Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Quarterly
National Fire Protection Association
July 1947
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4, No fire or smoke was visible at this the hold, A ship s fire hose was lowered
time according to survivors, One crew of into the hatch , but the first mate (known
four workmen commenced to stow bags as second captain on French ships) or-
of the fertilizer already in the hold on the dered that no water be used as it would
port side of the vessel. A second crew of damage the cargo, (Water was available
four sat down on the starboard side to and the ship s fire pump operating at full
await further supplies from topside, It is working pressure, ) The hatch was then
believed one or more of this idle crew covered , a tarpaulin put in place and wet
smoked a cigarette during the interval. down , vent cowls were sealed , and steam
There was known to be smoking on the introduced into No. 4 hold through the
main deck. installed steam smothering system,
The First Fire. It was 8:30 by this time and the smoke
About 8:15, smoke ' was observed in continued to increase despite efforts to
lower No, 4 hold on the starboard side smother the fire. A telephone alarm of
issuing from an open space about 8 inches fire was received about 8:30 by the Texas
wide between the hull and cargo battens, City Fire Department.' Two fire trucks re-
Attempts were made to extinguish the sponded immediately, followed by the two
fire with drinking water and hand fire remaining pieces of apparatus. A total of
extinguishers , but flames were observed to 27 volunteer firemen responded out of
increase along the starboard side, The the total 50 members of the department.
ship s whistle was sounded to give the Crew members of the Grandcamp left
alarm and all persons were ordered out of their ship and assembled on the adjoining
P,."A",...,""'
T.... City fi,.m., fighli'g Ih. fi,. . bo.,d Ih. Grandcamp p,io, to tho .,plosioo, Nol.
a," ho,. Ii,. " ,.n",. , olh." b.i'g p'.p.,.d, All 27 fi,.m., who '.'po,d.d w.,. kill.d by
Ih. bl..t,
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
teristic of oxides of nitrogen) was ob- ground, Heated missiles ignited flamma-
served, The hull in the way of the fire ble vapors at their source while others split
was sufficiently heated to , vaporize water, tanks and released vapors which were sub-
running off the deck before it reached the sequently ignited from friction sparks or
surface of the slip. . open flames in the vicinity,
The First Explosion.
Explanation of Shock Waves.
The explosion occurred at 9:12 AM,
Those on the pier fighting the fire and Concussion damages were most severe,
over 400 others in the vicinity were killed They took three distinct forms, First, the
the great majority instantaneously, Others itial shock waves leveled such build-
felled by the blast, were clemated by en- ings as Warehouse 0 , the Monsanto
suing fires. warehouse building directly across the slip,
A'm',
Damage to Ihe five-,to,y polysly'." bulldl'g of Ihe Mo",.,lo Comp.,y while fi,.s w...
buildl'g rec.lved di..ct .'plosio, blest f,om Ihe
Grandcamp
.1111 bumi'g I, Ihe "e., Th,.
a"o.. . disl.," of o,ly 350 ft,
THE TEXAS au DISASTER,
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THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
towers and the fourteen main storage tanks camp were killed outright. Their total of
of benzol , fuel oil , and other low vapor
four pieces of fire apparatus was wrecked,
pressure hydrocarbolls, Ground fires Other volunteer members of the depart-
spread fire damage to piping and were fed ment responded to the emergency follow-
ing the explosion , but the water supply
by flammable liquids which escaped flOm
broken or melted lines, The fact that the systems in both the Terminal and Mon-
highest pressure on equipment in the plant santo areas were inoperative due to explo-
was around 15 pounds was a factor which sion damage, Drafting water flOm the
must be credited , at least partially, with slips or bay was barred by fires and wreck-
age, Houston fire equipment and man-
the fact that there were no separate explo-
sions in the Monsanto plant area, power drove 50 miles to the ' scene fol-
The Terminal Warehouses 0 and A lowing commercial radio broadcasts of the
and the frame compress between these disaster, Army fire- fighting crews flOm
buildings , were immediately involved, Fort Crocker were dispatched by the Com-
Sulphur stored in Warehouse A was ignit- manding Officer , who observed the smoke
, giving off ' noxious fumes, What other and felt the explosion. There was no di-
Terminal buildings were immediately in- rect call for assistance to these or other
volved in fire cannot be definitely estab- neighboring fire departments on the 16th
lished because of the extent of concussion
although other communities also respond-
damage, the subsequent explosion of the ed with pumpers and manpower on their
High Flyer which destroyed evidence , and own initiative, All fire- fighting personnel
, concen.
