Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Midland, Texas (June 9, 2022): We trust those who enforce the law to follow it
themselves. During the course of our work in Midland, we have discovered facts
indicating Laura Nodolf is not worthy to continue as District Attorney because she is not
following the law. She has violated fundamental constitutional rights, basic legal
principles, and multiple ethical mandates every prosecutor knows. She has done this in at
least case that we can prove, namely by:
● Searching David Wilson's home without a warrant;
● Lying to a grand jury to secure David Wilson's indictment;
● Abusing the grand jury process in her quest to “win.”
Her actions have directly affected those in the court system and indirectly affected all
Midlanders by potentially subjecting Midland County to untold civil liability.
Accordingly, and with a heavy heart, we have filed a petition for the immediate suspension
and the ultimate removal of Laura Nodolf as Midland County District Attorney. It is
based on our discovery of independent facts demonstrating incompetency and official
misconduct.
As attorneys, the gravity of filing this petition weighs heavily on us. Given what we have
discovered, however, we feel we have no other choice. Midland County residents have
the right to know what is going on in their name and at their expense at the District
Attorney’s Office. They deserve better, but that process can only begin when people bring
the dark to the light. It is time to restore honesty, accountability, and integrity at the
District Attorney’s Office.
“For evil to flourish, it only requires good men do nothing.” - Simon Wiesenthal
“This is about being a responsible citizen. Knowing what I know, and after being
subjected to these abuses of power, I feel it would be irresponsible if I did not take action.
It’s time our District Attorney is held accountable.”
-David Wilson
Midland County - 385th District Court Filed 6/9/2022 3:33 PM
Alex Archuleta
District Clerk
CV58633 Midland County, Texas
Cause No. /s/ April Gomez
Petitioner, David Wilson, a resident of Midland County, Texas, having lived here for more
than the last six months, and not currently under indictment, moves the Court to remove Laura
INTRODUCTION
In January 2017, Defendant took the Oath of Office for the Office of the District Attorney
and in doing so swore to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and laws of the United
States and of this State.” In becoming a licensed attorney in the State of Texas, she swore to also
“honestly demean [herself] in the practice of law,” and to “conduct [herself] with integrity and
civility in dealing and communicating with the court.” Instead of abiding by her sworn oath,
Defendant has violated the federal and state constitutional laws, the Rules of Professional Conduct,
and likely state penal laws, by personally participating in at least one illegal search, a police
interrogation, lying to the grand jury on multiple occasions, and abusing the grand jury process. As
such, this Court should immediately (i) issue citation allowing this matter to proceed and (ii)
suspend Defendant and appoint another person to perform the duties of Defendant’s office. 1
1
See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 87.016, 87.017.
1. Petitioner intends to conduct discovery under Level 2 of Rule 190.3 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure.
2. Petitioner David Wilson is a resident of Midland County, Texas, and not currently under
County for at least six months prior to the filing of this Petition.
3. Respondent Laura Nodolf is the elected District Attorney of Midland County, Texas, and
4. Jurisdiction and Venue are mandatory and proper in Midland County, Texas, because
District Attorney Laura Nodolf both resides in Midland County and Midland is “the
5. This Court also has jurisdiction because the claims and causes of action asserted in this
Petition are within the jurisdictional limits of this Court and arise under the statutory and
common law of the State of Texas, as well as the Constitution of the State of Texas.
6. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 47, Petitioner seeks non-monetary relief in the
form of relief that is properly allowed pursuant to Chapter 87 of the Local Government
Code.
2
See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.015(a).
7. Because the issues raised in this suit were parallel to Petitioner’s criminal proceedings, he
was barred by Supreme Court precedent from bringing any type of tort suit until his case
resolved in his favor. Therefore, limitations did not begin until Petitioner’s criminal trial
RELEVANT LAW
B. Incompetency
3
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2371, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994):
The common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy to claims of the
type considered here because, unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment, it
permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process. “If there is a false arrest claim,
damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment, but not
more.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 888 (5th ed.
1984). . . .
One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the
prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused. Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 874;Carpenter v.
Nutter,127 Cal. 61, 59 P. 301 (1899). This requirement “avoids parallel litigation over the issues of
probable cause and guilt . . . and it precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort
action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong
judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical
transaction.” 8 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. Gans, American Law of Torts § 28:5, p. 24 (1991).
Furthermore, “to permit a convicted criminal defendant to proceed with a malicious prosecution claim
would permit a collateral attack on the conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.” Ibid.
10. Unlike official misconduct, “[n]o violation of a statutory provision is necessary to support
a finding of incompetency.” 5
11. An incompetency inquiry asks “only whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding
that appellant was grossly ignorant of his official duties or grossly careless in the discharge
of those duties.” 6
C. Official Misconduct
12. “Official misconduct” means “intentional, unlawful behavior relating to official duties by
an officer entrusted with the administration of justice or the execution of the law. The term
13. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure also defines “official misconduct” as “an offense
14. An elected officer can be removed for official misconduct only if he or she violates a specific
statutory duty that amounts to unlawful conduct, 9 or, stated differently, conduct without
4
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 87.011(2)(A)-(C).
