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1 RiskAversion
1 RiskAversion
Readings:
Ingersoll Chapter 1
Leroy and Werner Chapters 8 & 9
Ross Stronger Measures of Risk Aversion
The most interesting aspect of Asset Pricing, the focus of this course, considers how securities
markets price risk (the time dimension alone is largely mechanical although there are interesting
interactions between the two). For this question to be interesting, it must be that there is a
positive price for risk i.e. investors require some compensation for exposing their portfolios to
risk (this certainly appears to be true from the data). Theoretically, this in turn requires that
investors dislike risk or that they are risk averse. For intuitions sake, we will review some of the
relevant concepts.
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Definition: Let be a preference relation with an expected utility representation. is said
to exhibit or display risk aversion if for any simple gamble ~ with expected value g, denoted
~ ~ ~
g , the relation weakly prefers the fixed value g to the simple gamble g g g, g .
The weak preference allows for indifference so weak risk aversion includes risk neutrality.
(Strict risk aversion, risk neutrality, and risk seeking (weak or strict) are defined analogously.)
~
Example: A simple gamble: Consider a random payoff g which pays 1 > 0 with
~
probability 1 p 0 or 2 1 with probability 1 - p. The expected value of g is
~ ~
p 1 + (1-p) 2 = E( g ) = g. This gamble is said to be fair if E[ g ] = g = 0. We
can alternatively define a risk averse agent as one who is unwilling or indifferent to
taking any fair gamble, and strictly risk averse if unwilling to accept any fair gamble. In
the above definition, a risk averse individual (weakly) prefers to receive the amount E(
~ ~
g ) = g rather than face the bet g .
If a concave function f( ) is defined on an open interval of the real line then f( ) is continuous and
is continuously differentiable almost everywhere on that interval. ( denotes partial derivatives)
f ( ) is non-increasing if f( ) is concave. So, if f( ) is concave and twice
differentiable then f ( ) is non-positive.
Generally, we will be concerned with f( ) such that f ( ) 0.
U(w)
U(wo) =
U((wo+)+(wo-))
~
E[U ( wo )]
Wealth, w
wo wo wo +
~ ~
This compares U ( wo ) U ( E[ wo ]) with E[U ( wo )] 1
2 U ( wo ) 1
2 U ( wo )
2
Thus it is the concavity of U( ) that causes the agent to be unwilling to accept the fair gamble.
Intuitively, risk aversion derives from a downside loss causing a reduction in utility that is
greater than the increase in utility from an equivalent upside gain (f ( ) is non-increasing).
The two definitions provided above naturally lead to the following theorem.
The concave functions we are concerned with are of course utility functions. In finance, we
commonly simplify things and deal with utility of wealth. In this course we will consider,
directly or indirectly, the implications of the investment problem of maximizing agents. In the
standard two-date, consumption-investment problem, agents control two types of variables: (1) at
the first date they invest their after consumption wealth in the marketed securities; and (2) at the
second date they sell these securities/assets to buy consumption goods. Two components make
the problem interesting: time and risk.
Thus, the investment decision consists of forming a portfolio that transfers wealth from one
date to the next, and the consumption decision allocates the resulting wealth among the
various goods (in a multi-period problem, these goods include savings).
If a complete set of state contingent claims (futures contracts) are available, then the date 2
consumption goods can be purchased at date 1 and both allocations can be made
simultaneously. If there is some incompleteness in the market, then the decision must take
place in two distinct steps.
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Since it is also possible to consider the complete markets single-step problem as a two-step
problem we will generally think of the problem in two pieces investment then
consumption.
If there is a single consumption good in the economy/model, the utility of wealth function is
just a standard utility function over consumption of the single good.
If multiple goods exist, we are dealing with a derived utility of wealth function U(W) where
U(W) Max V(c) s.t. pc = W where c is a vector of consumption goods, p is a price
vector, and W the level of the budget constraint. U(W) is just the envelope of V(c) for
different levels of final wealth, W. In this case, we think of the date 2 consumption
allocations as specifying a derived utility of wealth function that the investment decision
seeks to maximize. We can then concentrate on the investment decision itself. To illustrate
in a simple two good example, consider:
x2
3
1 2
x1
U(W) W1 W2 W3
W
W1 W2 W3
x1 is the numeraire
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(1) Arrows measure of risk aversion what is the compensation required for a risk averse
agent to accept a gamble?
This defines a probability (or an expected payoff/return) based risk premium. In this sense, it
is related to the finance or asset pricing view.
If ~ with probability p
- with probability 1-p
Then, the question can be stated as: for what value of p (> ) is E[U(wo + ~ )] = U(wo)?
Or, for what p is pU(wo + ) + (1-p)U(wo ) = U(wo)?
To solve, take a Taylor series expansion of the left-hand side of this last equation at wo
p[U(wo) + U (wo) + U (wo) + o ] +
(1-p) [U(wo) - U (wo) + U (wo) + o ] = U(wo)
Note that for linear U( ) (so that U = 0) this holds at p = as would be expected.