including local plant brigades
the heavy smoke which drifted with the
20 mph wind over the entire area. There trated on rescue work except at the Stone
were fires , however, on the water edge of and Richardson- Republic tank farms
piers as far as the south slip, presumably which were segregated from the main ex-
from oil pipelines that had parted by con- plosion- damaged area, Fire equipment, in
cussion or had been pierced by missiles, It the main , was parked in the school yard
is also positively established that six tanks in the town during the first day,
High Flyer
in the Stone Oil Co, farm and one in the The uninjured crews on the
found their position
Richardson- Republic farm ignited, All and Wilsan B, Keene
other oil tank farm fires were caused by untenable due to the smoke and sul-
explosion. phur fumes , and abandoned their ships at
the High Flyer
10:30 A, M, High Fly., could not be
During the period between 9:12 and The
1: 10 A, M. the following morning, the moved under its own power as its main
scene was one of unparalleled tragedy, turbine casing had been removed for in-
mitigated only by many exhibitions of per- spection, An anchor was lowered to hold
Keene was also
sonal sacrifice , individual helOism , and the vessel in place, The
tugs which were despatched from Galves- community disaster plan, However , the
ton at 8:50 arrived at the Texas City turn- existence of a Disaster Plan would have
ing basin at 9:50 A, M" but could not enter speeded the organization of the several
the harbor due to dense smoke , fumes agencies involved,
and debris, The tugs picked up survivors
and returned to Galveston, The Iris re- Further Trouble Brewing.
turned to Texas City at 3:00 P, M" but While rescue work was proceeding, fur-
again could not enter any of the three slips ther trouble was brewing for the already
for fire fighting and left at 7:40 P, heavily damaged port, The Grandcamp
Fourth Army, Red Cross , and Salvation blast carried away the hatches of the High
Army rescue and medical workers rushed Flyer jumbled the cargo , sprang the
to the area, The small Galveston Red steam lines , distorted and deflected the
Cross Chapter was sending help to the superstructure and decks , besides injuring
scene within thirty minutes, The readily the captain and crew members, There was
available services of the Fourth Army from no fire observed on this ship, however
headquarters at Fort Sam Houston , Fort until approximately 6:00 P. M, of the 16th,
Crockett , Ellington Field , San Jacinto Ord- It is not difficult to imagine that flames
nance Depot , and the Galveston District from the burning piers and warehouses
Engineer were invaluable until the Red spread to the High Flyer reacbing the
Cross could muster sufficient personnel to cargo through the open hatchways, Sul-
handle the emergency, (The tornado in phur in holds No, 2 and No, 4 (total
Texas and Oklahoma on April 9th had 2000 tons) was observed burning about
drained normally available Red Cross
workers in the Southwest.) An indication
of the efficiency of rescue work may be
gleaned from the statistics of the Univer-
sity of Texas Medical Branch, Within the
first five hours this one hospital in Gal-
veston handled 360 casualties, A de-
activated hospital at Fort Crockett was
placed in service by 6:00 P, M, and was
handling patients (total admissions , 121
persons), The Fourth Army sent 9000 lbs,
of blood plasma from Austin , medical
personnel (69 officers , 50 nurses and 232 L.s A,s"" f;" D.p"- C'P', C..li.,
enlisted men), plus surgical equipment The ,em.;", of Ihe Keenei, Ih. M,i, Slip,
food , gas masks , beavy road and construc- Th. High Flyer .'plod.d ., ill,y 'g,i",1 tho
Keene, h,vi,g bee, blow, "'0" the slip f,om
tion equipment, and similar emergency Pie, " A" by the Grandcamp biasI,
relief supplies, Army aircraft brought
needed medicines from St. Louis supply six oclock, It was known that the ship
centers, Army specialists in gas gangrene had also been loaded with 860 tons of
were flown to the scene, General Wain- ammonium nitrate in hold No, 3, A call
wright, commanding the Fourth Army, was made to Galveston at 8:00 P, M, for
had joined Governor Jester of Texas at four tugs with oxy- acetylene cutting equip-
the scene by 4: 20 P. M, to speed all possi- ment and gas masks because authorities
ble relief to the area, There was no lack wele apprehensive concerning the explo-
of succor for the victims of the disaster on sion potential in this second situation, The
the part of relief organizations and the tugs arrived at Texas City between 11:00
Army despite the lack of an integrated and 11 :20 P, M, Personnel boarded the
THE TEXAS CiTY DISASTER,
Pipe Line Co, property four tanks were area prevented any, attempt at fire control
ignited immediately and four additional until the morning of the 20th , when a
tanks fired from these exposure fires; in tank of bunker oil which burned slowly
the Stone farm two more tanks were was extinguished with foam, Water was
ignited; in the Republic Refinery one tank drafted from the South Slip for this pur-
was ignited; while in the Carbide and pose and foam powder brought from other
Carbon Terminal property an aluminum refineries was used , as Humble s foam sup-
tank containing isopropyl acetate and one plies had been ruined by heat.
