Professional Documents
Culture Documents
B y Y i n g k e i M o k = a n d R. C. Hill a
The offshore supply vessel came intobeing in 1954 to meet the demands of a rapidly
growing offshore oil industry. The authors give a brief history of this development and pre-
sent the arrangement and profile of a typical supply vessel as well as a complete table of
characteristics on a number of vessels. It is shown how the demand to carry large quantities
of cargo on deck resulted in a hull form that is unique in some respects. Two particular
areas of design are stressed: stability and powering. The question of stability is examined
in detail, including development of the current U. S. Coast Guard stability criteria. The
difficulty in estimating power requirements for the low speed~length ratios associated with
supply vessels is discussed. Data for estimating power requirements are presented.
294.4 332.7 328.3 367.5 371.5 381.8 469.0 440.9 444.0 492.0 466.0
7.56 10.27 11.45 10.12 10.32 10.06 10.63 10.77 11.53 10.77
O. 560 O. 528 O. 505 O. 526 0. 500 0. 487 0. 572 0. 538 0. 5024 6:~71 0. 537
31420 35186 32100 31407 4i6oo 31407 33143 33300 38070 31915 43723 45608
1200 1200 600 1200 1600 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 2352 1200
4229 4567 5080 5249 3217 7129 6563 6227 6811 4335 6260
108-6 110-0 112-0 113-0 98-0 113-0 123-0 ii5-0 113-9 123-0 100-0 123-10
None None None None 2 @ 1025 None None 2 @ 1000 2 @ 1000 None None 2 @ 1000
cuft cu ft cu ft cuft
186.65 198.24 183.46 194.08 188.47 194.60 172.06 179.20 271.47 635 193.03
8-1~- 10-0~- 10-5 10-4} 12-9 10-4} 10-3} 11-1} 11-1} 11-8 11-4 11-0~
141-6 146-10 146-7} 151-6 t61-6 161-5 161-7 161-5 161-6 160-0 1.71-4
917.0 1028.5 967.5 1114.0 i4~5.0 1195.5 1248.0 1335.0 1376.5 1300.0 1325.0 1466.0
0.776 0.696 0.615 0.686 0.664 0.690 0.691 0.685 0.705 0.635 0. 674 0.716
O. 777 O. 752 O. 697 O. 740 0.697 O. 744 O. 746 O. 743 O. 757 0. 687 0.751 0. 769
0. 999 0. 925 0. 882 0. 928 0.952 0.928 0.927 0.921 0.931 0.925 0. 897 0.931
324.2 324.9 307.3 320.4 284.0 296.5 316.3 327.3 309.0 323.2 291.0
0. 828 2. 875 5. 355 3. 365 6:670 3.90 2.45 2.325 3.37 3.96 0.46 3.40
Fwd Aft Aft Aft A% Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Fwd AR
4.436 3.482 3.456 3. 459 3.059 3.459 3.696 3.412 3.412 3.257 3.353 3. 451
0811 0.837 0869 0.833 0.878 0. 833 0. 825 0. 856 0. 856 0. 833 0. 839 0. 848
432.0 435.0 410.0 460.0 576.3 575.0 550.0 550.0 610.0 590.0
845.0 895.5 852.4 937.6 1058.6 1144.5 1208.5 1228.9 1207.5 1360.0
105.4 119.2 106.0 102.0 102.7 106.8 111.3 110.9 96.0 :t52.4
lO.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
73.6 57.1 119.7 50.0 144.2
~i,%o 6i)o 6~2 6.:27 "-0".67 9.61 10.23 10.18 11.11 10.36
2.50 3.00 2.48 3.23 2.83 2.89 2.77 2.82 2.89 2.64
0. 750 0. 750 0. 793 0. 742 O. 774 O. 769 O. 787 O. 783 O. 794 O. 797
10.34 12.35 12.80 12.60 12.71 12.36 12.6!) 12.51 13.86 12.30
9.40 5.81 6.62 590 5.72 7.10 6.77 6.64 5.65 6.66
1000 1530 1530 1530 i~60 1530 1700 1700 2250 2900 2250
... 1131 12.13 11.50 11.40 12.36 11.77 12.25 13.50 11.86
456.0 702.0 589.2 728.0 753.0 645.0 705.2 ,, 810.5
6382 6602 61.94 6895 7341 7550 7834 7858 6969 8373
6712 6913 6396 7226 g2~0 7672 7903 8168 8201 7362 ~i4o 8721
also a strong contributing factor in five casualties. The with rough seas. Apparently the vessel was under ac-
designer can and should be concerned with this problem. tion of the helm at the time of the capsizing, as tile rud-
He can provide the operators with sutfieient stability in- ders were full left and the starboard engine control was at
formation to enable them to load in a safe manner. There full ahead while the port control was in neutral or slow
