The Puzzle of Political

Reform in the Middle East

A U G U S T U S R I C H A R D NORTON

Introduction 133

E x p l a i n i n g t h e d e m o c r a c y déficit 136

M u s l i m s a n d the q u e s t i o n of political r e f o r m 143

T h e A r a b uprisings of 2 0 1 1 144

Conclusión 155

Further reading 155

Questions 156

Notes 156

Overview
W i t h o n l y a h a n d f u l of e x c e p t i o n s , M i d d l e East g o v e r n m e n t s have failed to g o v e r n
e i t h e r fairly or c o m p e t e n t l y , a n d ruling élites have generally been m o r e intent on
k e e p i n g p o w e r in t h e i r h a n d s t h a n o n i m p r o v i n g the lot of t h e i r citizens. A l t h o u g h
r e f o r m initiatives have b e e n a n n o u n c e d periodically, business as usual has b e e n t h e
n o r m a l o u t c o m e . I n d i v i d u a l o r o r g a n i z a d c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t c o r r u p t i o n or a b u s e s
o f p o w e r have often b e e n p u n i s h e d a n d t h w a r t e d , a n d m a n y o f the region's j u d i -
ciaries h a v e s e r v e d as I n s t r u m e n t s o f state p o w e r . T h e p e r s i s t e n c e of a u t o c r a t i c rule
in the región s t e m s f r o m several factors, i n c l u d i n g the d o m i n a n t role o f t h e state in
the e c o n o m y , a 'ruling b a r g a i n ' w h e r e b y citizens w e r e p r o m i s e d p r o s p e r i t y in return
f o r restrictions o n f r e e d o m , a n d t h e p r e f e r e n c e o f e x t e r n a l great p o w e r s for stability
o v e r d e m o c r a c y . In t h e r e s o u r c e - p o o r states, the ruling b a r g a i n b e c a m e increasingly
u n t e n a b l e vis-á-vis f a s t - g r o w i n g , b e t t e r - i n f o r m e d p o p u l a t i o n s a n d state efforts to
r e s t r u c t u r e e c o n o m i e s (often u n d e r I n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure) p r o d u c e d w i d e n i n g u n -
e m p l o y m e n t a n d s p r e a d e c o n o m i c p a i n . A f t e r 11 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 1 ('9/11'), t h e U n i t e d
States a n d several E u r o p e a n p o w e r s d e c l a r e d t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to foster r e f o r m a n d to
s p r e a d d e m o c r a c y in the M i d d l e East, but littie w a s a c c o m p l i s h e d . E v e n so, dissatis-
f a c t i o n w i t h g o v e r n m e n t r e m a i n s p e r v a s i v e . In the e x t r a o r d i n a r y political u p h e a v a l
that b e g a n in 2 0 1 1 , t h e a c c u m u l a t e d rage against a u t o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s e r u p t e d
into a q u e s t for dignity ( k a r a m a h ) a n d w i d e s p r e a d d e m a n d s for better g o v e r n a n c e
a n d f r e e d o m . T h e s e d e m a n d s r e m a i n largely u n f u l f i l i e d , a n d Solutions to t h e p u z z l e
of r e f o r m r e m a i n e l u s i v a .
 C H A P T E R 6 T H E P U Z Z L E OF P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST 133

Introduction
The wellsprings of anti-government enmity fed by falsa promises and thwarted hopas be-
came apparent in 2011 when protests erupted i n many Arab world locales. As the year began,
protests were accelerating in Tunisia and, on 14 January, President Zine al-Abidine Ben
A l i fled into exiie in Saudi Arabia. I n neighbouring Egypt, the Tunisians' accomplishment
lent momentum to widespread demonstrations, especially after 25 January 2011, designated
(following Tunisia's exampie) as the 'Day of Raga' {yaum al-ghadib). Eighteen days later,
after more than 800 demonstrators were kiiied by security forcea and government-iinked
thugs, President H o s n i Mubarak, who had ruied Egypt for three decades, resigned from
office under pressure from the miiitary. Across the Arab world, emulative protests spread
in neariy every country, with varying success and sometimes with horrendous bioodshed.
In Libya, a strongman met his demise; in Yemen, a dictator retreated from the presidency;
in Bahrain, protesters demanding reform and equitabie treatment were suppressed within
weeks by a Saudi-ied forcé that was intended to stymie demands for reform; and in Syria,
chants of Irhal! Irhal! {'Gol Scram!') were met by brutal government vioience and a descent
into a civil war that by 2018 had claimed nearly half a miiiion lives and uprooted about haif
of Syrias population of 23 miiiion people. (See 'The A r a b uprisings of 2 0 1 1 ' later in the
chapter for case studies illustrating the widely variant and sometimes catastrophic outcomes
of popular demands for reform i n Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.)
I n Arab discourse, 2011 has been described by many people as al-sahwah ('the awaken-
ing'), or al-nahdah al-thaniyah ('the second Arab renaissance), or even al-thawrat al-arabia
('the Arab revoiutions'). Chaiiand (2011) succinctly refers to a new sense of coilective au-
tonomy, tasayir dhati, i n Arab societies. I n Western circies, the burgeoning protests, w h i c h
typically included the trademark demand al-sha'ab yurid usqat al-nizam ('the people want
the faii of the regime'), were styied an 'Arab Spring' {al-rabi'a al-'arabi), but the seasonai
metaphor impiies a transformationai episode whereas mass protests need to be understood
as part of a iong process of political change.
Although largely unnoticed outside of the región, the hrst decade of the twenty-hrst
century witnessed numerous demonstrations by organized iabour, and other economic
segments affected by economic reforms and high levéis of under-empioyment and u n -
empioyment. The governments' stifiing of political dissent by secular groups ient further
momentum to cuituraiiy entrenched Isiamists. A s disiiiusionment with government spread,
a variety of Islamist groups that offered religious answers to compiex political and economic
questions benehted and significant segments of the population ient them support.
Arguably the core demand of the protests was a ciamour for respect and dignity. A l i too
often, it is argued, A r a b governments have treated their subjects and citizens with disdain,
sloughing off their legitímate demands. Whether i n terms of monarchy or A r a b republic,
authoritarianism in the Arab world has been characterized by the depoiiticization of public
space. Other than political humour, politics i n many corners of the Arab world have been
consigned to a prívate sphere, and even then broached only cautiousiy with trusted intim-
ates. The depoiiticization of public space is iiiustrated i n places such as Saudi Arabia, where
a hint of dissent provokes an iron-fist response (as well as prophyiactic cascades of money—
after 2011, US$36 billion i n new funding and subsidies to address domestic concerns was
announced).
P A R T 2 T H E M E S IN I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L POLITICAL E C O N O M Y

The authorítarian state model

I n order to appreciate the immense challenges that face proponents of political reform in
the Middie East, it is important to consider the iegacies of state formation that shape the
contemporary poiiticai systems, as weli as the changing economic and social parameters
of societies i n today's Middie East. The following sections discuss the formation of modern
states, many of which emerged only after the Second W o r l d War, as weii as the institutionai
and poiiticai impediments to poiiticai reform, and particularly to democratization.
Most Middie Eastern states won their independence from European domination only in
the iatter half of the twentieth century. The new governments that emerged faced formidable
challenges, particularly in promoting prosperity and sustaining growth in late deveioping
economies that were iii-equipped to compete in the world economic system. The chosen
path centred on a iarge statist economy that, in time, sweiled government employment and
disadvantaged prívate enterprise.
Another challenge was to foster a coilective sense of civic identity, the essence of citizen-
ship. I n general, personal freedom was sacrificed in the interest of state security, often with
reference to the Arab-Israeii conflict, w h i c h has continued since 1948. I f poiiticai space was
dominated by the state and controlled by ubiquitous pólice apparatuses, this reflected a tacit
compact between government and citizen that was wearing thin. I n short, in return for ioy-
aity to the state, the citizen would be offered a heaithier, more p r o s p e r ó o s iife. Unfortunately,
ciienteiism and its handmaiden, corruption, often came to define the reiationship between
ruied and ruier.
Democracy was not much discussed. 'Democracy' refers most basicaiiy to the abiiity of
citizens to hoid their governments accountabie and to change their poiiticai ieaders at regu-
lar intervais. Instead, accountability to the public has been generally weak in the región,
and particularly in the Arab world ruiers were more iikeiy to change as a result of actuariai
reaiities than a withdrawai of public confidence. I n 1979, a revolutionary regime came to
power in Irán, and promised to offer a distinct modei of poiiticai development to the M i d -
dle East and the M u s l i m world, but the promise has not matched the reality. I n the four
decades since the revolution toppled the monarchy and estabiished the Isiamic Republic i n
Irán, some institutions of democracy, such as competitive elections for pariiament, gained
popular iegitimacy, but the ievers of power remain in the hands of conservative cierics who
evince httie enthusiasm for ioosening their grip on power. W h e n President M a h m o u d
Ahmadinejad w o n re-eiection in the 2009 elections, many Iranians suspected that the bai-
ioting was rigged in order to deny victory to Mir-Hussein Mousavi, a former prime minister
w h o espoused a modest reform agenda. The green movement, which had been inspirad by
Mousavi's campaign, iaunched massive protests, but the protesters were confrontad with an
iron fist and ieading opposition figures were either arrested or kept isoiated under long-term
house arrest, or simpiy intimidated into siience. The Iranian case iiiustrates that, even in the
face of broad disenchantment, miiitarized regimes retain an impressive capacity to forestaii
change through coerción and repression but the underiying popular appetite for reform
c o n t i n ú e s . I n 2013, Hassan Rouhani, a reformist cleric who was hardly favoured by the en-
trenched political élites, enjoyad overwheiming support and was eiected President of Irán.
The exceptions to the rule of a non-democratic Middie East include Israel and Turkey.
W i t h more than half a century of democratic experience, democracy is stiii strikingiy
 C H A P T E R 6 T H E P U Z Z L E OF P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST

incomplete i n Israel and Turkey, where ethnic minorities (some non-European Jews and es-
pecially Arab citizens in Israel, and Kurds i n Turkey) often find their freedoms curtaiied and
quite incomplete. Indeed, democracy has suffered a serious reverse i n Turkey. I n response to
a failed 2016 coup i n w h i c h more than 300 people were killed, the state relentlessly repressed
opposition figures, jailed tens of thousands, including soldiers, teachers, judges, and jour-
nalists, and put a real question m a r k on the durability of the Turkish democracy.