steel tank burned.
All day during the 17th , rescue opera- Additional Rescue Work.
tions proceeded without measurable efforts Cleaning up the debris- strewn area had
at fire control. The ravished area was to precede much of the rescue operations,
beyond salvage. Fires still b~rning in the Mayor Trahan of Texas City on the morn.
Monsanto and Terminal Buildings slowed ing of April 17 appointed a special com-
rescue workers and spreae gradually mittee representing each of the industries
among the rubble of twisted steel and affected to supervise relief and rescue oper-
flammable contents, The tanks were flam- ations under the direction of the chief en-
ing torches and the crude oil fires burned gineer for the Pan American Refining
with a black smoke which could be ob- Corporation. Governor Beauford Jester
served for miles around, A spectacular declared a " state of emergency " and desig-
boil over " occurred on the 19th , which nated the State Department of Public
is shown in the illustrations, Lack of Safety to coordinate all police and rescue
water supplies in the Humble Company activities, There was some confusion of
from the bay on the smoldering piers dur- 0,. of tho Humbl. OIl t.,ks bu,";'g two
d.y' .fl., tho .'plosio, o f tho High Flyer,
ing the 18th. Isolated fires were still burn- Ig,lllo, ott,lbul.d 10 hol mlssIl."
ing in the Monsanto property during the can t happen
18th also , a burning benzol tank provid- those who repeatedly say: " It
here."
ing the greatest volume of smoke. No fire (2) Prompr deteCtion and reporting of !ires
fighting was attempted in this area and the remain tbe chief keys to control. (Delay in
flames only subsided as their fuel was transmitting the ala,m of fire on the
Grand-
consumed, camp, "'temptS to fight the fire wi,hout calling
By the morning of the 19th , clean- the fire department , and poor judgment in p,o-
work had progressed admirably and fire hibiting ,he use of hose streams ser the srage for
fighting was systematic in the Terminal ,he tragedy,
area, Most of the bodies that were to be (3) Chemical p,oducrs must be continually
located had been removed to mortuaries, analyzed to derermine their fire and explosion
The buildings in' the city had been in- hazards, Fire departments must search out
chemical hazards within their proteCIion zones.
spected and those unsafe were placarded.
(The explosive violence of ammonium nitrate
explosions was a matter of record , bur even the
III. Conclusions.
expertS erted somewhat in evaluating its haz-
In a disaster of this nature and magni. a,ds unde, fire condirions,
tude , evaluation of the principal contrib- (4) Special proteCtion faciliries required by
uting factors presents difficulties , but the the inberent natu,e of certain indusrrial enter-
following recommendations are offered for prises must be provided to safeguard life and
those who , in studying Texas City, desire property which might be exposed. (The lack of
to prevent similar disasters in their own readily available marine tOwing equipment , the
communities: lack of a pOrt wa,den to govern handling of
(1) Tbe " impossible " happened again at haza,dous materials were se,ious deficiencies at
Texas City. La'ge fi,es and explosions continu- Texas City,
ally emphasize the need fo, preparedness and (5) More stri,t induStrial zoning is ob-
,h,ow the stigma of folly into the faces of viously required , especially wbere an explosion
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER.
