Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Political Law Reviewer Atty. Albano Compilations
Political Law Reviewer Atty. Albano Compilations
September 2, 2010, the Rules on Impeachment Proceedings of the 15 Congress was published. On
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September 7, 2010, the Committee found both complaints of culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust to be sufficient in substance. She filed a petition for injunction with the SC
contending that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on
September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency in form of the complaints. She
tacked her contention on Sec. 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. The respondent
contended that promulgation refers to publication of the rules in any medium of information. As basis for
her contention she invoked Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Officers and Investigation, G.R.
No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77 and 564 SCRA 152 (2008) which held that the Constitution
categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. The respondent contended
that the Impeachment Rules is intended merely to enable Congress to effectively carry out the purposes of
Sec. 3(8) of Article XI of the Constitution. Rule on the contention. Explain.
Answer: The contention is not correct. The Constitution merely uses the word promulgate which means to
publish or to announce officially (Black’s Law Dictionary).
The Constitution does not restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” hence, the former should be understood to
have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate
its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make
known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines
or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene
in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
work. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
intervene. (Sen. Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276 (1998)).
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically
as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. (Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011).
Q – She contended that the filing of the second complaint violated Sec. 3(5) Article XI of the Constitution
which provides that “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.” She reckoned the 1-year ban from the filing of the first complaint on July
22, 2010 or before the opening of the sessions on July 26, 2010. She contended that no impeachment
complaint can be accepted and referred within that period.
On the other hand, public respondent contended that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment
complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively
proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the
transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Is her contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. The term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts
with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice. (Francisco v. House of Representatives, et al., 460 Phil. 830 (2003). What ends the
initiation is the referral to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. (Gutierrez
v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011).
mathematical and clerical errors, instead of private respondent. A petition for correction of manifest error
and annulment of the proclamation was filed. It was contended that protest is the appropriate remedy. Is the
contention correct? Why?
Answer: Yes. As a rule, It is very clear that the proclaimed candidate was the loser, hence, the petition to amend
and annul was proper. The remedy of the losing party is an election protest after his opponent has already been
proclaimed as winning candidate, but such recourse is on the assumption, however, that there has been a valid
proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity
and annul the proclamation. (Torres v. COMELEC, 337 Phil. 270 (1997); Duremdes v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
86362-63, October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 746 and Aguam v. COMELEC, 132 Phil. 353 (1968); Taguiam v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184801, July 30, 2009).
Cayat principle not applied.
Q – Nardo Velasco, a Filipino citizen acquired American citizenship. Later on he became a dual citizen. He
applied for registration as a voter but his application was denied, hence, he filed his petition for inclusion as
voter with the MTC which granted the petition. The RTC on appeal reversed the order, hence, he appealed to
the CA but the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the meantime, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for Mayor, hence, Panlaqui filed a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel his COC based on
gross misrepresentation as to his residency, hence, disqualified to vote. He won in the elections and took his
oath. Finding material misrepresentations, the COMELEC nullified his proclamation hence, Panlaqui
moved for proclamation. Can he, as second placer, be proclaimed as the winner? Why?
Answer: No. Since the disqualification of Velasco had not yet become final and executory before the elections,
the COMELEC properly applied the rule on succession. Cayat v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007,
522 SCRA 23 does not apply because Cayat was disqualified in a final and executory judgment before the
elections. As the only candidate Palileng, who numerically lost in the elections, he was not a second placer. On
the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine in the rejection of the second
placer which triggers the rule on succession does not apply. (Panlaqui vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188671,
February 24, 2010).
ARTICLE XII - General Provisions
Filipinization provision of the Constitution; meaning and purpose.
Q – What is the meaning and purpose of the Filipinization of public utilities? Explain.
Answer: The Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism
which gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention. (Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom of schools includes autonomy to decide terms and conditions of employment.
Q – A teacher was dismissed because of failure to comply with the certain requirements like submission of
final test questions to his program coordinator for checking or comment; non-compliance with the standard
format (multiple choice) of final questions and failure to encode modular grade reports required by the
school.Sje was dismissed. Is the dismissal proper? Why?