Human development and democracy

Given that the exceptional cases of Israel and Turkey entail predominantly non-Arab so-
cieties, it is clear that the democracy déficit appiies significantiy to the A r a b world. A n ap-
propriate ñrst task is to weigh what is k n o w n about the correlatas of democracy and to
determine what patterns emerge in A r a b states. I n a ground-breaking study published by a
United Nations agency, a group of respected A r a b scholars examinad political, social, and
economic conditions i n the A r a b world ( U N D P 2003). This incisive and rich report attracted
wide attention in government circies and in the press.
The authors identified thirty-one indicators reflecting the ievei of democracy and free-
dom. These indicators are summarized i n three major ciusters: government process; govern-
ment capacity to impiement and shape sound poiicy; and the ievei of respect dispiayed by
both citizen and state for social and economic institutions. W h e n these ciusters of indicators
are correiated with measures of human development and then compared to those of the rest
of the world, the findings show cieariy that even weaithy Arab states provided fewer outiets
for poiiticai expression, fair government, and responsive government than states with com-
parable incomes and quaiity of life outside the región. Using a carefuiiy designed composite
measure, fewer than 9% of Arab citizens rank in the middie ievei of material weii-being and
freedom, and none are found i n the highest level. O n l y sub-Saharan Africa has a poorer
record of fairly applying the rule of law.
Across the región, extreme poverty (living on less than $ 1.25 per day) is relatively uncom-
mon and afflicts just 7.4% of ail Arabs, according to the most recent data ( U N D P , 2013). Yet
this figure represents a steady increase over recent years, after two decades of rapid decline.
Similariy, the prevalence of undernourishment is on the rise, affecting 15.3% of the A r a b
population overall by 2011, compared to 13.9% i n 1991. The change has been felt particu-
larly acutely i n some countries, with Iraq, for instance, now home to four times as many
people suífering from hunger as before, i n a trend w h i c h was i n place even before the dis-
ruption of the US-led invasión of 2003. It has often been argued that as income and other
measures of weii-being increase, the chances for democracy grow. I n the aggregate, per cap-
ita income in the Middie East is considerabiy higher than either East Asia, or Africa, yet both
regions have shown much more democratization than the Middie East. The A r a b middie
ciass varíes widely i n size, but i n many countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria,
it is quite iarge. However, since the government sector is often massive and empioys a large
percentage of the middle class, government employees are reluctant to slap the hand that
feeds them. For example, despite programmes in recent decades to shrink the public sector,
the government empioys one person for every two-and-a-haif people i n the prívate sector.
The coroiiary is that the large state sector stifles the development of market economies that
might produce more challenges to the autocratic state.
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Explaining the democracy déficit

The weak progress of democracy in the Middle East has fascinated many scholars. Some offer
a bne-size-fits-aii' cultural explanation of the absence of democracy. The late Ehe Kedourie as-
serted that 'the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam' (Kedourie 1992: 1).
This impiies that only by changing the mindset of the adherents of islam is democracy iikeiy
to be embraced—and Kedourie heid that to be improbable. Yet it is apparent that Muslims do
practice democracy in a variety of settings, including India, indonesia, Hoiiand, Lebanon, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. To discover whether Muslims embrace democracy, one
may learn less by examining non-democratic settings than by considering democratic contexts.
The notion that Muslims are unwilling to embrace democracy for deepiy seated cultural reasons
simpiy does not stand up. Given the opportunity to piay by democratic rules, Muslims have been
quite adept at forming political parties and interest groups, and buiiding effective coaiitions.
Prior to the awakening of 2011, a variety of scholars and poiicy experts eschewed cul-
tural expianations for their cynicism about the prospects of democratic reform, the activ-
ism of a vibrant civil society i n the Arab world, or the reievance of oppositionai volees,
instead, they focused on adaptive authoritarian tactics. The prevaihng perspectiva on the
dim prospects for A r a b democracy was capturad in Steven Heydemann's widely cited mono-
graph on 'authoritarian upgrading', which was published by the Brookings Institution, one
of Washington's ieading think tanks (Heydemann 2007). He argued that the A r a b regimes
had adoptad sophisticated techniques with w h i c h to dampen domestic demands for reform.
These techniques included a sophisticated combination of hmited poiiticai reforms, middie
ciass co-optation, patronage, surveiiiance, and coerción.
Eva Beiiin offered a conceptuaiiy rigorous account showing how the educated middie ciass
has been co-opted by autocratic regimes. She emphasized the coercive apparatus of regimes
and the prevalence of patrimonial leadership that is common in the Middie East. She did not
see much prospect for major poiiticai demonstrations. Writing in 2004, she said that the región
was characterized by a 'iow ievei of popular mobihzation for poiiticai reform' (Beiiin 2004:150).
Once the momentous events of 2011 were under way, there were mea culpas from some
scholars—notably Gregory Cause, who admitted his own biindness to the emerging social
forces i n the región. He also noted that many academic experts had got it wrong by suc-
cumbing to 'groupthink' about the durability of authoritarian regimes (Cause 2011). To be
fair, some experts understood how vulnerable the Arab regimes were and how deeply rage
penetrated A r a b societies. i n a much-discussed book, Nazih Ayubi emphasized the 'hoi-
iowness' of the 'fierce' regimes (Ayubi 1995). Some of the more prescient scholars tended
to be on the margins of the poiicy world, w h i c h may have insulated them from the dangers
of groupthink. Asef Bayat, for exampie, anticipated the potency of popular demonstrations
by 'ordinary people' in a number of his writings, including Life as Politics (Bayat 2010). i n
reiation to Egypt, Joel Beinin (2010) and others were alert to the widespread and spreading
iabour unrest and strikes that the Egyptian government proved heipiess to stop.

Public opinión
Viewed from the West, poiiticai attitudes i n the Middie East are often hidden not only by
barriers of language and distance, but also by metaphors that betray stereotypes rather than
 C H A P T E R 6 T H E P U Z Z L E O F P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST

reveal reality. A n exampie is the use of 'the street' to refer to o p i n i ó n i n M u s l i m countries,

especially in A r a b countries. Arab journaiists and others use the term, often in a sense that
corresponds with a Lebanese proverb, ra'i al-baqir ahsan min siyasa al-bashar ('the o p i n i ó n
of a cow is better than the politics of the people). Certainiy, in Western usage, the term 'the
Street' impiies a formiess mass of people swayed by the sentiments of the moment and ma-
nipuiated by autocrats—a modern paraiiei to 'the mob' in revolutionary France. "The street'
impiies that there are few nuances of o p i n i ó n and no need to stratify points of view to dis-
cern ciass, gender, age, regional, or occupationai distinctions. 'The street thinks . . . ' intone
sage-sounding commentators, as though taiking about tidal movements (Norton 2003).
The evidence does suggest that many people wish they were governed better than they i n
fact are. A number of Ieading poiiing firms, such as the Pew Research Center, Gaiiup, and
Zogby Associates, have turned their attention to the región and the broader M u s l i m world.'
I n addition, a cadre of regionaiiy basad public o p i n i ó n speciaiists and think tanks have pro-
duced high-quaiity scientific surveys of o p i n i ó n .
The picture that emerges from these o p i n i ó n studies are highiy differentiated views that
confound easy generaiizations. For exampie, when questioned about U S poiicy i n iraq or i n
Syria, views are overwheimingiy negativa, with disapproval ratings comfortably over 60%
(Arab Centre Washington D C ( A C W ) 2017). O n the Palestinian issue, 7 1 % of Arabs con-
sider U S poiicy in a negativa hght, and a firm majority consider the sitting president Isiamo-
phobic. I n contrast, favourabiiity ratings for the U S public are high among Arabs, with 65%
holding a positive view. O f course, the opinions vary by age and education, with younger
people ( 1 8 - 3 4 ) and those with some formal education much more iikeiy to have favourabie
views than oider and less educated respondents.

The role of outside powers

Whiie Western dipiomats and poiiticai ieaders paid hp service during the 1990s to encour-
aging democracy in the Middie East, there was httie real pressure on the region's governments
to permit people an expanded volee i n politics. Major powers, not ieast the United States,
the U K , and France, preferred stability over the uncertainty of democratization. Those who
wieided power in Cairo, Tunis, and Riyadh, and other Arab capitais, grew accustomed to
empty Western rhetoric about democratization. I n the United States, President B i l l Clinton
spoke meiodiousiy in the 1990s about the promotion of democracy around the giobe, whiie
his administration's ieading Middie East dipiomat, Martin Indyk, simuitaneousiy disparaged
the notion of democracy for Arab states as destabiiizing and threatening to the 'peace process'
and to Israel. Western governments were perfectly happy to ciing to autocratic ruiers, rather
than to gambie on the uncertainties of more open poiiticai systems (indyk 2002).
For many years, regional governments were abie to fragment or suppress those groups
that were calling most strenuously for reform, with few criticisms from Western capitais. The
islamist poiiticai movements of various stripes, then the best organized opposition forces,
posed a direct challenge to the monopoiy on power heid by the ruling élites. Where pariia-
mentary elections were heid, the isiamists' participation was carefuiiy circumscribed (as i n
Egypt), i f not outlawed completeiy (as i n Tunisia). W h e n isiamists were aiiowed to particí-
pate fuiiy i n elections i n Algeria, they proved to be a popular aiternative to the discredited
secular ruling party.
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Thus the contemplation of democracy i n the Arab worid prompted major outside powers
and iocai dictators to see eye to eye in terms of the virtue of continuing the status quo and
sustaining stabiiity, which has been the obsessive focus of Western and, in particular, U S
officiais.
The ai-Qaeda terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 ( ' 9 / 1 T ) changed Western, and par-
ticularly U S , perspectivas on political reform dramaticaiiy. Ofñciais now argued that stag-
nant poiiticai systems and stifled hopes were a formula for further disasters. Former U S
Secretary of State Madeieine K . Aibright noted, in a reveaiing 2003 comment, that she re-
gretted not pushing bardar for reform and she admitted that Middle East democracy was not
a priority during the eight years of the Clinton presidency:

We did nudge at times, supporting Kuwaiti ieaders in their initiative to give women the vote and
encouraging the creation of representative bodies in Bahrain and Jordán. But we did not make it
a priority. Arab public opinión, after ali, can be rather scary.
( A i b r i g h t 2003)

I n November 2003, President Bush declared a sea change i n poiicy that would see the United
States exchange its obsession with stability for the promotion of democracy, arguing that:

Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the iack of freedom in the Middle
East did nothing to make us safe—because in the iong run, stabiiity cannot be purchased at the
expense of liberty. As Iong as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it
will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and vioience ready for export.
(Bush 2003)

Given the broad disdain for U S poiicies i n the Middle East—especially Bush's fuisome sup-
port for Israel, even when it acts i n moraiiy obnoxious ways against Palestinian civilians
under occupation—such pronouncements evoked increduiity.
Powerfui external powers, especially the United States, now embraced secular democracy
as a panacea for the region's iiis. Top officiais referred frequentiy to the 'freedom déficit' in
the Middie East, and conciuded that economic faiiure and poiiticai oppression fed despair,
and conditioned people to succumb to ideoiogies of hatred and vioience. President George
W. Bush declarad in February 2003 that: 'The worid has a clear interest in the spread of
democratic valúes, because stabie and free nations do not bread ideoiogies of murder.'^
I n fact, evidence suggests that democratizing states are actually more prone to instability
than authoritarian systems ( M a n s ñ e i d and Synder 1995). Thus whiie there are other good
reasons to wish for more freedom for Middle Easterners, the project of democratization may
not produce the democratic peace presumed by some officiais and observers, at ieast not in
the foreseeable future.