5
Stern v. State ex rel. Ansel, 869 S.W.2d 614, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
6
De Anda v. State, 131 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
7
TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.011(3).
8
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 3.04(1).
9
Stern, 869 S.W.2da at 619 (citing State ex rel. Edwards v. Reyna, 333 S.W.2d 832 (1960)).
10
Meyer v. Tunks, 360 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex. 1962).
15. Petitioner had a home security system that malfunctioned in the early morning hours of
March 5, 2019. The malfunction indicated someone had tripped an alarm at Petitioner’s
home even though no one had done so. The home was actually secure. There was no
beeping, alarm, or any kind of notice given to Petitioner that the alarm was malfunctioning,
and the alarm company did not call Petitioner to check on him. Instead, and unknown to
home.
16. Neither the alarm monitoring company nor the police ever contacted—or even attempted
to contact—Petitioner by phone.
17. When officers arrived at the home, they opened the front door, briefly looked around, and
closed it. When they opened the front door a second time, Petitioner—protecting his three
young daughters, wife, and himself—fired one shot in the direction of the front door,
18. At no point before the shot was fired did anyone attempt to let Petitioner know that police
19. Petitioner did not know that the person at his front door was an officer until he was taken
20. Immediately afterwards, MPD sent almost every available officer to respond to the scene
at Petitioner’s home.
22. Petitioner was arrested and transported to the Midland Police Department, where he gave
23. At some point that evening, law enforcement contacted the defendant, District Attorney
Laura Nodolf.
24. After being contacted by law enforcement, Nodolf went to Petitioner’s home with multiple
25. Even though the home had already been cleared and secured by MPD’s SWAT Team and
even though Petitioner was already in custody, Nodolf walked inside Petitioner’s home and
perused around it. This was after the house had been swept and secured but before she or
26. Texas Ranger Cody Allen confirmed this during Petitioner’s criminal jury trial:
Q. We saw earlier that the police went in in full tactical gear before you arrived
at the house; right?
A. I would -- yes, sir. From the video I've watched, yes, sir.
Q. And they cleared the scene; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And so when you and Ms. Nodolf got there, you went back into the house,
didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you walked around.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you looked around.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you searched it.
A. No, sir.
Q. Well, you knew the house was cleared. Midland PD had done that; right?
27. Petitioner’s home surveillance system also captured Nodolf alongside six police officers
searching the inside of Petitioner’s home several hours before seeking and obtaining a
search warrant.
11
2 RR Excerpt of Cody Allen Testimony 117-18 (attached in Exhibit 1). Because Petitioner’s underlying criminal trial
resulted in an acquittal, a complete Reporter’s Record has never been prepared. However, Petitioner requested the formal
transcription of certain testimonies from his trial. Those excerpt testimony volumes are cited in this Petition.
Here Nodolf, standing in Petitioner’s dining room, appears to be having a discussion with Texas
Ranger Cody Allen (to her right, wearing the hat) and other police officers:
re-enter the home. Indeed, after they took the evidence they needed to establish probable
cause to arrest Petitioner, they in fact got a warrant to go back to Petitioner’s home and
search it (again).
29. After she was done at Petitioner’s home (and still before seeking or obtaining any arrest or
search warrant), Nodolf went to the police station where Petitioner was waiting. At the
Q. And what you were doing during that time was stepping out to discuss with Ms.
Nodolf the questions you should ask; right?
[RANGER CODY ALLEN]: Yes, sir. And Ranger Breeding once he arrived there at
the police department. 12
***
Q. And so when you testified previously that you were stepping out to clarify
things with Laura and figure out what questions to ask, that's really what you
were doing; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. No judge had signed a warrant for David Wilson's arrest at that point; right?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. No independent person had assessed whether probable cause existed, had
they?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. So, in other words, the prosecutor is getting involved even before a case has
been filed; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Before an arrest has been made.
A. Correct, sir. 13
12
3 RR Excerpt of Cody Allen Testimony 19 (attached in Exhibit 2).
13
3 RR Excerpt of Cody Allen Testimony 20 (attached in Exhibit 2).
30. Over the next two months, Texas Rangers, with help from District Attorney Nodolf,
31. During this investigation, Ranger Allen and District Attorney Nodolf herself spoke with
32. Neither the Rangers nor Nodolf could find a cause for the alarm malfunction.
33. Neither the Rangers nor Nodolf found a contract between Petitioner and the alarm
company.
34. There was never any executed contract between Petitioner and the alarm installation and
monitoring company. Petitioner never clicked, signed, or even saw such a “contract.”
35. Nevertheless, in May 2019, when presenting Petitioner’s case to the Grand Jury, Nodolf
claimed Petitioner was entirely to blame for creating the deadly situation leading to Officer
Heidelberg’s death. Nodolf contended Petitioner had, in a written contract, instructed the
alarm company to not call him before dispatching police and that he therefore had no right
36. To be sure she got her point across, Nodolf held up a document and suggested to the grand
MS. LAURA NODLOF: . . . one operator says, “We were unable to make
contact with the homeowner.” The supervisor gets on
and says, “No, we were told to dispatch the police
first.”
