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1. Del Rosario vs. Equitable Ins. & Casualty Co., 8 SCRA 343 [1963];

Amount recoverable in case of death by drowning is not stated in policy.

Facts: The insurer has bound itself under its policy to pay PI,000.00 to P3,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
the insured for bodily injury, the policy mentioning specific amounts that may be recovered. The policy,
however, does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning,
although it is a ground for recovery apart from death for bodily injury.

Issue: How much can the insured recover?

Held: There is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favour of the
insured and strictly against the insurer as to allow a greater indemnity, i. e., P3,000.00.

2. Taurus Taxi Co., Inc. vs. The Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 24 SCRA 454 [1968]

Deceased has already been paid under the Workmen's Compensation Act from another policy.

Facts: The insurance policy contained a prohibition to the effect that any "authorized driver of T (Taxi Co.)
should not be entitled to any indemnity under any other policy." The deceased, however, was paid his
workmen's compensation from another policy.

Issue: Should such fact defeat the right to recover under such insurance policy?

Held: No, despite the prohibition mentioned, it is too well settled to need the citation of authorities that what
the law requires (as the Workmen's Compensation Act [R.A. No. 4119], now embodied in Arts. 166-208, Labor
Code; 25 see Arts. 1711, 1712, Civil Code.) enters into and forms part of every contract. Assuming, however,
that there is doubt concerning the liability of the insurer, nonetheless it should be resolved in favour of the
insured. Courts are to regard "with extreme jealousy" limitations of liability found in insurance policies and to
construe them in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation.

3. CCC Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 264 [1970]

A driver's license, a representation by the government of holder's qualification to operate motor vehicles.
The issuance of the license is a proof that MVO officials considered the driver of the insured qualified to
operate motor vehicles and the insured was entitled to rely upon such license. And considering that the weight
of authority is in favor of a liberal interpretation of the insurance policy for the benefit of the party insured and
strictly against the insurer, no breach was committed of the above-quoted provision of the policy.

4. Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. vs. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., 124
SCRA 618 [1983]

Quantum of evidence to prove theft. "In the absence of any provision in the policy, prior conviction for the
crime of theft is not required to make the insurer liable under the theft clause policy. In a civil action for
recovery on an automobile insurance, die question of whether a person using a certain automobile at the time
of the accident stole it or not is to be determined by a fair preponderance of evidence and not by the rule of
criminal law requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt."

5. Landicho vs. Government Service Insurance System, 46 SCRA 7 [1972]

Policy contains conflicting provisions on effect of non-payment of premium

Facts: A provision in the application for insurance with the GSIS states this condition: "That my policy shall be
made effective on the first day of the month next following the month the first premium is paid; x x x."
Another condition provides: "That failure to deduct from my salary the monthly premiums shall not make the
policy lapse, however, the premium account shall be considered as indebtedness which, I bind myself to pay
the System." The applicant, an employee of the Bureau of Public Works, died in an airplane crash. It appears
that the Bureau had not remitted to the GSIS even a single premium because the Bureau's collecting officer
was not advised by the GSIS to make the required deduction pursuant to the provision in the application.

Issue: Should the policy be considered in force notwithstanding that not a single premium had been paid
thereon?

Held: Yes. The ambiguity created by the operation of the conditions should be interpreted adversely against
the GSIS which prepared the insurance contract or application. This rule is especially true in insurance policies
where forfeiture is involved.
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6. Gonzales vs. The Phil. American Life Insurance Co., l.C. Case No. 56, June 21, 1976

Insured spouses died when passenger truck they were driving was ambushed by Muslim rebels.

Facts: R (insurer) paid the face value of the life insurance policies of spouses D and E (insured) but denied
liability for accidental death benefits of double indemnity on the ground that the cause of their death was an
excluded risk provided for in the comprehensive accident indemnity rider which provides that "the policy shall
not cover loss or disability caused directly or indirectly by war, declared or undeclared, strikes, riots, and
civilwar, revolution, or anywarlike operation." It appears that D and E died when the passenger truck they
were driving was ambushed by Muslim rebels in Zamboanga del Sur.

Issue: Was the death of D and E caused by "warlike operation"?

Held: No. The ambush was an isolated one, and was not in the prosecution of hostilities between two
combatants or warring parties. The vehicle was travelling for the purpose of transporting their paying
passengers and not for the prosecution of any warlike operation. Even if such was the case, the passengers
were not aware of such fact. The use of the term "warlike operations" right after the terms "civil war" and
"revolution" must be interpreted to mean "operation in time of war."

7. American Home Assurance Company vs. Tantuco Enterprises, Inc., 366 SCRA 740 [2001]

Doubt is to be resolved against the insurer. "The object of the court in construing a contract is to ascertain
the intent of the parties to the contract and to enforce the agreement which the parties have entered into. In
determining what the parties intended, the courts will read and construe the policy as a whole and if possible,
give effect to all the parts of the contract, keeping in mind always, however, the prime rule that in the event of
doubt, this doubt is to be resolved against the insurer. In determining the intent of the parties to the contract,
the courts will consider the purpose and object of the contract."