Note that if U (wo) > 0 and U ( wo) < 0 (utility is increasing and concave) then A(wo) > 0
Note: A(wo) is a property of the preference relation and not its utility function representation
U( ). A(wo) relates to the curvature of the utility function at wo (think of the Jensens inequality
picture). So, clearly U ( ) belongs, but why is 1/ U ( ) there?
Lets interpret p: What we see is that the agent must be compensated for bearing the risk of ~ ,
~ ~
Ep(wo+ ) = p(wo + ) + (1-p)(wo - ) > wo, or, Ep( ) > 0 iff A(wo) > 0
U' ' (wo)
Since A(wo) = - and U (wo) > 0, then A(wo) > 0 iff U (wo) < 0 (i.e. iff U( ) is
U' (wo)
concave).
Thus, the amount by which we adjust p from the fair gamble level is proportional to A(wo)
(a positive amount for risk averse preferences) the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk
aversion, and a metric for the amount of risk in (the size of) the simple gamble.
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- wo with probability 1-p
then the above exercise would give us:
U ' ' (wo)
p + R(wo) where R(wo) = -wo
U' (wo)
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
(2) Pratts measure of risk aversion what payment would a risk averse agent make to avoid
a fair gamble (insurance premium)?
~
with probability = (note that in this case the gamble is fixed as fair)
- with probability =
The question is then, for what value of i is it true that E[U(wo + ~ )] = U(wo-i) ?
Taking a Taylors series expansion of both sides (around wo) and solving for i (do this) gives:
i A(wo) = A(wo)Var( )
(A(wo) is again an approximation to measuring risk aversion for small and in this simple
setting Var( ) measures the size of the gamble or the amount of risk.)
(3) Also consider the question: for what c compensating wealth premium is it true that:
E[U(wo + c + ~ )] = U(wo) for a fair gamble ~ ?
We can show that c depends on A( ). Since we can, do so as an exercise. What do you find?.
wow o w o
(2)
E 1 [U ( wo )] U ( w0 i )
2
wo wo wo
6
wo i
7
(3)
E 1 [U ( wo c )] U ( w0 )
2
wo c wo c wo c
wo
Each is determined by the nature of the curvature of U( ) at w0, i.e. its concavity.
Practice exercise: Assume U( ) is twice continuously differentiable. Show this holds iff A(w) is
non-increasing in w
Practice exercise: Show that if an individual is decreasingly risk averse then U(w) > 0 if U( )
is thrice differentiable.
Definition: Individual 1 is strictly more risk averse than individual 2 if simple gambles
~ ~
on and wo the insurance premium (i) individual 1 would pay to avoid the gamble
is strictly larger than that which individual 2 would pay. (Or, if 1 always chooses a safe
investment over a simple gamble whenever 2 does.)
Theorem: Consider two strictly increasing concave utility functions U1 and U2 the
following are equivalent:
1) A1(w) > A2(w) w 1 is more risk averse than 2
2) G( ) with G( ) > 0 and G( ) < 0 such that U1(w) = G[U2(w)]
(i.e., U1( ) is a concavification of U2( ))
3) i1 > i2 w0 and ~
Proof:
(3) (1) we know ij Aj(w)Var( ) for j = 1, 2
where ij is the insurance premium agent j will pay to avoid the gamble ~
Thus, i1 > i2 w and iff A1(w) > A2(w) w.
~
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(2) (3) U1(w- 2) = G(U2(w- 2)) from the definition of G( )
~
= G[E(U2(w+ ))] from the definition of 2
> E[G(U2(w+ ~ ))] Jensens inequality (G is strictly concave)
= E[U1(w+ ~ )] from the definition of G( )
= U1(w- 1) from the definition of 1
U '' R
=
U' w
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U(w) = e ( R log( w ) I1 ) = e I1 w R
Case 1: R = 1
U(w) = e I1 log( w) I 2
Case 2: R 1
U(w) = e I1 w R
U(w) = e I1 (w1-R/(1-R)) + I2
1
The risk tolerance measure is , the inverse of risk aversion:
A( w)
1 U ' ( w)
T(w) = =-
A( w) U ' ' ( w)
U ' ( w)
Linear Risk tolerance implies T ( w) = aw + b, a linear function of w.
U ' ' ( w)
U ' ' ( w) 1
HARA is simply A( w) = , a hyperbolic function of w.
U ' ( w) ( aw b)
Case 1: a = 0
1
If a=0, this is simply CARA utility: A(w) = =A
(b)
Case 2: b = 0
1
If b=0, this is simply CRRA utility: = A(w)
( aw)
1
= wA(w) = R
(a )
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General Case: a,b 0
In this case, we have
1
-log(U(w)) = log(aw+b) + I1 as long as aw+b is positive
(a )
b
Assume a > 0, w >
a
e ( a log( aw b ))
e I1
1
Then U(w) =
= e I1 (aw b)
1
a
and,
U(w) = e I1 log(aw+b) + I2 if a = 1
1
1
(aw b) a
1 I1
e 1
(a ) 1
U(w) = a + I2 if a 1
b 1
For simplicitys sake, let ws = - and R* = , so base utility can be written
a a
U(w) = log(w-ws) if R* = 1 (a = 1) Generalized log utility
( w ws )1 R*
U(w) = if R* 1 (a 1) Generalized power
1 R *
utility
These two base utility functions are generalized log and generalized power utility
functions. They are defined only for w > ws. ws is thought of as a subsistence level of
wealth, below which utility equals negative infinity.