potential exists. (Tbe 5000 employees of tbe remains of utmnst importance. (At Texas City
concenttated induStrial a,ea suItounding tbe ,he installations were reasonably well planned
pOIt facilities at Texas City wete innocent vic- and only about 22 per cent of the petroleum
tims in the disaster. stored within a 1Yz- mile radius was lost by
(6) Dependence on established fire p,otec- fire,
tion facilities in explosion hazardous areas is (10) Port operational procedu", and dock.
dangerous. (With the Tetminal and Monsanto ing facilities tequire renewed fire safety aoaly-
fire proteCtion systems koocked out by the first sis, BetIer supervision , increased proteCtion
blast , effective fire fighting was delayed (even facilities , and improved fire protection on sbip-
af,er rescue operations had been essentially com- board ate needed, (Texas City s disaster fol,
pleted) because there was no organized plan to lowed two ship fires and ,he Los Angeles explo-
draft water from the bay and to utilize pumper sion of June 22 , 1947 , is an i,dication thar rhe
equipment available, end is not yet,
(7) Open a,eas between stIUCtur" wiJI (11) Most imponant, preplanning against
mitigate explosion damage and a,e ,he only log- disaster co,fusion incorporating regional fire
ical me,hod other than subterranean constIUc- defense organization is obHgatory. (The Jack of
,ion, (The lessons a' Texas City were simila, such planning was a severe handicap at Texas
to those of World W", II in ,his 'espeer, Rein- City, overcome only by individual initiative and
forced concrete buildings within 200 feet of the personal heroism of ,hose on the scene,
explosions failed , while those 700 feet away
were only damaged and did not collapse, Con. IV. Losses.
cussion forces were less severe on rounded sur-
On June 22 , 1947 , 67 days following
faces and unencumbered StructUral steel,
(8) Opera,ional praerim in induStrial oc-
, Texas City committed its 63
the disaster
cupations established fot convenience or utility unknown dead to " God' s gracious mercy
but counte'poised ro safety must be te-exam- and protection, " These charred and brok-
ined, (DisabJing the High Flyer during load- en bodies brought to , 468 the known vic-
ing of hazardous chemical was a serious aCt tims of the blasts. Over 100 others are
leading ro rhe second fatal fire and explosion, still missing, The Red Cross reported
(9) Proper storage of petroleum produces 3000 injured , of whom more than 800
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
were hospitalized and 380 were still con- period of several days,
fined on June 1 , 1947, Two thousand Dollar losses are still indefinite and in-
people were given shelter following the surance claims not fully adjusted, Based
damages to homes in the city and 15, 000 on information available to the N,
people were fed during the emergency the following estimates are given below:
Property Damage
MonsantoChemicalCompany""",., ",' $14 750 000
Texas City Terminal Railway Co.. , , 11 450 000
','"
",., 2
Dwelli,gs and contents ,
Marinehulls,....,..
Texas City"", ",
Mercantile, city, and school pwperty, Texas Ci,y,
Humhle Pipe Line Company, , , , 1
Republic RefinI'g Company, , , , , , , , , 1
2, 1
000
000
000
000
500
000
500
200
Sub-tOtal..
O,her accidenr insu,anre estima,e, , 125 000
200 000
Total.. $67 000 000
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THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
klered,
klered,
Same as Whse. C except not sprin-
1911 100 ft, by 750 ft, 75, 000 sq, ft.
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A,mrAi,',,"',
V."'cal phologroph of Iha Mo",a,lo plo,l o,d o djol,l,g Terml,ol property two week. oft.r the e'plo,lo" Thl, pl,lu,. o,d olh., U, S, Army Ai,
Fa"., pholog,oph, w.,. loke, 10 sludy Ihe ,o",u,,'o, d.mog. .ffect, .,d 10 'ompore Ihem with bomb domage I,fi(,I.d " Europe o,d Jopo, du"'g
Wo,ld We' II.
