ARTICLE IN PRESS

International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedudev

Decentralising education in Indonesia$

Stein Kristiansena,, Pratiknob
a
School of Management, Agder University College, Servicebox 422, 4604 Kristiansand, Norway
b
Faculty of Social and Political Science, Gadjah Mada University, Bulaksumur, Yogyakarta 55281, Indonesia

Abstract

The paper aims to assess the impacts of a dramatic decentralisation reform in Indonesia on access to and quality of
primary and secondary education. The research draws on qualitative and quantitative data from interviews, focus
group discussions and household surveys in four selected districts. The main conclusions are threefold; the
administration of educational services is without transparency and accountability, household expenditures on childrens
education are high and increasing, and huge social and geographical disparities exist. Policy recommendations include
increased government spending to make primary education available to all and improved measures to control public
policies and expenditure in this sector.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Devolution; Local government; Human rights; Schooling costs; Transparency; Accountability

$
The paper is based on research under the institutional
collaboration between Agder University College, Norway, and
Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia, funded by the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD. Recently, this
collaboration has set a focus on good governance and human
rights. In addition to the authors, the following persons have
contributed in data collection and methodology discussions:
Purwo Santoso, Cornelis Lay, Lambang Trijono, Abdul Gaffar
Karim, Derajad Widhyarto, Nur Azizah, Desi Rahmawati,
Nurul Aini, Vita Dian Putri, Prastowo, Hery Setyo Nugroho,
Dag Ingvar Jacobsen, Fathul Wahid and Rahmatsyah Fuady.
The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for their
important comments to an earlier draft.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +47 38 14 15 21;
fax: +47 38 14 10 27.
E-mail addresses: stein.kristiansen@hia.no (S. Kristiansen),
pratikno@lycos.com ( Pratikno).
1. Introduction
Since 2001, the administration of education in
Indonesia has changed dramatically. Managerial
and nancial responsibilities for all levels of public
education have been decentralised from central
government, mostly to local government at the
district level. There are now 440 districts, repre-
senting the third layer of the ve-tier government
hierarchy. The reform followed a severe economic
crisis that started in 1997 and the introduction of
free elections and democratic governance in 1999.
The central government had an urgent need to
reduce expenditures, and the new political ideol-
ogy saw advantages in bringing power and

0738-0593/$ - see front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2005.12.003
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
514 S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
responsibility closer to the people. Also, leading
international agencies like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed
strongly for reforms in the direction of privatisa-
tion, deregulation and devolution. Advocates of
the reforms expected to see the combined results of
quality improvement and cost reduction in public
service delivery, including education.
Indonesia improved its education system sub-
stantially under the authoritarian New Order
regime of President Suharto, especially in the
1970s and 1980s. Primary education was made
available to all in the 1980s and 9 years of
schooling was formally made mandatory in the
mid-1990s. Also at the senior high school and
university levels, there was a rapid growth in
extension and enrolment. The gender balance at
lower levels of education was better than in most
comparable countries. Social and geographical
disparities have been high, however, and now
seem to be on the increase.
Over a long period, private institutions have
played an important role in education in Indonesia.
This is especially so for Muslim organisations in a
country of 220 million people where more than
85% are followers of Islam. In eastern parts of the
country, where Christian missionaries have played
a role for centuries, Catholic and Protestant schools
predominate. There is a current tendency towards
increased polarisation and conict between geogra-
phical areas and religious faiths.
In this research, our main objective is to trace
the impacts of decentralisation reforms on access
to and quality of education in Indonesia. More
specically, we have investigated the administra-
tive impacts of the decentralisation, the change in
quality of schooling as perceived by parents, and
the costs of education charged on households.
Primary, as well as secondary education, is
included in the study, which also covers both
public and private educational institutions. In this
paper, decentralisation is taken to mean a rather
dramatic devolution, whereby responsibilities for
funding and administration of public primary and
secondary education are delegated from central
government to district authorities. Four locations
have been selected for study. They are districts
characterised by different levels of per capita
income and geographical centrality. The research
methodology combines a qualitative approach
based on in-depth interviews and focus group
discussions with surveys and quantitative data at
the household level in the four selected districts.
The paper is organised in seven sections. After
this introduction, there is an overview of the
development of education in Indonesia since the
withdrawal of the Dutch colonial power in 1949.
Thereafter, we discuss the recent economic crisis
and decentralisation reforms in Indonesia in more
detail. Section four offers a theoretical approach
to decentralisation in general and brings in
experiences from other developing countries. The
research methodology is described in section ve,
followed by the presentation and discussion of our
empirical ndings in section six. Our conclusion
and a brief discussion of policy implications close
the paper.
2. A history of education in Indonesia
Public education was virtually non-existent in
Indonesia until the colonial government estab-
lished a system of village schools in 1906. By 1913,
public schools numbered approximately 3500,
along with a similar number of private, religious
schools, among a population of 40 million. Only
very few natives, from Javanese elite groups, were
permitted to study in the Dutch schools up to
university level. In 1945, less than 6% of the
population were literate (Brojonegoro, 2001).
Following independence in 1949, verbal priority
was given to the development of national educa-
tion. This was in accordance with the 1945
constitution, which stipulates that every citizen
has the right to obtain education and that the
government has the responsibility to provide one
national education system (article 31). Financial
constraints limited government efforts in this eld,
however, and new schools were predominantly
private and based on religious teaching and
funding, mostly Islamic in Sumatra and Java and
Christian in the eastern parts of the country.
The expansion of public primary schooling
really took off with the increasing oil revenues
and government budgets from 1973. Large
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S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
amounts of money channelled through a Presiden-
tial Instruction (Inpres) Block Grant were used to
construct thousands of schools throughout the
country. The number of primary schools increased
from 65,000 in 1973 to 130,000 in 1984 and the
number of enrolled children doubled accordingly
to 26 million (Ministry of Education, 1996). Gross
enrolment in primary schools thus rose from 62%
in 1973 until universal primary education was
achieved in the mid-1980s (Behrman et al., 2002).
Priority in education policies then shifted to
expanding universal schooling up to the junior
secondary level. The governments commitment to
extend basic schooling from 6 to 9 years was
marked in 1989 with the passage of a radically new
education law (Law 2/1989). Nine-year compul-
sory education was ofcially introduced in 1994,
with the target of reaching 95% of the nations
students by 2004. Junior secondary enrolments
increased from 18% in the mid-1970s to 70% in
1997. In 2004, however, only 90 out of 440 districts
had reached the ofcial target. Still, 3.2 million
children aged between 13 and 15 were not enrolled
in compulsory 9-year education (Jakarta Post,
May 1, 2004). Due to the economic crisis and
administrative reforms, the target deadline has
been postponed until 2008.