Iraq as a model?
W h e n the United States and Britain invaded Iraq in 2003, officiais and war proponents
asserted that, by toppling Saddam Hussein from power, Iraq would be transformed from a
republic of fear into a republic of freedom. Iraq would lead the way as a beacon of democracy
for the región. Speaking before the U S Congress i n July 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair
declared: 'We promised Iraq democratic government. We w i l l deliver it.'
 C H A P T E R 6 T H E P U Z Z L E O F P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST

L i k e Blair, Bush promoted I r a q as a poster child for democracy, especially after the
predicted massive stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction that were supposed to be
uncovered by the March 2003 i n v a s i ó n proved evanescent. Ironically, one of the most
influential Iraqi advocates of this transformation from fear to freedom was dissident Iraqi
intellectual Kanaan Makiya, who argued persuasively that the regime of Saddam Hussein
had obliterated civil society, the middle space between citizen and state, leaving Iraqis
exposed to the naked power of the state and able to find security only i n the basic institu-
tions of family and tribe—and sometimes not even there ( M a k i y a 1998). I f a democracy
is to be durable, then an essential ingredient is a vibrant civil society, w h i c h certainiy
requires m u c h more time than the few months anticipated initiaiiy by the U S architects
of the i n v a s i ó n .
The United States' and Britain's opportunistic embrace of democracy initiaiiy prompted
some ruling autocrats to ciean up their acts a bit, but the effect did not iast. Neither the
United States ñ o r Britain anticipated the difficuities that they would face in consoiidating
their occupation of Iraq following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime. Some iii-consid-
ered decisions, such as the much-regretted edict to dismantie the Iraqi army shortiy afier
the capture of Baghdad, only exacerbated the probiems. The deadiy resistance to the Aliied
occupation, the anger of many Iraqis at an often ciub-footed U S response to vioience, and an
onsiaught of bombings and assassinations against international and Iraqi institutions made
a mockery of the pro ject of democratizing Iraq.
W h i i e the advocacy of democracy by the United States initiaiiy provoked considerable
heated debate in the Arab worid, the chaos unieashed by the war in Iraq discredited the idea.
By 2005, even sympathetic Arab thinkers were iooking at Iraqi 'democracy' as an exempiar
offitnah (that is, disorder or chaos). Autocrats who had feit compeiied to respond to Bush's
democracy initiative when it was announced, such as Mubarak i n Egypt, began using Iraq as
an argument against expanding freedom.
I n any case, given the poiiticai economy of most of the region's regimes, reform, not to
mention democratization, needs to be understood as a long-term process of change rather
than as a 'two aspirins at bedtime' prescription.

The political economy of the state

i n iraq, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the public sector is massive and any thoughtful
effort to promote poiiticai reform must address the state's overarching economic role.' The
Middie Eastern state extends weii beyond the seragiios of the ruiers. Outside of agriculture,
the state is the Ieading empioyer. Thus many citizens have a stake in the state and their inter-
ests do not lie in destroying it, but in improving its performance. Government dominates
the formal economy, i n some instances through a phaianx of pubiic-sector companies; i n
others, through the flow of oii earnings and other 'rents' directiy into the state coífers. A s a
result, government expenditures i n the Middie East ofien make up a iarger share of the gross
nationai product than i n other countries of comparable income ievei outside of the región,
i n some cases, government spending amounts to neariy haif of G N P (for exampie, Egypt),
compared to iess than 25% i n middie-income countries generally (ai-Sayyid 1991).
WTiile the state's grip on the economy is important, considerable economic activity and re-
sources he outside of the state's control. A significant amount of largely undocumented economic
PART 2 T H E M E S I N I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

activity occurs in the reaim of the informai sector, which encompasses an array of craftspeopie,
doctors, iawyers, petty traders in iegai and iiiicit goods, workshop operators, pieceworkers, and
many others whose income is undocumented by the state. The informai economy has iong been
an important site for undermining and quietly contesting the states authority (Singerman 1995).

Rentierism
Yet the prevalence of rentier states in the Middle East means that governments are highiy
resistant to change. Unlike states that depend on taxation extracted directiy from citizens,
rentier states distribute rents rather than extract taxes. Rents are direct payments to govern-
ment that may derive from natural resources, especially oii, as weii as other significant trans-
fers such as foreign aid. (For exampie, Egypt receives over US$1.3 billion in annual miiitary
and development assistance from the United States, w h i c h reduces the state's dependence on
conventional taxation.) i n 2014, the European Union provided €650 million in development
aid, not including bilateral support by individual European states. Some of the smaller states
in the región, such as Qatar or the United Arab Emirates, receive almost all of their income
from oil or natural gas sales, rendering the government much more removed from public
pressure than governments that depend upon taxation.
The prevalence of the rentier state i n the Middle East has had a detrimental effect on both
economic development and political liberalization. The state has, i n effect, attempted to sat-
isfy the population at large through provisión of a host of services and economic activities
paid through rent income. A s Iong as rents from the outside world are available, the state
w i l l respond only to those concerns of the population that it finds necessary to maintaining
its power and position. Moreover, the rentier state's ofien extensive economic programmes
tend to co-opt the bourgeoisie and reward it economically i n projects conceived and funded
by the state. Henee the bourgeoisie's fortunes come to centre on the state and its defined
economic goals.
The rentier state tends to become increasingly autonomous from society. The state can use
the income from rent to enlist compliance and to pursue goals not necessarily i n the best
interests of society. Since most of the state's revenues are not extracted from the population,
the coroiiary sense of obligation and responsiveness to society does not necessarily develop.
So Iong as the rent c o n t i n ú e s to flow, rentier states have no incentive to liberalize their pol-
itical systems. A s Luciani has indicated i n Chapter 5 and elsewhere, the oil rent becomes 'a
factor perpetuating authoritarian government' (Luciani 1994: 131).
A state facing ñscal crisis and forced to resort to increased taxation will genérate demands
from within the society for accountability. Programmes of political reform in Jordán and
Morocco bear out this argument, i n that each state sought, through political reform, to salve
the pains of extensive economic belt-tightening and tax increases. However, the idea promoted
by major international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the international
Monetary Fund, that the path to democracy begins with economic liberalization has proven
arguable. This may be true over the Iong term, but the short-term consequences of economic
liberalization are often reduced freedoms. The case of Syria illustrates that economic crisis fol-
lowed by a relatively steady economic liberalization does not lead to political reform. Similariy
to some other authoritarian states, Syria controlled the bargaining process in its economic
liberalization programme by confining it to a privileged few (Heydemann 1993).
 CHAPTER 6 THE PUZZLE O F P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST

Divergent paths in rentier states: Irán and Turkey

The examples of Irán and Turkey also shed some light on how rentierism influences the
prospects for political reform. I n Irán, rentierism came to define the state in the 1970s.
Its systematic growth was conclusively evident after the oil boom that foUowed the 1973
A r a b - l s r a e l i War. Supremely c o n ñ d e n t of its economic and political positions i n domes-
tic, regional, and international arenas, the state's economic poiicies resulted in two simul-
t a n e ó o s developments. It created a heavily dependent commercial and industrial modern
bourgeoisie that benehted enormously from the state poiicies, but remained subservient to
it. The private sector's influence 'was limited to implementation. Being totally dependent on
the state, Iran's rentiér bourgeoisie had neither the incentive ñ o r the means to "capture the
state'" (Shambayati 1994: 3 2 0 - 1 ) .
The growth of rentierism also made the state essentially oblivious to the concerns and pri-
orities of civil society. The pre-revolutionary Iranian state decided what was good for society
and acted accordingly. W h e n the state was eventually challenged during the revolutionary
years, it was the traditional bourgeoisie from the bazaar, which had preserved some of its
autonomy from the state, that took the lead and in reality bankrolled the revolution. Using
the well-established bazaar-mosque alliance networks, the opposition legitimized its attack
on the Pahlavi state by utilizing powerfui Islamic ideology. The sharp lines of cleavage were
defined in cultural and moral terms, much more so than economic ones, in order to mobil-
ize support and attack the state where it was most obviously vulnerable (Ashraf 1988,1990;
Shambayati 1994).
The T u r k i s h case offers a sharply different model. Although certain features of rentier-
ism—remittances from workers abroad—are also present i n Turkey, the state's income is
based p r i m a r i l y on domestic sources, not external rent; henee rentierism has not dom-
inated the T u r k i s h economy. To increase revenues i n the 1970s, the state had to increase
taxation and domestic production. A number of poiicies, including import substitution
and industrialization, were adopted to increase domestic production and to reduce ex-
ternal dependence. Although these attempts did not help Turkey's negative trade balance
and foreign exchange crisis, they did prompt the state to engage in serious bargaining
w i t h the business community through chambers of commerce and industry. The ensuing
cleavages w i t h i n the private sector led to the creation of several organizations devoted to
the management of commerce and industry. It is instructive that an early Islamist group,
the National Salvation Party, was estabiished to protect the interests of petite bourgeoisie
against some of the more prominent organizations that were tied to the interests of lar-
ger industrial and commercial capitaiists. E c o n o m i c issues, rather than religious ones,
defined much of the poiiticai agenda of this Islamist party, as weii as the industriaiists, i n
their interactions w i t h the T u r k i s h state. Structured as a set of autonomous organizations,
the private sector was a serious forcé in the society at iarge and in its reiationship with the
state (Shambayati 1994).
I n the absence of fuUy developed rentierism, increasing domestic taxation and extraction,
foreign exchange crisis, and the wiiiingness to engage opposition from within the society in
an inciusionary way combinad to increase prospects for democracy in Turkey. This pattern
stands in sharp contrast to the Iranian case i n the pre-revoiutionary decade, during w h i c h
rentierism and exciusionary politics were dominant.
PART 2 T H E M E S IN I N T E R N A T I O N A L RELATIONS A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L POLITICAL E C O N O M Y