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
voir. A good system of 6 and 8. in, mains quate for safety, and fire protection meas-
supplied sprinkler systems and private hy- ures had been thoughtfully planned and
drants, There was no connection to public executed, The severe damage done to the
y.oater sources or mains, A total of 8850 installation cannot be ascribed to any fail-
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
ure to provide adequate resistance or pro- had not construction and layout been su-
tection from explosion or fire , and , as a perior. The fire protection provided was
matter of judgment , it was obvious that nevertheless , rendered ineffective by the
even greater damages might have resulted initial explosion,
2, Steam Plant aod Power To,al C- One story masonry and steel building ad-
House joini'g Polystyrene Building on the east;
concrere srack, Building 500 fee, from
Grandeamp,
3, Office Building MajutC Three- story masonry and sreel wi,h concrere
roof and 800rs,
Service Building MajorC Two-story masonry and steel wi th third
story in process of co",tIUCtion,
7, DIstillation UnitS 1 , 2 Tower" Un;' I Two separate rower groups 190 ft. in height
Major; Unit 2 each baving twO vacuum fraCtionating col-
Considerable; ~mns 165 ft. high , 10 ft, in diamerer with
Unit 3, Slight. six smaller rowers , all emb,aced in steel
Towerswithstood framework, Each group has itS own auxiliary
, damaged by equipmem , comrol room , and borizontal
MandF. Control tanks adjacem to the base of the tower, Pip-
houses heavily ;;n
damaged by C, ~1~d :~~~~~~:;s ;.:~~: a ~Ju~~::'J;':':~:
8, Cracking Unir CandM Twenty low pressure , bigh temperature
Moderate cracking unitS in struCtUral sreel f,amework
with control room of masonry construCtion,
9, Debydrogenation Uni, CaodM A series of catalytic Ctacking furnaces and
Light chambers and steam superheaters in Steel
f,amework with masonry enclosed control
and inStIum,m room,
10, Pump House Heavy to Brick- steel joist building housing nine sea
building, light to wa'er pumps for domeStic use, Fire pump
comems (1000 GPM Steam unit) located in sepa'ate
subterranean muCture on barbor bank,
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
11. Tankaget B,"zol TOtal C- Three lo ooo- barrel tanks of benzol on eaSt
and north sides of area destroyed,
Other Large Atmospheric Total C- A tOtal of 14 situated throughout the plant
Pressure Tanks destroyed, Contained low pressure hydLO-
ca,bons.
Propane Pressu,e Taoks LightC Eight tanks (510 barrels capacity each) on
conere'e pillars , comaining propane , with-
Stood blaStS and exposure fires,
Small Atmospheric Varied Heavy to Approximarely 25 ranks , horizontal and ver-
Pressure Tanks Ligh, C- tical types , located adjacent to processing
uniIS. HeavieSt damage to 4 venical tanks
near DiStillation Units,
12. Fire Department and TotalC Torally destroyed; buildings of light con-
Foam House struCtion,
'C-concussion Damages; F-Fire Damages; M-Missile Damages,
tSee also Part C , this seCtion , on major ,ankage.
Appro,imotio", of Slack, i, To,k, (IO OOO- horrel 0' Lo'ger CepocilyJ .,d Their Fire Domoges
" Ih. Fe,m e,d R.fi,.'Y A,... WilhI, I !!,-mlle Redlu, of Tem;,ol,
(Quamities expressed in 42. gal. barrels)
'g,iI.d Di,ectf,om Ig,iI.d f,om Expo,-
Typ. Hyd,oco,bo,
Slack of Oil
;,T.,k,o, No,
Apdl161h T.,k,
ol Esplos;o, Mi"lIe,
Slo,k No,
Qly, To,k,
u,e T o,k RIO,
Slo,k No,
Qty, To,k,
Narural Gasoline (14 lb, and
lighter) 500 None None None None
Gasoline and Naphthas, ., " . 293, 000 400 None None
Crude OiL",..,.."".... 995, 000 232 900 139, 900 4
Kerosene and Gas OiL, , , , , , 431 250 None None 600
Topped C,ude and Miscella.