***
MS. LAURA NODOLF: Yeah, he actually has to go -- and I can pass [this
around] -- you have to actually check on the contract,
GRAND JUROR: So was that change made after these other kind of false alarm
calls, or was that the initial contract? Has that always been the
same?
37. No such contract existed. All of these statements, which were instrumental in obtaining
38. During the same Grand Jury presentation, District Attorney Nodolf again made false
statements about another material matter. As Ranger Allen was testifying about the layout
of Petitioner’s house, Nodolf interrupted him to point out acoustic panels on the ceiling in
39. Later on, one of the grand jurors circled back around to the acoustic panels that Nodolf had
GRAND JUROR: . . . as part of the investigation, did anyone stand where David
Wilson was in that video and try to have someone else try to
yell from the front door to see if it’s audible?
14
GJR 93-94 (attached in Exhibit 4). Defendant made a recording of her presentation to the first Grand Jury. The
Court later ordered that recording to be handed over to the defense, who had it transcribed. For unknown reasons,
Defendant did not record her presentation to the second Grand Jury.
15
GJR 68-69 (Exhibit 4).
MS. LAURA NODOLF: The - - the reason why we went back and forth on it was
because there is - - there is a time, point in time, and
the officers can testify to this, anybody who’s been
hunting before, where you kind of get in this point
where you're in the black, when you're focusing on one
thing.
And my argument was, 16 I think we should take
the audible measurements, to say it in different audible
points, having somebody say that, doesn’t mean that
he heard it, I can’t say that for sure.
GRAND JUROR: Would those acoustical things have created some sort of
anomaly where he was in a dead spot versus --
MS. LAURA NODLOF: No, actually, those acoustic panels are meant to
amplify the sound.
MS. LAURA NODLOF: They're from [one of the officer’s] body camera, the
sound of how clear it is, I think that’s in part due to
amplification, because [the officer] is behind [the
officer who was shot]. 17
40. Those acoustic panels are not designed to amplify sound. To the contrary, they are
designed to muffle it. As the original homeowner who built the house testified,
Q. And if someone were to have told a grand jury or anybody else that your house
was built to amplify sound, would that be true?
A. No, it would be the opposite. I was trying to go for as dead and quiet as I could
get it.
Q. And if you were ever in your master closet and someone were in the kitchen or
someplace in the house, was it easy or hard to hear that person?
A. Very difficult.
Q. And was that by design?
16
Note that here, Nodolf is clearly recounting how she was actively participating in the investigation alongside law
enforcement at Petitioner’s house.
17
GJR 74-75 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 4).
41. As set out below, each of the following actions qualify as incompetency, official
misconduct, or both.
42. Petitioner realleges all preceding paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as if fully
repeated here.
43. Police may not enter a home without probable cause and exigent circumstances. Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). A search conducted without both probable cause and
exigent circumstances is illegal. See id.; Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
44. There is an exception to a warrantless home entry if it is done solely for a protective sweep.
45. A “protective sweep” is a “quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and
conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.
325, 327 (1990); Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). This search
must be “narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person
might be hiding.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 327. For a protective sweep to be justified, the searching
18
RR Excerpt of Mitch Clark Testimony 13 (attached in Exhibit 3). At a status hearing several months after the Grand
Jury proceedings, counsel for Petitioner asked Ranger Allen where law enforcement had gotten the idea that the acoustic
panels amplified sound. Ranger Allen indicated they based those representations on “[j]ust from hearing the house was
built by a person who enjoyed music and was in the music business and then had the house built for sound, that was the
only information that I had heard throughout the community about this house.” Status Hearing Transcript 24.
to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Id. at 337.
46. The Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the protective-sweep exception to the warrant
requirement in Reasor. 12 S.W.3d at 816–17. The court held, “When conducting an in-
home arrest, a police officer may sweep the house only if he possesses an objectively
reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that a person in that area poses a
danger to that police officer or to other people in the area.” Id. at 817. The protective sweep
must stay “within the appropriate scope” and “may last long enough to ‘dispel the
reasonable suspicion of danger.’” Id. “[E]very protective sweep must be justified under
the circumstances particular to that case.” Cooksey v. State, 350 S.W.3d 177, 187 (Tex.
47. When Defendant entered Petitioner’s home, there was no probable cause to do so because
the episode was over, and Petitioner was already in police custody and had been taken away
from the scene. See Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335–36 (holding a protective sweep may last “no
longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger” and “no longer than
it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” (emphasis added)). 19
48. When Defendant entered Petitioner’s home, there were no exigent circumstances to do so
because, again, the episode was over, and Petitioner was in police custody.
19
See also Johnson v. State, 161 S.W.3d 176, 182 n. 3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005), aff'd, 226 S.W.3d 439 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Flippo v. W. Va., 528 U.S. 11 (1999), Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1978))
(“Clearly, there is no ‘murder scene exception’ to the warrant requirement.”); State v. Smith, No. 2020-KK-00711, 2020
WL 6154322, at *1 (La. 2020) (per curiam) (“The issue of a protective sweep . . . would nevertheless not seem to be
applicable where, as here, the defendant was in handcuffs in a police car when the search was conducted.”).