is a trade-off between deck cargo tonnage, below-deck astern. There was evidence that the freeing ports were
tonnage, and freeboard which should be presented to the partially blocked by the deck cargo. This undoubtedly
operator in a simple straightforw-u'd manner for his contributed to the casualty, but as we shah see even
guidance. without considering trapped water on deck the vessel
A closer look at two of these casualties as reported by was loaded in an unsafe manner.
the Coast Guard Marine Boards of Investigation is re- There were other contributing factors. After being
vealing: found, the vessel was towed into port and righted. An
inspection revealed the following:
MV National Pride 1. The crossover valve between No. 1 port and star-
board ballast tanks was open
The National Pride was a 135 X 32 X 10 ft vessel of 197
2. The scuttle through the hatch leading to the after
gross tons. At the time of the casualty, she was en-
steering gear room was open.
route to a dumping area carrying a deck load of 392 long
3. The engine room access doors were open.
tons of obsolete ammunition. Her mean draft was
8 ft-4 in., leaving a freeboard amidships of 20 in. Open crossover lines between tank pairs greatly in-
The weather at the time of this casualty was bad. creases free surface. But after correcting for all free-sur-
Reports from the area indicated a wind of force 5-6 and face effects, including the cross-connected ballast tanks,
0 T ~-
I J Z
1500 __ ~ 20 60O
W Z
t~J
5_
500__ !0
~~-~--~ l 2oo5 09
I I I
60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
LENGTH BETWEEN PERPENDICULARS., FEET
the initial GM of the National Pride as loaded was still 4.2 lacked sui~eient stability. Again it was a eombint~tion
ft. B y conventional standards this would be more t h a n of overloading and improper operation. The vessel had
adequate. I t took a dynamic stability analysis to reveal three slack fuel oil tanks and three slack ballast tanks.
just how inadequate it really was. With ballast tanks It was also quite probable, although not conclusively es-
cross-connected, her full range of positive righting mo- tablished, that her forward ballast tanks were cross-con-
ments was only 28 deg, and her m a x i m u m righting arm nected and possibly also her forward fuel oil tanks. Her
was a meek 0.46 ft at a very low 13-deg heel angle. mean draft was approximately 9 ft-9 in., resulting in a
h'eeboard of 2 ft-3 in. She had a 6-in. trim by the stern.
MV Borie Her G21~r corrected for free surface in the ballast tanks
The Boric was 125 X 32 X 12 ft, similar in overall di- was 2.8 ft.
mensions to the National Pride. She had a conventional The stability curves at the time of capsizing for these
rounded hull form, however, as opposed to the barge- two vessels are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. These casualties,
shaped midship section more common to offshore supply which were extensively analyzed by the Coast Guard,
vessels--including the National Pride. Loaded with 259 made it quite apparent that initial GM is not an accept-
long tons of deck cargo and 271 tons of below-deck liq- able measure of intact stability for these broad, shallow-
uids, she departed on a voyage from Harvey, Louisiana depth vessels. W h a t then is an acceptable method[ for
to drilling rigs in the Gulf of Mexico. The trip downriver judging their stability?
was uneventful. The weather was dear, wind light with
a southerly sea of 3-4 ft. After clearing the river en- Rahola Stability Criteria
trance, she turned to port to avoid drill rigs in t h a t area.
