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Title of the Case Labor Standards/
G.R. No
[G.R. No. 207639. July 1,
2015.]
BAHIA SHIPPING
SERVICES, INC. and/or V-
SHIP NORWAY and/or
CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA,
petitioners, vs. CARLOS L.
FLORES, JR., * respondent.
[G.R. No. 189262. July 6,
2015.]
GBMLT MANPOWER
SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs. MA. VICTORIA H.
MALINAO, respondent.
Labor Relations
Labor Standard
Health, safety and social
welfare benefits
- Disability Benefits
Labor Relation
Illegally Dismissal
Issue
Ruling
Issue: WON the CA correctly
affirmed the NLRC ruling holding
respondent to be entitled to
permanent total disability benefits.
Ruling: YES, that respondent is
deemed to be suffering from a
permanent total disability. A
temporary total disability only
becomes permanent when so
declared by the company physician
within the periods he is allowed to
do so, or upon the expiration of the
maximum 240-day medical
treatment period without a
declaration of either fitness to work
or the existence of a permanent
disability. In the present case, while
the initial 120-day treatment or
temporary total disability period was
exceeded, the company-designated
doctor duly made a declaration well
within the extended 240-day period
that the petitioner was fit to work.
Issue:
1. Whether respondent was illegally
dismissed
2. Whether the Quitclaim and
Release was valid
Rulīng:
NO. Respondent was not
illegally dismissed.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042,
workers who are illegally terminated
are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their
employment contracts or for three
months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less,
in addition to the reimbursement of
their placement fee with interest at
the rate of 12% per annum.
This applies only to an illegally
dismissed overseas contract worker
or a worker dismissed from
overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract.
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[G.R. No. 183735. July 6,
2015.]
SEGIFREDO T. VILCHEZ, Labor Relation
petitioner, vs. FREE PORT
SERVICE CORPORATION
and ATTY. ROEL JOHN T.
KABIGTING, President,
respondents.
Respondent was not illegally
dismissed.
Article X of the POEA-approved
Contract of Employment, as well as
the second contract given to
respondent for signing upon her
arrival in Ethiopia, provides: “This
contract may be terminated by
either party, at any time and for
no cause by giving three months
notice to the other party.
2. YES. The Quitclaim and
Release is valid.
Where a person executing a waiver
or quitclaim has done so voluntarily
with a full understanding of its terms
and conditions, coupled with the
other person's payment of credible
and reasonable consideration, the
transaction is valid and binding.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal by
reason of loss of trust and
confidence is lawful
RULING: (1.) YES. Vilches was
lawfully terminated. Loss of trust
and confidence will validate an
- Dismissal employee's dismissal only upon
compliance with certain
requirements, namely: (1) the
employee concerned must be
holding a position of trust and
confidence; and (2) there must be
an act that would justify the loss of
trust and confidence. In order to
constitute a just cause for
dismissal, the act complained of
must be work-related such as would
show employee concerned to be
unfit to continue working for the
employer.
In the present case, there is no
doubt that Vilches held a position of
trust and confidence as
respondents' Physical Security
Department Manager responsible
for the department's operation and
administration and with about 800
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people under his charge.

Secondly, his failure to produce the

licenses of the 100 security
personnel for two years and to
account for the money received is
definitely an important aspect of his
work as Free Port’s Department
Manager. He failed to perform what
he had represented or what was
expected of him, thus, respondents
had a valid reason in losing
confidence in him which justified his
termination.
Further, failed to account and
produce the licenses of the FSC
Security personnel after two (2)
years from the date of issuance of
the check. This act alone by Vilches
constitutes gross misconduct and
disobedience which is already a
sufficient ground for his dismissal.

(2.) He could not just place the

blame on Col. Gerangco when it
was him who had the obligation to
secure the licenses as represented.
Moreover, there was no showing
that Vilches had exerted efforts for
the immediate release of the
licenses.

[G.R. No. 187491. July 8, ISSUE: Whether the LA’s Decision

2015.] has attained finality in light of
petitioner’s direct filing of its appeal
FAR EAST BANK AND Lbor Relations before the NLRC instead of the
TRUST COMPANY, Regional Arbitration Branch XII in
petitioner, vs. LILIA S. Cotabato City.
CHUA, respondent.
RULING:

YES.

 Art. 218 on the Powers of the

Commission provides that it
shall “promulgate rules and
regulations governing the
hearing and disposition of
cases before it and its regional
branches, as well as those
pertaining to its internal
functions and such rules and
regulations as may be
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necessary to carry out the

purposes of the Code.”
 Rule VI, Section 3 of the 1999
Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC that were in effect when
petitioner appealed from LA’s
Decision provides for the
requisites that must be satisfied
for an appeal from the LA’s
decision may be perfected:
(a) The appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period;
under oath with proof of
payment of the required appeal
fee and the posting of a cash or
surety bond; accompanied by a
memorandum of appeal which
shall state the grounds relied
upon and the arguments in
support thereof; the relief
prayed for; and a statement of
the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision,
order or award and proof of
service on the other party of
such appeal.
(b) The appellee may file with
the Regional Arbitration Branch,
Regional Office or in the POEA
where the appeal was filed, his
answer or reply to appellant's
memorandum of appeal, not
later than 10 calendar days
from receipt thereof. Failure on
the part of the appellee who
was properly furnished with a
copy of the appeal to file his
answer or reply within the said
period may be construed as a
waiver on his part to file the
same.
(c) Subject to the provisions
of Article 218, once the appeal
is perfected in accordance with
these rules, the Commission
may limit itself to reviewing and
deciding specific issues that
were elevated on appeal.
 Rule VI, Section 4 of the same
rules stipulates that appeal
shall be filed with the respective
Regional Arbitration Branch, the
Regional Office, or the
Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration
where the case was heard and
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decided.

[ G.R. No. 188464. July 29, ISSUE: Whether petitioner Raza's

2015. ]
ALBERTO J. RAZA,
petitioner, vs. DAIKOKU
ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC.
and MAMORU ONO,
respondents.
numerous acts of taking the
company car home overnight and
Labor Relation lying about one of the incidents to
the company president legally
- Dismissal deserve the supreme penalty of
dismissal from the company.
RULING
ART. 282. Termination
by employer. — An YES.
employer may terminate an
employment for any of the Raza's acts amounted to serious
following causes: misconduct which falls under the
(a) Serious valid grounds for termination of the
misconduct or services of an employee as
willful provided for in the Labor Code,
disobedience
by the Misconduct is improper or wrongful
employee of the conduct. It is the transgression of
lawful orders of some established and definite rule
his employer or of action, a forbidden act, a
representative dereliction of duty, willful in
in connection character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error of
with his work
judgment

In the case at bar, Raza was

For misconduct to justify
dismissal under the law,
(a) it must be serious, (b)
must relate to the
performance of the
employee's duties; and (c)
must show that the
employee has become unfit
to continue working for the
employer.
terminated not for the singular act
of taking home the company car but
that the incident was preceded by
31 other instances of unauthorized
use of the car. By taking the
vehicle out and driving it to his
home, the driver exposes such
company property to the risk of
damage or loss due to collisions,
theft or even untoward incidents
such as a fire or civil disturbance.
There is also a risk of company
liability to third persons arising from
such use. In addition, such use is
not free of costs, since the extra
journey entails fuel use, wear and
tear, and other allied expenses.
The infractions of Raza were
numerous enough that they already
amount to an unlawful taking of
company resources and that they
may be subsumed under the
charge of serious misconduct
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[G.R. No. 211882. July 29,
2015.] Labor Relations
ELBURG
SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILS.,
INC., ENTERPRISE
SHIPPING AGENCY SRL
AND/OR EVANGELINE
RACHO, petitioners, vs.
ERNESTO S. QUIOGUE,
JR., respondent
leveled against him.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER QUIOGUE IS
ENTITLED TO PERMANENT AND
TOTAL DIS ABILITY BENFITS
AND OTHER CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES?
- Total disabity
Benefit RULING: It is a well-settled rule that
if the medical treatment or
evaluation exceeds 240 days, the
seafarer is entitled to permanent
and total disability benefits. The
doctrine recognizes that, in
awarding disability benefits to the
seaman, disability should not be
understood more on its medical
significance but on the loss of
earning capacity.
The records show that Quiogue still
experienced recurring pains in his
injured left foot. The company-
designated physician, however,
even with the recurring pains,
declared him as fit to work. Thus,
Quiogue sought the opinion of his
own physician, Dr. Escutin, who
after the necessary tests and
examination declared him unfit for
sea duty in whatever capacity as a
seaman.
The right of a seafarer to consult a
physician of his choice can only be
sensible when his findings are duly
evaluated by the labor tribunals in
awarding disability claims.40
The credibility of the findings of
Quiogue's private doctor was
properly evaluated by the NLRC
when it found that the findings of
Dr. Escutin who gave Grade 1
disability rating was more
appropriate and applicable to the
injury suffered by Quiogue. With
these medical findings and the fact
that Quiogue failed to be re-
deployed by petitioners despite the
fit to work assessment, Dr.
Escutin's assessment should be
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upheld.

Even in the absence of an official

finding by Dr. Escutin, Quiogue is
deemed to have suffered
permanent total disability.

The fact that Quiogue was declared

"fit to work" by the company-
designated physician (with whom
he underwent treatment and
therapy from November 2010 to
April 2011) on April 13, 2011 does
not matter because the certification
was issued beyond the authorized
120-day period.

There is no merit in petitioners'

argument that Quiogue's
entitlement to permanent total
disability benefits was merely based
on his inability to return to work for
120 days. He was entitled to
permanent and total disability
benefits not solely because of his
incapacity to work for more than
120 days, but also because the
company-designated physician
belatedly gave his definite
assessment on Quiogue medical
condition, without any justifiable
reason therefor.
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Title of the Case Labor Standards/ Labor ISSUE

G.R. No Relations RULING
[ G.R. No. 212096, ISSUE: Whether or not
October 14, 2015 ] Lumahan was illegally
dismissed.
NIGHTOWL WATCHMAN Labor Relation
& SECURITY AGENCY, RULING:
INC., petitioner, vs. - Illegally dismissal
NESTOR LUMAHAN, NO. The SC find that the CA
respondent. erred in disregarding the NLRC's
conclusion that there had been
no dismissal, and in immediately
proceeding to tackle Nightowl's
defense that Lumahan
abandoned his work.

In every employee dismissal

case, the employer bears the
burden of proving the validity of
the employee's dismissal, i.e.,
the existence of just or
authorized cause for the
dismissal and the observance of
the due process requirements.
The employer's burden of proof,
however, presupposes that the
employee had in fact been
dismissed, with the burden to
prove the fact of dismissal
resting on the employee.
Without any dismissal action on
the part of the employer, valid or
otherwise, no burden to prove
just or authorized cause arises.

As no dismissal was carried out

in this case, any consideration of
abandonment - as a defense
raised by an employer in
dismissal situations -was clearly
misplaced. To our mind, the CA
again committed a reversible
error in considering that
Nightowl raised abandonment as
a defense.