Before the economic crisis started in 1997, gross
enrolment rates were well above 100% at the
primary level, 72% in junior secondary, and 46%
in senior high schools. At the tertiary level, the
enrolment rate was 11% (BPS, 1997). While the
vast majority of children enrol in primary schools,
only 80% complete primary education (SMERU,
2003). During the rst years of the economic crisis,
enrolment in junior high schools decreased to
69%. According to the Ministry of Education, the
national average participation rate in junior high
schools has increased again recently and passed
75% (Jakarta Post, May 1, 2004). The sheer
numbers of children in school clearly indicate the
task of developing the educational sector in
Indonesia. By the mid-1990s, about 30 million
pupils were enrolled in primary schools; 8.4
million in junior secondary schools and 4.7 million
in senior secondary schools.
Prior to the recent decentralisation reform,
social disparities were relatively large at the higher
515
levels of education. In junior high schools for
instance, 55% of children from the poorest
quintile of families were enrolled, while the
comparable gure was 92% for the richest 20%
of households. At the senior high school level,
similar gures were 25% and 75%, respectively
(Lanjouw et al., 2001). Also the geographical
differences are substantial and characterised by
lower levels of enrolment and literacy in rural
areas. At the senior high school level, there is a 31
percentage-points difference in enrolment between
urban and rural areas. More than one fth of the
nations districts still have less than 60% partici-
pation rate in junior high schools. Most of them
are located outside Java and especially in the
eastern parts of Indonesia (Jakarta Post, May 1,
2004).
The gender balance at lower levels of education
has been remarkably good. In 1995, the overall
male to female literacy rate was 1.2 and male to
female gross enrolment rates in primary education
stood at an impressive 1.0. The comparable gure
for secondary schools was 1.2 (Lee, 1998). The
improvement in gender ratio at all levels of
education represents a substantial achievement of
the Indonesian education policies in the period
from the mid-1970s until the nancial crisis started
in 1997.
Private schools maintained a dominate role in
the educational system through the New Order
era, especially at higher levels. Before the decen-
tralisation reform, 17% of students at elementary
level were enrolled in private schools, while similar
gures for junior and senior high schools were
40% and 50%, respectively. Private schools at the
elementary level are normally characterised by
lower operational costs and lower academic
quality. For instance, in private schools a sig-
nicantly lower share of students has access to
textbooks (Serrato and Melnick, 1995). Public
school graduates generally gain much higher
scores than those from private Islamic or non-
religious schools. Research has also revealed,
however, that graduates of private secondary
schools perform better than those from public
schools in the labour market (Bedi and Garg,
2000). The government gives substantial subsidies
to private schools, and those afliated with
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516 S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
religious organisations are administered under the
central Ministry of Religious Affairs. Many of
them are madrasah and pesantren, boarding
schools run by Islamic organisations. The number
of private elite schools has been small but seems to
be increasing.
Government spending on the educational sector
reached its heights in the mid-1980s with 1718%
of central government expenditures. In 1997, the
gure was reduced to 14% and after introducing
decentralisation stood at a meagre 45% in 2003
and 2004. Pre-decentralisation government costs
per student at primary, junior high and senior high
schools were 307,439 rupiah, 377,405 rupiah and
605,921 rupiah, respectively (Lanjouw et al., 2001).
According to Behrman et al. (2002), the central
government accounted for 66% of total spending
on these three levels of the education sector before
decentralisation. Due to the lack of accountability
at local government level today, it is impossible to
make a comparison of total government expendi-
tures on schooling before and after decentralisa-
tion. Based on Susenas1 data, one can calculate
that total household expenditures per student in
the year 1998 were 115,000 rupiah, 332,000 rupiah
and 639,000 rupiah at the three levels of schooling,
respectively (Sparrow, 2004). These gures will be
used for comparison with the present household
costs in section six of this paper.
Primary school fees in the public sector were
ofcially abolished in 1977. Secondary school fees
were formally retained until 1994. However, also
under the New Order regime, most schools
continued to charge fees for initial enrolment; up
to as much as 100,000 rupiah (USD 55) per child
admitted to grade 1 in 1990 (Moegiadi and Jiyono,
1991). A national survey conducted by the
Indonesian government in 1989 found that annual
fees in public junior secondary schools ranged
from 1000 to 125,000 rupiah, with an average of
11,700 (Bray, 1996). In addition, there were
irregular fees, costs of books, stationery and
1
Susenas, National Social Economic Survey, is a huge
household survey, which is annually conducted by the Central
Bureau of Statistics, BPS. According to Sparrow (2004, p. 6) the
reported Susenas gures include school fees, equipment and
supplies, transportation and tutors, and should thus be
comparable to the data from our household survey.
uniforms, and transport. School boards, known
as BP3, were established in most schools after a
government decree in 1974 and were extensively
used to legitimise the imposing of levies charged
on parents (Moegiadi and Jiyono, 1991). The need
to impose higher costs on households was drama-
tically increased by the economic crisis that started
in 1997.
3. Crisis and policy reforms in Indonesia
The Asian crisis hit Indonesia hard. The
national currency, the rupiah lost some 85% of
its value in a few months after July 1997. Ination
was running high, while salaries were falling and
increasing numbers were exposed to unemploy-
ment. More than ve million workers were
displaced as an impact of the crisis in 1998 alone
and the number of unemployed soon reached 18
million or around 20% of the workforce (ILO,
1998). The National Planning Agency estimated
an unemployment rate of 30% in 1999 (Bappenas,
1999). Towards the end of 2001, the Minister of
Manpower formally unveiled an unemployment
gure of 40 million (Jakarta Post 22.12. 2001).
The deep economic crisis, also illustrated by a
contraction of the Indonesian GDP by 14% in
1998, changed the fundamentals of political power
in society. Central governments in poor countries
are generally resisting the decentralising of author-
ity to local levels (Rondenelli et al., 1984).
However, in the case of Indonesia, the New Order
regime lost its bargaining power against outspoken
students and resilient local elites from 1997. The
students fought for democracy and regional
leaders contested for autonomy. Both prevailed,
substantially supported by international lenders,
who wanted to see good governance in politics
and state affairs as well as in private business. The
Indonesian government took the initiative for
dramatic reforms in 1999. That year, two new
laws with immense impacts on education were
passed in the newly democratically elected national
parliament. The two laws represent the initiation
of the decentralisation reform, aiming for expen-
diture reduction for the central government and
increased responsibility and contributions from
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S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
the local government and household levels. In line
with the key policy prescriptions of the Washing-
ton Consensus, the IMF offered a post-crisis
rescue package, which was conditional on the
implementation of market deregulation and pri-
vatisation, including in the supply of public
services. The World Bank, also following the
post-Washington Consensus, strongly advocated
decentralisation and institution building, due to
their expected contribution to creating good
governance. Increased emphasis on education,
and on devolution and privatisation of responsi-
bilities, have been typical elements of that strategy
since the late 1990s (Bonal, 2004; Fine, 2002).
There was a fear, however, that lower participa-
tion rates and negative impacts on social, geogra-
phical and gender balances would outweigh the
intended benets of the reform.
To curb the negative impacts of the economic
crisis on enrolment and completion rates in
Indonesian schools, a social safety net (JPS,
Jaring Pengaman Sosial) was introduced in 1999.