While in this turn, she developed a port list of 4 to 5 deg. I n 1939 a paper, referenee [4], was published in Hel-
The engineer was requested to remove the list. He sinki, Finland by a young graduate student completing
proceeded to the engine room, but b y the time he reached his doctorate. The title was " T h e Judging of the Sta-
the manifold the heel had increased to a dangerous bility of Ships and the Determination of the Minimum
degree. On deck the mate, realizing the vessel was going Amount of Stability." The author was J a a k k o Rahola.
to capsize, abandoned ship. The remainder of the crew Rahola first analyzed the various methods of judging sta-
realizing the danger, followed suit; at this time the deck bility. Among other things, he gave the pros and cons of
cargo shifted and very shortly thereafter the vessel using initial metacentric height as a criterion. But he
capsized. The engineer was trapped in the engine room, along with m a n y other established stability experts of his
but was later rescued. (The master died of an apparent day believed t h a t stability could best be judged by con-
heart attack.) sidering the statical stability or righting moment curve.
From the w a y in which the vessel capsized, it, did not The problem was to determine criteria for judging the ac-
take a dynamic stability analysis to know that this vessel ceptability of a vessel's righting moment curve.
'.0
0
PR~MOIPA~ ~IMEH S / Q M A
NO
.0
i .............
WI~DOW~:
,4
FOrECAStLE DEC~'A~GEMg~T
\_o s \
. . . . . . - ~ ; . . . . . _!L--i- - :~--- _ I _ ~ \ ; L _ _
I ,
i [ I - -
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
[ O O '
*
I
i [ I i i
I i
t . .o,. ~,.=. //
[ i . . . . .
I .....
i I
l k "
I i '
. . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . j j
z
m
.-I
"I-
Z
0
t-
O
0..<
Figure 7 shows a typical righting arm curve for a con-
ventional cargo vessel. This is simply a plot of a vessel's
righting arm versus heel angle. The righting m o m e n t is /
the product of the lever between the two equal forces
~cting on the vessel in calm water as it heels times the
magnitude of the forces. The two forces are of course the
g r a v i t y force acting downward through the vessel's cen-
J \
ter of gravity and the b u o y a n t force acting upward
through the vesset's center of buoyancy. I t is common
to convert the righting m o m e n t eurve to a righting arm
curve by plotting only the lever, or righting arm, versus
angle.
Rahola discussed the various criteria for judging right-
ing arm curves t h a t had been proposed down through the
years. A t t e m p t s had been made to establish minimum
values for:
M a x i m u m righting arm
Angle of m a x i m u m righting, 0m .....: ~
Angle of vanishing stability, Olc
Looking at Fig. 7, these values are: 5.2 ft, 43 deg, and 90
deg. The range of minimum values t h a t had been sug-
gested prior to Rahola's work were generally as follows: ii
M a x i m u m righting arm, 0.6-0.8 ft
Angle of m a x i m u m righting arm, 30-40 deg
Minimum range of positive stability, 55-60 deg
These values seemed reasonable enough. The reason
they had not generally been accepted is t h a t some vessels
with proven stability had values for these criteria t h a t
fell below the minimum limits proposed.
Rahola reasoned that perhaps the area under the right-
ing arm curve might be the best overall criterion. This
area is a measure of the vessel's righting energy or dy-
namic stability. Basic minimums of the other limits
might still be needed, but they could be less conservative.
Rahola then did a statistical study of vessel casualties.
