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The resolution provided for a burial assistance program where qualified beneficiaries (to be given P500.00) are bereaved families whose gross monthly income does not exceed 2 thousand per month. It will be funded by the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. The municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. When it was referred to the COA it disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners’ reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Moreover, it is not for a public purpose. It only seeks to benefit a few individuals. The Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 243 which reaffirmed Res. No. 60. However, the program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause HELD: YES. RATIONALE: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. "Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life. Resolution No. should have more in law. and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.experience. however must not be taken as a precedent." This decision. .
or unjust. purpose.a third reading is necessary for an ordinance. absurd. ISSUE: WON the resolution is different from the ordinance HELD: YES RATIONALE: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. . RA 7160 explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution. 3. unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. but said offer was not accepted. also lays down the parameters for its exercise. "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. the Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V. An ordinance is a law. Allegedly. or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 577. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain. since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible. the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government.MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE VS V. which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs. other public entities and public utilities. as required under Section 9. The RTC authorized petition to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Thus." In this case.M REALTY CORPORATION FACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. the law is applied according to its express terms. over two parcels of land. ymous. but a resolution is temporary in nature. Article III of the Constitution. was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. Thus. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated. there is no reason to depart from this rule. 4. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. however. it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code. Series of 1991. Realty Corporation. 93-95. which the latter did not accept. to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. is not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337. the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings. In contrast. previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent. if any. the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. and (b) the cause of action. CA to show that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. There is payment of just compensation. Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. 2." Petitioner. 30 the previous Local Government Code." 34 In the instant case. and other pertinent laws. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use." Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36. pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. he local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. The trial court dismissed the complaint. which provides: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use. Indeed. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character. On private respondent's motion. Additionally. but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. or welfare through purchase. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous. This case.M. its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160. Rule VI of the IRR of the Local Government Code. In the case at bar. in behalf of the LGU. but not for a resolution. Section 19 of RA 7160. purpose or welfare." The Court disagrees. there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. But Congress did not. the two are enacted differently . Series of 1993.
in exercising the power of eminent domain.Moreover. than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. appropriates the land of an individual without his consent. the law itself. This is clearly misplaced. the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. the manifest change in the legislative language . which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain." Petitioner relies on Article 36.from "resolution" under the BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 . since Article 32. . what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules. When the legislature interferes with that right and. because Section 19 of RA 7160.demands a strict construction. and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously. for greater public purposes. Besides. 35 Accordingly. Rule VI thereof. Rule VI of the Implementing Rules. the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance. also requires that.
TORIO VS FONTANILLA FACTS: On October 21. In a decision Promulgated on October 31. Gregorio T. The powers of a municipality are two fold in character public. the Municipal Council of Malasiqui." Resolution No. and the costs. the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto. and corporate. governmental or political on the one hand. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached. and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial private and corporate. . 159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21. 1959. passed Resolution No. The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10. so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. 1962. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. the Presiding Judge. RATIONALE: Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law. as a rule. After trial.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200. private. The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan. 10 nor from its officers.. Rizal. 1958. The defendant councilors in turn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit. judicial public. furthermore. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery. 1968. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter. 1959 to recover damages. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.00 its attorney's fees. with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. Serrano reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. 14 Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort.. xxx xxx xxx .000. the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. ISSUE:Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 22. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11. consequently. they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. can be. the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Esguerra. and many persons went up the stage. and contract and be contracted with. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage. Nicasio A. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the defendants exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the stage. the defendants were not liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches. they may inter alia sue and be sued. the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador V. 2282 of the Municipal Law was a proprietary function of the municipality. From his findings he arrived at the conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on entertainment. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative. HELD: : YES. and in their proper corporate name. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. and 23. With respect to proprietary functions. or proprietary on the other. Yatco and Eulogio S. Pangasinan. Hon.
2176. the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may be held at a later date in the same year. . that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment. cited in Mendoza v. by resolution of the council. by which another. 1610. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The mere fact that the celebration. earthquakes.attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers. The councilors are similar to the board of directors of a corporation. the municipality is liable for damages. Art. . The holding of the town fiesta was an exercise of a propriety function. as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations. The liability of public officers for damages under article 27 of the Civil Code applies to nonfeasance and not to negligence or misfeasance. Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Art. since the celebration of the town fiesta is not governmental function. de Leon. is obliged to pay for the damage done. petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at. supra.. foundations. Hence. 5th ed. — fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior. However.. who is free from contributory fault. For instance. the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools. and are liable. jails. they are not liable for damages for negligence of the agents and employees of the municipality unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross negligence on their part. . fall within the operation of this rule of law. employees. the councilors should be absolved from liability. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. epidemics. except when. . for weighty reasons. there being fault or negligence. such as typhoons. Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated. This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. . It is an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. or other public ties. and the like which are for public service. 2180.1647. . Celebration of fiesta. As such. or agents. Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 2282.The rule of law is a general one. accordingly. is injured. 514) The court held that the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. Sec. to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist.