Loans for the scholarship and block grant
programmes were supplied jointly by the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB),
which together with Indonesian government fund-
ing constituted a 5-year budget frame of 654
million USD. A main objective was to reach the
poorest 6% of all primary school children and
17% and 10% of junior high and senior high
school students, respectively, with scholarships to
cover their main costs of schooling. The target
was to reach more than 6 million students.
Similarly, the block grant (DBO) was allocated
to the poorer 60% of schools at all levels. Again,
the target was to reach more than 130,000 schools
with grants between 2 million and 10 million
rupiah per year (SMERU, 2003; Haryadi, 2001).
The programmes, however, have repeatedly been
accused of lack of transparency and weak regula-
tions that made funds leak severely (Jakarta Post,
May 19, 1999; Jakarta Post, September 30, 2003;
Jakarta Post, December 26, 2003). The JPS
programme was terminated in 2003. The logic of
targeting the poor may have ended up being just a
wishful thinking strategy, as the development
model kept on producing social exclusion (Bonal,
2004, p. 665).
517
Corruption was known to be extensive under the
New Order regime. The general lack of transpar-
ency in state affairs and the limited accountability
of inuential institutions facilitated rent-seeking
and shady economic affairs. The economy was
totally dominated by large-scale business con-
glomerates with ethnic Chinese and Suharto
family members and associates in crucial positions.
The state government was authoritarian and
highly centralised. The regional hierarchy was
strictly ordered, with the heads of province and
district administrations selected by the president.
The central elite with its regional operational
network for collecting and redistributing money
accumulated wealth in Jakarta, but also managed
to spread enough economic incentives to curtail
opposition, as long as the economy grew steadily.
If main political concerns are personal rather
than community interests and aspirations, and if
extensive information asymmetry exists as a moral
hazard in society (Bappenas, 1999), risks are
running high that decentralising political power
and administrative responsibility may result in
increased corruption and reduce the quality of
public services, like education. As stated by one of
the original architects behind the decentralisation
reform in Indonesia, local parliaments are places
where black money is circulating without any
legal instrument available to stop it and public
trust in regional governments accordingly is on a
downturn (Rasyid, 2003, p. 66). Today, the central
state does not have a mandate to audit the local
governments, and district authorities are not
obliged to report accounts to the central govern-
ment. Decentralisation has minimised the vertical
accountability mechanisms (Brodjonegoro, 2003,
p. 294). Vertical reporting is substituted by the new
principles of horizontal accountability, but dis-
closure of the local budget is rather limited and
the role of the legislative seems to be weak in
relation to the executive bodies at the local level
(Brodjonegoro, 2003, p. 295).
Specically for the education sector in Indonesia,
King (1995) pointed to the clear trend to devolve
more authority in matters of primary education to
the regional governments, especially to the district
level, as early as the mid-1990s. Forty years of
ambiguity of managerial roles and dualism in
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
518 S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
administration among ve administrative tiers had
contributed to sub-optimal performance and a low
and declining quality of primary education. Also
Bjork (2003) pointed to the signicant and proble-
matic departure from the previous highly centra-
lised education policy in Indonesia, when in 1994
the Ministry of Education delegated the design of a
Local Content Curriculum to provinces, districts
and schools.
The new decentralisation policy was put into
practice from January 2001. One main provision
of Law 22/1999 on regional government is the
abolition of the former strictly hierarchical rela-
tionship between the central government, pro-
vinces and districts. Another is that regional heads
at both provincial and district levels are elected by
regional legislative bodies and held accountable to
these, rather than to higher levels of government.
The districts (kabupaten/kotamadya), which repre-
sented the third level in the previous ve-tier
administrative system, now became responsible for
the implementation and daily operations of
activities in sectors including education, health,
culture, public works, and the environment. A
main provision of Law 25/1999 is to delegate also
the financial responsibility of the mentioned sectors
to the district level. The allocation of funds from
central government sources decreased, while in-
creasingly local government expenses are based on
tax revenues from natural resources and business
activities. There are now six sources of funding for
the public education sector at the district level:
(1) Natural resource and tax revenue sharing from
the central government. Between 15% and
80% of natural resource revenues are now
distributed to district governments. They have
the authority to decide its allocation without
reporting to the central government. A few
districts rich in oil and gas have especially
gained from this reform, whilst the remaining
are losers.
(2) The Central Government General Allocation
Fund (DAU/Dana Alokasi Umum), which is
designed to partially equalise the scal capacity
among districts. Local government decide the
distribution of this fund, without reporting to
central government. 25% of net central gov-
ernment revenue should, according to the law,
be allocated to the DAU, of which 90% goes to
the district governments. The DAU is distrib-
uted among the regions based on the size of
their population and area, and on their levels
of income and natural resource endowment.
(3) The Central Government Special Allocation
Fund (DAK/Dana Alokasi Khusus), which is
earmarked for specic purposes. The DAK
represents a minor share of local governments
income and a tiny source of education funding.
Spending from the special allocation fund is
the only item of expenditure that districts are
supposed to report to central government.
(4) Local government incomes from own sources,
for instance local taxes and prots from
properties.
(5) Contributions by companies and communities.
(6) Individual households.
For the private education sector, the main
sources of income are still religious organisations,
as well as community and household contributions
and nancial support directly from the Ministry of
Religious Affairs in the central government.
Many politicians remain convinced that the
decentralisation process is needed to save money
for the state and ensure better delivery of public
services than under the previous centralised
government system. Also, arguments are put forth
that the reform is necessary to mobilise people in a
democratic political process and to curb tendencies
to national disintegration after decades of author-
itarian centralisation of powers (EIU (Economist
Intelligence Unit), 2000). Others regard the auton-
omy policy as a threat to national integration and
a move away from good governance and justice
among social classes and geographical areas
(Indrawati, 2002).
4. Decentralisation: what can be expected
Governance, in its broadest denition, refers to
the sum of the many ways individuals and
institutions, public and private, manage their
common affairs (Weiss, 2000, p. 796), and it
includes administrative, political, and economic
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
dimensions of power relations and authority
structures (UNDP, 1997). Good governance,
according to leading lending institutions, should
be facilitated by the establishment of its four
pillars: accountability, transparency, predictabil-
ity, and public participation. The four pillars
should be constructed by decentralising political
decisions and administrative responsibilities and
by making public services, such as education,
subject to market exposure. According to the
World Bank, decentralisation can reduce adminis-
trative bottlenecks in decision making, increase the
efciency of government and its responsiveness to
local needs, enhance the accountability of public
institutions, improve service delivery, and allow
greater political representation and participation
of diverse groups in decision making (World Bank,
2003).
Decentralisation is normally understood as the
transfer of authority and responsibility from
higher to lower levels of government. However, a
distinction is often made between deconcentration,
delegation, and devolution. Deconcentration
means the transfer of responsibilities to lower
levels within central government. Delegation
means the change of mandate and authority to
other government units, while devolution is
normally understood as the shifting away of
decision-making power to lower and independent
public organisations (Manor, 1999; Rondenelli
et al., 1984). Decentralisation may also be
combined with or turn into privatisation if
responsibility and resources are transferred from
the public to the private sector (Cuellar-Marchelli,
2003; Hanson, 1998). As mentioned in the
introduction and indicated in the former section,
we use the word decentralisation as devolution in
this article.
