[G.R. No. 140244.

August 29, 2000]

JOEL R. UMANDAP, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE L. SABIO, JR., and DOMINGO F. ESTOMO,
respondents.

FACTS: private respondent Domingo Estomo filed against petitioner Joel Umandap an action for damages based on
breach of contract. Process Server Marmolejo effected substituted service of the summons and copy of the Complaint
upon petitioner, by leaving a copy at petitioner's home and office address to a certain Joseph David who refused to
receive and acknowledge the same.

Petitioner failed to file his Answer and, on motion of private respondent, was declared in default. Private respondent
was allowed to adduce his evidence ex parte. The trial court rendered a judgment against petitioner,

A Writ of Execution was issued and petitioner's deposit and receivables were garnished. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Set Aside Judgment by Default and Quash Writ of Execution which respondent Court denied in an Order. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
resolutions of the trial court.

Petitioner argued before the Court of Appeals that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person because
there has been no valid service of summons; that the substituted service of summons was improper and invalid since
the process server's return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service.

CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the substituted service of summons made on petitioner through Joseph David on was valid
and regular.

HELD: YES

RATIO: There can be no dispute that service of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order that a court may
acquire jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without such service in the absence of a valid waiver is null and
void.

In fine, the two modes for effecting substituted service of summons are: (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion; and (b) by leaving copies at defendant's office
or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Among these two modes of substituted
service, the sheriff or the process server may choose that which will more likely insure the effectiveness of the
service.

Central to the instant controversy is the process server's return which petitioner relies upon to show the invalidity of
the substituted service of summons.

In the instant case, no proof of irregularity in the process server's return was presented by petitioner. On the contrary,
a perusal of the process server's return in the instant case shows compliance with the requirements of substituted
service in accordance with the requirements set forth
G.R. No. 120334. January 20, 1998

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROLANDO I. TORRES Respondents.

G.R. No. 120337. January 20, 1998

ROLANDO I. TORRES, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Respondents.

FACTS: The plaintiff, [Torres], allegedly on a special mission to purchase firearms for the Philippine Senate,
purchased a round trip ticket from defendant [Northwest] for his travel to Chicago and back to Manila. Via defendants
flight, plaintiff left for United States.

Upon arrival in Manila plaintiff was not able to claim one of his baggages. Plaintiff was informed by defendants
representative that his baggage containing firearms was recalled back to Chicago by defendant for US Customs
verification. A Personal Property Missing Damage Report was issued by defendant to plaintiff.

On account of the continuous refusal of defendant to settle amicably, plaintiff then prayed before the trial court that
defendant be ordered to pay actual damages, moral damages, temperate damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees

After plaintiff had presented its evidence, defendant filed a "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Demurrer to the Evidence
with Motion for Summary Judgment)"

Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint

Instead of just ruling on NORTHWESTs Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Demurrer to Evidence) with Motion for
Summary Judgment, which it considered submitted for resolution in the order of 14 June 1989, 4 the trial court
rendered on 13 September 1989 a full-blown decision.

Both TORRES and NORTHWEST appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts judgment.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in determining by way of summary judgment the amount of damages;

HELD: YES

RATIO: NORTHWESTs Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Demurrer to Evidence) with Motion for Summary Judgment
involved two distinct and separate processes, viz: (1) demurrer to evidence, which was then governed by Rule 35,
now by Rule 33; and (2) motion for summary judgment, which was then governed by Rule 34, now Rule 35, of the
Rules of Court. The subject of the demurrer were the claims for moral, exemplary, and temperate damages and
attorneys fees; while the target of the motion for summary judgment was the claim for actual damages.

Indeed, as to the demurrer to evidence, the trial court should have been solely guided by the procedure laid down in
the rule on demurrer to evidence. It had no choice other than to grant or to deny the demurrer. It could not, without
committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, deny the motion and then forthwith grant
TORRES claims on a finding that TORRES has established a preponderance of evidence in support of such claims.
In the instant case, the trial court did just that insofar as moral damages, attorneys fees, and expenses of litigation
were concerned. What it should have done was to merely deny the demurrer and set a date for the reception of
NORTHWESTs evidence in chief.

As to the motion for summary judgment, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were in error . The rule is now
Rule 35 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure with the amendments allowing the parties to submit not only affidavits
but also depositions or admissions in support of their respective contentions.11 Motions for summary judgment may be
filed by the claimant or by the defending party.