Answer: Yes, because of the academic freedom of the school. It is the prerogative of the school to set high
standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long as the
standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside. Schools cannot be
required to adopt standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition. The same academic
freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher,
subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor Code. The authority to hire is likewise covered
and protected by its management prerogative – the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment,
such as hiring, the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed, regulation
regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of
workers.
Anti-Dummy Board, 46 SCRA 474 (1972). The 1987 Constitution “provides for the Filipinization of public
utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be granted only to
‘citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.’ The provision is an express recognition of the
sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national security.” The
evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control of public utilities,
which may be inimical to the national interest. This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens
control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to “conserve and
develop our patrimony” and ensure “a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.”
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the minimum nationality
requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted
authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its “capital” must be owned by Filipino citizens.
(Gamboa v. Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011).
Franchises cannot be exclusive, otherwise, void.
Q – Tawag Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a duly registered cooperative organized to provide
domestic water services in Barangay Tawag, La Trinidad, Benguet. It applied for a certificate of public
convenience with the National Water Resources Board to operate and maintain a waterworks system, but La
Trinidad Water District opposed contending that it has an exclusive franchise as a local water utility created
under PD 198. The application was approved where the NWRB held that the exclusive franchise is not valid
and unconstitutional. On appeal to the RTC, it held that the exclusive franchise is valid. Is the ruling
correct? Why?
Answer: No, because exclusive franchise is void and unconstitutional. Article XII, Section 11 of the
Constitution prohibits that exclusive nature or character of a franchise when it says “nor shall such franchise x x
be exclusive in character.” There is no exception. Section 47 of PD 198 which states that no franchise shall be
granted to any other person or agency unless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents thereto
is patently unconstitutional. In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic Law to which all laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to
uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. (Tawag Multi-Purpose
Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011, Carpio, J).
POLICE POWER
Q – There was a deed of restriction on the property of a homeowner that it can be used for educational
purposes up to nursery only. Subsequently, the City of Muntinlupa passed an ordinance re-classifying the
area as institutional, hence, the owner expanded the school. The neighborhood objected, hence, the suit.
Which shall prevail, the restriction in the title or the ordinance? Explain.
Answer: The ordinance as it is an exercise of police power. As early as Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Feati
Bank & Trust Co., 183 Phil. 176 (1979), the SC upheld the validity of an ordinance declaring the residential
area in Mandaluyong as industrial and commercial zone as it was passed in the exercise of police power.
Since the motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution is reasonable, and it being a legitime response
to a felt public need, not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution
will not bar the municipality’s exercise of police power. (Learning Child, Inc., et al. v. Ayala Alabang Village
Asso., et al., G.R. No. 134269, and other companion cases, July 7, 2010).
EMINENT DOMAIN
For compensation to be just it must not only be full, but it should like be not delayed.
Q – The government took a property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform program of the government
but there was no payment for twelve (12) years. State the effect of the delay in the payment? Explain.
Answer: There was no more just compensation. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the
constitutional rule on eminent domain – “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.” While confirming the State’s inherent power and right to take private property for public use,
this provision at the same time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes property
pursuant to its inherent right and power, the State has the corresponding obligation to pay the owner just
compensation for the property taken. For compensation to be considered “just,” it must not only be full and fair
equivalent of the property taken; it must also be paid to the landowner without delay.
Inevitably, if the government falters or is seen to be faltering through lack of good faith in implementing the
needed reforms, including any hesitation in paying the landowners just compensation, this reform program and
its objectives would suffer major setbacks. That the government’s agrarian reform program and its success are
matters of public interest, to our mind, cannot be disputed as the program seeks to remedy long existing ad
widespread social justice and economic problems. (Apo Fruits Corp. v. LBP, et al., G.R. No. 164195, April 5,
2011, Brion, J.).
Q – RA No. 8874 otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate Site or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Project and for Other Purposes provides for guidelines for expropriation proceedings. To
attain the objective of the government to facilitate infrastructure projects, what are the requirements for
authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property? Explain.