Most of the vessels studied ranged in length from 100-300
ft. As a result of his study, he arrived at certain conclu-
sions as to the dynamic stability necessary for vessel sur-
vival. He proposed t h a t for seagoing vessels the area
under the righting arm must equal 15 ft-deg up to the
least of the following angles :
40 deg
angle corresponding to m a x i m u m righting arm
angle at which openings immerse (downflooding)
1 _1 \1 \ I 1 t
o .O o I0 20 30 40 50~ X 60
eo x~\
-.5
\ \
-5 \
Fig. 5 National Pride, statical stability curves Fig. 6 13orie, statical stability curves
5.0
4.0
3.0
h-
~ 2.0
1,0
o ~o 20 30 4o 50 60 7o 80 oo
eo
5.0
4.0
OFFSHORE @@//
ta-
~2.0
1.0
" 1 I I IX, i i I I XI
IO 20 30 40 ~o 50 60 70 80 90
GMrd
was discussed. A special subcommittee was formed to K
study offshore supply vessel stability and manning. GM REQUIRED- DIMENSIONLESS FORM
Although all mechanically propelled vessels of over 15 NOTES: ( I ) The use o f these curves is r e s t r i c t e d to offshore supply vessels which
gross tons which carry freight for hire are subject to have the f o l l o w i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
a. They must have a w a t e r t i g h t f o r e c a s t l e o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y .25L.
Coast Guard inspection, many offshore supply vessels b. B must be ~ i t h i n the range o f 24 to 38 f e e t .
C. D must be a i t h i n the range o f 6,0 to 14 f e e t .
were operated under bareboat charter arrangements. d. The B/D r a t i o must be w i t h i n the range o f 2.50 to 4.00.
of g/O = 2.40 i s i n c l u d e d as an a i d to i n t e r p o l a t i o n .
The curve
Such arrangements were subject to much controversy. (2) It is assumed t h a t there is no d o w n f l o o d i n g up to the a n g l e o f maximum
righting arm.
Suffice it to say that if properly done, the charterer be-
(3) A c o n s t a n t beam to deadrise r a t i o equal to 25.6 was used i n d e r i v i n g
comes temporary owner and may carry freight for himself the c u r v e s . For vessels h a v i n g a lessen d e a d r i s e , the curves may be used by e n t e r i n g
w i t h d r a f t s and depths c o r r e c t e d by adding to each, h a l f the d i f f e r e n c e between a
without becoming subject to inspection laws. Thus, deadrise nqual to [~/25.6 and the a c t u a l d e a d r i s e . For vessels h a v i n g a g r e a t e r dead-
r i s e the reverse a p p l i e s .
even though the Coast Guard began requiring a stability
analysis early in 1961, its applicability was limited. Fig. 1i Curves of required G2,l
The criterion was given wide circulation within the
offshore industry through the efforts of the special sub-
committee on stability of the National Offshore Opera-
tions Advisory Panel. Subject to much discussion and shore supply vessels. It was, however, widely known in
some disagreement, the criterion was generally accepted Europe. It is now widely known internatioaally. In
as being reasonable. Then in January 1963 tragedy 1968 as a result of casualty studies undertaken by mem-
struck again. The uninspeeted supply vessel Diversitz/ ber nations, the International Maritime Consultative Or-
capsized in heavy weather with loss of all five crew mem- ganization (IMCO) recommended a stability criterion for
bers. The Diversit~d was found to have been operating cargo and passenger vessels under 328 ft in length which is
under an illegal bareboat charter. This was the clincher. based primarily on the area under the righting arm curve.