The recently dominating decentralisation poli-
cies in developing countries gain some support
from social sciences. From a political science
perspective, decentralisation is commonly re-
garded as fundamental to the development of
democracy. It normally functions as a means for
increased interest in political matters and may
result in enhanced participation by ordinary
citizens. Thus, in turn, it may strengthen decision
makers accountability towards the citizens (Blair,
519
2000). However, in contexts of traditional values
and authoritarian structures, there is no clear
empirical evidence for increased participation and
accountability with devolution reforms (Kohl,
2002; Wankhede and Sengupta, 2005). True local
democracy and accountability can only be
founded on a shift in values and awareness, and
the emergence of active citizenship (Francis and
James, 2003, p. 336).
From an administrative science point of view,
bringing bureaucrats closer to the people whom
they serve should ideally increase their efciency
and the chances for popular monitoring and
control (Breton, 1996). However, theories and
empirical ndings on associations between de-
centralisation and technical efciency are also
highly ambiguous (Treisman, 2000; Behrman and
King, 2001; Homedes and Ugalde, 2005). Fisman
and Gatti (2002) have estimated that scal
decentralisation in government expenditure is
strongly and signicantly associated with lower
corruption. However, if the level of corruption is
decided by the extent of monopoly power, the level
of agents discretion, and the level of account-
ability in the society (Klitgaard, 1988), then
problems of unclean bureaucratic practices have
most probably increased during decentralisation in
Indonesia (Kristiansen, 2004). Decentralisation
policies need to be context specic, and some
socio-economic conditions may have been over-
looked in the eagerness to make devolution
reforms in Indonesia.
There is a general tendency that decentralisation
of authority without a clear assignment of separate
responsibilities reduces the quality and efciency
of public services (Treisman, 2000). Problems of
unclear responsibilities among government institu-
tions, sectors and layers are generally created by
conicts of interest between groups of bureaucrats
and politicians. As stated by Adams and Kirst
(1999, p. 482), principal-agent ambiguity y
vague goals, multiple authorities and conicts of
interest are among the factors that may curb
accountability in the process of decentralising
educational policy. From the US, experiences
show that decentralisation of educational services
may work for the benet of a few strong groups
(Miron and Nelson, 2002). Similarly from Israel,
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520 S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
Gibton and Goldring (2001, p. 84) report that
educational decentralisation is motivated by domi-
nant groups in the society who wish to resegregate
the system to continue to allow for the reproduc-
tion of their own social capital and status of
power. Due to a lack of proper legislation, the
decentralisation process there tended to be chao-
tic, rough, and stormy. Shifting power within an
educational system requires a legal framework that
clearly redenes authority and responsibility and
secures the interests of weak groups.
The World Bank and IMF have observed that
parents are willing to pay relatively high amounts
of money even for primary education for their
children, if access to and quality of educational
services are improved (World Bank, 1995). Ac-
cording to Bray (1996, p. 6), households and local
communities represent untapped sources of in-
come for schools [that] can be exploited. Previous
ndings clearly indicate, however, that price
elasticity of demand for education is signicant
and negative (Alisjahbana, 1994; Lanjouw et al.,
2001). This means that an increase in the price of
education results in substantial decline in the
demand for schooling. This effect is generally
stronger among poor people and those located in
peripheral and rural areas. Price elasticity of
demand for education also tends to be more
strongly negative for girls than for boys (Alisjah-
bana, 1994) and, accordingly, willingness to pay
for education is empirically found to be lower for
girls than for boys (Gertler and Glewwe, 1990;
Bray, 1996). Willingness to pay is normally also
substantially lower among uneducated and poor
parents. Socio-economic reasons similarly explain
why urban citizens normally are willing to pay
more for educational services compared to rural
societies. Decentralisation policies generally tend
to widen the gap in investment in education
between urban and rural areas and thus may be
a mechanism for introducing and operating highly
unequal public education (Gibton and Goldring,
2001). There is evidence from many social and
geographical settings that children from poor and
rural families are prevented from receiving school-
ing due to direct and indirect costs imposed on
their parents (Brooks and Thant, 1998; Galabawa,
1994; Nam, 1996; Bray, 1996, p. 7).
5. Methodology and study areas
The number of administrative districts (kabupa-
ten/kota) in Indonesia has increased after the
decentralisation reform. Among the current num-
ber of 440 within 32 provinces, we selected four for
our empirical study. The national average popula-
tion of one district is 500,000. Each district is
further divided into an average of 10 sub-districts,
which are further administratively divided into
villages and sub-villages. The total number of
villages in Indonesia is approximately 70,000 with
an average population slightly above 3000.
With their earnings from oil and gas resources,
income per capita is more than 50 times higher in
the richest districts in comparison to the poorest,
and the differences are also huge in numbers of
population, geographical settings, and social and
cultural conditions. Our selection aims to cover a
variety of income per capita and level of urbanisa-
tion and centrality within the national context. In
three of the four districts (Bantul, Mataram and
Kutai Kartanegara) we conducted focus group
discussions that included representatives from the
legislative and executive bodies of government,
school employees, members of NGOs, and ordin-
ary parents. Within these districts, we selected one
sub-district for data collection also in the form of a
household survey. In the selection of sub-districts,
we used the criterion of typicality for each district.
At the village level, three study areas were
purposely selected within each sub-district, which
are at various distances from the centres of public
service supply within each sub-district. In Ngada,
due to the lower population density, three sub-
districts were included in the sampling frame for
the household survey and the sub-districts here
thus replace the villages in the three other districts.
Within the selected villages (desa) we made a
random sampling of sub-villages (dusun) for
distributing questionnaires by drawing numbers
from a list of all sub-villages within the desa.
Households to be included in the survey were
selected based on an area-wide sampling within the
selected 46 sub-villages, for instance every tenth
household in a systematic order to cover the whole
geographical area of the selected sub-villages. The
nal sampling was to comprise a minimum of 120
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
household respondents within the selected villages
in each district. The total number of household
respondents is 538. Data collection was made in
the period between July 2003 and March 2004. In
the following, we briey present the four study
areas.
Kabupaten Bantul is located in the province of
Yogyakarta, centrally located in Java. It is a
middle-income district and partly urbanised, close
to the city of Yogyakarta with its 100 institutions
of higher learning. The population of Bantul is
765,000, divided among 17 sub-districts and 75
villages, with a population density of 1530 per
square kilometre. Incomes are mainly from agri-
culture but increasing numbers commute to the
neighbouring city on a daily basis for trading or
employment in the service sector there. Within
Bantul, the sub-district of Imogiri, comprising
57,600 people in eight villages, was selected for
conducting the household survey and for more
specic focus group discussions and in-depth
interviews. The survey was made in the villages
of Karang Talun, Girirejo and Selopamioro.