Risk A general notion of risk we will study later, but for now, a quick introduction
General notion Risk is defined as any property of a set of random outcomes that is disliked by
a risk averse agent.
This is pretty general and seemingly broad enough to be almost useless. Youd be surprised.
Commonly we are in a situation of trying to focus this idea enough to make it fit within a
standard economic model and get a useful result to come out.
~ ~
Rothschild & Stiglitz presented the idea this way: If uncertain outcomes X and Y have the
~ ~
same location (the same mean), X is said to be weakly less risky than Y for a class of utility
~ ~
functions U if no individual with a utility function in U prefers Y to X . That is,
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~
E[U( X ~
)] E[U( Y )] U( ) U.
Risk, defined in this way, clearly depends on the class of utility functions considered. At the
most general level U is taken to be the set of all risk averse (concave) utility functions.
Practice exercise: Let U be the set of quadratic utility functions so (wlog) we can write:
bz 2
U(z) = z - . What can we use to measure risk for this class of utility functions?
2
Theorem: X ~
is weakly less risky than Y ~ ~
iff Y ~
is distributed like X + ~ , where ~ is a fair
game with respect to X . (That is E( ~ |X) = 0 X.) The fair game property is not as strong
~
as independence but stronger than a lack of correlation. Why would that be a requirement?
~ ~
Proof (sufficiency): Y is distributed like X plus noise the proof should depend on concavity.
E[U( Y ~
)] = E[U( X + ~ )]
~
due to the equivalence of the distributions
= E[E(U( X + ~ )|X)]
~
just conditional expectations
E[U(E( X + ~ |X))]
~
Jensens inequality (i.e. U( ) is concave)
~
= E[U( X )]
w1 p
Example: ~
X = with probability 1 p
and
w2
w1 e
.5 p
~
Y = w1 e with probability .5 p
w 1 p
2
Since e ~ is actuarially fair, any risk averse agent should prefer to avoid the second gamble
~
contained in Y . We now show that the Arrow-Pratt measure does not properly account for this
situation in comparing risk aversions.
The Arrow-Pratt measure approaches the problem by saying that U1( ) is more risk averse than
U2( ) if U1( ) prefers a riskless payoff r to a gamble y whenever U2( ) does. Ross instead directly
~ ~
compares the gambles X and Y given above. The first approach assumes complete insurance is
possible (can always evaluate a risky position against a riskless payoff); the stronger measures
were developed under the assumption that this is not possible. They highlight how the
possibility of perfect insurance simplifies this and many other issues.
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The Ross Theorem the following are equivalent:
(3) ~, ~
w e with E( ~
e |w) = 0, 1 2 where E[Ui( w
~ + ~ )] = E[U ( w
e i
~ i)]
Proof: First, lets find : E[U1( w
~ +~ ~-
e )] = E[U1( w 1)] where
w1 p
~ =
w with probability 1 p
and
w2
w1 e .5 p
~
w + e = w1 e with probability .5 p
w 1 p
2
E[U1(w+e)] = p [U1(w1+e) + U1(w1-e)] + (1-p)U1(w2)
pU1(w1) + (1-p)U1(w2) + pU1(w1)e
Note that the effect of e is only on the second order term (and only at w1).
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E[U2(w- 2)] + E[(G(w-2)] G is decreasing
= E[U1(w- 2)]
1 2 since U1 0
(1) (2) Define G( ) by U1( ) = U2( ) + G where U1( ) and U2( ) are scaled so (1) holds
for some > 0
or,
Note - The Ross ordering implies the A-P ordering, simply let w1 = w2 and rearrange the Ross
definition but well see that the A-P ordering does not imply the Ross ordering.
Example: ~~
Suppose wealth is distributed w e as above
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12 pU i ' ' ( w1 )e 2
We know that i
pU i ' ( w1 ) (1 p )U i ' ( w2 )
But, for w1-w2 sufficiently large, so that w2-w1 is very negative (i.e. far from perfect
insurance), we end up with:
then, for p small enough, 1 < 2 and U1( ) prefers some gambles that U2( ) does not
despite U1( ) being more risk averse under the A-P measure.
The marginal value of insurance is determined by the second order effect -U(w1)e. The cost of
insurance, on the other hand (for very low p), is valued at the margin by U(w2), the marginal
utility of the likely state. The premium is thus determined by a tradeoff between the benefits of
insurance at w1 and the costs at w2.
The example forces these wealth levels far apart. The A-P measure cannot consider the two
separate wealth levels and so it fails to order properly the required premiums. Note that the Ross
measure controls for this nicely in this example. See representation (1) in the Theorem.
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