The pressure mounts

W h i i e literacy rates in the Middie East may be unimpressive by Western standards, the sim-
ple fact is that access to education has proiiferated, including at the university ievei, so that
many peopies expectations have become more compiex. I n an era of straitened resources,
governments capacity to sustain the ioyalty of citizens through patronage and subsidies is
strained, and often overwheimed, i n the iess weaithy states.
Especially i n the 1980s and 1990s, the manifest faiiures of state-dominated modeis of
economic development became undeniabie. Repression iightened as a means of accommo-
dating dissent and reducing governments cuipabiiity for faiiure. The population pressures
are immense, as reflected i n the aggregate figures on youths aged fourteen or younger, who
account for about 30% of the Middie Eastern population according to 2016 data, and over
40% i n some cases, such as Iraq and Yemen.'' Equally relevant is the fact that 60% of the total
population of the A r a b States were under thirty, according to a recent report ( U N D P 2016).
It is easy to visualize the serious challenges that this 'youth bulge poses for government, not
Ieast i n terms of schooling and job creation. W h i i e per capita measures of gross domestic
product increased by an average of over 3% in the first decade of the twenty-first century,
i n recent years growth rates have sometimes been negative and have not risen above 1.8%
annually (World B a n k Group 2015 141-8).
I n the swelling working-class neighbourhoods of the region's largest cities, rural-to-urban
migration has fuelled massive urban sprawl. To begin to grasp the sheer magnitude of the
phenomenon, consider that some cities, such as Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, grew so quickly that
populations doubled i n as littie as seven years, whiie already-massive cities, such as vener-
able Cairo, become home to millions of new residents each decade.
W h e r e political space opened, i n d i v i d u á i s began to organize, giving new breath to long-
suppressed associational life. The result was a rapid e x p a n s i ó n of civil society, the melange
of associations, clubs, syndicates, guilds, and other groups that enjoy a measure of auton-
omy from the state's control, and w h i c h ideally serve as a buíTer between the citizen and
the raw power of the state (Norton 1995). A s early as the 1980s, more than 70,000 such
groups were counted i n the A r a b world ( I b r a h i m 1995). W h i i e the components of civil
society that attracted the most international attention were oriented to the protection of
rights, such as the Egyptian Organization of H u m a n Rights, or the Palestinian al-Haqq,
the vast majority was not overtly political, and focused instead on aiding the indigent and
the i l l , or providing religious or educational resources. I n cities such as Cairo, Istanbul,
and Algiers, intricate networks defined by kinship, locality, and reciprocity intersect w i t h
other elements i n civil society, the informal economy, opposition political movements,
and government functionaries to d e ñ n e a compiex setting for politics (Singerman 1995;
W h i t e 2014).
Equally, i f not more importantly, large informal and undocumented sectors of the econ-
omy grew. Across the r e g i ó n , vast numbers of Iabour migrants were attracted to the em-
ployment opportunities in the oil economies of the Gulf. These workers, as they returned
home to Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, J o r d á n , and Yemen, among other countries, brought
hoards of hard currency that w o u l d be used not only to improve their families' standards
of living and to start businesses, but also to fund opposition groups—especially Islamist
movements.
 C H A P T E R 6 T H E P U Z Z L E O F P O L i T i C A L R E F O R M !N T H E M I D D L E EAST

Muslims and the question of political reform

There are now 1.8 billion Muslims i n the world, of w h i c h a fifth live i n the Midde E a s t - N o r t h
Africa región, according to latest estimates (Pew 2017a). W h i i e it might be thought conveni-
ent i f a preponderance of Muslims were to embrace Western secular ideáis, not to mention
Western-style democracy, the picture is more compiex. A relative handful of Arab liberáis do
share and espouse Western ideáis, but they do not have a broad constituency. The dominant
oppositionai forces i n the broader M u s l i m world, not ieast i n the A r a b world, have typic-
ally been hostile to secularism—particularly when 'secularism' is understood to mean that
Islamic valúes have no place i n politics—but they also embrace representative democracy.
I n a región i n w h i c h religión is an important source of personal identity, any opening of the
political system brings with it a debate about the proper role of religión i n society and the
reiationship of religión to the state, but Middle Eastern governments have generally not been
willing to experiment i n political reform and allow that debate to occur.
I n Middle Eastern societies the embrace of piety (taqwa) is common, but the content of
that piety is actively contested and reimagined, especially among the youth. Islam has be-
come increasingly personalized under conditions of growing urbanization, globalization,
and the commercialization of identity, not to mention a new horizon for political imagin-
ation (White 2014). Political groups cannot help but be influenced by what Asef Bayat (2010)
calis the 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary', whereby subtle individual actions resocialize
religious movements and governments, and thereby créate new identities and opportunities
for change, including democratic change.
There are many variants of democracy, but a core component is the conduct of reasonably
fair competitive elections. I n many of the countries of the región, where credible political
'secular' parties have been repressed, Islamist groups are poised to seize the opportunity of
open elections. Justifiably or not, this prospect generated unease i n Western circies. At best,
major external powers, such as the United States, promoted a 'go slow' approach, but more
typically sought to undermine elections that brought Isiamists to power. The cases of Algeria
and Palestina are instructive.

Algeria
I n the face of horrible unemployment, discontent, and economic faiiure, Algeria attempted
democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The ruling National Liberation Front
( E L N ) had monopolizad power for three decades, ever since Algeria w o n its hard-fought
independence from France i n 1962. The E L N was soundly trounced by the Islamic Salva-
tion Front ( F I S ) i n Algeria's first free elections, including municipal and then parliamentary
elections. The Algerian army intervened i n January 1992 to prevent the F I S from realizing
its victory and civil war ensued. It is impossible to k n o w whether the F I S might have rulad
competently or incompetently, and whether it would have been able to impose its religious
valúes on a divided society split between secularism and religious conservatism.
More than 100,000 people died i n the internal war and Algeria became a cautionary tale
invoked routinely by Middle East dictators, secularly inclinad intellectuals, and Western
officiais alike. The faiiure of the Algerian reform experiment certainiy iiiustrated the Iikeiy
fate of ruling parties w h e n exposed to reasonably free elections.
144 P A S T 2 T H E M E S !N I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

Algerian secularists who enthusiastically supported the coup in 1992 now often concede Not to d i
that it would have been far better to permit the F I S experiment to go forward, especially within week
since the option of intervention would have continued to be an option for the Algerian lions watche
generáis, who c o n t i n u é to wield enormous power. sages, and oi
government
moments of
Hamas and the 2006 elections
Popular d
W h e n Palestinian legislative elections were conducted i n January 2006, at U S insistence, the Middle I
the unexpected, but clear-cut, winner was the Islamist group Hamas (Lesch 2007). Palestin- meet, live in
ian voters were expressing their anger at Israels occupation and the burgeoning of illegal opportunity
settlements on occupied Palestinian territory, as well as the notorious corruption of the Pal- twenties, an<
estinian Authority and Fatah. Contrary to a sanguina acceptance of the whoUy unexpected or simpiy fir
result, the U S led a campaign to isolate the new Gaza-based Hamas government and to Unlike in E i
starve it of funds, w h i c h also entailed starving large numbers of aid-dependent Palestinians. inverse relat
European dipiomats and some U S officiais urged a path of incremental inclusión instead, educated peí
but the United States rejected any attempt to co-opt Hamas as Iong as it refused to forswear duration of j
terrorism or to accept Israel's Iegitimacy. strations oc<
The poiicy was not successful and it has left Gaza impoverished, i n large measure as a Syria, Bahra
result of a blockade imposed by Israel and supported i n recent years by Egypt. Hamas seized I n realitr;
complete control of Gaza i n 2007 and a rival Fatah-oriented government resides i n the still of a regime l
Israeli-occupied West Bank. Despite a series of Israeli raids and bombardments that have bureaucratic
killed many civilians—including miiitary campaigns i n December 2008 and January 2009, is exercised,
November 2012, and i n July and August 2014—Hamas c o n t i n ú e s to dominate Gaza and haps endurii
enjoys significant support i n the occupied West Bank. Arguably, the path of incremental
inclusión (as respected international dipiomats urged) rather than exclusión would have Tunisia: th
been a wiser response to the Hamas electoral triumph. Hamas is indisputably an entrenched
player in Palestinian politics. O f all of the
democratic
there is a sizc
The Arab uprisings of 2011 in its comnr
any of the ot
G i v e n the, at best, tepid external support for substantial political reform, particularly en- than 40,000
tailing the i n c l u s i ó n of Islamist opposition groups, and considering the hostility of A r a b the power b
governments to meaningful political reform, the puzzle is: under what circumstances behemoth E
w o u l d the r u l i n g structures be compeiied to succumb to popular demands for change? North Añ
For years, public space i n A r a b countries has been depoliticized, so that even ephemeral diversit}'. \ \ 1
attempts to organize or mobilize opposition were met w i t h repression and intimidation. pecially the
Short of an unlikely epiphany w i t h i n the political class, only sustained popular demon- Morocco i w
strations and resistance that d w a r f the capacity of the repressive apparatus might con- within T u n i
vince those w h o w o r k the levers of power of the imperative for embracing reform (the Morocco or
sincerity of the embrace w o u l d be another matter). W h e n are people w i l l i n g to go to the as well as cui
street, to act collectively and put their lives at risk for change? A solution to the puzzle Tunisias I
arrived i n T u n i s i a , w h e n fruit seller M o h a m m e d B o u a z i z i set h i m s e l f alight i n the city of ñ g u r e . He re
Sidi B o u z i d , on 17 December 2010, i n a desperate quest for dignity, and massive protests he played an
foUowed. sanee P a m -
 CHAPTER 6 T H E PUZZLE OF POLITICAL REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Not to diminish the profound sacrifice of Bouazizi, the more important fact was that
within weeks an enduring Tunisian dictator was forced from office and fled into exile as m i l -
lions watched the events unfold on satellite televisión and celebrated the event in text mes-
sages, and on social media, particularly Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (few of the regions
governments then anticipated the importance of such platforms). These were exhilarating
moments of enthusiasm when the people imagined they could topple a regime.
Popular despair gave way to anger i n 2011. For the multitudes of men and women across
the Middle East with limited access to government services, who struggle daily to make ends
meet, live in fear of abusive pólice and witness government corruption regularly, a credible
opportunity for better lives elicited tremendous excitement. Young people i n their teens,
twenties, and beyond, hoping for a good job, accumulating the resources necessary to m a r r y
or simpiy finding a decent place to live, were galvanized by a chance to level the playing field.
Unlike in Europa, Japan, or North America, i n many Middle Eastern societies there is an
inverse reiationship between higher education and employment, which is to say that better
educated people are more Iikeiy to be unemployed than less well-educated people. W h i i e the
duration of protests varied, in the early months of 2011 large-scale, sometimes huge demon-
strations occurred i n nineteen Arab countries, most momentously i n Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen.
In reality, as events unfolded it would be all too clear that displacing a few men at the top
of a regime hardly constituted a revolution. Often left intact was the 'deep state—the webs of
bureaucratic power centres, including miiitary and security agencies through which power
is exercised, not Ieast in Egypt. The one exception is Tunisia, where consequential and per-
haps enduring changes have occurred.