Summary judgment is allowed if, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
G.R. No. 148246 February 16, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JUAN C. TUVERA, VICTOR P. TUVERA and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.

FACTS: Twin Peaks Development Corporation (Twin Peaks) was organized as a corporation with a principal purpose of engaging
in the real estate business. There were five incorporating stockholders, including respondent Victor Tuvera.
Timber License Agreement was awarded in favor of Twin Peaks. As a result, Twin Peaks was able to engage in logging
operations.
The PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration on all assets, properties, records, documents, and shares of stock of Twin
Peaks on the ground that all the assets of the corporation are ill-gotten wealth for having been acquired directly or indirectly
through fraudulent and illegal means.
PCGG, in behalf of the Republic, filed the Complaint now subject of this Petition.6 Impleaded as defendants in the
Complaint were Juan and Victor Tuvera.
In their Answer, respondents Victor Tuvera and Twin Peaks claimed that Twin Peaks was awarded TLA only after its
articles of incorporation had been amended enabling it to engage in logging operations and that the PCGG has no statutory
authority to institute the action. By way of counterclaim, respondents asked that the Republic be ordered to pay Victor Tuvera
moral damages and to pay both Victor Tuvera and Twin Peaks exemplary damages.
As an affirmative and special defense, respondents Victor Tuvera and Twin Peaks alleged that after Twin Peaks was
granted TLA, Felipe Ysmael, Jr. and Co., Inc. had filed a motion for the cancellation of the same with the DENR
Secretary. When respondents submitted their Answer, the denial by the DENR of the Ysmael motion was under review before the
Court.
Juan Tuvera, who was abroad when the case was filed later submitted his own Answer. He also denied the allegations of
the Republic. He filed a compulsory counterclaim on the ground that the instant action had besmirched his reputation and caused
serious anxiety and mental anguish thus entitling him to moral and exemplary damages and litigation expenses.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion to Nullify Writ of Sequestration and/or the Mission Order.The Sandiganbayan
issued a Temporary Restraining Order against the PCGG. Subsequently, on motion of respondents, the Sandiganbayan granted a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction covering the Mission Order. The Sandiganbayan deferred its resolution on the Motion to Lift the Writ
of Sequestration.
Thus, upon motion by respondents, the Sandiganbayan granted them a separate pre-trial/trial from President Marcos.
Respondents submitted their documentary evidence in the Pre-Trial Conference while the Republic reserved to present the same
during trial. After the pre-trial conference, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order, which presented the issues for litigation.
The Pre-Trial Order also indicated that the Republic admitted the exhibits by respondents, subject to the presentation of
certified true copies. The Republic presented three (3) witnesses during the trial.
The Republic filed a Manifestation, contending that the demurrer is not based on the insufficiency of its evidence but on
the strength of the evidence of respondents as shown by their own exhibits.
Respondents opposed the Manifestation, maintaining that since the Republic admitted the exhibits of respondents during
the pre-trial, it is bound by its own admission. In its Resolution, the Sandiganbayan sustained the demurrer to evidence and
referred to the decision of this Court in Ysmael in holding that res judicata applies.
The Sandiganbayan held that the validity of TLA was already fully adjudicated in a Resolution/Order issued by the Office
of the President which had become final and executory with the failure of the aggrieved party to seek a review thereof.

ISSUES: 1. WON of res judicata can be validly applied in the case.

2. WON a demurrer to evidence may be granted based on the evidence presented by the opposing parties.

HELD: 1. NO
2. NO

RATIO:The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment
or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action.When there is only identity of issues with no identity of causes of action, there exists res
judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
The present case, on the other hand, was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General. No amount of imagination could let us believe that there was an identity of parties between this case and the one formerly
filed by Felipe Ysmael Jr. & Co., Inc.
The substantial identity of parties in the application of res judicata in instances where there is privity between the two parties, as
between their successors in interest by title or where an additional party was simply included in the subsequent case or where one
of the parties to a previous case was not impleaded in the succeeding case.
The Court finds no basis to declare the Republic as having substantial interest as that of Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. In the first
place, the Republic’s cause of action lies in the alleged abuse of power on respondents’ part in violation of R.A. No. 3019 63 and
breach of public trust, which in turn warrants its claim for restitution and damages.

2. The general rule is that upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant loses the right to present his
evidence and the appellate court shall then proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence.
The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff’s evidence) on the ground
that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the
dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the
case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant’s evidence so that all the facts
and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in
case of appeal.