Abandonment, as understood
under our labor laws, refers to
the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to
resume his employment. It is a
form of neglect of duty that
constitutes just cause for the
employer to dismiss the
employee.
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Under this construct,

abandonment is a defense
available against the employee
who alleges a dismissal. Thus,
for the employer "to successfully
invoke abandonment, whether
as a ground for dismissing an
employee or as a defense, the
employer bears the burden of
proving the employee's
unjustified refusal to resume his
employment." This burden, of
course, proceeds from the
general rule that places the
burden on the employer to prove
the validity of the dismissal.

In cases where no dismissal

took place, the proper award is
reinstatement, without
backwages, not as a relief for
any illegal dismissal but on
equitable grounds. When,
however, reinstatement of the
employee is rendered
impossible, as when the
employee had been out for a
long period of time, the award of
separation pay is proper.

[ G.R. No. 194410, ISSUE: Whether the

October 14, 2015 ] redundancy program was legally
implemented.
OCEAN EAST AGENCY, Labor Relation
CORPORATION, ENGR. RULING:
ARTURO D. CARMEN, - Termination of
AND CAPT. NICOLAS employment NO.
SKINITIS, petitioners, vs.
Redundancy exists when the
ALLAN I. LOPEZ, service capability of the
respondent. workforce is in excess of what is
reasonably needed to meet the
demands of the enterprise. A
redundant position is one
rendered superfluous by any
number of factors, such as over
hiring of workers, decreased
volume of business, dropping of
a particular product line
previously manufactured by the
Article 283 of the Labor Code. For company, or phasing-out of a
the implementation of a service activity previously
redundancy program to be valid, undertaken by the business.
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the employer must comply with
these requisites:
(1) written notice served on
both the employee and the
Department of Labor and
Employment at least one
month prior to the intended
date of retrenchment;
(2) payment of separation
pay equivalent to at least one
month pay or at least one
month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher;
(3) good faith in abolishing
the redundant positions; and
(4) fair and reasonable
criteria in ascertaining what
positions are to be declared
redundant and accordingly
abolished.
Under these factors, the
employer has no legal obligation
to keep in its payroll more
employees than are necessary
for the operation of its business.
Even if a business is doing well,
an employer can still validly
dismiss an employee from the
service due to redundancy if that
employee's position has already
become in excess of what the
employer's enterprise requires.
As an authorized cause for
termination of employment,
redundancy may be
implemented subject only to
strict requirements spelled out in
Article 283.
The Court finds that petitioners
failed to establish compliance
with the first, third and fourth
requisites for a valid
implementation of a redundancy
program, thereby making Ocean
East liable for illegal dismissal.
In this case, petitioners were
able to establish through Ocean
East's Quality Procedures
Manual that Lopez' position as a
Documentation Officer was
redundant because its duties
and functions were similar to
those of the Documentation
Clerks in its operations
department. However, they
failed to prove by substantial
evidence their observance of the
fair and reasonable criteria of
seniority and efficiency in
ascertaining the redundancy of
the position of Documentation
Officer, as well as good faith on
their part in abolishing such
position. Petitioners were unable
to justify why it was more
efficient to terminate Lopez
rather than its two other
Documentation Clerks, Reynolds
and Hing. Also, while Reynolds
was supposedly retained for
being more senior than Lopez,
petitioners were silent on why
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[ G.R. No. 194969,
October 07, 2015 ]
CONVOY MARKETING Labor Relation
CORPORATION AND/OR
ARNOLD LAAB, - Status of Employment
petitioners, vs. OLIVER B.
ALBIA,* respondent.
The test of independent
contractorship is whether one
claiming to be an independent
contractor has contracted to do
the work according to his own
methods and without being
subject to the control of the
employer, except only as to the
results of the work
they chose to retain Hing who
was hired in 1996, instead of
Lopez who was hired about
eight (8) years earlier in 1988.
ISSUE: Whether or not Albia
was not a regular employee of
Convoy, but merely a
contractual one whose services
ended upon the expiration of the
period agreed upon.
RULING: NO. The existence of
an employer- employee
relationship cannot be negated
by expressly repudiating it in a
contract and providing therein
that the employee is an
independent contractor when the
facts clearly show otherwise.
The employment status of a
person is defined and
prescribed by law and not by
what the parties say it should
be. Contrary to petitioners'
claim, the fact that Convoy has
fifteen (15)regular drivers only
underscores that indeed, having
been hired as a driver, Albia was
engaged to perform an activity
which is necessary or desirable
in the usual company business
of marketing and distribution of
bottled wines, liquor and bottled
water. No less than Convoy's
daily trip summary
breakdowns contradict
petitioner’s allegation that
Albia is only an on-call driver
who does not have to report
for work daily. Albia has
become a regular employee is
evident from the Delivery
Agency Agreements (For Driver)
— which indicate that he had
rendered at least one year of
broken service with respect to
the same activity in which he
was employed from the time he
was hired as a driver on
November 22, 2002 until he was
terminated on July 23, 2004.
Albia cannot be considered as
in independent contractor. There
is no dispute that it was Convoy
who engaged the services of
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Albia as a driver without the

intervention of a third party, paid
his wages on a per trip basis,
and abruptly terminated his
services the next day after
admitting to have consumed
three bottles of beer after
finishing his deliveries on July
22, 2004. There is, likewise, no
question that Convoy controls or
has reserved its right to control
Albia's conduct, not only as to
the result of his work but also as
to the means and methods by
which such result is to be
accomplished.
ISSUE: WON posting a bond is
[G.R. No. 206612. August required to perfect the appeal in
this case.
17, 2015.] Labor Relation
TOYOTA ALABANG, INC., RULING:
petitioner, vs. EDWIN - Illegally Dismissed
GAMES, respondent. The decision that petitioner
illegally dismissed respondent
was already final and executory
because of petitioner's failure to
file a timely appeal. Petitioner
itself was negligent in advancing
its case and failed to exhibit
diligence when it did not attend
the hearings. the Court finds that
the CA justly refused to reopen
the case in the former's favor.
Definitely, petitioner cannot now
be allowed to claim denial of due
process when it was petitioner
who was less than vigilant of its
rights. No appeal may be taken
from an order of execution of a
final and executory judgment.
After all, just as a losing party
has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, so
does the winning party have the
correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the
case. An appeal is not a matter
of right, but is a mere statutory
privilege.

The bond is required to perfect

an appeal. Article223 of the
Labor Code and Section 6, Rule
VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, uniformly state that
“In case the decision of the
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Labor Arbiter or the Regional

Director involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a bond,
which shall either be in the form
of cash deposit or surety bond
equivalent in amount to the
monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorney's fees.”
These rules generally state that
in case the ruling of the LA
involves a monetary award, an
employer's appeal may be
perfected only upon the posting
of a bond. Therefore, absent any
qualifying terms,13 so long as the
decision of the LA involves a
monetary award, as in this
case,14 that ruling can only be
appealed after the employer
posts a bond. The purpose of
the bond is to ensure that the
employee has properties on
which he or she can execute
upon in the event of a final,
providential award. PETITION
DENIED.
[G.R. No. 190984. August
19, 2015.] ISSUE: Whether or not the
respondent is entitled to
ACOMARIT PHILS., Labor Standard permanent disability benefits?
and/or ACOMARIT
HONGKONG LIMITED, - Permanent Disability RULING: No, the respondent is
petitioners, vs. GOMER L. not entitled to the permanent
DOTIMAS, respondent. disability benefits.

When respondent was declared

fit to work 144 days from the
date of his medical repatriation,
he cannot be considered under
the state of permanent total
disability. Hence, he cannot be
said to have acquired a cause of
action for total and permanent
disability benefits. To stress, the
rule is that a temporary total
disability only becomes
permanent when the company-
designated physician, within the
240-day period, declares it to be
so, or when after the lapse of the
same, he fails to make such
declaration. In this case, he was
declared fit to work 144 days
from the date of his medical
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repatriation or before the lapse

of 240 days.

[G.R. No. 202090.

September 9, 2015.] ISSUE:
WON THE COMPLAINT IS
ICT MARKETING Labor Relation ILLEGALY DISMISSED AND
SERVICES, INC. (now SEPARATION PAY
known as SYKES - illegally dismissed
MARKETING SERVICES, RULING:
INC.), petitioner, vs.
Concerning the transfer of
MARIPHIL L. SALES, employees, these are the
respondent. Labor Standard following jurisprudential
guidelines: (a) a transfer is a
- Separation Pay movement from one position to
another of equivalent rank, level
or salary without break in the
service or a lateral movement
from one position to another of
equivalent rank or salary; (b) the
employer has the inherent right
to transfer or reassign an
employee for legitimate business
purposes; (c) a transfer
becomes unlawful where it is
motivated by discrimination or
bad faith or is effected as a form
of punishment or is a demotion
without sufficient cause; (d) the
employer must be able to show
that the transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient, or
prejudicial to the employee.

While the prerogative to transfer

respondent to another account
belonged to petitioner, it wielded
the same unfairly. The evidence
suggests that at the time
respondent was transferred from
the Washington Mutual account
to the Bank of America program,
petitioner was hiring additional
CSRs/TSRs. This simply means
that if it was then hiring new
CSRs/TSRs, then there should
be no need to transfer
respondent to the Bank of
America program; it could simply
train new hires for that program.
Transferring respondent - an
experienced employee who was
already familiar with the
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Washington Mutual account, and

who even proved to be
outstanding in handling the
same - to another account
means additional expenses for
petitioner: it would have to train
respondent for the Bank of
America account, and train a
new hire to take her place in the
Washington Mutual account.
This does not make sense; quite
the contrary, it is impractical and
entails more expense on
petitioner's part. If respondent
already knew her work at the
Washington Mutual account very
well, then it is contrary to
experience and logic to transfer
her to another account which
she is not familiar with, there to
start from scratch; this could
have been properly relegated to
a new hire.

There can be no truth to

petitioner's claim either that
respondent's transfer was made
upon request of the client. If she
was performing outstanding
work and bringing in good
business for the client, there is
no reason - indeed it is beyond
experience and logic - to
conclude that the client would
seek her transfer. Such a claim
could only be fabricated.

The managerial prerogative to

transfer personnel must be
exercised without grave abuse
of discretion, bearing in mind the
basic elements of justice and fair
play. Having the right should not
be confused with the manner in
which that right is exercised.
Thus, it cannot be used as a
subterfuge by the employer to
rid himself of an undesirable
worker. In particular, the
employer must be able to show
that the transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient or
prejudicial to the employee; nor
does it involve a demotion in
rank or a diminution of his
salaries, privileges and other
Kuya arjjay

benefits. Should the employer

fail to overcome this burden of
proof, the employee's transfer
shall be tantamount to
constructive dismissal, which
has been defined as a quitting
because continued employment
is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; as an
offer involving a demotion in
rank and diminution in pay.
Likewise, constructive dismissal
exists when an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer has
become so unbearable to the
employee leaving him with no
option but to forego with his
continued employment.