Tunisia: the Jasmine Revolution

O f all of the North African countries, Tunisia would seem to enjoy the best chance for a
democratic transformation. The population of 11 million is generally well educated, and
there is a sizeable middle class and an impressive civil society. Tunisia has also been a pioneer
in its commitment to women's rights, which are arguably more respected in Tunisia than in
any of the other North African countries. The small Tunisian miiitary, w h i c h includes fewer
than 40,000 people under arms, is led by a professional official corps that has neither been
the power behind the curtains ñ o r infiltrated the civilian economy in the same way as the
behemoth Egyptian miiitary has done.
North Africa, the Maghreb ('the West') is a región of remarkable cultural and political
diversity. W h i i e the population is predominantly Arab, there are also ethnic minorities, es-
pecially the Berbers, who comprise important and often restive minorities i n Algeria and
Morocco (with sizeable numbers as well as in Tunisia and Libya). W h i i e this may change,
w i t h i n Tunisia the A r a b - B e r b e r divide has been far less important than it is in either
Morocco or Algeria, where the Berbers have insisted on education i n the Berber language,
as well as cultural autonomy.
Tunisia's Isiamists are led by Rachid Ghannouchi, who is often celebrated as a m o d é r a t e
figure. He returned from exile only in February 2011, after years of living in F o n d ó n , where
he played an important role as a voice for Muslim accommodation in Europe. The Renais-
sance Party (al-Nahdah), which Ghannouchi founded, managed to survive years of state
PART 2 T H E M E S IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS A N D INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL E C O N O M Y

suppression by maintaining a covert presence i n society and cultivating a youthful lead-

ership. Tunisia is also k n o w n for its strong Iabour u n i ó n movement—one that is without
parallel i n North Africa, or the Arab world for that matter. At moments of political impasse,
the Tunisian General Labour Union ( U G T T ) , w h i c h boasts a membership of more than
500,000 and is one of the most powerfui institutions i n the country, played a decisive role by
brokering compromises between al-Nahdah and its secular opponents.
Transparent and well-designed elections for seats i n the proportionately distributed
217-member National Constituent Assembly were heid on 23 October 2011. The Assem-
bly was charged with writing a new constitution. Thirty parties participated, but six w o n
three-quarters of all seats. W h i i e al-Nahdah w o n the largest share, with ninety seats, a var-
iety of ideological and regional groups won representation, and nineteen seats were allo-
cated to Tunisians living abroad.
T i m e and again since December 2010, Tunisians rallied to preserve the momentum of the
Jasmine Revolution. I n contrast with other Arab states, the Tunisians have revealed a pen-
chant for reform. Thus, while the Secretary-General of al-Nahdah, Hamadi Jebali, became
Prime Minister i n December 2011, the Constituent Assembly named Moncef Marzouki, a
highiy respected human rights activist and physician, Acting-President (a weaker position
than the premiership).
Over time, al-Nahdah lost support, particularly for failing to address Tunisia's deep eco-
nomic probiems, including the unemployment crisis. I n parliamentary elections i n October
2014, al-Nahdah came in second to Nada Tunis (Cali of Tunis), a party bringing together
figures from the former regime, liberal opposition figures and elements from the U G T T . To
its credit, the Islamist party gracefully conceded defeat and turned over power to the victors.
In December 2014, Mohamed Be) i C a i d Essebi, the octogenarian founder of Nada' Tunis,
was eiected Tunisia's first freely eiected President.
I n his seminal article, D a n k w a r t Rustow (1970) conceptualized the process of democra-
tization as a process of habituation whereby the players learn and grow used to the democratic
rules of the game. This is an important insight when considering Tunisia because it is unreal-
istic to presume that democratic systems begin with all parties fully imbued with democratic
principies; indeed, even mature democracies are still evolving, still democratizing.
As in Egypt and across the Arab world, conservative and sometimes violent Salafists have
asserted themselves in Tunisia, often targeting secular institutions such as universities for
failing to adhere to strict moral standards, including permitting men and women to study
together, or for not permitting veiled women to enter campus. W h i l e the Salañsts are pol-
itically weak in Tunisia, neighbouring Libya provides a ready sanctuary and training site.
So jihadist-oriented Salafists constitute a security threat to Tunisia and its economy, par-
ticularly i n light of several attacks on key tourist destinations, including, i n 2015, the Bardo
National Museum and a popular seaside resort.
Tunisia also faces profound economic challenges. Unemployment is over 15%, and rates
are twice as high among young people. International lenders, such as the International
Monetary F u n d and the European U n i o n provided crucial funding for stabilizing and re-
structuring the economy, but the quid pro quo has been curtailing government subsidies
upon w h i c h Tunisians have depended for years. Members of the middle class commonly
complain that they are losing the struggle to maintain their standard of living.
 C H A P T E R 6 T H E P U Z Z L E O F P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST

Elsewhere in the Arab world, Tunisia may prove to be the exception that proves the rule,
namely that the legacy of decades of authoritarian rule is a weak foundation for the political
reform. Arabs may be watching political developments in Tunisia with envy, but the short-
term possibility of any A r a b political system following the Tunisian example is slim indeed.

Egypt: the 25 January Revolution and Its aftermath

Egyptians chafed under the Mubarak dictatorship for years. W h i l e opposition activities
were often stymied by repression and dampened by fear, labour strikes were increasingly
commonplace and political activists continued to highlight regime abuses. W i t h i n oppos-
ition Islamist circies, there was much debate and discussion about themes of civil society,
democracy, and tolerance (el-Sherif 2011).
Using word of mouth, text messaging, and social networking tools (especially Facebook,
w h i c h had become a locus of opposition communication by the previous autumn), 25 Janu-
ary was declared a 'Day of Rage'. A variety of groups was involved, but for many the memory
of K h a l i d Said, a young computer activist who was savagely beaten to death by pólice the
previous summer i n Alexandria, was vivid.^ Tens of thousands turned out, especially in
Cairo's Tahrir (meaning 'Liberation') Square, a central site adjacent to Egypt's famous arch-
aeological museum, where chants of Irhal! Irhal! Irhal! ('Scram! Get out! Leave!') became
commonplace. Although the momentum was tenuous, especially when armed thugs were
unieashed by the government to foster a climate of lawlessness, the 'revolution' succeeded in
a mere eighteen days i n toppling H o s n i Mubarak, who had ruied Egypt since 1981, when he
had notoriously pledged to serve only one six-year term.
The oíd order was shaken, but no revolution occurred in Egypt. The massive Egyptian
miiitary holds the reins of power. It was the sénior generáis who told Mubarak that his time
was up and pledged to superintend a transition to elections. The miiitary has a big stake in
the present distribution of resources and privileges, and it begs credulity to imagine that the
uniformed brass w i l l accept any political arrangement that challenges their vested interests.
This is a gargantuan constraint on reform.
I n March 2011, the Egyptians went to the polis and overwheimingiy approved (more than
77% voted 'yes') a series of constitutional amendments intended to permit parliamentary
and presidential elections. Despite promises by the ruling Suprema Council of the A r m e d
Forces ( S C A F ) that the new constitution would be drafted i n an open process, the miiitary
unilaterally amended fifty-five articles of the existing constitution after the referendum. The
full dimensions of the generáis' agenda became clear on 1 November 2011, when S C A F
distributed its 'Guidelines' for the drafting of a new constitution. These guidelines include
provisions that there w i l l be no scrutiny of the miiitary budget by civilian authorities and
that the miiitary w i l l retain veto power over any proífered drafts of a new constitution. ( T w o
subsequent constitutions have greatly broadened the protections and prerogatives of the
miiitary.)
Although there were about twenty legal parties i n Mubarak's time, few enjoyed anything
approaching nationai organization. A d hoc groups that played Ieading roles in the Tahrir
Square demonstrations that toppled Mubarak would have to start from the ground up to
créate a political party. The only opposition group that could boast nationai organization
was the M u s l i m Brotherhood, which founded the Freedom and Justice Party. A variety of
PART 2 T H E M E S IN I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