Answer: The requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property
are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the
defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current
relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if
any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of
the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the
proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of
possession as a matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of
possession. No hearing is required, and the court exercises neither its discretion nor its judgment in determining
the amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the amount
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974. (Rep. v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009
citing Capitol Steel Corp. v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, G.R. No. 169453, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA
590).
TAXATION
Q – Cooperatives, under RA 6938 as amended by RA 9520 enjoy preferential tax treatment. The members of
the coop were being made to pay taxes. They protested as they should likewise be exempted. The BIR
contended otherwise, hence, they filed a petition contending that the tax preferential treatment include the
members. If you were the Court, how would you decide? Explain.
Answer: I would rule in favour of the members of the cooperative. Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by
RA 9520, it is a declared policy of the State to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives as a practical
vehicle for promoting self-reliance and harnessing people power towards the attainment of economic
development and social justice. Thus, to encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere
conducive to their growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.
Cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax treatment because of the vital role they play in
the attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus, although taxes are the lifeblood of the
government, the State’s power to tax must give way to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives. To
borrow the words of Justice Isagani A. Cruz: “The power of taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and
may be subordinated to the demands of social justice.” (Dumaguete Credit Cooperative v. Com. Of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 182722, January 22, 2010; Rep. v. Judge Peralta, 234 Phil. 40 (1987).
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q – Calixto Cataquiz, then General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority was charged with
violation of the Anti-Graft Law. The case was dismissed. In the meantime an administrative case was filed
seeking his removal. He contended that because of the dismissal of the criminal case, there was no more
basis to hold him administratively liable. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for
a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and
administratively liable for the same act. (Tecson v. SB, 376 Phil. 191 (1999)). Obviously, administrative
liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. (Veloso v. SB, 187 SCRA 504, (1990)).
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the following: first,
the difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions
imposed; and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related
provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. (People v.
SB, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 147, citing People v. Paredes, G.R. No. 169534, July 30, 2007,
528 SCRA 577; Office of the Pres. v. Calixto Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011).
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Doctrine of condonation does not apply to appointive.
Q – Petitioners were appointed by X, a duly elected mayor. During his incumbency, he was administratively
changed, but he was re-elected. The charges against petitioners continued, hence, they filed a motion to
dismiss contending that the doctrine of condonation to coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with re-elected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly
committed during their preceding term should apply to them. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema
lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot
be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when
the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president. (Atty. Vicente Salumbides, et al. v.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010 citing CSC v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008)).
Q – Is not the non-application of the doctrine of condonation to appointed officials violative of the equal
protection clause? Why?
Answer: No. The non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to
equal protection of the law. The electorate’s condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the re-
elected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of
the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither
subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed
coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could
extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the
mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and
character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
The unwarranted expansion of the doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, provide civil servants,
particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn
and breed abuse in the bureaucracy. (Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 180917, April 23,
2010).
3-term limit.
Q – Marino Morales was elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 local
elections. He was, however disqualified in the 2004 elections because of the 3-term limit. While his
proclamation in the 1998-2001 election was declared void, it was done after serving the term or on July 4,
2001. On May 7, 2007, the SC promulgated a decision disqualifying him. He vacated the position, the next
day, the Vice-Mayor assumed office from May 17, 2007 to June 30, 2007. It was contended that he was not
qualified to run in the 2007 local elections, otherwise, he would be serving a 5 term. Is the contention
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correct? Why?
Answer: No. It is true that he occupied the position of mayor in the following periods: 1995-1998; 1998-2001;
2001-2004; 2004-2007 but because of his disqualification he was not duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007
term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed
to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the
term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30
June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June
2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009).
Q – It was alleged that Morales “was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. In
other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and
profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom.” Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then
opponent which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioner’s incumbency in an
office to which he was not lawfully elected. Such delay cannot be imputed to the him because there was no
proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover,
protestant, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was
pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court’s decision
declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was
pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner
to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local
government post in the succeeding mayoral election. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182088, January
30, 2009).