In placing respondent on
"floating status," petitioner
further acted arbitrarily and
unfairly, making life unbearable
for her. In so doing, it treated
respondent as if she were a new
hire; it improperly disregarded
her experience, status,
performance, and achievements
in the company; and most
importantly, respondent was
illegally deprived of her salary
and other emoluments.

For her single absence during

training for the Bank of America
account, she was refused
certification, and as a result, she
was placed on floating status
and her salary was withheld.
Clearly, this was an act of
discrimination and unfairness
considering that she was not an
inexperienced new hire, but a
promising and award-winning
employee who was more than
eager to succeed within the
company. This conclusion is not
totally baseless, and is rooted in
her outstanding performance at
the Washington Mutual account
and her complaint regarding the
incentives, which only proves
her zeal, positive work attitude,
and drive to achieve financial
success through hard work. But
Kuya arjjay

instead of rewarding her,

petitioner unduly punished her;
instead of inspiring her,
petitioner dashed her hopes and
dreams; in return for her
industry, idealism, positive
outlook and fervor, petitioner left
her with a legacy of, and awful
examples in, office politicking,
intrigue, and internecine
schemes.
[G.R. No. 201536. ISSUE: Whether or not
Respondent is entitled to
September 9, 2015.] permanent disability benefits?
GRACE MARINE
SHIPPING RULING:
CORPORATION and/or Yes, he is entitled to permanent
CAPT. JIMMY BOADO, disability benefits. The court held
the following:
petitioners, vs. ARON S.
ALARCON, respondent. The Court finds that
respondent’s psoriasis and
nummular eczema, which have
not been cured, are work-
connected and thus
compensable. He is unfit to
continue his duties as messman,
as his illness prevents him from
performing his functions as
such. Up to this point, it does not
appear that petitioners took him
back to work for their principal,
or that a declaration of fitness to
work or that his condition has
been resolved or cured has
been issued. “[A]n employee’s
disability becomes permanent
and total when so declared by
the company-designated
physician, or, in case of absence
of such a declaration either of
fitness or permanent total
disability, upon the lapse of the
120 or 240-day treatment period
under Article 192 (c) (1) of the
Labor Code and Rule X, Section
2 of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation
Commission, while the
employee’s disability continues
and he is unable to engage in
gainful employment during such
period, and the company-
designated physician fails to
arrive at a definite assessment
Kuya arjjay

of the employee’s fitness or

disability. This is true regardless
of whether the employee loses
the use of any part of his body or
if the injury or disability is
classified as Grade 1 under the
POEA-SEC.”

The evidence further suggests

that before respondent was
employed by petitioners, he did
not suffer from psoriasis and
nummular eczema; if he had
been afflicted with these
ailments prior to employment,
surely he would not have been
taken in. He was given a clean
bill of health through the
standard pre-employment
physical examination. Besides,
in any of their pleadings,
petitioners did not contest this
fact; nor did they claim that
respondent had these conditions
prior to his employment.
Kuya arjjay

[G.R. No. 202090. September 9,

2015.]
ICT MARKETING SERVICES,
INC. (now known as SYKES
MARKETING SERVICES, INC.),
petitioner, vs. MARIPHIL L.
SALES, respondent.

[G.R. No. 201536. September 9,

2015.]
GRACE MARINE SHIPPING Labor Relations ISSUE: Whether or not
CORPORATION and/or CAPT. Respondent is entitled to
permanent disability benefits?
JIMMY BOADO, petitioners, vs.
ARON S. ALARCON,
respondent.

RULING:

Yes, he is entitled to permanent

disability benefits. The court held
the following:

The Court finds that respondent’s

psoriasis and nummular eczema,
which have not been cured, are
work-connected and thus
compensable. He is unfit to
continue his duties as messman,
as his illness prevents him from
performing his functions as such.
Up to this point, it does not
appear that petitioners took him
back to work for their principal, or
that a declaration of fitness to
work or that his condition has
been resolved or cured has been
issued. “[A]n employee’s
disability becomes permanent
and total when so declared by
the company-designated
physician, or, in case of absence
of such a declaration either of
fitness or permanent total
disability, upon the lapse of the
120 or 240-day treatment period
under Article 192 (c) (1) of the
Labor Code and Rule X, Section
2 of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation
Commission, while the
employee’s disability continues
and he is unable to engage in
gainful employment during such
period, and the company-
Kuya arjjay

designated physician fails to

arrive at a definite assessment of
the employee’s fitness or
disability. This is true regardless
of whether the employee loses
the use of any part of his body or
if the injury or disability is
classified as Grade 1 under the
POEA-SEC.”

The evidence further suggests

that before respondent was
employed by petitioners, he did
not suffer from psoriasis and
nummular eczema; if he had
been afflicted with these ailments
prior to employment, surely he
would not have been taken in. He
was given a clean bill of health
through the standard pre-
employment physical
examination. Besides, in any of
their pleadings, petitioners did
not contest this fact; nor did they
claim that respondent had these
conditions prior to his
employment.

Title of the Case Labor ISSUE

G.R. No Standards/ RULING
Labor
Relations
[G.R. No. 201535, October 05, 2015 ]
NEC SYSTEM INTEGRATED CONSTRUCTION (NESIC) PHILS.,
INC., petitioner, vs. RALPH T. CRISOLOGO, respondent.[ ISSUE: Whether or not
Crisology may dispute
his retrenchment

RULING:

NO. Crisologo has

declared and
manifested thru the quit
claim and waiver that he
executed the same in
his "own free will and for
valuable consideration."
This signifies his
acceptance of the
benefits thereunder.
Thus, it can hardly be
doubted that from its
end petitioner had dealt
at arms length with
respondent in the
Kuya arjjay

matter of duly
compensating the latter
for the services he had
rendered the petitioner
during the 11 years or
so that he had been
under its employ. The
records of the case
yield no evidence that
respondent had ever
been tricked or
hoodwinked into affixing
his signature upon the
said deed of waiver-
quitclaim cum
separation pay. His
impressive credentials
are of course ample
proof of authentic high
level academic
achievement, indicative
of a by-no-means
middling or common
place intellectual power.
The combination of all
these circumstances
thus repels the
suggestion that
respondent might not
have fully or thoroughly
grasped or understood
the plain meaning,
intendment and
significance of the
deed/document to
which he affixed his
signature, and from the
obvious and inevitable
effects of which he now
seeks to rid or extricate
himself. That by his free
and voluntary act and
deed he chose or opted
to deed away his
patrimonial rights he
has only himself to
blame. The decision of
the NLRC was
reinstated.

.[ G.R. No. 186114, October 07, 2015 ] ISSUE: Whether or not

CHEVRON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. VITALIANO C GALIT, there exists an
SJS AND SONS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION AND MR. Labor Relations employer – employee
REYNALDO SALOMON, respondents. relationship between
Kuya arjjay

Galit and SJS

RULING:

(1.) Galit is a regular

employee of SJS. Upon
cursory reading of the
employment contract
between SJS and Galit,
it is readily seen that
SJS has the power of
dismissal and control.
Galit admitted in his
complaint that it was
SJS which detailed him
in the Pandacan oil
depot. Galit also did not
present any evidence to
prove that it was
Chevron which pays his
wages and that SJS is a
mere conduit of the
latter. He was
dismissed therefrom
because Chevron no
longer renewed its
contract with SJS and
that the latter
subsequently ceased to
operate.

(2.) The work performed

by Galit, which is the
"scooping of slop of oil
water separator," has
no direct relation to
Chevron’s business,
which is the importation,
refining and
manufacture of
petroleum products.
The job performed by
Galit, which essentially
consists of janitorial
services, may be
incidental or desirable
to petitioner's main
activity but it is not
necessary and directly
related to it.

[ G.R. No. 193990, October 14, 2015 ]

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., AND/OR CONGRESSMAN ISSUE: Whether or not
ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, petitioners, vs. JULIO C. CANJA, Labor Relations the act of the CA
respondent. modifying the NLRC
decision is proper
Kuya arjjay

despite it being final and

executory and that an
entry of judgment has
been made.

RULING: YES, in
Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc. v.
Legaspi, 16 the Court
has the occasion to rule
that a petition for
certiorari is not
rendered moot by the
mere fact that there was
already an executed
NLRC decision.

The judicial review of

decisions of the NLRC
may be sought via a
petition for certiorari
before the CA under
Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and under
Section 4 thereof,
petitioners are allowed
sixty (60) days from
notice of the assailed
order or resolution
within which to file the
petition. Hence, in
cases where a petition
for certiorari is filed after
the expiration of the JO-
day period under the
2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure but within the
60-day period under
Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the CA can grant
the petition and modify,
nullify and reverse a
decision or resolution of
the NLRC.

In this case, under the

NLRC Rules of
Procedure, petitioners
have sixty (60) days
from receipt of the
denial of the motion for
reconsideration within
which to file the petition
for certiorari under
Section 4 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. The
Kuya arjjay

petition for certiorari

filed on February 16,
2010 was then timely.
Consequently, the
appellate court can still
grant the petition and
modify, nullify and
reverse a decision or
resolution of the NLRC.

In this case, considering

that the petition was
filed within the
reglementary period to
file a petition for
certiorari, the decision
had not attained finality
yet. It bears stressing
that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65
must be filed not later
than 60 days from
notice of the judgment,
order or resolution
sought to be annulled.
Indubitably, the
issuance of an entry of
judgment by the NLRC
cannot render a petition
for certiorari as moot
and academic. Hence,
Petition denied.

[ G.R. No. 211145, October 14, 2015 ] Labor Relations ISSUES: Whether
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD REP. BY Samahan should have
ITS PRESIDENT, ALFIE ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF formed a union and
LABOR RELATIONS, HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND whether they may carry
CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. (HHIC-PHIL.), respondents.. the Hanjin name.

RULING:

Yes. Samahan should

have formed a union
however the labor code
is silent when it comes
to the matter that
involves them carrying
the Hanjin Name. The
Supreme Court
discussed the following;

As Article 246 (now

252) of the Labor Code
provides, the right to
self-organization
Kuya arjjay

includes the right to

form, join or assist labor
organizations for the
purpose of collective
bargaining through
representatives of their
own choosing and to
engage in lawful
concerted activities for
the same purpose for
their mutual aid and
protection. This is in line
with the policy of the
State to foster the free
and voluntary
organization of a strong
and united labor
movement as well as to
make sure that workers
participate in policy and
decision-making
processes affecting
their rights, duties and
welfare.

The right to form a

union or association or
to self-organization
comprehends two
notions, to wit: (a) the
liberty or freedom, that
is, the absence of
restraint which
guarantees that the
employee may act for
himself without being
prevented by law; and
(b) the power, by virtue
of which an employee
may, as he pleases, join
or refrain from joining
an association.

In view of the revered

right of every worker to
self-organization, the
law expressly allows
and even encourages
the formation of labor
organizations. A labor
organization is defined
as "any union or
association of
employees which exists
in whole or in part for
the purpose of collective
Kuya arjjay

bargaining or of dealing
with employers
concerning terms and
conditions of
employment." A labor
organization has two
broad rights: (1) to
bargain collectively and
(2) to deal with the
employer concerning
terms and conditions of
employment. To bargain
collectively is a right
given to a union once it
registers itself with the
DOLE. Dealing with the
employer, on the other
hand, is a generic
description of
interaction between
employer and
employees concerning
grievances, wages,
work hours and other
terms and conditions of
employment, even if the
employees' group is not
registered with the
DOLE.