Kota Mataram is the capital city in the province
of Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). It is a middle-
income district, located on the island of Lombok,
on the border between Indonesias inner (Java
and Bali) and outer islands. The population is
315,000 (5163 per square kilometre). The economy
is dominated by the service sector, related to
governance, trade, transport and tourism. Kota
Mataram consists of three sub-districts, of which
Cakranegara with 105,000 people was selected for
conducting the household survey. The survey was
made in the neighbourhoods (kelurahan) of
Cakrabarat, Bertais and Sayang Sayang.
Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara is located in the
province of Kalimantan Timur, peripherally lo-
cated within the national context. It is among the
economically wealthiest districts in Indonesia,
based on incomes from oil and gas extraction as
well as timber. The district is predominantly rural,
comprising 460,000 people in 18 sub-districts and
197 villages. The population density is 17 per
square kilometre. Migrants from Java and Bali
represent a large share of the population. The
district has a high number of private and govern-
ment companies operating in the oil industry,
521
mining, and logging. The sparsely populated inner
parts of the district have limited accessibility,
based on transport on the Mahakam river, and we
selected a relatively centrally located and more
densely populated sub-district, Tenggarong Seber-
ang, for the survey. The sub-districts population is
around 45,000. The 120 questionnaires were
distributed in the villages of Manunggal Jaya,
Kertabuana, and Suka Maju.
Kabupaten Ngada is located on the island of
Flores in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur
(NTT), which is known to be among the poorest
provinces in Indonesia. The district is predomi-
nantly rural and remote from major centres of
higher education and information. The total
district population is 235,000, with a population
density of 77 per square kilometre. The three areas
(sub-districts) selected for the household survey
are Riung, Soa, and Aimere, comprising a
population of 54,000. The survey is conducted in
the villages of Latung, Lengkosambi, Rawangka-
lo, Denatana, Nginamanu, Waepana, Mengeruda,
Kaligejo, Werupele and Inerie.
In addition to the qualitative data from focus
group discussions and in-depth interviews and the
quantitative data from questionnaires, the follow-
ing discussion is also based on secondary data,
mainly statistics from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS,
Central Bureau of Statistics), obtained from
national, provincial and district levels. Availability
and reliability of secondary data are limited,
however, and we have intentionally avoided the
dependency on monopolised data from BPS
(Susenas data for instance) in a politically sensitive
study like this.
Our own data also have limited reliability in
some aspects. Respondents may not have been
willing to tell the whole truth in focus group
discussions or in-depth interviews, and parents
have probably assessed the value of revealing
information to the enumerators, though guaran-
teed full anonymity. School participation and
attendance may have been over-reported, for
instance. People in Indonesia are generally careful
to criticise the government and its policies or
reveal behaviour that contradicts government
intentions. This may especially be the case in a
formal interview setting. It should also be taken
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
522 S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
into consideration that the decentralisation re-
forms in the post-authoritarian regime were still at
an initial stage at the time of the survey. Also,
reliability of survey data on quality of education
among poor and uneducated people is generally
weak. Peoples opinions on quality of services may
also have been inuenced by government pro-
reform policy statements and propaganda. Re-
spondents judgments of education quality will
therefore be considered carefully in the following
analyses.
Survey interviews were conducted in the houses
of respondents who are the fathers or mothers
(often both) of school aged children (518 years).
Also questions relating to health and security
services were included in the questionnaire. Very
few refused to be questioned. The interviews took
around 30 minutes; more for those with many
children. One form was lled out for each child
and the total number of cases is 925. Each
interview was initiated in the same manner,
introducing the researchers and their institutions
and the purpose of the study. Representatives
from the government were not present in any
situations during the data collection.
6. Findings and discussion
In the following, the main research questions are
subsequently discussed, using both qualitative and
quantitative data and analyses. We rst look at the
administrative aspects and service delivery from
the perspective of service providers, using qualita-
tive data. Next, we consider changes in the quality
of schooling as perceived by parents, mostly
applying data from the surveys. Thereafter we
look into changes in household costs of education.
Finally, we analyse school accessibility in terms of
geographical distance and nancial costs, also
using mainly quantitative data.
6.1. Administration and service delivery
Focus group discussions and interviews with
service providers and local government authorities
clearly reveal that decentralisation has created a
new deal in the education sector. Local politi-
cians are eager to underline the priority given to
this sector in their districts, bureaucrats point to
specic and optimistic projects and programmes
that have been initiated, and school principals and
teachers also report substantial changes since the
implementation of regional autonomy. As ex-
pressed by a local parliament member in Bantul:
Building good education image is now our major
concern. In Mataram, education is now formally
number two on the list of prioritised programmes,
after security. Weight sometimes seems to be
placed on the image, however, rather than on real
content.
Local government funds are used to buy support
from the society. For instance, as explained by the
chairman of the planning agency (Bappeda) in
Kutai Kartanegara in an interview, the govern-
ment allocates 2 billion rupiah (222,000 USD) per
village per year, which they call a bottom-up
programme. 30% of this is supposed to be used for
human resource empowerment, for instance scho-
larships for university students or civil servants.
The awareness of the value of education, however,
is generally very low in that district, according to
the head of Bappeda. The leader of the commis-
sion in the local parliament (DPRD) in charge of
education in that district says: We keep giving
pressure on the bureaucracy to increase the quality
of education, which is proved to be very low here.
Kutai is not as good as it looks. The district has
formally applied the policy of free tuition fees in
public schools, but as expressed by parents in a
focus group discussion: When teachers are paid
extra, it is the parents who have to pay. As can be
seen from Appendix A, total costs of schooling in
Kutai Kartanegara are not lower than in the
poorer districts.
In Bantul, the Babonisasi programme has been
implemented to improve education at the primary
level. Every child was given a hen (babon) to take
care of. This should raise their responsibility and
also the quality of nutrition from eating eggs, and
thereby their capability to concentrate in school-
work. The programme took a substantial share of
the non-routine education budget and the main
advantage, according to a district education
ofcer, is to build the trust to the local govern-
ment from the society. Mataram has another
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
approach to underline the local governments
seriousness in education affairs. One prestige or
model school is being built in each of the three
sub-districts with the objective of reaching an
international standard. The contrast between the
new mall-like buildings and neighbouring worn-
down schools is striking and people complain
about the dominance of the elite. Everybody
knows that entrance and tuition fees will be
high in these schools, either formally or infor-
mally, and everyone gures out how government
employees gain from large construction pro-
jects. As expressed by a school principal in a focus
group discussion in Mataram: Dont you ever
think that the education sector is free from
corruption.
As can be seen from Table 1, the education
sector typically takes a major share of the total
district budgets (APBD, Anggaran Pendapatan
Belanja Daerah). Routine expenditures comprise
the major slice, as the local governments now pay
all salaries and allowances for teachers in public
schools. Teachers remuneration has been in-
creased substantially to enhance motivation and
increase educational efciency, even to the extent
that there is concern of teachers getting too
focused on money. As expressed by the sub-
district head of the teachers union in Imogiri,
Bantul: I am sorry, but nowadays the teachers
and principals are consumerists. Teaching respon-
sibilities have also increased and in the case of
public schools in Bantul, from 18 to 24 h per week.