neous O,her, 950 None None None None
Residual Fuel Oil.., , 23, 000 No" None None None
Benzol , Other Atomatics,.,.. 29, 600 29, 600
TotaL""...." .... 853, 300 102 265 900 145 500
*Figu,es secured f,om report by Geo'ge ArmiStead , J', Smaller tanks (less ,ban 10 000 bar-
rels) not included,
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
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THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
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THE TEXAS CITY DiSASTER,
D. City of Texas City. while even farther from the source of the
The closest dwelling properties were blast , the negative pressure effect (uplift-
approximately a half mile from the core ing of roofs) was readily discernible.
of the explosion, Such segregation was in- The school building was located about
deed fortunate for , while the damages sus- a mile from the Terminal. Damage to this
tained were serious , the distance factor story structure was of interest, as every
must be looked upon as a mitigating ele- partition inside was destroyed ,
while the
ment. Other cities are not so fortunately brick exterior walls were not damaged,
zoned, The school was in session and while many
Frame bungalow type , single and double children were injured , none were killed
family structures were severely battered
and teachers evacuated the children from
the building and the area promptly,
many totally collapsing, in an area roughly
mile from the Terminal docks, This
In the mercantile district many build-
heaviest damage included , approximately ings of brick wood- joist brick veneer , and
12 blocks , which contained perhaps 150 stucco construction were heavily damaged
homes, Beyond this area and within a the higher buildings and those of largest
radius of a mile , damage to dwellings was area suffering the greatest loss, Two the-
atres suffered roof collapse , while several
chiefly to roofs , windows , and porches
story mercantiles had similar damage,
although many were so struck by the con-
Plate glass loss was extremely heavy
cussion waves that they were rendered un-
safe for occupancy, Walls shifting off throughout the business district,
their foundations and thrown out of align- In a survey of all dwelling and business
ment were chiefly responsible, Beyond buildings , 539 were condemned as unsafe
the mile radius and up to approximately
out of a total of 1500 inspected,
10 miles , window glass damage was E. Miscellaneous Properties Involved,
extensive and some mls~iles pierced roofs. I. The V."el"
Concussion damage in the closer build- The S, S, Grandcamp (French Line)
ing was too complete to determine how totally disintegrated from the explosion,
the forces were applied , but in those some The ship was built in 1942 and was for-
distance away evidence showed downward merly the S, S, Benjamin R. Curlis,
pressure zones formed a decided pattern Liberty type , the vessel was 422 ft. long,
had a gross tonnage of 71 76 , and had 5 (Hold No, 4 where explosion occurred
cargo hatches, Cargo on board the vessel was aft of midship house, ) The difference
included 2339, 69 tons of ammonium ni- is accountable due to the lifting of the
trate , 380 bales of cotton , 16 cases of am- water in this slip and its resettling plus
munition and unknown quantities of the destruction of the earth foundation of
binder twine, tobacco , shelled peanuts Pier 0.
machinery and drill stem,
(Lykes Bros, 3, OIl Shippi'g F.cili"."
The S, S, High Flyer
be found in this slip following several Three tanks , located in a group directly
days of exploration by a diver. Soundings opposite " Pier 0" were collapsed by the
taken in the North Slip when the Grand- concussion. One of these had a capacity
camp exploded did not reveal any sub- about 10 000 barrels , while the other two
stantial crater; rather soundings showed a were 2000 barrel size, Small wooden
depth of only 20- 25 ft, in a position near buildings were also collapsed, There was
the stern and 30- 33 ft. at the bow end, no fire observed in thls area,
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER,
Bo""o Mi...,
Showi'9 molhod of loo di'g .mmo,Ium ,It,.to fo"ilizor oboord ,hip, Nolo 100 lb.