In the case at bench,

the Court cannot
sanction the opinion of
the CA that Samahan
should have formed a
union for purposes of
collective bargaining
instead of a workers'
association because the
choice belonged to it.
The right to form or join
a labor organization
necessarily includes the
right to refuse or refrain
from exercising the said
right. It is self-evident
that just as no one
should be denied the
exercise of a right
granted by law, so also,
no one should be
compelled to exercise
such a conferred right.
Also inherent in the right
to self-organization is
the right to choose
Kuya arjjay

whether to form a union

for purposes of
collective bargaining or
a workers' association
for purposes of
providing mutual aid
and protection.

In this case, Samahan's

registration was
cancelled not because
its members were
prohibited from forming
a workers' association
but because they
allegedly committed
misrepresentation for
using the phrase,
"KAMI, ang mga
Manggagawa sa HAN
JIN Shipyard."

Misrepresentation, as a
ground for the
cancellation of
registration of a labor
organization, is
committed "in
connection with the
adoption, or ratification
of the constitution and
by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of
ratification, the list of
members who took part
in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws
or amendments thereto,
and those in connection
with the election of
officers, minutes of the
election of officers, and
the list of voters.

The Court concludes

that misrepresentation,
to be a ground for the
cancellation of the
certificate of
registration, must be
done maliciously and
deliberately. Further,
the mistakes appearing
in the application or
attachments must be
grave or refer to
Kuya arjjay

significant matters. The

details as to how the
alleged fraud was
committed must also be
indubitably shown.

The records of this case

reveal no deliberate or
malicious intent to
commit
misrepresentation on
the part of Samahan.
The use of such words
"KAMI, ang mga
Manggagawa sa
HANJIN Shipyard" in
the preamble of the
constitution and by-laws
did not constitute
misrepresentation so as
to warrant the
cancellation of
Samahan's certificate of
registration. Hanjin
failed to indicate how
this phrase constitutes a
malicious and deliberate
misrepresentation.
Neither was there any
showing that the alleged
misrepresentation was
serious in character.
Misrepresentation is a
devious charge that
cannot simply be
entertained by mere
surmises and
conjectures.

Even granting arguendo

that Samahan's
members
misrepresented
themselves as
employees or workers
of Hanjin, said
misrepresentation does
not relate to the
adoption or ratification
of its constitution and
by-laws or to the
election of its officers.

Nevertheless, the Court

agrees with the BLR
that "Hanjin Shipyard"
Kuya arjjay

must be removed in the

name of the
association. A legitimate
workers' association
refers to an association
of workers organized for
mutual aid and
protection of its
members or for any
legitimate purpose other
than collective
bargaining registered
with the DOLE. Having
been granted a
certificate of
registration, Samahan's
association is now
recognized by law as a
legitimate workers'
association.

According to Samahan,
inherent in the workers'
right to self-organization
is its right to name its
own organization. It
seems to equate the
dropping of words
"Hanjin Shipyard" from
its name as a restraint
in its exercise of the
right to self-
organization. Hanjin, on
the other hand, invokes
that "Hanjin Shipyard" is
a registered trade name
and, thus, it is within
their right to prohibit its
use.

As there is no
provision under our
labor laws which
speak of the use of
name by a workers'
association, the Court
refers to the
Corporation Code,
which governs the
names of juridical
persons. Section 18
thereof provides:
No corporate name
may be allowed by the
Securities and
Exchange
Kuya arjjay

Commission if the
proposed name is
identical or
deceptively or
confusingly similar to
that of any existing
corporation or to any
other name already
protected by law or is
patently deceptive,
confusing or contrary
to existing laws. When
a change in the
corporate name is
approved, the
Commission shall
issue an amended
certificate of
incorporation under
the amended name.
[Emphases Supplied]

The policy underlying

the prohibition in
Section 18 against the
registration of a
corporate name which
is "identical or
deceptively or
confusingly similar" to
that of any existing
corporation or which is
"patently deceptive" or
"patently confusing" or
"contrary to existing
laws," is the avoidance
of fraud upon the public
which would have
occasion to deal with
the entity concerned,
the evasion of legal
obligations and duties,
and the reduction of
difficulties of
administration and
supervision over
corporations.

For the same reason, it

would be misleading for
the members of
Samahan to use "Hanjin
Shipyard" in its name as
it could give the wrong
impression that all of its
members are employed
Kuya arjjay

by Hanjin.

[ G.R. No. 197852, October 19, 2015 ] Labor Relations ISSUE: Whether or not
PASIG AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL the CA erred in holding
SUPPLY CORPORATION AND CELESTINO E. DAMIAN, that petitioners’ exercise
petitioners, vs. WILSON NIEVAREZ, ALBERTO HALINA, GLORY of its management
VIC NUEVO, RICKY TORRES AND CORNELIO BALLE, prerogative to
respondents. temporarily lay-off
employees is illegal in
view of its failure to
present financial
statements to evidence
its financial losses.

RULING:

The Court finds

the petition without
merit. Jurisprudence, in
both a permanent and a
temporary lay-off,
dictates that the one-
month notice rule to
both the DOLE and the
employee under Article
283 (now Article 298) is
mandatory. Also, in
both cases, the layoff,
as an exercise of the
employer's
management
prerogative, must be
exercised in good faith -
that is, one which is
intended for the
advancement of
employers' interest and
not for the purpose of
defeating or
circumventing the rights
of the employees under
special laws or under
valid agreements.

In light of the well-

entrenched rule that the
burden to prove the
validity and legality of
the termination of
employment falls on the
employer and the
requisites provided by
Article 286 (now Article
301) of the Labor Code,
Kuya arjjay

PADISCOR should
have established the
bona fide suspension of
its business operations
or undertaking that
would have resulted in
the temporary lay-off of
the respondents for a
period not exceeding six
(6) months in
accordance with the
Labor Code.

In the present case,

PADISCOR failed to
prove its compliance
with the said requisites.
In invoking such article
in the Labor Code, the
paramount
consideration should be
the dire exigency of the
business of the
employer that compels
it to put some of its
employees temporarily
out of work. This means
that the employer
should be able to prove
that it is faced with a
clear and compelling
economic reason which
reasonably forces it to
temporarily shut down
its business operations
or a particular
undertaking, incidentally
resulting to the
temporary lay-off of its
employees.
Kuya arjjay
Kuya arjjay

Title of the Case Labor ISSUE

G.R. No Standards/ RULING
Labor
Relations
[ G.R. No. 196597, October 21, 2015 ] ISSUE: Whether or not Rivera was
MODESTO W. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. ALLIED illegally dismissed from work
BANKING CORPORATION, CORA D. CORPUS AND Labor
ANTONIO H. SANTOS, respondents. Relations RULING:

NO. Under Article 282 (c) of the

Labor Code, as amended, an
employer may dismiss the
employee either for (1) fraud; or (2)
willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized
representative. There is no question
that petitioner's position as Branch
Head requires a high degree of trust
and confidence. Given the sensitive
functions of his office, he is thus
expected to strictly observe and
comply with the Bank's standard
operating procedures. Contrary to
petitioner's asseveration,
respondents did not just rely on the
allegations of Ms. Sta. Cruz, whose
complaint merely triggered the full
investigation conducted by the Bank
on the return of several foreign
currency checks. Subsequently, the
audit on petitioner's branch
revealed that several US Dollar
denominated currency checks were
returned due to forged or
unauthorized endorsements. The
practice of accepting for deposit
second-endorsed US Dollar
denominated checks is strictly
prohibited under the Bank's
established policies, and may be
allowed only in certain exceptional
cases. The Bank's investigation on
the transactions involving foreign
currency checks during petitioner's
tenure as Branch Head disclosed
that petitioner deliberately
disregarded the foregoing rules
when he accepted for deposit
several US Dollar denominated
checks from Ms. Sta. Cruz. Thus,
the Bank is justified in imposing the
supreme penalty of dismissal.
Kuya arjjay

[ G.R. No. 215313, October 21, 2015 ]

OLIMPIO O. OLIDANA, petitioner, vs. JEBSENS ISSUE:
MARITIME, INC., respondent. Labor
Relations RULING:

Permanent disability is the inability

of a worker to perform his job for
more than 120 days, regardless of
whether he loses the use of any
part of his body. Total disability, on
the other hand, means the
disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work of
similar nature that he was trained
for, or accustomed to perform, or
any kind of work which a person of
his mentality and attainments could
do.

Accordingly, permanent total

disability does not mean a state of
absolute helplessness but the
inability to do substantially all
material acts necessary to the
prosecution of a gainful occupation
without serious discomfort or pain
and without material injury or
danger to life. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury per
se which is compensated but the
incapacity to work.

To determine whether a seafarer is

entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits, the Court takes
into account both the law and the
contract which govern his overseas
employment. Recently,
amendments were placed in the
POEA-SEC which is the primary
contract that regulates a seafarer's
employment. Section 20 (A) (6) of
the 2010 POEA-SEC now provides
that "[t]he disability shall be based
solely on the disability gradings
provided under Section 32 of this
Contract, and shall not be
measured or determined by the
number of days a seafarer is under
treatment or the number of days in
which sickness allowance is paid.

The Court, nevertheless, is of the

view that before the disability
gradings under Section 32 should
be considered, these disability
Kuya arjjay

ratings should be properly

established and contained in a valid
and timely medical report of a
company-designated physician.
Thus, the foremost consideration of
the courts should be to determine
whether the medical assessment or
report of the company-designated
physician was complete and
appropriately issued; otherwise, the
medical report shall be set aside
and the disability grading contained
therein cannot be seriously
appreciated.

The company-designated
physicians issued two medical
reports, both dated March 27, 2012.
The disability report, on one hand,
stated that Olidana only suffered
loss of grasping power for small
objects between the fold of the
finger of one hand, which was a
Grade 10 disability or a partial
disability rating. The company-
designated physicians' final medical
report, on the other hand,
recommended that Olidana was
unfit for duty. Glaringly, these two
medical reports contradicted each
other. Interestingly, the final medical
report, which stated that Olidana
was unfit for duty, concurred with
Dr. Runas' medical evaluation
report. The latter report stated that
Olidana was physically unfit to
continue with his job as a seaman
or cook, or in whatever capacity,
due to his permanent disability.

In the recent case of Elburg

Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v.
Quiogue, Jr., the Court summarized
the rules regarding the company-
designated physician's duty to issue
a final medical assessment on the
seafarer's disability grading, as
follows:

1. The company-designated
physician must issue a final medical
assessment on the seafarer's
disability grading within a period of
120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;
Kuya arjjay

2. If the company-designated
physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120
days, without any justifiable reason,
then the seafarer's disability
becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated
physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120
days with a sufficient justification
(e.g. seafarer required further
medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of
diagnosis and treatment shall be
extended to 240 days. The
employer has the burden to prove
that the company-designated
physician has sufficient justification
to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated
physician still fails to give his
assessment within the extended
period of 240 days, then the
seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total, regardless of
any justification.