Meanwhile, the headmaster of an Islamic madra-
sah school in Mataram complains about the
Table 1
Local government budgets, 2003 (9000 rupiah 1 USD)
District Total budget Education
(APBD) (billion budget (billion
rupiah) rupiah)
Bantul 436.0 198.2
Mataram 196.0 86.6
Kutai Kartanegara 2456.6 241.2
Ngada 227.4 71.1
Sources: BPS District statistics (Dalam Angka), and Bappeda.
a
Based on information from the district governments on enrolled pupils in primary, junior high and senior high schools in each
district.
523
economy and efciency of his school: Teachers
in our institution receive around 20,00060,000
rupiah (2.26.7 USD) per month,so what can we
expect from them?
Figures in Table 1 show, substantial discrepan-
cies among districts with regard to the allocations
for education as a percentage of total budgets and
counted per capita and per student. Kutai
Kartanegara has by far the highest government
budgets in this sector per capita and per student
and still by far the lowest share of total district
budgets. On average, the four districts allocate 1.6
million rupiah (187 USD) per student per year. In
Mataram, the corresponding gure is less than 1.2
million rupiah (131 USD) per year.
The gures above are only from the annual
budgets, however, and no real expenditure data are
made available. No accounts are presented on the
real spending on education, neither to the local
parliaments nor to the central government. There
is, in other words, a total lack of transparency and
accountability in the educational sector of the
district administrations. Even for the social safety
net package (JPS), co-funded by the World Bank
and the ADB, no gures are available showing the
disbursement to the education sector at the district
level. The World Bank in Jakarta does not
contribute to transparency. After repeated formal
requests, no data has been made available to us on
how the 654 million USD programme has been
distributed to the districts in charge of implement-
ing the programmes since 2001. At the district
level, no distinction is made between various
sources of income for the education budget.
Share of total Education budget Education budget
budget (%) per capita (1.000 per student (1.000
rupiah) rupiah)a
45.5 259.1 1660.8
44.2 274.9 1180.5
9.8 524.4 2450.5
31.3 302.6 1454.1
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
524 S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
According to a leading ofcer in the district
administration in Bantul: The problem is whether
it is clear enough where the funding comes from, is
it from Jakarta or from local revenue?
In focus group discussions and in-depth inter-
views, no doubt is concealed that corrupt practices
dominate in governing the education sector.
Headmasters and government bureaucrats accuse
each other, and members of local parliaments
complain about shady affairs within the bureau-
cracy. In a focus group discussion in Bantul, a
local government education ofcer openly ex-
pressed that at the school level, there are still a
lot of funds leaking. y For example, we dont
want this Block Grant [JPS] to be just for the
teachers. Meanwhile, a headmaster in a similar
focus group discussion in Mataram expressed his
dissatisfaction with education department ofcers
and policy makers: If something is not protable
to decision makers, then they will think many
times. He further explained that information is
covered and correct amounts [from the Block
Grant] are not received by the schools. Well, the
amount is correct but the money is not. He is
supported by the kelurahan chief: The budget goes
up, yes, but the large amount of the budget is not
received by the schools. There must be something
wrong. In an interview the DPRD (local parlia-
ment) Vice-Chairman in Bantul expressed: About
the budget, I dont know exactly, it is the executive
who breaks down the budget. y A constitutional
problem exists: DPRD gives money to the execu-
tive and they dont have to report on it. y This is
a vertical authority problem: we feel bad to ask
them to discuss it.
When accounts are not even presented to the
local parliaments for approval, obviously the civil
society has limited opportunity to be informed.
Concerns are clearly expressed by several NGOs
interviewed. Also the media are in many cases
forced to avoid investigations and critical ques-
tions. In Mataram, for instance, the local news-
paper, Lombok Post, has been identied as an
enemy of the state by the mayor, after illuminat-
ing some shady government business affairs.
Journalists have been harassed and forced to keep
quiet. The local governments security guards are
able to put force behind loyalty requests (inter-
view with an NGO in Mataram). The mayor
(walikota) in Mataram strongly emphasised the
good relationship with the DPRD. The executive
bodies are willing to share revenues with the
members of the legislative, in exchange for other
services, like loyalty. Bagi-bagi duit, or a system
of distributing money, is often referred to for
explaining the process of increasing collusion and
collective corruption, where members of the
executive and the legislative bodies join forces to
gain and hide. In Kutai Kartanegara, according to
a local newspaper journalist: The bupati [head of
the kabupaten] says there is a magic lamp in this
district. Development here is like an abracadabra
process.
Education boards (Dewan Pendidkan) and
school committees (Komite Sekola) should be
established at the district and school levels,
respectively, according to the law, to enhance
participation of stakeholders and to control the
bureaucracy and the headmasters. However, the
district education department and the headmasters
tend to become superior over their respective
boards and committees, due to unequal access to
information. As expressed by the leader of the
commission that is in charge of education in the
district parliament in Bantul: The education
board at the district level does not function well.
The brother of former President Suharto is the
chairman and meetings are held in his private
house. At the school level, rivalry colours the
relationship between committees and headmasters,
and responsibilities and duties are unclear. Our
survey data reveal that in 34% of the cases,
parents were not aware of any school board at the
specic school of their child. In Kutai Kartane-
gara, only 27% could report that a school board
was established in the school attended by their
child. As a contrast, parents in Ngada reported in
98% of the cases that school boards were
established. For those who know that school
boards exist, parents perception of their quality
is generally positive. As an average for all four
districts, as much as 95% of these respondents
regard the school boards where their children are
enrolled as serious and fair, while only 5% report
that they are uncommitted and unfair. There is
still, however, a need to clarify their roles and to
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
enhance ordinary peoples access to information
on educational affairs and budgets.
6.2. Quality of schooling as perceived by parents
In our total sample of households in the four
districts, 81% of the parents report that the overall
quality of their childrens schooling has improved
after the decentralisation reform. Only 4% of the
parents report that the general quality has
decreased. Perception of quality varies somewhat
with location. The educational quality is perceived
to be highest in Mataram and lowest in the rich
Kutai Kartanegara. Differences are not statisti-
cally signicant, however. Also, there are no
signicant differences in regard to this between
government and private schools or among the
various levels of education.
In open-ended questions, parents are mostly
unable to point to specic elements of school
qualities that they assess. In Bantul, a parent
representative said in a focus group discussion that
most parents dont have the qualications to
judge the quality of the schools. Therefore, what
matters in selecting a school for ones child is the
price. Parents judgements of quality seem to be
based on higher expectations from their increased
payments and on pro-reform local government
propaganda.
6.3. Costs charged on households
Most respondents in our survey regard school-
ing costs as much higher or higher compared to 3
years ago; i.e. before the regional autonomy
reform. For those who have children in govern-
ment schools, 74% report that costs are higher,
while the comparable gure is 81% in private
schools. Only Kutai Kartanegara represents a
regional exception in our sample in this regard.
