which relations are

conducted all point towards Rafsanjani and Khatami as key to the rapprochement.

This case study analysis has implications for other Third World countries with a

concentration of executive power, as it points to the need for greater use of Foreign

policy analysis to understand foreign policy decision-making. A neoclassical realist

assessment, in conjunction with foreign policy analysis, has been key to explaining

the combination of factors that resulted in the rapprochement. It is therefore clear

that whilst the roles of individuals were central, no Middle Eastern relationship can

be studied without a thorough investigation of the many factors affecting the

complex relations between Middle Eastern States.

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