the worm had a spleen but the toy monkey does not.

The phenomenon where young

children use naive causal theories for performing judgments that transcend surface-structural
similarities has also been shown by Susan Gelman and her colleagues (Gelman, 1988; Gelman &
Markman, 1987).
Altogether, the above studies demonstrate that children have principled knowledge that
allows them to reason correctly and efficiently. Yet, despite their mastery of certain fundamental
mathematical ideas, children continue to have great difficulty with school mathematics. Thus,
the driving question in much of the current research on mathematical cognition is, Why should
strong and reliable intuitions of the kind that have been documented in young children fail to
reliably sustain school mathematics learning? (Resnick, 1986, p.161). One common answer to
this question is that the school mathematics overemphasizes rote manipulation of symbols. This
overly procedural focus may discourage children from using their intuitions