bog, .,d co""trolod pili'g. B,ok., bog, ." vi"blo i, 0'I9I,.1 pri,l " I.ft fo,.g,ou,d,
THE TEXAS GTY DISASTER,
nitrate liquor received in tank cars by: which contained less than 1 per cent mois-
(1) lancing (to dissolve the crystallized ture and was ground so that 97 per cent
ammonium nitrate); (2) evaporating- would pass a 200- mesh sieve,
maximum temperature allowable , 3250 F, It may be observed from this informa-
(to change the liquor to a molten form); tion that the material was of standard
(3) graining (to provide proper granula- grade and tests of samples of all the box-
tion); (4) waxing (to minimize moisture car lots shipped to Texas City failed to
absorption by the granules); (5) adding reveal any decomposition or chemical
clay (to assist in providing a free flowing changes in the material. These tests were
product); (6) bagging. The finished prod- conducted by the Emergency Export Corp,
uct is required to meet the following gov- and the Bureau of Explosives , Association
ernment specifications: of American Railroads, The processes at
Moisture content", , , , , , , ' , , 25% maximum each plant were examined by chemical
Ether soluble mate,ial (wax), , 75%='=0, 35% engineers of the U, S. Bureau of Mines
Water insoluble marerial and it appeared unlikely that any materials
(day) ".,.""" 350%='=1.00%
TOtal niuogen"",.."", 32, 50%minimum other than normal constituents could have
Granulation specifications called for re- been incorporated in the product,
quire 100 per cent minimum pass through The only observations of possible signif-
aU, S, Standard No, 8 sieve , 55 per cent icance to the fires and explosions at Texas
minimum through a No, 35, and 8 per City with regard to the manufacture proc-
cent maximum through a No, 100 sieve, esses employed are:
The ammonium nitrate liquor used was 1. The paraffin wax was in direct con-
also governed by strict government specifi- tact with the ammonium nitrate, a strong
cations as follows: oxidizing agent. Under conditions of high
Ammonium nitrate, minimum, ,.",, 70, heat (as by fire), chemical reactions which
Acidity.. None would be self- sustaining would result be-
Alkalinity, maximum"., ,, 05% tween the two materials.
Pbenol..... .......
Nitrites,.."" "
None
None
2, The paper bagging was a readily
ignitable material and tests on small sam-
Ether soluble material , maximum, " , ' , 10% ples filled with the fertilizer showed that
Water- insoluble material , maximum" . 30% it would ignite when subject to a heat of
Ferrocyanides , maximum".,.."". , 10% 3000 F, for five or six hours, A steampipe
Pyridine , maximum"".,." , 005%
would provide this much heat under cer-
Thiocyanates , maximum, , 01%
not
Sulphates , maximum""", '" , 50%
tain conditions, The bagging when
they are accompanied by exothermic heats prolonged exposure (five or six hours per-
haps) to steam pipes reaching a heat of
which quickly bring about an explosion
potential. Other factors (besides tempera-
approximately 3000 F, The fire on the
ture), affecting explosion hazard and re- High Flyel' was caused by exposure condi-
marks concerning their part in the disaster tions and most probably could have been
are listed: prevented if the ship had been withdrawn
from the danger area during the nine- hour
F.clo" Fovo,;'g Esplo.
';0' U, d., FI,e period between the first explosion (9:12
Co, dllio", Rem"ks ) and the first indication of fire on the
1. Sreeng,h of detOna,ion No pre- explosion High Flyer (about '6:00 P, ) or even
impulse -- ,he g,eater derona,ion impulses
,he impulse ,be greater a, Texas City, later (prior to 1:10 A, fighting
) if fire-
, a "-
H,,:
~ ~JJ
: 1
THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER.
cautions againSt contaminarion as in Stor- Gas masks should be worn by fire fight-
age, ers , as the oxides of nitrogen are toxic.