50. On or about March 5, 2019, District Attorney Nodolf intentionally crossed the threshold
of Petitioner’s home. She walked around, searched, and had discussions with law
51. Nodolf was on the scene because she was the District Attorney, and in that role she
52. At the time Nodolf entered Petitioner’s home, she knew there was no warrant to do so, as
not enough time had passed for obtaining one, and she was with the investigating officers,
53. As District Attorney, Nodolf knew no state actor can enter a home without a warrant unless
they have probable cause and exigent circumstances. Having neither, Nodolf entered
54. At the time of Petitioner’s trial, Nodolf asserted the home invasion was done as part of a
protective sweep. But video from the house security system shows police had already
55. At the time she entered the home, Defendant was in custody. His wife and children had
also been escorted elsewhere by police. So even if Nodolf did not know about the earlier
protective sweep, there was no reasonable belief that the home still harbored an individual
20
2 RR Excerpt of Cody Allen Testimony 117-18 (Exhibit 1).
56. Nodolf, acting in her role as District Attorney, intentionally engaged in unlawful behavior,
i.e. entering Petitioner’s home without a warrant or without probable cause and exigent
circumstances. In doing so, she committed official misconduct sufficient to expose her to
57. If not official misconduct, District Attorney Nodolf’s actions in entering, looking around,
58. If, at the time she entered Petitioner’s home, Nodolf did not understand the laws she was
breaking, or if she thought her position as District Attorney somehow permitted her
unlawful entry into a private residence, then she would be grossly ignorant.
59. This is a blatant Fourth Amendment violation, which Nodolf committed knowingly or in
reckless disregard for the law, and with gross carelessness in the discharge of her official
duties.
60. Accordingly, Nodolf’s actions in entering Petitioner’s home without a warrant or without
probable cause and exigent circumstances constitutes incompetency justifying her removal
from office. 22
21
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 3.04(1); TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.011(3).
22
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 87.011(2)(A)-(C).
61. Petitioner realleges all preceding paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as if fully
repeated here.
A. The Attorney for the State Cannot Also Be a Witness to the Grand Jury
62. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure greatly limits who may participate in the Grand
Jury process and what their role is. Regarding the prosecutor, the Code delineates his or
The attorney representing the state is [i] entitled to appear before the grand jury and
[ii] inform the grand jury of offenses subject to indictment at any time except when the
grand jury is discussing the propriety of finding an indictment or is voting on an
indictment. 23
63. The grand jury may independently solicit the participation of the prosecutor, but the
The grand jury may send for the attorney representing the state and ask the attorney's
advice on any matter of law or on any question regarding the discharge of the grand
jury’s duties. 24
64. Texas law very clearly does not permit the prosecutor to be a witness before the Grand
Jury.
(a) While the grand jury is conducting proceedings, only the following persons may
be present in the grand jury room:
(1) a grand juror;
(2) a bailiff;
(3) the attorney representing the state;
(4) a witness:
(A) while the witness is being examined; or
23
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 20A.103.
24
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 20A.151.
(a) Only a grand juror or the attorney representing the state may examine a
witness before the grand jury.
(b) The attorney representing the state shall advise the grand jury regarding the
proper mode of examining a witness. 26
66. Even if a prosecutor could become a witness to the jury, he or she would still have to be
sworn:
Before each witness is examined, the foreperson or a person under the foreperson’s
direction shall administer the following oath to the witness . . . 27
67. The purpose of the oath is to promote truthfulness to the Grand Jury, as lying to the Grand
Jury derails the entire judicial process that follows an indictment. This is why lying to the
68. Defendant made statements to the Grand Jury regarding the underlying facts that she had
personal knowledge of by virtue of her own investigations in the case. Here are just some
examples of testimony that was introduced to the Grand Jury not via Ranger Allen (the
● The person who made the 911 call that night was with a third-party monitoring
company in New Jersey. 29
25
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 20A.102.
26
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 20A.257.
27
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 20A.256.
28
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 37.03.
29
GJR 22 (attached in Exhibit 4).
● Later on in the proceedings Nodolf herself played and walked the Grand Jury
though the recordings of prior instances where Petitioner had spoken with the
alarm monitoring company about tripped alarms. 31
● Petitioner’s “entire house [is] surrounded 360 degrees with video cameras that can
be accessed on television, on a cell phone, on a monitoring panel, and in another -
- in a - - like a computer area.” 32
● There acoustic panels towards the living room on the ceiling of Petitioner’s home. 33
69. Defendant also made statements bolstering Ranger Allen’s credibility on the underlying
facts in this case. Here are two examples of important instances where Nodolf vouched for
● The alarm company thought the alarm was tripped and contacted the police
department. When it re-ran the system everything was fine, but no one canceled
the alarm with the police. 35
70. When Defendant made statements regarding the underlying facts in this case, she was not
under oath. She made herself an unsworn witness to the Grand Jury.
71. Defendant intentionally recounted to the Grand Jury substantive facts in the case as a
prosecutor, not as a witness, and without first taking the requisite oath. This both
30
GJR 23 (Exhibit 4).
31
GJR 87-93 (Exhibit 4).
32
GJR 35 (Exhibit 4).
33
GJR68-69 (Exhibit 4).