Here, Olidana was repatriated on

November 18, 2011. Within three
(3) days, he was referred to the
company-designated physicians. It
was only on March 27, 2012, or
after a period of 130 days, that the
company-designated physicians
issued the questionable disability
report beyond the 120-day period.
Although Section 20 (A) (6) of the
2010 POEA-SEC instructs that
disability shall not be measured or
determined by the number of days a
seafarer is under treatment, equally
significant is our pronouncement in
Carcedo v. Maine Marine Phils.,
Inc., that while "the determination of
the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty
is the province of the company-
designated physician, it is still
subject to the periods prescribed by
law.”

Even assuming that Jebsens

properly raised the extended 240-
day period due to prolonged
physical therapy sessions, Olidana
Kuya arjjay
[ G.R. No. 192955, November 09, 2015 ]
EDILBERTO P. ETOM, JR., petitioner, vs. AROMA
LODGING HOUSE THROUGH EDUARDO G. LEM,
PROPRIETOR AND GENERAL MANAGER, respondent.
still has a valid claim against his
employer.
In the present case, it has been
established that, in spite the lapse
of the extended 240-day period,
Olidana was still incapacitated to
perform his sea duties. Due to the
injury he sustained, he could no
longer perform his usual tasks as
chief cook in any vessel. Thus, it
resulted to his unemployment until
this very day. As correctly held by
the VA, this clearly indicate
Olidana's permanent disability.
In addition, it must be reiterated that
the company-designated
physicians' disability report should
be set aside for being contradictory.
Necessarily, it cannot be said that
the company-designated physicians
issued a valid and final medical
assessment within the 120-day or
240-day period. The Court in
Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar
held that the declaration by the
company-designated physician is
an obligation, the abdication of
which transforms the temporary
total disability to permanent total
disability, regardless of the disability
grade
In fine, it cannot be said with
certainty whether Olidana could
resume his seafaring profession in
the future. He must accept the
inevitable that his distressing injury
had practically ruined his career
and he must carry its burden for the
rest of his life. Nevertheless, at
present, it is clear is that Olidana
suffered from a permanent total
disability resulting in a loss of
earning capacity, which should be
compensated accordingly.
Labor RULING: YES. The power of the
Standard Court to review a CA Decision in
labor cases is limited. Specifically,
in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the Court
Kuya arjjay

has to resolve whether the CA

properly determined the presence
of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC in rendering its
Decision, and not whether the
NLRC Decision on the merits was
correct. However, while the strict
inquiry on the correctness of
evaluation of evidence is not
required in a certiorari proceeding, it
is still necessary to determine that
the conclusions of labor tribunals
were supported by substantial
evidence. This is because a
decision unsupported by substantial
evidence is a judgment rendered
with grave abuse of discretion.

In addition, as a rule, once the

employee has asserted with
particularity in his position paper
that his employer failed to pay his
benefits, it becomes incumbent
upon the employer to prove
payment of the employee's money
claims. In fine, the burden is on the
employer to prove payment, rather
than on the employee to establish
non-payment.

While a notarized document is

presumed to be regular such
presumption is not absolute and
may be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.
The fact that a document is
notarized is not a guarantee of the
validity of its contents. Petitioner is
an unlettered employee who may
not have understood the full import
of his statements in the affidavit.
Notably, petitioner, along with a co-
worker did not state the specific
amount of what they referred as
salary above the minimum required
by law.

As found by the LA, respondent did

not present substantial evidence
that it paid the required minimum
wage, 13th month pay and holiday
pay in favor of
petitioner. Respondent's mere
reliance on the foregoing affidavit is
misplaced because the requirement
of established jurisprudence is for
Kuya arjjay

the employer to prove payment, and

not merely deny the employee's
accusation of non-payment on the
basis of the latter's own declaration.
[ G.R. No. 185058, November 09, 2015 ] Labor
JOVITA S. MANALO, petitioner, vs. ATENEO DE NAGA Relations ISSUES:
UNIVERSITY, FR. JOEL TABORA AND MR. EDWIN
BERNAL, respondent. 1. Manalo raises the issue of
the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals to review the
decisions of the NLRC and
that the facts found by LA
and NLRC are binding upon
the CA.

2. Another issue raised was

the validity of the transfer,
WON it is a form of
Constructive Dismissal.

RULINGS:

1. Court of Appeals can review

the decisions of NLRC and the
facts found by LA and NLRC are
not binding upon it.

Supreme Court reiterated that as

clarified in the case of St. Martin
Funeral Homes v. NLRC, a judicial
review of decisions of NLRC is
permitted. However, the review is
through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, rather than an
appeal. This petition is filed before
the CA rather than directly to the
Supreme Court in view of the
principle of the hierarchy of courts.

Supreme Court also found error on

the petitioner's stance that CA was
bound by the facts found by LA and
NLRC, the fact that under rule Rule
65, determination of jurisdiction and
grave abuse of discretion, CA
should not be faulted for examining
the records of the case to have a
proper analysis whether LA or
NLRC properly performed their
duties and functions in disposing of
the case. Had it found no error, then
the CA could just dismiss the Rule
Kuya arjjay

65 petition.

2. There was no constructive

dismissal.

Constructive dismissal arises "when

continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely; when there is a demotion
in rank and/or diminution in pay; or
when a clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to
the employee. " It can happen in
any number of ways. At its core is
the gratuitous, unjustified, or
unwarranted nature of employer's
action.

However, not every inconvenience,

disruption, difficulty, or
disadvantage that an employee
must endure results in a finding of
constructive dismissal.
Jurisprudence has long recognized
that a transfer of employee done
fairly and in good faith is a valid
exercise of management
prerogative.

In this case, petitioner was

transferred by Fr. Taborda instead
of dismissing her for being found
guilty of the charges was a valid
exercise of management
prerogative. Petitioner should be
reminded that even if the charges
against her was outside of her
capacity as a faculty member of the
Accounting Department, the fact
that she violated the ethical
standards of her profession made
her unfit to teach Accounting.

ISSUES
[ G.R. No. 174115, November 09, 2015 ] Labor
PUNONGBAYAN AND ARAULLO, et al., petitioners, vs. Relations 1. Whether the factual findings of
ROBERTO PONCE LEPON, respondent. both the NLRC and the LA were
supported by substantial
evidence – YES
2. Whether respondent was validly
dismissed – YES
3. Whether respondent was
deprived of his right to due
Kuya arjjay

process – NO

RULING:

The factual findings of the

NLRC and the Labor Arbiter were
supported by substantial
evidence

 Affidavits may be sufficient to

establish substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence means
"that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion."
 In Capitol Medical Center, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the respondents
failed to adduce substantial
evidence that the said affiants
were coerced into executing the
said affidavits. The bare fact
that some portions of the said
affidavits are similarly worded
does not constitute substantial
evidence that the petitioner
forced, intimidated or coerced
the affiants to execute the
same.
 In INC Shipmanagement, Inc.,
et al. v. Moradas, the
corroborating affidavits and
statements of the vessel's
officers and crew members
must be taken as a whole and
cannot just be perfunctorily
dismissed as self-serving
absent any showing that they
were lying when they made the
statements therein.
 CAB: Respondent did not
adduce evidence to show that
the affiants, including Nanola,
Ganhinhin, Verdida, and Diano,
all of whom were employed by
P&A, were coerced to execute
an affidavit prejudicial to
respondent. Respondent never
questioned the evidentiary
value of the affidavits at any
stage of the proceedings. There
was no single evidence
submitted showing that
petitioners have exerted undue
pressure on the affiants.
Kuya arjjay

 The affidavits constitute

substantial evidence to prove
that respondent committed acts
breaching the trust and
confidence reposed on him by
P&A. The colleagues and
subordinates of respondent
executed the affidavits based
on their personal knowledge,
and without any proof of
coercion. Their statements, as
discussed below, corroborate
each other and leave no room
for doubt as to the acts
committed by respondent.

The affidavits of his co-

employees are sufficient basis
for P&A's loss of trust and
confidence.

 An employer may terminate an

employee for willful breach by
the employee of trust reposed
in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative [Art.
297(c), Labor Code]. While the
right of an employer to freely
select or discharge his
employees is subject to
regulation by the State in the
exercise of its paramount police
power, there is also an equally
established principle that an
employer cannot be
compelled to continue in
employment an employee
guilty of acts inimical to the
interest of the employer and
justifying loss of confidence
in him.
 The following requisites must
be satisfied to justify a valid
dismissal based on loss of trust
and confidence, to wit:
(1) The employee concerned
must be one holding a position
of trust and confidence; and (2)
There must be an act that
would justify the loss of trust
and confidence.
 The two requisites are present
in this case.
 Respondent was
a managerial employee. At
the time of his termination,
Kuya arjjay

he was the Manager-in-

Charge of the Cebu
operations and Director of
the Visayas-Mindanao
operations of P&A.
Respondent failed to
dispute that his position, as
the highest ranking officer
of P&A's Visayas-Mindanao
operations, demanded
utmost trust and
confidence.
 P&A's loss of trust and
confidence is based on a
willful breach of trust, and is
founded on clearly
established facts.
 Degree of Proof Required:
In Mendoza v. HMS Credit
Corporation, the Court
distinguished the degree of
proof required in proving
loss of trust and confidence
in a managerial employee
and a rank and file
employee – With respect to
RANK-AND-FILE
PERSONNEL, loss of trust
and confidence as ground
for valid dismissal requires
proof of involvement in the
alleged events in question,
and that mere
uncorroborated assertions
and accusations by the
employer will not be
sufficient. But as regards a
MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEE, the mere
existence of a basis for
believing that such
employee has breached
the trust of his employer
would suffice for his
dismissal. Hence, in the
case of managerial
employees, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not
required, it being
sufficient that there is
some basis for such loss
of confidence, such as
when the employer has
reasonable ground to
believe that the employee
concerned is responsible
Kuya arjjay

for the purported

misconduct, and the nature
of his participation therein
renders him unworthy of the
trust and confidence
demanded by his position.
 CAB: Respondent breached
the trust reposed in him by
committing the following acts:
(1) negotiating to transfer to a
competing firm while still
employed with P&A; (2)
enjoining a number of P&A's
clients to transfer their audit
business to a competing firm;
(3) inviting P&A's staff to join
him in his transfer to a
competing firm; and (4)
enjoining P&A's staff to engage
in a sympathy strike during his
preventive suspension.
 The affidavits of Nanola,
Ganhinhin, Verdida, and
Diane show respondent's
commission of these acts
which are all in breach of
the trust and confidence
reposed in him by P&A.