Q – Nicasio Bolos ran for Punong Barangay in Dauis, Bohol in the 1994, 1997 and 2002 barangay elections
and won. Petitioner contended that he is qualified to run for the position of Punong Barangay in the October
29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections since he did not serve continuously three
consecutive terms. He admitted that in the 1994, 1997 and 2002 Barangay elections, while serving his third
term as Punong Barangay, he ran as Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol, and won. On July 1, 2004, he
assumed office and, consequently, left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law. He averred that he
served the full term as member of the Sangguniang Bayan until June 30, 2007. On October 29, 2007, he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay and won. The COMELEC issued an order disqualifying
him as a candidate for Punong Barangay since he did not complete his third term by operation of law. He
contended that he is qualified. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
It is undisputed that petitioner was elected as PunongBarangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first
condition for disqualification.
Petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayanmember and,
upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office
as Punong Barangay which is deemed to be voluntary renunciation of said office.
Q – Mayor Abundo was elected Mayor in the local elections of Viga, Catanduanes in 2011, 2004, 2007
and served as Mayor. However, in the 2004 elections, Torres was proclaimed as the winner, but after the
protest was decided Abundo was finally proclaimed as the winner, hence, he served as Mayor starting
May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007 or for a period of one year and one
month. In the 2010 local elections, he again filed his certificate of candidacy. The opponent filed a petition
for disqualification because he was running for a fourth term, violating of the 3-term limit rule. Is the
contention correct? Why?
Answer: No, because he did not serve the full term in the 2004-2007 elections, when he was initially deprived
of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and
Sec. 43(b) of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code provide that no local elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. The 3-term limit has two (2) basic requirements,
thus:
(1) That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
(2) That he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July
28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602).
Abundo could not have served for a full term in 2004-2007 because the opponent was proclaimed as the winner,
hence, Abundo was termporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election
protest. The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to
serve the unexpired portion of the term but while was declared the winner for the 2004-2007 term, his full term
has been substantially reduced by the actual service by his opponent. Hence, there was involuntary interruption
in the term of Abundo and cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. (Mayor Abelardo
Abundo, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013).
Q – Wilfredo Asilo was elected councilor in Lucena City for three (3) terms, but he was suspended for 90
days by the SB on his third term. In the 2007 elections, he filed his certificate of candidacy for councilor
but there ws a petition to deny due course to his certificate of candidacy alleging that he was running for
a fourth term. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Asilo and denied the petition to deny due course holding
that the preventive suspension was an effective interruption of his term because it rendered him unable to
provide complete service for the full term, hence, such term should not be counted for the purpose for the
three-term limit rule. Is the ruling correct? Explain.
Answer: No, because he has already served three (3) terms as councilor.
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected. (Sec. 8, Art. 10, Constitution).
The constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in
office to no more than three consecutive terms. This provision refers to a “term” as a period of time –
three years – during which an official has title to office and can serve. In Appari v. Court of Appeals, it was
ruled that:
The word “term” in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that
an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office
may be held. Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties
and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural
frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed. (G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231; Simon Aldovino, Jr., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, Brion, J).
Q – State the reason why a preventively suspended elective public officer cannot run for a fourth term.
Explain.
Answer: To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close
our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary
inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision
contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary – some of them personal and some of
them by operation of law – that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions
of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force
majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an
office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive
suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such
interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term
rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions
when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the
enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an
effective interruption is. (Simon Aldovino, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184836, December 23,
2009, Brion, J).
Criterion in creating a local government unit.
Q – In the February 10, 2010 decision of the SC, it declared RA 9355 creating the province of Dinagat
unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements of population and land area. It further declared
as void Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR stating that the land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. Under the law, a province must comprise of at
least 2,000 square kilometres, but the province does not meet the requirement, hence, a motion for
reconsideration seeking the exemption’s application was filed with the SC contending that while the Local
Government Code allows the creation of a city or municipality even if the areas are not contiguous, such
does not exist in the creation of a province. Is the MR proper? Why?
Answer: Yes. When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt
from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in
the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in
most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of
the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the
validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. (Navarro, et al. V. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April
12, 2011).
Q – What is the reason for the above interpretation of the law? Explain.