34
GJR 29 (Exhibit 4).
35
GJR 31 (Exhibit 4).
72. As District Attorney, Defendant should know the law regarding presentation of a case to
the Grand Jury. Specifically, Defendant should know that as the attorney for the State, she
was only permitted to inform the Grand Jury about the offense or, if the Grand Jury asked,
73. Defendant should know the attorney representing the State cannot make representations
74. Defendant demonstrated gross carelessness in her presentation to the Grand Jury by
36
See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.011(3).
37
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 20A.103, 20A.151.
38
See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 87.011(2)(A)-(C).
76. Petitioner realleges all preceding paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as if fully
repeated here.
77. Any properly sworn witness who lies to the Grand Jury commits the felony of aggravated
perjury. 39
78. Any attorney who lies to the Grand Jury violates multiple Rules of Professional Conduct:
● A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal. 40
● A lawyer shall not knowingly: offer or use evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false. 41
79. Any District Attorney who lies to the Grand Jury violates the Oath of Office for District
(a) All elected and appointed officers, before they enter upon the duties of their offices,
shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:
“I, _______________________, do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will
faithfully execute the duties of the office of ___________________ of the State of
Texas, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
and laws of the United States and of this State, so help me God.” 43
80. Any District Attorney who lies to the Grand Jury also violates the Oath of Admission to the
Bar:
39
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 37.03.
40
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. COND. 3.03(a)(1).
41
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. COND. 3.03(a)(5).
42
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. COND. 8.04(a)(3).
43
TEX. CONST. art. VIX, § 1.
B. Defendant Lying to the Grand Jury About a Contract that Does Not
Exist Constitutes Official Misconduct
81. As recited above, when Defendant was asking the Grand Jury to indict Petitioner for
murder, she placed the blame for a horrible tragedy squarely on Petitioner’s shoulders.
Specifically, she said Petitioner had created the situation that led to the shooting because
he had instructed his alarm company to not notify him if the alarm was tripped. Instead,
she stated Petitioner affirmatively told the alarm company to immediately dispatch police
82. In a display bolstering her false statement, Defendant held up a document that she told the
Grand Jury was the contract between Petitioner and his alarm monitoring company
memorializing Petitioner’s wishes for the police to be dispatched to his house without first
83. Here is a still shot from the video of the Grand Jury proceedings where Nodolf hands the
85. Defendant intentionally told the jury a contract between Petitioner and the alarm company
existed. She intentionally held up a document, suggesting it was the actual executed
contract even though no such contract exists. She lied to the Grand Jury about a “fact”
86. Had Defendant been a properly sworn witness, she herself would be subject to indictment
87. In making this misrepresentation of material fact to a judicial tribunal, Defendant violated
88. In making this misrepresentation of material fact to a judicial tribunal, Defendant violated
89. In making this misrepresentation of material fact to a judicial tribunal, Defendant violated
C. Defendant Lying to the Grand Jury About a Contract that Does Not
Exist Constitutes Incompetency
91. As an attorney, Defendant should know what a signed contract looks like.
92. As an attorney, Defendant should know that lying to any judicial tribunal about the
Conduct.
93. As District Attorney, Defendant should know that lying to the Grand Jury about the
existence of a key contract is an ethical violation of multiple oaths and, for witnesses, a
criminal offense.
94. Defendant made a serious misrepresentation of a material fact to the Grand Jury in the
95. In doing so, Defendant demonstrated gross carelessness in the discharge of her
official duties.
97. Petitioner realleges all preceding paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as if fully
repeated here.
98. As detailed above, at least one grand juror was interested in whether Petitioner could have
heard Officer Heidelberg announcing that he was with the police when he entered
44
See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.011(3).
45
See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 87.011(2)(A)-(C).
Cody Allen, a properly sworn witness before the Grand Jury at the time. Defendant
interrupted Ranger Allen’s testimony to talk about the course of the investigation inasmuch
announcement at the front door. The grand juror then asked Defendant directly about
whether the special acoustic panels in Petitioner’s house would have blocked any sound.
Defendant responded, “No, actually, those acoustic panels are meant to amplify the
sound.” 46 Trial testimony established the opposite—the panels are designed to muffle
sound.
99. The main issue in the case was whether Petitioner knew or should have known that the
people coming into his house were police officers. Accordingly, the effect of the acoustic
panels was material to whether Petitioner was acting in self-defense, as reflected by the fact
100. Defendant’s misrepresentation about the effect of the acoustic panels directly impacted the
A. Defendant Lying to the Grand Jury About the Effect of the Acoustic
Paneling in Petitioner’s Home Constitutes Official Misconduct
101. Defendant intentionally interrupted the testimony of a properly sworn witness about the
102. Defendant intentionally represented to the Grand Jury that the acoustic panels in
46
GJR 74-75 (Exhibit 4).
104. Had Defendant been a properly sworn witness, she herself would be subject to indictment
105. In making this misrepresentation of material fact, Defendant violated multiple Rules of
Disciplinary Conduct.