Other Islamist parties have emerged, including the Hizb al-Wasat, the reformist Islamist
'Centre Party' that was ñnally granted legal status i n 2011, after sixteen years of struggle.
The growing vitality of Salañst parties is noteworthy. The Salafists are generally contemp-
tuous of profane politics, but they proved to be quite pragmatic i n exploiting political op-
portunity i n order to advance their goal of instilling a conservative Islamic order i n Egypt.
Salafi groups have Iong been especially active i n Alexandria, but they also enjoy a nationai
following.
Parliamentary elections were conciuded in December 2011, and the M u s l i m Brother-
hood's Freedom and Justice Party and aliied parties won nearly half of the 508 seats, with
the Salafists coming i n second with a quarter of the seats. The secularly oriented groups that
played such a formative role i n launching and sustaining the Tahrir Square demonstrations
came i n a distant third, with votes scattered among an admixture of small parties.
Presidential elections followed i n June 2012. Non-lslamist candidates for the presidency
included former A i r Forcé General and Prime Minister A h m a d Shafik, a long-term Mubarak
ally, and leftist Hamdeen Sabahi. Non-lslamist voters split their votes between Sabahi and
former foreign minister A m r Moussa, so law-and-order man Shafik came i n second and
then enterad a run-off against Muhammed Mursi, the Brotherhood's candidate. After days
of suspense (and rampant suspicions that the results were being 'cooked'), M u r s i was de-
clared the winner, with about 52% of the vote. What seemed to be a watershed moment i n
Egypt's political history became a catastrophe. Mursi proved to be an inept leader with a
penchant for harangue rather than consensos. He and his coUeagues i n the Brotherhood
were unprepared for the immense challenges confronting Egypt, and they were regularly
undermined by components of the deep state that remained well entrenched i n power.
B y early 2013, a massive anti-Mursi movement gained forcé—with g e n e r ó o s support from
rich opponents of the president, as well as massive funds provided secretly by the army by
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates ( U A E ) . * The army, led by Field Mar-
shal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, deposed Mursi i n July 2013, and pro-Mursi demonstrators were
brutally suppressed. I n August, pólice and soldiers slaughtered almost 1,000 protesters. The
toppled president and thousands of Brotherhood members were jailed and face Iong prison
terms (and death sentences, as i n the case of Mursi), often under ludicrous charges in a court
system that has inspired international derision. The Brotherhood was subsequently declared
to be a terrorist organization. Public assembly has been severely restricted, and some of the
Ieading secular figures i n the so-called 25 January Revolution have been imprisoned for
mounting peaceful protests. Meanwhile, jihadist groups unreiated to the Brotherhood (and
now aligned with the so-called Islamic State, or IS) have Iaunched scores of attacks, particu-
larly on security personnel but also on civilians, as i n an horrendous incident i n November
2017 when forty jihadists attacked a Suñ mosque i n the northern Sinai, killing an estimated
235 civilians and soldiers. Smaller-scale attacks on soldiers and pólice occur regularly.
The deep state, led by the army, has clawed back power. I n March 2014, Field Marshal
al-Sisi won the presidency with 97% of the vote, a result that is reminiscent of the Mubarak
era. A l - S i s i repeated the feat when he was re-elected with no credible opponent i n March
2018, also with 97% of the vote. The economic probiems that helped provoke the 2011 dem-
onstrations remain largely unresolved, Egyptian society is now deeply divided along ideo-
logical lines, and there is certainiy less freedom today than during the authoritarian rule of
Mubarak.
 CHAPTER 6 T H E PUZZLE OF POLITICAL REFORM IN T H E MIDDLE EAST 149

Libya: the 'Mukhtar Revolution'

Muammar Gaddafi's strategy of ruling was premised on weak state institutions and alli-
ances with favoured tribes.' H i s self-styled jamahiriya ('people's republic') was intended to
preclude challenges to his power by diffusing power throughout society. Henee the Libyan
A r m y was weak and fragmented; particularly i n the case of the eastern units, it centred on
the city of Benghazi. The judiciary was fragmented and the pólice forces lacked a central
authority. A s for civil society, any initiative that suggested establishing anything resembling
autonomous local actors was suppressed or crushed by the state. This meant that any group
seizing the state immediately confrontad the task of buiiding nationai institutions, as well as
offering í m p e t u s to civil society.
I n Libya, swelling protests began in mid-February. O n 17 February 2011, a proclaimed
'Day of Rage' inspired by the modeis of Tunisia and Egypt prompted a deadly response, es-
pecially against demonstrators in Tripoli's Green Square. A vindictive Gaddafi promised to
tolérate no dissent, declaring that his opponents were drug-addled terrorists led by al-Qaeda
and calling on Libyans to fight the 'greasy rats'.
A s the groundsweil of opposition to Gaddafi's rule expanded in February and March,
an inchoate civil society could be observed—but Libya lacks either an estabiished political
opposition or estabiished legal institutions other than tribal-based traditions of customary
law. The M u s l i m Brotherhood does enjoy considerable support, especially i n the eastern
cities including Benghazi, and Salafist groups have found significant pockets of support.
The venerable Sufi or mystical orders, especially the Sanusiyya, played an important role i n
Libyan history, including ieading the anti-colonial campaign against the Italians. Having
been ruthlessly repressed by Gaddafi, the Sanusiyya are resurging.
I n an extraordinary meeting on 12 March, the League of Arab States ( L A S ) voted to
support international action to protect Libyan civilians, w h i c h was followed five days later
by United Nations Security C o u n c i l Resolution 1973. The Resolution enabled the United
States-European intervention to créate 'no-drive' and 'no-fly' zones to stop attacks on L i b -
yan civilians. The N A T O effort evolved into a transparent campaign to destroy the miiitary
apparatus of the G a d d a ñ regime i n support of opposition forces that were engaged in dan-
gerous on-the-job training.
Gaddafi's capture on 20 October 2011, and his bloody, ignominious end, came amidst
reports not only of government atrocities and mass executions, but also of scores of sum-
mary executions of regime loyalists by opposition militias. The legacy of disregard for legal
processes and disrespect for fundamental human rights by both sides suggested that rocky
days lay ahead in liberated Libya, where militias remain heavily armed. Reliable estimates
indicate that at Ieast 165,000 Libyans have been displaced by the turmoil.
Credible elections for the General National Congress or pariiament were heid in 2012,
with over 60% of eligible voters participating, but by 2014 less than 20% of voters turned out
to elect representatives to pariiament. A n admixture of Islamist groups performed poorly
in the latter election, and the weak Supreme Court has challenged the legality of the elec-
tion. T w o rival entities claim to be the legitímate Libyan government. The Government of
National Accord ( G N A ) is based i n Trípoli, and it is recognized by the United Nations and
the European U n i o n as the legitímate government. The G N A enjoys on-the-ground support
from a variety of militias and factions, including the M u s l i m Brotherhood, but it does not
PART 2 T H E M E S IN I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

effectively exercise authority or provide government functions. To the east, the rival govern-
ment is based i n Benghazi, Tobruk, and al-Bayda and is led by General Khalifa Hiftar, who
commands the Libyan army and receives significant support from the U A E and Saudi A r a -
bia. Neither authority effectively controls its own territory, and power is widely fragmented
and alliances shift often, as might be expected i n a state i n w h i c h durable nationai institu-
tions are largely absent. The prospect for a Consolidated government authority emerging i n
the near term is low, although the United Nations Secretary G e n e r á i s special representative
has devoted great energy to creating an action plan for improving the constitution, fostering
a nationai dialogue, and even holding new elections.

'The Syria Revolution'

Following the death i n 2000 of Hafiz al-Asad, who had ruied Syria for twenty-seven years,
there was hope that his son and successor, D r Bashar al-Asad, would shepherd Syria towards
more freedom. Whatever Bashar's intentions, he promptly revealed his dependence on the
authoritarian structure of power that his wily father had mastered. After a flush of excite-
ment i n 2000, opposition volees were soon stifled by the state.
The chant that became famous i n Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya was al-shdah yurid usqat al-
nizam ('the people want the fall of the regime), but i n Damascus the regime was smugly
c o n ñ d e n t that Syria would not be affected by the upheaval. Not only were the many agen-
cies of the security apparatus vigilant to control dissent, but President Bashar al-Asad also
presented himself as a reformar. I n 2 0 I I , he gave a Iong interview to the Wall Street Journal
(2011), i n w h i c h he argued that Syria was stabie:

We always say that we need reform but what kind of reform? This is first. Second, if you want
to make a comparison between what is happening in Egypt and Syria, you have to look from a
different point: why is Syria stabie, although we have more diílicult conditions? Egypt has been
supported financially by the United States, while we are under embargo by most countries of the
world. We have growth although we do not have many of the basic needs for the people. Despite
all that, the people do not go into an uprising. So it is not only about the needs and not only about
the reform. It is about the ideology, the heliefs and the cause that you have. There is a difference
between having a cause and having a vacuum. So, as I said, we have many things in common but
at the same time we have some different things.

February passed with only a few small demonstrations, but by March it became clear that
Syria was by no means immune: a surge of demonstrations began in the southern H o u r a n
district of Syria, particularly i n the Sunni town of Deraa. The demonstrations were provoked
by the arrest and heinous mistreatment of teenagers, who had been arrested by the pólice for
posting anti-regime graíRti. The initial protests evoked a bloody response from the regime,
but the demonstrations spread throughout the southern región, despite widespread arrests
and indiscriminate killings by the army and pólice. A s i n Egypt, government thugs, k n o w n
locally as shabiha, were commonly employed as well. No serious efforts have been made
by the government to accommodate any of the demonstrators' demands, either i n 2011 or
since.
The initial waves of protests were peaceful, but within months an armed insurrection was
underway, including significant number of soldiers who deserted to join the opposition. B y
 CHAPTER 6 T H E P U Z Z L E O F P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST 151

2018, credible estimates put the total deaths in what has become the Syrian civil war as high
as 450,000 people, i f not more. I n addition, more than half of the country's population of 23
million have fled their homes. Over four million people have sought safety in neighbouring
countries (primarily Iraq, Jordán, Lebanon, and Turkey) or i n Europe (see Chapter 18),
while millions more have been impelled to seek safe haven wherever they may find it i n
Syria.
The dominant forces opposing the regime have often been hostile to non-Sunni minor-
ities, especially so i n the case of Daesh (or Da'ish, the Arabic acronym for the so-called
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; IS, which calis itself the Islamic State). Especially in Damas-
cus and Aleppo, as well as in áreas dominated by minorities such as Christian sects, Alawis,
Kurds, or Druze, the regime has retained significant support. A majority of Syrians (about
65%) are Arab Sunni Muslims, who dominate the opposition (yet many urban-based Sunni
merchants have stuck with the regime).
K e y elements within the miiitary remain loyal to the regime, but casualties have taken a
massive toU on what had been a standing forcé of 400,000. Tens of thousands of desertions
and defections among non-Alawi soldiers and oíficers have eroded the military's strength,
although these losses have typically been from less important units. For more than forty
years, the Syrian regime has been dominated by the minority A l a w i community, which ac-
counts for about 1 1 % of Syrias population of 21 million, and the Alawis control all s é n i o r
positions i n the army. The A l a w i sect is an offshoot of Shi'i Islam, but the sect is quite unique
in its practices and structure. For generations, the Alawis were poor and disadvantaged, but
their path to influence and power was the miiitary. Unlike either Tunisia or Egypt, where
professional army oíhcers broke with the president, this is unlikely to happen in Syria. The
two most important army divisions are controlled by relatives of Bashar al-Asad—particu-
larly his brother Maher, who has taken the lead in attempting to crush the growing insur-
rection brutally.
Left to its own resources, the al-Asad regime was imperilled but the 2013 intervention of
Irán and a variety of Shi'i militias, notably Lebanon's HezboUah, not only buttressed govern-
ment forces but even took the initiative in battle. Equally important was the engagement of
Russia i n September 2015, which not only contributed skilled advisors, armaments, and the
coordination of miiitary operations throughout Syria, but a lethal air forcé as well. B y 2017,
the tide had turned decisively i n favour of the government.
I n contrast to Russia, the United States was reticent about committing major forces to
Syria, but the US-led campaign against IS, i n w h i c h U S advisors worked with skilled K u r d -
ish fighters and aligned Arab groups to methodically attack IS, bore fruit by the end of 2017.
W h i l e scattered remnants of IS remain, at the time of writing, the group has been effectively
defeated and its self-proclaimed Caliphate is in shambles. I n October 2017, Raqqa, the
city i n northeastern Syria w h i c h I S claimed as its capital, was liberated. I n northern and
especially northeastern Syria, where Kurds predominate, a self-governing región, Rojava,
has been proclaimed. Rojava is adjacent to Turkey, where at Ieast 18% of the population
is Kurdish, and A n k a r a is fiercely opposed to any model of Kurdish autonomy, not to say
independence. B y 2018, Turkey Iaunched ground operations against vulnerable Kurdish
enclaves i n Syria and it has shown no sign of compromise vis-á-vis Rojava.
At the time of writing in mid-2018, notwithstanding the mixed motives of the powers that
intervened in Syria (for instance Turkey, w h i c h has been a major supporter of anti-regime
PART 2 T H E M E S IN I N T É R N A T Í O N A L R E L A T I O N S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