Answer: The interpretation has to be so because of the basic policy consideration underpinning the principle of
local autonomy.
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation could prove to be counter-productive,
if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several
municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to
Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum
land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that
Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one
composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural
progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more
difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands
are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
A very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of
local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should
be read together with territorial contiguity. (Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 180050,
April 12, 2011).
Zoning power of LGUs is intended to increase local autonomy.
Q – Resolution No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmariñas dated July 9, 1972 approved the subdivision of
certain properties for residential purposes from agricultural. Petitioners Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing
Ramos, Inc. and the DAR sought to include the same under the coverage of the CARP Law contending that
the LGU has no power to reclassify the land; only the national legislature can do it. Is the contention
correct? Why?
Answer: No, because a parcel of land reclassified for non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 shall no
longer be considered agricultural land under the CARP.
When city and municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or district in their
cities or municipalities as residential, commercial or industrial zone, pursuant to the power granted to them
under, they were, at the same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use;
hence, ensuring the implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances. The logic and practicality
behind such a presumption is more evident when considering the approval by local legislative bodies of
subdivision ordinances and regulations. The approval by city and municipal boards and councils of an
application for subdivision through an ordinance should already be understood to include approval of the
reclassification of the land, covered by said application, from agricultural to the intended non-agricultural use.
Otherwise, the approval of the subdivision application would serve no practical effect; for as long as the
property covered by the application remains classified as agricultural, it could not be subdivided and developed
for non-agricultural use.
A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal boards and councils, as to include the power
to accordingly reclassify the lands within the zones, would be in accord with the avowed legislative intent
behind the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, which was to increase the autonomy of local governments. (Buklod
nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos, Inc., G.R. No. 131481; DAR v. E.M. Ramos, Inc.,
G.R. No. 131624, March 16, 2011).
Renunciation of Filipino citizenship must be under oath.
Q – Teodora Sobejana-Condon, a Filipino citizenship acquired Australian citizenship. In 2006, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship but it was not under oath contrary to the mandate of Section 5(2)
of RA 9225. Then, she filed her certificate of candidacy and was elected. Is she qualified to run for public
office? Explain.
Answer: No. The requirement that the renunciation of her foreign citizenship must be under oath is mandatory.
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical
and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to
administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized
to administer oath. (Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012, Reyes,
J, citing De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 149).
Q – What is the effect of her winning in the election? Explain.
Answer: The fact that she won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most
number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. (Lopez v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 696; Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, et al., supra.).
Candidate convicted of robbery is disqualified to run; petition for cancellation of COC is the remedy.
Q – Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the City of Dapitan,
Zamboanga del Sur for the 2010 elections. His opponent Agapito Cardino filed a petition to deny due
course and cancel his COC due to a false material misrepresentation in his certificate when he declared
under oath that he was eligible when he has been convicted of the crime of robbery and sentenced to
prison mayor by the RTC. Jalosjos contended that he was granted probation where the COMELEC
found out that the certificate of compliance with the requirement was fraudulently issued. He has not yet
served his sentence. The penalty of prision mayor carries with it perpetual special disqualification to hold
public office. Is the COMELEC’s ruling correct? Why?
Answer: Yes. The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of
candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that exited at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can
never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was
cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the election is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never
a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility
existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections -- Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for said
office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible
because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under
oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. (Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 193237; Cardino v. Jalosjos, et al., G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012).
Vice-Mayor is included in computing the quorum.
Q – Petitioners alleged that Atty. Rex Rojo’s appointment as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary is void.
They maintained that respondent’s irrevocable resignation as aSangguniang Panlungsod member was
not deemed accepted during the regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsodof La Carlota City,
Negros Occidental for lack of quorum. Consequently, respondent was still an incumbent regular
Sangguniang Panlungsod member when then Vice Mayor Jalandoon appointed him as Sangguniang
Panlungsod Secretary on 18 March 2004, which contravenes Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution.