8. Misamis Lumber Corporation vs. Capital Dev. & Surety Co., 17 SCRA 228 [1966]

Liability is limited to P150 if repair of insured was undertaken without notice to insurer. Where the
automobile liability policy provided that the insurer would not be liable for more than P150.00 if the insured
undertook repairs of the car subject of the insurance without the knowledge of the insurer, the lat-ter is not
liable to pay a greater amount to the insured who had actually spent P307.27 for repairs due to an accident
covered by the policy but which were authorized without first notify-ing the insurer.

9. Union Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Phil. Guaranty Co., 47 SCRA 271 [1972]

Insurer must be given notice of the existence of other fire policies. In the absolute absence of notice by the
insured to the insurer of the existence of other policies of insurance against fire upon the property insured
when it is one of the conditions specified in the fire insurance policy for the validity of the policy and
entitlement to indemnity in case of loss, the policy is null and void and the insured cannot recover. Courts are
not permitted to make contracts for the parties. Their function and duty consist simply in enforcing and
carrying out the contracts actually made. The parties must abide by the terms of the contract because such
terms constitute the measure of the insurer's liability and compliance therewith is a condition precedent to the
insured's right of recovery from the insurer.

10. Ty vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc., 1 SCRA 1324 [1961]

Only the amputation of hand is considered as a loss thereof. Where the insured, an operator mechanic of a
factory, suffered injuries which caused the temporary total disability of his left hand, due to the fractures of the
index, middle and fourth fingers thereof, he cannot recover on the insurance policy which provides that partial
disability of either hand means amputation through the bones of the wrist. As the terms of the policy are clear,
express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an
interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability, not covered by the policy,
would be unwarranted. The insurance contract is the law between the parties.

11. Ang vs. Fulton, 2 SCRA 945 [1961]

Action on a claim must be brought within one year from denial thereof. Where under the terms of the
policy, an action on a claim denied by the insurer must be brought within one (1) year from the denial, the
contract which is the law between the parties, governs, not the rules on the prescription of actions.

12. Dumoy Sawmill, Inc. vs. Times Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., I.C. Case No. 132 [1976]

Use of motor vehicle must be for social, domestic or pleasure purpose." The provision of the policy on the
limitation as to use reads: "Use only for social, domestic and pleasure purpose. This does not cover use for
hire, or reward, or for racing, pace making, reliability-trial, and speed testing x x x."
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Is car rallying embraced within the exception?

Yes. While an "auto rally is not racing as the contest is not based on speed or acceleration where the vehicle
which is travelling at a higher rate of speed throughout the duration of test will be the winner" (see 36 Words
and Phrases 3.), it is definitely a contest based on "precision" and "coordination of crew" as well as on "road
worthiness." Since the contest was timed, controlled and conducted under the conditions with a crew to test
the precision of the driver and the road worthiness of the car, the "auto rally" falls within the exception,
particularly under "pace-making, reliability-trial, and speed testing" and thus, not within the coverage of the
policy.

13. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 741 [1990]

Written permission of insurer is required before insured may effect payment in settlement of claim. The
policy specifically requires that insurer's written consent be first secured before any payment in settlement of
the claim against the insured can be made. There is nothing unreasonable or objectionable in this stipulation
as would warrant its nullification. The same is obviously designed to safeguard the insurer's interest against
collusion between the insured and the claimant. The failure of the insured to comply with this condition
contained in the insurance policy will preclude him from seeking reimbursement of the payments made.

14. Tolentino vs. Filipinas Life Assurance Co., Inc., I.C. Case No. 162, July 19, 1976

Death caused by violation of law. The mere fact that the insured died while he was committing a felony or
violating a law would not warrant denial of liability. To avoid liability, the insurer must further establish that the
commission of the felony or the violation of law was the cause or had a causal connection with the accident
resulting in the death of the insured.

15. Lalican vs. Insular Life Insurance Co., Limited, 597 SCRA 159 [2009]

Pecuniary in nature. In general, a person is deemed to have an insurable interest in the subject matter
insured where he has a relation or connection with or concern in it that he will derive pecuniary or financial
benefit or advantage from its preservation and will suffer pecuniary loss or damage from its destruction,
termination, or injury by the happening of the event insured against.

16. The Insular Life Assur. Co. vs. Ebrado, 80 SCRA 181 [1977]

A common-law wife is disqualified from becoming the beneficiary of the insured in view of the prohibition in
Article 2012 in relation to Article 739 of the Civil Code and the absence unless otherwise indicated, refers to of
any specific provision in the Insurance Code on the matter.

In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is concerned.
Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee, because from the
premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will receive the proceeds or
profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article 739 (infra.) of the Civil Code should
equally operate in life insurance contracts.

17. Gercio vs. Sun Life Assurance of Canada

Where right to change is waived. If the right to change the beneficiary is expressly waived in the policy,
then the insured has no power to make such change without the consent of the beneficiary. (a) The
beneficiary acquires an absolute and vested interest to all benefits accruing to the policy from the date of its
issuance and delivery, including that of obtaining a policy loan to the extent stated in the schedules of values
attached to the policy.

18. Go vs. Redfem, 72 Phil. 71 [1941]

The beneficiary has thus a property right in the policy of which could not be deprived without his consent. (b)
Neither can a new beneficiary be added to the irrevocably designated beneficiary for this would in effect
reduce the latter's vested rights.