B y late 1964, the majority of the offshore supply vessels IMCO has also published a recommended stability cri-
being constructed in the Gulf were being built under terion for fishing vessels using similar criteria. The
Coast Guard inspection. Stability was no longer a major United States does not regulate fishing vessels, but the
issue. The operators were being guided by loading re- IMCO recommendation for fishing vessels was given wide
strictions b~sed on a Rahola stability analysis even circulation by Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
though many of them surrendered their certificate after No. 6-68. Thus the basic criterion being used to judge
construction. Rahola had become a household word. the stability of offshore supply vessels is gaining wide
The last phase of this development came as a result of applicability.
the 1966 International Load Line Convention. The new To the knowledge of the authors, following the loss of
international regulations, ratified by the United States, the Diversity in January 1963 no offshore supply vessels
require that the master of all new vessels over 79 ft in capsized in this country for almost six years. Then on
length be supplied with necessary stability information November 25, 1968, the 160 ft supply vessel Triple Crown,
in a form approved by the Administration prior to is- while engaged in picking up anchors and chain for a drill-
suance of a load line certificate. New U. S. Coast Guard ing rig off Santa Barbara, California, capsized with the
load line regulations, implementing the International loss of nine crew members. Results of the Coast Guard
Convention, became effective on July 21, 1968. The investigation were published on September 11, 1969, but
Coast Guard stability criterion presented in this paper is were not available. It is known that the vessel had little
now applicable to any offshore supply vessel that re- freeboard at the stern, and that flooding of the engine
quires a load line. room occurred through a weather door that was blocked
open by an anchor.
Conclusion This latest casualty once again points out the obvious.
Almost any vessel can be overloaded to such a degree, or
The Rahola stability criterion was relatively un- operated in such a manner, that stability will be critical.
known in the Uaited States prior to its application to off- Offshore supply vessels because of their design and fume-
MODEL 3 ~,,
MODEL I Cp- .74
Cp =,786 35
3.5
e0 MODEL I
0 MODEL 4 % Cp = .792
X Cp " .75
MODEL 2 X 3.0
L 3,0 FOR ALL P. AND S. MODELS
Cp=.742 1_ ,&/('0. OI LWL)3 =301 / F MODEL 2
U F O R ALL P. AND S, MODELS
U Cp = .77
A/(0.01 LWL)3- 260
MODEL 3
2.5 F MODEL 4
2.5 Cp=.719
Cp=.76
l.O L
L0 ~ / I/ I I I I __ .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 ]. [
.5 .6 .7 ,8 .9 I.O I.I
v K/J~-w~
VK ~',/EWU
Fig. 12 Residuary resistance coet~icients--950-ton model com- Fig. 13 Residuary resistance coefticients--ll00-ton model
pared to Webb's Series compared to Webb's Series
tion are particularly vulnerable. This makes it manda- marie coefficients greater than 0.70. One reason for this
tory that the designer identify situations that should be is that many offshore supply vessels were built with bow
avoided and provide guidance on how to avoid them. and stern sections added to a barge-type midsection for
The rest is up to the operators. easy construction. Another important reason is that
owners are reluctant to sacrifice cargo-carrying capacity
Power, Speed, and Hull Forms for speed and seakeeping qualities.
Because cargo is being carried on the deck, the de- The questions most often asked about a supply vessel,
signe~ of offshore supply vessels have developed a form other than the question of cost, are usually in the follow-
that is quite different from other types of vessels. A high ing order :
beam-to-draft ratio is necessary for stability and a square
1. H o w big?--usnalty referred to length.
afterdeck is desired for maximum deck area. This
2. H o w much cargo?--usually referred to tons of deck
unique and relatively new hull form has left supply boat
cargo permitted by the U. S. Coast Guard.
designers with very little data for design, not to mention
3. H o w many horsepower?
a systematic series such as the Taylor's Standard Series
4. H o w much deck area?--usually referred to after-
[6, 7] or the Webb's Trawler Series [8].
deck length.
Hull Form 5. H o w fast?