militias), the result is clear and that is that the regime, however battered and dishonoured by
its wiiiingness to decimate its o w n citizens, has survived. Meanwhile, while the opposition
remains intact in several áreas of the country, in Idlib province i n the northwest, in particu-
lar, the prospect for a credible challenge to the regime is missing.
International efforts to foster a negotiated solution to the conflict have failed, although
Russian-led efforts i n Astana, Kazakhstan have brought together I r á n , Syria, and T u r k e y
to créate 'de-escalation zones', w h i c h have been a m i x e d success at best. The regime and
its adversaries reject the principie that facilitated a negotiated end to the fifteen-year civil
war i n neighbouring Lebanon i n 1990, namely 'no victor, no vanquished'. The major com-
batants have rejected compromise out of hand. This suggests that Syria w i l l be a country
i n fragments for many years to come. Even as the level of vioience recedes over time, the
rebuilding of Syrias infrastructure w i l l be a gargantuan, i f not impossible challenge, not
to mention meeting the basic needs of millions of impoverished people struggling to live
day by day.

Renewed dissent in Saudi Arabia and probiems next door

Significant demonstrations took place in Saudi Arabia and i n Bahrain. I n Saudi Arabia, the
minority Shi'i M u s l i m community of the Eastern Province, who may account for 10% of the
country's population, mounted a ' D a y of Rage' on 11 March—also styied the ' H a n i n Revo-
lution of 11 March', i n reference to a document drafted by Shi'i intellectuals i n 2010, w h i c h
was presented to the late K i n g Abdullah. The document calis for respect for the civil rights of
the Shi'a, including the end of long-term imprisonment without trial (citing the case of some
prisoners who have been heid for fourteen years without trial). The pólice responded to
the protests by about 800 people by arresting several dozen protesters, some of w h o m were
alleged to have been involved i n the 1996 bombing of the al-Khobar Tower barracks. The
knee-jerk response of the Saudi authorities has been to describe Shi'i protesters as serving
Iranian purposes, often with fallacious or weak evidence. Whether i n the Eastern Province,
in Bahrain, or elsewhere i n the G u l f or i n Yemen, the Saudi narrative grants littie or no
credibility to either local grievances or the distinctive qualities of various Shi'i communities.
Instead, it is claimed that Iran's agenda is the key factor.
The government in Riyadh was also concerned that restive Sunni citizens would be i n -
spired to protest. B y March, several obliging sénior cierics i n the holy city of Mecca issued
a religious o p i n i ó n declaring that it was forbidden to protest because this undermines se-
curity and stability. Simuitaneousiy, K i n g Abdullah announced a large stimulus package to
be spent on creating jobs, housing, and medical facilities. The expanded expenditures even-
tually totalled nearly $130 billion. Subjects were also threatened with punishment i f they
mounted illegal demonstrations (and there is no possibility of'legal' demonstrations).
Under K i n g Abdullah some modest reforms were announced, including a September
2011 promise that women would be permitted to vote and stand for local elections begin-
ning i n 2015. W i t h AbduUah's demise i n 2015, and the installation of K i n g Salman, the ques-
tion was whether the tepid reforms initiated under his predecessor would c o n t i n u é . Prior
to ascending the throne, Salman served as the Governor of Riyadh for forty-eight years and
he earned a reputation as the royal family's stern disciplinarían, probably not an obvious
credential for a reformen
 C H A P T E R 6 T H E PUZZLE OF P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST

K i n g Salman q u i c k l y named his son M u h a m m a d b i n Salman to be M i n i s t e r of

Defence. I n June 2017, the k i n g deposed the incumbent C r o w n P r i n c e M u h a m m a d b i n
Nayef i n favour of his son M u h a m m a d b i n Salman, w h o was then thirty-one years o í d .
T h e m o n a r c h , w h o was b o r n i n 1935, has positioned his son, w h o is often referred to
as 'MBS', to rule the k i n g d o m for generations. Judging by his first year as c r o w n prince,
M B S intends to impose significant social reforms. He placed limits on the powers of
religious p ó l i c e , w h o are often m u c h disliked by young Saudis, allowed movie theatres
to open (the blockbuster Black Panther was the first movie s h o w n ) , and announced
that w o m e n w o u l d be allowed to drive and attend sports events. He also took some
steps to bring more w o m e n into the labour market. H i s most audacious measure was
to r o u n d up hundreds of r i c h Saudi businessmen, i n c l u d i n g some Ieading members of
the royal family, and keep them i n custody i n the five-star R i y a d h R i t z - C a r l t o n u n t i l
they agree to forfeit large chunks of their wealth, w h i c h presumably had been gained
in m a n y instances through various forms of corruption. A c c o r d i n g to the kingdom's
public prosecutor, speaking i n January 2018, agreement was reached for the recovery of
$106 billion. It should be added that M B S was also showing his muscles to those w h o
might marshal the temerity to challenge his quiet rise to power. He is daring and i m -
petuous, and m a n y o f the measures he has Iaunched have been applauded by large parts
of the Saudi youth population, m a n y of w h o m feel stifled by the kingdom's rampant
corruption, l i m i t e d job opportunities, and the sociaJ restrictions that characterize the
conservative k i n g d o m .
Meanwhile, neighbouring Yemen, the A r a b worid's poorest country, was collapsing
into civil war by 2014. L o n g - t e r m dictator A l i A b d u l l a h Salih was nudged from power
w i t h Saudi help i n late 2011 after months of demonstrations and vioience. The conflict
in resource-poor Yemen is extraordinarily compiex, and involves competing regional,
ideological, and especially tribal interests. Major combatant forces include a formidable
local branch of al-Qaeda, elements of the m i i i t a r y that remain loyal to Salih, m i i i t a r y
units that remain loyal to the l e g i t í m a t e government, pro-Saudi tribes, and Houthis (Shi'i
tribesmen w h o follow a different sect of Shi'ism than Iranians). The Saudi response to
the unfolding c i v i l war was to fall back on its narrative of blaming I r á n for inciting and
a r m i n g insurgents, although Iran's role has been far more limited, especially i n the early
stages of the conflict, as western dipiomats are quick to note. Thus, rather than focusing
on the need to accommodate competing Yemen! interests, Saudi A r a b i a decided to inter-
vene militarily through a campaign of aerial bombardment beginning i n M a r c h 2015
( w i t h support from other G C C states, especially the U A E , as well as the United States).
The southern port city of A d e n was recovered from H o u t h i occupation, but otherwise the
Saudis and their allies have been unable to impose their w i l l on Yemen. W h i l e consider-
able physical damage has been caused by the bombing, as well as the deaths of hundreds
of civilians, the internal balance of power i n Yemen has not been meaningfully changed.
B y 2017, it was estimated by the W o r l d Food Program that 60% o f Yemenis are in 'food
crisis' and the possibility of famine looms i n this country of 28 m i l l i o n people. M a l -
nutrition, cholera, and diphtheria became widespread i n 2017. Short of an enormously
difficult ground i n v a s i ó n of Yemen, w h i c h was attempted with disastrous consequences
by Egypt i n 1962, the capacity of Saudi A r a b i a to impose a political solution on Yemen
appears d i m .
PART 2 T H E M E S IN I N T E R N A T I O N A L RELATIONS A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L POLITICAL E C O N O M Y

