UP Board of Regents VS Court of Appeals and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE

G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999

Facts:
Private respondent Ms. Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine a citizen of India enrolled
doctoral program in UP CSSP Diliman QC. She is ready for oral defense with selected panel
members Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani
Medina, the last included as the deans representative.

Even though Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of her dissertation that was lifted
from different sources without proper acknowledgement, she was still allowed to continue to with her
oral defense. Four (4) out five (5) give her a passing mark with condition to incorporate the suggestion
made by the panel members. Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form. Dr. Teodoro also noted that
a revision should be submitted.
On March 24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved her graduation pending
the final revised copies of her dissertation. Private respondent submitted the supposedly final revised
copies although petitioners maintained that suggestions were not incorporated. She left a copy for Dr.
Teodoro and Dr. Medina and did not wait for their approval relying to the Dean Paz remarks during
previous meeting that a majority vote was sufficient for her to pass. The supposedly revised copies
were later disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina.
Private respondent was disappointed with the administration. She charge Dr. Diokno and
Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation and further warned Dean Paz
against encouraging perfidious act against her. Dean Paz attempts to exclude the private respondent
in the graduating list in a letter addressed to the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros
Ibe), pending for clarification of her charges against panel members and accusations relating to her
dissertation. Unfortunately the letter did not reach on time and the respondent was allowed to
graduate. Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she
substantiated the accusations. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private
respondent with plagiarism and recommended for the withdrawal of her doctorate degree.
Dean Paz formed an ad-hoc committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate and recommend
to Chancellor Dr. Roman to withdraw her doctorate degree. Private respondent was informed of the
charges in a letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90 instances or portions of thesis lifted from other
sources with no proper acknowledgement. After it was unanimously approved and endorsed from the
CSSP and Univ. Council the recommendation for withdrawal was endorsed to Board of Regents who
deferred its actions to study further for legal implications. Private respondent was provided with a copy
of findings and in return she also submitted her written explanation. Another meeting was scheduled
to discuss her answer.
Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends private respondent for withdrawal of
her degree after establishing the facts the there were massive lifting from published sources and the
private respondent also admits herself of being guilty of plagiarism.
On the basis of the report and recommendation of the University Council, the Board of
Regents send a letter to inform private respondent that it was resolved by majority to withdraw your
doctorates degree.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages to RTC QC. She alleged that petitioners had
unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due
process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500, 000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages and P1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings. RTC
dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and ordered to
restore her doctorates degree.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering
petitioners to restore doctoral degree.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondents doctoral degree cannot
be recalled without violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual property and to justice and
equity.

Held/Ruling:

The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed.

 1. Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private respondent was
denied of due process and that she graduated and no longer in the ambit of disciplinary powers of
UP.
In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the charges, the
private respondent was heard on her defense. In fact she was informed in writing about the charges
and was provided with a copy from the investigating committee. She was asked to submit her
explanation which she forwarded. Private respondent also discussed her case with the UP
Chancellor and Zafaralla Committee during their meetings. She was given the opportunity to be
heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her.
The freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the
Court of Appeals held because the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. The
investigation began before graduation. She was able to graduate because there were many
investigations conducted before the Board finally decided that she should not have been allowed to
graduate.

2. Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning by
Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a university will confer
degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject to due
process being followed, may cancel that degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed
in all institutions of higher learning."
It is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide
who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor
and distinction of being its graduates.

Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping
& Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in intervention Muslim
Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation
Inc.,

Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is
scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August
05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare
unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public
consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD
and to exclude the city to the BJE.

GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and
additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.

GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the
MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the
MOA-AD.

GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or
any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.
 The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government
and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on
August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when
then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued.
MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded.
Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in
2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal
took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview

This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this
MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO
Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of
compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their
Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First
Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity
and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion
to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, A which will be subject to
plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and B which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years
from the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have
jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have
"territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within
these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters;
but no provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in
those countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in
the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The
BJE shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the
specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and
delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and
equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its
resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to
cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is
associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall
be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before
the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the
details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:
1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial
review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the
right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of
judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on
issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the
SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does
not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave
abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their
authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes,
the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case
or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not
necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet
effective does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato,
Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention
Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it
is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin
Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would
be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory.
On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as
an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim
Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim
lawyers since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the
MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been
suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court
reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained
of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially
when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render
the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including
possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its
negotiating entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable
expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents'
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus
to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have
already complied thereat.

On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for
the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions
are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable safeguards
the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the
contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be
consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As
such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto.
Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he complied
with the Courts order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-
AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as
enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that
would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing
ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs;
but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the
respondentsince they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot be
all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them:

On matters of the Constitution.

 Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested that
in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In international
law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the
one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its
international status as state; free association is a middle ground between integration and
independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international
definition of association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of
an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects
because the principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the
Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition;
and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is
nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence. The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-
AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD
clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those
areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the
respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in
contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run
afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its
inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers
vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the
constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers
included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls
for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with the
Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The
Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ and is the countrys sole
representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate
with other states, the former provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also
be amendedthe provision of the law that promotes national unity and development. Because
clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but rather,
of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the
act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition
of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between the
Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which
includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain
is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of
reference of the MOA-AD.

On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the
land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that
people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development. There are the internal and external self-determinationinternal, meaning the self-
pursuit of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral
secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial
integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when
there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination.
International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the
right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated
within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under
international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have
the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their
own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide
for the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does
not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would
impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the
provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal
framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions
from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity
of the countrysuch was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart
from this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP
Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even constitutional
amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether the President
can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule
that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the
President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather
implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the
President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she
has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions
that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may
not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be
prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded,
act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the
course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that
require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
The Presidents power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not
changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is
not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when.
Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework which
changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent
with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual
guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be
adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck
down as unconstitutional.

On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding
on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a
document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to
guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their
solution.Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process
of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process