They contended that the vice-mayor, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, should not be
counted in determining whether a quorum exists. Excluding the vice-mayor, there were only six (6) out of
the twelve (12) members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod who were present on 17 March 2004. Since the
required majority of seven (7) was not reached to constitute a quorum, then no business could have
validly been transacted on that day including the acceptance of respondent’s irrevocable resignation.
On the other hand, Atty. Rojo maintained that the Sangguniang Panlungsod consists of the presiding
officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members,
hence there was a quorum as the Vice-Mayor should be included in the computation of the quorum.
Whose contention is correct? Explain.
Answer: The contention of Atty. Rojo is correct. The Vice-Mayor is a member of the Sanggunian, hence, he
should be included in the computation of the quorum.
RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod “shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as
presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of
the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and
the sectoral representatives, as members.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “composed of” as “formed of” or
“consisting of.” As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding
officer votes when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as
presiding officer, is a “member” of the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under Section
49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation
where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a “member”
of the Sanggunian. (La Carlota City, Negros Occidental, etc. v. Atty. Rex Rojo, G.R. No. 181367, April 24,
2012, Carpio, J).
ELECTION
Votes of nuisance candidate is counted for the legitimate candidate.
Q – If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy was still included or printed in the
official ballot on election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or
counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? Explain.
Answer: It is counted in favor of the bona fide candidate because the votes cast could have been intended only
for the legitimate candidate. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the name of the nuisance
candidate remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated even under the automated
voting system especially considering that voters mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance
candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement
ballots to correct the same. (Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012, Villarama,
J).
3-term limit; Mayor did not serve the 3-term limit when he was deprived of the right to occupy position
although finally proclaimed winners.
Q – Mayor Abundo was elected Mayor in the local elections of Viga, Catanduanes in 2011, 2004, 2007
and served as Mayor. However, in the 2004 elections, Torres was proclaimed as the winner, but after the
protest was decided Abundo was finally proclaimed as the winner, hence, he served as Mayor starting
May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007 or for a period of one year and one
month. In the 2010 local elections, he again filed his certificate of candidacy. The opponent filed a petition
for disqualification because he was running for a fourth term, violating of the 3-term limit rule. Is the
contention correct? Why?
Answer: No, because he did not serve the full term in the 2004-2007 elections, when he was initially deprived
of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and
Sec. 43(b) of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code provide that no local elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. The 3-term limit has two (2) basic requirements,
thus:
(1) That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post;
and
(2) That he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28,
1999, 311 SCRA 602).
Abundo could not have served for a full term in 2004-2007 because the opponent was proclaimed as the winner,
hence, Abundo was termporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election
protest. The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to
serve the unexpired portion of the term but while was declared the winner for the 2004-2007 term, his full term
has been substantially reduced by the actual service by his opponent. Hence, there was involuntary interruption
in the term of Abundo and cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. (Mayor Abelardo
Abundo, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Q – A resolution was issued by Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) Board of Directors
removing a certain Setudo, Jr. as a member of the Board of Directors. A petition for prohibition was filed
with the RTC. Is the petition proper? Why?
Answer: No, because the National Electrification Administration has jurisdiction, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The NEA has the power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives under Secs. 5 & 7.
PD No. 1645, hence, the resolution removing the Director within the power of NEA to review. The RTC has no
jurisdiction (Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Setudo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, Peralta, J).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has
been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., G.R.
No. 18487, August 15, 2011). In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend
the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties
would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al.,
supra.).
Action for damages against a school for refusal to release transcript of records is within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts. Exhaustion of administrative remedy to CHED, not necessary.
Q – A school refused to release the transcript of records of a student. The school contended that the student
failed to enroll during the second semester of the school year 2000-2001, hence, the school contended that
the complaint failed to state a cause of no action, hence, a motion to dismiss was filed. It was further
contended that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedy to CHED. Rule on the contention.
Answer: The contention is not correct as the action essentially is one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is
provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its
jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground
for dismissal of the action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where
the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioners’ liability – if any – for
damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the
interpretation of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. As
held in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology:
x x x exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; x x x neither
are they part of the judicial system, or deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the
power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission. (485
Phil. 446 (2004); UST, et al. v. Danes Sanchez, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010).