Lepanto vs Dumyung

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667, L-31668 | April 30, 1979 | J. Fernandez | Contreras

Statement of Facts:

Petitioners in this case assail the ruling of the lower court insofar as the properties in question
form part of timber/mineral lands and thus, inalienable. This case originated from an action filed by the
State for the annulment of the free patents over the properties in dispute. The lower court rendered the
said decision bearing in mind that the upon the issuance of the free patents the applicants are
automatically qualified to acquire a corresponding title over the lands.

Issue:

Whether or not the ruling of the trial court is erroneous.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The SC held that a certificate of title is void
when it covers forest or timber and mineral lands. The SC found it premature for the trial court to rule
on whether or not the titles have already become indefeasible. The trial court merely assumed that the
applicants in this case are members of an Indigenous group and thus they are one of the personalities
entitled to a right of a title over the land (whether it is inalienable or not). The Supreme Court also held
that there is no evidence that the respondents are members of the Natural Cultural Minorites.
Therefore, the land in question undoubtedly belongs to that State.

Garcia vs CA

G.R. No. 48971, 49011 | January 22, 1990 | Aquino, J. | Contreras

Statement of Facts:

A deed of sale for two parcels of land was executed in favor of Lapus and against Vidal, by
order of the CFI Rizal in a civil case for partition. However, the deed of sale was not annotated in the
OCT for some mysterious reason. Years after the sale, the heirs of Vidal filed a motion in the CFI-Rizal,
alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the disputed hacienda covered by the OCT.,
which happened to be unencumbered (due to the absence of the said annotation). The heirs were
given a favorable decision by the CFI-Rizal, and they assigned their rights over the land to Cruz and the
petitioner. Cruz assigned his rights to Go, and Go mortgaged the land to PNB. Upon failure to pay, the
PNB foreclosed the same. Gozon, heir of Lapus, learned about this ruling and filed an action to quiet title
against the heirs of Vidal and their assignees.

Issue:
 Whether or not the previous title in favor of Lapus should prevail over the title of the heirs of
Vidal.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court rendered a decision in favor of Gozon. The SC held that inasmuch as Lapus
was an innocent purchaser for value, his title over the land cannot be stripped away as his title is
considered indefeasible already. As a rule, in case of two certificate of titles including the same parcel of
land, the earlier one prevails. Also, with regard to the petitioners contention that mere entry in the day
book without noting it in the certificate of title is tantamount to an insufficient registration, the SC held
that in cases of involuntary registration (like the one in this case), a mere entry in the day book serves as
sufficient notice to all persons even if the owners duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the
Registry of Deeds.

With regard to the rights of PNB, the SC held that it is not a buyer in good faith when it bought
the lot in the auction sale, as there was already a notice of lis pendens annotated in the title. The PNB
should have made a thorough investigation first to determine whether a third partys right over the land
is made subject of a judicial proceeding.

Yared vs. Tongco

G.R. No. 114732 | August 1, 2000 | De Leon Jr., J. | Contreras

Statement of Facts:

Petitioner in this case assails the vailidity of the adjudication made by respondents Tongco and
Doronilla. He alleged that their fathers are siblings, and that when their grandmother died, Tongco
adjudicated the lots forming part of the estate to the prejudice of the other heirs. Thus, Yared caused to
be annotated on the TCT of the parcels of land notices of lis pendens. Tongco challenged the said
annotation by a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens, claiming that it was only done by
Yared to molest him. The RTC first denied the motion, and granted the same upon a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the Registry of Deeds cancelled the notices of lis pendens over the land.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the case, insofar as the principle of judicial hierarchy was
disregarded by Yared. However, the SC in this case discussed the concept of lis pendens thoroughly.

It stated that the doctrine of lis pendens is found upon reasons of public policy and necessity,
the purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still within
the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over
the said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.

The possible grounds for a notice of lis pendens are:

a. action to recover possession of real estate;
b. action to quiet title;
c. action to remove clouds;
d. action for partition; or
e. other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting title to the land or the use or occupation
therefor or the building thereon

The SC stated the grounds by which a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled:
If the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party OR
When the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
recorded.