The tragedy of Bahrain

I n the small G u l f state of Bahrain, many of the complaints coincide with sectarian differ-
ences and disparities i n privilege that are extraordinary because they are so readily noticed.
Although Shi'i Muslims account for nearly 70% of the small population (excluding expatrí-
ate workers, the Bahraini citizens number about 600,000), they have typically felt the short
end of the stick i n terms of access to government employment and favours. O n a journey
from the cosmopolitan capital of Manama to the predominantly Shi'i and very distressed
Shi'i city of Sitrah, the differences are abrupt and stunning. Sitrah, along with many of the
Shi'i villages i n Bahrain, is a dreadful place to live. Unemployment and per capita income
data speak volumes about the inequity that defines Bahraini society.
O n 14 February 2011, protests were mounted by predominantly Shi'i demonstrators, al-
though some reform-minded Sunni Muslims also joined them. Many of the demonstra-
tors gathered around the Pearl Roundabout, a downtown Manama landmark where a white
concrete pedestal heid aloft a pearl, recalling earlier days when Bahrain was a world centre
for their harvesting. The demonstrators were overwheimingiy peaceful and pólice efforts to
dislodge them were largely unsuccessful, despite pólice vioience that killed five protesters on
18 February. The government—urged on by the United States—sought a negotiated end to
the protests. C r o w n Prince Salman took the lead i n negotiations to initiate a serious dialogue
about reform, particularly with Shaikh 'Ali Salman, the softly spoken and m o d é r a t e head of
al-Wefaq (meaning 'the Compact'), w h i c h heid all of the eiected opposition seats i n pariia-
ment. Hardliners on both sides were sceptical of the proposed dialogue and it was stymied.
O n the opposition side, the rival al-Haqq movement declared that its goal was to over-
throw the monarchy, while w i t h i n the regime Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman, the únele
of K i n g H a m a d bin Isa and who had served i n his post for four decades from the very begin-
ning of Bahraini independence, was hostile to the prospect of reform. The reputedly corrupt
prime minister, who enjoys cióse ties to Saudi Arabia, has Iong frustrated reformist efforts,
not Ieast those pursued by his grand nephew the C r o w n Prince. U S efforts to encourage the
reform dialogue seemed to be bearing fruit i n early March, but any talk of dialogue ended on
14 M a r c h when troops from Saudi Arabia and the U A E troops crossed the causeway linking
the main island to the mainland to lead a crackdown on the demonstrators. The Saudi-led
i n c u r s i ó n was clearly a riposte to the United States, w h i c h K i n g Abdullah felt was m u c h too
quick to jump on the bandwagon of reform and far too reticent to support oíd friends ( i n -
cluding President Mubarak of Egypt). W i t h i n days, the very symbol of the protests, the Pearl
monument, was demolished.
A l l talk of reform came to a crashing halt. Shi'i employees were dismissed from state jobs
as punishment for having demonstrated, and hundreds were arrested. Health professionals,
w h o treated injured demonstrators and those accused of trying to overthrow the regime,
were tried by miiitary courts and sentenced to Iong terms i n prisons. Under international
pressure, some of the most egregious miiitary triáis have been overturned and referred to
civilian courts, but littie has been done to address the underiying disparities that gave rise
to the protests, w h i c h c o n t i n u é periodically. The risk is that the majority Shi'i population,
w h i c h has Iong been surprisingly m o d é r a t e , especially given the discrimination that they
face routinely, w i l l be radicalizad and that charges of foreign meddling by Irán will prove to
be self-fulfilling.
 CHAPTER 6 THE PUZZLE OF POLITICAL REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Conclusión
Never i n the modern history of the Middle East have so many millions demanded the dis-
mantling of their autocratic regimes with such unanimity, perseverance, and—it must be
emphasized—courage as they did in 2011. Unfortunately, in all but one instance where ruiers
were toppled, the results have been horrendous. Embedded political élites have clawed back
power, oppression and bioodshed have increased, and many people are living lives more
miserable than they were before the protests. The authoritarian states have proven neither
'nimble ñ o r effective in their efforts to retain power. Three countries are in the grips of
civil war (Libya, Syria, and Yemen); Egypt is kept afloat by boatloads of cash from the rich
G u l f states* while a spreading jihadist insurgency replaces jailed m o d é r a l e s of the Muslim
Brotherhood; and Bahrain imposes a pólice state on the majority of its population.
However, the memories of coilective protests cannot be easily erased, as well as the lesson
that public space can be reclaimed and repoliticized. The path of reform w i l l indeed be Iong,
far longer than so many people imagined i n the uplifting days of 2011, but there is space for
new political imaginarles. We need to ensure that our assessments allow room for surprise,
including radically changing terms of reference for politics. Demands for accountability and
a responsive political system may have subsided, but they have not disappeared.

Further reading
B a y a t , A . ( 2 0 1 0 , 2 0 1 3 ) Life as Poiitics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East ( S t a n f o r d , C A :
Stanford University Press)
A p r e s c i e n t , n u a n c e d , a n d richiy i n f o r m e d study of y o u t h politics, Islamist politics, a c t i v i s m , a n d t h e
p r o s p e c t s f o r m u n d a n e politics t o foster r e f o r m .

C a m m e t t , M . , D i w a n , I . , R i c h a r d s , A . , a n d W a t e r b u r y , J . ( 2 0 1 5 ) A Poiiticai Economy ofthe Middie

East, 4 t h e d n ( B o u l d e r , C O : W e s t v i e w P r e s s )
E x t e n s i v e l y u p d a t e d e d i t i o n o f t h e s e m i n a l r e f e r e n c e o n t h e interplay o f politics a n d e c o n o m i e s . T h e b o o k
c o m b i n e s lucid analysis w i t h rich detail a n d w e l l - r e a s o n e d insights.

H i l s u m , L . ( 2 0 1 2 ) Sandstorm: Libya in the Time of Revolution ( N e w York: Penguin Press)

Exceptional reportage by a veteranjournaiist w h o witnessed the Libyan Revolution first-hand. Her account
is n o t e w o r t h y f o r its lucidity a n d its insights.

I s m a i l , S. ( 2 0 1 3 ) ' U r b a n S u b a l t e r n s i n t h e A r a b R e v o i u t i o n s : C a i r o a n d D a m a s c u s i n C o m p a r a t i v a
P e r s p e c t i v e ' , Comparativo Studies in Society and History 55 ( 4 ) : 865-94.
E o r t h e u r b a n u n d e r c l a s s t h e i r p r i m a r y ¡nterface w i t h g o v e r n m e n t is w i t h t h e pólice, w h o a r e m u c h
d r e a d e d a n d f e a r e d . For m a n y protesters, as Ismail reveáis, t h e pólice b e c a m e t h e p r i m a r y target f o r t h e i r
rage.

N o r t o n , A . R . ( e d . ) ( 1 9 9 5 , 1 9 9 6 ) Civil Society in the Middle East, 2 v o l s ( L e i d e n : E . J . B r i l l )

T h e m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e c o l l e c t i o n of studies o n s t a t e - s o c i e t y relations in t h e M i d d l e East, c o v e r i n g
a l m o s t e v e r y c o u n t r y in t h e r e g i ó n .

O w e n , R. ( 2 0 1 2 ) T?ie R i s e and Fall ofArab Presidents for Life ( C a m b r i d g e , M A : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y

Press)
A v e r y t i m e l y political history o f t h e A r a b w o r l d t h a t e x p l a i n s h o w c o l o n i a l i s m , t h e drive f o r sovereignty,
a n d political e c o n o m y g a v e s h a p e to A r a b political s y s t e m s .
156 P A R T 2 T H E M E S !N I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S A N D I N T E R N A T Í O N A L P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

S a l a m é , G . ( e d . ) ( 1 9 9 4 ) Democracy without Democrats: Renewai of Politics in the Muslim World ( N e w 3. T h i s section dr

Y o r k : St M a r t i n ' s ) 4. D a t a from t h e '

A g r o u n d - b r e a k i n g v o i u m e t h a t e x p l o r e s t h e p r o s p e c t s for d e m o c r a c y in a región w h e r e Ieading 5. Seehttp;//\svs-»

o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e s m a y initiaiiy s p u r n t h e c o n c e p t . 6. See H e y d e m a n

S h e n k e r , J . ( 2 0 1 6 ) The Egyptians: A Radical History ofEgypt's Unfinished Revolution ( N e w York: The 7. O m a r M u k h t a i

N e w Press) 8. L e a k e d t r a n s a
A richiy d e t a i l e d a n d s y m p a t h e t i c a c c o u n t of o r d i n a r y Egyptians a n d their struggles for a better life a n d for m u c h as S50 'oí
freedom. generáis-1452<

U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) ( 2 0 0 2 , 2 0 0 4 , 2 0 0 5 , 2 0 0 8 , 2 0 0 9 , 2 0 1 2 , 2 0 1 6 ) Arab
Human Development Reports ( N e w Y o r k : U n i t e d N a t i o n s P u b l i c a t i o n s ) , a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e at h t t p : / /
www.arab-hdr.org/reports/regionalarab.aspx (retrieved December 2018)
T h e s e c a n d i d a n d p e n e t r a t i n g studies by s c h o l a r s f r o m t h e A r a b w o r l d e x a m i n e t h e factors that i m p e d e
f r e e d o m ¡n t h e r e g i ó n , i n c l u d i n g c o r r u p t i o n , t h e r e p r e s s i o n of political life, t h e status of w o m e n , a n d t h e
role of e x t e r n a l p o w e r s .

W h i t e , J . B . ( 2 0 1 4 ) Muslim Nationaiism and the New Turks ( P r i n c e t o n , N J : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y

Press)
T h e author's e x t e n s i v e f i e l d w o r k in T u r k e y is t h e basis for her e n g a g i n g s t u d y o f ' M u s l i m h o o d ' - a m o d e l for
i n c o r p o r a t l n g p i o u s Individuáis a n d p r i n c i p i e s into t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e w i t h o u t e x c l u d i n g n o n - M u s l i m s .

Questions
1. W h a t is the 'ruling bargain that defined the reiationship between many people i n
the Middle East and their governments? W h a t factors have undermined the ruling
bargain?
2. M a n y Middle Eastern states depend heavily on 'rents' as opposed to taxes to finance the
government and provide service. W h y might rentier states be more autonomous from
society than states dependent upon taxes?
3. Islamist groups have attracted signiñcant support i n most, i f not all Middle Eastern
states. Given the opportunity to particípate i n the political systems, how have Islamist
groups fared?
4. W h a t factors motivated multitudes of people to take to the streets i n mass
demonstrations i n 2011?
5. Ruling ñgures were toppled i n Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen as a result of the 2011
protests, and i n Bahrain and Syria profound challenges were posed to the sitting ruiers.
I n a number of these cases, the results have been dismal. What factors explain the poor
outcomes?

Notes
1. T h e P e w C h a r i t a b l e T r u s t also offers extensive poUing reports. See the w i d e l y discussed P e w G l o b a l Attitudes
Project, w h i c h includes a lot o f m a t e r i a l on the M i d d l e East, o n l i n e at http://www.pewglobal.org/ (retrieved
December 2018).

2. George W. B u s h , Remarks at American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner, 28 F e b r u a r y 2003, o n l i n e at http://

www.aei.org/publication/president-george-w-bush-speaks-at-aeis-annual-dinner/ (retrieved D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 8 ) .
MY C H A P T E R 6 THE P U Z Z L E OF P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M IN T H E M I D D L E EAST 157

(New 3. T h i s section d r a w s upon w o r k originally completed j o i n t l y w i t h Professor F a r h a d K a z e m i .

4. D a t a from the W o r l d B a n k , o n l i n e at https://data.worldbank.org/ (retrieved D e c e m b e r 2018).

5. See http://www.elshaheeed.co.uk/ (retrieved D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 8 ) .

6. See H e y d e m a n n a n d L e e n d e r s ( 2 0 1 4 ) .

7. O r n a r M u k h t a r w a s a revered leader o f t h e a n t i - c o l o n i a l struggle against the Italians a n d was hanged i n 1937.

8. L e a k e d transcripts reveal that by 2014 the cash infusions from the G u l f totalled S39.5 billion, a n d perhaps as
m u c h as S50 b i l l i o n by 2015. See http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/does-sisi-retain-support-his-top-
generals-1452666191 (retrieved D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 8 ) .

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