Respondent was validly

dismissed on the ground of loss
of trust and confidence

 In Elizalde International
(Philippines) Inc. v. CA: One
who asserts an interest, or
performs acts adverse or
disloyal lo one's employer
commits a breach of an
implied condition of the
contract of employment which
may warrant discharge,
e.g., where one secretly
engages in a business which
renders him a competitor and
rival of his employer. An
employer has the right to
expect loyalty from his
employees as long as the
employment relationship
continues. When an employee
deliberately acquires an interest
adverse to his employer, he is
disloyal, and his discharge is
justified.
 In Molina v. Pacific Plans, Inc.:
Kuya arjjay

An employer has a protectable

interest in the customer
relationships of its former
employee established and/or
nurtured while employed by the
employer, and is entitled to
protect itself from the risk that a
former employee might
appropriate customers by
taking unfair advantage of the
contract developed while
working for the employer. While
acting as an agent of his
employer, an employee owes
the duty of fidelity and
loyalty. Being a fiduciary, he
cannot act inconsistently
with his agency or trust. He
cannot solicit his employer's
customers or co-employees
for himself or for a business
competitor of his employer.
 CAB: While respondent may
have the liberty to express his
views of the proposed merger,
he was not justified when he
told clients of P&A that the
latter's reputation as provider of
quality service is expected to
deteriorate due to the merger
and further induced them to
patronize the rival firm he
intended to join. As the
Director of P&A's Visayas-
Mindanao operations, owed
duties of loyalty to P&A, his
employer, to inform its clients
about P&A's business decision
to merge, for as long as he was
still employed by P&A.
 Respondent's act of inviting
P&A's staff to conduct a
sympathy strike is
inconsistent with
respondent's duty of fidelity
and loyalty to P&A. In doing
so, respondent urged his
colleagues and
subordinates to disregard
their responsibilities as
employees of P&A and
sought to disrupt the latter's
operations. Thus, P&A
merely acted within its right
as employer when it
dismissed respondent. The
Kuya arjjay

acts he committed are

sufficient basis for the loss
of trust and confidence of
P&A.

Respondent was not deprived of

due process; “Ample
Opportunity to be Heard”

 Article 292(b) of the Labor

Code, in relation to the then
applicable Section 2(d), Rule I
of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI, as amended by DO
No. 10, s. of 1997, requires the
employer to give the employee
two written notices prior to his
termination for just cause.
 First notice must contain a
statement of the causes for
termination and shall afford
the employee ample
opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the
assistance of a
representative if he so
desires.
 Second notice (notice of
termination) must indicate
that upon due consideration
of all the circumstances,
grounds have been
established to justify the
employee's termination.
 P&A complied with the two-
notice rule.
 In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Company, the
Court explained the meaning of
"ample opportunity to be heard"
under Article 292: To be heard
"does not mean verbal
argumentation alone inasmuch
as one may be heard just as
effectively through written
explanations, submissions or
pleadings. While the phrase
"ample opportunity to be heard"
may in fact include an actual
hearing, it is not limited to a
formal hearing only. The
existence of an actual, formal
"trial-type" hearing is not
absolutely necessary to
satisfy the employee's right
to be heard.
Kuya arjjay

(a) "ample opportunity to be

heard" means any
meaningful opportunity
(verbal or written) given to
the employee to answer the
charges against him and
submit evidence in support
of his defense, whether in a
hearing, conference or some
other fair, just and
reasonable way.
(b) A formal hearing or
conference becomes
mandatory only when
requested by the employee in
writing or substantial
evidentiary disputes exist or a
company rule or practice
requires it, or when similar
circumstances justify it.
(c) The "ample opportunity to
be heard" standard in the Labor
Code prevails over the "hearing
or conference" requirement in
the implementing rules and
regulations.
 Despite the lack of formal
hearing or investigation,
respondent was given ample
opportunity to be heard. He was
given the opportunity to refute
the charges against him. In fact,
his reply thoroughly discussed
his justifications and defenses
to the accusations imputed on
him.

In view of the foregoing,

respondent's dismissal from
employment is valid. Thus,
respondent's monetary claims
against P&A and petitioners
have no legal and factual basis.

(Hence premises considered,

the petition is
hereby GRANTED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 15, 2006 is
hereby REVERSED).
[ G.R. No. 195654,
November 25, 2015 ]
REYNALDO INUTAN, et al., petitioners, vs. NAPAR Labor ISSUE: whether they are entitled to
CONTRACTING & ALLIED SERVICES, et al., Relations backwages due to the illegal
respondents.
constructive dismissal
Kuya arjjay

RULING:
YES, Petitioners, as being regular
employees, are deemed to have
been constructively and illegally
dismissed by respondents. Being
on floating status and off-detailed
for more than six months, not
having been reinstated and
reassigned by respondents,
petitioners are considered to have
been constructively dismissed.
Settled is the rule that an employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement, or
separation pay if reinstatement is
no longer viable, and to his full
backwages.

[ G.R. No. 203115, December 07, 2015 ]

ISLAND OVERSEAS TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ISSUE:
petitioner vs. ARMANDO M. BEJA, respondent. 1.Whether or not the cba is can be
applied in this case

2.Whether Beja is entitled to

compensation?

RULING: Petition is partly

meritorious.

The CBA is inapplicable.

Beja has not presented any proof of
his allegation that he met an
accident on board the vessel. No
accident report existed nor any
medical report issued indicating he
met an accident while on board. It
was all based on pure allegation.
Evidence submitted by petitioners
disputed Beja’s allegations.
Certifications by the Master of the
vessel and Chief Engineer affirmed
that Beja never met an accident on
board nor was he injured while in
the performance of his duties under
their command.

YES, Beha is entitled to a total

and permanent disability
compensation of US$60,000.00
Kuya arjjay

under the POEA-SEC

Provision should be read in
harmony with each other, thus: (a)
the 120 days provided under
Section 20 B(3) of the POEA-SEC
is the period given to the employer
to determine fitness to work and
when the seafarer is deemed to be
in a state of total and temporary
disability; (b) the 120 days of total
and temporary disability may be
extended up to a maximum of 240
days should the seafarer require
further medical treatment; and (c) a
total and temporary disability
becomes permanent when so
declared by the company-
designated physician within 120 or
250 days, as the case may be, or
upon the expiration of the said
periods without a declaration of
either fitness to work or disability
assessment and the seafarer is still
unable to resume his regular
seafaring duties.

Beja was repatriated on November

21, 2007. Roughly a month after his
right knee operation, Dr. Cruz
rendered a Grade 10 and 13 partial
disability grading of his medical
condition. Although he was given
grades 10 and 13 combined
disability rating by Dr. Cruz, this
assessment may only be
considered as tentative because he
still continued his physical therapy
session, which went beyond 240
days.

There was no assessment that Beja

was found fit to resume sea duties
before the end of the 240 day
period. Beja’s allegation that he has
not been able to perform his usual
activities has not been contradicted
by petitioner or by contrary
documentary evidence. In fact, in
his medical report, Dr. Matias
opined that there was still difficulty
in Beja’s knee movements. Beja
should be deemed to be suffering
permanent total disability.

In the case at bar, Beja filed the

complaint on May 15, 2008. Dr.
Kuya arjjay
[ G.R. No. 199314 [Formerly UDK No. 14553], December
07, 2015 ]
TAMBLOT SECURITY & GENERAL SERVICES, INC.,
petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO ITEM, LEONARDO PALM A,
et al., respondents.
[ G.R. No. 209559, December 09, 2015 ]
ENCHANTED KINGDOM, INC., petitioner, vs. MIGUEL J.
VERZO, respondent.
Cruz issued his assessment only on
May 26, 2008 or 187 days from
Beja’s repatriation. Due to Dr.
Cruz’s failure to issue a disability
rating within 120-days period, a
conclusive presumption that Beja is
totally and permanently disabled
arose. There was no need for Beja
to secure an opinion from his own
doctor or resort to a third doctor as
prescribed under Section 20 B (3)
of the POEA-SEC.
The CA is correct in affirming the
NLRC’s award of permanent total
disability benefit to Beha. It erred in
pertaining to the CBA in granting
the award relative to the amount
due.
Labor ISSUE: Whether or not the
Relations employees were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
YES. The respondents were
illegally dismissed. Petitioner utterly
failed to establish the requisite for
abandonment of work 1) that the
employees has failed to report for
work or must be absent without
valid or justifiable reasons 2) that
there must have been a clear
intention to severe th employee-
employer relationship by some
overt acts
In this case there were no showing
of any overt act of the respondents
that would point of an intention to
abandon their work.
Labor
Relations
ISSUES
1. Whether the dismissal was
Kuya arjjay

legal?

2. Whether Verzo was

properly apprised of the
standards for his
regularization?

RULING:
The Court finds that Enchanted had
basis when it decided not to
continue with the services of Verzo
as SH-MIM.

First, while the CA leaned heavily

on the fact that the performance
evaluation given by Enchanted did
not specify the instances of Verzo’s
unfitness, it should be pointed out
that Verzo himself admitted that the
performance evaluation he received
on February 3, 2010 was
accompanied by the respective
reports of Schoefield, Montemayor
and Velesrubio. As earlier stated,
these reports detailed the reasons
why Verzo failed to meet the
standards set by Enchanted and
compromised the safety of its
patrons.

Second, granting that Verzo was

not informed of his specific duties
and responsibilities, nonetheless,
his dismissal was valid because he
failed to adhere to the dictates of
common sense which required that
he act in accordance with the
necessary work ethics and basic
skills required by his position as
SH-MIM and by his profession as
licensed engineer.

Third, while the CA considered the

fact that Velesrubio advised Verzo
to resign because he was not going
to be regularized even before his
performance appraisal, the Court
finds that such should not be taken
as an indication of bad faith on the
part of Enchanted. For this Court,
the same could only be Velesrubio’s
own opinion of Verzo, because he
was the one supervising his
performance. Whether Enchanted
had decided to discontinue Verzo’s
employment cannot, at that point,
Kuya arjjay
[ G.R. No. 204275, December 09, 2015 ]
LILIOSA C. LISONDRA, petitioner, vs. MEGACRAFT
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND SPOUSES
MELECIO AND ROSEMARIE OAMIL, respondents.
be said to have been a foregone
conclusion.
Suffice it to state that Enchanted
was able to substantially comply
with the requirement of the law in
apprising him of the standards for
his regularization. Verily, the
purpose of the law in requiring that
an employee be notified of the
standards for his regularization
during his probationary employment
is to simply afford him due process,
so that the employee will be aware
that he will be under close
observation and his performance of
his assigned duties and functions
would be under continuous scrutiny
by his superiors.
Moreover, while it may be argued
that ideally employers should
immediately inform a probationary
employee of the standards for his
regularization from day one, strict
compliance thereof is not required.
The true test of compliance with the
requirements of the law is, of
course, one of reasonableness. As
long as the probationary employee
is given a reasonable time and
opportunity to be made fully aware
of what is expected of him during
the early phases of the probationary
period, the requirement of the law
has been satisfied.
Labor : Whether or not he CA erred in
Relations dismissing the petitioner
RULING: YES. Before going to the
issues of the case, the court noted
that the petitioner failed to attach
copies of the decision of the LA and
the NLRC in this petition. That
alone would have been a ground to
dismiss the case outright. However
since what is at stake is petitioners
livelihood itself, leniency should be
applied in order to serve the ends of
justice
Proof of Service;
Essentially, the purpose of this
Kuya arjjay

service is to apprise such party of

the pendency of an action in the
CA. Thus, if such party had already
been notified of the same and had
even participated in the
proceedings, such purpose would
have already been served.

