BINAY VS DOMINGO

FACTS: On September 27, 1988,Petitioner Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60.

The resolution provided for a burial assistance program where qualified beneficiaries (to be given P500.00)
are bereaved families whose gross monthly income does not exceed 2 thousand per month. It will be funded by the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury.

Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. The municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of
P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. When it was referred to the COA it disapproved Resolution 60
and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners’ reconsideration as Resolution 60
has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general
welfare of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Moreover, it is not
for a public purpose. It only seeks to benefit a few individuals.

The Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 243 which reaffirmed Res. No. 60. However, the program has
been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.

ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause

HELD: YES.

RATIONALE: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas
and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may
arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation;
and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose
of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes
conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to
the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under
the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by
law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."
And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such
as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the
local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. "Police power is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the
greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad,
and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people
in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all
the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the
peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is
broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by
promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort
of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose
is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards
state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social justice
(Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power
in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers
as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes
have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of
the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality
of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
 MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE VS V.M REALTY CORPORATION

FACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed a
Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was
filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project." Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of
1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the
latter did not accept.

The RTC authorized petition to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of
court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.

Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if
any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's motion, its Answer was treated as a
motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: WON the resolution is different from the ordinance

HELD: YES

RATIONALE: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and
"resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief
executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain."
Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the IRR of the Local Government Code,
which provides: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase,
the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
initiate expropriation proceedings."

The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which
may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise
the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and
restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA
7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. Thus,
the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU,
to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, he local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. CA to show that a resolution may suffice to
support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at
that time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would
enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160 explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.

ymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a
general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted
differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a
majority of all the Sanggunian members.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would
have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear
divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local
chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 34 In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the
law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
 Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or
private right of the people. 35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language - from "resolution" under
the BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 - demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful
interpretation."

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law
itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law
is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the
discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI
thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act
pursuant to an ordinance.
 TORIO VS FONTANILLA

FACTS: On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 whereby
"it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No.
182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-
committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas
Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan,
Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was
Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons
went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage
collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to
tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day.
The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11,
1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of
Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959.
Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly
organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its
governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
The defendant councilors in turn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying
out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are
likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care
and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance.
After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the defendants
exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the stage. From his findings he arrived at the conclusion that the
Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good father of
the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed
that was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on entertainment, consequently, the defendants were
not liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision
dated July 10, 1962. The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on October 31,
1968, the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador V. Esguerra, Nicasio
A. Yatco and Eulogio S. Serrano reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages:
P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs.

ISSUE:Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the
Municipal Law was a proprietary function of the municipality.

HELD: : YES.

RATIONALE: Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such are endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in
conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with.

The powers of a municipality are two fold in character public, governmental or political on the one hand, and
corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial
public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the
community and include those which are ministerial private and corporate.

This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for
the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.

If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a
rule, can be. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, 10 nor from its officers, so
long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.

With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto. 14

Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. ...

xxx xxx xxx

 The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence
or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who
is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated,
fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages
when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. Sec.
1610,1647, cited in Mendoza v. de Leon, supra. 514)

The court held that the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a
private or proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. — fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once
a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than
that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, foundations,
earthquakes, epidemics, or other public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case
it may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the council.

This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it
a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the
town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure
profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for
damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at- attributable to the negligence of the municipality's
officers, employees, or agents.

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. . .

The holding of the town fiesta was an exercise of a propriety function. It is an act for the special benefit of
the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. Hence,
the municipality is liable for damages. However, the councilors should be absolved from liability. The liability of
public officers for damages under article 27 of the Civil Code applies to nonfeasance and not to negligence or
misfeasance. The councilors are similar to the board of directors of a corporation, since the celebration of the town
fiesta is not governmental function. As such, they are not liable for damages for negligence of the agents and
employees of the municipality unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross negligence on their part.
 REPUBLIC VS GONZALES

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in Tañong Malabon, Metro
Manila. This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof, among them appellants
Policarpio Gonzales and Augusta Josue, started filling it. On 14 April 955, then President Ramon Magsaysay
issued Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of
the Public Domain." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the
purposes mentioned in the Proclamation. The Municipality of Malabon passed Resolution authorizing the filing of
ejectment cases against appellants. Separate complaints were then filed against them. Appellants disputed the
right of the Government to recover the lot as: (a) the already filed sales application with the Bureau of Lands,
(b) he had a municipal permit to construct buildings thereon, (c) the lot occupied was not needed to widen the
street and that the setting aside of the lots for parking space purposes does not redound to the public
benefit. The trial court ordered appellants to reconvey the property to the government.