' or
5. Packaging should be in metal drums
cigbt wooden casks to prevent amdental 6, P,evIou, M.ior Fi,., "d "'plo,;o""
spillage, Any drums or casks spIlt or 1906, Witt." G.,ma,y' Explosion involving
broken in handling or stOrage sbould be ammonium nitrate , TNT, and potassium
removed and spillage disposed of imme- nitrate. Cause unknown,
diately in a safe manner, Ja,ua,y 14 , 1916 , Gibb"ow" N, J" Explosion
6, Labeling requirements sh~uld include of concentrate solution of ammonium nitrate
ma,kings in conformance with Standards during crystallizaci on,
presently ,ecommended for oxidizing ~a- July 30 , 1916, Wu,g., dorf, Ge,ma,y' Explo-
te,ials , indicaring the haz:udous properties of compound 80% ammonium nitrate
sion
of the chemical. 12% TNT and 4% nitroglycerin and g,ain
7, DetOnators should not be used '0 break up mill. Sun on metal drums caused decomposi-
caked materials, cion,
8. StriCt no smoking rules should be enforced Seplemb., 15 , 1916. O.kdale , N, J. , Explosion
during Storage and handling, ~~d rhe use during manufacture of ammonium nitrate in
of any open Hame devices' prohibited, cryStallizing pans,
Oclob., 4. 1918 , Mo'go" N, J. , Explnsion of
5, FI,. Fighll'g Ope roll 0"" 000 pounds of pure ammonium nitrate
000
In case of fire , immediate application of and 12 000 000 pounds of amatol (a miXtUre
of 80% ammonium nItrate and 20% TNT),
water in large quantities is probably the Fi,e believed ,esponsible for causing explo-
best procedure , even though a large water sions,
loss may result , as the ammonium nitrate is April 12 , 1920 , Sloiberg, Germany, Explosion
highly soluble in water. As ammonium of mixtu,e of ammo,ium nitrate, powdered
aluminum and TNT being converted from
nitrate is dissolved in water a cooling explosive intO fertilizer. Material had caked
effect is produced (unlike many chemicals and explosion resulted from atr,,"pts to
break up mass.
which produce heat when dissolving in Ap,il 19 , 1920 , 8rookly' , N. y" SteamerHall-
water), fried-.:hlorate fire involved 8460 casks con.
Carbon dioxide , foam and other extin- taining 4 230 000 pounds of ammonium ni-
tra,e, App,oximately 3900 casks burned,
guishment agents of the smothering type Minor explosions but none severe enough to
are ineffective, because ammonium nitrate cause ship to dIsintegrate,
provides its own oxygen for combustion, Ap,1I 26, I92I , K,iewold , Germ.,y' Explosion
Bude" W, T" U, 05, Coast Gua,d, Maps af Texas City, Showing Damage Caased
16. 17, Sanborn
Conlin , C. A" J'" Capt" Lo s Angeles Fire D,pt, by APril 1947, Explosion,
ing Basin, Channel from Galveston Harbor 10 Conlin, C. A" Jr. , Capt" City of Los Angeles
Texas City, Texas, U. S, A,my Sem~e Forces Departmenr of Fire,
Co'ps of Engineers , Galveston DlStnCt, (May Culberson , OIen , Railroad Commission of
Texas,
9, 1947,
~ire &'.u Davis , H, H" Fire Prevenrion and Engineering
~~9 Bureau of Texas.
fJ~~~~t~'jlze N~,
Davis , R, 0, E. , U, S. Deparrmenr of Agricul-
Dep', of Agriculture, (March , 1945, ture , Ag,icu!rural Research Administration,
Explasives or Other Dangereas Articles on
Fisher , P. L. , ea,bide and Carbon Chemicals
U, S, Dept, of Commerce
Board Vessels,
Co'pomion.
Bureau of Matine InspeCtion and Navigation, Gross , Harry, City of Los Angeles , Deparrmenr
Fire aad ExPlosion Hazards of Ammoni~m Ni- of Fire,
trate p"tiliz" Bases, Research Bulleun No, Heagy, Kennerh , Corps of Engineers , Galves-
20, Underwrirers ' LaboratO,ies (1940), ton , Texas,
Investigation of Disast" at Texas City, Texas, Holman , J. L. , B,ig, Gen" Office of the Chief of
APril 16, 1947, U, S, Dep', of ,he Inrenor Ordnance , War Department,
Bu,eau of Mines, Holt , L M" United grates Maritime Commis-
Keepers , Hugh V, Address, 5i;, annyal meet- sion,
ing, NFPA, (May 28;1947, Hussey, G, F" Vice Admiral , Bureau of Ord.
Manufacture of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer nance , Navy Department,
aJ the Type that ExPloded al rr",~s CitY, Huston , W , E" Republic Oil Refining Company,
Texas. U, S, Dept, of tlie Interior, Bureau of James , Garrett B" Sr" NFPA Committee on
Mines, (May , 1947, Hazardous Chemicals and Explosives,