Offshore supply vessels are too full for their horsepower. The trend is, however, for finer vessels because of :increas-
These vessels run at speed-length ratios between 0.9 to ing interest in speed as drilling sites continue to move fur-
1.1. Optimum prismatic coefficient for this speed range ther offshore. Perhaps a good compromise between
is around 0.55 to 0.60 according to references [6, 7, 8, cargo capacity and speed is a prismatic coefficient of
10, 11]; while a large number of supply vessels have pris- 0.65.
cients of these models, corrected for 100-ft length, are ~/V X LwL
plotted in Fig. 15 for comparison, where:
and
( ehp
(~) = \ ~ a J 427.1
V = volumetric displacement, c u f t
160
_J
0 F i-
W
t.) - 5,000
140
0
h MOMENT M ~ \ 4- 3
- - I0~000
T~ 120
U)
O
I00 Z 2OO
",d
RUBDER ANOLE / /
ZLLL
O
< 3o TO PORT ~ / / _- i o
CO 45 TO RORT ~ / / - - - 2 :~
<1 80 150
o % W
G:
U
:LZL> V/ :t
60 O3 I 0 0
d
133
F- //" PORT [ { STBD
4O o3 // SCREW I I I ] SCREW
b- 5 0 __ // AHEAD iT I BACKING
o // TURNING I I f I TURNING
OUTBOARD ~ INBOARD
20 EL.
L 1 J L~ 1 .......
0 .50 IOO 150 200
RPM OF P O R T SCREW RUNNING AHEAD
I I I I I I I Fig. 18 "Walking" test of 180-ft supply vessel--outboard
90 .95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1,20 1.25
turning
VK/,/L-~
I
+ 5~000
4
very close to zero and, thereby, lateral movement can CO FORC E F
be achieved. In the case of the vessel with outboard O
Discussion
.STILL WATER
t~
I0 20 30 40
HEElm DEGREES
35 /- --IZoo ;z
l-
b.
<
c~
o
J
/
/
l
-- tooo ~.
g
r-
25 / ~oo g
/
/
/
ZO -- ~ 600
/ LI6HTSNIP " ~
for a preliminary estimation of light ship weight in the equipped with two-speed gears with some 30 to 60-rpm
formulaL X B X D/100 X coefficient. differential between the low and high shaft speed. The
It is also noted that because the depth of the S & A development of this type of vessel will be interesting to
vessels is greater than the Mok & Hill averages, the follow.
draft is somewhat greater. Probably the greatest M y compliments again to the authors on an excellent
difference, however, is the beam, and consequently the paper.
displacement.
It was at first thought that the prismatic coefficients Authors' Closure
would also be less because of the great difference in dis-
placement; however, checks of several of the S & A The authors thank all of the discussers for their kind
prismatic coefficients showed them to be in excess of comments.
0.70. The information offered by Mr. Macy provides a
The cargo carrying capabilities of the S & A designs are valuable addition to the paper. The loss of stability
somewhat less than the average shown in the paper due with a wave crest amidship was investigated by the
mainly to the decrease in beam; however, because of the Coast Guard following the Natiortal Pride casualty. In
extra depth, the difference is negligible and seakindliness still water as loaded, with ballast tanks cross-connected,
is improved. the Natiorta[ Pride had about 5 ft-deg of righting energy.
There is a new breed of supply vessel developing which With a wave crest amidships, theoretical calculations
will probably have characteristics somewhat different showed this was reduced to zero. This certainly leads
from those discussed in the paper. This group is the one to hypothesize that this factor contributed to the
combination supply vessel towing vessel. casualty. Initially, the Coast Guard imposed an addi-
The offshore oil operators desire a vessel working tional 0.4 of a foot of GM because of this. In the finnl
around their rigs that can both supply the rig and move it analysis, however, we did reason as Mr. M a e y suggested
from location to location. This requires even more that the possible loss of righting energy while on a wave
horsepower than is normal for supply vessels, and, due to crest is inherent in Rahola's criterion. Very simply
the large wheels required, the after body is cut away, thus he (Rahola) decided that vessels with a minimum of
moving the LCB forward. These vessels are usually 15 ft-deg of righting energy had a very high probability