ISSUE: WON Proclamation 144 is invalid

HELD: YES.

RATIONALE: Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passed by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal,
which had become particularly aware of the increasing vehicular traffic and congestion along F. Sevilla
Boulevard. The Municipal Council had proposed to widen F. Sevilla Boulevard and at the same time, to
reserve an area for parking space to ease up traffic problems, in anticipation of the completion of the then
proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the west of F. Sevilla Boulevard. In this day and age, it is hardly
open to debate that the public has much to gain from the proposed widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and
from establishment of a municipal parking area. Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other
main thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course, caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area to
the great discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the streets.

Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or
highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose.

Appellants, however, allege that the benefits, if any, that may be derived from the proposed street-
widening and hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for public use or
benefit. The conception urged by appellants is both flawed and obsolete since the number of users is not the
yardstick in determining whether property is properly reserved for public use or public benefit. In the first place,
Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also of "quasi-public uses or purposes." To
constitute public use, the public in general should have equal or common rights to use the land or facility
involved on the same terms, however limited in number the people who can actually avail themselves of it at a
given time. There is nothing in Proclamation No. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street
or a parking area should they in fact happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof
remains open for the public in general.

Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not determine either the validity or invalidity of
Proclamation No. 144. What is important are the long-term benefits which the proposed street widening and
parking areas make available to the public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderly transportation on land.
This is the kind of public benefit envisioned by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal and which was
sought to be promoted by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 144. We believe and so hold that
Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid.

Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of Lots No. 1 and 2 shall be subject
to existing private rights, if any there be. Prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 144, appellants had
applied for miscellaneous sales applications over the lots respectively occupied by them. Insofar as appellant
Policarpio Gonzales is concerned, it is not disputed that he had acknowledged the ownership of the National
Government of the land applied for by him. The miscellaneous sales application, however, of appellant Policarpio
Gonzales had not been approved by the Bureau of Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 was issued; the
land therefore retained its character as land of the public domain. Upon the other hand, the miscellaneous
sales application of appellant Augusto Josue had already been rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands
dated 8 January 1954.

Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial buildings on Lot 2. The evidence of
record discloses that appellants had secured the appropriate municipal permits or licenses therefor, that is,
for the construction of said buildings as well as the carrying on of business therein. However, since the lease,
sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of lands of the public domain was directly
under the executive control of the Director of Lands, and not of local government officials, the Malabon
Municipal Mayor must be held to have exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the public
domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial and residential use buildings, or any other kind of
building for that matter.
 CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO, JR.

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is
entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES

PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that
these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for
entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community."

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional. In their Answer petitioners City
of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment
in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of
the Local Government Code.

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect
the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article
III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila.

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had
the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.21

Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter
simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial
zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was
prospective in operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be
denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area
and other places in the City of Manila.24

Respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the
enforcement of the Ordinance. After trial, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the
petitioners from implementing the Ordinance.
ISSUE: WON the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of
police power
HELD: YES.

RATIONALE: The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.37

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to
the laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional
uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not
violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue
of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.39

This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by
the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is
still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.40

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City
Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with
police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 41 This
delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the
sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the
validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The Ordinance infringes

the Due Process Clause

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the
rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming
part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.58 Due process
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.59

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and
to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the
means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of
the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of
legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and
motels.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within
the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were
unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality.

Means employed are

constitutionally infirm

The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area.
In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months
from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any
place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the
Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to
liberty and property.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the
beneficial use of its property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated
businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business
operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance
which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals.

The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law
may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.103 The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging
and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is
invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is
arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the
Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-
Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located
outside the area.

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with
prevailing laws.

The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to
regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv.

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section
458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.
 Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and
prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they were modified by the Code vesting
upon City Councils prohibitory powers.

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna
baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section
458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to
"prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community" are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers
of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are
separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are
independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or
paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a
conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition.112

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to
regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other
similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration
therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly
those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or
entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are
necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature
thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms
used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a general rule in
statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an
express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of
logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes
as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict
construction.114

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general
welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without
merit.

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of
the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such
character deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of itsthe
judiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to
stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the
enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without
infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guiseof due process and equal protection
of laws of police power.