106. In making this material misrepresentation of fact to a judicial tribunal, Defendant violated
107. In making this material misrepresentation of fact to a judicial tribunal, Defendant violated
B. Defendant Lying to the Grand Jury About the Effect of the Acoustic
Paneling in Petitioner’s Home Constitutes Incompetence
109. As District Attorney, Defendant should know that only Ranger Allen—the properly sworn
witness—could testify about the acoustic paneling before the Grand Jury.
110. As District Attorney, Defendant should know that her only role before the Grand Jury was
to inform the Grand Jury of the offense and answer any questions of law the Grand Jury
may have had. Her role was not to give any statements of underlying facts to the Grand
Jury. It certainly was not to give incorrect statements of underlying facts to the Grand Jury.
111. As District Attorney, Defendant should have known how to permit Ranger Allen to testify
47
See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.011(3).
paneling to the Grand Jury in the course of her representation as the State’s attorney.
113. In doing so, Defendant demonstrated gross carelessness in the discharge of her official
duties.
115. Petitioner realleges all preceding paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as if fully
repeated here.
116. Abuse of Official Capacity occurs when “with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to
117. “’Harm’ means anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, including
118. By the plain language of the statute, harm is broadly defined. There is no requirement that
it be physical harm, nor is there any requirement limiting it to pecuniary harm. 51 Although
both of those are certainly forms of harm, they are not the only forms contemplated by
Texas Penal Code § 1.07(a)(25). 52 Harm can include damage to one’s reputation in the
48
See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 87.011(2)(A)-(C).
49
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 39.02.
50
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(25).
51
Dauben v. State, No. 10-13-00047-CR, 2014 WL 2566470, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco June 5, 2014, no pet.) (citing
Hudspeth v. State, 31 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, pet. ref’d) and White v. State, No. 14-05-0045-
CR, 2006 WL 2771855 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 28, 2006, pet. ref’d)).
52
See id.
B. Defendant Abused Her Official Capacity by Breaking the Law with the
Intent to Harm Petitioner
119. As District Attorney, Defendant should know actions that constitute criminal offenses in
120. As detailed above, Petitioner intentionally or knowingly violated the law acting in her role
as District Attorney. She did this by conducting an illegal search of Petitioner’s home, by
testifying to material facts as an unsworn witness before the Grand Jury, by lying to the
Grand Jury about the existence of a contract Petitioner never executed, any by lying to the
121. Defendant intended to harm, and in fact did harm, Petitioner with her actions.
122. Defendant’s illegal search of Petitioner’s home was done with the intent to gather evidence
123. Defendant testified as an unsworn witness to the Grand Jury because she was trying to
persuade it to indict Petitioner. In fact, in speaking with media after Petitioner’s acquittal,
Defendant herself indicated, “she had always believed that this case should be tried by a
jury.” Iris Foster, Jury: Wilson is not guilty of murder, Midland Reporter Times (Dec. 8,
2021). The material, factual evidence Nodolf introduced to the Grand Jury, alongside her
efforts to bolster Ranger Allen’s testimony, were done because she was determined to
53
Brazelton v. State, 947 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.).
54
Tidwell v. State, No. 08-11-00322-CR, 2013 WL 6405498, at *16 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 4, 2013, pet. ref’d).
and the alarm monitoring company because she was trying to place blame for the accident
on Petitioner. She was doing so because she was seeking an indictment against him.
125. Defendant lied to the Grand Jury about the acoustic panels in Petitioner’s home amplifying
sound because a juror was rightly questioning whether Petitioner could have heard Officer
Heidelberg’s announcement. The juror was clearly reasoning that if Petitioner could not
hear the announcement, then he would be justified in using deadly force against an
unknown intruder. Defendant shut down that correct line of inquiry by the juror by
representing that the acoustic panels in fact amplified the sound. Defendant lied about the
acoustic panels because she wanted the Grand Jury to indict Petitioner.
126. Mere indictment alone would constitute “harm.” But there was additional, easily
foreseeable, harm that came to Petitioner as a result of that indictment, including damage
to his reputation in the community; trauma visited upon he and his family, including his
127. Because Defendant broke the law with the intent to harm Petitioner, she is liable to answer
addition to each one of those behaviors establishing the basis for Defendant’s removal,
they also constitute an abuse of Defendant’s official capacity, which is a criminal offense.
129. Defendant’s intentional behavior constitutes a knowing violation of law, i.e. the prohibition
133. Petitioner realleges all preceding paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as if fully
repeated here.
134. Official Oppression occurs when “[a] public servant acting under color of h[er] office or
employment:”
135. Defendant intentionally subjected Petitioner to arrest, detention, and search Defendant
55
See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.011(3).
56
See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 87.011(2)(A)-(C).
57
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 39.03.
for hours, in a locked room, handcuffed, with paper bags over his hands,
his illegal arrest and detention but well before a warrant or probable cause
136. Defendant misused the Grand Jury for a second indictment for murder based on a legal
theory Defendant never even presented at Petitioner’s trial. This was actually Defendant’s
attempt to secure a continuance of the trial setting in order to deny Petitioner his
constitutional right to a Speedy, Public Jury Trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
137. Defendant’s intentional behavior constitutes a knowing violation of law, i.e. the prohibition
on official oppression.