 In this case, respondents

were informed and even
filed their Comment to the
petition. Thus, the purpose
of the rule had been
achieved. It would have
been "more prudent for the
Court [of Appeals] to
excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a
substantive review of the
case in order to attain the
ends of justice than to
dismiss the same on mere
technicalities."

Written Explanation

The Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition on account of petitioner's
failure to incorporate a written
explanation on why the NLRC's
copy was not personally served to
the agency.

 Petitioner explained in her

Motion for Reconsideration
that her former counsel had
died, which gave her little
time to find and engage the
services of her present
counsel before the lapse of
the period for filing the
petition. That day that the
pleadings were sent via
registered mail was already
the last day of filing, and
with heavy rains at that
time, her counsel had
anticipated that they would
not be able to beat the
deadline in filing the petition
before the Court of
Appeals, prompting her
counsel to resort to
registered mail.

Other grounds for dismissal

Kuya arjjay

 As to the supposed failure

to implead the NLRC, the
Court finds that the NLRC
was, in fact, impleaded in
the case, based on the
body of the petition. Under
the section on Parties, the
NLRC was named as one
of the parties to the
case.Clearly, the failure to
include public respondent's
name in the title was mere
inadvertence.

 The other ground cited by

the Court of Appeals, i.e.,
counsel's failure to indicate
his roll number and the
place of the notary public's
commission, does not affect
the merits of the petition.
The appellate court could
have simply asked
petitioner's counsel to
submit the information
instead of dismissing the
case outright. Likewise, we
deem that petitioner should
not be penalized for the
omissions of her counsel
and deserves to have her
case properly ventilated at
the appellate court.

A last word:

Counsel's actions are binding on his

client. Petitioner in this case would
have had her entire case thrown
out, with all hope for proper review
and determination lost, through no
fault of her own but merely because
of her counsel's carelessness in
preparing and filing the pleadings. It
is only the Court's discretion that
petitioner's cause needs a chance
to be properly reviewed and
reevaluated that has kept this case
alive. Counsel is therefore reminded
of his duty to "serve his client with
competence and diligence" and
ensure that the pleadings he files
comply with all the requirements
under the pertinent rules.
Kuya arjjay

[ G.R. No. 213696, December 09, 2015 ]
QUANTUM FOODS, INC., petitioner, vs. MARCELINO
ESLOYO AND GLEN MAGSILA, respondents
Labor ISSUE: Whether the appeal bond
Relations posted accompanied by a motion to
reduce bond is reasonable in order
to suspend the period to perfect an
appeal.

RULING: YES.

While it has been settled that the

posting of a cash or surety bond is
indispensable to the perfection of
an appeal in cases involving
monetary awards from the decision
of the LA, in several cases, the
Court has relaxed this stringent
requirement whenever justified.
Thus, the Rules – specifically
Section 6, Rule VI – thereof, allow
the reduction of the appeal bond
upon a showing of: (a) the
existence of a meritorious ground
for reduction, and (b) the posting of
a bond in a reasonable amount in
relation to the monetary award.

In Nicol vs. Footjoy Industrial Corp.,

the Court summarized the
guidelines under which the NLRC
must exercise its discretion in
considering an appellant’s motion
for reduction of bond in this wise:

“The bond
requirement on appeals
involving monetary awards
has been and may be
relaxed in meritorious
cases. These cases include
instances in which (1) there
was substantial compliance
with the Rules, (2)
surrounding facts and
circumstances constitute
meritorious grounds to
reduce the bond, (3) a
liberal interpretation of the
requirement of an appeal
bond would serve the
desired objective of
resolving controversies on
the merits, or (4) the
appellants, at the very
least, exhibited their
willingness and/or good
Kuya arjjay

faith by posting a partial

bond during the
reglementary period.

Here, Quantum posted a partial

bond in the amount of P400,000, or
more than twenty percent (20%) of
the monetary judgment, within the
reglementary period to appeal,
together with the Motion to Reduce
Bond anchored on its averred
difficulty in raising the amount of the
bond and searching for an
insurance company that can cover
said amount within the short period
of time to perfect its appeal. Before
the NLRC could even act on the
Motion to Reduce Bond, Quantum
posted a surety bond from an
accredited insurance company
covering fully the judgment award.

As to what constitutes “a
reasonable amount of bond” that
must accompany the motion to
reduce bond in order to suspend
the period to perfect an appeal, the
Court, in McBurnei vs. Ganzon,
pronounce:

To reduce that the

provisions of Section 6,
Rule VI of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure that give
parties the chance to seek
a reduction of the appeal
bond are effectively carried
out, without however
defeating the benefits of the
bond requirement in favor
of a winning litigant, all
motions to reduce bond that
are to be filed with the
NLRC shall be
accompanied by the
posting of a cash or surety
bond equivalent to 10% of
the monetary award that is
subject of the appeal, which
shall provisionally be
deemed the reasonable
amount of the bond in the
meantime that an
appellant’s motion is
pending resolution by the
Commission. ..
Kuya arjjay

Hence, the posting of a

P400,000 cash bond equivalent to
more than 20% of the monetary
judgment, together with Motion to
Reduce Bond within the
reglementary period was sufficient
to suspend the period to perfect the
appeal. The posting of the said
partial bond coupled with the
subsequent posting of a surety
bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary judgment also signified
Quantum’s good faith and
willingness to recognize the final
outcome of its appeal.

It should be emphasized that the

NLRC has full discretion to grant or
deny the motion to reduce bond,
and its ruling will not be disturbed
unless tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Verily, an act of a court
of tribunal can only be considered
to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in
a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, which clearly is not
extant with respect to the NLRC’s
cognizance of Quantum’s appeal.
Far from having gravely abused its
discretion, the NLRC correctly
preferred substantial justice over
the rigid and stringent application of
procedural rules.

.[ G.R. No. 202215, December 09, 2015 ] Both issues ISSUES:

VICMAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al., involves 1. Whether or not the
petitioners, vs. CAMILO ELARCOSA, MARLON BANDA, falls under respondents were
DANTE L. BALAMAD, et al., respondents. considered as regular
the ambit of
employees,
Labor 2. Whether or not there was a
Relations. valid independent
contracting.

RULING:

The SC affirmed the decision of the

CA and ruled that the Respondents
were regular employees. Section
280 of the Labor Code defines a
regular employee as one who is 1)
engaged to perform tasks usually
Kuya arjjay

necessary or desirable in the usual

business or trade of the employer,
unless the employment is one for a
specific project or undertaking or
where the work is seasonal and for
the duration of a season; or 2) has
rendered at least 1 year of service,
whether such service is continuous
or broken, with respect to the
activity for which he is employed
and his employment continues as
long as such activity exists.66

The test to determine whether an

employee is regular is the
reasonable connection between the
activity he performs and its relation
to the employer's business or trade,
as in the case of respondents
assigned to the boiler section.
Nonetheless, the continuous re-
engagement of all respondents to
perform the same kind of tasks
proved the necessity and
desirability of their services in the
business of Vicmar.72 Likewise,
considering that respondents
appeared to have been performing
their duties for at least one year is
sufficient proof of the necessity, if
not the indispensability of their
activities in Vicmar's business.73

On the second issue, to determine

the existence of independent
contractorship, it is necessary to
establish that the contractor carries
a distinct and independent
business, and undertakes to
perform work on its own account
and under its responsibility and
pursuant to its own manner and
method, without the control of the
principal, except as to the result;
that the contractor has substantial
capital or investment; and, that the
agreement between the principal
and the contractor assures the
contractual employees to all labor
and occupational safety and health
standards, to right to self-
organization, security of tenure and
other benefits.

Other than their respective

Certificates there was no showing
Kuya arjjay

that the contractors have

substantial capital or investment,
tools and the like. Neither was it
established that they owned
equipment and machineries for the
purported contracted job. Also, the
allegation that they had clients other
than Vicmar remained to be bare
assertion without corresponding
proof. More importantly, there was
no evidence presented that these
contractors undertook the
performance of their service
contracts with Vicmar pursuant to
their own manner and method,
without the control and supervision
of Vicmar.
[ G.R. No. 209418, December 07, 2015 ] Both issues ISSUES:
W.M. MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner, vs. RICHARD involves
R. DALAG AND GOLDEN ROCK MANPOWER Labor (1) Whether or not W.M.
SERVICES, respondents. Manufacturing, Inc. (WMMI)
Realtions.
and Golden Rock manpower
Services (GRMS) engaged in
labor-only contracting

(2) Whether or not Dalag was

illegally dismiised

RULING:
(1) Yes. WMMI and GRMS
engaged in labor-only
contracting. First, GRMS lacked
the substantial capital.

It may be that the DOLE Regional

Director for the National Capital
Region was satisfied by GRMS'
capitalization as reflected on its
financial documents, but the basis
for determining the substantiality of
a company's "capital" rests not· only
thereon but also on the tools and
equipment it owns in relation to the
job, work, or service it provides. DO
18- 02 defines "substantial capital
or investment" in the context of
labor-only contracting as referring
not only to a contractor's financial
capability, but also encompasses
the tools, equipment, implements,
machineries and work premises,
actually and directly used by the
contractor or subcontractor in the
performance or completion of the
job, work or service contracted out.
Here, the Certificate of Registration
Kuya arjjay

may have prevented the

presumption of labor-only
contracting from arising, but the
evidence Dalag adduced was
sufficient to overcome the
disputable presumption that GRMS
is an independent contractor. To be
sure, in performing his tasks, Dalag
made use of the raw materials and
equipment that WMMI supplied. He
also operated the side-seal
machine in the workplace of WMMI,
not of GRMS. With these attendant
circumstances, the Court rules that
the first confirmatory element
indubitably exists. Second, WMMI
exercised control over the
employees supplied by GRMS. The
second confirmatory element under
DO 18-02 does not require the
application of the economic test
and, even more so, the four-fold
test to determine whether or not the
relation between the parties is one
of labor only contracting. All it
requires is that the contractor does
not exercise control over the
employees it supplies, making the
control test of paramount
consideration. The fact that Golden
Rock pays for Dalag's wages and
salaries then has no bearing in
resolving the issue. Here,
notwithstanding the contract
stipulation leaving Golden Rock the
exclusive right to conirol the
working warm bodies it provides
WM MFG, evidence irresistibly
suggests that it was WM MFG who
actually exercised supervision over
Dalag's work performance. As
culled from the records, Dalag was
supervised by WM MFG's
employees. Having ascertained that
the essential element and at least
one confirmatory element obtain in
the extant case, there is then no
other result than for the Court to
rule that WM MFG and Golden
Rock engaged in laboronly
contracting. As such, they are, by
legal fiction, considered principal
and agent, respectively, jointly and
severally liable to their illegally
dismissed employees, in
accordance with Art. 109 of the
Kuya arjjay

Labor Code 66 and Sec. 19 of DO

18-02.