There, as much as 54% report that costs are the
same (29%) or lower (25%).
Among the total number of 925 children
reported to be attending schools in our survey,
71% are enrolled in government schools and 29%
in private institutions. The market share for
private schools is 22% at the primary level and
40% at the senior high school level. There are huge
525
regional differences in market share. In Ngada,
60% of students attend private schools, while
Mataram represents the extreme opposite with a
private school market share of only 10%. Overall,
21% of children had received some form of
scholarship over the last year. This gure is higher
in Bantul (27%) and Ngada (25%), and higher
at the senior high (25%) than at the junior high
school level (18%).
The real schooling costs per year as reported by
the parents, and the various cost elements at
different levels of schooling in private and public
institutions in the four districts, are revealed in
Appendix A. They include tuition and enrolment
fees, the purchase of books and uniforms, and
transport expenditures. As can be seen, there are
relatively small differences between districts with
regard to total costs at various levels of schooling.
Also, costs at public and private institutions are
quite similar, though with a tendency towards
higher prices in private schools, especially for the
higher levels. For instance in Ngada, students
in private senior high schools pay more than
double the price of those in similar government
schools. Tuition and enrolment fees represent
higher shares of total costs at the higher levels
of education. Parents generally pay much for
the transport of their children to schools. Uni-
forms and books also represent major shares
at all levels. The costs of books have especially
gone up, partly due to the change of curriculum,
and partly because this burden is now denitely
put on the parents. Parents also complain speci-
cally of the increasing enrolment and tuition
fees, which they believe are used to improve the
quality of the schools and raise the salaries of the
teachers.
The overall average school costs per child per
year are 1,031,400 rupiah (115 USD) and the
average total schooling costs per family is
1,773,318 rupiah (197 USD). Compared with
previously mentioned cost statistics from 1998
(Sparrow, 2004), we nd that expenditures for
schooling at various levels are approximately
36 times higher at current prices, as depicted in
Table 2. The consumer price index and govern-
ment regulated minimum salaries, meanwhile, rose
by less than 50%.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
526 S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
6.4. School accessibility
Households distance to schools is generally low.
Overall, 63% of the children can reach their
schools within 1 km and 96% within 10 km. At
the primary level, in 76% of the cases schools are
located within 1 km from the childrens houses.
Also at the primary school level, 83% of children
walk to school, while at the senior high school
level, 65% use either their own vehicle or public
transport.
In many cases, especially for the poor and rural
families and in households where parents have low
education, the costs of education for all children
appear to be impossible to bear. Households
average costs of keeping their children in schools
now make up 29% of their total expenditures. In
the urban area of Mataram, households pay an
average of 34% of total expenditures for childrens
schooling. For the poorest half of the interviewed
households in the four districts, those with less
than 750,000 rupiah monthly expenditures, school
costs comprise 40% of total family payments.
Transcripts from an interview with an NGO
representative in Bantul may partly explain how
costs of schooling and alternative income oppor-
tunities tend to push parents to pull children out of
Table 2
Increase of total annual school costs 19982003/04 at various
levels
Primary school costs: 5.8
(+481%)
Junior high school costs: 4.2
(+322%)
Senior high school costs: 3.3
(+229%)
Sources: Our survey and Susenas (Sparrow, 2004).
Table 3
School participation rates among districts
District N Mean SD Kutai
Bantul 120 96.6 12.4 ns
Kutai 149 92.9 18.0
Mataram 149 87.6 22.4
Ngada 119 55.9 25.9
Notes: ns not signicant, * po0.05, **po0.01.
schools: In sand mining areas, elementary school
children are able to earn 20,000 rupiah per day,
and then in sum, working is better than studying.
Priority is in many cases given to education for the
oldest son, while other children are withdrawn
from schooling at early stages and utilised as
labour force for increased family income.
The overall gender balance in our sample is 1.13,
constituted by 53% boys and 47% girls. The
imbalance grows bigger at higher levels of school-
ing, and reaches 1.33 at the senior high school
level. There are substantial regional differences,
exemplied by an overall representation of
52% girls in Ngada and only 42% in Kutai
Kartanegara.
We have analysed means differences in partici-
pation rates in schools for all children aged 518 in
our sample among districts and households
sources of income and expenditure levels. We have
also tested the correlation between participation
rates and the number of children and parents
levels of education in the interviewed households.
The participation rate is lowest in Ngada. Here,
less than 56% of school-aged children (518 years)
are enrolled in schools. As can be seen from
Table 3, the participation rate in Bantul district is
signicantly higher than in Mataram and Ngada.
Also, the participation rate in Kutai Kartanegara
is signicantly higher than in both Mataram and
Ngada, while Mataram scores signicantly higher
than Ngada.
It can be concluded from Table 4 that house-
holds with agriculture as their main source of
income have signicantly lower participation rates
in schooling for their children compared to
families with other sources of income.
Mataram Ngada
Bantul4Mataram** Bantul4Ngada**
Kutai4Mataram* Kutai4Ngada**
Mataram4Ngada**
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S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
Table 4
School participation rates and households main source of
income
Source of income N Mean
Agriculture 206 74.67
Own business 197 89.16
Salary from government employment 82 90.73
Salary from private company 51 92.32
Among those with less than 500,000 rupiah
monthly expenditure, the school participation rate
is 80% on average. Among those spending
between 500,000 and one million rupiah per
month, participation rate is 84%. Among those
with expenditure higher than one million per
month, the comparable gure is 95%. The
differences are signicant using one-way ANOVA.
Using correlation analyses (Pearsons), we nd
that the participation rate is strongly and nega-
tively (r 0:664, po0:01) correlated with the
number of children in the households. Similarly,
we nd signicant (po0:01) positive associations
both between the fathers and mothers level of
education and the participation rates in schooling
for their children.
7. Conclusion and policy implications
The central government in Indonesia has
initiated a dramatic decentralisation policy to
reduce its own powers and surrender authority to
the districts. The main objectives are to decrease
government spending on public service delivery
and to increase responsibilities and duties at lower
levels of government and with households. Decen-
tralisation at this scale implies an unavoidable
learning process and at least a decade-long
transitional process, according to one of the
reform architects (Rasyid, 2003, p. 71). Our
research, which is based on both quantitative
and qualitative methodology and conducted in
four of the countrys districts, has revealed a
number of negative consequences of the decen-
tralisation policy on the education sector.
527
Firstly, there is a total lack of transparency and
accountability in government spending on educa-
tion after the decentralisation reform. Vertical
SD nancial accountability has been abolished and no
alternative exists in horizontal accountability. The
29.78 executive bodies at the district level are not
20.94
enforced to reveal any detailed accounts or policy
18.91
18.77 assessments from the education sector to the
legislative bodies or to the civil society in general.
The lack of reliable accounts makes a comparison
of total expenditures of schooling before and after
the decentralisation reform impossible. Thus,
judgements on the development of technical
efciency are also impeded.