58
Charge In MPD Officer Heidelberg Trial Upgraded To Murder, MIDLAND REPORTER TELEGRAM (Nov. 2, 2021),
https://www.mrt.com/news/crime/article/Charge-in-MPD-Officer-Heidelberg-trial-upgraded-16585935.php (last
visited May 27, 2022) (“Wilson was able to be re-indicted because the state presented a new legal theory, according to
Assistant District Attorney Timothy Flathers. The defense had the option to request more time but chose to move forward
with a jury trial, he said.”). In addition to these public statements made by Defendant’s employee, Defendant’s co-counsel
suggested repeatedly at a last-minute hearing prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial that Petitioner seemed to be asking for a
continuance. Petitioner was not seeking to delay his trial by continuance. Rather, the State was attempting to deny
Petitioner his right to a speedy, public trial by re-indicting Petitioner for a more serious charge hoping Petitioner would ask
for a continuance. Finally, and perhaps most egregious, upon information and belief, Defendant was heard saying to co-
workers and/or police officers that Petitioner’s counsel “called her bluff” when Petitioner did not seek a continuance.
Defendant as a principal actor and under the law of parties committed official oppression.
59
See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.011(3).
JURY DEMAND
141. Petitioner requests trial by jury and hereby tenders the jury fee.
142. On an ex parte basis, pursuant to TEX. GOV’T CODE § 87.016 (a) & ( d), 61 Petitioner
requests the Court order issuance of a citation and service by certified copy of this Original
Petition to Mrs. Nodolf and require her to file an answer as required. 62 Petitioner asks for
an immediate trial setting so that these matters may be resolved as soon as possible.
143. Pursuant to TEX. GOV’T CODE § 87.017(a) Petitioner seeks the temporary removal of Mrs.
Nodolf from office pending trial of this matter. 63 After the Court orders the issuance of the
citation and service via certified copy of the petition, Petitioner asks the Court, ex parte, to
remove Mrs. Nodolf on a temporary basis until the resolution of this matter. In the
alternative, Petitioner requests the Court to set a hearing on the Temporary Removal of
Mrs. Nodolf. The public needs assurance that the highest law enforcement office for this
County will remain in business, without misconduct and incompetence, while this matter
is being resolved.
60
See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 87.011(2)(A)-(C).
61
TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.016(a) (“After a petition for removal is filed, the person filing the petition shall apply
to the district judge in writing for an order requiring a citation and a certified copy of the petition to be served on the
officer.”).
62
TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.016(d) (“The citation shall order the officer to appear and answer the petition on a
date, fixed by the judge, after the fifth day after the date the citation is served. The time is computed as it is in other suits.”).
63
TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.017(a) (“After the issuance of the order requiring citation of the officer, the district
judge may temporarily suspend the officer and may appoint another person to perform the duties of the office.”).
1 REPORTER'S RECORD
VOLUME 2 OF 3 VOLUMES
2 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. CR53361
6
7
8 _____________________________________________
9 TRIAL ON MERITS
10 EXCERPT TESTIMONY OF CODY ALLEN
11 VOLUME 2 OF 3 VOLUMES
_____________________________________________
12
13
14
23
24
25
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
2
Trial on Merits - December 1, 2021
Excerpt Testimony of Cody Allen
1 APPEARANCES
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
3
Trial on Merits - December 1, 2021
Excerpt Testimony of Cody Allen
1 VOLUME 2
5 Proceedings ....................................... 7 2
14 Allen, Cody 7 v2 96 v2 79 v2
15 Allen, Cody 42 v2 87 v2
82 v2
16 89 v2
18
Use is indicated as follows:
19 J - Jury R - Record Only D - Demonstrative
B - Bill of Exceptions
20
24 44 Uniform pants 43 v2 43 v2 J
25 45 Ballistic vest 44 v2 44 v2 J
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
117
Cody Allen - December 1, 2021
Cross-Examination by Mr. Sellers
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And so when you and Ms. Nodolf got there, you
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. And you walked around.
11 A. Yes, sir.
15 A. No, sir.
16 Q. Well, you knew the house was cleared. Midland
21 the home.
22 A. Yes, sir.
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. And so when Laura Nodolf arrives -- is that
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
118
Cody Allen - December 1, 2021
Cross-Examination by Mr. Sellers
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And y'all looked at the security system.
12 this day.
13 Q. All right. Went into the house without a
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. Ms. Nodolf went in the house without a
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. All right. You told the jury yesterday that
24 right?
25 A. It was two hours from the time I arrived on
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
134
Trial on Merits - December 1, 2021
Excerpt Testimony of Cody Allen
1 STATE OF TEXAS
2 COUNTY OF MIDLAND
17
/s/Ann M. Record
18 Ann M. Record
CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR (NM)