(2) No. WMMI dismissed Dalag

for just cause, but did not comply
with the procedural requirements.
To constitute just cause for an·
employee's dismissal, the neglect of
duties must not only be gross but
also habitual. Gross neglect means
an absence of that diligence that an
ordinarily prudent man would use in
his own affairs. Meanwhile, to be
considered habitual, the negligence
must not be a single or isolated act.
Here, WM MFG duly established
that Dalag was terminated for just
cause on the second ground. The
litany of Dalag's infractions, as
detailed in memos 20 l 0-13 up to
2010-18 demonstrated how Dalag
repeatedly failed to report to his
supervisor the problems he
encountered with the side-seal
machine assigned to him for
operation. This failure resulted in
repeated machine breakdowns that
caused production and delivery
delays, and lost business
opportunities for the company.

Petition granted.

With regard ISSUE:

[ G.R. No. 203882, January 11, 2016 ] to the first
LORELEI O. ILADAN, petitioner, vs. issue what 1st; Wether or not Iladan’s
LA SUERTE INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, I resignation was voluntary
is involved
NC., and DEBBIE LAO, Respondents.
is Labor 2nd; Whether or not placement fee
Relations. was paid.

Whereas in RULING:
the 2nd
Issue, with YES. Iladan's resignation was
respect to voluntary; Hence, there was no
the matters illegal dismissal
involving
When it comes to illegal dismissal
placement cases, the employer has the burden
fee, it falls of proving that the employee's
under the dismissal was legal. However, to
ambit of discharge this burden, the
Labor employee must first prove, by
substantial evidence, that he had
been dismissed from employment.
Kuya arjjay

Standards. Iladan did not adduce any

competent evidence to prove that
respondents used force and threat.

 In the instant case, Iladan

executed a resignation letter in
her own handwriting.

 She also accepted the amount

of P35,000.00 as financial
assistance and executed an
Affidavit of Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim and an
Agreement, as settlement and
waiver of any cause of action
against respondents.

o The affidavit of waiver

and the settlement
were
acknowledged/subscrib
ed before Labor
Attache Romulo on
August 6, 2009, and
duly authenticated by
the Philippine
Consulate. An affidavit
of waiver duly
acknowledged before a
notary public is a public
document which cannot
be impugned by mere
self-serving allegations.
Proof of an irregularity
in its execution is
absolutely essential.
The Agreement
likewise bears the
signature of Conciliator-
Mediator Diaz. Thus,
the signatures of these
officials sufficiently
prove that Iladan was
duly assisted when she
signed the waiver and
settlement.

None. There was no placement

fee was paid.

The court finds no sufficient

evidence that payment had been
made.

Iladan and her mother's affidavit

attesting to its payment are self-
Kuya arjjay

serving evidence and deserve no

weight at all. Neither did the
mortgage loan and deed of transfer
executed in favor of third persons
as well as the letter from Nippon
prove that placement fee was paid
to respondents. These documents
merely show that Iladan is indebted
to certain persons and to Nippon;
however, they do not prove that
these indebtedness were incurred
in connection with the placement
fee she purportedly paid to
respondents. As aptly ruled by the
CA, Iladan has the burden of
proving, with clear and convincing
evidence, the fact of payment.

[ G.R. No. 187691, January 13, 2016] Labor ISSUE: Whether or not there is an
OLYMPIA HOUSING, INC. vs. ALLAN LAPASTORA AND Relations employer – employee relationship
IRENE UBALUBAO between Petitioner and
Respondents

RULING:

Lapastora was a regular

employee of OHI. His uninterrupted
employment from March 3, 1995
until he was placed on floating
status on February 2000 manifests
the continuing need and desirability
of his services, which characterize
regular employment

By the nature of its

business of managing condominium
units, it is imperative that OHI
maintains a pool of housekeeping
staff. It is no wonder why Lapastora,
among several others, was
continuously employed by OHI
precisely because of the
indispensability of their services to
its business. The fact alone that
Lapastora was allowed to work for
an unbroken period of almost five
years is all the same a reason to
consider him a regular employee.

The attainment of a regular status

of employment guarantees the
employee's security of tenure that
Kuya arjjay

he cannot be unceremoniously
terminated from employment. "To
justify fully the dismissal of an
employee, the employer must, as a
rule, prove that the dismissal was
for a just cause and that the
employee was afforded due
process prior to dismissal. As a
complementary principle, the
employer has the onus of proving
with clear, accurate, consistent, and
convincing evidence the validity of
the dismissal.

[ G.R. No. 209921 January 13, 2016 ] Labor ISSUE: Whether or not Quiro-
QUIRO-QUIRO vs. BALAGTAS CREDIT COOPERATIVE Relations in quiro’s dismissal was valid and
& COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, INC. realtion to complied with due process
requirements.
illegal
dismissal. RULING:

Yes. Quiro-quiro was validly

dismissed. BCCCDI was able to
prove by substantial evidence that
Quiro-quiro’s dismissal is lawful.
BCCCI presented documents and
affidavits establishing Quiro-quiro’s
gross negligence and her breach of
respondent’s trust and confidence
in her. We agree with the finding of
the CA that Quiro-quiro’s “inability
to stop during her watch an over
withdrawal by one member,
amounting to P250,000.00,” and
followed by a series of monthly
withdrawals, “constitutes gross and
habitual neglect of duty that is a just
cause for her dismissal.” Clearly,
Quiro-quiro’s act of allowing the
over withdrawal of P250,000 on the
time deposit placement of a
member and her subsequent
inaction and non-rectification of
such misconduct breached
respondent’s trust and confidence
in her, warranting the penalty of
dismissal. While Quiro-quiro's
dismissal is lawful, we sustain the
award of P30,000 nominal damages
in favor of Quiro-quiro for BCCCDI's
nonobservance of the due process
requirements in dismissing her.
Furthermore, the 48 hours given to
Quiro-quiro to explain her side was
insufficient time to consult the union
Kuya arjjay
[ G.R. No. 199683, February 10, 2016 ]
ARLENE T. SAMONTE, et al., petitioners, vs.
LSGH, BRO. BERNARD S. OCA, respondents.[
official or lawyer, gather data and
evidence and decide on her
defenses. Quiro-quiro should have
been given at least five calendar
days from receipt of the notice to
prepare for her defense.
Notwithstanding, the lack of
statutory due process does not
nullify the dismissal or render it
illegal or ineffectual when the
dismissal was for just cause, but it
will merit the grant of nominal
damages as indemnification.
Petition denied.
Labor ISSUE:
Relations
Whether or not the CA correctly
ruled that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that petitioners were not regular
employees who may only be
dismissed for just and authorized
causes.
RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, the CA
disregarded the repeated renewals
of the Contracts of Retainer of
petitioners spanning a decade and
a half. While vague in its
sparseness, the Contract of
Retainer very clearly spelled out
that LSGI had the power of control
over petitioners. It is enough that
the employer has the right to wield
that power. In all, given the
following: ( 1) repeated renewal of
petitioners' contract for fifteen
years, interrupted only by the close
of the school year; (2) the necessity
of the work performed by petitioners
as school physicians ~and dentists;
and (3) the existence of LSGI's
power of control over the means
and method pursued by petitioners
in the performance of their job, we
rule that petitioners attained regular
employment, entitled to security of
tenure who could only be dismissed
for just and authorized causes.
Consequently, petitioners were
illegally dismissed and are entitled
Kuya arjjay
G.R. No. 208986 January 13, 2016 ]
HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, et al., respondents.
[ G.R. No. 212878, February 01, 2016 ]
MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC. et al., petitioners,
vs. WILFREDO L. CABATAY, respondent.
to the twin remedies of payment of
separation pay and full back wages.
We order separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement given the time that
has lapsed, twelve years, in the
litigation of this case.
Hence, petition was granted.
Labor ISSUE: Whether a decision in a
Relations certification election does foreclose
further dispute as to the existence
or non-existence of an employer-
employee relationship.
RULING: NO. The Med-Arbiter's
order in this case dismissing the
petition for certification election on
the basis of non-existence of
employer-employee relationship
was issued after the members of
the respondent union were
dismissed from their employment.
The purpose of a petition for
certification election is to determine
which organization will represent
the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer.The
respondent union, without its
member-employees, was thus
stripped of its personality to
challenge the Med-Arbiter's
decision in the certification election
case. Thus, the members of the
respondent union were left with no
option but to pursue their illegal
dismissal case filed before the
Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal
dismissal case filed before the
Labor Arbiter on the basis of the
pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter
in the certification election case that
there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties,
which the respondent union could
not even appeal to the DOLE
Secretary because of the dismissal
of its members, would be
tantamount to denying due process
to the complainants in the illegal
dismissal case. This, Supreme
Court cannot allow.
Labor ISSUE: Whether or not Cabatay is
entitled to permanent total disability
Kuya arjjay

Relations compensation

RULING:

For the duration of the treatment but

in no case to exceed 120 days, the
seaman is on temporary total
disability as he is totally unable to
work. If the 120 days initial period is
exceeded and no such declaration
is made because the seafarer
requires further medical attention,
then the temporary total disability
period may be extended up to a
maximum of 240 days, subject to
the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a
permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The
seaman may of course also be
declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by medical
condition.

It is established that Cabatay went

through an intensive treatment,
including special medical
procedures and therapy sessions,
under the care and management of
Dr. Tay for six months or for 180
days within the 240-day extended
period allowed under the rules
implementing the employees
compensation law.

Since Dr. Tay had timely and duly

made a disability assessment for
Cabatay, the CA erred in ruling that
he is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits because he had
lost his employment/profession.
Neither can Cabatay's submission
that he had lost his profession in
contemplation of the TCC-FA
prevail over Dr. Tay's assessment,
not only because he did not dispute
the assessment, but also because
he did not go through the procedure
under the agreement on how a
disability is determined, permanent
total or otherwise.

Moreover, a seafarer cannot claim

full disability benefits on his mere
say-so in complete disregard of the
Kuya arjjay
[ G.R. No. 201073, February 10, 2016 ]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. PAL EMPLOYEES
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.
POEA-SEC and the CBA, which
are, to reiterate, the law between
the parties and which they are duty
bound to observe. And so it must be
in Cabatay's case, especially when
he refused the petitioners' offer that
his medical condition be referred to
a mutually appointed doctor under
the TCC-FA, to determine whether,
despite Dr. Tay's combined 36%
disability assessment under the
agreement, he is permanently unfit
for further sea service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision
was contrary to Article 2055 of the
Civil Code when it effectively
declared a contract of guaranty
between PAL and the members-
debtors of PESALA.
RULING: Contrary to PAL's
erroneous argument, however, it is
liable, not because it is being made
a guarantor of the debts of
PESALA's members, but because
of its failure to comply with the
RTC's directives. Indeed the
amount of P44,488,716.41 has not
yet been deducted from the salaries
of the PESALA members and,
precisely, the reason why such
amount has not been deducted is
because PAL contravened the
RTC's TRO and WPI. PAL is
therefore liable, not because it is
being made a guarantor of the
debts of PESALA's members, but
because its own actions brought
forth the loss in the case at bar.