Secondly, based on their own perceptions, the
respondents in our household survey report that
the quality of education is higher today than it was
3 years ago. Remarkably, the parents in Mataram,
where government spending on education per
student is lowest, regard quality improvements as
higher than in the other districts. However, quality
judgements are made by parents who in most cases
disclose limited insight into school priorities,
policies and quality issues when asked more
detailed questions about their childrens educa-
tion. Still, there is denitely a feeling of a new
deal in educational matters, observed by parents
as well as by school administrators. Also, new and
costly books and increased household payments in
general, for instance to cover salary increases for
the teachers, may also create a feeling of quality
improvements among parents.
Thirdly, the costs of education charged to
households are much higher than 3 years ago,
actually as much as six times higher for the average
primary education. Households spend an average
of 29% of their total expenditures on childrens
schooling. In the city of Mataram, this gure is
34%. Among the poorest half of our respondents,
those spending less than 750,000 rupiah (83 USD)
per month, 40% of family expenditures is on
education.
Fourthly, there are signicant differences in
access to education, measured as school participa-
tion rates for school-aged children, among districts
and social groups. Participation rates are signi-
cantly lower in the remote and rural district of
Ngada, among households whose main income
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
528 S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531
comes from agriculture, and among the largest and
poorest families and those where parents have low
education. Our data cannot conrm if geographi-
cal, social and gender differences are increasing.
However, also supported by theories and empirical
ndings from other areas, most probably they are.
Hopefully, our empirical ndings could be used
for improving policy instruments in the transi-
tional process that is ahead of central and local
government institutions in Indonesia. The devolu-
tion of responsibilities for educational nancing
and services to the district and household levels
certainly requires continued improvements and the
attention of a qualied civil society to avoid clearly
unwanted consequences. It also demands the
awareness of politicians and a general politicisa-
tion of the process to make people aware of
potential gains and losses related to their specic
geographical, social and cultural settings. Without
adequate political handling from local as well as
central government, differences in education costs,
quality and enrolment might evolve into geogra-
phical and social gaps. As observed in our study,
devolution reforms neither create accountability,
nor increased participation or lower costs. On the
contrary, problems of corruption seem to increase
due to lack of transparency and prevalent pro-
blems of information asymmetry among politi-
cians, bureaucrats and civil society at the local
level.
Our policy recommendations are concentrated
in the following three points:
(1) There is a need for increased public invest-
ments to make schooling available for all and
to avoid increasing geographical and social
gaps. Government costs on education should
not be regarded as subsidies, but as invest-
ments in human resource development, equity,
and social stability. The Indonesian constitu-
tion from 1945 clearly requires that every
citizen shall have the right to obtain free
education. Also the international community
has a responsibility, based on the approval of
the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights
(Article 26), the 1959 Declaration of the Rights
of the Child (Principle 7), and the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (Article 13), all stating
that Education shall be free, at least at the
elementary level. It is difcult to combine a
policy of making school costs reach 40% of
poor households expenditures with the ap-
proval of human rights declarations.
(2) Increasing central government funding, ear-
marked for educational purposes, should go
hand-in-hand with increased vertical account-
ability. Transparent and clean control func-
tions and sanction mechanisms need to be
developed by the central Ministry of Educa-
tion, and certain minimum quality standards
and maximum household payment norms
should be applied.
(3) There is a need for political education to
increase the awareness of rights and duties at
local levels under the new political and
administrative system. Increased horizontal
accountability and demand driven advances
are dependent on improved functions of the
district legislative bodies. The critical role of
the civil society should also be expanded and
the media and institutions of higher learning
should take on more seriously the tasks of
creating transparency and facilitating real
political discussions and priorities.
Our research has certain limitations. First and
foremost, our data cannot reveal to what extent
social, geographical and gender differences are
increasing under the new decentralisation era.
Secondly, aggregate expenditure gures from
central or district government levels do not allow
for judgements on technical efciency changes
through decentralisation. As long as government
gures are unavailable or unreliable, cost compar-
ison should be made on the individual school level.
Therefore, more research and impact assessments
are recommended in the educational sector in the
further development of local responsibilities.
Appendix A
For the school costs at various levels in four
districts see Table 5.
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S. Kristiansen, S. Pratikno / International Journal of Educational Development 26 (2006) 513531 529

Table 5

Tuition Enrollment Books Uniform Transport Other Total

Bantul
Government Kindergarten 74,786 62,250 43,500 91,600 65,833 43,250 381,219
Primary 43,522 58,279 54,589 78,111 59,912 170,299 464,713
Junior 226,679 271,577 71,679 187,482 158,000 322,810 1,238,226
Senior 207,214 616,333 83,571 344,038 348,077 351,600 1,950,834
Private Kindergarten 49,286 85,222 24,651 68,215 7,000 234,373
Primary 2500 2000 10,000 40,000 30,000 84,500
Junior 100,000 400,000 200,000 250,000 720,000 1,670,000
Senior 306,167 784,333 67,500 325,909 740,500 189,917 2,414,326
Mataram
Government Kindergarten 200,000 120,000 36,000 140,000 650,000 69,000 1,215,000
Primary 57,381 78,248 88,238 78,148 300,000 129,746 731,762
Junior 235,349 289,886 147,705 154,500 592,000 320,643 1,740,083
Senior 329,000 418,000 200,000 209,846 659,091 512,000 2,327,937
Private Kindergarten 185,800 288,500 132,000 146,667 390,000 274,000 1,416,967
Primary 63,625 41,750 103,500 91,875 300,750
Junior 533,000 175,125 119,286 228,750 1,500,000 219,167 2,775,327
Senior 285,000 531,000 160,833 220,833 725,000 167,000 2,089,667
Kutai
Government Kindergarten 120,000 88,333 405,000 88,333 322,000 342,667 1,366,333
Primary 47,527 54,214 162,762 145,429 65,286 264,619 739,837
Junior 43,529 155,938 263,781 173,971 166,700 460,897 1,264,815
Senior 201,200 333,571 326,000 347,063 498,292 507,500 2,213,626
Private Kindergarten 137,143 65,000 225,200 130,000 320,000 877,343
Primary 60,571 48,229 142,536 121,667 205,000 463,800 1,041,803
Junior 251,769 145,227 249,833 181,786 693,333 606,429 2,128,377
Senior 257,143 362,500 298,571 482,500 436,667 801,429 2,638,810
Ngada
Government Kindergarten 67,250 700 82,500 47,500 140,000 38,333 376,283
Primary 157,815 12,831 129,108 117,885 209,394 64,396 691,428
Junior 230,100 4048 153,889 136,466 244,375 78,571 847,449
Senior 187,250 3257 165,625 121,875 164,000 206,000 848,007
Private Kindergarten 111,324 5106 30,313 52,250 132,143 45,000 376,135
Primary 149,552 5736 140,750 78,389 276,702 59,886 711,015
Junior 323,455 6245 135,667 141,409 371,464 73,077 1,051,317
Senior 757,938 5136 294,500 197,333 712,083 159,750 2,126,740

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