19 TX CSR #4747/NM CCR #89
Expiration Date: 10/31/2022
20 Deputy Official Court Reporter
Midland County District Courts
21 500 N. Loraine, Suite 1001
Midland, Texas 79701
22 (432)688-4371 / ARecord@mcounty.com
23
24
25
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
Exhibit 2
Trial Testimony of Ranger Cody Allen
pages 19-20
1
Trial on Merits - December 2, 2021
Excerpt Testimony of Cody Allen
1 REPORTER'S RECORD
VOLUME 3 OF 3 VOLUMES
2 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. CR53361
6
7
8 _____________________________________________
9 TRIAL ON MERITS
10 EXCERPT TESTIMONY OF CODY ALLEN
11 VOLUME 3 OF 3 VOLUMES
_____________________________________________
12
13
14
23
24
25
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
2
Trial on Merits - December 2, 2021
Excerpt Testimony of Cody Allen
1 APPEARANCES
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
3
Trial on Merits - December 2, 2021
Excerpt Testimony of Cody Allen
1 VOLUME 3
5 PAGE VOL.
6 Proceedings ....................................... 5 3
7 Reporter's Certificate .......................... 105 3
8
Cody Allen Direct Cross V.Dire
9 By Mr. Sellers 5 v3
By Ms. Nodolf 10 v3
10 By Mr. Sellers 11 v3
By Ms. Nodolf 52 v3
11 By Mr. Sellers 82 v3
By Ms. Nodolf 99 v3
12
13
18
19 EXHIBITS OFFERED BY STATE
20
Use is indicated as follows:
21 J - Jury R - Record Only D - Demonstrative
B - Bill of Exceptions
22
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
19
Cody Allen - December 2, 2021
Cross-Examination by Mr. Sellers
2 A. Yes, sir.
5 A. Yes, sir.
8 A. Yes, sir.
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. About three or four times; right?
20 A. Yes, sir.
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
20
Cody Allen - December 2, 2021
Cross-Examination by Mr. Sellers
2 she?
5 the interview.
24 A. Correct, sir.
25 Q. During your interview with David Wilson, you
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
105
Trial on Merits - December 2, 2021
Excerpt Testimony of Cody Allen
1 STATE OF TEXAS
2 COUNTY OF MIDLAND
17
/s/Ann M. Record
18 Ann M. Record
CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR (NM)
19 TX CSR #4747/NM CCR #89
Expiration Date: 10/31/2022
20 Deputy Official Court Reporter
Midland County District Courts
21 500 N. Loraine, Suite 1001
Midland, Texas 79701
22 (432)688-4371 / ARecord@mcounty.com
23
24
25
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
Exhibit 3
Trial Testimony of Mitch Clark
page 13
1
Trial on Merits - Excerpt of Testimony
December 7, 2021
1 REPORTER'S RECORD
VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUMES
2 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. CR53361
6
7
8 _____________________________________________
18 stenotype machine.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
2
Trial on Merits - Excerpt of Testimony
December 7, 2021
1 APPEARANCES
14
15
16
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
3
Trial on Merits - Excerpt of Testimony
December 7, 2021
2 December 7, 2021
3
4 PAGE VOL.
5 Proceedings ....................................... 4 1
6
7 Mitch Clark Direct Cross V.Dire
By Mr. Carney 5 v1
8
9
10
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Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
13
Mitch Clark - December 7, 2021
Direct Examination by Mr. Carney
9 A. Very difficult.
10 Q. And was that by design?
17 it.
18 A. You're welcome.
19 THE COURT: Pass the witness?
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
15
Trial on Merits - Excerpt of Testimony
December 7, 2021
1 STATE OF TEXAS
2 COUNTY OF MIDLAND
Ann M. Record, CSR, RMR, CRR, CMRS, CRI, TCRR, TMR, CCR(NM)
Deputy Official Court Reporter - Midland County
(432) 688-4371 ****** ARecord@mcounty.com
Exhibit 4
Grand Jury Proceedings
excerpts
1
12
13
14
15
16
17
21
22
23
24
25
2
1 INDEX PAGE
2
Proceedings ---------------------------------- 3
3
Transcriber's Certificate Page --------------- 112
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3 3-5-2019, the alarm was not armed. We did not have this
17 burglary?
24 that is detached from the house. You can't get into the
11 building before.
24 arrived.
20 the time. These are big, heavy metal doors. They have
1 the ones in here, that you can easily hit and they open.
4 to see that.
13 David and Amy, they walk around the house, see what's
24 doorbell.
6 burglar.
16 off?
18 audible alarm.
11 used. You can see it's lodged, this was not cleared by
4 living room sitting area, like you saw on the deal, that
13 the angle we saw from the living room, just a lot lower.
16 this way, master bed goes this way. Photo Marker Number
21 it.
12 David Wilson was in that video and try and have someone
14 audible?
16 that.
18 done?
10 spot versus --
19 clearly.
4 is a system failure --
15 first?
18 police, --
22 random alarm.
2 said.
7 unmute my end.
10 haven't --
25 for you.
88
3 sir.
12 assistance needed?
13 MR. WILSON: No --
2 pleasure. Bye-bye.
11 called before.
14 March --
20 options.
2 thank you.
11 us.
22 B-A-M-S.
4 Zone's 49.
9 attempt to contact --
15 cancellation is 656.
19 you.
3 why?
8 sure what you call them, they asked if the homeowner had
19 and then that's when her supervisor comes back and says,
1 to that date.
6 that they did not -- they did not make -- she -- one
22 passed.
12 phone call --
16 than --
1 TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
3 COUNTY OF LUBBOCK )
8 May, 2022.
10
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