The conception urged by appellants is both flawed and obsolete since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether property is properly reserved for public use or public benefit. We believe and so hold that Proclamation No. the public in general should have equal or common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same terms. since the lease. ISSUE: WON Proclamation 144 is invalid HELD: YES. Proclamation No. for the construction of said buildings as well as the carrying on of business therein. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. What is important are the long-term benefits which the proposed street widening and parking areas make available to the public in the form of enhanced. sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of lands of the public domain was directly under the executive control of the Director of Lands. the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open for the public in general. the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not determine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No. 144. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of Lots No. Sevilla Boulevard. On 14 April 955. In the first place. the miscellaneous sales application of appellant Augusto Josue had already been rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands dated 8 January 1954. The evidence of record discloses that appellants had secured the appropriate municipal permits or licenses therefor. This is the kind of public benefit envisioned by the Municipal Council of Malabon. Indiscriminate parking along F. Appellants. or any other kind of building for that matter. this. however. however limited in number the people who can actually avail themselves of it at a given time. Sevilla Boulevard and from establishment of a municipal parking area. it is hardly open to debate that the public has much to gain from the proposed widening of F. among them appellants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusta Josue. This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation. the land therefore retained its character as land of the public domain. The Municipal Council had proposed to widen F. Separate complaints were then filed against them." To constitute public use. The miscellaneous sales application. Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial buildings on Lot 2. . if any. that may be derived from the proposed streetwidening and hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for public use or benefit. Metro Manila. caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. if any there be. Prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. RATIONALE: Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passed by the Municipal Council of Malabon. (b) he had a municipal permit to construct buildings thereon. of appellant Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by the Bureau of Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144. Insofar as appellant Policarpio Gonzales is concerned. However. to reserve an area for parking space to ease up traffic problems. however. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existing private rights. in anticipation of the completion of the then proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the west of F. The trial court ordered appellants to reconvey the property to the government.REPUBLIC VS GONZALES FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in Tañong Malabon. allege that the benefits. Upon the other hand. and not of local government officials. 144 was lawful and valid. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact happen to be driving cars. of course. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was prevalent. There is nothing in Proclamation No. Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recover the lot as: (a) the already filed sales application with the Bureau of Lands. that is. 144 was issued. Rizal and which was sought to be promoted by the President in issuing Proclamation No. the Malabon Municipal Mayor must be held to have exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the public domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial and residential use buildings. it is not disputed that he had acknowledged the ownership of the National Government of the land applied for by him. started filling it. 144. then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. (c) the lot occupied was not needed to widen the street and that the setting aside of the lots for parking space purposes does not redound to the public benefit. appellants had applied for miscellaneous sales applications over the lots respectively occupied by them. Sevilla Boulevard. entitled "Reserving for Street Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain. 144. safe and orderly transportation on land. parking in designated areas along public streets or highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. Besides. In this day and age. Sevilla Boulevard and at the same time. The Municipality of Malabon passed Resolution authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against appellants. Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also of "quasi-public uses or purposes. which had become particularly aware of the increasing vehicular traffic and congestion along F. Rizal.
19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO. hostels and lodging houses.8 FACTS: Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993. Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. Hon. insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments." "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. the petitioners likewise claimed. Further. the petitioners noted." and neither did they "disturb the community. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. In their Answer petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code.D. be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels. the Ordinance had the presumption of validity.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation. Laguio. Alfredo S.10 In the RTC Petition. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila. private respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. hence.24 Respondent Judge Perfecto A. ENTERTAINMENT. Lim (Lim). Hon. issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. JR. MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants. the said Ordinance is entitled– AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT. PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF.21 Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P. enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance." MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional. and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). Atienza. Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III. motels.S. motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment. 409. SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA. MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments." nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment. . After trial. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance. herein petitioners City of Manila. Joselito L.22 The Ordinance. Jr.
the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. may be adversely affected only to the extent . unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power HELD: YES. limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid. arbitrarily or despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution In the case at bar. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. or otherwise.42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.ISSUE: WON the subject ordinance is ultra vires. an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. and (6) must not be unreasonable.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.39 This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. known as the general welfare clause. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. in this case. as agencies of the State. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. unfair. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. Local government units. it bears emphasis.40 The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power. are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 41 This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code. ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically. Individual rights.37 RATIONALE: Anent the first criterion.
karaoke bars. motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. bars. the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.59 Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance. Modality employed is unlawful taking In addition. infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond . In Section 3 thereof. karaoke bars. licensed and tax-paying nightclubs. night clubs.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life. liberty and property. cocktail lounges. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers." It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. dance halls. it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance. day clubs. not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally. beerhouses. but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest. hotels and motels. as distinguished from those of a particular class. discotheques. girlie houses. accordingly. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate. the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. cabarets. the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. require an interference with private rights. the governmental interference itself. Means employed are constitutionally infirm The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors. the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently. massage parlors. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded." Further. The object of the Ordinance was.that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. super clubs. owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. and not prohibit. pension houses. all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. . it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. there are no substantial distinctions between motels. hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the ErmitaMalate area but not outside of this area. not be arbitrary.104 In the Court's view.103 The classification must. Failing the test of constitutionality. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. inns. it is ultra vires The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate. lodging houses or other similar establishments. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. and maintenance of motels. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. By definition. operation. the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated. While its power to regulate the establishment. To be valid. both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. hotels. If the classification is reasonable. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses. hotels. and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. lodging houses or other similar establishments. as an indispensable requisite. operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation.
3. or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. pension houses. null and void. Its powers to regulate. therefore. and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. pension houses.113 Moreover. and other similar establishments. it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person. it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. hotels. and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). public dance halls. respectively of the same Section.Clearly. with respect to cafes. the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools. Conclusion All considered. suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. public dancing schools. lodging houses. it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation. inns. sauna baths. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend. or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. inns. suppress or prohibit. motels. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof. thing. it is pertinent to emphasize.). The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment. suppression and prohibition.112 The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses. Similarly. sauna baths. operation and maintenance of such establishments.114 The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code and of Art. the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third clauses. are separated by semi-colons (. beerhouses. These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers. motels. and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)). impose penalties or punishments. restaurants. Sec. massage parlors.111 These powers. And not to be forgotten. public dance halls. should not be confused. . lodging houses. This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. The Ordinance contravenes statutes. hotels. commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. massage parlors. said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. It is constitutionally infirm.
the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins.Concededly. in this case. the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. the City Council. . Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. Local legislative bodies. But inspite of itsthe judiciary virtuous aims. cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guiseof due process and equal protection of laws of police power.
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